the ‘crisis’ in social psychology, an empirical approach

European Journal o f Social Psychology, Vol. 13, 255-280 (1983)

The ‘crisis’ in social psychology, an empirical approach*

ANTON J. NEDERHOF DS WO, University of Leyden, Middelstegracht 4, 2312 M Leiden, The Netherlands

A. GERARD ZWIER Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, Private Bag, Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract

The preponderance of empirical research in social psychology has ofren been a central issue in the ‘crisis literature’. However, no extensive empirical study has ever been undertaken vis a vis the ‘crisis’ in social psychology. In two studies, factors effecting the perceptions of social psychologists of their discipline were investigated. Although in the first study, among Dutch social psychologists, four hypotheses were tested and confirmed, a large part o f the total variance in the perception of the ‘crkk’ remained unexplained. In the second study, both a worldwide sample of active social psychological researchers as well as a sample of authors o f the ‘crisis literature’ were surveyed. The stances of both groups differed considerably. Although a majority of the active researchers did not agree that a crisis is at hand in social psychology, a large minority did. The active researchers agreed with many of the criticisms of social psychological research and theorizing. Attitudes on nine central issues, including the functioning of the editorlreviewer publishing system, predicted a large percentage of the total variance in the subjects’ attitude toward the existence of a ‘crisis’ in their discipline.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past fifteen years, a fast-growing literature has dealt with the state of the social sciences as a whole and social psychology in particular (e.g. Gilmour and Duck, 1980; Rosnow, 1981). Since then, hundredsof articles, chapters, and books, as well as a number of conferences (Strickland, Aboud and Gergen, 1976) have been devoted to the alleged ‘crisis’ in social psychology.

Elms (1975), for instance, believed he expressed the views of many of his colleagues when he stated:

‘Address correspondence to either author. ‘Some authors like to refer to the state of social psychology as being in a state of ‘crisis’, whether or not they borrow this term for the work of the philosopher Thomas Kuhn (1970), while others dislike the use of the term (cf: Elms, 1975; McGuire, 1973). During the last few years, the term has been used extensively in quotes. We will follow that use.

0046-2772/83/030255-26$2.60 Received I0 September 1982 0 1983 by John Wiley 8~ Sons, Ltd. Revised I March I983

256 A. J. NederhofandA. G. Zwier

‘Whether (the social psychologists) are experiencing an identity crisis, a paradigmatic crisis, or a crisis of confidence, most seem agreed that a crisis is at hand’ (Elms, 1975, 967)

The Greek ‘krisis’ mean decision, and the concept is often defined, also in contemporary English, by a condition of instability, leading to a decisive change. As Thomas Kuhn (1970) utilizes the word ‘crisis’, the outcome of a period of instability in a scientific field leads to the abandonment of one paradigm in favour of another more fertile and productive one. This use of the word may, however, not be applicable to the social sciences (Elm, 1975; Kuhn, 1970).

From another perspective, a ‘crisis’ is a point in a process at which protagonists are most vigorously opposed to another. Viewed in this light, the case can and has been made that social psychology actually is in a state of crisis since the intensity of the debates on the nature of the discipline reached an unprecedented high (e.g. the debated between McGuire (1967) versus Ring (1967); Gergen (1973) versus Schlenker (1974); Plon (1974) versus Deutsch (1974)).

Moreover, there have been an increasing number of social psychologists who have started to address themselves to many of the usually unstated and unacknowledged assumptions inherent in social psychological research (e.g. Israel and Tajfel, 1972; Armistead, 1974), and various social psychologists appear intent on changing what they regard as the traditional, positivist approach which dominates the discipline (e.g. Gergen, 1978, Note 2; H a d and Secord, 1972).

Some of the more controversial issues focus on the social psychological experiment. There are objections concerning the ethical abuse of the laboratory situation (Kelman, 1972; West and Gunn, 1978), the contrivedness of the experimental situation (Argyris, 1975; Henshel, 1980), the experimenter subject relationship as it was institutionalized by the laboratory experiment (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975; Kruglanski, 1976), and the usefulness and applicability of specific statistical concepts such as the Null hypothesis (Cronbach, 1975; Morrison and Henkel, 1970). Moreover, the ‘social psychology of social science research’ has brought many artifacts and ensuing controversies to light (Miller, 1972; Nederhof, 1981; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1969). The role that social psychology plays, or should play, in contemporary society has been intensely debated (Steiner, 1974; Warr, 1977) and some have argued that social psychological research is socially irrelevant (Lemon, 1976) or of little use (c6 Argyris, 1975). At a theoretical level, concern has also been shown over the non-integration of the various levels of analysis (Doise, 1978), the problematic nature of theory in social psychology (Tajfel, 1972), or even the lack of theory (Moscovici, 1972). Moreover, the theories that do exist have been criticized for ignoring the socio-economic context of behaviour (Annistead, 1974). Additionally, complaints are uttered about the philosophical naivete of social psychologists (Faucheux, 1976; Israel and Tajfel, 1972) and the imposition of a single perspective in social psychology (Finkelman, 1978) which is reflected in the ‘story book’ image that social psychologists tend to hold of the history of their discipline (Baumgardner, 1977; Samelson, 1974). Yet others point to the ‘fragmentation’ of the discipline (House, 1977), the poor relationship between social psychology and the other social sciences (Archibald, 1977; Elms, 1975), and the linguistic isolation of American and European social psychology (Finison and Whittemore, 1975).

The above merely lists some of the ‘highlights’ of the so-called ‘crisis literature’.

Crisis in social psychology 257

in general, two lines seem apparent. The flood of complaints, alternatives, and criticisms of (older) mainstream social psychological research has indicated that there are a lot more ways of doing social psychological research and of looking at social psychology than was previously assumed. Another common, but distinctive, feature of the crisis literature (or rather, the lack of it) is perhaps more surprising: Although the preponderance of empirical research in social psychology has often been a central issue in the above discussions, no extensive empirical investigation has ever been undertaken vis h vis the ‘crisis’ in social psychology. Although many contributions to the debates have been made by individual social psychologists, one might wonder to what extent these contributions can be regarded as being representative for the entire community of social psychologists. Does the fact that a considerable number of social psychologists have uttered serious misgivings about our research imply that social psychology is in a state of ‘crisis?’ We propose that these issues require more than a mere argument because they contain conceptualizations and interpretations which often reduce to opposing and often incommensurate convictions, attitudes, and beliefs (cf: Godow, 1976). Therefore one side may often not be able to convince the other side of the correctness of its beliefs (Smith, 1976). Whenever this occurs in a given field, a decision has to be taken finally by the community of scientific researchers in that field (cf. Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970). Thus, instead of arguing, as many critical analysts have done so far, that a(n) (aspect of a) certain research tradition/programme is in some way faulty and proposing our own remedy for this shortcoming, we have instead sought to establish what opinions are held by two groups of social psychologists.

