The Difficult Problem ofEstablishing Measures ofEffectiveness for Commandand Control: A SystemsEngineering PerspectiveNoel Sproles

University of South Australia and The Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australia

ESTABLISHING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

Received August 15, 2000; Accepted November 23, 2000

ABSTRACT

Formulating Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for complex sociotechnical systems is adifficult task. This can be seen in particular in the difficulties experienced when this isattempted for military command and control (C2). The intent of this paper is to demonstratewhy this is so for C2 and for similar sociotechnical systems. Systems such as these only becomepurposeful when they are integrated as part of a parent system. Without this parent systemthey are purposive and are unable to perform a mission. The MOEs of these componentsystems are tightly linked to the contribution they can make to the achievement of the parentsystem’s mission. In military operations, the purposeful system is the result of the synergygenerated by the component systems that constitute the force assigned to the commanderto accomplish a mission. These components combine to provide the emergent propertiesnecessary to satisfy the need and their individual effectiveness is assessed on the contribu-tion they make to the parent system. An essential component of this purposeful system isCommand and Control (C2), but it is difficult to separate the contribution that C2 makes to itsparent system from those made by other component subsystems or to treat C2 as an isolatedsystem. Because of this, the formulation of MOEs for C2, and for similar systems in other areas,a difficult task. It is possible that the behavioral or “soft” sciences will offer a solution. © 2001John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Syst Eng 4: 145–155, 2001

1. INTRODUCTION

Command and Control (C2) systems are the tools em-ployed by military commanders to manage the forces

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Systems Engineernig, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2001© 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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assigned to them in accomplishing an operational mis-sion. They are an integral and essential part of anycommander’s assigned force encompassing all func-tions within the force. Their importance warrants thecontinual monitoring of new technology in order toascertain any advantages it may offer in its applicationto C2. The costs and risks involved are considerable andthere is a requirement for a rigorous Test and Evaluation(T&E) program to minimize these risks. A necessaryprecursor to any such T&E program is a set of Measuresof Effectiveness (MOEs) that is able to provide a guideas to what must be tested to ensure that the C2 systemwill do the job required of it.

The task of formulating MOEs for C2 systems isacknowledged as being difficult. A symptom of this is seenwhen discussion of MOEs for C2 among practitionerssoon moves from issues of effectiveness to those of per-formance. This paper offers an explanation as to why thisis so. It will establish what is meant by MOEs, what is aneed, and what C2 means. It will examine the importantdistinction to be drawn between purposeful and purposivesystems and how C2 can be one or the other depending onhow it is observed. From this will be drawn the reasonswhy MOEs for C2 are so difficult to be formulated.

While the emphasis is on military systems, there isno reason why the argument cannot be adapted for anymanagerial system. The nature of C2 is common tosituations to be met in commercial and service institu-tions and not just the military. The paper is written inthe belief that articulating the nature of the problem isa first step to solving it.

2. WHAT ARE MEASURES OFEFFECTIVENESS?

MOEs are an essential part of systems engineering, andare referred to in documents such as IEEE Std 1220-1994 and EIA/IS-632. They are a tool designed to helpestablish if a system, when developed as a solution to aproblem, performs the mission required of it by a stake-holder. As far as the stakeholder is concerned, thesolution is merely a means to an end. This is in effectsaying that the stakeholder is considering factors exter-nal to the solution when making a choice as to whichsolutions will meet the need. MOEs form the basis of aT&E program for candidate solutions and so are anessential part of any rigorous evaluation program.

Yet, despite its importance and frequent reference inthe literature, there is no universal definition for the termand there is much confusion with the manner in which itis used. The giving of the same meanings to similar termsexacerbates this. Sproles [1998] has suggested a definitionand a methodology for the use of MOEs as a basis forstandard usage. This was achieved by drawing upon the

thread of agreement that can be found in the literaturewhen the term is used. The suggested definition is that

…[MOEs are] standards against which the capabilityof a solution to meet the needs of a problem may bejudged. The standards are specific properties that anypotential solution must exhibit to some extent. MOEsare independent of any solution and do not specifyperformance of criteria. (p. 97)

Characteristics of MOEs include the ability that theycan be tested and perhaps be able to be quantified insome manner. This latter characteristic does not pre-clude the use of MOEs that will ultimately rely onsubjective assessment or are qualitative in nature. How-ever, an MOE is a statement and is not the figureobtained as a result of any measurement process. Adistinction must be made between MOEs and Measuresof Performance (MOPs). A MOE views the solutionfrom the stakeholder’s viewpoint and so is an externalview of the solution. MOPs, on the other hand, view thesolution from the solution developer’s viewpoint andare therefore an internal view. This distinction is dis-cussed in detail in Sproles [2000a: 50–58)). MOEs areconcerned with how well the solution performs theintended purpose while MOPs look at how well thesolution does what it actually does, and a parallel canbe drawn with the distinction between effectiveness andefficiency or accuracy and precision.

