the czechoslovak partial mobilization in may 1938: a mystery (almost) solved author(s): igor lukes

8/13/2019 The Czechoslovak Partial Mobilization in May 1938: A Mystery (almost) Solved Author(s): Igor Lukes

1/23

The Czechoslovak Partial Mobilization in May 1938: A Mystery (almost) SolvedAuthor(s): Igor LukesReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 699-720Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/261044 .

Accessed: 15/02/2013 04:49

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Contemporary History.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloade d on Fri, 15 Feb 2013 04:49:4 8 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/261044?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/261044?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd


2/23


3/23

Journal of Contemporary History

the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He found that

Prague's decision to call up reservists was a reasonable responseto a real German military threat.5 Donald Cameron Wattattempted to define a middle-ground view on the affair. In hisopinion, neither Berlin nor Prague had intended to provoke acrisis. It was 'a typical war-scare' which had been caused by the'bad nerves' of statesmen such as Benes, who had tried to predictHitler's next step. Watt, however, abandoned his neutral positionand assumed a definite partisan stand on the key issue of the con-troversy when he asserted that in May 1938 the Fiihrer 'was asyet not up to anything'.6 Unfortunately, after this brief and help-ful exchange of views, the discussion seemed to run aground.7This was caused not by lack of interest but by the scarcity ofprimary documents, especially from the closed archives inCzechoslovakia.

The purpose of this article is to restart the interrupted debate.I believe that I have the kind of new evidence which was tenta-tively anticipated by Professor Weinberg. On that basis, I will

argue that the partial mobilization took place neither becausePrague chose to escalate the crisis to pre-empt a diplomatic com-promise (Taylor), nor because the Wehrmacht had assumed anaggressive posture along the Czechoslovak border (Wallace), norbecause of nervous European statesmen who had mistakenlythought that Hitler was about to attack (Watt). I will demonstratethat Prague decided to carry out the partial mobilization in goodfaith, in response to reports gathered by the Second Bureau of the

Czechoslovak army's General Staff, but that the decision wasbased on disinformation. The Bureau and the Prague governmenthad been deliberately misled into thinking that a German offen-sive was imminent, when in reality Hitler had not taken, or hadnot intended to take, any such measures at the time. Con-sequently, neither Berlin nor Prague was the spiritus agens of theMay crisis. The culprit is a so far unknown third party, the sourceof the deception which set the events in motion in May 1938.

First some background. Tension between Berlin and Prague hadrisen to an unprecedented high in the spring of May 1938. Hitlerhad marched into Austria a little more than two months earlierand, although the Wehrmacht had performed poorly on its first'battlefield',8 it was clear to all militarily-minded observers in

700

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


4/23

Lukes: Czech Partial Mobilization in May 1938

Prague that the Anschluss had produced a disastrous situation for

Czechoslovakia: its soft underbelly, the poorly fortified approachto southern Moravia, was now exposed to a German surgicalstrike. Mechanized units could drive north from Austria tomeet a simultaneous Wehrmacht offensive moving south fromPrussian Silesia. Such an operation would cut Czechoslovakia inhalf and bring about a collapse of the defensive effort at the verybeginning of the war. It was generally accepted that after Hitlerhad consolidated his position in Austria, the next target of futureGerman activity would be Czechoslovakia. Indeed, as the Wehr-macht was creeping toward Vienna, a small unmarked airplaneflew from Bavaria over the Czechoslovak border and proceededto drop clouds of leaflets. The text could not be more suggestive:'Sagen Sie in Prag, Hitler lafit Sie grii3en'. The Fiihrer's regards tothe Prague government were duly conveyed.9 The country'sdomestic situation also provided no grounds for optimism.Tension in Czechoslovakia's German districts and throughout theSudetenland had been rising steadily since 1933. It dangerouslyescalated in late April 1938 when Konrad Henlein announcedthat he and his followers, members of the Sudetendeutsche Partei(SdP), were delighted to declare themselves in agreement withnazi ideology. 0This dashed any hope of solving Czechoslovakia'sminority problem by a negotiated compromise.

Despite such ominous international as well as domestic signs,the Czechoslovak President, Edvard Benes, had not anticipatedthe May crisis. On the morning of 20 May 1938, he gave a long

interview, followed by a photo session, to a journalist from Lifemagazine. At 12.30 pm, he received a writer and a photographerfrom Lyon Soir in yet another effort to counter hostile Germanpropaganda.' That session had to be kept short. Only minutesafter the French had been asked to leave, at 1.15 pm, Benesreceived Minister Machnik and the army's Chief of Staff,General Ludvik Krejci, who had requested an emergency meet-ing.12 The news they brought shattered the relatively peacefulcourse of the day. Machnik and Krejci told the president they hadconfirmed reports indicating a strategic concentration of nine totwelve German divisions along the Czechoslovak border.'3 Withthe Wehrmacht in Austria, the president's guests did not have towaste time explaining the possible significance of this develop-ment. Benes summoned Emil Sobota, a constitutional expert,and asked him what would count, on legal grounds, as an

701



5/23


appropriate Czechoslovak response.'4 Although Sobota was ably

assisted by Prokop Drtina, one of Benes's secretaries, it was twohours before the president was able to meet, at 4.30 pm, withrepresentatives of the main political parties. On this occasion,General Krejci presented for the second time that day evidence ofGerman military preparations against Czechoslovakia. It wasonly at 6.30 pm, that is, more than five hours after Benes had metMachnik and Krejci, that a meeting of the government withthe president took place. There was some debate regarding theproper extent of Czechoslovakia's response but no one doubtedthat definite military countermeasures would have to be taken.'5The soldiers were only too happy to oblige. The governmentaldecree which set the machinery in motion was grounded in lawno. 22 of the Defence Legal Code of May 1936, the main instru-ment for regulating Czechoslovak military affairs.