Our main interest was to obtain information on the degree of consensus among social psychologists with regard to perceived progress in the discipline. Secondly, we wanted to know what their opinions were about the climate in which academic research takes place, and how they felt about the somewhat more specific criticisms that have been raised. Finally, we wondered whether the respondents’ attitudes toward these issues were related to a number of relevant background variables such as age, one’s philosophical orientation or having been an editor of a journal. More specific hypotheses will be outlined below.

STUDY I

Two sets of hypotheses were tested in the first survey. The first group concerned social psychologists’ perceptions of scientific progress in social psychology. The first hypothesis, which was drawn from the literature, tested the assertion that:

(1) Most social psychologists perceive scientific progress in social psychology to be less in the 1970s than the 1950s (cf. Elms, 1975).

The next three hypotheses identify three possible factors which may influence the perception of social psychologists about the progress of their discipline. The first two assert that the (worldwide) scientific progress in social psychology is judged by reference to relatively well-known comparison points such as the progress in the researcher’s own field or country. A third reference framework might be their philosophical stances.

(1) Social psychologists’ perceptions of scientific progress in social psychology

258 A . J . NederhofundA. G. Zwier

are influenced by their perceptions of scientific progress in their own field(s) of research.

(3) Social psychologists’ perceptions of worldwide scientific progress in social psychology are influenced by the perceptions of scientific progress in social psychology in their own country.

(4) Social psychologists’ perceptions of scientific progress in social psychology are influenced by the particular schools of thought they endorse.

Another set of hypotheses was based on theories of scientific progress of several philosophers of science (u.o., Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1959). Nederhof (1979, Note 3) developed five criteria based upon the theories of these philosophers which, depending upon the degree to which they are met, may either inhibit of advance the progress of a science.

Three of these criteria were put to the test in the present study:

(1) the public availability of scientific information*; (2) the quality of communication between members of a scientific

(3) a certain degree of consensus as to what constitutes the main theoretical community3; and

issues in a particular field4 (Nederhof, 1979).

It was hypothesized that the perception of the degree to which each of these criteria are met in social psychology would influence the perception of scientific progress by social psychologists.

Method

Subjects

A mail survey was completed among Dutch social psychologists who were-actively engaged in social psychological research. Two subgroups were contacted: (1) all social psychologists working at Dutch universities, and (2) all members of the Dutch Association of Social Psychological Researchers. Outside these two groups few active social psychological researchers can be found in The Netherlands (Nederhof, Note 3). The status of the subjects was determined by means of a screening question.

Procedure

In February, 1978,144 questionnaires were sent out, followed one week later by a reminder.

2Compare, for instance Popper’s (1945) ‘open society’ concepts and Lakatos’ public judgment of competing research programmes. kompare, for instance, Kuhn’s (1970, 1977) essays on this subject; also compare Popper’s (1945) social institutions. 4This is important in both Kuhn’s paradigm and exemplary constructs, the ‘hard core’ of Lakatosian research programme, and even Popper’s (1959) consensus with regard to basic statements.


Instrument

The questionnaire consisted of thirteen items and required, on the average, thirty-six responses. Three items dealt with the longterm organization of research. Two items explored the specific field of research covered in master’s and doctoral theses. Another item asked the respondent to enumerate the areas of research in social psychology in which the respondent had been involved during the last three years (1975-1978), the dates at which research projects had started and finished, and whether or not the project(s) was (were) to be continued. Three further items dealt with the respondents’ perceptions of scientific progress in social psychology, progress made in the 1970s as compared with the 1950s, progress made in the respondents’ field(s) of research during the last two years, and progress in Dutch social psychology (both as a whole and as regards the respondents’ own field(s) of research) as compared to progress made in foreign countries.

The respondents’ methodological and philosophical affiliations were assessed by means of two items. One asked the respondents to indicate which philosopher(s) had an important influence on the way they thought about research (they could choose between Adorno, Carnap, Chomsky, Feyerabend, Foucault, Habermas, Heidegger, Holzkamp, Husserl, W. James, Kuhn, Lakatos, Levi-Strauss, Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, Popper, Wittgenstein, or suggest their own favourite philosopher). The other item inquired about which school of thought the respondent felt most influenced by (the choice being between Marxism, Symbolic Interactionism, Phenomenology, the Frankfurt School, Critical Rationalism, or ‘Other, please specify . . .’). Three items concerned the three criteria regarding scientific progress enumerated above. Finally, two items asked for the age and institutional affiliation of the respondents.

Results and discussion

Return rate

Of the 144 questionnaires sent to the Dutch social psychologists, 93 (or 64.6 per cent) were returned by the due date. Of these, 66 (or 71 per cent) belonged to the target group of those actively engaged in social psychological research.

Description of the sample group

The mean age of the 66 subjects was 43.6 years. A third held a doctorate. This may seem a low figure, but it should be noted that the requirements for a doctorate in The Netherlands are different from those of a PhD in, for instance, the United States.

Perception of social psychology’s progress

Hypothesis 1. The conjecture of Elms (1975) and others that most social psychologists perceive a decline in scientific progress made by social psychology was not unequivocally confirmed 40 per cent of the Dutch social psychologists judged that progress during the 1970s had been smaller compared to a similar period of the 1950s, while 30 per cent noted more progress. If it is assumed that the large group of respondents (30 per cent) who noted ‘no difference’ meant that progress now is as large as that in the ‘blooming Fifties’ (e.g. Atkinson, 1977), then

260 A. J. Nederhofand A. G. Zwier

it appears that a majority agrees that much progress is being made today. Yet the findings may at least partially explain the feelings of ‘crisis’ in a considerable number of social psychologists. Also, it might be the case that a large part of the ‘crisis literature’ has been produced by the latter group of social psychologists.

A related measure of perceived progress concerned the degree of progress made during the last two years in the respondent’s own field of research. The results indicate that only 1.5 per cent of the respondents perceived much progress, 26 per cent discerned moderate progress, while 48.5 per cent note only slight (25.9 per cent) or little (22.6 per cent) progress. Almost a quarter (24.4 per cent) of the respondents were undecided. If we take the number of research fields in which the respondent is involved into account, we find that only in a quarter of the research areas is moderate, or much, progress perceived by the respondents. If the number of research fields are averaged for researchers (to avoid bias by the heavier weight of those individuals working on a large number of research programmes), only 19 per cent of the respondents are willing to indicate much (1.6 per cent) or moderate (17.7 per cent) progress in their field(s) of research. Suffice it to note that these findings seem not indicative of perceptions of a blooming science.

Hypothesis 2. A Pearson correlation of 0.30 (p < 0.01) was found between social psychologists’ perception of progress in social psychology and their perception of scientific progress in their own main field of research. Although the relationship is significant, the percentage of variance explained is small. Moreover, the relationship might be an effect of generalization as well as common judgment (e.g. optimism or pessimism). Therefore, it may be concluded that perceived progress in one’s particular field of research, although noticeable, does not seem to have a large influence on perceived progress of social psychology at large.