The term “stakeholder” is used in a generic sense, asthere may be many stakeholders with an interest in asolution to a problem. Some stakeholders may be thecustomer or user of the system while others may haveno direct interest in the solution per se other than that itmay have some form of impact on their interests. Inhuman society, people’s interests overlap, and it is thisoverlap that often brings about conflict and the need toinclude disparate groups in the selection of a solution.The variety of interests that contribute to the prepara-tion of environmental impact statements is just oneinstance of this. Different stakeholders will have differ-ing needs and therefore will have formulated their owncriteria as a basis for deciding if some solution isacceptable to their interests. Stevens [1998: 22] drawsa distinction between the requirements of the user andthese other stakeholder’s. Of all the stakeholders, thereis one group whose need defines the function of anyproposed solution. For example, a mining companymay want to mine a new ore deposit. While an environ-mental impact statement may address the needs of allthe stakeholders, it is fundamental that the final solutionmust at least result in, say, a profitable mining opera-tion. If satisfying the requirements of other stakeholdersprevents this, then the mine may not be developed. “To

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establish if a candidate solution to a need successfullymeets that need, a stakeholder must first establish if itis functionally successful” [Sproles, 2000a: 53]. MOEsare concerned with these functional requirements. Theyrelate to the need of those stakeholders whose concernis the function of the solution, and the other require-ments, “…important as they are, they do not dictate thefunction of the solution” [Sproles, 2000a: 53]. Theneeds of the other stakeholders may represent con-straints on the choice of a solution, but the solutionchosen must still satisfy the needs of the stakeholderwho identified the need. For the purpose of this paper,a stakeholder is one who is responsible for establishingif a solution meets the functional elements of the need.

Therefore, when formulating an MOE, it is importantto consider the viewpoint from which the MOE is beingformulated. The formulation of MOEs is a cognitive proc-ess using those functional issues that the stakeholderconsiders critical to the acceptance or otherwise of thesolution. These are variously called Critical OperationalIssues (COI) or ‘show stoppers’ and represent those issueswhich, if not successfully addressed, will make the solu-tion unacceptable on functional grounds.

While T&E may be used to assess the “quality andgoodness” of an entity, that which constitutes “qualityand goodness” needs to be defined before T&E cancommence. MOEs fulfill this function and so serve toact as the “engine” of T&E. It would be pointless tohand an item to the test agency and say “Test andevaluate this for me to see if it meets my needs” withoutalso providing some indication as to the goal of the test.The test agency will need to know details about thestakeholder’s need; it will need to know what the itemmust be able to achieve in order to satisfy the stake-holder’s need; and it needs to know how the stake-holder will judge success. The stakeholder provides thetest agency with this information in the form of MOEsthat can be tested and so it is the MOEs that establishthe properties to establish “goodness.” “MOEs…formthe basis for the operational evaluation which, in turn,shapes the operational tests” [DoD Test and EvaluationProcess, 1994: 3]. When referring to testing, the U.S.Navy T&E agency states that the tests are “…designedto help us determine the things we need to know aboutthe system—quantitative things included in the vari-ous MOEs….” It also noted that the process of select-ing MOEs is to determine “…what the evaluator needsto know to adequately test and evaluate the suitabilityCOIs” [Test Directors Guide, 1996: 6, 14].

3. DEFINING “NEED”

Reference has been made to the stakeholder’s need, butthe word “need” has many meanings in the English

language. In this paper it is taken as referring to a goalor mission or the end to be achieved as distinct from themeans to that end. “Goal” itself is a word often requiringa clarification of its meaning. One useful meaning isgiven by Preece et al. [1994: 411], who refer to a goalas a desired state of a system that “…must be describedat a particular level of abstraction,” which is the mean-ing intended for “need” in the context of this paper.However, a distinction must be made between the goaland the means of achieving the goal. The definitionbeing sought is one that emphasises what is wantedrather than what must be done to satisfy a customer orstakeholder. Drucker [1977: 57] points out that a cus-tomer buys value, which he calls “utility,” and not aproduct. The customer is buying utility or “…what aproduct or service does for him or her,” so “need” mustexpress the utility required and not the product that maysatisfy this need. It is possible that several products maybe able to satisfy the customer’s requirement for utility;which of the contending products is chosen is a matterfor the customer. Preece et al. [1994: 411] follows asimilar line of reasoning. They note that goals areachieved using some form of device(s) and that once agoal has been formulated, a person will select the de-vice(s) necessary to achieve that goal. In other words,the customer determines what Drucker [1977] calls“utility” and then seeks the means to achieve this “utility.”“Need” therefore is taken to refer to an abstract entity inthe sense that this entity is not “…associated with aspecific instance” [Webster, 2000]. This is opposed to thetangible or the means to the end, which can be describedas “…capable of being precisely identified and capable ofbeing appraised….” [Webster, 2000]. The intangible isutility; the tangible is product(s) of some form.

