Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners, vs.HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has.

Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines,  3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision." 7

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear."

On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau.

On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.

The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.

After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977.

This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the courta quo.

In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience.

Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other cases 13 the Court found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more

information regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."

As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.

There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. 15

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.  16 In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; 18or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22

This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.

The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of

appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well settled . 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have overstated their case.

A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.

The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they were arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became independent in 1946.

We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.

The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Sanders v. Veridiano (Case Digest)

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Doctrine of State Immunity.

Sanders v. VeridanoGR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988

FACTS:Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.

ISSUE:1)    Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents sued them for damages?2)    Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters, the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case. 

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT. NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT) NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners, vs.HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORIANO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents.

G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993

ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA,

ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE, petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents.

The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines.

Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners in 84645 & private respondents in 84607.

 CAMPOS, JR., J.:

People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For those however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just that. They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back to life again.

Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent Judge Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351.

Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."

The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows:

With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers, since they are being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently and correspondingly be applied to them.

WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is hereby dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order within which to file their respective pleadings.

On the other hand, the Order 3, dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both parties, for a reconsideration of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to disturb the said order.

The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.

The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments.

The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following day. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.

Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag.

At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day.

On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacañang to air their demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery words, the most telling of which were:". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . . ." 4

The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacañang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).

At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they joined the march to Malacañang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue.

In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break through the police lines and rush towards Malacañang, CAPCOM Commander General Ramon E. Montaño inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending attacks.

OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacañang. The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated.

Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly occupied.

In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate the facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short) stated that the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges, in the following manner:

(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, was designated as ground commander of the CDC

first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were ordered to move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment — aluminum shields, truncheons and gas masks.

(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD policemen were the elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force, who carried also the standard CDC equipment — truncheons, shields and gas masks. The INP Field Force was under the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz.

(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the first and second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under the command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field Force.

At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the entire width of Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one on each side of the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water cannons.

Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and the team leader.

In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacañang stood the VOLVO Mobile Communications Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montaño. At this command post, after General Montaño had conferred with TF Nazareno Commander, Colonel Cezar Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed that Police General Alfredo S. Lim would designate Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torresand Police Major Conrado Francisco as negotiators with the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the latter would negotiate with the marchers. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its findings, to wit:

. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police fought back with their shields and truncheons. The police line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators disengaged from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic firing continued from the government forces.

After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paquinto and Lt. Laonglaan Gocesped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of General Montaño to disperse the rallyists assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands, who were armed with long firearms. 6(Emphasis ours)

After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.

Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the like.

In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987.

In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:

(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.

(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.

(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the police and military commanders were in civilian attire in violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.

(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal control units in dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.

(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.

(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were determined to march to Malacañang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo — "bubutasin namin ang barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas. . .

(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line of the CDC contingent.

(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started the firing.

(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.

(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a) there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of the marchers.

(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the marchers.

(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was given for its absence. 8

From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montaño; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed.

The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government.

Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended the expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11

After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.

On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.

Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the instant petition.

On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari.

Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues, the two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.

The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit.

Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued.

Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. 13

This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads:

1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court. 15

In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.

Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.

Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 16

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 19

As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 (Case Digest)Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine

land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which

resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result,

then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola

Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most

significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the

deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government.

Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed

an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers

involved in the incident. 

Issues: (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity

(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as

claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the

Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does

not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely

states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore,

whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a

cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus,

the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the

State. 

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who

allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the

marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule

that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police

officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally

liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts

cannot be considered official.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5156             March 11, 1954

CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante-apelante, vs.ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de Obras Publicas, demandado-apelado.

D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Diaz y el Procurador Sr. Antonio A. Torres en representacion del apelado.

DIOKNO, J.:

Carmen Festejo, dueña de unos terrenos azucareros, de un total de unas 9 hectareas y media de superfice, demando a "Isaias Fernando Director, Bureau of public Works, que como tal Director de Obras Publicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas y proyectos de irrigacion y es el funcionario responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en el pais," alegando que —

The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ----- R. on A., p. 3.

causando a ella variados daños y perjuicios. Pidio, en su consecuencia, sentencia condenando el demandado:

. . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square meters and to return the land to its former condition under the expenses of the defendant. . . .

In the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated can not be returned to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P19,343.20 as value of the portions totalling an area of 24,179 square meters; ---- R. on A., p. 5.

y ademas a pagar P9,756.19 de daños y P5,000 de honorarios de abogado, con las costas R. on A., pp. 5-6.