Hypothesis 3. A similar relationship was found to exist between the perception of social psychology’s progress in general and that of progress of social psychology in one’s own country: A significant Pearson correlation of 0.22 was found 0, C 0.05), explaining less than 5 per cent of the variance. It can be concluded that, at least with regard to Dutch social psychology, no substantial relationship exists between these two perceptions. It must be noted, however, that a more extensive test of this hypothesis would only be possible with a crossnational sample (see below). It might also be the case that it is not ‘social psychology in general’ that is taken as the referent, but ‘social psychology in a particular part of the world’ (e.g. the United States, Western Europe, or Eastern Europe). Indeed, several respondents indicated that they found ‘social psychology in general’ to be too global a concept to compare progress in one’s own country with.

Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis stated that social psychologists’ perceptions of progress in social psychology are influenced by the particular school of thought they endorse. The results show that only adherents to the Frankfurt School (including Adorno and Habermas) perceived significantly less progress than did other subjects (t (61) = 2.2; p < 0.05). No differences were found with regard to the other schools of thought. This may partly be due to the eclectic choices of the respondents: On the average, each subject acknowledged to have been influenced by 1.8 (out of five) main schools of thought. However, it was not possible to determine the relative weights of the influences of each school of thought on the perception of social psychology’s progress.

Thus, although some confirmation was obtained for all hypotheses, two of the observed relationships (influence of perceived progress in one’s own field, and

C r b b in social psychology 261

influence of perceived progress in one’s own country) explained only little of the total variance in the scores of the item concerning progress in social psychology at large.

Criteriu of scientific development

The criteria for assumed optimal functioning of social psychology were only partly met. With regard to the public availability of scientific information, 53.3 per cent of the sample group thought that it was not easy to get 2n otherwise good scientific article published. Only 16.7 per cent found this easy while 30 per cent thought that it would be ‘rather easy’. Several respondents indicated that they found publishing in English or American journals especially hard. An analysis of twenty-five publication lists solicited from the respondents confirmed this impression. In the twenty-five lists, only two articles had been published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and three in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Finally, the relative ease or difficulty with which the publication process was perceived by the respondent was not significantly related to the perception of progress of social psychology in the last two decades-although the direction was as hypothesized (r = 0.10).

Concerning the second criterion, the perceived quality of communication among colleagues working in the same field of research, it was found that only 31 per cent believed it to be satisfactory. The relationship between this criterion of progress and the perception of social psychology’s advance was small (r = 0.12), unsignificant, but in the expected direction. With regard to a consensus on what constitutes the main theoretical issues in a particular field, only a small group (7.3 per cent) saw much agreement. Again, no significant correlations could be found between responses to this item and the respondent’s perception of progress.

Conclusions and summary

In summarizing the above, it may be noted that the climate in which research takes place (as perceived by the respondents) does not directly bear on the perception of progress in the discipline.

However, the scores on the three criteria of scientific development do indicate that the organization of social psychology as a science is not smooth. The perceived difficulty involved in publishing good material (specifically in foreign countries) and the often perceived low quality of communication among colleagues show that the respondents think that the written, as well as the personal, communication channels are in a far-from-optimal condition. Additionally, only a small group sees much consensus among researches on theoretical matters. Thus, opinions may largely diverge as to what constitutes important theoretical and empirical work and what counts as an important contribution (c$ Lewicki, 1982).

A considerable minority of respondents believe that less progress has been made in the last decade than was made in the 1950s. Half of the respondents perceive little or relatively little progress in their own field of research during the last two years, whereas only a few (1.5 per cent) claim much progress. The scores on the items which concerned the criteria of scientific development also point to serious shortcomings in the actual mechanics of the research process.

It is, of course, possible that these results are representative for Dutch social psychologists only. Therefore a second study was implemented in which a

262 A. J . Nederhof and A. G. Zwier

worldwide sample of social psychologists was employed. The questionnaire that was developed contained a broader range of items than had been previously used. Allowance was also made to assess more specifically whether authors who contributed to the ‘crisis literature’ had other perceptions of social psychology’s scientific advance than had ‘common’ social psychological researchers.

STUDY I1

The same four hypotheses as in the first study were tested again, this time not only with Dutch subjects but with a sample covering the international scientific community. However, the second study was not only undertaken to establish more firmly the external validity of the previous findings but also to assess in a more complete way the factors determining feeling of ‘crisis’ or the absence of them. Additionally, we wished to assess in what ways the authors of the ‘crisis literature’ represented the attitudes and opinions of the scientific community at large.

Method

Subjects

Two groups of social psychologists were sampled. The first group covered those individuals who have had articles published in 1978 and early 1979 in some numbers of, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, the Journal of >ersonality and Social Psychology, and the European Journal of Social Psychology. All first authors were included (N = 157). In this way, we hoped to obtain a sample of active social psychological researchers. This group was called the ‘research group’.

The second sample consisted of those individuals who have had articles or books published (including contributions to edited books) which deal with (some aspect of) the ‘crisis’ in social psychology. The selection of these persons was based on articles and books identified by a citation analysis (Zwier, Note 1). All first authors of publications during the time period 1963-1978 (N = 128) were included. This group was called the ‘concerned group’.

Instrument

The first section of the questionnaire presented the subjects mostly with paraphrases of statements made by social psychologists about the ‘crisis’ in social psychology. The number of items in this section totalled fifty-four, three of which were included for exploratory reasons only (see Appendix 1). Use was made of a 7-point scale which ranged from ‘very strongly agree’ to ‘very strongly disagree’.

A second section covered a number of background variables such as age, sex, nationality, religion, year of completing PhD, and university graduated from. Also, information was solicited about the type of journal read, the number of articles published, editorship of a journal and authorship. Further items referred to the perceived quality of communication among one’s colleagues (as in Study I), the ease with which research grants could be obtained, the subject’s main orientation as a social scientist (choices given were: (1) theoretical social psychology; (2) theoretical/empirical research; (3) applied research; (4) teaching social psychology;


and (5) something else, namely . . .), and whether the respondents considered themselved primarily a psychologist or a social psychologist. Finally, a number of items concerned with the respondents’ beliefs about progress in his or her own field, as well as with progress in social psychology in general were incorporated.

Respondents were also requested to indicate whether-and if so, how much-he or she has been influenced by several major schools of thought.

In the fall of 1979, subjects received a first copy of the questionnaire, while non-respondents received a second copy early in 1980 (cf. Nederhof, in press).

Results and discussion

Return rate

The ‘concerned group’ had a return rate of 74.3 per cent, the ‘research group’ of 67.8 per cent. In the former group, 10.2 per cent was returned with ‘address unknown’ or ‘deceased’, while this percentage was 4.7 per cent for the latter group. The number of explicit refusals was two for the ‘concerned group’, while none of the ‘research group’ declined. The return rates of both group may be considered as adequate (Nederhof, 1981).