A further distinction can be drawn between themeaning of “goal” and “end,” and it can be argued thatsocial systems are not goal seeking so much as “rela-tionship maintaining” [Checkland, 1981: 165]. Accep-tance of this viewpoint necessitates further refining ofthe definition. In their thesaurus, Webster [2000] notesthat goal “…means what one intends to accomplish orattain,” while an end “…stresses the intended effect ofaction often in distinction or contrast to the action ormeans as such.” In placing a meaning on “need,” it isfelt that the nuance provided by the latter definition maybe more appropriate than calling a “need” a goal. There-fore, for the purpose of this paper, a “need” refers to thedesired end and is separate from whatever means maybe available to meet this end.

4. PURPOSEFUL AND PURPOSIVE

Checkland [1981: 119] notes, “Man as a designer is ateleological being, able to create means of enabling

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ends to be pursued….” He makes a distinction betweensuch systems designed by humans and natural systemsand further breaks the designed systems into what hecalls “purposeful” and “purposive” systems. A pur-posive system “…exists implacably” and is given themeaning of “serving a purpose” while a purposefulsystem involves conscious human action. A designedsystem becomes purposeful when it becomes part of a“human activity system” [Checkland, 1981: 115]. Theexample is provided of a watch escapement being pur-posive, while telling the time is purposeful as it servesa human purpose and involves humans. When Drucker[1977: 432] states, “The most beautifully designed ma-chine is still only so much scrap metal until it has utilityfor the customer,” he is illustrating the difference be-tween purposeful and purposive systems. A ship or anairplane would qualify as such “beautifully designedmachines,” but by themselves they will lie dockside orstand on a runway and do nothing except obey thesecond law of thermodynamics and other natural laws.It is only when they are combined with a crew andmission as well as other elements such as payloads andrefueling systems that they can provide utility to acustomer or stakeholder. Products by themselves seemto serve no purpose; they can only justify their existenceby being part of a system meeting a need. A hammer byitself is useless; combine it with a carpenter, other toolssuch as a saw, some nails or glue, pieces of timber, anda plan and it becomes a component in a system thatprovides, say, comfort for humans, i.e., it becomes acomponent of a furniture production system.

Preece et al. [1994: 411] suggest that there is a nexusbetween humans and goals when they describe a goal as“…a state of a system that the human wishes toachieve….” Mitchell [1982: 10–11] discusses how peoplejoin together in organizations in order to attain physical,personal, or economic advantages. This comes about be-cause humans believe that this is the best way to reachgoals and, as a consequence, “…organisations are de-signed and exist to facilitate the attainment of objectives.”Hitchins (personal communication, April 2000] suggeststhat humans may be a necessary and integral componentof purposeful systems, and it is an idea that may well betrue. Checkland [1981] at least implies that this is so in hisdiscussions of human activity systems.

5. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS ANDPURPOSEFUL SYSTEMS

The successful meeting of a need requires a purposefulsystem as only such a system provides utility to ahuman. Stevens et al. [1998: 5] state that the correctresponse to a user’s need is a full operational capabilityand that the user does not want a product but a complete

service. A product is purposive whereas the completecapability or service is purposeful. Needs are met bypurposeful and not purposive systems. MOEs have beendefined as the standards by which it can be judgedwhether or not a solution has satisfied a need and so aresatisfied by purposeful systems. The appropriate meas-ures for purposive systems would be MOPs.

6. CONTRIBUTION AS A BASIS FORMEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Systems do not necessarily exist by themselves but canexist within larger systems. “…[I]t is possible to couplelarge systems together to create large meta-systems, or‘systems of systems.’ These meta-systems fulfil func-tions greater than the set of coupled systems from whichthey are built” [Stevens et al., 1998: 302] while Hitchins[1992] introduces the idea of a system or systems beingcontained within a containing system.

Hitchins [1992: Chapters 4–5] discusses the rela-tionship between effectiveness and contribution. Effec-tiveness is described as how well something doessomething, and this is the definition used in this paper.Contribution is then described as what a containedsystem contributes to its containing system, andHitchins [1992] sees this as being a more useful meas-ure than effectiveness. There seems no reason not to getthe benefit of both ideas by combining them and sayingthat effectiveness is how well something does its joband that its job, in turn, is to contribute to the effective-ness of its containing system. This is akin to saying that,when formulating MOEs, the MOE should reflect thedesire to win the war as well as to win the battle.

6.1. What is Command and Control?

6.1.1. Origin of Phrase “Command and Control”Ashworth [1987: 36] refers to the phrase “Commandand Control” as “a composite word” in order to stressthat C2 is not a combination of the separate terms of“command” and “control” with one being subordinatedto the other. He traces the origin of the term to WorldWar II when it was initially applied to Combined1 andJoint operations where command, that is, authority andresponsibility, had to cross national and organizationboundaries. On occasions, there were confusion andmisunderstanding when commanders realized that they

1 Combined operations refer to the use of the forces of differentnations and is different from Joint operations which refer to opera-tions using the various services of the one nation. The CombinedBomber Offensive (CBO) was a combined operation as it used theAir Forces of the USA and UK. The Falklands campaign was a jointoperation because the British navy, army, air force and marines actedtogether under one commander.

