the crime allocation system: police investigations into...

Editor: Gloria LaycockHome Office Police Research Group

50 Queen Anne’s GateLondon SW1H 9AT

Police ResearchSeries

Paper 16

The Crime Allocation System:Police Investigations intoBurglary and Auto Crime

Martin GillJerry HartKen LivingstoneJane Stevens

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© Crown Copyright 1996© First Published 1996

Police Research Group: Police Research Series

The Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) was formed in 1992 to carry outand manage research in the social and management sciences relevant to the work ofthe police service. The terms of reference for the Group include the requirement toidentify and disseminate good policing practice.

The aim of the Police Research Series is to present results of externally fundedstudies, and those carried out by the Police Research Group, in a way that willinform policy and practice throughout the police service.

A parallel series of papers on crime prevention is also published by PRG, as is aperiodical on policing research called ‘Focus’.

ISBN 1-85893-573-3

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Foreword

This paper reports on findings from a study of police management of investigationsinto burglary and auto crime undertaken as part of the first stage of the PoliceResearch Group’s ‘Police Operations against Crime’ programme. The study soughtthe views of police officers involved at various stages of investigations and askedvictims for their feelings on how the police responded to ‘their’ crime.

The report addresses how and why the police allocate certain crimes forinvestigation. It presents a theoretical model of the crime allocation system andconsiders the range of influences on decision making. It also considers theadvantages to the police of investigating crime in different ways, for example, using‘static investigation’ via crime desks, telephone investigations and similar resources.But many police officers are sceptical of the investigative effectivemess of suchresources, and, as a result, these techniques remain under-used by the police incomparison with their potential.

The research found that successful crime allocation depends on the provision ofgood information at various stages throughout the crime allocation system. Certaininvestigative actions were associated with particular results during investigations.Crime reports, for example, were found to be a major source of information forsecond investigators. Thirty-five per cent of officers interviewed had gained a‘positive indication’ of suspects’ identity from this source, whilst a further 21% hadgained ‘some indication’.

Victims of burglary and auto-crime did not judge the police by the same criteria asthe police used to assess their own performance. Victims tended to comment on thequality of service provided and the level of attention their crime received, whereasthe police related success to making arrests. In the eyes of victims, officers might bemore successful than they themselves allowed.

S W BOYS SMITHDeputy Under Secretary of StateHome OfficePolice DepartmentJanuary 1996

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Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the help of a number ofindividuals. We would like to particularly thank the staff at the Police ResearchGroup including George Houghton, Jane Hirst, Chloë Jolowicz and especially TimRead for his advice and guidance throughout the project.

Our task was further assisted by numerous police officers serving in forcesthroughout the country. It is impossible to name all those who helped. However, wewould like to acknowledge the considerable contributions offered by DetectiveSergeant Dave Johnson, Detective Constable Ian Dome, Detective Chief InspectorPeter Stelfox, Detective Chief Inspector Peter Boylan, Detective Chief InspectorAndy Tattersall and Detective Inspector Bob Kelly (all of Greater ManchesterPolice), Detective Superintendent Steve Maidment, Mr. Derek Hinchcliffe (bothDorset Police), Detective Inspector Miller (Sussex Police), Detective ChiefInspector John Lewis (Dyfed Powys Police), Detective Superintendent A. Partridge(Thames Valley Police), Inspector Peter Spindler (Metropolitan Police), DetectiveChief Superintendent Ken Daun (Gloucestershire Constabulary), Detective ChiefSuperintendent John Essery, Detective Sergeant Oakden and Detective InspectorPeter Moyle (all Devon and Cornwall Constabulary), Detective Inspector PaulScotney (Cambridgeshire Constabulary), Detective Superintendent David Cox andDetective Inspector Mick Creedon (both Leicestershire Constabulary). To all thoseofficers, civilians and crime victims who answered our many questions we also sendour thanks.

We also owe a debt of gratitude to all our colleagues at CSPO; Jim Borrows, JackieKelly, Siobhan McKenna, Julie Trickey and Adrian Woolley, as well as to SylviaWest and Vicky Lander of the Leicester University Computer Centre who providedvaluable IT support.

The Authors

Martin Gill, Jerry Hart, Ken Livingstone and Jane Stevens are members of theScarman Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester

The Police Research Group would like to thank Dr Trevor Bennett of theUniversity of Cambridge Institute of Criminology for acting as independent assessorfor this report.

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Executive summary

This paper reports on findings from a study of police management of investigationsinto burglary and auto crime. It explains some of the rationale upon whichindividual force policies are based, considers the realities of managing limitedresources, and discusses the impact of police culture and the various decisionmaking environments. The study sought the views of police officers involved atvarious stages of investigations and asked victims for their feelings on how thepolice responded to ‘their’ crime.

Following a national survey of all 43 police forces in England and Wales, nine werechosen for the initial research phase. Three of these were later selected for anextensive programme of interviews with first and second investigators and recentvictims of burglary and auto crime. First and second investigators are respectivelydefined as those police personnel who form the initial response to complaints ofcrime (most typically the first officers at the scene) and those who furtherinvestigate incidents following case allocation (often described as ‘screening’). Theinterviews offered a new perspective on police decision making and its perceivedeffectiveness.

The report addresses a number of important issues. It looks at how the policeallocate crime and why only some incidents are selected for investigation. Itconsiders a range of influences on decision making and presents a theoretical modelof the crime allocation system. It also considers why it is necessary and potentiallyuseful for the police to investigate crimes in different ways. These include ‘staticinvestigations’ by crime desks and similar resources which were found to bepotentially very useful but under-used at present.

It also relates how police managers, crime investigators and victims of burglary andauto crime perceive police effectiveness in relation to various types of outcome orresult.