Viewed militarily, the operation was a success. MinisterMachnik called up one year-class (70,000) of the first-linereservists, five classes (114,000) of specialists, highly trained men

who had been issued distinct mobilization cards upon being dis-charged from regular service, and 15,000 men of the SOS units(Straz obrany statu, State Defence Guard), whose mission was tomaintain law and order in the border areas.'6 Altogether, some199,000 men were called up and the Czechoslovak army grewto a force of 383,000 determined, well-trained soldiers.l7 Thereservists, together with the standing army, marched into theSudetenland and occupied the front-line fortifications. They

could temporarily hold the frontier and prevent a German sur-prise attack. If Hitler were to move, there would be a shootingwar.

The mobilized reservists reported for duty with genuineenthusiasm. Having secured imaginative means of transporta-tion, many had arrived at their regiments hours before they wereexpected. Once in position, they worked with zeal and discipline.A US military observer, Major Lowell M. Riley, noted that 'theassembly and movement of Czech troops was smoothly and wellconducted'.'8 He stood on the outskirts of Prague, on the strategi-cally important road to Karlovy Vary, and watched a battalion ofmechanized infantry loaded on modern six-wheel trucks drivingtoward the Czechoslovak-German border. The American officerwas moved by the spirit displayed by the troops. They seemedcheerful and eager to fight.'9 Riley's initial impressions were later

702



6/23


confirmed by Czechoslovak army officers. They found that the

mobilized troops stood ready for a war against Hitler and thatthe Sudeten German followers of Henlein were taken aback bythe precision and discipline demonstrated by the army. Over-night, nazi symbols disappeared as did abusive behaviour by thelocal leaders of the SdP.20 Army generals seemed conspicuouslyproud,2' and Benes repeatedly expressed his satisfaction with theoperation.22 On 21 May 1938 he travelled to Tabor, a city with along military tradition, where he delivered one of the best politi-cal speeches of his life. Nothing, he told the audience, absolutelynothing could change the democratic character of Czechoslovakpolitical institutions. As for the future, Benes asserted that therewas no reason to be afraid. 'We are ready for everything', he con-cluded.23 After many months of passivity, uncertainty, andhumiliation, the path had now been cleared: Czechoslovakia wasnot Austria, it was not going to be wiped off the map without anall-out fight. In the Austrian case, Hitler opted for a combinationof internal subversion with external pressure. The May partialmobilization demonstrated that the Austrian pattern wasinapplicable in Czechoslovakia. The general feeling in Praguewas that, with the Anschluss Hitler had exhausted his reservoirof easy successes. If he wanted to go any further there woulddefinitely be war. First a local one, and finally a world war.24

German diplomacy, as was to be expected, reacted to thepartial mobilization with fury. The German minister in Prague,Ernst Eisenlohr, denied the existence of any military concentra-

tions in an interview with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister,Kamil Krofta.25 When Krofta insisted that German militarymeasures had been detected and verified, Eisenlohr respondedthat such reports were all 'grober Unsinn' [vulgar nonsense].26This was followed by a number of angry denials to the Czecho-slovak minister in Berlin, Vojtech Mastny. Officials of theforeign policy establishment, such as Ernst von Weizsacker andHans Georg von Mackensen, suggested that the rumours regard-ing German war preparations had been manufactured

bythose

who stood to profit from a war in Central Europe.27 It was notentirely clear to whom this referred. Mastny also had to endurean unpleasant interview with Joachim von Ribbentrop, whoinsisted that there was not a word of truth in Prague's assertionthat it was reacting to German mobilization. The GermanForeign Minister warned that in response to this provocation,

703



7/23


Hitler might order the very measures which Prague had

invented.28 The British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Hender-son, saw von Ribbentrop on instructions from London toreassure the German government that the British were doingtheir best to contain the crisis. Von Ribbentrop talked bitterlyabout the 'grossprecherische Herren in Prag' [the big-mouthedgentlemen from Prague] who could only lie when they spoke. SirNevile agreed that the Czechoslovak partial mobilization was'very foolish' and he pleaded for Berlin to show prudence. Hewas certain that if Hitler remained patient 'all will work well andGermany will score a sweeping victory'. Despite Henderson'sconciliatory efforts, Ribbentrop refused to part on friendly terms.He predicted that, unless satisfied, 'the German nation will standup as one man. Let no one have any illusions.'29 Berlin went so faras to spread the false rumour that the May partial mobilizationwas carried out by a Czechoslovak military clique that presentedthe Prague government with a fait accompli.30 The GermanLegation took part in this campaign designed to portray Czecho-

slovakia as a military dictatorship.3'Hitler was personally enraged by the audacity of the Prague

government, and the May crisis only strengthened his resolve todestroy Czechoslovakia. He sensed that the swift and enthusiasticstrategic concentration on the other side of the border had broughtabout a loss of German, and his own, prestige. Enraged, he satdown to rewrite the Operation Green directive.32 The very firstsentence now read: 'It is my unalterable intention to smash

Czechoslovakia by military action in the nearest future.'33 TheFiihrer accused the Prague government of having committedfraud in order to put terrorist pressure upon the course of munici-pal elections scheduled to take place on 22 May 1938.34 Actually,even with the Czechoslovak army deployed in the Sudetenland,the majority of the German population was free to vote for theSdP: in some parts, almost 90 per cent of the Sudeten Germansvoted for it. Overall, the party polled 82-85 per cent of theGerman vote.35 In larger cities, however, pro-Czechoslovakparties and German democrats held at least one third of the vote.36The anti-nazi German social democrats had been energized by theMay partial mobilization. Wenzel Jaksch, a leading personalityamong democratically-minded Germans in Czechoslovakia, saidin early June that Czechoslovakia would fight for its existence andindependence to the last man. The military measures taken in