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did not have the full command authority and associatedresponsibility that they had come to expect in singleservice commands. It was in this context that McCarthy[1959: 15] used the term “command and control” whenreferring to the 23 December 1941 conference betweenBritish and U.S. political and military leaders. He says,“Among the most important results of the Decemberconferences was agreement between Britain and Amer-ica regarding the machinery to be set up for the strategi-cal command and control of their military resources.”McCarthy explains that this was a “…principle of unityof command” with its first expression in the American,British, Dutch, Australian Command (ABDACOM) inwhat is now Indonesia. Brittanica [1959: 277] describeshow the system of the Combined Chiefs of Staff andSupreme Commanders achieved the controlling organi-zations “…needed to encompass both interservice andinter-Allied coordination” and solved the problem of“…coordination and direction.”

6.1.2. Command and Control as a Means to an EndAshworth [1987: 34] notes how C2 has, over the years,“…acquired additional meaning, gathering into its foldsuch things as communications, computers, and intelli-gence, and grandiose titles like C3I.” In developing anexplanation of why it has proved difficult to formulateMOEs for C2, it is useful to examine the “additionalmeaning” given to C2 and determine what C2 is seenas encompassing at this time.

Many definitions of C2 to be found in the literaturesee the “command and control” function as being syn-onymous with the mechanics by which a commanderexercises command authority. An indication of this canbe seen in some of the terminology, or “grandiose titles”in Ashworth’s [1987] view, associated with C2. Ryan[1997: 7] provides some examples commonly found inthe literature. All these acronyms place emphasis onsome part(s) of the components that make up C2 reflect-ing an emphasis on means at the expense of the endsought:

C3—command, control and communications;CIS—communications and information systems;C3I—command, control, communications and in-

telligence;C4I—command, control, communications, comput-

ers, and intelligence;C4ISR—command, control, communications, com-

puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Prior to the 1970s, the term C2 was rarely used andinstead one spoke of the “staff” for it was the staff whosupported the commander in both the operational andadministrative functions of command. Early command-

ers such as Alexander and Caesar did not have staffs butdid all their work themselves. Even Napoleon com-manded his great armies with only the assistance of afew runners [Brittanica, 1959], and in the 1870s Moltkecommanded a force of 1 million using a General Staffof only 70 officers [van Crevald, 1985: 7]. However,even these great commanders needed communicationsystems even if they were only runners. The “grandiosetitles” given to C2 do serve a purpose in stressing thatthe system comprises more than just the staff but in-cludes a collection of other systems such as communi-cations, intelligence sensors, procedures, etc.

Some current definitions refer to C2 as a system andindicate that C2 is a tool to be used in conjunction withother tools such as combat and support units. The U.S.Navy goes even further when it states that C2 “…is thetool the naval commander uses to cope with the uncer-tainty of combat…” [NDP6, 1995: i]. The same docu-ment [NDP6 1995: 8] states, “A commander isconnected to his subordinate commanders by a com-mand and control system…,” and also draws the anal-ogy that C2 is like the sensory nervous system of thebody while the commander is the brain. The brain(commander) uses the nervous system to receive infor-mation and to disseminate orders.

Other definitions describe instead the purpose of C2,such as MCDP6 [1996] which states that C2 is “…howwe can reach effective military decisions and imple-ment effective military actions faster than an adver-sary.” Another such definition is provided by FM 17-95[1996] which states that the “… purpose of the com-mand and control system is to implement the com-mander’s will in pursuit of the objective.” TheAustralian definition [ADFP1, 1993], which is nearlyidentical to the U.S. definition given in Joint Publica-tion 1-02 [JP 1-02, 2000], combines both approacheswhen it says:

Command and control is the process of and the meansfor the exercise of authority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assigned forces for theaccomplishment of the commander’s mission. Com-mand and control functions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment, communica-tions facilities and procedures that are employed by acommander in planning, directing coordinating andcontrolling his forces and operations.

Dennis et al. [1995: 169] emphasize the differencebetween “command” and “control” and that the wordsare not intended to be synonymous. A distinction ismade between the meaning of the term when applied atthe operational level and at the higher levels of militaryorganizations. They note that current American usage

ESTABLISHING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 149

“…refines these terms somewhat so that control encom-passes the planning, direction, coordination and controlof forces and operations in the accomplishment of themission.” The value of the explanation is lost somewhatby defining “control” in terms of “control.”