Findings and recommendations

• Crime allocation depends on good information at various stages throughout thesystem. It is important to identify and understand all of these and the potentialinfluences that occur at each.

• Police investigation strategies involving officers attending the scene areessentially systematic. They are effective in achieving many forms of positiveoutcome beyond the detection and arrest of offenders. These include therecovery of stolen property, the gathering of intelligence and the provision ofvictim reassurance. Interviews with officers revealed that they felt that theirefforts had generated some form of benefit in nearly every instance. However,many police officers under-estimate their own effectiveness because theirperformance is measured against a very narrow definition of ‘success’.

• Police civilians also investigate crime. The extent of their participation varies

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from simply answering the telephone or helping victims complete crime reportsat

the front desk of a police station, to making resource allocation decisions anddeciding the future of investigations. However, even though their participationin the system is likely to increase, this fact is not reflected in most forceorganisational structures. Police civilians are almost universally perceived to havea purely administrative role, regardless of their actual investigative function.

• Many police officers do not appreciate the investigative effectiveness of ‘static’resources. These include crime pattern analysts, intelligence development officersand any others who investigate crimes without attending the scene. They areoften grouped together on ‘crime desks’, based at a sub-divisional level. Manyofficers perceive crime desks’ functions to be purely administrative whether thoseinvolved are sworn officers or not. Although their managerial role is currentlyparamount, crime desks are also capable of conducting successful criminalinvestigations.

• Conversely, some crime desks do little more than record minor crimes. This maybe linked to poor investment in training and technology and poor management.This also leaves crime desks less likely to have the respect of ‘operational’officers.

• Some investigative actions are more likely to be associated with certain results.For example, the presence of witnesses logically had a powerful influence ondecisions to allocate cases for further investigation. First investigators consideredwitness statements a good source of information for criminal intelligence in bothauto crime and burglary cases. Witnesses interviewed by second investigatorscontributed to arrests in 82% of cases.

• Although it was demonstrated that all forms of evidence can provide usefulinformation, it is questionable whether police information systems are currentlycapable of making effective use of it.

• Crime reports are a major source of information for second investigators. Thirty-five per cent of officers interviewed had gained a ‘positive indication’ of suspects’identity from this source, whilst a further 21% had gained ‘some indication’.

• A significant number of second investigators lacked confidence in thethoroughness of the first investigation. This was expressed, for example, inaccusations of neglect on the part of first investigators, though there was alsosympathetic understanding of the severe time constraints imposed upon them.

• Second investigators were far more likely to consult with Local IntelligenceOfficers (LIOs) than first investigators. Over two-thirds of burglaries detected bysecond investigators involved some form of conference with an LIO.

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• Victims did not appear to judge the police by the same criteria as the policeassess their own performance. They tended to comment on the quality of serviceprovided and the level of attention their crime received, whereas the policerelated success to making arrests.

• Conversely, some victims expressed a feeling that the police could haveinvestigated their crime more thoroughly. Some mentioned that officers hadneglected to perform certain actions that victims themselves perceived to befundamental (e.g. house-to-house enquiries). Furthermore, many felt that officerscould have kept them better informed of the progress of the investigation.

• Most victims said they had no objection to reporting their crime to civilians.However, they did expect the incident to be fully investigated.

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Contents

Page

Foreword (iii)

Acknowledgements (iv)

Executive summary (v, vi, vii)

List of figures (ix)

List of tables (ix)

1. Background to the Study 1What is crime screening? 2Structure and methodology 3A postal questionnaire and visits to police forces 3Interviews with police officers and selected crime victims 4

2. The Crime Allocation System 7

Anatomy of the system 7Sub-system 1: Resource Allocation 9Sub-system 2: Case Allocation 16Crime desks 20

3. Investigators’ Perspectives on Investigation 23

Auto crime: first investigating officers 23Auto crime: second investigating officers 26Burglary: first investigating officers 27Burglary: second investing officers 29Police officers’ general attitudes to burglary and auto-crime 34

4. Victims’ Perspectives on Investigation 38

5. Conclusion and Recommendations 43

References 47

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List of figures

Figure No. Caption Page

1. The Crime Allocation System 8

2. The process by which messages are received 9

3. The process by which messages are assessed 10

4. The process by which resources are allocated 12

5. The decision to investigate a complaint 15

6. Factors involved in the assessment of the crime report 17

7. Process by which the case is allocated 18

List of tables

Figure No. Caption Page

1. Contrasting features of police forces chosen for officer interviews 5

2. Afternoon uniform shift staffing levels in an inner city sub-division 13

3. Auto-crime – results achieved by police officers during first investigation 24

4. Auto crime – officers’ perceptions of the results of specificinvestigative actions 25

5. Auto crime – results officers’ perceived as being associated withcertain types of physical evidence found during the most recent case 26

6. Burglary – results first investigators felt they achieved as a result of specific investigative actions during the most recent case 28

7. Burglary – results officers’ perceived as being associated with certain types of physical evidence found during the most recent case 29

8. Burglary – results achieved by second investigating officers in the most recent case 30

9. Burglary – results indicated to second investigator by reading thecrime report in the most recent case 30

10. Burglary – results indicated to second investigator by visitingthe crime scene in the most recent case 31

11. Burglary – results indicated to second investigator by interviewing witnesses in the most recent case 32

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1. Background to the study

The reported incidence of burglary and auto crime has risen since 1981 to accountfor well over four in ten of all recorded crimes. In the year 1993-94 recorded crimesstood at 5,565,400 with 1.3 million burglaries and 1.5 million incidents of autocrime1. Such levels of crimes place a formidable burden on police forces which areunder continual pressure to enhance performance without incurring extra cost.Many of the public now recognise that at least some crime complaints can no longergenerate a police visit.