704



8/23


May were but the first warning to all those blinded by their love

for the Fiihrer.37As well as Germany, Poland, too, was critical of Prague'sdecision to carry out the partial mobilization. A spokesman forthe Warsaw Foreign Ministry stated that Polish (intelligence)sources had confirmed the absence of any German military con-centrations. The military measures taken by Prague were but askilful manoeuvre designed to pacify the German minority, heasserted. He predicted that Great Britain and France would con-tinue

pressuringCzechoslovakia to make

biggerand

biggercon-

cessions to Hitler until the state itself dissolved.38 The director ofthe Eastern Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry, M.Kobylanski, received the Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw andarrogantly protested against the May partial mobilization. It wasuncalled-for and justified only by fantasies, he claimed.39 Tomake matters worse, the Polish ambassador in London informedthe British that 'there had not, in fact, been any concentration ofGerman troops on the Czechoslovak frontier ten days ago'. LordHalifax, who tended to blame the Prague government for theCzechoslovak-German crisis, was pleased to hear this andpromptly passed the information on to British diplomats inWarsaw.40

The partial mobilization in May 1938 played an important rolein the development of the Czechoslovak-German crisis, and itsaccurate analysis is crucial for our understanding of Europeandiplomacy on the eve of the second world war. As shown at the

beginning of this article, historians have so far had to rely ongenerally available German and British documents and on evi-dence seized from German officers and presented at Nurem-berg.4' Such sources of information had been exhausted by the1960s. The analysis which follows is based on documentsreceived and produced by the Second Bureau of the Czecho-slovak army's General Staff, i.e., the military intelligence service,in the course of the May crisis. The file consists of reports fromCzechoslovak

agentsin

Germanywho were controlled

bythe

Bureau's operational and counter-intelligence section. Its chief,Colonel (later General) Frantisek Moravec, passed such reportson to the chief of the analytical section of the service, ColonelFrantisek Havel. Unless indicated otherwise, information on thepartial mobilization is derived from this file.42

705



9/23


According to documents of the Second Bureau, the Prague

government decided to carry out the partial mobilization on thebasis of three sources of information. The first and most impor-tant source has not been identified. This is not surprising sinceonly case officers of the offensive, operational section of theSecond Bureau knew the real identity of agents who worked forthem. Intelligence analysts of the Second Bureau and personagesof the Prague government who had access to intelligence reportswere only told whether a particular source was reliable andwhether he possessed specialized (for instance, military) know-ledge. It was suggested that the primary source for ColonelMoravec and the whole operational section during the May crisiswas Paul Thiimmel, Czechoslovak agent A-54.43 It has now beenshown that Thiimmel met his control officers from the SecondBureau on Thursday, 12 May 1938. On that occasion, manyaspects of the Czechoslovak-German crisis were discussed, but astrategic concentration by the Wehrmacht was not mentioned.After this meeting the agent disappeared for several weeks; he

wrote to the Second Bureau only at the end of June 1938. Themessage stressed that the May crisis must have been caused by anerror on the part of the Czechoslovak authorities since anyGerman military action would have had to be preceded by a stateof readiness of the Abwehr - so-called Spannung - and that hadnot been declared. At the next meeting after a sixty-day hiatus(on Thursday, 11 August 1938) Thiimmel told Colonel Moravecand his colleagues that there was no immediate danger of a

German invasion. Spannung was not declared even in the middleof August, let alone in May.44 In short, Paul Thiimmel hadnothing to do with Prague's decision to carry out the Maymobilization.

A tentative case could be made that the source may have beenWilly Lange, agent D-14, a German social democrat and one-time deputy mayor of Leipzig, who had built up an information-gathering network among railroad personnel (mostly formersocial democrats and communists) in Germany. He worked forthe Second Bureau from the beginning of 1933. It is true that on20 May 1938 Prague received a message from Lange, who wrotein vague terms about movements of the Wehrmacht.45 However,it is shown below that the first of the reports that caused Prague todeclare the May mobilization had already been received two daysbefore 20 May. This, as well as the other reports from the source,

706



10/23


was detailed, involved specialized military terminology and could

not have come from a lower-ranking social democratic politicianwhose left-wing ideology and political career made him a primesuspect in the eyes of the Gestapo: Lange and his wife would haveto leave Germany in a hurry shortly after the Munich Agree-ment.46 It is well known that Heinrich Himmler's Gestapo hadefficiently flushed out the underground communist networks by1935. The Social Democratic Party, banned in June 1933, onlymonths after Hitler had outlawed the Communist Party, had alsocollapsed. When the May crisis broke out, most German commu-nists and social democrats were dead, imprisoned or exiled - orhad accepted the new circumstances in the Third Reich; many hadjoined the NSDAP. The likelihood that in 1938 Lange wascapable of running a vast network of agents (social democrats andcommunists who refused to surrender to the nazis), who couldsupply him and the Second Bureau with sophisticated militaryintelligence covering, as will be seen, at least a quarter of theGerman field army, is close to zero. In short, Willy Lange could

not have been the main trigger of the May crisis. It is important tonote that Colonel Havel shared this view. He stated for the recordthat in May 1938 A-54 was not the main source of the SecondBureau and he rejected out of hand the possibility that the crucialinformation had come from D-14.47 Colonel Havel held a grudgeagainst Colonel Moravec and his testimony has to be regardedwith caution when his rival, Moravec, is involved. But Havel is ascrupulously accurate witness in all other instances and we can

accept his opinion that the information, which caused Prague tocarry out the partial mobilization, had come neither from A-54nor from D- 14. For the sake of convenience, let us call the entitywhence came the information which resulted in the partialmobilization, 'the mystery source'.