Description of the two sample groups

The respondents in both groups differed on a number of background characteristics. Members of the ‘concerned group’ were generally older than those of the ‘research group’ [x2(5) = 30.5, p < 0.OOlJ. This difference might be due to the differences in the sampling frames since the ‘concerned group’ consisted of individuals who published during a period of fifteen years, while the ‘research group’ was a sample comprised of authors who had all published recently. No differences were found with regard to the nationalities of both groups. Almost 50 per cent of the respondents were American, 18 per cent were English, 17 per cent had conti- nental European nationalities, 9.6 per cent were Canadians, and the remaining 5.4 per cent were of some other nationality. With regard to the level of productivity, 28.4 per cent of the ‘concerned group’ and 9.4 per cent of the ‘research group’ claimed to have published more than fifty articles. More than three-quarters of the ‘concerned group’ had been an author of at least one book (78.8 per cent) versus 50 per cent of the ‘research group’ [x2(1) = 1 4 . 5 ; ~ < O.OOl]. Similarly, 67.5 per cent of the first group and 42.7 per cent of the latter group had been a journal editor at some time or another [x2(1) = 10.2; p < 0.001]. The ‘concerned group’ typically stated an interest in theoretical social psychology, while the ‘research group’ opted more often for ‘theoretical/empirical’ research [x2(1) = 11.6; p < 0.001]. Thus, it seems that both groups differ on a number of background characteristics. Most of the analyses will be focused on the ‘research group’ since this group represents the target group of active social psychological researchers.

Perception of social psychology’s progress

As in the first study, Elms’ (1975) conjecture was tested that the scientific advances made in social psychology during the 1950s have, in general, been perceived as greater by social psychologists than those made in the 1970s. Of the ‘concerned group’, 31.5 per cent agreed with this statement, while 45.2 per cent disagreed. In

264

the ‘research group’, this situation was reversed: 46.1 per cent agreed, and 35.9 per cent disagreed with this assertion. This finding lends support to the suggestion put forth on the results of Study I, namely, that a large part of the ‘crisis literature’ has been produced by authors who are more pessimistic or more concerned on this point than the ‘average’ researcher.

A related measure of perceived progress referred to the degree of progress made in the respondent’s own field of research during the last two years. The responses indicated that 47.2 per cent of the ‘research group’ agreed that much progress had been made in their own field, while 41.6 per cent indicated disagreement. In the ‘concerned group’, the situation was again reversed: only 36.6 per cent expressed agreement, while almost half (49.3 per cent). disagreed.

Thus in both cases and using two measures, a division of perception is visible. In general, however, the figures show that there is a lot of concern about the scientific progress of social psychology.

To test the hypothesized relationship between a feeling of crisis and a perception of lesser progress, we had developed an item which is a paraphrase from Ring (1967). This item will be referred to as the ‘crisis item’. It says: ‘there is a crisis in social psychology. It is in a state of profound intellectual disarray, and there is little sense of progress’ (Ring, 1967,54). The negative Pearson correlation between this item and the item comparing the progress in the 1950s and 1970s confirms our hypothesis that the feeling of crisis may, to some extent, be due to the perception of lesser progress in the discipline as a whole (‘research group’: r = 0 . 3 4 5 ; ~ < 0.003; ‘concerned group’: r = 0.254; p < 0.03):

Although many social psychologists (88.8 per cent of the two samples put together) believe that many of their colleagues have shown concern over the state of the discipline, they are very much divided over the issue of whether or not their discipline is in a state of ‘crisis’. Across the two samples, we find that there is an almost symbolic division of opinion among the respondents to the ‘crisis item’ (see above): 44.6 per cent expressed agreement, while 44.0 per cent disagreed; 10.7 per cent were undecided. There exists, however, a different climate of opinion within

A. J . Nederhof and A. G. Zwier

60%

50%

Endorsement in 40%

percentages adjusted

frequencies 30%

20%

1 0%

Agreementa ) Undecided Disagreement

a ) Responses to the ‘crisis’ item (6 ) : ‘There is a crisis in Social psychology . . ..’ Figure 1. Perception of crisis in social psychology


the respective sample groups (see Figure 1): the ‘research group’ tends to disagree slightly (mean = 3.3; S = 1.55) and the ‘concerned group’ tends to agree (mean = 4.4; S = 1.46) with the description of social psychology as being in a state of crisis.

A glance at the means and standard deviations of the responses of both groups to other items in the questionnaire directly related to the concept of crisis indicated that, among the ‘research group’ as well, there are apparently many individuals who are concerned over the present state of the discipline (see Table l ) , although only a minority perceives a real ‘crisis’.

Those who agreed with the assertion that social psychology can be regarded as being in a state of crisis also tended to think that less scientific progress has been made in their own field than did those who tended not to hold this interpretation. To state it conversely, those respondents who tended to believe that much scientific progress has recently been made in their own field are not likely to think of social psychology as being in a state of crisis-‘research group’: r(88) = 0.332; p < 0.002; ‘concerned group’: r(70) = 0.431; p < 0.001.

A third hypothesis concerned the influence that the perception of social psychology’s progress in the respondent’s own country has on perceptions of scientific progress in social psychology at large. Subjects not living in the United States found the progress made in the United States to be ‘slightly greater’-‘concerned group’: mean = 3.58; N = 38-or ‘greater’-‘research group’: mean = 2.82, N = 45. Both sample groups noted somewhat more progress in their own country than in either England or Western Europe (means are between 4.73-4.91), while progress in Eastern Europe was generally perceived as smaller than in one’s own country-‘research group’: mean = 5.27; ‘concerned group’: mean = 5.00. However, the third hypothesis was not borne out. With regard to the ‘research group’, the four independent variables had an insignificant multiple correlation with the dependent variable (r = 0.28; F < 1, NS), while the multiple correlation for the ‘concerned group’, although larger (r = 0.496), was also insignificant [F(4,25) = 1.71, NS].

The fourth hypothesis tested concerned the influence of particular schools of thought upon the perception of crisis. Multiple regressions on the ‘crisis item’, using the ‘philosophical orientation variables’ as independent variables, were found to be non-significant for both groups. Therefore, it must be concluded that the degree of influence experienced from particular schools of thought is not related to one’s agreement with the specific assertion that social psychology is in a state of crisis.

Fuctor unaiyses

To obtain a broader perspective than is possible by merely testing a limited number of hypotheses in mostly bivariate analyses, a factor analysis using Varimax rotation was carried out on responses of both groups to fifty-one items which contained paraphrases of statements about the ‘crisis’. This analysis, which showed important differences between the ‘concerned group’ and the ‘research group’, resulted in the identification of three factors in each group. For the ‘concerned group’, these three factors were labelled respectively:

(1) ‘Attitudes toward the criticisms of social psychology’ (EV = 10.85, per cent V = 21.3), items: 4, 13, 15, 19, 22, 24, 29, 33, 39, 41, 42.

Tabl

e 1.

Res

pons

es to

cen

tral c

risis

item

s ? %

% e

ndor

sem

ent*

%

end

orse

men

t R 3- s ?

!- T

he ‘

conc

erne

d gr

oup’

(N

= 7

3)

The

‘res

earc

h gr

oup’

(N

= 8

9)

Item

A

gree

U

ndec

ided

D

isag

ree

Mea

n s

Agr

ee

Und

ecid

ed

Dis

agre

e M

ean s

Ther

e is

a cr

isis

in so

cial

psy

chol

ogy.

