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Case 334

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISISUnited States Deliberations and Negotiations

at the Edge of the Precipice

Gabrielle S. BrusselColumbia University

BACKGROUND

On Monday, October 22, 1962, after six days ofsecret U.S. government deliberations, President JohnF. Kennedy announced on television that the SovietUnion had placed offensive nuclear missiles inCuba. The Soviets had staged a sealift to Cuba,which had begun in July of that year and continuedover the next few months, which constituted amajor military deployment involving more than onehundred shiploads and containing several thousandvehicles and more than twenty thousand men. U.S.policymakers interpreted these actions as contradic-tions of explicit Soviet pledges and statements thatSoviet aid to Cuba was defensive and would remainso.

The United States employed political pressure onbilateral and multilateral levels—through both for-mal and informal channels. It also applied militarypressure while policymakers sought to resolve thecrisis short of war. The United States succeeded inpresenting a firm and resolved stance, but it stoppedshort of a bellicose response. The administration,and particularly the president, was not interested inbeginning a military confrontation with the SovietUnion, but the United States was strongly commit-

ted to proving to its allies and adversaries that itcould meet whatever it perceived as a threat to itsnational security and its sphere of influence. Fur-thermore, since the Soviets had been warnedagainst employing such a display of force, theadministration wanted to prove it would back upstatements of policy with actions.

Publicly the crisis lasted for six days—fromKennedy’s speech on October 22 until the officialSoviet statement on October 28 that the missiles inCuba would be dismantled and removed from theisland. For U.S. policymakers, however, the crisisbegan on October 16 at 11:45 A.M. during the firstmeeting of the group of advisors that becameknown as the ExComm.1 The group served the pres-ident almost twenty-four hours a day as the UnitedStates managed the situation.

When they were presented with the evidence ofthe missiles, U.S. government officials were sur-prised and angered by the Soviet deception.Kennedy personally assembled a politically diversegroup of advisors comprising representatives of thepublic and private sectors that he believed wouldcontribute to a successful resolution. They were menhe depended on regardless of rank or political affilia-tion, men he believed served their country and hisadministration above all. They were recruitedregardless of seniority, the criteria for their selectionbeing President Kennedy’s assessment of their intel-ligence, judgment, and loyalty. During the crisis thisadvisory group consisted of:

Copyright 1992, 1988 by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.ISBN: 1-56927-334-0Publications, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.20057–1025 http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/

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2222 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy

Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon

Secretary of State Dean Rusk (who was absent dur-ing a large part of the deliberations)

Under Secretary of State George Ball

Soviet expert and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson2

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric

General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Assistant Secretary for International Security AffairPaul Nitze

The Central Intelligence Agency membersincluded Deputy Director Marshall Carter for thefirst day and Director John McCone, who returned toWashington on October 16, thereafter. The specialassistants/advisors to the president included:

McGeorge Bundy, advisor on national security affairs

Presidential Counsel Theodore “Ted” Sorenson

Kenneth O’Donnell

Other intermittent participants included:

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin M. Martin

Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, U.S. representative tthe United Nations

USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson

State Department Director of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who left the deliberations after a naval quarantine was chosen as the U.S. policy response but served as Kennedy’s personal emissary to France and West Germany

Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett

Wall Street lawyer and former High Commissioner of Germany John McCloy

The ExComm was primarily divided into twocamps—the hawks and the doves3—with the hawksadvocating a military confrontation and the doves

stressing negotiation. The hawks included TaylorAcheson, the Joint Chiefs (without U.S. Marine CorpsCommandant David Shoup), McCloy, Nitze, and, ini-tially, Dillon and McCloy. The doves were RobertKennedy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Ball, Thompson,Sorenson, Stevenson and Lovett. The others wereindecisive, shifting their opinions as the days woreon.

The president mandated, and his advisorsagreed, that the crisis remain secret until the UnitedStates formulated a plan. Consequently, to avoidleaks, the circle of people in government who knewabout the crisis remained extremely tight. The groupmet almost continuously for the two weeks of thecrisis. It broke up into smaller groups for purposes ofanalysis and debates while experts presented infor-mation, but the composition of the general groupremained consistent.

The Soviets placed missiles on an island that theUnited States had viewed as its backyard since thelate nineteenth century. U.S.-Cuban relationsthough certainly strained by 1962, had been closelytied for almost a hundred years. As far back as1808, U.S. foreign policy and government officialshad viewed Cuban interests “as their own.”Repeated offers to buy Cuba culminated in theOstend Manifesto of 1854, which stated that theUnited States had the “right” to acquire Cuba. LaterU.S. government officials asserted that Cuba was“indispensable to the United States.”

On January 1, 1959, Cuban rebels took control ofthe government. The United States officially recog-nized the new regime on January 7. Not long after,U.S.-Cuban relations began to deteriorate. Tensionsincreased steadily, and the two nations went head-to-head in public forums. Cuban Prime MinisterFidel Castro refused to back the United-States in itsCold War with the Soviet Union. In April 1959, Presi-dent Dwight D. Eisenhower publicly refused to meetwith Castro during his trip to the United States,instead leaving Washington to play golf. By Decem-ber Castro had declared himself and his revolutionCommunist and had received substantial Sovietbacking. Soon the United States reduced trade withCuba and refused to purchase sugar from Cubaabove world sugar prices. Cuba increased its anti-American rhetoric. The Soviets began to purchasesugar at premium prices, sent aid packages, andpromised to “support the Cuban people with . . .rocket fire if aggressive forces in the Pentagondare[d] to launch an intervention against Cuba.”

Trade between the United States and Cuba dimin-ished quickly. In 1958 exports from the UnitedStates totaled 69.8 percent of Cuban imports; by

Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 3333

1961 this figure was down to 3.7 percent. In con-trast, Soviet imports from Cuba rose during thesame period from 0 to 48.2 percent. Trade withSoviet bloc countries accounted for 73.4 percent ofCuba’s trade in 1961, while just three years earlier ithad been a mere 2.5 percent. Tensions culminatedin expropriation of all U.S. property in Cuba (1960–61) and the 1962 U.S. trade embargo. Further exac-erbating the relationship was the 1961 Bay of Pigsepisode. Supported by the CIA and personallyapproved by President Kennedy, anti-Castro Cubanexiles attempted to invade Cuba. The invasionfailed, and the U.S. government withdrew its air sup-port of the exiles after they reached the island.Although Kennedy made a public apology and theadministration pursued diplomatic negotiations tosecure the release of captured exiles from Cubanjails, the crisis contributed greatly to strained rela-tions. Moreover, the Kennedy administrationemployed policies that had the potential to causethe ouster or death of Fidel Castro. The UnitedStates also encouraged the political and diplomaticisolation of Cuba with the declaration by the Organi-zation of American States (OAS) in January 1962that Cuba’s government was incompatible with theinter-American system. These incidents and poli-cies created an atmosphere of mistrust and misap-prehension, with the Soviets and the Cubansexpecting an invasion and the United States fearingincreased Soviet-Cuban ties and military build-ups

Cuba’s importance to the United States is a resultof its geography and politics. it is ninety miles fromthe tip of Florida, closer than Puerto Rico to thecoast of United States. It lies on the Windward Pas-sage, the Straits of Florida, the Yucatan Channel, andthe shipping lanes from the east coast of the UnitedStates. It has direct access to the strategic sea lanesof South and Central America, the Caribbean andthe Western allies of the United States. Since itsearly role as a colony of Spain, Cuba’s proximity tothe Caribbean sea lanes that carry trade to LatinAmerica has given it strategic importance.

Cuba was the only communist country that had aU.S. naval base on its territory. It was also the onlycountry that maintained both Soviet and U.S. mili-tary installations and by which Soviet naval vesselsfreely passed. Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, cover-ing forty-five square miles, 1 percent of Cuban terri-tory, trains more than 40,000 U.S. militarypersonnel every year. Built after the Treaty of Paristhat ended the Spanish-American War, Guantánamowas leased in perpetuity to the United States. TheCastro government has long maintained that theagreement for the base is illegitimate because the

governments were not “on equal footing” andbecause Cuba was coerced into the contract by aforeign government. Many U.S. government offi-cials and analysts feared that the Soviet Unionwould request a U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamoin exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missilesfrom Cuba. This proposition was never brought tothe negotiating table, and President Kennedy main-tained during the ExComm deliberations that itwould be rejected “out of hand.”

The Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba wentbeyond actual military and strategic importance; itwas a modern, post-nuclear affront to U.S. perceivedinterests dating back to the early nineteenth cen-tury. On December 2, 1823, President James Mon-roe delivered an address to Congress in which heasserted that the United States viewed the WesternHemisphere as its sphere of influence and that Euro-pean expansionism in the Western Hemispherwould be regarded as “dangerous to [United States]peace and safety.” The United States would respondin whatever manner was necessary to protect itself.In May 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt’s“Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrinerefined the U.S. view of European expansionism byasserting that the United States had the “right” tointervene in the Western Hemisphere and Carib-bean. Thus, the United States has long consideredthe Western Hemisphere a special region of influ-ence.