Police productivity in crime investigations is usually measured in terms of thedetection and arrest of offenders. Investigations, however, can generate several other‘products’. These include satisfying the needs of victims, by providing reassurance ofconcern, recovering stolen property and advising them how to prevent repeatvictimisation. In the past the police have been subject to criticism over theirhandling of victims, the suggestion being that they have been overly focused onevidence and results (Maguire 1985; Shapland et al. 1985; Gill, 1987):

Specially trained victim liaison or ‘community involvement unit’ policeofficers exist in some forces but their work still tends to be regarded asoutside the remit of ‘real’ policing.

(Zedner, 1994)

Satisfying victims can assist good relations with the public which, in turn, can profitother investigations, although such benefits are difficult to measure. Even if aninvestigation fails to produce an arrest or recover property, the informationgenerated can be developed into useful intelligence. All proactive policing initiatives,including offender-targeting strategies, are intelligence driven. Hence, eveninformation can become a valuable ‘product’ in its own right.

Ways of classifying crimes vary considerably from one police force to another. Ingeneral, however, they correspond to the following:

crimes cleared up during the first investigation, e.g. when offenders are caughtin the act or shortly after the commission of a crime;

those designated ‘not worthy of further investigation at this stage’ (‘screenedout’), either because there are no positive lines of enquiry and/or they are notjudged to be sufficiently serious;

those allocated for further investigation (‘screened in’), typically by the CID.

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

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1 See Home Office Crime Figures for All Forces. The Home Office, London.

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What is crime screening?

In 1989 the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) defined ‘crime screening’as:

... a structured system to help target investigative resources on crimes most likely tobe detected. This requires an objective assessment of the nature and number ofsolvability factors available at the time of the initial investigation or subsequently.

Progress Report (II) of the Detection of Crime Working Group, 1989: 6

This form of crime screening is not a new concept. It has always existed as aninformal practice. Veteran officers relate how, before the introduction ofsophisticated statistical recording methods, known offences were ‘cuffed’, i.e.informally de-prioritised and sometimes not even officially recorded, if there were nopositive lines of enquiry. The officer responsible kept the incident in mind andquestioned future suspects about similar offences. If someone confessed to the crimeit was duly recorded as detected in the official statistics.

Today, crimes that would once have been cuffed are likely to be recorded by ‘staticresources’ such as crime desks. However, the extent to which they are investigated bysuch resources is uncertain. The concept of conducting an investigation withoutdeploying an investigator to the crime scene is not incorporated in the ACPOdefinition. Therefore, although more crimes are recorded, many are effectively‘screened out’ from investigation. Many police policy makers argue that there is no‘screening out’ and that all incidents are investigated because the fact that a crime isrecorded allows it to be resurrected as soon as further evidence becomes available.This research found that, although true in theory, static methods are ofteninsufficiently developed to merit the term ‘investigation’ without risk of misleading.There is a difference between facilitating chance detections and evolving coherentand coordinated strategies for static investigation. ‘Screened out’ crimes can becleared up later, often by those arrested for other incidents asking for a list ofoffences to be taken into consideration (TICs), but the findings of this study suggestthat much more could be done actively to investigate these offences by static meanswhile achieving the objective of targeting resources where they are most needed.

If static resources investigate then crime allocation (not crime screening) is a betterterm for describing the police response. Crimes should be assessed and allocated themost appropriate form of investigation, not screened in or out of the investigativeprocess.

Crime allocation involves two principle decision making points in the ‘career’ of acrime complaint. The first is when a crime is reported to the police and personnel(usually in the control room) must decide the nature of the police response. Allforces have some system of prioritising demands on their services. Systems of gradedresponse have been commonplace for some time. These guide control room staff indeciding whether and how quickly to deploy ‘mobile resources’ to the crime scene.

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Officers are sent to more serious incidents immediately and to the less urgent in duecourse. Similarly, some incidents are diverted to static resources if it is deemedunnecessary to send officers to the scene. This is the resource allocation decision.

If an offence has been committed, the initial investigation generates a crime report.The second principle decision making point occurs after this report is analysed. Atthis stage the crime (or series of crimes) may be allocated to a second investigator forfurther ‘mobile investigation’ or, as before, to a crime desk for collation and analysis.This is the case allocation decision.

A principal objective of this study was to examine how crime allocation systems canhelp achieve better resource management and enhance investigative performance.

Structure and methodology

A postal questionnaire and visits to police forcesThe first stage of the research began in October 1993 with a short postalquestionnaire sent to all 43 police forces in England and Wales. The questionsasked included whether the force had a set procedure for allocating cases for furtherinvestigation, the extent to which this was computerised, the criteria used for caseallocation, and to identify those with the responsibility for taking case allocationdecisions. In addition the questionnaire enabled the research team to identify andcontact key officers in case allocation in anticipation of follow-up enquiries. Thequestionnaire received a 100% response from police forces.

The second stage of the study commenced in November 1993. Nine forces wereselected for more detailed study on the basis of data from the returnedquestionnaires and other information supplied. The following forces were selected:

Devon & CornwallDorsetDyfed PowysGloucestershireGreater ManchesterLeicestershireMetropolitan (Area 4)SussexThames Valley

These forces were chosen because they represented a good regional and demographicspread (with at least one force from each of the groups within Her Majesty’sInspectorate of Constabulary’s (HMIC) ‘family of forces’), and because the initialquestionnaire indicated that they provided a range of practice in case allocation.

Two researchers spent approximately three days with each force. They visited atleast two sub-divisions: one urban, usually with a heavy crime workload; and onerural, normally with a smaller crime problem, although invariably fewer officers. The


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researchers followed crime complaints through the police information system; fromthe civilian telephonists or control room staff, to the crime desk personnel or policeofficers allocated to attend crime scenes. This was done both by day and by night,enabling researchers to observe the application of both formal and informal decisionmaking criteria at each stage.