Whoever he was, the mystery source was important enough toset the May crisis in motion. The first reports from Germanyindicating a strong military concentration in Saxony and in thenorth-eastern corner of Bavaria were received on the evening of18 May 1938. The analysts in the Second Bureau, who workedwith the raw material delivered to them by the operationalsection, were sceptical at first. Their initial reaction to the reportswas to write them off as politically motivated demonstrationsdesigned psychologically to strengthen the Henlein party for thecoming municipal elections and to scare the democratically-

707



11/23


minded German minority. However, three-and-a-half hours

after midnight on 20 May 1938, more reports from the sourceoperating in Germany were passed on to officers of the SecondBureau stationed in one of the Forward Intelligence Centrals(Predsunuta agenturni ustredna, PAU) which had been estab-lished throughout the tense border region during the 1930s.48 Thenew reports were immediately passed on to Prague where StaffCaptain (later Major) Kostka of the German Department,Analytical Section of the Second Bureau, received them at 6.15am. The emerging picture was alarming. The latest intelligencereports stated that hundreds of German reservists had been calledup in various locations along the Czechoslovak-German border.Furthermore, whole combat-ready Wehrmacht divisions weresaid to be leaving their barracks to assume jump-off positions inpreparation for offensive action. Unusually heavy activity by theLuftwaffe was reported in various cities along the Czechoslovakborders; several airports were said to have been placed under aspecial regime. Given the location and pattern of military activi-

ties for the past two days, there were similarities to what Czecho-slovak military specialists had observed on the eve of theAnschluss of Austria. Intelligence analysts in Prague workedfeverishly to produce a map capturing the essence of the reportsreceived during the night.

By 8 am on 20 May 1938, the Second Bureau had come upwith the following summary of reports that had been received sofar. In Saxony, elements of the 4th, 14th, and 24th Divisions

(IVth) had been concentrated along the Czechoslovak border. Innorthern Bavaria, units belonging to the 7th (XIth) and 17thDivisions (XIIIth) were 'alerted'. Additionally, the 19th and 31stDivisions (XIth) and the 23rd Division (IIIrd) were reportedlymoving toward the Czechoslovak border, together with units ofthe 22nd Division (Xth) from Bremen and the 12th Division(IIth) from Schwerin. The airport at Chemnitz was said to havereceived 32 fighters, Altenburg 100 fighters, and Plauen 8bombers. This looked ominous. Around noon, 20 May 1938, thedocument went from the Bureau's chief analyst, Colonel Havel,to the Bureau's chief, Colonel Frantisek Hajek, who quicklypassed it to General Bohumil Fiala, Deputy Chief of GeneralStaff. Fiala gave it to his boss, General Krejci, who, together withMinister Machnik, delivered it to President Benes at 1.15 pm.

In addition to the mystery source, Prague also heard from

708



12/23


British Intelligence. That was the second source of information.

The Second Bureau had approached the British with a request toconfirm or deny military activities in Germany.49 The Britishcomplied and communicated with Prague via the CzechoslovakLegation in Berlin. Minister Mastny came to the Legation on 20May 1938 early in the morning and discovered that ColonelAntonin Hron, the military attache, had already been in touchwith Prague, via his own channels. The Minister learned onlythat Hron had passed on to his superiors in the Second Bureau amessage from the British.50 This report, which Mastny never gotto see, stated that a good source with no military knowledgehad observed German military formations moving toward theCzechoslovak border. The British specifically mentioned a reportfrom an intelligence asset in Dresden regarding possible Germanmilitary concentrations in southern Silesia and northern Austria.All military leave in Dresden had been cancelled. However, theBritish were careful to state that, in their view, these wereprobably only demonstrations of military might, not preparationsfor an all-out aggressive action.51

Complementing the two intelligence reports from Germanywas information received from a third source, the domesticcounter-intelligence service. President Benes found out thatMinister Eisenlohr had boasted before a supposedly discreteaudience in the German Legation on 18 May 1938 that a Wehr-macht offensive was to be expected in the very near future. Thestatement was relayed to the authorities by an agent at the Lega-

tion.52Having heard from the Second Bureau, from the British, andnow from the German Legation, Benes no longer believed thatthe crisis could be handled exclusively by diplomats. He hadto take action because all seemed ominously clear: Hitler haddecided to repeat the Austrian scenario. He would invadeCzechoslovakia in concert with terrorist actions by the SudetenGerman Henleinists, who would cause disturbances in cities andcarry out acts of sabotage elsewhere. The latter would make itimpossible for the Czechoslovak army to make use of the defen-sive fortified positions that were being constructed at a feverishpace along the borders. The Wehrmacht would easily cut throughthe German districts of Czechoslovakia and prevent the armyfrom carrying out a general mobilization. Unopposed, the firstGerman units could reach Prague within hours. This scenario

709



13/23


seemed depressingly feasible and, therefore, Prague's decision to

declare the partial mobilization made complete sense.But there was a problem. Having mobilized, Prague beganhearing from various quarters that Germany had made no aggres-sive moves whatsoever. A second message from British Intelli-gence stated that London had no evidence for reports that the19th Division had moved from Hanover to an offensive posture

-this was most likely a response to another concrete inquiryfrom Prague. On 21 May 1938, just hours after the partialmobilization had been declared, Colonel Havel and others in theanalytical section started having doubts about the whole affair.Havel began speculating - and he had to speculate becauseonly the operational section knew the identity of the mysterysource - that all the reports had in fact come from one intelli-gence-gathering central, possibly one person who controlledseveral sub-agents. Havel's marginal comments on the materialshe received on 21 May 1938 grew more and more critical asthe crisis progressed. Specifically, Havel wondered how one

intelligence central could report on an area covering Nuremberg,Wurzburg, Augsburg, Zwickau, Aue, Johanngeorgenstadt,Eibenstock, Amberg, Regensburg, Deggendorf, and Straubing.The next day, after the mystery source reported that Germanyhad mobilized three year-classes and, in areas along theCzechoslovak border, six year-classes, the analysts became con-vinced that the reports were a hoax. 'The whole report, it isimmediately obvious, is fantastic', commented Havel in the

margin of one of the reports he had received from the operationalsection. How could one intelligence centre, even with many sub-agents, have had enough resources to investigate the area of Hof,Berlin, Munich, Kassel and Hanover? And how did it happenthat such large-scale German military measures had not beenconfirmed from other sources available to the Second Bureau?On 23 May 1938 Colonel Havel made up his mind that the offen-sive section was being deceived. He wrote that further analysis ofthe reports he received from the operational department was awaste of time. How could one source accurately report on move-ments of some ten higher units from the areas of all the GermanGruppenkommandos? That would have amounted to a quarter ofthe whole German field army, Havel noted ironically.