Although the Monroe Doctrine was originally di-rected at Western European expansion, subsequentinterpretations were directed at the Soviet Unionand the possibility of Soviet expansion in the region.The 1962 decision to put missiles in Cuba madeCuba the first Soviet ally to receive ballistic missiles.The United States viewed this policy as a direct at-tack against its public and private perceptions of re-gional influence and global balance. “Ever since theMonroe Doctrine, the United States has perceived aspecial interest in excluding European militarypower from the Western Hemisphere. This was apowerful fact of [U.S.] political consciousness. . . .4

President Kennedy intended to address the Sovietdecision immediately and firmly. His administrationbelieved that the missiles would affect global per-ceptions of U.S. strength and resolve, causing alliesand adversaries to question U.S. ability and commit-ment to global alliances. Furthermore, the missilesin Cuba would threaten the global power structurethat the United States sought to maintain.

The missile balance also contributed to uneasyrelations between the United States and the SovietUnion. When Kennedy became president, he


received contradictory evidence and intelligence. Bylate summer and certainly by fall 1961 the adminis-tration realized that Soviet missile superiority, whichhad been a campaign issue in 1960, did not exist—that the United States, in fact, was ahead. Kennedyand his advisors discussed their options and decidedto inform the Soviets that they knew the U.S. missilegap did not exist. In October 1961 Deputy Secretaryof Defense Roswell Gilpatric was selected to give aspeech disclosing U.S. armed strength and reveal-ing that the missile gap was actually reversed—theSoviets were at a military disadvantage, not theUnited States. The United States briefed its allies,including allies who the United States knew hadbeen penetrated by Soviet intelligence officers, inorder to reinforce its position.

U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

The ExComm began by trying to understand whythe missiles were deployed in Cuba. What couldKhrushchev hope to gain by such a dangerous gam-ble? If the United States could understand the moti-vations of the Soviets, it could better manage an endto the crisis and communicate more effectively withthe opposition.

U.S. Deliberations

Dean Acheson told Charles de Gaulle that the Sovietsplaced missiles in Cuba because they believed thatthey could get away with it.5 The discussions aboutthe deployment went deeper than Acheson’sanswer, however. At the first meetings of theExComm, the advisors debated five hypotheticalanswers to the question of Soviet motivation.

The first hypothesis was based on the SovietUnion’s strong commitment to maintaining a posi-tion in Latin America and, specifically, to supportingthe social and political revolution in Cuba. It wasalready sending great amounts of aid to Cuba.Although the United States had not continued itsplanned military and air support during the actualinvasion of the Bay of Pigs, it had sponsored aninvasion of Cuba less than two years before. TheSoviet government saw an opportunity to defend afirm ally and decided to take it.

Constant discussions were going on in Congressin the White House, and in the Cuban exile commu-nity regarding invasion. On September 4 PresidentKennedy stated that “. . . the Castro regime will notbe allowed to export aggressive purposes by force orthe threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever

means may be necessary from taking action againstany part of the Western Hemisphere. . . .” Threedays later he asked Congress for standby authorityto call up reserves. On September 13 Kennedy reit-erated his stand against Cuba and the Castro regime“exporting aggressive purposes by force or threat offorce” [emphasis added]. One week later Congresspassed a joint resolution on Cuba stating that theUnited States would “prevent by whatever meansmay be necessary, including the use of arms, theMarxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, bforce or the threat of force, its aggressive or subver-sive activities to any part of this hemisphere.”

Although Kennedy and his administration repeat-edly declared that the United States would notattempt additional military action against Cuba, thebelligerent statements Kennedy made throughoutSeptember 1962 did not persuade the Cuban andSoviet governments that Cuba’s safety was ensured.Kennedy questioned whether the U.S. mistake was“in not saying sometime before this summer that ifthey do this we’re [going] to act.”6

The second hypothesis was that missiles in Cubawould alter the geopolitical and psychological situa-tion, showing the world unequivocally that theUnited States was unable to control its sphere ofinfluence, the Western Hemisphere. These missileswould tell U.S. allies that the United States could notstop Soviet influence ninety miles off the coast ofFlorida, in a country that had been a U.S. territoryand, for more than sixty years, a U.S. satellite. Theperception that even the Western Hemisphere wasunmanageable for the United States would have leadthe world to ask: How could the United States beexpected to extend protection to its allies all overthe world if it could not protect itself from missilesin Cuba? The United States considered that even thisquestion in the minds of allies or adversaries wouldhave altered the global balance of power.

The third hypothesis raised the possibility thatthe missiles were placed in Cuba simply to be re-moved. Rusk suggested that “Mr. Khrushchev mayhave . . . known that [the United States does not] re-ally live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the ex-tent that . . . he has to live under fear of ours.”7 Themissiles could be used as bargaining chips to securthe Soviet borders with Turkey or traded to obtain amore positive settlement of the Berlin arrangementfor the Soviets. If the United States made militaryconcessions, it would diminish its prestige. Sovietstatements suggested that they would “trade Cubafor Berlin” support this hypothesis.8

The fourth hypothesis, advanced by Nitze andTaylor, was that the missiles would, in fact, alter the


strategic strength of the Soviet Union with relativelylittle cost. The Soviets knew that the missile gap didnot exist, but they traded on the fact that the UnitedStates believed it to be true. The newly announcedU.S. military superiority made them vulnerable.Placing missiles in Cuba would help the Sovietschange the balance of missile power. Bases in Cubafor Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles and inter-mediate-range ballistic missiles (MBRMs and IRBMs)were a quick and relatively inexpensive means ofcutting the U.S. warning time. Although the UnitedStates would still retain a 2-to-1 military superiorityover the Soviet Union, the missiles in Cuba wouldsubstantially change the appearance of that superi-ority. Kennedy noted later that “appearances con-tribute to reality,” and the United States could illafford the appearance of weakness or decreasingstrength.

The fifth hypothesis assumed that the Sovietswanted the United States to discover the missilesand attack the island, thereby splitting the allies andfueling anti-American sentiment through the world.Questioning this theory, however, PresidentKennedy wondered “if . . . any other time since theBerlin blockade . . . the Russians [had] given [theUnited States] so clear provocation . . . becausethey’ve been awfully cautious really.”9 DiscussingU.S. policy options for response to the emplace-ment, Robert Kennedy effectively argued that suchan attack would horrify the world. The United Stateswas one of two superpowers in the world, he said;for it to attack Cuba would “destroy” the “essence[of] our history and our ideals.”10

The ExComm members discussed these five pos-sibilities at length. In the end they decided that theanswers to the question were the perceived balanceof military power and a basic testing of Kennedy’swill. The missiles would embarrass the U.S. govern-ment and demonstrate its inability to control itssphere of influence. Furthermore, according to theU.S. advisors, the Soviets believed that the risk theywere taking was not great. They were testing the willof a young and relatively inexperienced administra-tion. Khrushchev thought “Kennedy too young,intellectual, not prepared well for decision-makingin crisis situations.”11

Soviet Motivations

The ExComm assessments were somewhat accu-rate, though they were also bound by U.S. percep-tions of reality, which did not coincide with Sovietand Cuban perceptions. The primary Soviet reasonsfor deploying the missiles were to defend the Cuban

revolution and to deter a U.S. attack. ExComm poli-cymakers immediately discounted this motivation.The United States knew it did not intend to invadeCuba and believed it had communicated this inten-tion to the Soviets and the Cubans. In fact, it hadnot. The Soviets believed the United States thoughtit was in its interest to launch a first strike againstCuba. “We had no doubt the United States wouldrepeat the attack on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs.12

Furthermore, in the Soviet view, and most especiallyin Khrushchev’s eyes, the loss of Cuba would “havebeen a terrible blow to Marxism-Leninism,” dimin-ishing Soviet “stature throughout the world, butespecially in Latin America.”13

The placement of missiles in Cuba was first dis-cussed in April of 1962 between Anastas Mikoyan,Soviet first deputy premier and special envoy toCuba at the end of the Cuban missile crisis, andKhrushchev.14 Khrushchev continued personal dis-cussions with advisors throughout the spring. ByJuly some Presidium (now called Politburo) mem-bers were let in on the discussions with Cuba, butthere was no written correspondence.15

Khrushchev believed estimates that a Soviet inva-sion of Cuba would take “three or four days, a week,maybe,” and, therefore, “the same time would beneeded for a U.S. invasion. [Since t]hat was not longenough to defend against it, even by retaliatingsomewhere else . . . [i]t was thought [to] deter aninvasion beforehand.”16 The Cubans did not agreewith the Soviet defense assessment, asserting thatthey had 270,000 armed and mobilized troops andcould fight an invasion much longer than severaldays. In fact, this was double McNamara’s 1962 esti-mate.17