El demandado, por medio del Procurador General, presento mocion de sobreseimiento de la demanda por el fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene jurisdiccion para dictar sentencia valida contra el, toda vez que judicialmente la reclamacion es contra la Republica de Filipinas, y esta no ha presentado su consentimiento a la demanda. El Juzgado inferior estimo la mocion y sobreseyo la demanda sin perjuicio y sin costas.

En apelacion, la demandante sostiene que fue un error considerar la demanda como una contra la Republica y sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.

La mocion contra "Isaias Fernando, Director de Obras Publicas, encargado y responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en Filipinas" es una dirigida personalmente contra el, por actos que asumio ejecutar en su concepto oficial. La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por las extralimitaciones que cometa o haga cometer en el desempeño de sus funciones oficiales. Un caso semejante es el de Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933) 18 minn. 584, NW 49, 90 ALR 1472. Alli el Comisionado de Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la

carretera ocupo o se apropio de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal Supremo del Estado declaro que espersonalmente responsable al dueño de los daños causados. Declaro ademas que la ratificacion de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era equivalente a una orden a los mismos. He aqui lo dijo el Tribunal.

We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition an dusefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before construction began. . . .

"Ratification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be inferred from acquiescence where there is power to restrain." It is unnecessary to consider other cases cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the jury could find or infer that, in so far as there was actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's land as a dumping place for the rock to be removed from the additional appropriated right of way, defendant planned, approved, and ratified what was done by his subordinates. — Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A.L.R., 1472, 1476, 1477.

La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos parecidos se resume como sigue:

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act. — 49 Am. Jur. 289.

. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent. — 43 Am. Jur. 86.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. — 43 Am. Jur. 89-90.

El articulo 32 del Codigo Civil dice a su vez:

ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

x x x           x x x           x x x

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

x x x           x x x           x x x

In any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right ot commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The inmdemnity shall include moral damages Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda, No. L-1648, Agosto 17, 1947; Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412, Septiembre 1950.

Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuacion de la tramitacion de la demanda conforme proveen los reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas. Asi se ordena.

Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, MM., estan conformes.

Separate Opinions

CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:

To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:

4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines;

5. That the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection, unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied.)

The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were performed by said defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly shows that the designation of his office was included in the title of the case to indicate that he was being sued in his official capacity. This conclusion is bolstered up by the fact that, among other things, plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a judgment

Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square meters and to return the land to its former condition under the expense of the defendant. (Paragraph a, of the complaint).

We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government. Consequently, in praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the irrigation canal involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff therein, and that said land be restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its possession of said irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the Government to be removed or destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez (47 Off. Gaz., 665), the Government is, accordingly, "the real party in interest as defendant" in the case at bar. In other words, the same partakes of the nature of a suit against the state and may not be maintained without its consent.

Hence I am constrained to dissent.

Festejo v. Fernando (Case Digest)

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Doctrine of State Immunity.

FESTEJO v. FERNANDOGR No. L-5156; March 11, 1954

FACTS:The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, took possession of the three parcels of land on February 1951 without obtaining first a right of way, without consent and knowledge of plaintiff, and against her express objection. The petitioner demands that the lands be restored to its former condition and the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P19, 343.20 for the unlawful taking possession of the defendant.

ISSUE:Is the defendant liable for the unlawful possession of the lands?

HELD:The evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff’s land, defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff’s land southeasterly of the right of way innocently for the surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way. It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. He cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office and not personally.

Festejo v. Fernando (Case Digest)

Fact:

The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority

obtained first from the CFI of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way,

and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express

objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and

caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels

of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

Issue:

w/n this is a suit against the state?

Held:

No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff’s

land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went

outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff’s land and damaged it

or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have

designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable

therefore, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for

whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial,

ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and

without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal

liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he

cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the

color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are

wholly without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly

or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs

any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the

latter for damages:

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Separate Opinions

CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:

To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than

that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal

capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the

defendant is “Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works.” Moreover, in

paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:

That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of

irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction

of irrigation system in the Philippines;

We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system

reffered to in the complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando,

according to the same pleading, is “in charge” and for which he is “responsible”

as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated with

public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law.

Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been undertaken

by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of

the Government.

US vs. Guinto (Consti1)En Banc

Cruz, February 26,1990

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense

Facts: In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consentedOn the first suit:On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F. ShawAmong those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del PilarBidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bidThe Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to DizonBut Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concessionOn June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigationRespondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quoOn July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suabilityOn July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunctionOn Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismissOn the second suit: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion

for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio CityIt had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customersHis dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force BaseGenove filed a complaint in the RTC of BaguioThe defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be suedMotion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the chargeHe then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removedDefendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consentMotion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer

On the fourth suit:Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except USA)According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on themDefendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrestUSA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functionsMotion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendantsIssue:

Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without its consentIn relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official functions.Holding and Ratio:1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower court.2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.)3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992.]