In these definitions, C2 is sometimes being used aseither a noun phrase or a verb phrase, and sometimes asboth. As a verb phrase, it denotes what C2 does. It “…describes a process … a collection of related activities”[MCPD6, 1996]. These activities include the collectionand analysis of information; making of decisions; or-ganizing resources; planning; communicating instruc-tions and information; coordinating; monitoringresults; and supervision. As a noun phrase, it describeshow C2 achieves the process. It “… describes a sys-tem—an arrangement of different elements that interactto produce effective and harmonious actions” [MCPD6,1996]. These elements are people; information; andthose items that provide the support structure.

6.1.3. Command and Control as a ProcessC2 as a process is illustrated by the range of activitiesin what Ryan [1997: 6] refers to as the Decision Cycle,Boyd Cycle2 or the OODA Loop, where OODA is anacronym for Observation, Orientation (understanding),Decision, and Action. MCDP6 [1996] illustrates thisloop as depicted in Figure 1.

A process is a “a series of actions or operationsconducing to an end” [Webster, 2000]. C2, as a process,changes ideas into action and is a cyclic process. Duringthe course of a military operation, a commander makesdecisions, gives instructions, observes the results, andmakes further decisions amending or altering the pre-vious decisions. The function of observing results andamending or altering the previous decisions is the func-tion of “controlling” which Urwick [1961: 97] de-scribes as a method to keep informed as to the result ofplans and orders.

A commander uses the various facilities available,such as sensors and situation reports, to Observe bycollecting data about the enemy and the commander’sown forces. This data are then correlated in order toprovide Orientation, or as Ryan [1997] has noted, tounderstand. In fact, orientation is more the gaining of amental picture of the situation. It is not necessarily theunderstanding of the situation if we take the view thatknowledge is being aware of “what is happening” andunderstanding is being aware of “why it is happening.”Understanding is best seen in that elusive ability of great

generals, such as Montgomery and Rommel, to see intothe “mind of the enemy.”

After orientation, the commander is able to Decideto take a course of action and to disseminate a plan.When the plan is put into Action, the commander is nowable to Observe the results and to bring these results intoline with the desired results. In effect, the loop hasstarted over again. During this process, the commanderis afflicted by “the fog of war,” or the “friction of war,”caused by the uncertainties and vagaries of conflict andthe fact that there are humans in the loop.

6.1.4. Command and Control as a Systemvan Crevald [1985:262] notes, “Command sys-tems…consist of organisations, procedures, and techni-cal means; command itself is a process that goeson…within the system.”’ This process and the systemof C2 are inextricably intermeshed. Whereas a processis “a series of actions, changes, or functions that bringabout an end or result” [Webster, 2000], it is the systemthat brings this process about by providing the meansto realize it. The stakeholders specify the “technicalmeans” in order to be able to execute the process. Thesetechnical means can be tested using quantitative datagained from objective testing. It is this that causesdiscussion about C2 systems to shift from MOEs toMOPs as discussed in the Introduction to this paper.

The C2 “technical means” can be depicted as anorganization comprising the three elements of people,information and support as shown in Figure 2. Peoplecomprise all those who “…gather information, makedecisions, take action, communicate, and cooperatewith one another in the accomplishment of a commongoal” [MCPD 6, 1996]. Information is the fuel for theC2 process, and it is the aim of the commander to collectand process information at a faster rate than the enemyin the pursuit of reducing uncertainty. Support com-prises the people, equipment, facilities, and procedures

Figure 1, The OODA loop

2 Named after a former USAF officer, Col. John Boyd in ’Anorganic design for Command and Control’, “A discourse on winningand losing”. Unpublished lecture notes, August 1987 (NDP6, 1995,p. 18)

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that actually collect, process, and disseminates the in-formation to the commanders at the various levels andtheir subordinates.

From the definitions it can be seen that the “what”of C2 is “…planning, directing coordinating and con-trolling.” The “how” is “…an arrangement of person-nel, equipment, communications facilities andprocedures that are employed by a commander.” The“what” of C2 is achieved by a process—the “how” bythe technical means or what is commonly referred to asC3I, etc.

7. WHAT DOES COMMAND ANDCONTROL DO?

Hitchins [1997] states that C2 is the management ofconflict where management [Harper Collins, 1995:377] is “…the process of organising and directing hu-man and physical resource within an organisation so asto meet defined objectives.” This is achieved throughplanning; control; coordination; and motivation. This issupported by an analysis of the definitions of C2 pre-viously provided:

• “…how we can reach effective military decisionsand implement effective military actions fasterthan an adversary” [MCDP6, 1996];

• “…the exercise of authority and direction by aproperly designated commander over assignedforces for the accomplishment of the com-mander’s mission” [ADFP1, 1993];

• C2 “…allows a commander to make effectivedecisions and direct the successful execution ofmilitary operations” [NDP6, 1995];

• “…planning, directing coordinating and control-ling his forces and operations” [ADFP1, 1993];

• ‘…to implement the commander’s will in pursuitof the objective” [FM 17-95, 1996].