The Soviets also believed that the missiles wouldrepair the strategic imbalance in deliverable mis-siles.18 Deploying missiles on the U.S. peripherywould establish Soviet strength, countering the U.S.missiles posed on the Soviet borders.19 During his1959 U.S. tour, Khrushchev asked, “How would [theUnited States] feel if there were Soviet military basesin Mexico and Canada.”20 The ExComm discussedthis on Tuesday, October 16. Rusk reminded the pol-icymakers that McCone “suggested some weeks agothat one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind isthat . . . we don’t really live under fear of his nuclearweapons to the extent, that . . . he has to live underfear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby,in Turkey and places like that.”21

Khrushchev maintained exactly that view: “Inaddition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would haveequalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance ofpower’ . . . now [the United States] would learn just


what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing atyou; we’d be doing nothing more than giving thema little of their own medicine.”22 Soviet officials latersaid that correcting the nuclear balance was “impor-tant” to Khrushchev “because there were only twothoughts: defend Cuba and repair the imbalance.But defending Cuba was the first thought.”23

U.S. Response

On Tuesday, October 16, members of the ExCommassembled in the White House Cabinet room fortheir first meeting. CIA analysts and photo recon-naissance intelligence experts made a formal pre-sentation. After the initial presentation of the U-2photographs, the ExComm discussions turned to thesignificance of the missiles. The men present in theroom had a wide range of responses. PresidentKennedy was angered by the Soviet actions andquite aware of the implications of such a ploy. Itwas, he said, “an effort to materially change the bal-ance of power . . . a deliberately provocative andunjustified change in the status quo.”24

Although Kennedy’s advisors were not unani-mous about the U.S. response, they agreed that thepolitical implications of the missiles were seriousand that their emplacement was a deliberate chal-lenge to U.S. prestige and influence. Even AdlaiStevenson, whose relations with the president werestrained after the crisis25 and who encouraged non-military solutions, said, “No politician could havemissed the significance of Russian missiles in Cuba.We just had to get them out of there.”26

The advisors, however, were not in accord on theU.S. policy response, nor were they all concernedwith the military consequences of the Soviet actionsMRBMs and IRBMs were placed in four missiles siteson the southern edge of Sierra del Rosario in westcentral Cuba—Guanajay and Sagua la Grande (thave three battalions of MRBMs each), and SanCristó bal and Remedios (to have two battalions ofIRBMs each). In total there would be forty launchpads—San Cristó bal and Sagua la Grande wouldeach have twelve, and Guanajay and Remedioswould each have eight.

The weapons transfers were accomplished in twophases, with the defensive weapons first and the of-fensive missiles and weapons later. The plan in-cluded MRBMs with ranges up to 1,100 nauticalmiles; IRBMs with ranges up to 2,200 nautical miles;IL-28s (Beagle bombers) with ranges of 600 nauticalmiles and the ability to deliver nuclear or nonnu-clear payloads of 6,000 pounds; surface-to-air mis-siles (SAMs) with the ability to strike at targets at

altitudes of 80,000 feet and at a horizontal distanceof 30 nautical miles; Cruise missiles; KOMARguided-missile patrol boats; and MiG-21 aircraft ca-pable of speeds up to 1,000 knots at 40,000 feet. So-viet technicians, operators, mechanics, and soldierssent to the four installation points numbered morethan 20,000. The MRBMs had an estimated ability tohit one-third of the United States, including the Dis-trict of Columbia, St. Louis, and Dallas; Panama; andall of Central America. The IRBMs stationed in Cubawere estimated to be able to hit southeastern Can-ada, all of the United States, Mexico, Central Amer-ica, Panama, and most of South America.

The U.S. policy was not one that “came out of theblue”; it was publicly and privately reiterated bymany advisors. From the beginning McNamarmaintained that “a missile is a missile. It makes nogreat difference whether you are killed by a missilefired from the Soviet Union or from Cuba.”27 He didnot believe that the Soviets were attempting to alterthe military balance. “The military balance [has not]changed.”28 McNamara argued in favor of limitedaction because it could be increased as the situationwarranted it. At the 6:30 P.M. meeting on that firstday, he urged the president to consider the conse-quences of an air strike against Cuba, saying, “Theconsequences of these actions have not beenthought through clearly.”29 He said further, “I don’tknow quite what kind of a world we live in afterwe’ve struck Cuba, and . . . we’ve started it . . . Afterwe’ve launched . . . sorties, what kind of world dowe live in. . . . I think State and [Defense] ought towork on the consequences of any one of thesecourses of actions, consequences which I don’tbelieve are entirely clear.” 30

The options that the ExComm addressedincluded inaction, private diplomatic advances, anexpression of outrage at the United Nations, limitedmilitary action in the form of a blockade of Cuba,surgical air strike against the island, and generalinvasion. The president did not believe that the mis-siles changed the global military balance, but he didbelieve that they had serious political ramifications,and, consequently, the United States had to respondto their emplacement. After months of reassur-ances against such an action, the United Stateswould not tolerate a Soviet action carried out in sucha deliberate and deceitful manner.31 Furthermore,missiles in the Western Hemisphere pointingdirectly at the United States would not be judged inthe same manner as missiles similarly targeted butlocated in the Soviet Union.

Kennedy believed that not addressing the Sovietactions would have severe consequences in Soviet


military and political expansionism. He said,“[W]hen we said we’re not going to and then theygo ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then . . .I would think that our risks increase. . . . After allthis is a political struggle as much as military.”32

Soviet expert and newly appointed U.S. Ambassadorto France Charles Bohlen attended the meetings onthe first two days. In a memorandum to the presi-dent he noted that “no one can guarantee that thiscan be achieved by diplomatic action—but it seemsto me essential that this channel should be testedout before military action is employed.”33 TheBohlen plan suggested sending a letter to the Krem-lin before pursuing a military response. AlthoughSorenson worked on composing such a letter forseveral days, he concluded that it was impossible towrite a letter to Khrushchev “to which his replycould not outmaneuver us.”34 Consequently, theBohlen plan as such was rejected.

Diplomatic advances were not discounted com-pletely, although they were not considered withoutother concurrent actions. They were rejected out-right as a preliminary to U.S. actions. Diplomaticnotes would provide the Soviets and the Cubanswith warning time and would not change the U.S.position. A private diplomatic approach would betime consuming, but the administration feared thepossibility that nothing would be accomplished in apublic forum. Furthermore, Kennedy and his advi-sors believed that they had already on many occa-sions warned the Soviets against this type of action.Bringing the issue to the U.N. Security Council alonewas discounted because, as a permanent member,the Soviet Union had an automatic veto and, ironi-cally, Soviet Ambassador Valerian I. Zorin was serv-ing as the chairman of the Council.

Another alternative, which seemed especially at-tractive in light of the possibility of disengaging theSoviet-Cuban alliance, was to approach Castro di-rectly. The ExComm considered sending a messagethat would highlight the problems for Castro. TheUnited States saw it as “action [by] the Soviets . . .[which] threatened [Castro] with attack from theUnited States, and . . . therefore the overthrow ofthis regime.” The United States would point to Sovietstatements suggesting the possibility of “bargaining”Soviet “support [for Cuba] and these missiles,against concessions in Berlin, and elsewhere, andtherefore . . . threatening to bargain him away.”35

This approach was not rejected, but it was “setaside” for the time being as Kennedy believed thisto be a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and crisis. Sincethe weapons were Soviet-designed, Soviet-built,Soviet constructed, and Soviet-controlled, he did not

believe that addressing Castro on this issue wouldbe useful. Approaching Castro would have affordedthe Soviets advance notice. Furthermore, Castromight have responded defensively, thereby forcing afaster or more difficult military confrontation if hehad not perceived the approach to be genuine 36

The ExComm members next discussed the alter-native of military action. The hawks believed thatthe Soviet missiles had strategic as well as politicalvalue. General Taylor and Assistant Secretary Nitzeargued that the missiles exposed part of the U.S.strategic bomber force to sudden ground attack andcut the U.S. warning time from approximately fif-teen minutes to three minutes or less.37 Advocatesof military action against Cuba pointed out that mili-tary action was the only option that would physicallyremove the missiles. The direct surgical air strike onthe missiles in Cuba option came to be known asthe “fast track.” Proponents of this alternative main-tained that the missiles were not defensive or placedfor the sake of Cuba but were, in fact, designed toenhance the Soviet position and to intimidate theUnited States and its allies.

The other option that claimed ExComm’s atten-tion was the “slow track.” Advocated by the dovesthis plan called for a limited military embargo ofSoviet shipments to Cuba, enforced by a navalblockade of the island. McNamara was one of theearliest advocates of the blockade. “He argued that itwas limited pressure, which could be increased asthe circumstances warranted. Further, it was dra-matic and forceful pressure, which would beunderstood38 yet, most importantly, still leave [theUnited States] in control of events.”39

Both of these alternatives constituted direct con-frontations with the Soviets. The naval blockadehowever, would be somewhat less provocative as itdid not entail the immediate risk of casualties. Itcould be graduated and tightened, and, although itwould be a show of force, it would not be immedi-ately life threatening. In addition, the United Stateshad planned military maneuvers off the coast ofFlorida that could be used to cover the preparations.