When possible, researchers also accompanied CID officers making secondaryinvestigations into ‘screened in’ cases. The aim here was to gauge the quality of theinformation flow from first investigators to the second investigating officers, and howdecision making at one stage could affect processes taking place elsewhere in thesystem.

Researchers also interviewed and observed personnel engaged in special initiatives(e.g. ‘Operation Gemini’ in Gloucestershire and the dual-purpose Armed CrimeVehicle in Dyfed Powys) to find out how intelligence generated by reactiveinvestigation (where the police respond to specific crime complaints) informedproactive work (e.g. the targeting of known offenders or high crime venues). Finally,the researchers canvassed views on how cases should be allocated and priorities setfrom those involved in the design, implementation and assessment of integratedcrime recording and intelligence systems.

This work enabled the research team to understand the complexities of crimeallocation and enabled the development of the theoretical crime allocation modeldescribed in Section 2 of this report. In addition the force visits provided thebackground for the design of the interview schedules used in subsequent stages ofthe research.

Interviews with police officers and selected crime victimsGood practice in case allocation depends on knowing which available investigativetechniques and resources work. To discover what officers did and what they felt theiractions achieved when investigating crime, during the third stage of the research(beginning in May 1994) the researchers systematically interviewed first investigatingofficers of burglary and auto crime, and second investigating officers of burglary.Views were also sought from those second investigators who had recent experienceof dealing with an auto offence.2 The researchers also asked second investigators toestimate how much time they spent on each activity. The findings are set out inSection 3 of the report.

Very few offences of auto crime are judged to merit secondary investigation, exceptby specialist auto crime squads who may target known offenders or high crimevenues, e.g. multi-storey car parks. A detailed evaluation of such operations was,

2 Owing to their high volume, auto crime offences are rarely allocated for secondary investigation.

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however, outside the scope of this enquiry. Consequently this research focused onsecond investigators of burglary, although these officers were also asked about anyauto crime enquiries they had conducted during the previous six months.

The research was undertaken in three forces, Greater Manchester Police (GMP),Leicestershire Constabulary and Dorset Police. They provided contrasting levels ofcrime, numbers of police officers, geographical locations and regional demographiccharacteristics (Table 1).

Furthermore, in all forces the researchers visited two sub-divisions, one urban andone rural, to ensure that contrasting characteristics were represented in the survey.

The methodology adopted for the interviews was largely determined by theinformation technology available to the police. While it had been hoped to ‘track’ asample of cases through the case allocation system from the point where a call hadbeen received from the public to its final resolution, and to examine the rationalebehind the various actions that were taken during this process, it quickly becameapparent that this was not feasible. Links between the various systems used by thepolice (command and control, crime recording and so on) did not allow casetracking.

Instead an alternative approach had to be employed. Police officers were asked todescribe how they had dealt with the last burglary and/or auto crime they hadinvestigated, and to respond to a series of statements designed to assess their generalattitudes to investigative actions.

The researchers aimed to interview every operational officer in each sub-divisionwho had investigated a burglary and/or auto crime offence in the previous sixmonths. Accordingly two researchers visited each of the three forces involved.Officers who had been involved in investigating both types of offences wereinterviewed about both. In all 655 semi-structured interviews were completed withthe officers interviewed representative of all investigating officers. Section 3 reportson the investigators responses.

No attempt was made to link individual investigative actions (cause) withcorresponding results (effect); that would have required quite a different kind of

GMP Leicestershire Dorset

Size of force 6000 - 7500 1500 - 3000 up to 1500

Level of crime High Medium Low

Location North Midlands South

Demography Mainly urban Mixed urban/rural Mainly rural

BACKGOUND TO THE STUDY

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Table 1: Contrasting features of police forces chosen for officer interviews

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study. The emphasis here was on evaluating the allocation or ‘screening’ process,although this did require consideration of police investigations.

The researchers also interviewed victims of burglary and auto crime to take accountof their perspectives of the investigation. Victims were asked about the policeresponse to ‘their’ crime, and whether it met with their expectations. In a departurefrom other surveys, however, victims were asked to prioritise their requirements.Those who expected particular police responses were further asked whether theywould still require them even if it meant that officers would have to be diverted fromother duties. These findings are discussed in Section 4.

The team aimed to interview a random sample of 100 victims selected by the police.But, because of data protection legislation, the police had first to contact each victimfor permission to forward a contact name and telephone number. This caused delaysand, in the event, only 67 interviews could be conducted within the available time.Structured telephone interviews were conducted with the victims. Section 4 of thereport contains the victims’ responses.

The need for consultation prior to interview may reduce the integrity of the sample.Despite liaison with the research team, the possibility remains that victims who werehostile to the police could have been excluded from the sample. However, this isunlikely, indeed none of the officers who contacted victims on the project’s behalfhad any involvement in the associated investigations. As a final point, four of thevictims did not speak English nor any other European language, and so wereexcluded from the survey. The findings do not, therefore, incorporate the views of animportant minority of victims which should be recognised and rectified by futureresearch.

The report concludes with a summary and recommendations for good practice inSections 5 and 6.

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2. The Crime Allocation System

As a result of the information collected from the case allocation questionnaire andthe follow-up force visits, the researchers built up a comprehensive picture of theway the crime allocation process functioned across a number of forces and identifiedsimilarities between different police forces. The model shown in Figure 1 belowattempts to provide an ‘ideal type’ representation of a crime allocation system. It canbe used to identify a wide range of factors that may influence decisions and can alsohelp diagnose the cause of crime management problems. For example, using themodel to trace the career of a crime complaint in one force revealed that thenocturnal response to crime did not operate entirely as specified in the new forcepolicy. This the force traced to the off-peak reception of crime complaints made bytelephone and so identified a problem not previously recognised.

