the development of nigeria-u.s. relations by...

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA-U.S. RELATIONSBy John A. Ayam*

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Nigeria as an independent country in 1960 and itsadmission into the United Nations Organization (UN) signaled the beginningof the development of foreign policy positions on key issues of internationalsignificance. Nigeria-U.S. relations began within the context of the Cold Warrivalry between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Interactionbetween the two countries in the 1960s was influenced by U.S. policy ofcontainment and Nigeria's non-aligned posture. Containment had been used asa policy by the United States to stop the spread of communism. Whilecommunism did not gain any foothold in Nigeria, even at the height of Sovietsupport for the federal government during the civil war, the desires of bothcountries was for good and cordial relations. America's high level ofdevelopment, technology and wealth, remain a source of assistance to Nigeria.In a similar vein, the United States has benefitted-and would continue tobeneflt-from friendly relations with Nigeria, a country that possesses a wealthof natural resources and the largest population in Africa.

With the end of the Cold War, the circumstances of Nigeria-U.S.relations have undergone significant transformation. Relations between the twocountries have been dictated by the need for democratization in Nigeria, trade,the fight against the sale of illegal drugs, and peace keeping within Africa. Inthe specific case of peace keeping, the United States is increasingly becominghesitant to deploy its military forces in Africa, especially after the fiasco inSomalia. This has paved the way for Nigerian peace-keeping forces tointervene in conflicts within the West African sub-region as the cases ofLiberia and Sierra Leone have shown.

A eogent point about Nigeria-U.S. relations is the fact that even whenpolitical and diplomatic relations were at their worst, economic relations seemto continue unhindered. Robert R. Shepard observed, in relation to thediplomatic conflict between Nigeria and the United States over theindependence of Angola in 1975 that "political relations remained acrimonious

•John A. Ayam, PhD, formerly a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at AhmaduBello University, Zaria, Nigeria, is currently the Head of the Department of Political Science atCovenant University, Ota, Ogun State Nigeria. He was a 1997-1998 Senior Fulbright Fellow atHoward University, Washington, DC, where research for this paper was conducted..

Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2© 2008 by Association of Third World Studies, Inc.

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while economic relations were left undisturbed by the two governments andcontinued to fiourish."' Even at the height of the June 12, 1993 presidentialelections, when the United States selectively imposed sanctions on Nigeria, thesanctions, however, did not extend to other cmcial aspects of the economy,such as trade in crude oil. Both countries have been hesitant in undertakingpolicies that could jeopardize their economic self-interests despite seriousdiplomatic and political disagreements.

THE COLD WAR ERA

The first officially recognized contact between Nigeria and the UnitedStates was when Govemor Nelson Rockefeller of New York representedPresident Eisenhower at Nigeria's independence ceremonies on October 1,1960. U.S. policy towards Nigeria in the Cold War was guided by two keyissues: (1) containment of communist expansion; and (2) the provision of aidand the strengthening of bilateral economic ties. Then U.S. PresidentEisenhower's message, for instance, assured Nigeria's leaders of U.S. supportbut cautioned on possible threats coming from without-an ostensible referenceto the former Soviet Union.^ But Nigeria's Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, didnot wish his country's newly won sovereignty and independence to be draggedinto the Cold War rivalry between the East and West. In his speech on theadmission of Nigeria into the United Nations, the Prime Minister stated that thecountry, as a matter of policy, would not be a member of any power bloc'Subsequently actions by Nigeria at the intemational level proved the country'srelative neutrality. During the Congo crisis of 1963, Nigeria supported thework of the U.N. by providing troops to the peacekeeping efforts in that crisis-ridden county. Nigeria also demonstrated moderation when the Brazzaville andCasablanca groups emerged as options to a future Organization of AfricanUnity (OAU). Nigeria, along with Sierra-Leone, Liberia and Togo called fora separate meeting in Lagos, whose moderate blueprint was subsequentlyadopted at Addis Ababa in 1963 as the Charter of the new OAU.