Opponents of the blockade, including Acheson,Taylor, and General Curtis LeMay, criticized the pol-icy because the Soviets could take advantage of it.They correctly concluded that it would not removethe missiles. It could easily drag on while the worlddebated its legality and legitimacy. At the same time,the Soviets could continue their missile construc-tion and build-up. Furthermore, if the Sovietsattempted to “run the blockade,” the United Stateswould be forced into firing the first shot. Above all,traditional rules in international relations protected


the freedom of the seas. A blockade was an act ofwar. Vice-President Johnson had recently character-ized it as such in response to Republican SenatorKenneth Keating’s demand for an embargo of Cuba.By Wednesday, October 17, Secretary McNamara, inRobert Kennedy’s words, “became the blockade’sstrongest advocate,” arguing that limited pressurcould be increased as the circumstances warranted.“Further, it was dramatic and forceful pressure,which would be understood yet, most importantly,still leave [the United States] in control of events.”40

The “fast track” had advocates as well. At the firstExComm meeting, the majority of advisors encour-aged an air strike. They perceived the United Statesas threatened strategically and believed it wouldhave to respond in a quick military manner that leftno room for debate; a surprise attack on Cuba wouldhave removed the missiles and proved to the Sovietsand to the world that the United States stood by itsword. The United States had warned the SovietUnion repeatedly against emplacement of missilesin Cuba, and now the United States should respondin a forceful manner, according to advocates of theposition. The joint Chiefs of Staff, Acheson, and Tay-lor remained strong proponents of a surgical airstrike against Cuba, while other advisors changedtheir opinions sharply.

Advisors quickly pointed to the ramifications inother U.S. military posts and situations. Deputy Sec-retary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric pointed to the“points of vulnerability around the world,” suggest-ing that “precautionary measures” might have to betaken. He also said that the measures adopted mustbe military and political.41 McNamara was also con-cerned with the consequences and ramifications ofa surgical air attack, suggesting that U.S. forcesaround the world must be put on alert.”42

Under Secretary of State George Ball was amongthose concerned with the costs of such a response.On October 17, the second day of the meetings, hebecame the first firm opponent of an air strike.43

Ball said that the bombing of Cuba would be in dis-tinct contradiction of U.S. traditions and historyRobert Kennedy agreed and became the staunchestadvocate of this philosophy. Kennedy believed thatthe U.S. response must be consistent with U.S. val-ues. He maintained that the United States was fight-ing for something more than just survival and thatall our heritage and our ideals would be repugnantto such a sneak military attack.”44 In an argumentwith Acheson, he said that “advocating a surpriseattack by a very large nation against a very smallone . . . could not be undertaken by the UnitedStates if we were to maintain our moral position at

home and around the world.”45 Furthermore, hesaid, “My brother is not going to be the Tojo of the1960s,” nor would he initiate a “Pearl Harbor inreverse.”46

Acheson staunchly opposed the analogy of PearlHarbor. He argued that the United States hadwarned the Soviet government for months againstplacing offensive weapons in Cuba. The presidenthad specifically discussed this in his public state-ments of September 4 and September 13, 1962. OnOctober 3 Congress had authorized the president toprevent “by whatever means may be necessary”Cuba from endangering U.S. security. FurthermoreAcheson stated, the Western Hemisphere had, sincethe Monroe Doctrine, been in the U.S. military andpolitical sphere of influence. The doctrine unequivo-cally stated that European interference in thatsphere will not be tolerated by the United States. ForAcheson, these warnings negated the “surpriseattack” suggestion of the Pearl Harbor analogy. Forthe president and the attorney general, however,these statements and warnings were not enough tojustify a surprise attack. In fact, the attorney generallater characterized President Kennedy’s decisionagainst the attack as based on “his belief in what isright and what is wrong.”47

The final option the ExComm considered was ageneral invasion of Cuba. Few of the advisorsbelieved that the U.S. response should begin withsuch extreme action, though several advisors saw itas an opportunity to “take Cuba away from Castro.”This response was quickly discounted as risking aworld war. At the very least it was a step that wouldgive the world cause to indict U.S. aggression andinterventionism for years to come.

Mindful of previous crises during which the presi-dent had not received complete information, Presi-dent Kennedy set an informal agenda for theExComm meetings encouraging discussion by allpresent regardless of rank. Open discussion of allalternatives was encouraged, with advisors present-ing and updating reports, analyses, and suggestionsThe president believed that his presence had a con-straining effect on the discussion, arresting interac-tion between less senior advisors and theirsupervisors and overwhelming the possibility for“true give-and-take.” For this reason and because hewanted to maintain his schedule to convey theappearance of normality, Kennedy did not attendthe deliberations during the first days 48 RobertKennedy served as an informal chair at the meet-ings, although the discussions were rarely directedand largely unstructured. The president instructedthe group to develop a consensus in favor of one or


two specific responses, which he would consider inmaking his decision. Discussion quickly centered onwhether the immediate U.S. response should be ablockade or an air strike

On the third day of the crisis, Thursday, October18, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko calledon the president. During the meeting, which hadbeen planned weeks before, Gromyko told Kennedythat the Soviets would do nothing about Berlin or aGerman peace treaty until after the November 6congressional elections. He said that U.S. hostilitiesagainst Cuba could lead to problems between theSoviet Union and the United States. The SovietUnion, he continued, had given Cuba assistance forpurely defensive purposes. At that point, Kennedystopped him, saying that the United States had nointention of invading Cuba and the Soviet Union’ssupplying of arms to Cuba was having a profoundeffect on the people of the United States and was asource of great concern.49 Kennedy then readGromyko his statement of September 4, whichdeclared that Soviet placement of offensive weap-ons in Cuba would have serious consequences andthat the United States would go to any length to stopCuban aggression and Soviet expansionism in LatinAmerica. He did not ask Gromyko directly whetherthere were offensive missiles in Cuba. If Gromykowas puzzled by the president’s actions, he did notappear so. Upon leaving the White House, Gromykodescribed the meeting as “useful, very useful.”50

As the days wore on, the meetings and debatescontinued. Certain people, from government ana-lysts to reporters, began to be aware that a majorpolicy issue was under discussion, although thewere not quite sure of its content. The presidentordered the armed forces to stand at DefCon 2, astage of military preparation that is one step awayfrom actual confrontation. As the United States forti-fied its position, it publicly defended the build-up aspart of long-planned naval activities in the Carib-bean—Philbriglex-62.51 Arthur Sylvester, informa-tion chief of the Defense Department, denied thesignificance of the build-up, saying that the exercisehad “nothing to do with any possible imminentaction against Cuba.”52 Time was running short,however.

Speculation centered on Berlin, on India, and onthe Far East as well as on Cuba. At one point duringthe deliberations W. Averill Harriman, assistant sec-retary of state for Far Eastern affairs, was sum-moned to a private anteroom in the west wing ofthe White House and left there as a decoy to encour-age journalists to speculate about a crisis in the FarEast rather than in Latin America. Martin Hillen-

brand of the German Affairs Office and AssistantSecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs PhilipsTalbot were also called to the White House in a pub-lic manner as decoys.53 Government officials dideverything they could think of to avoid publicity.One evening a mid-level official told Secretary Rusk,“I know there is something going on that you don’twant to talk about. But if security is all that tight,maybe you’d better tell all those big wheels fromacross the river to get their cars off the street.”54

After that the limousines were left in the basementgarage

On the evening of Thursday, October 18, whenthe State Department gave a dinner party forGromyko, the ExComm was divided into two clearcamps—air strike versus blockade. At the beginningthe group was divided almost evenly. McCone, Dil-lon, Taylor, Acheson, and Nitze favored a strategic airstrike. Initially McGeorge Bundy had supported ablockade, but by that time he also favored an airstrike. Robert Kennedy, McNamara, Gilpatric,Thompson, Ball, and Lovett, however, believed thatthe United States must pursue a blockade, at leastbefore resorting to more drastic military action. Theair strike proponents suggested an advance warn-ing to both the Cubans and the Soviets through con-tacts in the Swiss government.55

Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson, resuming anargument he had supported in earlier meetings,maintained that the missiles were placed and con-trolled by the Soviets. To consider Castro as a majorpolicymaker in this crisis, he believed, would befutile. Since this was a dramatic departure from pre-vious Soviet military policy (they had never beforeplaced missiles outside the Soviet Union), Thomp-son argued, the plan must have originated in theKremlin. A resolution, therefore, had to be negoti-ated with the Kremlin. Furthermore, attacking theSoviet missiles meant killing Soviets, and it wasunlikely that Khrushchev would not respond in kindsomewhere in the world. President Kennedy agreed.During a briefing with Air Force Chief of Staff Gen-eral Curtis LeMay, Kennedy said that although heunderstood the position of the joint Chiefs of Staff incalling for immediate military action, there would inall probability be some Soviet military retaliation toa U.S. military action. “They, no more than we,”Kennedy said, “can let these things go by withoutdoing something. They can’t, after all their state-ments, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lotof Russians and then do nothing.”56