Anatomy of the system

The crime allocation system is divided into two parts or sub-systems:

A. Resource allocation and;

B. Case allocation.

The system as a whole comprises a series of six separate processes, shown as ellipsesin figure 1. These are:

1. Receive message2. Assess message

Resource allocation sub-system3. Allocate resource4. Investigate complaint

5. Assess crime reportCrime allocation sub-system6. Allocate case

The two sub-systems are linked by the crime report, which may be generated by anyof the following resources:● Mobile or pedestrian police patrols and specialist units such as ‘crime cars’ or

‘burglary cars’, all of which may visit the scene of an alleged crime in accordancewith a ‘graded response system’.

● ‘Area Constables’ or ‘Principal Beat Officers’ who normally visit by appointment;● CID detectives, usually only sent as the first response to more serious or ‘special

interest’ crimes;● ‘Crime Desks’, ‘Help Desks’, and all other ‘static’ police resources that record and

investigate crime when a police presence is not required. This category includescontrol room staff who complete crime reports for minor crime when thededicated resources are closed;

THE CRIME ALLOCATION SYSTEM

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}}

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Figure 1: The Crime Allocation System

Receive Message

complainant’semotional state

reporting method

messagecontent

quality standardsfor receiving

messages

receiver’scompetence

received message

Assess Message

assessor’scompetence

legal definitionsof crime & force

policy

other activities inassessment

environment

links with other incidents

message forother system

Allocate Resource

informal &subjective

criteria

policy criteria:urgency, seriousness

& solvability

resourceavailability

politicalexpediency

resource allocator’scompetence

request for furtherresources

crime complaintallocated resource

crime complaint

Investigate Complaint

supervisioninvestigator’scompetence

investigativeactions

evidence ofcrime

timeliness ofinvestigation

SOCO or othersupport service

crime report

‘no crime’

Assess Crime Report

input fromother systems

assessor’scompentence

quality standardsfor crime reports

investigator’sprevious

performance

reject crimereport

assessed crimereport Allocate Case


case allocationpolicy

politicalexpediency

case allocator’scompetence

case allocatedfor further

investigation

case cleared upby initial

investigation

case filed

65

34

1 2

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● Front desk personnel (often civilian), who record the details of a crime when acomplainant visits the police station.

In order to understand better the crime allocation system, the remainder of thissection will discuss the processes within each sub-system. This is important becauseeach process informs those which follow. Hence, all the factors discussed may affectcrime allocation decision making.

Sub-system 1: Resource Allocation

This sub-system determines which resource will conduct the initial investigation foreach case. The system is initiated by a message:

Figure 2 shows a range of factors that may influence how messages are received. Theprocess is initiated by a victim, witness or other concerned party communicating amessage to the police. Good resource allocation relies on good information. Hence,it is here that the overall process begins. The content of the message, the chosenmethod of communication and attributes of both the organisation and the individualwho receive it may have a significant effect on subsequent decision making. Clearlythe police have limited control over many of these factors. How complainantschoose to make contact (e.g. by telephone, entering a police station or speaking to apatrol officer directly) is their choice. The police, however, do prepare for outsidecommunications by developing policies for dealing with the public and providingtraining and experience for their personnel.

The research highlighted some important issues, some of which were not fullyaccounted for in force policies. First, useful information can be extracted frommessages by noting more than the content of the words. It was found that how andunder what circumstances messages are communicated to the police can affect thesubsequent response. For example, the speaker’s coherence (e.g. whether he or she isdrunk, injured or in fear) are important factors that may influence the seriousness


9

Receive Message

complainant’semotional state

reporting method

messagecontent

quality standardsfor receiving

messages

receiver’scompetence

To next processreceived message

Figure 2: The process by which messages are received

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attributed to the message. Second, the time of day or night a complaint is receivedmay have an effect. Every organisation has its ‘peak periods’ and a caller who ringsduring a busy time may receive a different response from a caller in a slack time. Yetanother issue is that of public perception. Most members of the public rarely comeinto contact with the police, and when they do the circumstances may be difficult.The combination of these factors can have a fundamental effect on how theparticipants in the process perceive the interaction and may influence subsequentenquiries.

The first impression created [on] somebody seeking to report a crimewill probably determine the level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction theyhave in the way that their report was handled. For this reason, the wayin which the first contact is managed is crucial to effective crimemanagement.

Sussex Police, An Integrated Crime Strategy for Sussex, 1994

Assess Message


legal definitionsof crime & force

policy

other activities inassessment

environment

links with other incidents

From previous system

To next process

message forother system

received message

crime complaint

Figure 3: The process by which messages are assessed

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Many forces have developed innovative crime management strategies to focus onvictims’ needs and provide quality service. It became apparent during the fieldresearch, however, that some personnel remained unaware of how these strategiesaffected their role. Civilian telephonists (who are most likely to receive messagesfrom the public) are a good case in point. The only training that staff in one forcecould recall since their induction was in new communications technology. Oneoperator acknowledged that she spoke no differently now to victims of crime thanwhen she started working for the police in the early 1970s. This was despite a radicaloverhaul of force policy for dealing with the public. Policy and practice may remainout of step unless the competence of such key personnel is revised. This willinevitably affect standards of service.

Once the message is received it must be assessed. Often the processes of receivingand assessing messages overlap or occur simultaneously. This model examines themseparately to articulate the complex interactions that occur. Figure 3 shows somefactors that may influence message assessment.

Those assessing messages must decide whether they are matters of police concernand, if so, which department is best suited to deal with them. Their job is tointerpret incoming messages according to force policy and, as regards the crimeallocation system, the legal criteria that define certain incidents as crime. This is askilled job and the quality of decision making will affect all subsequent processes.