Much as the country professed political neutrality as far as East-Westrivalry was concemed; it, nonetheless, was receptive of Westem economic aid."*It was in this context that a five-man U.S. delegation visited Nigeria in June1960 to study areas of possible economic cooperation. On the basis of theeconomic mission's recommendations, the United States announced that itwould provide Nigeria with $225 million in economic development aid overfive years. According to the U.S. State Department, "the primary interest of theU.S. in Nigeria is to see it grow and prosper, within the Free World, as a leaderand good example for other African countries."' Although the U.S. share oftrade and investments in Nigeria during the early years of independence wassmall compared to Britain's, these bilaterial ties were to sow the seeds of future

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economic relations. On the whole, diplomatic relations between Nigeria and theUnited States remained generally amicable.

By January 15,1966, a military coup had overthrown the governmentof Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and a gradual, though clearly discernibleslide toward disunity and civil war was imminent. General Ironsi's militaryadministration which lasted a mere six months had itself been overthrown ina counter coup leading to the emergence of Colonel (later General) YakubuGowon as Head of State, who was not recognized by Colonel OdumegwuOjukwu of the Eastern region. The outbreak of war in 1967 did not initiallymean much to the United States because the Vietnam War was on and Israelhad launched a pre-emptive air strike on Arab capitals, which touched off theSix-Day War'-the United States was a staunch ally of Israel and supported thelatter in its struggles against the Arab states. President Johnson's approach toNigeria's civil war was that it was a "British Affair," and considering that therewere no tangible American interests at stake, it was better to steer off theconflict as much as possible. An arms embargo was imposed on both sides andno serious consideration was given to recognizing Biafra. The Nigerian FederalGovernment's request for arms from the United States and Britain was refuted,compelling Nigeria to turn to the Soviet Union. U.S. criticism of the Sovietsupply of aircraft was that it was an act in self-aggrandizement and wascondemned by Lagos, which accused the United States of disguised support forthe Ibos.' As the war intensified, and although the Federal government'scriticism continued unabated, American reaction to the Civil War remained oneof minimal intervention that was restricted to relief supplies through theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and urged compromise andsettlement by the conflicting parties. At the end of the war in 1970, and despitethe slight hitches in Nigeria-U.S. relations, diplomatic relations remainedcordial. Moreover, increased oil revenues for Nigeria after the Civil Warincreased trade with the United States, which was worth some $1.65 billion by1974.*

Much as the Civil War did not result in any serious rupture in Nigeria-U.S. relations, by 1975, when General Murtala Muhammad overthrew Gowon,the calculus on foreign policy had changed. Murtala took hard foreign policypositions unlike Gowon who relied more on building consensus among Africanstates. The differences in style were manifested in Nigeria's recognition of theMPLA as the sole representative of the Angolan people after it became clearthat the United States supported South African military intervention in supportof UNITA. At an extra-ordinary O.A.U. Summit, Nigeria launched adiplomatic offensive, which resulted in the recognition of the MovimentoPopular da Libertaçà de Angola (MPLA) by most African governments. Aletter sent to Nigeria by U.S. President Ford offering to use his influence onSouth Africa to withdraw its troops while Nigeria used its good offices to get

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the Cubans out of Angola was publicized in the press as an "insult to thedignity of the black man." The issue that was decisive in persuading Nigeria tochange its reconciliation policy in Angola was the military intervention ofSouth Africa in support of the Frente Nacional de Libertaçào de Angola(FNLA) and Uniào Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNIT A).In addition, the United States began to pressure African states not to recognizethe MPLA as the representative of the Angolan people unless Cuban troopswere withdrawn from Angola. Moreover mercenaries from the Westem worldwere busy infiltrating and boosting the ranks of FNLA and UNITA forces intheir fight against the MPLA. Nigeria's policy towards the Angolan crisis,which subsequently led to a a clash of interests with the United States, wasinformed by its desire for a general liberation of Southem Africa. The militaryintervention of South Africa-with the tacit support of the United States-wasbound to led to a clash of interests judging from Nigeria's strong anti-apartheidpolicy. Indeed, Nigeria considered an MPLA victory in Angola as aspringboard for the total liberation of Southem Africa.

Secondly, Nigeria opposed South Africa's strategy of seeking toestablish a string of client states within the continent to act as a buffer toapartheid. These client states were expected to protect Westem interests andtheir existence could have interfered with the fight against apartheid by thenational liberation movements in southem Africa. Indeed, the Nigerian Headof State, General Murtala Mohammed, noted that due to its strategicimportance in the South Atlantic, "Angola has become an area of great interest.Strategically, there are those countries including South Africa and obviouslythe United States who are frightened by the emergence of a truly nationalistgovernment who will insist on the sovereign rights of Angola to control bothits territory and the sea."'