Robert Kennedy, continuing an argument that heand others, including McNamara and Ball, sup-ported, maintained that the president was not faced


with a “zero-sum” choice. Instead, he suggested thatthe president should begin with responses thatoffered the least risk of war and increase pressure ifnecessary. The blockade was a limited action thatcould be tightened or supplemented with an airstrike as time went on. A turning point occurredwhen Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillonshifted his opinion away from support of an airstrike to a blockade. “What changed my mind,” hesuggests, “was Bobby Kennedy’s argument that weought to be true to ourselves as Americans, that sur-prise attack was not in our tradition. Frankly, theseconsiderations had not occurred to me. . . .”57

Around 10:00 P.M. the advisors left the State De-partment to meet with the president. In a meetingthat lasted past midnight, they presented two policyoptions they had been debating for days: the airstrike and the blockade. In the course of the meetingthe advisors were not able to answer all of the presi-dent’s questions, and their own opinions began toshift again. The president sent them back to theState Department for further deliberations. The nextday the advocates of the two plans split up to writerecommendations outlining the steps each policywould require. Presidential Assistant TheodoreSorenson was asked to draft a speech that wouldjustify the blockade. It was to include an analysis ofthe Latin American countries that could assist in theblockade and the military procedures that would beused to stop ships. The advocates of immediate mili-tary action were required to draw up a list of riot-control equipment that would be used to maintaindomestic security throughout Latin America; weap-ons that would be barred from Cuba; an analysis ofthe Cuban exile groups in the United States; and aproposed communication to Khrushchev designedto persuade him that it would be inadvisable tomove militarily against us in the Caribbean, in Ber-lin, or elsewhere in the world.58 The Justice andState departments were entrusted with the task ofbuilding the legal defense for the blockade.

The deliberations were not over, however. On Fri-day, October 19, the opponents of a blockade con-tinued to raise criticisms of the plan and to arguethe futility of such action. Furthermore, they sug-gested that the “slow track” of a blockade wouldremove any advantage that the United States mighthave with a surprise attack.

Reporters were becoming more persistent as theglobal U.S. military mobilization continued. At 1:20P.M. an alert went out to Atlantic and Caribbeanbases and commands warning them against possi-ble attacks. High-level policymakers were cancelingappointments and speaking engagements. Govern-

ment officials were remaining in Washington whenthey were scheduled to be in other places. Troopmovements and mobilizations were being ques-tioned, even though they were covered somewhatby the naval exercises. The president maintained hisscheduled campaign stops in Illinois while his advi-sors continued their discussions, but questions werebeing raised about what was going on. Time wasrunning out.

International and Legal Ramifications

The ExComm now began a new debate: What couldbe the justification for the limited response, or “slotrack,” which was, in fact, an act of war? Further-more, what domestic constitutional questions wereinvolved? Although the blockade was considered aless provocative response, it was not in accord withinternational law or with U.S. traditions. The historyof foreign policy provides numerous examples of theimportance to governments of freedom of the seas.Indeed, the United States had fought the War of1812 to protect American access to the seas.

Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbachand State Department Deputy Legal Advisor LeonardMeeker were responsible for creating a legal frame-work to justify the naval blockade. Although theadministration already believed that it was impor-tant for its actions to have a legal basis, Thompsonemphasized the importance of this point in dealingwith the Soviet government. He noted that althoughthe Soviets might manipulate the legal justificationsor ramifications of a situation, they consistentlysought legal interpretations to justify their actions inthe international sphere.

Katzenbach maintained that U.S. military actions(including a blockade) could be justified on the inter-national principle of self-defense based on ChapterVII, Article 51, of the United Nations Charter. More-over, a blockade would not require a declaration ofwar. Meeker agreed that U.S. actions were valid onthe basis of “self-defense,” but he maintained that ablockade or “defensive quarantine”59 would be con-sidered “use of force” prohibited by Article 2(4) ofthe UN Charter, which states:

All Members shall refrain in their internationalrelations from the threat or use of force againstthe territorial integrity or political independenceof any state, or in any other manner inconsistentwith the Purposes of the United Nations.

There are, however, exceptions to the “use offorce” prohibition, including self-defense in an


armed attack, action by the United Nations itself,and regional arrangements. The regional arrange-ments exception, stated in Article 52(1) and Article52(2), sanctions “appropriate” actions for the main-tenance of regional peace and security. Katzenbachbelieved that the blockade with a regional sanctionwould provide a solid legal basis. He also felt thatthe United States could, without the sanction,defend the blockade in view of a state’s right of selfdefense

An Organization of American States (OAS) sanc-tion, under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciproc-ity, or Rio Treaty (a treaty to which Cuba is asignatory), established cooperative relations and aforum to deal with internal and external conflictsamong the American states. Meeker argued that thistreaty would legitimize a quarantine of Cuba.Meeker especially noted Articles 6 and 8 of the RioTreaty, which condone measures taken within theorganization (including the recommendation offorce by one or more members) to resolve a situa-tion that endangers the peace and security of thehemisphere:

Article 6: If the inviolability or the integrity of theterritory or the sovereignty or political indepen-dence of any American State should be affectedby an aggression which is not an armed attack orby an extra-continental or intra-continental con-flict, or by any other fact or situation that mightendanger the peace of America, the Organ ofConsultation shall meet immediately in order toagree on measures which must be taken in caseof aggression to assist the victim of the aggres-sion or, in any case, measures which should betaken for the common defense and for the main-tenance of the peace and security of the Conti-nent.

Article 8: For the purposes of this treaty, the mea-sure on which the Organ of Consultation mayagree will comprise one or more of the following:recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breakingof diplomatic relations; breaking of consular rela-tions; partial or complete interruption of eco-nomic relations or of sea, air, postal, telephonicand radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic commu-nications; and the use of armed force

The advisors recognized that the language used todescribe the crisis was critical. Meeker was careful,therefore, to qualify the naval response as a “defen-sive quarantine” rather than a “blockade.” A defen-sive quarantine would not necessarily imply a state

of war, while a blockade would be subject to consid-erable retaliation as an act of war. Both advisorsunderscored the statement in Article 2(4), whichoutlaws “use of force” that is “inconsistent with thePurposes of the United Nations.” They suggestedthat the quarantine would be “legal” in the contextof Article 2(4) as it supported the aim of maintaininginternational peace. Furthermore, within the sanc-tion of the regional institution, the OAS, a “defensivequarantine” would not be illegal. Sorenson began adraft that announced a blockade but suggested thatthe United States would increase the pressure of theblockade and proceed to more offensive actions ifthe Soviet build-up continued.

The Presidential Decision

At 2:30 P.M. on Saturday, October 20, after five daysof almost constant deliberations, the ExComm pre-sented two alternative proposals to PresidentKennedy:

1. Begin with a naval blockade and increase themilitary pressure as the crisis demands; or

2. Begin with an air strike of Cuba, probablyaccompanied by an invasion of Cuba.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatricsummarized the general opinion of the ExComm:“Essentially, Mr. President, this is a choice betweenlimited action and unlimited action; and most of usthink that it’s better to start with limited action.”60

Adlai Stevenson said that the United States shouldbe prepared to negotiate to remove the missiles. Hesuggested that the president should consider pro-posing that Cuba be demilitarized, neutralized, andits territorial integrity guaranteed by the demobiliza-tion of U.S. forces at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base.Additionally, either as an alternative or as an accom-panying proposal, the president should consider dis-mantling the obsolete Jupiter missiles in Turkey andItaly.

Kennedy discounted both options. He did notwant to give up Guantánamo at that time, and herefused to be perceived as trading away an ally forthe safety of the United States, whether the missilesin the Mediterranean were militarily useful or not.Primarily, the United States could not and would notnegotiate under threat. The president did agree,however, that the political importance of the U.S.negotiating position had to be addressed andstrengthened. With the exception of Stevenson, theExComm fully agreed with the president’s refusal to


include the U.S. missiles in a negotiation package. Astraw vote revealed that the ExComm remainedsplit, with six advisors voting for a surgical strikeand eleven advocating a naval quarantine within acontext of international negotiations.61

That morning the president ordered the U.S. mis-siles stationed in Turkey to be defused. This ren-dered them incapable of firing without a directorder by an authority.62 This was done to consoli-date the responsibility of the crisis into the hands ofthe executive and to prevent, to the best of theadministration’s ability, escalation through mistake,misperception, or miscalculation of an unautho-rized government official. This action did not affectthe U.S. strategic position or diminish its securityBy the fall of 1962, only Air Force General LeMaybelieved that the Jupiters were “good military weap-ons.”63 Turkey maintained that the missiles were aphysical sign of the U.S. commitment to NATO, andto Turkey in particular. In May and June 1962 theState Department had broached the subject with theTurkish government; both times the Turkish govern-ment refused to discuss it. Although in August 1962Bundy had pursued the subject of how to removethe missiles, no action had as yet begun.64

President Kennedy decided in favor of a blockadeor “defensive quarantine.” 65 Although he realizedthat the quarantine would not remove the missiles,he knew that an air strike would not necessarilyremove all of them either, thereby forcing an escala-tion to higher levels of military confrontation. Thiscourse allowed the United States to increase pres-sure as required. Once the United States went for-ward with an attack, there would have been littlerecourse. The quarantine bought some time.