This need for management systems has been thesame for military commanders from Alexander throughCaesar, Marlborough, Napoleon and Wellington, Grant,Monash, to Schwarzkopf and Cosgrove. The only sig-nificant difference is the technology of the solutionsavailable to them to meet that need. As military forcesbecame larger and more complex, there was an increas-ing requirement to provide assistance to the commanderin managing the force so as to accomplish the mission.In the mid 19th century, European nations developedC2 systems built around highly trained military staffsusing whatever technology was available at the time.These military staffs have developed into today’s C2systems, but, while the means have changed radically,the need for the commanders to be able to manage theirforce has always been the same!

Having been given a force and a mission, the com-mander has a need for a system to enable this force tobe managed as it prepares for and undertakes its mis-sion. Managing covers concepts such as tempo, situ-ational awareness, exercise of authority, planning,direction, coordination, control, etc. as referred to in thedefinitions. That such a need exists and that humansaddress such needs by setting up organizations such asa C2 system is as old as mankind.

8. WHO IS THE STAKEHOLDER?

Once a commander is given a mission, C2 becomes“…fundamentally the business of the commander”[MCDP 6, 1996]. The commander is the focus of theC2 process and system because “[t]he commanderdrives the command and control process and has finalresponsibility and accountability for success of the

Figure 2. Outline of the C2 system

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mission.” “At any level, the key individual in the com-mand and control system is the commander who has thefinal responsibility for success” [NDP6, 1995: 8]. Hav-ing been given “…final responsibility and account-ability for success of the mission,” the commander istherefore the stakeholder in whatever C2 system isprovided and the requirements and MOEs will be writ-ten with this in mind. There will be others who have aninterest in a C2 system such as the government whomust finance it; industry who must develop it; etc.;however, it is the commander who determines the func-tion of the system.

9. THE CONTAINING SYSTEM

MLW One 1-1 [1992: 2.37] states that the ultimate aimof military operations is victory and that “selection andmaintenance of the aim” is the first principle of war.Thus, while a commander has a need to be able tomanage the resources allocated to him, it would bedifficult to argue that this was the end state desired bythe commander, let alone an end state more importantthan achieving the assigned mission. The C2 or staffsystem is a means to an end and the end is the mission.

To be able to achieve the mission, the commander isassigned a force. This force is a purposeful system inthe form of a synergistic combination of subsystemsbrought together with the clear intent of achieving themission. “The outcomes of battle emerge from theinteraction of the many parts of a complex, chaotic anddynamic system” [LWD1, 1998: 2–6]. C2 is one suchcomponent system. “Applying the art of war…requirescomprehensive staff procedures, intuition, judgment,and an understanding of the relationship between awide range of factors that bring extraordinary complex-ity to every situation” [LWD1, 1998: 2–6]. C2 is there-fore a contained system in the metasystem needed toachieve the commander’s mission. As such, C2 mustneed to be able to make a contribution to that meta-sys-tem and will be judged on that contribution.

10. CONTRIBUTION

There are ample examples in the literature to show thatC2 systems have contributed to mission success in thepast. Air Chief Marshall Sir Basil Embry, former Com-mander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces, Central Europewhen praising the contribution made by the staff ar-rangements of the Royal Air Force immediately priorto World War II, noted the importance of the managerialaspect, and observed that as a result:

…the Royal Air Force, in the early years of the war,was able single-handed not only to match up to thecombined strength of the German and Italian AirForces but to inflict on them decisive defeat [Embry,1958: 79].

General Sir Brian Horrocks, who commanded theBritish XXX Corps in Europe after D Day, was onceasked by General Montgomery if given the choicebetween six divisions in his Corps or five divisions anda first-class communications system, which would heprefer. Horrocks opted for the latter as “…it is quiteimpossible to fight a modern battle without first-classcommunications” [Horrocks, 1977: 29]. Here Horrockshas indicated that he considers a first-rate communica-tions system will make a greater contribution to theoutcome of the battle than an extra division. The basisof choice is on the success of the mission—the fightingof the battle—rather than on the merits or otherwise ofcommunications per se. If another similar rhetoricalquestion was posed seeking his choice between a dif-ferent set of component systems, he may well haveopted for a different combination. But in all instancesthe choice would be based on the contribution to theoutcome of the battle or mission.

C2 “…by itself will not will not drive home a singleattack…[and] it will not destroy a single enemy target,”but it does “…help commanders make the most of whatthey have—people, information, material …and time”[MCDP6, 1996: 1]. The view expressed in 1917 by theChief of Staff for Second British Army that “[t]he staffare servants of the troops” [Smithers, 1973: 163] givesfurther credence to the notion that C2 is a means to anend and not an end in itself.