Thirdly, Nigeria rejected the United States' insistence that awithdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military personnel from Angola be made acondition for the recognition of the MPLA-led government. Angola, Nigeriaargued, had the right to invite assistance from any friendly country to enableher protect her security and territorial integrity. Even more important was thatthe Soviet Union and Cuba had long identified themselves with Africanliberation struggles.

Fourthly, Nigeria insisted that the resolution of the Angolan crisis beundertaken within the rubric of the then OAU (now African Union) and thatfirm recognition be accorded to. the MPLA-led government. Only closecollaboration between the OAU, MPLA and other liberation movements couldhave achieved genuine national reconciliation and cessation of hostilities.Seven months after the incident, Muhammed was assassinated in an attemptedcoup. Relations with the United States further worsened with the allegedcomplicity of the United States in the coup plot. A tirade of anti-U.S.

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sentiments was whipped up by the Nigerian govemment, leading to a virtualbreakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

President Jimmy Carter's style and approach towards Nigeria, whichdid not necessarily represent any change the substance of U.S. policy, seemeddifferent from that of President Ford's. Carters belief that our "attitude towardquestions such as majority mle and racial justice has a direct bearing onAmerican society," and that "foreign relations will be strengthened by themoral promise inherent in our stance on these questions,"'" fumished the basisfor better relations with Nigeria. In addition. Carter's approach of consultingand coordinating policy with Nigeria, rather than orchestrating Cold Warrivalry as Kissinger did, further strengthened relations between the twocountries. Indeed, Zbignew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor,observed that one cardinal principle of the Carter Administration was to"weave a world wide web of bilaterial, political, and where appropriate,economic relations with new emerging regional "influentials."" Nigeria, inview of the Carter Administration, was one such influential country. AndrewYoung's visit to Nigeria in February 1977 completely changed the tone ofrelations from an adversarial to a cordial one. Although the Reaganadministration reverted U.S. policy to one of viewing Nigeria within thecontext of East-West rivalry during the Cold War, relations remained fairlystable until the end of his administration.

Discordant political relations between Nigeria and the United Statesare explainable by a variety of policy trends pursued by governments of bothcountries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria-U.S. relations wereshaped by three basic undercurrents, namely: (1) the pursuit of the policy ofcontainment by the United States; (2) commitment to the policy of non-alignment by Nigeria; and (3) the negative legacy which militated against thecapacity of the African-American lobby to compel their govemment to adopta more positive policy towards Nigeria.'^ Basically, containment policycommitted the United States to act to prevent the spread of communism. Theapplication of the policy of containment to Africa placed the United States ona collision course with Nigeria over the issue of decolonization in Africa.Containment created political tensions between Nigeria and the United Statesbecause Nigeria's policy of non-alignment stipulated that the idologicalconfiicts between the East and the West was not the only consideration indetermining relations with other nations. The US often foimd itself supportingthe European colonial powers against the forces of nationalism andindependence, which Nigeria supported. It is in this context that the diplomaticrow over the independence of Angola could be understood.

On the issue of Namibia's independence, U.S. policy linkedNamibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.Nigeria opposed such a linkage. Consistently, the practice of the policy of

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containment placed the Untied States on the side of colonial and oppressiveforces, which viewed apartheid South Africa as part of the fi"ee world whileCuba was unfree because it is a socialist country.

U.S. relations with apartheid South Africa further strained relationswith Nigeria during the Cold War era. The Reagan administration adopted apolicy of constructive engagement towards South Africa, which sought tocooperate with the apartheid state with a view to persuade it to carry outpolitical reform. Nigeria opposed the policy of constructive engagementbecause such a policy sought to neutralize the power of the overwhelmingblack majority in South Africa.

The United States, at other times, sought to criticize apartheid SouthAfrica in conformity to majority public opinion of the international communitywhile her behavior condoned it. In 1981, the United States vetoed a UNSecurity Council resolution, which recommended the imposition of sanctionson South Africa. In the same year, it relaxed embargoes imposed on the exportof equipment to the South African military and police. Moreover, manymultinational flrms and banks in the Untied States continued to operate in theSouth African economy.