The personnel involved may be telephonists, front desk personnel, crime deskoperators, or even patrol officers approached on the street. However, not all willpossess the same ‘message assessment’ competence and this may also influence theirresponse. Moreover, all these personnel operate in markedly different environments,each of which has its own demands. For example, inner city premises often appearless than welcoming, whether as a result of stale tobacco fumes or the presence ofhostile customers. A drunken attack on reception staff in the main police station ofone large city was witnessed during this research. Several people left the premisesbefore completing their business even though the perpetrator was quickly restrained.This is a good example of a message reception environment repelling incominginformation before any assessment of its worth.

A further factor influencing message assessment is awareness of other incidents.Crimes often occur in discernible patterns and a complaint that conforms to one ofthese may attract assessing officers’ attention.


11

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Once a message is assessed to be a crime complaint, it must be decided whichresources to allocate to the incident. This is often referred to as ‘initial screening’.Influential factors are shown in Figure 4.

All forces have formal grading criteria that relate to the urgency, seriousness andsolvability of reported incidents. Responses are categorised into one of several grades ofurgency, ranging from the most immediate to non-attendance.3 Most forces allocateincidents that cannot be attended for static investigation. The formal criteria for thisis remarkably consistent between forces: auto crime offences are typically dealt withby telephone, whereas burglaries normally must be attended. Occasional differencesreflect the local scenario and special initiatives. For example, one force did allocateattendance to auto crime because it was specifically targeting it.

Beyond formal criteria, most personnel felt the ‘human element’ to be an importantsubjective factor in deciding whether and which resources to allocate. They rejectedthe notion that strict resource allocation guidelines could be rigorously implemented,and argued the case for victims’ needs.

We are dealing with the same type of crime time and time again, but thepeople involved are all different. You can’t ignore them (the victims)

Allocate Resource

informal &subjective

criteria

policy criteria:urgency, seriousness

& solvability


politicalexpediency

resource allocator’scompetence

From previous system

Returned from future process

To next process

request for furtherresources


crime complaint

Figure 4: The process by which resources are allocated

3 See PRG Paper 13 for a fuller discussion of call-grading categories, including the variety of terminology for the different categories across forces.

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when you make your decision, there is more to police work, even on theend of a telephone, than whether you can get an arrest or not.

Crime Desk Officer

Most tried to recognise victims’ immediate circumstances when allocating resources(hence the importance of comprehensive message assessment). For example, manywould order a prompt visit to the crime scene if the victim were elderly or verydistressed, even if policy recommended the offence to be dealt with by telephone. Ineffect, resource allocators frequently set their own criteria for urgency andseriousness.

Resource availability is crucial to allocation decisions. This is fundamentally amanagement problem that encompasses matters as diverse as staffing arrangementsand contingency planning, vehicle servicing and equipment purchasing. It is growingin importance as available funding declines in real terms. Researchers were quitestartled at the scarcity of officers, especially at night. During one research visit, oneInspector in a major town was forced to leave the routine policing to a single TrafficUnit. This was because he had to deploy all general duty officers to an area where aserial arsonist was operating to a discernible pattern. The number of incidentsintensified just as many of the local night clubs were closing and the risk of publicorder problems was at its highest. The Inspector would have drafted more officerswere he not quite so constrained by what were described as ‘fierce’ overtimerestrictions.

Shift levels can appear very low even in less exceptional circumstances. Table 2shows the staffing levels of what researchers were assured was a fairly typical eveningin one high crime area:


13

CID attachment 2

Court apperance 2

Public order training 2

Assigned to custody office 1

Annual leave 4

Sick leave 3

Quick-cuffs training 1

Available for general duties 9

TOTAL 24

Table 2: Afternoon uniform shift staffing levels in an inner city sub-division

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Officers also bypassed resource allocation guidelines because of anxieties over howcolleagues and senior officers might perceive their decisions. Although theyrecognised the need to preserve resources in the prescribed manner, many admittedto allocating according to their sense of political expediency rather than policy orpersonal values. As one officer summarised:

If it’s a slack period I might send a car to something that probablycould have been done over the phone. Sometimes it’s better to be onthe safe side.

Crime Allocator

The crux of the matter is that personnel must decide whether to deploy a mobileresource to the crime scene (and, if so, which one) or allocate the incident to acrime desk who will deal with it by telephone. Patrol officers who see an incidentand decide to investigate, effectively engage in message reception and assessmentthen allocate themselves to investigate.

It is noteworthy that crime desks and the like can relieve pressure on mobileresources. However, their effectiveness may be partly determined by their level ofintegration within the overall crime management structure. This is a cultural issue.In some forces these facilities are perceived as dynamic resources interfacing with theintelligence system and providing valuable advice to operational officers based oncrime pattern analysis. In others they were regarded as recording bureaux ‘staffed byold women4 and sick people’ (comment by an operational detective inspector) thatrepresent to little more than an admission of police failure to respond effectively.

The deliberate process of resource allocation should ensure the crime receives themost appropriate available response, provides the police with the greatest controlover the management of their investigative resources and helps conserve non-investigative resources, such as finances and equipment. This does not always workin practice. Interviews with patrol officers revealed instances when they had beenallocated to an incident to find that it would have been better dealt with bytelephone, or that the control room had deployed other officers needlessly. As oneofficer commented:

We arrived [at the scene] to find that another unit was already there.We had received the first call but we were on another job at the time.Once we were finished we went straight there, but by then they hadgiven it to someone else without telling us.

Police Constable

Once a resource has been allocated to the incident, it must investigate the complaintand verify that a crime has in fact occurred.

4 The term ‘old women’ is often used by police officers with reference to collegues of either sex who are approaching retirement age or are generally considered to be past their operational usefulness.