Moreover, a Czechoslovak diplomatic courier travelled on 23May 1938 from Prague to Switzerland via Munich and saw no

710



14/23


military concentrations anywhere. Agents of the Second Bureau

reported no suspicious movements in Austria, around Chemnitzand Leipzig in Saxony, in Glatz in Prussian Silesia, and in thearea Zittau-Bautzen-Gorlitz. The 23rd Division stationed inPotsdam was in its barracks and was following a regular, peace-time schedule. By 25 May 1938, the Second Bureau analystsnoted that the mystery source, who until the day before hadclaimed with confidence that the Wehrmacht had been on theverge of attacking Czechoslovakia, was now forced to report theabsence of detectable signs of any strategic concentrations.Finally, five days after the May crisis had started, PresidentBenes was informed by the Second Bureau via his MilitaryOffice, headed by General Sylvestr Blaha, that, according toCzechoslovak intelligence assets in Germany and a reliableforeign source, all units of the Wehrmacht were in their peace-time locations.53 Colonel Havel did not hesitate to express hiscontempt for the way in which the operational section had reliedon its mystery source and allowed itself to be fed disinformation.

Colonel Havel and other sceptics in the analytical section of theSecond Bureau could cause no harm to Czechoslovakia's reputa-tion since their work was, naturally, top secret. There is in fact noindication that President Benes himself was informed of theconflict within the Second Bureau between the operational andanalytical sections and he consequently never doubted thecorrectness of the decision to carry out the partial mobilization,although he privately admitted that the Second Bureau had

exaggerated the danger Czechoslovakia was facing on 20 May1938. Such a tendency, observed Benes, was the Second Bureau's'deformation professionelle'.54 Nevertheless, the president wasproud of Czechoslovakia's sudden action in May. He told the USmilitary attache in early July that had it not been for the Maymobilization Czechoslovakia would already have been at war.55Along with the president, the whole country lived under theimpression that the partial mobilization was, in fact, a response toan imminent German offensive.

Unfortunately, it was not only the analysts of the militaryintelligence under Colonel Havel who doubted the veracity of themystery source. Soon, information from all other quarters indi-cated that Havel's scepticism was justified. The British militaryattache in Prague, Colonel H.C.T. Stronge, a friend of the demo-cratic cause, was glad that Czechoslovakia had carried out the

711



15/23


partial mobilization. His report to London stated that it 'had a

most salutary effect on the [Sudeten] population, who werebecoming very confident and overbearing. . . . The lightningaction which had been taken left them dumbfounded and con-siderably sobered.'56 However, he drove all around Saxony andSilesia, and found no traces of any German military move-ments.57 Similarly, two British military diplomats posted in Berlinwere dispatched on an extensive reconnaissance through Saxonyand Silesia. Like Stronge, they found no signs of unusualGerman military activity.58 On 24 May 1938, French Intelli-gence, the Deuxieme Bureau, told the Second Bureau in Praguethat it had no reports of any untoward preparations in Germany.59The same day, the Czechoslovak air attache in Berlin flew backto Prague along a route designed to cover the most militarilysensitive areas; he was reported to have seen no military move-ments whatever. On 25 May 1938, another Czechoslovak officerflew from Berlin to Prague via Dresden and reported that nomilitary convoys were anywhere in sight. Altogether, Havel

noted, four allied military attaches and two Czechoslovakofficers were able to deny any noticeable preparations for aGerman military offensive. Colonel Havel was convinced thatthe whole affair had been provoked by Czechoslovakia'senemies. He did not speculate any further as to the identity andintentions of the source that had engineered the provocation.

The doubts expressed throughout the May crisis by the SecondBureau analysts and the reports of various military specialists

and diplomats who denied that the Third Reich was about toattack Czechoslovakia were justified. As we have seen, there was(and is) no evidence of a German strategic concentration againstCzechoslovakia in May 1938. Then why did the Prague govern-ment, which had so far behaved with characteristic caution,decide to carry out the partial mobilization?

Let us immediately dismiss the possibility that the mysterysource had made an honest error (caused, perhaps, by lack ofexperience or tension) during the undoubtedly difficult process ofgathering intelligence on behalf of democratic Czechoslovakia inthe hostile Third Reich. According to his report, ten Wehrmachtdivisions (4th, 7th, 12th, 14th, 17th, 19th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and31st) were alerted and involved in the strategic concentrationalong the Czechoslovak borders. We can check the plausibility ofthis report against a list prepared on 16 May 1938, two days