Nigeria's position on these issues conflicted with those of the UntiedStates. Nigeria consistently called for UN resolutions which imposed sanctionson South Africa. In addition, she condemned the South African constitutionalreform, which was introduced in 1984. When the U.S. Congress passed the1986 comprehensive anti-apartheid act over the veto President Reagan imposedon a UN resolution, Nigeria commended the action. The act imposedcomprehensive sanctions on South Africa, which were to be lifted only after thefollowing conditions had been met: (1) repeal of the apartheid legislation; (2)lifting of the ban imposed on the ANC by the South African government; (3)release of all political prisoners; (4) lifting of the state of emergency; and (5)the entering of the South African government into meaningful negotiation withthe ANC.

Despite tensions in political and diplomatic relations there wasconsiderable economic cooperation between Nigeria and the United States. Theoil dominant character of the Nigerian economy is the very basis on whicheconomic ties with the United States are hinged. American oil companies areengaged in mining and sale of crude oil from Nigeria. Up to 90 percent ofNigeria's foreign exchange is earned from the sale of crude oil. A substantialquantity of Nigeria's crude oil is sold in the United States. In 1980, at least 46percent of Nigeria's oil exports went to the United States. This accounted forapproximately 12 percent of U.S. imported oil.'^By 1988, Nigeria's oil exportsto the United States had increased to 54.5 percent of the total value of oilexported from the county.'''However, the fact that Nigeria is highly dependenton oil exports as a major source of foreign exchange places serious constraint

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on her capacity to pursue important national interests because of hersusceptibility to manipulation by foreign forces.

By 1981, U.S. exports to Nigeria had increased tenfold. This increasein exports by the United States to Nigeria was intended to offset the tradedeficit incurred from the import of Nigeria's oil. This deficit stood at $9 billionin 1980. Exports to Nigeria continued to increase in spite of sharp declines inimports from Nigeria. The subsequent fall in the price of crude oil plungedNigeria into an economic crisis, thus, necessitating the introduction of austeritymeasures aimed at restructuring and revamping the economy. The restructuringmeasures introduced by the Nigerian govemment led to a decline in the valueof goods imported from the United States by almost 50 percent.''

In addition to direct trade, Nigeria has expressed interest in attractingmore U.S. investments. But the United States has often emphasized theimportance of creating a conducive atmosphere for investment to be made inthe Nigerian economy. In the early 1980s, U.S. direct investment in Nigeriaamounted to $492 million and has been on the downward trend in subsequentyears." This may not be unconnected to the heightening political tensions inNigeria from the mid-1980s up to 1990.

THE POST COLD WAR ERA AND NIGERIA-U.S. RELATIONS

There has been some optimism among policy-makers and scholars thatwith the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Africa, previously viewedwithin the prisms of East-West rivalry, could be transformed for the better.Michael Clough, for instance, argues that U.S. policy towards Africa was "freeat last" of cold war schisms and could therefore settle to tackle some ofAfrica's intractable problems of economic development, conflict resolution anddemocracy. Other scholars argue that Añica still remains America's "backbumer."" Whatever the consensus over U.S. policy towards Africa, the post-Cold War era has seen America increasingly getting concemed over low-intensity confiicts, threat of Islamic fundamentalism to its interests, conflictresolution, promotion of multi-party democracy as a precondition for improvedeconomic and political relations and abandonment of ideologically basedpolicies in favor of economic self-interest. In the specific case of Nigeria-U.S.relations, all the above-mentioned policies have bene pursued by the UntiedStates. Due to its "economic self-interest," the United States is increasinglybecoming disturbed by developments in Nigeria. As George Moose, formerAssistant Secretary of State for African Affairs noted, "Nigeria is a criticallyimportant country and significant United States interests are at stake."'*Concem over developments in Nigeria is directly inextricably linked to U.S.interests in Nigeria, namely:

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• Ensuring that there is a continued and uninterrupted supplyof Nigerian oil to the U.S.: This is in addition to the fact thatU.S. interests in Nigeria are based on significant privateU.S. investment in the economy, which is mainly in the oilsector and amounting to some $4 billion."The increasing wave of narcotics activities (mainly heroin,but also other lethal drugs, such as cocaine and marijuana),which is specifically targeted at U.S. markets: While theU.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) recognizes thatNigeria is not a producer of these drugs, it nonetheless, hasa substantial number of couriers who ferry these dangerousdrugs into the United States from the Far East and LatinAmerica.^"