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Figure 5 displays the factors that influence the investigation of the complaint. Thisprocess will produce one of three types of output:● the incident is designated a ‘no-crime’;● other resources are requested; or● the incident is ‘crimed’ and a crime report prepared.

Investigating officers must first confirm that a crime has been committed. Theamount of time taken to arrive at the scene clearly affects their ability to do this asthey must identify and preserve any evidence. If there is no evidence of a crime yetthe matter still requires attention, they may refer the matter elsewhere, for exampleto social services. In such cases officers exchange their role as crime investigators forthat of community constables. Sometimes officers who first answer a call areinadequately equipped to deal with it. Similarly, a telephone investigator mayconsider it necessary to deploy an officer to the scene. In such cases the allocationdecision is referred back to the ‘allocate resources’ process and additional oralternative resources are requested.

Qualitative differences can and do exist between investigations. Most forces stipulateinvestigative techniques that officers should apply to initial investigations; forexample, securing the scene, identifying and interviewing witnesses and performing


15

Investigate Complaint

supervisioninvestigator’scompetence

investigativeactions

evidence ofcrime

timeliness ofinvestigation

SOCO or othersupport service

Back to previousprocess

Back fromfuture process

From previousprocess

To next process

reject crimereport

request for further resources


crime report

‘no crime’

Figure 5: The decision to investigate a complaint

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house-to-house enquiries. However, the extent to which these guidelines arefollowed varies, often according to workload and the immediate environment. Toperform these tasks inadequately will compromise the quality of the investigationand arguably also its success or failure.

The competence of the investigating officer may also determine how a complaint isinvestigated, making the difference between a ritual crime recording exercise and agenuine investigation. Officers do their best, but many interviewed during thisproject expressed their frustration at their inadequate training and the lack of timethey were allowed to fulfil their investigative role:

A lot of the time we’re turning up, filling in the crime report and we’reoff to the next one. There’s no time to do any kind of investigation, wejust take the details. It isn’t police work; anyone could do that.

Police Constable

Other factors influencing the investigation of the complaint are the availability ofsupervision by senior or more experienced personnel and the presence of supportservices, such as scenes of crime officers (SOCO). Some forces are consideringspecial initiatives such as the provision of consultative services that investigators cancontact for advice from remote locations. Others are providing SOCO training fortheir officers, owing to the limited availability of specialist personnel.

The eventual output from the first investigation is the crime report. Each action andthe involvement of all personnel up to this point will have made some impact on itscontents. It is the crucial link between the initial police response to the complaint(the resource allocation sub-system) and the secondary investigation (the caseallocation sub-system).

Sub-system 2: Case allocation

After the initial crime report is submitted the case is allocated. The officerresponsible for case allocation (usually the Crime Manager) may prescribe a strategyby offering advice or specific instructions to officers allocated to return to the scene.Most remaining cases will be referred to the crime desk, either for static investigationor holding on file. Many are written off as undetectable. Sometimes a case that hasbeen allocated for static investigation may, as a result of that investigation, bereallocated to operational units for further ‘mobile’ investigation. It was not possibleto discern how frequently this occurs, yet there was evidence that staticinvestigations can contribute to achieving detections.5

The crime manager assesses the case according to a range of factors as displayed inFigure 6.

5 Crime desks’ contribution to investigations are seldom noted in case files. This is a lost opportunity for evaluating crime desks’ investigative performance.

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The crime report is the principal input to the case allocation sub-system, as itcontains details of all previous investigative action. It is the only written indicator ofthe quality of the initial investigation and any results achieved. Crime reports areprepared according to specific standards concerning the information they maycontain and the manner it is presented. Their worth can be undermined by theirpoor written quality. This is because officers either lack the time to complete thepaperwork for one job before they start the next, or they lack the necessarycompetence. If the report is sub-standard, the assessor should return it to the firstinvestigator for further work. This may also occur if there is evidence thatinvestigative actions have been neglected.

The assessment of crime reports is shared between the investigating officers’supervisors (who attempt to identify problems before crime reports are submitted)and a designated assessor. Some forces have attempted to relieve uniformedsergeants from inspecting an endless stream of crime reports to encourage them tospend more time supervising investigations. Crime desks are then sometimes giventhe quality assurance role, providing ‘crime evaluators’ to check all reports.Elsewhere, the senior detective on the sub-division is formally responsible.

The research identified some decisions based on the assessor’s personal knowledge ofthe investigating officer’s past performance. Crime managers may pass a more criticaleye over some reports than others. Furthermore, their competence is also crucial togood crime report assessment. Officers in this role tend to have many years’experience and, although policy guidelines exist, there is a cultural expectation thatthe assessor can assess the report by instinct.


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Assess Crime Report

input fromother systems


quality standardsfor crime reports

investigator’sprevious

performance

Back topreviousprocess

From previous process

To next process

reject crimereport

assessed crimereport

crime report

Figure 6: Factors involved in the assessment of the crime report

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The assessment process may also be influenced by other factors of the crimemanagement structure; e.g. the intelligence system, which may generate crimeportfolios on known offenders, or communications, where, as mentioned, staff mayidentify crime patterns. The crime manager must have easy access to the informationgenerated by such systems. Information technology aside, this may even be affectedby the geographical location of the assessor’s office within the building. For example,one rural Crime Management Unit (CMU) studied was spread over two offices onthe corner of a rather cramped building. The CID office was on the opposite corneron another floor and officers rarely made informal contact. This contrasted with anurban CMU in the same force which was more centrally accommodated. Unlike theformer, this operated as an information clearing house, visited by both uniformedand CID officers, all bringing new information with them. It was the dynamic sceneof many exchanges of information. Moreover, as crime evaluators were in clearearshot of discussions between intelligence officers and operational CID, they weremore readily aware of new trends and developments in the area.

