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The Custom Defense Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. The Custom Defense Gastone Nencini – Senior Technical Manager South Europe

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Page 1: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

The Custom Defense

Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc.

The Custom DefenseGastone Nencini – Senior Technical Manager South Europe

Page 2: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

Evolution of Security

Integrated & Flexible Threat & Data Protection

Bu

sin

ess F

lexib

ilit

y

Cloud

Virtualization

Cloud-Era Security

Network and Security Evolution / Time

Bu

sin

ess F

lexib

ilit

y

Mobility

3/26/2013 2Confidential | Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc.

Page 3: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

CRIMEWARE

CO

MP

LE

XIT

Y

Security that Fits: Threat Landscape

Spyware

Intell igent

Botnets

Web Threats

Targeted

Attacks

Evolution to Cybercrime

2001 2003 2004 2005 2007 2012+

Vulnerabil it ies

Worm Outbreaks

Spam

Mass MailersSocial

Engineering

Single Shot Malware

Data Exfiltration

3/26/2013 3Confidential | Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc.

Page 4: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities

January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key

February 2011 HBGary hacked by Anonymous and resulted data leakage

March 2011 Authentication product related information leaked from RSA

April 2011 77 million customers’ data leakage from Sony PSN users

May 2011 360,000 US City Group customers’ data leaked

4

May 2011 360,000 US City Group customers’ data leaked

July 2011 leakage of personal data of 35 million users of Korean social network site

August 2011 Japanese defense related firms suffered from cyber attacks

September 2011 Japanese National Personnel Authority and Cabinet Office sites were temporarily unavailable by DDoS attacks

June 2011 Major US defense contractor Lockheed Martin attacked

October 2011 PCs in Japanese House of representatives infected by virus; possible data leakage ※ These information are all extracts from news

4

Page 5: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

Repeated damages caused by Advanced Persistent Attacks

The series of attacks which intend to penetrate inside of target firms and organizations

using several methods like Emails with malicious program attached or exploiting

vulnerabilities to steal information or hijack computers communicating with the external parties.

Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. 5Advanced

Persistent Attack

・ for fun

・ for a justice

・ for money

・ spying

・ agitation

・ terrorism

< Examples of principal motives >

Exploiting vulnerabilities in public servers, penetrate

into target networks directly from outside.

Using social engineering and other techniques,

penetrate into target network by manipulating users

inside target networks

< 2 typical types of penetration in Advanced Persistent Attack >

Page 6: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

Repeated damages caused by Advanced Persistent Attacks

Their technique cunningly exploits not only systems but also human weakness as a means to gain access

Prior to the attack, the attackers confirm that their attack will not detected by major

antivirus solutions

Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. 6

It is difficult to cope with new threats which are born every seconds in real time manner only with pattern file

deployment.

Because the attacker knows the target’s internal environment on attacking, the attack can

be delivered very efficiently.

Because the back door facilitates unauthorized traffic from inside out, it is hard to cope with this by traditional entry solution.

When traffic is encrypted by viruses detection by IDS or IPS is difficult

Page 7: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

The Targeted Attack Process

Preparation for

attack

Initial

penetration

Establishment

of attack

platform

System

investigation

Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

As a preparation stage before

they conduct attacks, the

attackers investigate

information of target

organization.For that, they attack

Various methods are used in

the initial penetration stage.

Suspicious (targeted)

email is one such method. These methods are used to

deploy viruses deep within the

Once the attackers succeed to get

into the system, they quickly

establish a backdoor for

communication with a server they prepare. Unlike the traditional

backdoors , this backdoor is the

Using the attack plat-form

established in the prior stage,

the attackers search for

internal system

information.At this time, a back door is

They steal information via

the backdoor. In some cases, using information

stolen, they repeat attacks.

APT is the attack which the

Attack on the

ultimate target

Stage 4

Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. 7

For that, they attack

organizations around

target to collect platform information for initial intrusion

like Emails exchanges

between that organization and

the target.

Using this information, they

conduct attacks which

increase the success

rate of the initial penetration.

deploy viruses deep within the

organization.

In this stage, the attack can

achieve the goal only when

one employee open that

Email.In the initial penetration stage,

there is no need for virus to

infect many systems. It is

thought that the attack

methods used at this stage are

expected to be detected and

cleaned. That mean they are

disposable.

backdoors , this backdoor is the

one that uses HTTP and other

communication protocols that are

used in the business in the target

organization. Thus it cannot be

blocked by a firewall.Using this backdoor, they will add

functions needed for next system

investigation stage, and an attack

platform will be established.