• Concern over progress towards democracy: The mainargument of the Clinton Administration was that, whilemany African countries, and indeed the entire globe, weremoving towards democracy, the Nigerian government wasretrogressing towards military dictatorship, violence andviolation of human rights, especially of pro-democracygroups.^'

• Fourthly, is the fact that, due to Nigeria's large population,territorial size, human and material resources, the ClintonAdministration needed to elicit the support and cooperationof the Nigerian government over a wide range of regionaland international issues. In specific terms, the strategicimportance of Nigeria from U.S. perspectives lies in thecountry's economic, political and military power (which)has provided some anchor of stability for the region. If theNigerian state degenerates, so will regional stability." Inaddition is, "the danger of chaos in Nigeria spreadingthrough the already troubled and fragile West Africanregion. Several of Nigeria's West African neighbors.. .whichshare most of Nigeria's borders would be seriouslydestabilized by state collapse or large scale deadly conflictin Nigeria."^^

These four key issues have dominated Nigeria-U.S. relations since1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General M. Buhari'sadministration. The issue of exporting Nigerian oil, and indeed, trade generallyis not unnecessarily jeopardized by strained political and diplomatic relations.Between 1989-1995, U.S. net income from foreign investment in sub-SaharanAfrica has been largely dominated by Nigeria. With the exception of the years

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between 1992-1994 when Nigeria was going through political turmoil, and inwhich U.S. net income from foreign investment dropped, there has been anincrease from $200 million in 1989 to $779 million in 1995 ; about 71.4 percentof total U.S. net income in sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 1).

Table 1: Net Income from U.S. Foreign Investment in sub-SaharanAfrica, 1989-1995 (U.S. $, millions)

Year

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Total

Percent ofTotal

Nigeria

200

197

642

620

571

570

779

3,579

71.4%

Other Sub-Saharan African

Countries

147

119

29

70

242

335

491

1,433

28.6%

Total

347

316

671

690

813

905

1,270

5,012

100%

Source: Bennel, P., "Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Rhetoric andReality," SAIS Review; A Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 2(Summer 1997), p. 132.

Although conventional theory about the relationship between politicsand the economy suggests that the one follows the other, economic relationsbetween Nigeria and the United States have not been unduly hindered bystrained political relations. Smooth economic relations went unhindered evenwhen General Ibrahim Babangida badly wanted to visit the United States, andwas denied, and air links between the two countries were severed becauseLagos airport was considered unsafe for U.S. citizens. The fight against illegal

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drugs in the United States has led to the emergence of divergent views betweenNigeria and the United States. While Nigeria argued that it has done the bestit can in the prevailing circumstances, the United States has been of the opinionthat, in light of fmance and training provided Nigeria's Drug Law EnforcementAgency (NDLEA), not much has bene done by the authorities to stymie thecontinued flow of drugs into the United States. Indeed, the U.S. DrugEnforcement Agency has stated that up to 50 percent of the heroin coming intothe United States passes through Nigeria. The latter's anti-drug agency, theNDLEA, has, instead, put forward the point that it has attacked the drug baronsheadlong through the promulgation of decrees, which limit amounts of moneythat can be deposited in banks and has also seized cars purchased with dmgmoney and are being sold on the streets of Lagos and other towns in thecountry.

Progress towards democracy is another contentious issue between thetwo countries. Nigeria began a tortuous move towards retum to civilizationdemocratic mle in 1985 under General Babangida. The process had falteredand stalled on numerous occasions-the most celebrated being the annulmentof the June 12,1993 Presidential elections. A second attempt was made underGeneral Sani Abacha's military regime, however, the United States continuedto insist that there was lack of progress towards the institutionalization ofdemocracy in the country. On the other hand, Nigeria argued that the UnitedStates and other developed countries should allow it to evolve a democracysuitable to its environment and which is more likely to stand the test of time.Also contentious at the time was the incarceration of Chief Moshood Abiola,the alleged winner of the June 12 presidential elections along with GeneralsOlusegun Obasanjo and Musa Shehu Yar'adua for "plotting" a coup againstAbacha.