It is

in

a sta

te of

pro

foun

d in

telle

ctua

l dis

arra

y and

a

ther

e is

little

sen

se of

pro

gres

s 56

.9

11.1

30

.6

3.4

1.6

34.1

9.

1 56

.8

4.4

1.4

9

Dur

ing

the

last

dec

ade,

soci

al ps

ycho

logi

sts

have

sho

wn

muc

h co

ncer

n ov

er th

e st

ate

of

thei

r di

scip

line

89.0

4.

1 5.

5 2.

3 1.

2 87

.6

4.5

7.9

2.4

1.1

3. 2

The

basis

for

cur

rent

feel

ings

of ‘

crisi

s’,

as re

port

ed in

con

tem

pora

ry li

tera

ture

, go

far b

eyon

d th

e pa

rticu

lars

of

how

soc

ial

psyc

holo

gist

s do

expe

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past

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(2) ‘Placing social psychology in a broader perspective’ (EV = 3.42, per cent

(3) ‘Broad versus narrow interests in social psychology” (EV = 2.83, per cent

EV = Eigenvalue, per cent V = Percentage of variance explained. The factors for the ‘research group’ were labelled respectively:

(1) ‘Beliefs about the status of social psychological findings’ (EV = 7.55, per cent V = 14.8), items: 6, 15, 19, 32, 35.

(2) ‘Purpose to which social psychology should be employed’ (EV = 3.88, per cent V = 7.6), items: 13, 22, 33, 38.

(3) ‘Concern over the social and political aspects of (social) science’ (EV = 3.66, per cent V = 7.2), items: 16, 31, 37, 40, 46.

EV = Eigenvalue; per cent V = Percentage of variance explained.

V = 6.7), items: 16, 35, 37, 40, 51.

V = 5.5), items: 14, 21, 25, 36.

Individuals in the research group scoring high on the first factor found that there is indeed a ‘crisis’ in social psychology. They do not think that our theories are very useful when they are applied ‘in the real world’, and doubt that many findings which have been produced are relevant to existing social conditions. They also believe that social psychological inquiry is guided more by the fads and fashions of the day than by theoretical problems and the findings of empirical research. Finally, they do not agree with Schlenker’s assertion that ‘Numerous social psychological principles have been supported by a sufficiently wide range of data to establish their universality’ (Schlenker, 1974). Low scorers perceive no crisis: They believe that social psychological knowledge has been shown to be generally useful, relevant, and a guide to social psychological inquiry. Congruously, they hold that the universality of many social psychological theories has been assured by a large amount of data.

A second factor was named ‘the purpose to which social psychology should be employed’. High-scoring persons prefer sophisticated mathematical models over verbally stated theories, and believe that ‘as long as we have a genuine research interest, we have little need to question any other motives’. They disagree with claims which suggest that the paradigms in terms of which social psychologists operate are ideologies reflecting the interests of the ruling class, and that social psychological research endorses the power structure of society. The low-scoring individual, on the other hand, clearly would question the role that the discipline should play in contemporary society. The third factor loads heavily on items which deal with the social and political aspects of (social) science. High scorers deny that scientific activity is relatively independent of sociocultural influences, and believe that social psychologists should overcome their ahistorical perspective.

They perceive an urgent need to study the ideological nature of social belief systems, and see no need to exclude social psychology itself from such an inquiry. Not surprisingly, they note that many subjective factors enter social psychological research. Low scorers are much less concerned about the social and political aspects of (social) science.

Nine out of twenty of the high-loading items in the three factors of the ‘research group’ were also included among those in the ‘concerned group’. Nevertheless, the configuration of these items showed substantial differences. For instance, the first

5The authors are indebted to H. Triandis for suggesting this label.


factor identified in the ‘concerned group’ shared a number of items with a loading of > 0.5 with the first two factors found for the ‘research group’, without, however, merely embracing them. Typically, Factor One of the ‘concerned group’ reflects broader and more pertinent issues, such as whether or not social psychology should be regarded as a science at all, rather than an art; or whether or not all data collection should indeed be stopped until some very fundamental difficulties have been resolved; or whether or not the choosing of problems and methods is actually foreclosed by ‘existing loci of power’ beyond the control of the individual investigator. In contrast, the ‘research group’ seems mainly concerned with somewhat more specific matters, such as the status of research findings and the purpose to which social psychological research should be employed, questions which are probably frequently encountered in their daily activities (experimental research and teaching) or directly touched upon.

Factor Two of the ‘concerned group’ resembles to a great extent Factor Three of the ‘research group’. These factors, which share three items of > 0.5, seem to point to the ‘historicity argument’ and the implications and ramifications that follow it. There is no item in either factor which does not entail reference to the historical and ideological nature of a social belief system such as the one propagated by social psychology-except perhaps for the high-loading item which inquires whether or not the respondent has thought a lot about issues such as these in the last few years. It may come as no surprise that an affirmative answer to this question is positively correlated with an agreement with many of the criticisms made by Gergen (1973) and others.

Finally, Factor Three of the ‘concerned group’ offers a dimension which does not appear to have been identified by the factor analysis of the ‘research group’. Although its meaning is more opaque, it does seem to point out to a dimension on which the respondents’ interests (broad or narrow) in social psychology could be sampled. Predictably, those who would argue for a broader perspective would also tend to agree with many of the criticisms that have been made of social psychology and of the publication system that supports it.

Multiple regression analysis

Stepwise multiple regressions were carried out with the ‘crisis item’ as a dependent variable for both groups (see Tables 2 and 3). Although important differences between both groups were found, two items were commonly shared: Both groups have in common that those who do perceive a ‘crisis’ situation find that social psychology cannot rightfully claim to be a science, and that social psychological theories are generally not very useful when it comes to applying them outside the ’ lboratory.

Yet individuals from both groups had characteristically different reasons for believing that social psychology should or should not be regarded as being in a state of ‘crisis’. In the ‘concerned group’, the perception of ‘crisis’ was related more to a pervading pessimism. Bones of contention were: social psychology should (should not (claim scientific status; theories are regarded as (not) being useful; the editor/ reviewer selection system is perceived as (not) functioning adequately; and it is agreed that (not) much progress is being made in one’s own field of research. Interestingly, relationships were found with this item which imply that the critic from this group (as opposed to his or her opponents) is acquainted with

Tabl

e 2.

M

ultip

le re

gres

sion

on

the

'cris

is it

em' f

or th

e 'co

ncer

ned

grou

p'*

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ultip

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R

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dep.

step

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edito

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dequ

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l the

orie

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nera

lly

very

use

ful w

hen

it co

mes

to a

pply

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them

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truth

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in th

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Tabl

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Mul

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reg

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on th

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risis

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scie

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art

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have

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anip

ulat

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labo

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xper

imen

t not

to

test

out

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poth

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but

to

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onst

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for

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any

cont

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vest

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ions

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ave

you

ever

y be

en an

edito

r or

ser

ved

on a

n ed

itoria

l boa

rd of

a (s

ocia

l) ps

ycho

logi

cal j

ourn

al?