The president was scheduled to make a state-ment on Monday October 22, but the administrationwas not sure it could keep the crisis from reachingthe press. James Reston of the New York Times hadmany of the facts. Alfred Friendly of the WashingtonPost also had a fair idea of what was going on. Boththe New York Times and the Washington Post, inaddition to the New York Herald Tribune, compliedwith the request that they wait on the story until thepresident had gone public hours later.

The final hours of the weekend were spent draft-ing the president’s speech to the public; contactingcongressional leaders; coordinating the militarymobilization and naval buildup; establishing sup-port systems, including doctors and nurses, thatwould be needed in the event of a military confron-tation; and dispatching ambassadors to inform ourallies. Kennedy also sent personal envoys to FrenchPresident Charles de Gaulle, Canadian Prime Minis-

ter John Diefenbaker, West German Chancellor Kon-rad Adenauer, and British Prime Minister HaroldMacmillan. Presidential letters, sent through U.S.embassies, went to forty-three heads of state.

The president gave a final, last-minute consider-ation to an air strike during a meeting with GeneralWalter C. Sweeney, Jr., commander-in-chief of theTactical Air Command, on the morning of Sunday,October 21. Sweeney explained that an air attackcould not be certain of destroying all the missilesites in Cuba. In fact, he said, approximately tenpercent of the missiles would remain, necessitatinga U.S. invasion. That confirmed the president’s deci-sion to begin with the naval quarantine. The airstrike plan as outlined by the military includedbombing several populated areas as well as militaryinstallations. Later reports suggested that U.S. intelli-gence advisors had estimated that 25,000 Cubanswould be killed if the decision had been made tobomb the missiles sites and destroy the bases.66

Once the president made his decision, time andenergy were channeled into reviewing the speechesto be made and deciding on the exact presentationthe president would make. There were many ques-tions: How would he explain the U.S. evidence?Would he present the photographs on television?Should the president admit to illegal reconnaissanceflights over Cuban air space? Should he state thatthe United States would continue its blockadewhether it received regional approval from the OASor not? Should the speech mention Berlin and try toforestall a retaliatory action there?

Kennedy decided against showing the enlargedphotographs on the grounds that the viewer wouldprobably not be able to discern the missile sites inthe photographs. Robert Kennedy later admittedthat the first time he looked at the photographs hehad to take the photo reconnaissance analysts attheir word, since what he saw “appeared to be nomore than the clearing of a field for a farm or thebasement of a house.” This had been the reaction ofmany of the experts in the room, including Presi-dent Kennedy.67 Although the public would haveseen later stages of construction, the president didnot want to present questionable evidence. At thesame time the administration did not want toheighten panic, so the president removed any spe-cific references to Hiroshima and megatonnage.

The speech would admit the secret surveillance ofCuba and would announce that the United Stateswould increase this surveillance until the crisisabated. Surveillance was justified in an earlier OAScommuniqué condemning secret military prepara-tions. Although the United States would institute the


blockade in any event, the ExComm chose not toreview that point in the speech in the hope that thestatement about “the defense of [U.S.] security andof the entire Western Hemisphere” would encourageregional unity and approval. The speech discouragedSoviet advances in Berlin, stating that the UnitedStates would resist any hostile retaliations any-where in the world “including in particular [against]the brave people of West Berlin.”68

At 2:30 P.M., October 21, the National SecurityCouncil formally ratified the decisions of theExComm. Admiral George W. Anderson outlined thenavy’s plan for the blockade. Orders from the Penta-gon readied Guantánamo naval base for a possibleconfrontation, evacuating family dependents andassigning operational control of specified army andair force units. In the evening Secretary of DefenseMcNamara formally approved the procedures andauthorized air force interceptors flying in the UnitedStates to carry nuclear weapons.

On Monday, October 22, the political and militarypreparations continued. John McCloy flew back tothe United States from Europe to join the Stevensonteam at the United Nations. A blockade-planningdirective was ordered to the Atlantic fleet, and theair force missile crews received maximum alertorders. One hundred fifty-six Inter-Continental Bal-listic Missiles (ICBMs) were readied for firing. Thebomber force was dispersed, with B-47s sent toforty civilian airports and the B-52 bomber forceordered into the air. During the following month asignificant portion of the B-52s were in the air at alltimes. In addition, the force on the ground carried afull load of fuel and bombs and was ready to take offon fifteen minutes notice. Five army divisions wereon full alert, and 180 ships were deployed in theCaribbean.69

The ExComm met to discuss the presidentialannouncement. Abram Chayes, the legal advisor ofthe State Department, stressed that the legal basisof the quarantine was the right of collective actionfound in the Rio Treaty and in the UN Charter. Heemphasized the OAS right to take collective actionsto guard the security of the region and Article 52 ofthe UN Charter, maintaining a state’s right to makeregional arrangements.

The United States did not point to Article 51 ofthe UN Charter protecting the right of all nations toself-defense because that article allowed a broadinterpretation of self-defense. International justifica-tions and pleas of self-defense had been establishedover many years. Chayes maintained that a danger-ous and difficult precedent would be set if theUnited States extended the interpretation of “self-

defense” to “anticipatory self-defense” in regard tothe placement of offensive missiles close to U.S.borders when an attack, although possible in thefuture, was obviously not imminent.

The legal advisors urged policymakers to supportthe U.S. position with the other available avenues ofinternational legal posture. This was agreed upon,and the text of the president’s speech was changed.Chayes agreed with Meeker’s emphasis on terminol-ogy, strongly recommending that the U.S. action betermed a “defensive quarantine” rather than ablockade. The president also accepted this idea.Action Memorandum No. 196 was approved, for-mally establishing the advisors as the ExecutiveCommittee of the National Security Council “for thepurpose of effective conduct of the operations of theexecutive branch in the current crisis.”

Later that day President Kennedy met with lead-ing members of Congress, many of whom had beenflown back to Washington. McCone, Rusk, andMcNamara began the briefing with a description ofthe intelligence reports and a report of the U.S.response. Members of the congressional group werfairly uniform in their criticism of a blockade. Believ-ing it slow and ineffective, they called for strongeraction. Some, including Senator Richard Russell ofGeorgia and Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas(both Democrats), went so far as to call for an inva-sion.

President Kennedy later suggested that the con-gressional leaders were responding as the executiveadvisors had at first. He believed that “if they hadgone through the five-day period we had gonethrough—in looking at the various alternatives,advantages and disadvantages . . .—they would havecome out the same way we did.”70 Kennedyresponded to the congressional leaders by statingthat he was acting by executive order, presidentialproclamation, and inherent powers, not under aresolution or an act of Congress.”71 He was seekingbipartisan governmental unity, he explained, but theplanned U.S. response of a quarantine would con-tinue in any event. Congressional support wasimportant to Kennedy, but he had already decidedthat the executive branch would formulate aresponse without contacting Congress.

The State Department was also preparing brief-ings. Secretary Rusk left the meeting with Congressfor a meeting with Soviet Ambassador AnatolyDobrynin. Dobrynin was given an advance copy ofthe president’s speech. Rusk recalled that Dobrynin“age[d] ten years right in front of [his] eyes.”72 Infact, Dobrynin’s own government had not informedhim of the missile deployment. In the State Depart-


ment’s international conference room, Under Secre-tary Ball briefed the ambassadors of forty-six alliedcountries, showing them photographs of the sites.U.S. ambassadors all over the world, including FoyKohler in Moscow, were giving similar briefings

At 7:00 P.M. (EST) President Kennedy broadcaston an international network arranged by the U.S.Information Agency:73

This government as promised, has maintainedthe closest surveillance of the Soviet militarybuild-up on the island of Cuba. Within the pastweek, unmistakable evidence has established thefact that a series of offensive missile sites is nowin preparation on that imprisoned island. Thepurpose of these bases, can be none other thanto provide a nuclear strike capability against theWestern Hemisphere. . . .

This urgent transformation of Cuba into animportant strategic base—by the presence ofthese large, long-range and clearly offensiveweapons of sudden mass destruction—consti-tutes an explicit threat to the peace and securityof all the Americas. . . .

This secret, swift and extraordinary build-up ofCommunist missiles—in an area well-known tohave a special and historical relationship to theUnited States and the nations of the WesternHemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances,and in defiance of American and hemisphericpolicy—this sudden, clandestine decision to sta-tion strategic weapons for the first time outside ofSoviet soil is a deliberately provocative and unjus-tified change in the status quo which cannot beaccepted by this country, if our courage and ourcommitments are ever to be trusted again byeither friend or foe. . . .

Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be tprevent the use of these missiles against this orany other country, and to secure their withdrawalor elimination from the Western Hemisphere. . . .

The president went on, outlining the initialresponse planned by the United States, including thenaval quarantine, continued surveillance, reinforce-ment of Guantánamo Bay, and a diplomaticapproach consisting of negotiations at the UN,through the OAS, and in bilateral discussions withKhrushchev. He warned that the United States wouldretaliate if necessary:

It shall be the policy of this nation to regard anynuclear missile launched from Cuba against anynation in the Western Hemisphere as an attackby the Soviet Union on the United States, requir-ing a full retaliatory response upon the SovietUnion.

Kennedy concluded with a statement reaffirmingthe U.S. commitment to freedom and peace, “Ourgoal is not the victory of might, but the vindicationof right; not peace at the expense of freedom, butboth peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere,and, we hope, around the world. God willing, thatgoal will be achieved.”

During the president’s speech, the State Depart-ment continued addressing world opinion to gain aworld consensus favoring or at least understandingthe proposed U.S. actions. Ambassador Adlai Steven-son requested that the Security Council convene taddress the “dangerous threat to peace and securityof the world caused by the secret establishment inCuba” of long-range offensive missiles. He deliveredthis request to the chairman of the Security Council,Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin.74 The UnitedStates had ready a draft resolution calling for the dis-mantling of the missiles under the jurisdiction of theUN Observer Corps. If this were done, the blockadewould be called off.

Assistant Secretary of State for Latin AmericanAffairs Edwin Martin briefed the ambassadors of theOAS, while Secretary Rusk met with members of thenonaligned and neutral nations. Characterizing theSoviet emplacement as a “gross . . . error of judge-ment,” Rusk appealed to the nations to “look at thissituation in terms of national purposes, nationalcommitments, national interests.” Further, he sug-gested that “one of the issues . . . involved . . . theindependence of states . . .” and that Cuba was thevictim rather than the perpetrator of the act.75

McNamara and Ball also held briefings that eveningfor the correspondents of the State Department andthe Pentagon. When asked how far the navy wouldgo to stop a Soviet vessel, McNamara responded, “Ifthere is an indication of offensive weapons onboard” and the captain refuses another course orport, “we will use force.”76

The OAS met at 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October23, to discuss the U.S. resolution proposing a U.S.“quarantine” of Cuba. Martin estimated that theUnited States would get fourteen votes—the mini-mum necessary to approve the collective actionunder the Rio Treaty (two-thirds of the twenty-onemember nations). The U.S. delegation, includingSecretary of State Rusk, urged the OAS to act in


concert for the defense of the entire hemisphere.The nations discussed the blockade throughout theday. Eighteen favored the blockade. The Bolivianambassador, under instructions from his govern-ment to boycott the OAS for reasons relating to anearlier border dispute, was unable to participate inthe proceeding. Deciding, however, to take a standon what was viewed as one of the most importantdecisions the OAS would ever make, he abstainedon a paragraph and voted with the majority. Uru-guay alone abstained, making the vote nineteen tozero in favor of a U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba.

U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

On Tuesday, October 23, the UN Security Councilheld its first meeting on the Cuban missile crisisU.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson denounced theSoviet actions in Cuba, while Soviet AmbassadorValerian Zorin accused the United States of riskingworld war and making “false accusations.” TheSoviet ambassador introduced a resolution callingfor condemnation of the United States for violatingthe UN Charter and increasing the likelihood ofworld war. The Cuban ambassador also condemnedthe U.S. actions, announcing that Cuba would neveraccept UN observers on the island.

The United States estimated that it could dependon seven votes (including its own) from its alliesamong the permanent members, France, Great Brit-ain, and China, and Venezuela, Chile, and Irelandwho, by rotation, were sitting on the council. TheSoviet bloc on the Security Council consisted ofRomania and the Soviet Union, which, as a perma-nent member, had an automatic veto. The otheralternate members during the rotation were neu-tral.77 Secretary General U Thant was asked to medi-ate the crisis.

Edge of the Precipice

In Washington the CIA presented evidence to theExComm that “as of the day before, four MRBM siteswere ‘operational’ and many others had ‘emergencycapability.’" The Soviet technicians continued toimprove the sites. The “emergency capability” wouldbecome “fully operational” shortly. The ExCommdecided, with the president’s approval, that if a U-2reconnaissance plane flying surveillance over Cubawas fired on, the United States would, with specificpermission from President Kennedy, use bomberand fighter planes to destroy the Surface-to-Air mis-sile site (SAM) that had shot down the U.S. plane.

The United States did not know if nuclear warheadswere on the island, so the administration shaped itsstrategy assuming the worst. In fact, two-thirds ofthe Soviet warheads were either on the island or enroute to it. Thirty-six warheads for use on medium-range missiles and twenty-four launchers were inCuba, as well as nine Luna short-range, nuclear-tipped missiles with six mobile launchers. More-over, the local Soviet commander in Cuba had per-mission to fire a nuclear retaliation in response to aU.S.-ordered invasion of the island. The atomic war-heads on the Soviet rockets had yields of six ttwelve kilotons, or 6,000 to 12,000 tons of TNT.

At 11:56 A.M. (EST) the U.S. Embassy in Moscowtransmitted the response by Chairman NikitKhrushchev to President Kennedy’s public state-ment:78

[M]easures outlined in your statement representserious threat to peace and the security of peo-ples. United States has openly taken path of grossviolation of Charter of United Nations, path ofviolation of international norms of freedom ofnavigation on high seas, path of aggressiveactions both against Cuba and against SovietUnion.

Statement of Government of United States Amer-ica cannot be evaluated in any other way than asnaked interference in domestic affairs of CubanRepublic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charterof United Nations and international norms do notgive right to any state whatsoever to establish ininternational waters control of vessels bound forshores of the Cuban Republic.

It is self-understood that we also cannot recog-nize right of United States to establish controlover armaments essential to Republic of Cuba forstrengthening of its defensive capacity

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba,regardless of classification to which they belong,are destined exclusively for defensive purposesin order to secure Cuban Republic from attack ofaggressor.

I hope that Government of United States willshow prudence and renounce actions pursued byyou, which could lead to catastrophic conse-quences for peace throughout the world. . . .

Kennedy responded immediately, transmitting aletter through the U.S. State Department to the U.S.


Embassy in Moscow. It was delivered in Moscow at7:00 A.M. October 24 (Moscow time). Briefly dis-cussing the cause of the crisis, Kennedy firmlyannounced that the quarantine would go intoeffect:79

I think you will recognize that the steps80 whichstated the current chain of events was the actionof your government in secretly furnishing offen-sive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing thismatter in the Security Council. In the meantime, Ihope that we both show prudence and do noth-ing to allow events to make the situation moredifficult to control than it already is.

I hope that you will issue immediately the neces-sary instruction to your ships to observe theterms of the quarantine, the basis of which wasestablished by the vote of the Organization ofAmerican States this afternoon, and which will gointo effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time Octobertwenty-four. . . .

That evening the president signed the interdictionorders that were to go into effect the next day. Thematerials to be stopped included SAMs, bomber air-craft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided mis-siles, warheads, support equipment for the bannedweapons, and any other materials so designated bthe secretary of Defense “for the purpose of effectu-ating this proclamation.” McNamara, as secretary ofDefense, ordered the quarantine: Any ships headedfor Cuba would be interdicted. The presidentreserved to himself the right to order each ship to beintercepted or boarded. Again, as with the order tdefuse the Turkish missiles, by completely centraliz-ing the orders the President aimed to reduce theability of government officials to take matters intotheir own hands and unwittingly increase the levelsof tension.

The United States asked its African allies to refuselanding rights to Soviet planes seeking to refuel onAfrican territory. This was especially important forSenegal and Guinea, the most practical refuelingstops for planes en route to Cuba from the SovietUnion. Both nations disavowed the Soviet buildup inCuba and agreed to refuse landing rights to Sovietplanes.

In Washington, Ambassador Dobrynin met withRobert Kennedy to discuss the events of the past sixweeks. Kennedy reminded him of the repeatedSoviet pledges not to place offensive missiles inCuba and to give Castro only defensive assistance.Dobrynin renewed those pledges and denied the

existence of offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedyobserved that the president had chosen a less bellig-erent attitude toward the Soviet Union than otherpolitical figures in the United States would have andsuggested that the Soviet actions had “devastatingimplications for the peace of the world.”81 Dobryninquestioned the U.S. silence regarding the missilesduring the Kennedy-Gromyko meeting the previousweek. The attorney general replied that “there wasnothing the President could tell Gromyko thatGromyko didn’t already know—after all, why didn’tGromyko tell the President.”82 The president hadmet Soviet demands for the “withdrawal of Ameri-can troops from Thailand.” He believed that he wasnegotiating in good faith and “sneaking missiles intoCuba now displayed the Soviet leaders as hypocriti-cal, misleading and false.” Kennedy asked if theSoviet ships were continuing on their course towardCuba. Dobrynin replied that “that had been theirinstructions and he knew of no change.”83 Themeeting ended in a stalemate, neither man securein his knowledge of the other.