Of particular importance was the extent to which the Untied Statescould bring pressure to bear on the Abacha regime. Unlike in Eastem Europewhere the Clinton Administration was able to link the provision of foreign aidto progress towards democracy-in a similar fashion as was done in Kenya,Zambia and Malawi-it was unable to effect the same pressure in Nigeria.Nigeria was not heavily dependent on foreign aid, and, hesitant not to imposean embargo on Nigerian oil due to its economic interests, the leverage waslimited. Debate in the U.S. Congress, which discussed Senate Bill S.1419(Nigeria Democracy Act), had instead, urged that "in the specific context ofNigeria, promotion of those goals (democracy and human rights) is served byengagement and dialogue calculated to build the institutional foundations ofdemocracy and the culture of respect for the rights of the individual," rather •than outright oil sanctions.

The maintenance of regional security and peace is perhaps animportant area where the interests of the United States and Nigeria converge,

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but one in which there was no mutual reinforcement due to glaring divergencesover democracy and human rights and drug trafficking. Indeed, General SaniAbacha observed that "while the U.S. accepts our efforts in Liberia, itnonetheless turns around to impose sanctions on us over democracy, humanrights and the drug problem." The statement is a pointer to growingmisunderstanding in U.S.-Nigeria relations. At the economic level, there wasburgeoning trade while political and diplomatic schisms endured. Sanctionswere imposed on Nigeria while it was keeping the peace in a Liberia that is anAmerican creation. Indeed, at the point Nigeria spearheaded an ECOWASpeacekeeping force in Liberia, the U.S. was preparing for war in Iraq over itsinvasion of Kuwait." While Nigeria provided the bulk of ECOMOG troops anda financial bill of $4 billion,^" American role in Liberia was mainly one ofproviding humanitarian assistance and logistical support towards thePresidential elections in which Charies Taylor emerged winner.

Clearly the vacuum created by the unwillingness of the Untied Statesto deploy its military forces in Liberia, except of course to ferry out its citizensand diplomats, has provided Nigeria the opportunity to project its powercapabilities in the West African sub-region. To that extent, Nigeria became aguarantor of peace, which underscored American fears of "chaos in Nigeriaspreading through the already troubled and fragile West African region." Ofcourse, Nigeria had its fair share of domestic problems ranging from militaryrule that prevented democracy from maturing to eeonomic and social malaisethat threatened domestic unity. But Nigeria has contributed in no small measureto the maintenance of regional stability in the West African sub-region.

THE POLITICS OF SANCTIONS

The response of the United States to Nigeria's political crisis was theimposition of limited sanctions. Immediately after the June 12, 1993Presidential elections were annulled, the Untied States cancelled $11 millionin assistance intended as budgetary support to Nigeria's Ministry of Health;terminated development assistance, except humanitarian aid through non-governmental organization; ended military assistance and export of defense-related materials, denied entry into the United States of Nigerians whoformulate and implement policies that hinder transition to democracy;decertified Nigeria for not doing enough to counter trafficking by its citizensin illegal drugs; and requested the withdrawal of Nigeria's defense attaehé inWashington, D.C." As earlier argued, both Nigeria and the United States havebeen hesitant in undertaking policies that could jeopardize their economic self-interests, and despite political and diplomatic disagreements, economicactivities have been allowed to continue unimpeded.

Several political and economic factors make it difficuh for the U.S.

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government to impose an oil embargo on Nigeria. For oil sanctions to beeffective it needed the concerted effort and cooperation of its European allies.The United States has been unable to sustain a coalition of Westem nationsagainst Nigeria. Just as the Westem-backed coalition against Iraq faltered inthe wake of confiicting national interests,^* so did the one against Nigeria. TheFrench, for instance, did not intend on imposing sanctions on Nigeria for thesimple reason that French economic investments in Nigeria by far outweighinvestments in several ex-French colonies combined." The Germans andJapanese have not indicated any keen interest in sanctioning Nigeria. Indeed,"there is little intemational political support for imposing a multilateral oilembargo. This lack of support refiects the fact that most nations do not viewNigeria as a major threat to world peace and security."^^

Unilateral U.S. embargo on Nigerian oil would not have any impacton exports due to the highly integrated nature of world oil market. A dismptionof supply from one source caused a unilateral embargo could easily becontained by switching to other sources. In this case, a ban on purchase ofNigeria oil by the U.S. will result in other markets absorbing oil exports fromNigeria. In addition, much as an embargo is not likely to affect availability ofpetroleimi products on a national scale, "there may be some adverse effects onthe sections of the [U.S.] economy and in those regions...involved in importing,refining and using Nigerian oil."^'

For all intents and purposes, much as the American govemment hasimposed limited sanctions, it has been careful to safeguard its key economicinterest in Nigeria.