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY and PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

SUPERVISORY UNIT FOR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCIES (PC-SUSIA),Respondents.

Franciso A. Lava, Jr. and Andresito X. Fornier for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY CHIEF AND THE PC-SUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE STATE. — The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE SUED IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY IF HE ACTS, AMONG OTHERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR. — A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.

3. ID.; ID.; CONSENT TO BE SUED MUST EMANATE FROM A LEGISLATIVE ACT. — Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.

4. ID.; ID.; REASONS BEHIND. — The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477).

D E C I S I O N

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 11, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15990, entitled "The Chief of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Philippine Constabulary Supervisor Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies (PC-SUSIA) v. Hon. Omar U. Amin and Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI)," lifting the writ of preliminary injunction which the Regional Trial Court had issued to the PC-SUSIA enjoining them from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of the license of VMPSI to operate as a security agency.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati, Metro Manila, praying the court to: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo, enjoining the defendants, or any one acting in their place or stead, to refrain from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s license;

"B. In due time, issue a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect;

"C. Render decision and judgment declaring null and void the amendment of Section 4 of R.A. No. 5487, by PD No. 11 exempting organizations like PADPAO from the prohibition that no person shall organize or have an interest in more than one agency, declaring PADPAO as an illegal organization existing in violation of said prohibition, without the illegal exemption provided in PD No. 11; declaring null and void Section 17 of R.A. No. 5487 which provides for the issuance of rules and regulations in consultation with PADPAO, declaring null and void the February 1, 1982 directive of Col. Sabas V. Edadas, in the name of the then PC Chief, requiring all private security agencies/security forces such as VMPSI to join PADPAO as a prerequisite to secure/renew their licenses, declaring that VMPSI did not engage in ‘cut-throat competition’ in its contract with MWSS, ordering defendants PC Chief and PC-SUSIA to renew the license of VMPSI; ordering the defendants to refrain from further harassing VMPSI and from threatening VMPSI with cancellations or non-renewal of license, without legal and justifiable cause; ordering the defendants to pay to VMPSI the sum of P1,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and granting such further or other reliefs to VMPSI as may be deemed lawful, equitable and just." (pp. 55-56, Rollo.)

The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487 (otherwise known as the "Private Security Agency Law"), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint: chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"SECTION 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. — Any Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have an interest in, more than one such agency except those which are already existing at the promulgation of this Decree: . . ." (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)

"SECTION 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. — The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. and subject to the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act." cralaw virtua1aw library

VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that "all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located . . ." (pp. 5-6, Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-471). As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila (Annex B, Petition).

On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).

The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license (Annex E, Petition).

As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one.

VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO (Annex F, Petition).

As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSI’s license was expiring on March 31, 1988, VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, on March 28, 1988 against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. On the same date, the court issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA "from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s license" (Annex G, Petition).

The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that VMPSI’s license already expired on March 31, 1988, hence, the restraining order or preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because there was no more license to be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion.

On April 18, 1988, the lower court denied VMPSI’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction for being premature because it "has up to May 31, 1988 within which to file its application for renewal pursuant to Section 2 (e) of Presidential Decree No. 199, . . ." (p. 140, Rollo.). chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On May 23, 1988, VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment of the penalty for its failure to submit its application for renewal of its license and the requirements therefor within the prescribed period in Section 2(e) of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 5487, as amended by P.D. 1919 (Annex M, Petition).

On June 10, 1998, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one acting in their behalf, from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSI’s license, until further orders from the court.

The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order, but it was denied by the court in its Order of August 10, 1988 (Annex R, Petition).

On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is hereby GRANTED, and the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, is ordered to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent VMPSI in Civil Case No. 88-471, insofar as petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are concerned, for lack of jurisdiction. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 10, 1988, is dissolved." (pp. 295-296, Rollo.)

VMPSI came to us with this petition for review.

The primary issue in this case is whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.

The answer is yes.

The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Thus did we hold in Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded." (Emphasis supplied.)

A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were

performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.

We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC Chief in relation to the exercise of a function sovereign in nature. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. This was clearly enunciated in the case of United States of America v. Ruiz where the Hon. Supreme Court held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions.’ (136 SCRA 487, 492.)

"In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies. (Emphasis ours.)" (pp. 258-259, Rollo.)

Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.

The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic v. Purisima (78 SCRA 470, 473) rationalized: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be cause [by] private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacles, could very well be imagined." (citing Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, 29 SCRA 598.) cralawnad

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.