That evening the president met with BritishAmbassador David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore sug-gested that Kennedy should release the aerial photo-graphs proving the U.S. position. This would help torally public opinion behind the U.S. position. It wasabsolutely imperative that the world accept that themissiles represented a real crisis rather than a politi-cal attempt to increase public support before theimportant congressional elections on November 6.The president agreed with the ambassador on thispoint and decided to publish enlarged versions ofthe pictures the next day.

The quarantine line was drawn at 10:00 A.M. onWednesday, October 24, by nineteen U.S. shipsoperating as Task Force 136. If the Soviet shipsbound for Cuba continued at their current speed,two ships would be intercepted before noon.84 Morethan twenty Soviet ships bound for Cuba had beentracked by navy reconnaissance planes.

President Kennedy received a warning fromKhrushchev stating that the Soviet Union would notaccept the U.S. “ultimatum:”85

Having posed these conditions to us with theseconditions, you, Mr. President, have challengedus. Who asked you to do this? By what right haveyou done this? Our relations with the Republic ofCuba, like our relations with other states, regard-less of what sort of state it may be, concern onlythe two countries between which those relationsexist. . . .


You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantines,but advancing an ultimatum and threatening thatunless we subordinate ourselves to yourdemands, you will use force . . . You are no longerappealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us. . . .

Reference to the decision of the Organization ofAmerican States cannot in any way substantiatethe demands now advanced by the United States.This organization has absolutely no authority orbasis to make decisions like that of which youspeak of in your letter.

Consequently, we do not recognize these deci-sions. International law exists, generally recog-nized norms of conduct exist. We firmly supportthe principles of international law, strictly observethe norms regulating navigation on the high seasand in international waters. We observe thesenorms and enjoy the rights recognized by allstates.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights thatevery sovereign state enjoys, you are attemptingto legislate in questions of international law, andyou are trampling upon the generally acceptednorms of this law. . . . What morality, what lawcan justify such approach by the American Gov-ernment to international affairs? You cannot findsuch a morality and such a law. . . .

The Soviet Government considers that violationof freedom of the use of international waters andinternational air space is an act of aggression,pushing mankind toward the abyss of a worldmissile-nuclear war. . . . Of course, we shall not besimply observers of piratical actions of Americanships on high seas. We will then be forced on ourpart to take the measure we deem necessary andadequate in order to protect our rights. For thiswe have all that is necessary.

Just after 10:00 A.M. McNamara announced thatthe ships Gagarin and Komiles were going to reachthe interdiction line within one hour. A Soviet sub-marine had moved into position between the twoships. The U.S. Navy planned to meet the Sovietswith an aircraft carrier supported by anti-submarineequipped helicopters. The U.S.S. Essex would signalthe submarine by sonar. If it failed to respond, depthcharges would be released to force the submarine tosurface.

The administration had come to the moment ithad carefully attempted to avoid, the “first exchange

with an Russian submarine.” Even at that momentthe president asked if “there was some way we canavoid” it. This moment was characterized as “theedge of the precipice with no way off.”86 The U.S.government began to make final preparations for aretaliation by the Soviets in Berlin. At 10:25 A.M.,however, a report stating that the Soviet ships hadstopped “dead in the water” was received. Sevenminutes later the report was confirmed. The four-teen ships closest to the quarantine line had stoppedin the water or had turned back toward the SovietUnion, although the tankers bound for Cuba contin-ued. The president was determined to afford bothnations the time necessary to negotiate their wayout of the crisis. “No ships will be stopped or inter-cepted. . . . If the ships have orders to turn around,we want to give them every opportunity to do so.Get in direct touch with the Essex and tell them notto do anything . . . give the Russian vessels anopportunity to turn back. We must move quicklybecause the time is expiring.”87

Avoiding the Confrontation

The U.S. military community was not completelyreassured by the Soviet actions. Some officers spec-ulated that ships might have altered their course inorder to rendezvous with Soviet submarines, six ofwhich had been tracked in the area, and thenattempt to force their way through the line. Thepresident ordered the Soviet ships followed but notboarded. This, he believed would keep the UnitedStates in an alert position, afford Khrushchev timeto plan his next move, aware of U.S. pressure andrestraint, but not cause precipitate action.

At 1:00 P.M. the administration released the pho-tographs of Soviet bases in Cuba. This was espe-cially important in London where public opinionwas running against the U.S. administration. Manycritics felt that the Democratic administration wascreating a propaganda campaign to aid its party dur-ing the upcoming elections

U Thant, attempting to mediate between the twogovernments, proposed the simultaneous suspen-sion of the quarantine and the arms shipments.This, he maintained, would facilitate and establishthe groundwork for an immediate summit meetingbetween Khrushchev and Kennedy. Kennedy andKhrushchev responded to the secretary general thenext day, Thursday, October 25. Khrushchevaccepted the proposal: “I declare that I agree withyour proposals which accord with the interest ofpeace.” Kennedy did not: “As we made clear in theSecurity Council, the existing threat was created b


the secret introduction of offensive weapons intoCuba, and the answer lies in the removal of suchweapons.” First, remove the missiles then theUnited States will negotiate. Otherwise, the quaran-tine will remain.

Khrushchev decided to approach the U.S. govern-ment in an unofficial manner. He settled on invitingvisiting businessman William Knox, president ofWestinghouse International, to meet with him onWednesday in the Kremlin. During the ensuing dis-cussion, Khrushchev presented the Soviet view to aman he viewed as an informal channel to the U.S.government. Discussing semantic questions of“offense and defense,” he admitted what his ambas-sadors and official statements had been denying,namely that there were missiles and other offensiveweapons in Cuba. Furthermore, the Soviet Unionwould use them if necessary. He warned that theywould also sink the American vessels if the UnitedStates attempted to stop and board the Soviet ships.

On Thursday, October 25, Walter Lippmann’s col-umn in the Washington Post suggested that therewere “three ways to get rid of the missiles already inCuba:”—invasion and occupation, total blockadeand what he termed a “face-saving agreement,” atrade of the U.S. missiles in Turkey for the Sovietmissiles in Cuba.

At 8:00 A.M. (EST) on Thursday, October 25, aSoviet tanker, the Bucharest, was intercepted butwas allowed to pass through the quarantine linewithout a U.S. boarding. An East German passengership was also allowed through. The United Statesdecided that since it was only a matter of time untila ship was boarded, contingency plans would haveto be made. After long discussions the ExComm, theState Department, and the Pentagon agreed that thefirst ship to be boarded must not be a Soviet shipnor the ship of a Western ally, but preferably shouldbelong to a neutral state.

That day at the United Nations, AmbassadorZorin denied the presence of Soviet missiles inCuba, challenging Ambassador Stevenson to presentevidence proving their existence. Stevenson obligedwith a dramatic flair:

Mr. Ambassador we do have the evidence. Wehave it and it is clear and incontrovertible. . . .You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weaponsto Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have created thisnew danger not the United States. . . .

I remind you that the other day you did not denythe existence of these weapons, but today . . .

you now say that they do not exist, or that wehaven’t proved they exist. . . .

All right, Sir, let me ask you one question. Doyou, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R.has placed and is placing medium and intermedi-ate range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no?Don’t wait for the translation, yes or no?

Zorin: I am not in an American courtroom. . . . Indue course, Sir, you will have your answer

Stevenson: You are in the courtroom of worldopinion right now and you can answer yes or no.You have denied that they exist and I want toknow whether I have understood you correctly.

Zorin: Continue with your statement. You willhave your answer in due course.

Stevenson: I am prepared to wait for my answeruntil hell freezes over, if that’s your decision. AndI am also prepared to present the evidence to thisroom.

With that Stevenson turned to a set of easelsbehind him and presented the enlarged photographsof the Soviet missile sites to the Security Council.Zorin did not respond. Stevenson said, “We knothe facts, and so do you, Sir, and we are ready to talkabout them. Our job here is not to score debatingpoints. Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. Andif you are ready to try, we are.” The Security Counciladjourned later that day and did not meet againuntil the crisis had ended.

At 7:00 A.M. (EST) Friday, October 26, the U.S.S.Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., stopped the American-built,Panamanian-owned, Lebanese-registered freighterMarcula. The Marcula was bound for Cuba with aSoviet charter. It had been tracked since the previ-ous evening. The encounter had been specificallyplanned by the White House; it was selected as aneutral ship sailing under a Soviet charter. The U.S.Navy stopped and searched the vessel. The Marculacooperated with little protest, presumably underSoviet instructions. But construction of the missilesites continued at an increasing pace.

Kennedy stepped up the psychological and politi-cal pressure. Low-level photo reconnaissance flightsover Cuba were increased to one every two hours.From Florida to Washington, contingency planswere made in the event that the United States wasforced to bomb and invade Cuba. The State Depart-ment was ordered to proceed w

the cuban missile crisis: united states deliberations and ......case 334 the cuban missile crisis 3...

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