THE POST 1999 ERA AND NIGERIA-US RELATIONS

Nigeria witnessed a retum to democratic mle in 1999 with the electionof Chief Olusegun Obassanjo as President and commander in chief of thearmed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The onset of democratic mlein the coimtry was shrouded in an intimidatingly negative image of the countrywithin the comity of nations. Not only had the Commonwealth of nationssuspended Nigeria but the United Nations was consistently mounting all sortsof pressures. The EU had declared Nigeria a pariah state. Within this context,it was imperative on any leadership emerging from long years of militarydictatorship to attempt to rectify this negative intemational image. Even beforehis inauguration as President of the Federal Republic, Chief Obasanjoundertook a long, drawn out tour of several European, American, Añ"ican andAsian states in an effort to restore Nigeria's battered image so that it isaccorded some level of respectability and confidence.

A number of contentious issues in Nigeria-U.S. relations, which oftenresulted in misimderstanding seem to have been resolved. One is the issue of

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the war on illegal drugs. The intensification of the war on the drug barons inNigeria by the NDLEA has curtailed the incidences of large scale smugglingof drugs within the country's air and seaports. The U.S. Drug EnforcementAgency has also coincidentally delisted Nigeria from the group of countriesknown to smuggle drugs into the United States. The second question relates tosafety at Nigeria's airports. Here too, the U.S. aviation authorities haverecertified Nigeria's airports as safe, although US airlines are yet to beginflights into Nigeria's airports.

Thirdly, improved relations between Nigeria and the United States hasbeen extended to the area of international peacekeeping. While acknowledgingNigeria's past peacekeeping roles in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UnitedStates has attempted to augment Nigeria's capability in future internationalpeacekeeping. To this end, training has been extended to several Nigerianmilitary contingents by U.S. personnel both in Nigerian and American militaryinstitutions. In addition, the United States has generously provided equipmentto Nigeria's armed forces towards enhancing its capability at maintaininginternational peace in the West African sub-region.

Despite improvements in these directions, Nigeria's approach tointernational peacekeeping has deviated form what it used to be during the eraof military rule. Unlike in the past when Nigerian governments bore thefinancial burden of peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it has insistedthat when it is compelled to commit troops to international peacekeeping, theinternational community (specifically the UN) must provide the financialresources.

Perhaps the biggest signal to the effect that political and diplomaticties between Nigeria and the Untied States are at a new height is representedby the visit of President George W. Bush to Nigeria after an earlier visit byPresident Obasanjo to the Untied States. The level of cordiality since the returnto democratic rule has improved compared to the ear of military rule.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria-US relations since 1960 have undergone significanttransformations. There have been periods of cordiality and improved relationswhich have been exemplified by the Kennedy, Carter and George W. Bushadministrations while other periods depicted low-keyed relations and evenoutright hostile ties as the Ford and Clinton administrations have shown. Thispattern is likely to persist for sometime to come. However the two nationswould, in future, continue to explore close political, diplomatic and economicties due to the significance of the economic interests that bind the two nations:the importance of Nigerian oil to the U.S. economy in addition to the largemarket for American goods while Nigeria would continue to search for

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technology and investment avenues from the American market. Indeed,Professor I.A. Gambari has observed that:

"There are many things that bind the people of Nigeria andthe people of the United States. We speak the samelanguage. We share similar democratic spirits and traditions.Between us, we have the largest concentration of Africanpeople. We need American technology and investment inNigeria. We have a fairly large volume of trade between thetwo countries. These are of such ñindamental importancethat they cannot be pushed aside by a change of regimeeither in the United States or in Nigeria.^"

A projection of relations into the future between Nigeria and theUnited States is indicative of the fact that while misunderstandings are boundto occur at the political level, the solidity of economic interest would alwaysreverse adverse political relations.