4.71

4.27

2.83

4.26

4.82

6.07

4.37

2.62

1.61

1.2

0.43

1 0.

186 -

1.3

0.55

0 0.

302 -

1.1

0.60

2 0.

363 -

1.5

0.64

7 0.

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7.44

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7.30

$

6.97

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5.30

6

4.85

$

6.13

6

7.91

$

Crkb in social psychology 271

Phenomenology, but only slightly with Positivism. In agreement with a general phenomenological orientation, he or she believes that one cannot really detach oneself from the situation that is studied, and that, in the final analysis, it is the truth which is decisive in empirical matters.

As was evident in the factor analysis, individuals in the ‘research group’ concen- trated more on items connected with experimenting, theorizing, and the societal aspects of research. Thus, a person in agreement with a ‘crisis’ interpretation would tend to believe-as distinct from their ‘no crisis’ colleagues-that there is often insufficient theoretical work involved in contemporary research designs, that laboratory experiments do not really test our hypotheses but merely demonstrate their obvious truth, and nomothetic generalizations are invalidated by the more passing of time. He or she would also be more.likely to consider the proposition that all data collection should be stopped in order to resolve some of the fundamental difficulties which social psychology faces today.

A second feature which is characteristic of individuals belonging to the ‘research group’ is their stance toward the actual process of scientific development. Adher- ents to the crisis interpretation would tend to agree with the Piagetian assertion that ‘the act of investigation transforms reality’ (see Israel, 1972). In their opinion, the primary reason for doing research is not academic, and social ‘spin-offs’ which would occur should not merely be regarded as a bonus. Finally, such individuals, who are not likely to be or have been an editor, believe that social psychological theories have generally not been very useful. Those who do not see a crisis disagree with their colleagues on these points.

Having obtained some understanding of the more important dimensions that may underlie a critical attitude, we can now proceed with an investigation into ‘who believes what?’ Another stepwise multiple regression analysis was carried out, using the item which directly tapped the respondents’ position with regard to the ‘crisis’ as the dependent variable and several background (age, nationality, number of articles published, authorship, editorship, access to research grants, and type of journal read) and philosophical orientation variables as independent variables. Only the editorship variable was found to be significant for the ‘research group’, but none of the variables were found to be significant for the ‘concerned group’ [F(1,62) = 9 . 3 ; ~ < 0.01; r = 0.321.

In order to determine whether the philosophical orientation influenced the subjects’ general stance toward topics connected to the ‘crisis’, multiple regression analyses were carried out on the ‘crisis factor’, which was composed of the factor scores obtained from the first factor found in the factor analysis. First, the analyses with the seven background variables as independent variables were repeated, which showed that the variable ‘editorship’ again attained significance-but now only in the ‘concerned group’ [F(7.40) = 4.39; p < 0.051. Thus, the conclusions drawn on the basis of the analysis with the ‘crisis item’ were corroborated.

A final regression analysis on the ‘crisis factor’ was completed, using the six ‘orientation variables’. In the ‘concerned group’, the variable ‘Marxism’ success- fully predicts the respondent’s critical attitude toward the state of social psychology (F = 26.8; p < 0.001). The positive and strong correlation implies that respondents who agree that they have been influenced by Marxism also would tend to be more critical of the state of the discipline, and vice versa.

In the ‘research group’, there are no significant correlations to be found between


the ‘crisis factor’ and the various ‘orientation variables’. Since only one of the background variables explains a significant portion of variance in the ‘crisis item’ (about 10 per cent) for any one group, it appears that substantial differences in the responses cannot be explained by differences in the composition of the samples as measured by most background variables used in this study.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results of the previous two empirical studies are among the first of their kind in the study of social psychology. In recent years, many social psychologists have expressed concern over the discipline, yet very few indeed have actually turned the methods of the social sciences on their own field of investigation.

It is important to point out that an empirical approach of the ‘crisis’ problem presupposes that, in the final analysis, not the opinion of any single individual determines whether or not there ‘actually’ is a crisis in social psychology (which is the approach many contributors to the ‘crisis literature’ appear to have taken in their manifold treatises on what is ‘really wrong’ with social psychology today), but that the opinion of the scientific community of social psychologists as a whole should be decisive (cf. Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1959).

Put this way, the issue whether or not social psychology is in a state of ‘crisis’ becomes equivalent with the question of who thinks so. With regard to this issue, we showed that a majority of active social psychological researchers (57 per cent), all publishing in one of three top journals in the field, finds that their discipline is at present not (or no longer) in a ‘crisis’. Nevertheless about a third (34 per cent) was willing to agree that social psychology should be regarded as being in a state of crisis. Not surprisingly perhaps, most of the social psychologists who contributed to the ‘crisis literature’ also agreed with a crisis interpretation. Although the picture is more complicated, these findings suggest that contributors to the ‘crisis literature’ have been unable to convince the majority of the scientific community of their views. Even among this group of ‘crisis’ authors, a sizeable minority does not (or no longer) view social psychology to be in a ‘crisis’. As hopeful as these findings may seem to some social psychologists thinking themselves to be lonely dissenters among a majority of a ‘crisis’-oriented scientific community (cf. Festinger, 1980), it must be noted that the majority of active researchers may merely have loathed the use of the word ‘crisis’, while actually agreeing with many of the criticisms of essential parts of social psychological research and theorizing, as well as being pessimistic with regard to the scientific progress of (parts) of the discipline.

The two studies reported here investigated the manner in which the state of the discipline of social psychology was perceived by social psychologists. First, we tested Elms’ (1975) conjecture that one of the sources of widespread feelings of ‘crisis’ could be found in the social psychological effect on a recent slackening of scientific progress. Both in the Dutch sample group (40 per cent) and in the international sample (36 per cent), a minority-although a substantial one-judged scientific progress during the 1970s to be smaller than that during the 1950s. The relationship between feelings of ‘crisis’ and opinions about the comparative progress of the discipline was significant, but small to moderate of strength in the different samples. In general then, although there is no widespread concensus regarding the decreased scientific progress of social psychology, as Elms suggested,


it is the case that a perception of ‘crisis’ in the discipline coincides in a considerable number of cases with the belief that less progress is being made today than in the 195Os, and that less progress is believed to have been made in the respondents’ own fields of research.

Secondly, important differences were found between contributors of the ‘crisis literature’ and active research social psychologists. Contributors to the ‘crisis literature’ were on all measures more pessimistic on social psychology’s progress. This finding could be indicative of what some may regard as an inherent minor bias in the publication progress: Those who are more concerned about the state of social psychology tend to publish more frequently about the topic than those who do not see much reason for concern. Even the fact that the ‘crisis literature’ counts a number of articles by authors who possess more optimistic views about progress in the discipline and who often write in response to proponents of a crisis interpretation does not completely baiance both sides. It is a matter of conjecture to what extent the ‘widespread feelings of crisis’ so often referred to in the introductory part of articles can be regarded as a misrepresenta- tion of the severity of the ‘crisis’, occasioned by disproportionate publicizing of positive and negative views.