712



16/23


before hostile movements of the Wehrmacht were reported by the

mystery source; the author of the list was Lieutenant-Colonel(later General) Kurt Zeitzler of the German supreme head-quarters, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Hitler wantedZeitzler to name specific divisions which could march againstCzechoslovakia within twelve hours. Of the ten divisions identi-fied by the mystery source, five (4th, 7th, 14th, 17th and 24th)were in fact on Zeitzler's list. Those could plausibly have beeninvolved in that alleged concentration against Czechoslovakia,the beginning of which the mystery source reported on 18 May1938. However, the source had failed to report the state of readi-ness of five other divisions (3rd, 8th, 10th, 18th and 28th), whichwere on Zeitzler's list, while he fabricated the readiness of fiveothers (12th, 19th, 22nd, 23rd and 31st) which were not on thereliable list prepared by Zeitzler, and could not have been readyfor war forty-eight hours later.60 If a division is to be capable ofmarching within twelve hours, visible measures must be takenthat can be detected by any inquisitive layman; for instance,every tavern-owner can tell when a division is on that kind ofalert for he has no customers in uniform. All in all, the mysterysource's list was one third plausible and two thirds wrong, andthis has all the fingerprints of a professional deception. It willhave been noted that the picture of German military measureswhich the source delivered to Prague was far too sophisticated tohave come from well-meaning but inexperienced German demo-crats. It could only have come from professionals who knew a

great deal about the Wehrmacht and possessed specialized mili-tary knowledge.61

Once we reject the view that the mystery source had made anhonest error, we are left with the only remaining alternative, viz.,that the reports which came to the Second Bureau between 18May and 24 May 1938 were part of a deliberate deception. Theoffensive section of the Second Bureau had been deceived. Berlinsensed that this was, at least in part, the right explanation.The German Minister in

Praguetold an official of the Czecho-

slovak Foreign Ministry on 25 May 1938: 'The CzechoslovakGeneral Staff acted bona fide but it had been duped by its secretinformers.'62 But who was the source of the disinformation whichset the machinery in motion and produced the May crisis, andwhat were his objectives?

London and Paris are obviously innocent. They both saw in

713



17/23


Prague's decision to call up reservists a dangerous provocation, if

not an act of jingoism.63 Moreover, British Intelligence is onrecord as having told the Second Bureau that whatever measuresBerlin may have taken had been intended as a political demon-stration, and it subsequently denied any evidence of hostilepreparations against Czechoslovak territory. Paris was just assceptical and the Deuxieme Bureau rejected the possibility ofGerman aggression. The application of the principle cui bono?allows us to reject other potential candidates as sources of the dis-information which caused the May mobilization, e.g., Polandand Hungary. Neither had an interest in the outbreak of hostili-ties. In fact, they both stood to profit from the continuing crisis asit allowed them to press for their own territorial demands inPrague - weakened, yet not destroyed by Hitler. If the war hadbroken out and Czechoslovakia had been occupied by the Wehr-macht, Warsaw and Budapest could not have taken Teschen andsouthern Slovakia. The Poles and Hungarians wanted Czecho-slovakia to be weak so that they could seize the disputed territory.But they did not want Hitler's troops deployed in between them.Two authors have speculated that the deception operation mayhave been designed and carried out by the Abwehr.64 But evennow, almost six decades after the crisis, there is no evidence thatWilhelm Canaris, Hans Oster or anybody else in the Abwehrcommunity had planned in May 1938 to scare Hitler from esca-lating the crisis with Czechoslovakia any further.

It has been suggested that the culprit may have been in the

Kremlin: in spring 1938 Stalin feared not war but a diplomaticarrangement between the western allies and Hitler leading to thecollapse of Czechoslovakia. That would have isolated the SovietUnion and brought the Wehrmacht into its own backyard.Therefore, Stalin may have attempted to trigger the outbreak ofhostilities, hoping that the Czechoslovak-German war wouldsoon also involve France, and perhaps even Great Britain.65 If aconflict between Prague and Berlin had broken out, Frenchparticipation would have been taken for granted in May 1938,since there was as yet no indication that Paris was prepared toviolate its commitments toward Czechoslovakia. Soviet Intelli-gence had, in fact, an active central in Prague. It was code-namedVONAPO 2066 and it became operational on 27 May 1936.67 Itconsisted of a Soviet rezident, whom the Second Bureau called'Rudolf, a Czech liaison officer, support staff, and agents in

714



18/23


the field, especially in Germany. If the Soviet Union had in fact

misled the Czechoslovaks to believe that a partial mobilizationwas necessary VONAPO 20 would have been the disinformationchannel. Of course, this theory is not verifiable at the momentand it comes to mind only as a result of the exclusion of otherpossible culprits. It is offered here as a suggestion for futureresearch.

For the time being, we can be satisfied that Hitler did notintend to attack Czechoslovakia in May 1938. However, Praguehad been misled by a professional intelligence

organizationinto

believing that he did, and the Czechoslovak government there-fore carried out the partial mobilization. The identity of thesource whose reports had caused the confusion remains unclear.In my view, light will be cast on it once the presidential and otherrelevant archives in Moscow finally become accessible to westernresearchers.68

Notes

Research for this paper was conducted in various archives in Prague, theCzech Republic, and in the National Archives (NA), Washington DC. InPrague, I worked in the Archives of the Ministry of Interior (AMI); theArchives of the National Museum, Vojtech Mastny (ANM-M), JaromirSmutny (ANM-S); the State Central Archives at Loreta (SCA); the MilitaryHistorical Archives, Edvard Benes (MHA-B), Military Office of the Presi-dent (MHA-MOP); the Archives of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of Czechoslovakia (ACC CPC).

1. AMI. File 12434. Minister Machnik, a member of the Republican(Agrarian) Party, paid a high personal price for Czechoslovakia's dismember-ment in 1938-9. He was arrested by the Gestapo on 12 July 1943 in Klatovy,a town west of Prague, after three members of a resistance organization hadnamed him as an accomplice. The Gestapo gave the former minister a clearchoice: betray others, or face the predictable consequences. Machnik declinedthe offer to become an informer and was sentenced to death for treasonagainst the Third Reich on 16 December 1943 by a special court in Dresden.He stayed on death row until 9 September 1944 when his sentence wascommuted to ten years in a concentration camp. Machnik took part in theinfamous death march and was liberated by the US Army on 29 April 1945.He returned to Prague on 22 May 1945.