NOTES

1. Robert R. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States; FromKennedy to Reagan, (Indiana University Press, 1991),p.90.See also,Bassey E. Ate, Decolonization and Dependence; The Developmentof Nigeria-US Relations, 1960-84 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1987), p. 181' George A. Obiozor, Uneasy Friendship: Nigeria-American Relations (Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1992).

2. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States; From Kennedy toReagan, p. 16.

3. For a discussion on Nigeria's Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives,see Philips Claude, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy(Northwestern University Press, 1964) Gordon Idang, Nigerian;Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 1960-66 (Ibadan UniversityPress, 1983); A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism (IbadanUniversity Press, 1974); Ibrahim A. Gambari, Party Politics andForeign Policy; Nigeria Under the First Republic (Ahmadu BelloUniversity Press, 1980); Akiba Okon, Nigeria Foreign PolicyTowards Africa; Coniinwiiyani/CÄa/Jge (Peter Lang Publishing Inc.,1998).

4. Douglas Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and EconomicAlignment," Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, 1964.

5. U.S. Department of State, National Policy Paper: Nigeria, May 15,1964, SP70D19114862,p. 3.

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6. R. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States: From Kennedy toReagan, p. 34.

7. John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War,1967-70. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 29.

8. Intemational Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade: Yearbook, 1980, p.288.

9. Speech to the OAU Summit, 11 January 1976 (Lagos: Ministry ofInformation).

10. Quoted in R. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States: FromKennedy to Reagan, p. 101.

11. Zbignew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the NationalSecurity Advisor (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), pp.53-54.

12. Mae C. King, Basic Currents of Nigerian Foreign Policy, (HowardUniversity Press, 1996), p. 213.

13. United States Department of Agriculture, Nigeria: Agricultural andTrade Policies (Washington, DC, 1981).

14. Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report, 1989, p. 102.15. King, Basic Currents of Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 219.16. Ibid, p. 220.17. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "The Marginalization of Africa,"

Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 2, Winter 1992, pp. 1-14; MichaelCox, U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Without a Mission?(Royal Institute of Intemational Affairs, 19960, p. 109; PeterSchraeder, United States Foreign Towards Africa: Increamentalism,Crisis and Change (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 250;Ibrahim Gambari, "The Role of Regional and Global Organizationsin Addressing Africa's Security Issues" in Edmund J. Keller andDonald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in the New International Order(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 29-31. For altemative view,which argues that, rather than focus on the relegation of Africa to thebackground of world polit9ics, we should instead focus on lessonsAfrica can leam from Easter Europe, see Eboe Hutchful, "EastemEurope: Consequences for Africa," Review of African PoliticalEconomy, No. 50, 1991, pp. 51-59.

18. See Update on U.S. Policy Towards Nigeria. Hearing before the Sub-Committee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,United States Senate, 104'* Congress, May 15, 1996.

19. Ibid20. See Nigeria White Collar Crime, House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Intemational Relations,Washington, DC, September 11, 1995.

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21. Goncerning Movement Toward Democracy in the Federal Republicof Nigeria, U.S. House of Representatives, 1995.

22. Hearing on Recent Development in Nigeria. House ofRepresentatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on InternationalRelations, December 12, 1995.

23. U.S. News and World Report, "Time Out in the Gulf," December 1,1997, pp. 42-45.

24. Adekeye Adebayo and Michael O'Hanlon, "Africa: Toward a RapidReaction Force," SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs.Summer-Fall, 1997, Vol. XCII, No. 2, p. 161.

25. "The Situation in Nigeria," Hearing before the Sub-Committee onAfrican Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,104"̂ Congress, First Session, July 20, 1995, p. 8. See also The WallStreet Journal, November 13, 1995, PA 19 (W) lAl and The WallStreet Journal, November 15, 1995, PA 19 (W) PAl.

26. U.S. News and World Report, December 1991.27. P.J. Schraeder, "France and the Great Game in Africa," Current

History-Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 610,May 1997, pp. 207-211.

28. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Issues Regarding Imposition of anOil Embargo Against Nigeria," GAO/GGD-95-24, November 1994,p. 2.

29. Ibid.30. Sunday New Nigeria, July 16, 1984.

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