The two sample groups in Study I1 did not only differ in pessimism regarding the state of the discipline, but were also found to vary as to the reasons for optimism or pessimism. A factor analysis showed the ‘concerned group’ to differ among themselves on issues of a broader scope and of a contemplative philosophical nature. These concerns question fundamental stipulations and assumptions held by many social psychologists, and also constitute the main topics of the discussions in the ‘crisis literature’.

The same questionnaire elicited quite a different response from the ‘research group’. Critics and non-critics from this group seem specifically divided on more pragmatic issues of the ‘publish or perish’ world (cf. Rowan, 1974). From the point of view of the critics, the main issues included: the debatable validity of laboratory experiments, the often low quality of research designs, the doubtful use of theoretical analyses, the irrelevance of many of the findings, and the worry that not theories and data but fads and fashions would be primarily responsible for what seem to them to be somewhat aimless expansion of social psychological ‘knowledge’.

An analysis of the factor scores of both groups revealed that, among the ‘concerned group’, those who were most pessimistic and critical about social psychology and its progress were also the ones who were more often influenced by Marxism, a relationship not apparent for the ‘research group’. Many of the criticisms that have been made of the discipline are steeped in what often appears as a Marxist critique. Although many critics would deny being faithful followers of Man, many too would agree that the specific criticisms have often been directed at the ideological nature of the discipline and at the power structure that supports it (e.g., Baumgard- ner, 1977; Buss, 1979; Gadlin and Ingle, 1975; Lubek, 1976). Apparently these ideological and philosophically tinted criticisms had less appeal to the ‘research group’ than to the ‘concerned group’.

The differences between both sample groups could not be traced back to differences in sampling methods since a multiple regression analysis failed to identify background predictor variables other than the ‘editorship’ variable in the ‘research group’. This fact also reveals something about the group of critics (and non-critics)

274

from both groups. To put it in negative terms, it means that the critics are not all young or old people, nor do they all believe that the quality of communication between colleagues is poor, nor do they all have a shared specific research interest, nor do they find it particularly difficult to obtain research grants, nor do they come from a certain continent or country. Although positive individual correlations between these variables and both the ‘crisis item’ and the ‘crisis factor’ exist, they are not powerful enough to predict individual responses. Thus, with the exception of editorship, attitudes with regard to the ‘crisis’ cannot be identified with a particular subgroup of social psychologists.

These findings tie in well with what we found out about the salient points in the belief systems of the critics in both groups. Although individuals between the two groups differed with respect to the focus of their concerns, there were two issues on which they agreed most, namely, that social psychology cannot claim to be a science and that social psychological theories often turn out to be of little use when they need to be applied in real world situations. Interestingly, a similar concern with regard to application of research emerged in a recent survey among members of the elite American Society of Experimental Social Psychology (Lewicki, 1982). The finding that these two variables explain much of the variance in the ‘crisis item’ indicates that critics and non-critics are very much divided over the scientific status of the discipline, as well as over the debatable usefulness of social psychological theories.

A strong and often recurring theme concerned the functioning of editors within the journal-publishing system in social psychology. For both groups, various analyses indicated that those who were or had been an editor of a journal in the field were less likely to perceive a ‘crisis’ or to share the criticisms of social psychology. How do we explain these divergent opinions of those who function as the gate- keepers of science? It seems apparent that the group of editors consists of individuals who have more vested interests in social psychology than have other researchers. To become an editor, one has often made important theoretical or empirical contributions to social psychology, and one has, in many cases, long years of outstand- ing service. Both factors may give rise to a certain commitment to social psychology and to the way in which it is carried out. This commitment is enhanced further when the two factors are combined. Still, an even more important determinant of commitment may lie in the tasks which editors have to fulfil: They have to uphold and defend the scientific standards of the discipline. These tasks may not easily be reconciled with an attitude that raises fundamental criticisms of the basis philo- sophy which underlies the scientific method and the purpose(s) for which it is employed (cf. Williams, Note 4, 122).

Equally interesting is the converse interpretation that individuals who have never made it to editorship are more likely to agree with the criticisms that have been made of social psychology. Since much of the critique has been directed at the ideology of social psychology and at the power structure that maintains it, it is understandable that criticisms would be more likely to be forthcoming from those persons not occupying ‘powerful’ or ‘visible’ positions. The apparent dissatisfaction with the current editor/reviewer system should deserve serious attention. The journal-publishing system takes a central position in the social psychological enterprise, and signs of malfunctioning of this vital part of any science should not be taken lightly. Further study as to the exact locus or loci of the dissatisfaction shown

A. J. Nederhof and A. G. Zwier

Crkis in social psychology 275

with regard to this central institution seems badly needed (cf: Lubek, 1976; Mahoney, 1976).

Social psychology may not progress much further scientifically unless hard and no doubt painful work is done on many of the criticisms which are shared by a considerable number of social psychological researchers. What seems to be required in particular is extended knowledge of the many factors (cognitive, individual, social and political) which influence an understanding of research activity as a social psychological process. Already some evidence indicates that a constructive and reflexive attitude is replacing the cries of ‘crisis’ with which we started the 1970s and the abundancy of verbal contributions which accompanied these (see Buss, 1979; Morawski, 1979; Spiegel-Rosing and de Solla Price, 1977).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors (listed in alphabetical order) are indebted to Barry Kirkwood, Peter White, Graham Vaughan and Mike Corballis of the University of Auckland for their comments and assistance, and to Lee Freese for his comments on an earlier version. The research was partially supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.) to the first author.

APPENDIX I

1. During the last decade, social psychologists have shown much concern over the

2. Social psychological theory must be regarded as an active part of social change. 3. Insufficient theoretical work underlies many contemporary research

4. Most of experimental social psychology yields static conceptualizations of

5. As a general rule, it is advisable that the social psychologist should detach

6. There is a crisis in social psychology. It is in a state of profound intellectual

7. Mathematical proof is the surest form of scientific knowledge. 8. The relatively new methodologies made possible by developments in computer

technology (i.e. computer simulation, time series analysis, parameter estimation, path analysis) promise to be a lot more useful than the traditional a-affects-b sequential design.

9. There is no reason why the natural science methodology cannot also be used in the social science.

10. There is a great need to question the fundamental assumptions underlying much of our research.

11. The best guarantee of a correct explanation of social behaviour is given by a demonstration of control over that behaviour.

12. The basis for current feelings of ‘crisis’, as reported in contemporary literature, goes far beyond the particulars of how social psychologists do experiments, whether in the laboratory or in the field.

state of their discipline.

investigations.

social behaviour.

him/herself as much as possible for the situation he/she is studying.

disarray and there is little sense of progress.

276

13. When sophisticated mathematical models are available, they are preferable over verbally stated theories.

14. One of the primary purposes of research is to describe the world as it really is, and to explain why and how events happen in it.

15. Numerous social psychological principles have been formulated in sufficiently abstract terms and have been supported by a sufficiently wide range of data to establish their universality.