2. Military experts like to point out that since no new units had beenformed, one should not use the term 'mobilization'. Indeed, the official termused by the Czechoslovak army planners was 'mimoradna vojenska opatreni',i.e., emergency military measures.

715



19/23


3. Gerhard L. Weinberg, 'The May Crisis, 1938', Journal of ModernHistory, 29, 3 (September 1957), 213-25.

4. A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London 1961),165.

5. W.V. Wallace, 'The Making of the May Crisis of 1938', The Slavonicand East European Review, XLI, 97 (June 1963), 368-90.

6. D. Cameron Watt, 'The May Crisis of 1938: A Rejoinder to MrWallace', The Slavonic and East European Review, XLIV, 103 (July 1966),475-80; see also W.V. Wallace, 'A Reply to Mr Watt', The Slavonic and EastEuropean Review, XLIV, 103 (July 1966), 481-6.

7. The May crisis continued to receive attention in books. For instance,Henderson B. Braddick, Germany, Czechoslovakia, nd the Grand Alliance inthe May Crisis, 1938 (Denver, CO 1969); Telford Taylor, Munich. The Priceof Peace (Garden City, NY 1979); D. Cameron Watt, How War Came: TheImmediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York 1989)and Robert Kvacek, Obtizne spojenectvi: Politicko-diplomaticke vztahy meziCeskoslovenskem a Francii, 1937-1938 [The difficult alliance: politico-diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and France, 1937-38] (Prague1989). It was also dealt with in articles, as part of larger topics, e.g., D.Cameron Watt, 'Hitler's Visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: AStudy in Hitler's Response to External Stimuli', Journal of Contemporary

History,9, 1

(January 1974),23-32.

8. MHA-B. Fond Munich, Box 7. The Czechoslovak Legation, Vienna,no date, no addressee. The report found that the German action had shownsigns of improvisation. The troops had revealed lack of training and juniorofficers had not mastered basic leadership skills.

9. ANM-S. Box 38, 12 March 1938.10. R.G.D. Laffan, Survey of International Affairs 1938 (London 1951),

vol. 2, 96.11. The Office of the President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, the

Castle, Prague, Book of Presidential Audiences for 1938.12.

Prokop Drtina,recalled

(Ceskoslovensko, mujosud

[Toronto 1982], 59)that General Jan Syrovy had accompanied Machnik and Krejci. But after thewar Syrovy testified that he had only found out about the partial mobilizationon 21 May 1938 while he was on a tour of inspection in Trutnov. He thenreturned to Prague in a hurry (SCA. The National Tribunal, TNS 1/47, JanSyrovy).

13. SCA. The National Tribunal, NS, interrogation protocol of armyGeneral Ludvik Krejci (ret.) of 16 April 1946. General Krejci was the army'sChief of Staff from 1 December 1933 to 1 March 1939. As the crisisdeveloped, on 25 May 1938, the US Military Attache, Major Lowell M.Riley, was told on 25 May 1938 by Colonel Benes, the spokesman of theDefence Ministry, that altogether seven German divisions had been movedfrom their peacetime locations and deployed along the Czechoslovak border.See NA. US MA Lowell M. Riley, US Legation, Prague, report no. P-745,25 May 1938, G-2/2657-II-95-3.

14. Drtina, Ceskoslovensko, 9.15. SCA. The Ministerial Council, PMR, Government protocols XVII-

29.

716



20/23


16. These units were typically deployed in critical areas along the border,often in front of the fortified line.

17. MHA. The Ministry of National Defence, the General Staff, firstdepartment, 1938, Box 242.

18. NA. US Military Attach6 Major Lowell M. Riley, US Legation,Prague, 1 June 1938, 2657-11-90, Box 1704.

19. NA. US Military Attache Major Lowell M. Riley, US Legation,Prague, 24 May 1938, P-742, G-2/2657-II-95-1.

20. MHA-MOP. A report by the Second Bureau of the General Staff,1938, secret, 444, 1 June 1938.

21. ANM-S. Box 38, 23 May 1938.22. ANM-S. 24 May 1938: 'The President is happy that our military

measures worked so smoothly. The soldiers made a good impression. Nowit's important not to ruin it politically.'

23. Narodni osvobozeni, 22 May 1938.24. Ferdinand Peroutka, 'Co bylo, nebude' [What has been, won't be],

Pritomnost, XV, 12 (23 March 1938).25. MHA-B. Fond Munich, Box 1, documents on the May crisis, no. 2.26. MHA-B. Fond Munich, Box 1, Eisenlohr's telegram to Berlin, 21

May 1938.27. MHA-B. Fond Munich, Box 1, documents on the May crisis, nos 4

and 5.28. MHA-B. Fond Munich, Box 1, document on the May crisis, no. 6.29. MHA-B. Fond Munich, Box 1, document no. 7.30. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, series D, vol. II

(Washington, DC 1953-9), no. 181, 308-9.31. MHA-B. Fond Munich, Box 8, MOP, 24 May 1938, report of Dr

Passer, a Czechoslovak reserve officer, who had spoken with Dr Hoffmann, asecretary of the German legation in Prague.

32. Operation Green was the code-name for German aggression againstCzechoslovakia. Its origins go back to May 1935. It had been intermittentlyupdated until it received its final shape three years later.

33. Trial of the Major War Criminals [TMWC], XXV (Nuremberg 1947),434-5. The original text was as follows: 'Es ist mein unabanderlicherEntschluss, die Tschechoslowakei in absehbarer Zeit durch eine militarischeAktion zu zerschlagen.' See also ACC CPC. Fond 100/45, file 8, archivalunit, 177, Kniha o prepadeni Ceskoslovenska ve svetle dokumentu predlozenychMezinarodnimu vojenskemu soudu v Norimberku (Prague, no date, probably1946).