11. THE DIFFICULT TASK OFFORMULATING MEASURES OFEFFECTIVENESS

11.1. Command and Control as a ComplexSystem

Jackson and Keys [1984: 475] make a distinction be-tween complex and simple systems. They note the smallsize of the components and the regular interaction be-tween the components for simple systems as opposedto the large number of components and high interrela-tionships of complex systems. Checkland [1981] de-scribes systems as falling into the four classes ofnatural, designed, designed abstract, or human activitysystems. A term often used, in a similar fashion toCheckland’s human activity system, is “sociotechnicalsystems.” Kline [1995: 60] illustrates this when hedefines them as linking humans with hardware or tools

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so as to perform tasks that people want done. Sociotech-nical or human activity systems generally fall into thecategory of complex systems, while designed systemsare usually considered not to be complex.

C2 systems are sociotechnical systems built up ofgroups of people and equipment as illustrated in Figure2. As such, they “…pose difficult problems becausethey are often only partially observable, probabilistic,open…” [Jackson, 1984: 476]. They indicate severalimplications when dealing with such complex systems,two of which have particular relevance to the problemof why it is difficult to formulate MOEs for C2 systems.They have been adapted to demonstrate that the contri-bution that C2 must make to the meta-system, or pur-poseful system, assembled to achieve the missioncannot be readily identified; and that C2 systems cannotbe isolated.

11.2. Contribution Cannot Be Identified

The MOEs for C2 must be based on the contribution C2makes to the metasystem represented by the purposefulsystem that is the commander’s force. On rare occasionsthis contribution, or the lack of contribution, is soobvious that it can be identified. The withdrawal fromthe Gallipoli Peninsula in December 1915 is often citedas “…a model of precision and clear thinking” [Bean,1968: 178], where C2 contributed significantly to thesuccess of the operation. The 1st British Airborne Divi-sion’s operations at Arnhem in 1944 are, on the otherhand, an example of how a C2 system failed to make apositive contribution to the battle. Radio communica-tions broke down between all levels making it impossi-ble for the commander to control his division. Thecommander himself “…had been absent and lackingcontrol of the battle in its most crucial period, for almost39 hours” [Ryan, 1974: 355].

Instances in which the contribution is so obvious areexceptional for the contribution of C2 is generally lostamong the synergy that occurs when all the componentsof a complex system combine to provide the emergentproperties of the meta-system. If the contribution thatC2 makes was always as obvious as the above examplesthen an MOE such as “contribution to mission accom-plishment” would be simple to establish and, moreimportantly, to test. But the contribution is rarely soobvious, and formulating an MOE to capture qualitiesthat will indicate contribution is difficult. This is moreso when it is remembered that the MOE must be capableof being measured and that an MOE that cannot bemeasured is of no use.

The C2 system exists to help the commander in theaccomplishment of the mission, but the commander isultimately only interested in the emergent property of

the purposeful system that is his force and its ability toachieve the mission. That is the only job that can alwaysbe measured for effectiveness. The assistance providedby the C2 system is only of interest so long as it makesa contribution to mission achievement. The stakeholderis seeking utility, and this is most obvious in an exami-nation of whether the mission was accomplished or not.That this is so is evident in an analysis of the literature.Military history texts speak at length about the missionand whether it was achieved or not and even why thismay have occurred. Only on rare occasions will aspectsof C2 be discussed such as in the works of van Crevald[1985] or when Horrocks [1977] gave a cursory outlineof the functioning of a corps HQ.

An analogy can be drawn between C2 as a compo-nent of the metasystem and the making of a cake. Theingredients, when combined and cooked, lose theirindividuality and cannot be distinguished one from theother. Hence the expression that “the proof of the pud-ding is in the eating.” What contribution does the qual-ity of flour made from a particular variety of wheatmake to the satisfaction to be gained by eating the cake?It would probably be difficult or even impossible toascertain. It is only when some ingredient capable ofreally standing out is added, such as almonds in afruitcake, that the contribution can be judged. To con-tinue with the analogy, C2 generally compares with thestandard ingredients of the cake making it virtuallyimpossible to formulate MOEs that can isolate qualitiesthat are testable

11.3. Command and Control SystemsCannot Be Isolated

Without a commander and the commander’s associatedforce, the best-designed C2 system in the world has nopurpose. There is no one to report to; there is no one toreceive instructions from and no one to give instructionto; there are no resources to allocate; there is nothing tocoordinate; and there is nothing or no one to receiveinformation from. It would exist implacably with itsstaff and its equipment idly passing time! A C2 systemisolated from the commander’s purposeful system is asnothing just as the commander’s force without a C2system is also as nothing. C2 cannot be as a singularitybecause it “…encompasses all military functions andoperations, giving them meaning and harmonizingthem into a meaningful whole” [MCDP6, 1996: 1].