16. Today there is an urgent need for social psychology to study the ideological nature of social belief systems.

17. Nomothetic generalizations are invalidated by the mere passing of time. 18. The alleged ‘crisis’ in social psychology represents merely the tip of the

iceberg; all the social sciences now experience a crisis of some sort. 19. Social psychological theories are generally very useful when it comes to

applying them outside the laboratory. 20. Abstract, natural science thinking tends to endorse a male-dominated

world-view. 21. Conceptual boundaries between social psychology and other social sciences

must be minimized. 22. The claim that social psychological research endorses the contemporary

power-structure of society is unwarranted. 23. Social psychological accounts often include clearcut value-judgments regarding

‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of behaviour. 24. Scientific knowledge of social phenomena is necessarily historical. 25. I am sick of hearing about a crisis in social psychology. 26. The truth is not the only criterion which, in the final analysis, is decisive in

27. The reason for doing social psychological research is primarily academic; any

28. We have tended to use the manipulative laboratory experiment not to test our

29. Social psychology rightfully claims to be a science rather than an art. 30. Although conceptual analysis is important, especially in a time of intellectual

31. Scientific activity is relatively independent of socio-cultural influences. 32. Social psychologists have produced many findings which have been found to be

relevant to existing social conditions. 33. The paradigms in terms of which social psychologists operate are ideologies

reflecting the interests of the ruling class. 34. There is an order in the world, independent of our perception and experience,

of which we can gain knowledge. 35. Social psychological inquiry is guided more by theoretical problems and the

findings of empirical research than it is by the fads and fashions of the day. 36. The editor/reviewer selection system in social psychology work adequately. 37. Social psychologists need to overcome their ahistorical perspective. 38. As long as we have genuine research interest, we have little need to question

39. Social psychological investigation consists in transforming reality rather than

A. J. Nederhofand A. G. Zwier

empirical matters.

social ‘spin-offs’ may be regarded as a bonus.

hypothesis but to demonstrate their obvious truth.

crisis, it cannot substitute for empirical research.

any other motives.

discovering its existence.


40. Social psychology needs to clarify the ideological presuppositions and the political implications of the social psychological enterprise.

41. It may be a good idea to halt all data collection until some of the fundamental difficulties which social psychology faces today have been overcome.

42. The options available to social psychologists, in choosing problems or methods, are often foreclosed by the influence of existing loci of power in society or in academic hierarchies.

43. In order to deal adequately with historical facts and processes, we need to develop a theoretical system which includes a taxonomy of situations that cover different periods and different subcultures.

44. The marxist terminology currently employed in some quarters of social psychology merely replaces other forms of jargon to no scientific advantage.

45. The social science should have a dual approach; one empirical and one in the tradition of the Critical Social Science school.

46. Many subjective factors enter social psychological research. 47. Approaches such as those of ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism

have little to offer to social psychology. 48. Research interests should be directed by individual preferences and interests

rather than imposed by social institutions. 49. Debates over the alleged ‘crisis’ in social psychology concern premises whose

acceptance depends more on powers and persuasion than they do on the logic of the presented arguments.

50. Speaking generally, there is much agreement on theoretical matters among social psychologists.

51. In the past few years 1 have thought a lot about most of the statements presented above.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. Zwier, A. G..(1980). ‘The crisis in social psychology, a theoretical and empiricial study’. Master’s thesis, University of Auckland, New Zealand, Department of Psychology.

2. Gergen, K. J. (1979). ‘Social psychology and the phoenix of unreality’. Paper delivered at the Centennial Symposium of the American Psychological Association, New York, Sep- tember.

3. Nederhof, A. J. (1978). ‘De Wetenschappelijke Vooruitgang van de Sociale Psychologie’. Doctoral thesis, University of Leyden, Department of Social Psychology.

4. Williams, D. L. F. (1975). ‘The socio-psychological foundations of scientific change’. Master of Science Thesis, Auckland University.

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R$SUME

La prtpondtrance de la recherche empirique en psychologie sociale a souvent constitd un CICment-clt dans la 'litttrature sur la crise'. Toutefois, une ttude empirique d'envergure n'a jarnais t t t entreprise vis-li-vis de la 'crise' en psychologie sociale. Dans deux recherches, on a exarnint les facteurs qui influencent les perceptions que les psychologues sociaux ont de leur discipline. Quoique dans le premiere ttude, portant sur des psychologues sociaux nterlandais, quatre hypotheses furent testCes et vkrifites, une large part de la variance totale quant i~ la perception de la 'crise' demeurait inexpliqute. La seconde C t d e porta sur un echantillon international de chercheurs actifs e n psychologie sociaIe, ainsi que sur un tchantillon des auteurs de la 'litttrature sur la crise'. Les positions des deux groupes Ctaient considtrablement diiitrentes. Bien qu'une majorit6 des chercheurs actifs n'ktaient pas d'accord pour dire qu'i1.y avait une 'crise' en psychologie sociale, une minoritt I'Ctait. Les chercheurs actits etaient d'accord avec beaucoup de critiques adresstes P la recherche et aux theories en psychologie sociale. Les attitudes concernant neuf problbmes centraux, y compris le systeme de publication Cditeur/lecteur, prtdirent un large pourcentage de la variance totale des attitudes des sujets concernant I'existence d'une 'crise' dans leur discipline.

280 A. J . Nederhofand A. G. Zwier

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das Uebergewicht von emprisichen Untersuchungen in der Sozialpsychologie war oft ein zentrales Thema in der ‘Krisen-Literatur’. Jedoch hat sich bisher keine empirische Untersuchung ausgiebig mit dieser hypothetischen ‘Krise’ der Sozialpsychologie beschartigt. In zwei Studien wurden Faktoren untersucht, welche die Wahrnehmung der Sozialpsychologen ihr I-achgebiet betreffend beeinklussen. Obwohl in der ersten Untersuchung mit hollindischen Sozialpsychologen als Vpn vier Hypothesen getestet und bestatigt werden konnten, blieb ein Grossteil der Varianz der ‘Krisenwahmehmung’ unerklart. In der zweiten Studie wurde eine weltweite Stichprobe von aktiven Sozialpsychologen sowie eine Stichprobe von Autoren im Gebiet der ‘Krisen-Literatur’ untersucht. Die Haltungen dieser zwei Gruppen unterschieden sich in betriichtlichem Masse. Obwohl eine Mehrheit der aktiven Forscher nicht der Meinung war, dass die Sozialpsychologie in der Krise stecke, wurde ebendiese Annahme doch von einer grossen Minderheit geteilt. Viele Kritiken hinsichtlich der sozialpsychologischen Forschung und Theorie wurden von den aktiven Forschern ebenfalls geteilt. Einstellungen beziiglich neun zentraler Themen, darunter das hnktionieren des Editor/Revisor-Publikationssystems, liessen einen Grossteil der Varianz der ‘Krisenwahmehmung’ erklaren.

the ‘crisis’ in social psychology, an empirical approach

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