At this time, a back door is

used to communicate

with the attackers and the search will be continued

while confirming system

information.

APT is the attack which the

attackers keep attack platform

which established in the target

organizations to repeat

penetrations and data

thefts. This attack is the one tend to be

repeated several times.

Source: IPA design/ maintenance guide to aim for the

solution against “new type of attack”.

Page 8: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

What actually happens at each stages?

Preparation for

attack

Initial

penetration

Establishment

of attack

platform

System

investigation

Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Attack on the

ultimate target

Stage 4

Direct attack

exploiting system

vulnerabilities

Investigation of IP,

applications, used

updated status etc.

Unauthorized

exporting of key dataExecution of initial

stage virus.

Searching for server

vulnerabilities and

spreading viruses

Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. 8

Email with malicious

PDF attachment

sent from attacker

which pretend to be

come from a

superior or a

business contact

Penetration via USB

memory

Penetration via PC

brought into

organization

Penetration into

affiliated companies,

overseas branches

etc..

Assuming rules for

generating email

addresses.

Information about

target organization

gathered via

Facebook or other

social media

Communication with

external command

server and new

malicious activity

Using target as a

springboard for

attacking other

systems

Downloading bots

and other new

viruses

Download and

execution of

backdoor virus

Exporting ID,

passwords etc..

Accessing confidential

data by exploiting

acquired ID and

password

System

falsification

Installing key logger

and obtaining

sysadmin authority

Page 9: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

The type of malicious files attached

Preparation for

attack

Initial

penetration

Establishment

of attack

platform

System

investigation

Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Attack on the

ultimate target

Stage 4

Direct attack

exploiting system

vulnerabilities

Investigation of IP,

applications, used

updated status etc.

Unauthorized

exporting of key dataExecution of initial

stage virus.

Searching for server

vulnerabilities and

spreading viruses

Types of malicious attachments

Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. 2

Email with malicious

PDF attachment

sent from attacker

which pretend to be

come from a

superior or a

business contact

Penetration via USB

memory

Penetration via PC

brought into

organization

Penetration into

affiliated companies,

overseas branches

etc..

Assuming rules for

generating email

addresses.

Information about

target organization

gathered via

Facebook or other

social media

Communication with

external command

server and new

malicious activity

Using target as a

springboard for

attacking other

systems

Downloading bots

and other new

viruses

Download and

execution of

backdoor virus

Exporting ID,

passwords etc..

Accessing confidential

data by exploiting

acquired ID and

password

System

falsification

Installing key logger

and obtaining

sysadmin authority

Email with malicious

PDF attachment

sent from attacker

which pretend to be

come from a

superior or a

business contactDocument files like PDF, Word and EXCEL

70%

Executables 30%

Source: Trend Micro

Page 10: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

How we can prevent them?

Preparation for

attack

Initial

penetration

Establishment

of attack

platform

System

investigation

Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Attack on the

ultimate target

Stage 4

Direct attack

exploiting system

vulnerabilities

Investigation of IP,

applications, used

updated status etc.

Unauthorized

exporting of key dataExecution of initial

stage virus.

Searching for server

vulnerabilities and

spreading viruses

Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. 2

Email with malicious

PDF attachment

sent from attacker

which pretend to be

come from a

superior or a

business contact

Penetration via USB

memory

Penetration via PC

brought into

organization

Penetration into

affiliated companies,

overseas branches

etc..

Assuming rules for

generating email

addresses.

Information about

target organization

gathered via

Facebook or other

social media

Communication with

external command

server and new

malicious activity

Using target as a

springboard for

attacking other

systems

Downloading bots

and other new

viruses

Download and

execution of

backdoor virus

Exporting ID,

passwords etc..

Accessing confidential

data by exploiting

acquired ID and

password

System

falsification

Installing key logger

and obtaining

sysadmin authority

Page 11: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

ISACA & Trend MicroISACA & Trend MicroISACA & Trend MicroISACA & Trend Micro

Page 12: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

Advanced Persistent Threat Awareness

Study Results

© 2013 ISACA. All rights reserved

Page 13: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

questions & commentsquestions & comments

Copyright 2011 Trend Micro Inc.

Page 14: The Custom Defense - AIEA · December 2010 Cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities January 2011 21-year-old George Hotz decrypts Sony PS3 root key February 2011 HBGary hacked by

Copyright 2011 Trend Micro Inc.

Thank you!

[email protected]