34. Norman H. Baynes, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, vol. II (New York1942), 1494.

35. Dwight E. Lee, Ten Years: The World on the Way to War, 1930-1940(Boston 1942), 320.

36. ANM-S. Box 38, 24 May 1938. The document states that such was thecase in Ceska Lipa, Duchcov, Teplice, Most.

37. Lidove noviny, 10 June 1938.38. MHA-B. Box 470, the Czechoslovak Legation, Warsaw, to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 27 May 1938.39. MHA-B. Box 10, Dr Juraj Slavik, the Czechoslovak Legation,

717



21/23


22/23


cated with the British Intelligence Service via Major Harold Charles Gibsonwho was posted to Prague (as a passport officer at the British Legation) soonafter Hitler's Machtergreifung. He established solid ties with the Czecho-slovak Second Bureau and (on 14 March 1939 at 5 pm) masterminded theescape from Prague of Moravec and his ten colleagues, only hours before theWehrmacht occupied the country.

50. ANM-M. Mastny, Memoirs, 72. This is an unpublished manuscript.51. The British report stated, 'Der Berichterstatter st der Meinung, dass

die Deutschen fur die Wahlen in der Tschechoslowakei eine Truppen-demonstration an den Grenzen in Absicht haben.'

52. MHA-B. Box 1. Minister Eisenlohr, the German Legation, Prague, 18May 1938, 8 pm, no. 147.

53. MHA-B. Box 8, MOP, 25 May 1938.54. ANM-S. Box 38, 23 May 1938: 'Well', said the president, 'but Krejci

had wanted too much. But I stood firm and, as we can see, it has worked verywell.' Drtina states that Minister Machnik and General Krejci had originallydemanded a mobilization of five year-classes and that President Benesnegotiated the request down to one year-class. See Drtina, Ceskoslovensko,61-2.

55. NA. Major Lowell M. Riley, US Military Attache, Prague, report no.P-799, 5 July 1938, G-2/2657-II-90-30. Riley spoke with Benes on 2 July1938.

56. Public Record Office, London. FO 408/68.C5435/4786/18.Newton's report to Halifax of 1 June 1938 includes a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Stronge to Newton on the former's trip to the Sudetenland on 28 and29 May 1938.

57. H.C.T. Stronge, 'The Military Approach to Munich', The Times, 29September 1967. Colonel Stronge's reports, often contradicting those of hiscolleague in Berlin, Colonel (later General) Sir Frank Noel Mason-Macfarlane, were mostly ignored by Whitehall, and Stronge's military careerafter his tour of duty in Prague was short and unillustrious. See Stronge, 'TheCzechoslovak

Armyand the Munich Crisis: A Personal Memorandum' in

War and Society, vol. 1, 162-77.58. Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission, Berlin 1937-1939 (New

York 1940), 136-7. Sir Nevile speculated that the Prague government hadbeen misled by 'unskilled agents and observers'.

59. Colonel Havel, 'Zpravodajska cinnost 2. oddeleni hlavniho stabu cs.armady v letech 1936-1939' [Intelligence activities of the Second bureau ofthe general staff of the Czechoslovak army, 1936-39], 50-1; the manuscripthas 176 typed pages and is deposited at the Military Historical Institute inPrague.

60. TMWC, XXV, 420. It will be noticed that Zeitzler listed divisionswhich could march within twelve hours, not divisions which had marchedagainst Czechoslovakia.

61. Having written this sentence (in the summer of 1994) I received (inDecember 1994) a communication from Professor Donald Cameron Wattwho wrote: 'The reports reaching the Czechs were far too detailed and far-reaching to be the product of error, or of misinterpretation of the naturalregrouping of German forces consequent on the occupation of the Austro-

719



23/23


Czech border and the incorporation of the Austrian army in the Reichswehr.They were a deliberate piece of misinformation.'

62. Dokumenty k historii mnichovskeho diktatu, 1937-1939 [Documents onthe history of the Munich Diktat] (Prague 1979), document no. 66, 119.

63. ACC CPC. Fond 100/24, file 172, archival unit 1524. Benes's state-ment to David, Stasek, Gottwald, Richter, Rasin, Stransky, Klima and Tykalon 30 September 1938 at 2 pm.

64. Gebhart and Kuklik, 'Zapas o Ceskoslovensko', 59. This is a manu-script I received from the first of the two authors in January 1990.

65. Igor Lukes, 'Did Stalin Desire War in 1938? A New Look at SovietBehavior During the May and September Crises', Diplomacy Statecraft, 2,1 (March 1991), 28-30 and idem, 'Benesch, Stalin und die Comintern: VomMiinchner Abkommen zum Molotow-Ribbentrop Pakt', Vierteljahrshefte urZeitgeschichte, 3 (1993), 346-53.

66. It is said that the acronym stood for voennyi nabliudatelnyi post (inRussian) and volajici na pousti (in Czech).

67. Colonel Moravec claimed that co-operation between Czechoslovakand Soviet intelligence was agreed upon on 16 May 1935 when Prague andMoscow signed The Treaty of Mutual Assistance Between the CzechoslovakRepublic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Moravec, Spion,jemuz neverili, 97-110 and 154-61 and Kokoska, Spor o agenta A-54, 53.

68. The mostinteresting

would be the archives of the GRU, Soviet mili-tary intelligence, and the NKVD. Helpful would be the opening of the so-called presidential archives in the Kremlin.

Igor Lukesis University Associate Professor of

International Affairs at Boston Universityand a Fellow of the Russian Research

Center at Harvard. His most recentpublication is Czechoslovakia Between

Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of EdvardBenes in the 1930s (New York 1996).

720