The inability to isolate C2 as a purposeful system inits own right contributes to the difficulty in formulatingMOEs. For example, an infantry battalion or a tankregiment can be a purposeful system in its own right andscenarios could be developed enabling MOEs to beformulated and for them to be tested in isolation. The

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results from such MOEs and tests could be used as thebasis for an estimate of their contribution to a metasys-tem such as the commander’s force. Similarly, beingable to be isolated, their contribution to the metasystemcould be assessed by withdrawing them from the me-tasystem or replacing them by another component andobserving the effect. It is therefore reasonable to havean MOE of “contribution to mission achievement” for,say, infantry battalions, as they can be isolated. Intheory, this should be able to be applied to C2 byinstalling different C2 systems into different formationsor units and making a comparison of the effect onaccomplishing a mission. In practice, this is difficult toachieve due to the implications in training, the effect onoperational readiness, and cost. It may be possible forthe largest military forces to attempt this but it wouldbe beyond the resources of most countries. It is unlikely,for instance, that any modern military force still has theC2 systems of the Vietnam War era in service. Thiswould make it difficult to attempt using the pre com-puter age C2 systems as a benchmark for the contribu-tion of a new C2 system. Similarly, the rapid evolutionof computer systems and their often ad hoc utilizationin C2 systems makes it difficult to find any post com-puter age benchmarks.

It is not possible to isolate a C2 system from itsmetasystem thus making this type of approach impos-sible. Without the other systems that make up the pur-poseful system, there is no job for C2. When looking ata functioning C2 system, it is not possible to say whatit has to do only how well it does what it is doing. Sucha system cannot be examined from the outside onlyfrom the inside. It has no existence in its own right. AC2 system cannot be purposeful in its own right, and soit follows that a C2 system per se is purposive. In itspurposive state it cannot, by definition, do a job and soit is not possible to formulate MOEs for it. C2 onlybecomes purposeful when it is integrated into a me-tasystem and its change of state is brought about by itsability to make a contribution to the metasystem. This,as has been discussed previously, has its own problems.

11.4. The Behavioral Sciences Contribution

Those associated with the development, implementation,and use of C2 systems would seem to be more familiarwith the hard sciences such as mathematics and physics,than with the behavioral or soft sciences such as psychol-ogy, anthropology, and sociology. The bias therefore maywell be towards the hard sciences when formulatingMOEs so that they can be tested by obtaining quantitativedata using objective means. However, as a sociotechnicalsystem, there should be scope for seeking MOEs betterable to be tested by seeking either quantitative or qualita-

tive data from subjective sources. van Crevald [1985:262] discusses the absence of quantitative data suitablefor statistical analysis and how that data, even if avail-able, would probably fail “…to capture many of…themost important aspects of command.” He indicates thatsome of these aspects include informal communica-tions within an organization; the ability to distinguishbetween relevant and irrelevant information; a com-mander’s mental processes; and body language. Thebehavioral sciences have great experience in these areasand have developed methods for obtaining data fromwhich conclusions or insights may be drawn. It is an areaworthy of further research to confirm that a bias towardsthe hard sciences exists and to establish the role that thesofter sciences may have in formulating MOEs for C2.The contribution that a C2 system makes to the metasys-tem may be able to be ascertained by discursive means.The Defence Science and Technology Organisation(DSTO), in an evaluation of the impact of the AustralianArmy’s Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS)on the operational capability of a mechanised brigade,have already tried such an approach with some success[Sproles, 2000b: 183–184].

12. CONCLUSION

The difficulty in formulating suitable MOEs for C2 liesin the difficulty of establishing if the C2 system has orhas not made a contribution to the accomplishment ofthe operational mission. Whatever contribution C2 maymake is generally masked by the contribution made byother component systems. Because these contributionsare combined to produce an emergent property of thetotal system, one can rarely be separated from the other.It is only when some gross contribution is made, forbetter or for worse, that an observer can make such adistinction. As well, it is not possible to treat C2 as aseparate entity making techniques available to othersystems impossible to utilize. While no solutions havebeen offered as to a way around this dilemma, it issuggested that the approach taken by the behavioral orsoft sciences may warrant investigation. Experiencewith the BCSS project has indicated that techniquessuch as focus groups, workshops, and discursive analy-sis offer worthwhile areas for continued research. Evenwithout a solution to the problem, the establishment ofa theoretical basis to explain what is happening showsa path to be followed when working with C2 systems.

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Noel Sproles is a former Australian Army officer and graduate surveyor who served for 23 years inAustralia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and South Vietnam in map making and precision surveys. Hestudied the British acquisition process for military equipment at the Royal Military College of Science inthe UK and spent five years with the Department of Defence in Canberra preparing requirementsdocuments. He left the Army to follow a new career in warehousing and distribution before satisfying anold ambition to return to University. He gained a First Class Honours degree in Information Managementand a scholarship to complete a Ph.D. at the Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre (SEEC), aresearch group of the University of South Australia in Adelaide. Dr. Sproles successfully completed hisPh.D. in 1999 with a thesis entitled “Measures of effectiveness: The standards for success.” He has hadseveral articles published on the topic of MOEs both in Australia and the USA and has made presentationsbased on his Ph.D. thesis in Australia as well as the UK and USA. He is currently applying his work to aproject at the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) in Adelaide.

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