Following formal assessment personnel involved will consider how to allocate thecase for further investigation or otherwise.

The influences on the case allocation process are illustrated in Figure 7. Four kindsof decision about the future of a case may result from this process

Allocate Case


case allocationpolicy

politicalexpediency

case allocator’scompetence

From previous process

assessed crimereport

case allocatedfor further

investigation

case cleared upby initial

investigation

case filed

Figure 7: Process by which case is allocated

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Cases may be:● referred to an Administration of Justice Department prior to forwarding to the

Crown Prosecution Service (if detected during the first investigation);● allocated to a mobile resource (usually a detective) to pursue further enquiries;● allocated to file from where (theoretically) it may be subjected to crime pattern

analysis or detected during the course of investigating another offence; or● rejected as incomplete or inadequate and returned to the first investigator.

This is the so-called ‘secondary screening’ process. Many forces with a busy crimework load will screen out or ‘file’ as many as 80 per cent of reported crimes at thispoint. They are forced into this choice because specialist resources, such as the CID,are expensive, in short supply and need to be used where they are most likely to beeffective.

Quantitative data on the numbers of crimes cleared up following allocation to fileare poor. This should be disclosed through the practice of reallocating the crime toan operational office if crime pattern analysis or any other static resource uncoversfurther evidence. In practice crimes following this route to clear-up are not identifiedas such, and it is accordingly very rare for police forces to monitor the investigativeperformance of their static resources.

In theory, the assessed crime report is an input to the case allocation process. Inpractice, however, the processes of assessment and allocation occur simultaneously.A further input is force policy guidelines on case allocation. However, this may bemodified by internal office policy or political expediency. Managers may have thediscretion to give special consideration to factors such as the value of stolenproperty, racially motivated crime, media attention generated by a particularincident or series of offences, and the type of locality where the alleged offence tookplace. For example, senior officers in one force freely admitted that a burglary in aquiet country town would receive more urgent attention than one in an inner citysuburb (although for obvious reasons this is not clearly stated in any force policydocuments). They justified their stance by arguing that it is best to keep criminalactivity contained in an area with a substantial number of police officers. The spreadof crime to rural areas would create a logistical nightmare requiring police officers tobe drafted out of the cities.

If the officer responsible fails to assess the crime report properly, the integrity of theallocation decision will be compromised. A crime requiring further investigation maybe filed, allowing vital evidence to be lost before the mistake can be rectified; orexpensive resources may be allocated to a crime with little hope of achieving anoutcome. Interviews revealed cases allocated to mobile resources for the sake ofexpediency whilst others were rejected after it became too late to re-gain lostground.


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Crime desks

Effective crime management requires an appropriate and efficientinitial response; prompt identification of cases meriting furtherinvestigation by detectives; integration of investigation, intelligenceand scientific support inputs; and a high quality of communicationwith victims of crime. This represents a substantial task of co-ordination and progress monitoring, and a number of forces haveadopted the crime desk mechanism to undertake it.

Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively, Audit Commission 1994

If the service is to pursue the idea of an integrated approach to crime management,the crime desk must be at the heart of this new strategy.

The crime desk ideally performs four important functions within the crime allocationsystem. First, crime desk staff may conduct initial investigations in response to crimeswhere both the police and the complainant do not consider it necessary for an officerto attend the scene. This function should enable general duty officers time toconcentrate on incidents where attendance is considered crucial. Second, it is aresource manager or ‘crime screener’ that is responsible for the allocation of cases tooperational officers for further investigation following initial enquiries. This shouldliberate sergeants and other supervisors from the chore of checking crime reports andallow them to dedicate themselves to supervising ongoing investigations. Third,where referring the case to a ‘mobile’ officer cannot be justified, crime desk staff mayfurther investigate cases by static means. This enables investigations to continuebeyond the point when active enquiries have ceased and facilitates the integration ofinformation on crimes from all incidents. Clearly, access to the appropriatetechnology and the necessary competence are crucial to this function. Fourth, thecrime desk may also operate an advisory service to help the public with any issueincluding non-crime related matters. In some forces this ‘help line’ operates as adiscrete unit, in others it is integrated within the crime desk itself.6 It should bepointed out as a matter of urgency that by no means do all crime desks fulfil thesefour functions.

The first three functions are of greatest interest to this study. They often occur inrapid succession as crime desk personnel shift between their various managerial andinvestigative roles. Before a crime desk can investigate a crime, it must allocate itselfas the investigative resource. This process is preceded by the same message receptionand analysis processes as in all other cases of reported crime. For example, the crimedesk may receive a direct call from a member of the public who complains of thetheft of a pedal cycle (receive message). The message is judged appropriate for the

6 See PRG paper ‘Crime Desks and Help Desks: a survey’ for a full discussion of the roles and responsibilities of crime desks.

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crime allocation system (assess message) so a resource is allocated according to thepolicy criteria and other values already discussed (allocate resource). As the crime isconsidered ‘non-serious’ and the complainant is happy for the investigation toproceed by telephone, the crime desk officer allocates him/herself as firstinvestigating officer and conducts the initial enquiries by telephone. This generates acrime report providing documentary evidence of the investigation so far, enablingthe need for further investigation to be assessed later.

The role of the crime desk as ‘first investigator’ corresponds to that of the ‘firstofficer at the scene’ in the conventional investigative model, and the processesdescribed within the resource allocation sub-system must still occur, even though theinvestigation will be conducted by telephone. The important thing to recognise isthat the same factors that affect the outcome in a conventional scenario (e.g. forcepolicy, staff competence and local environment) will also affect the outcome of crimedesk investigations.

If the initial crime desk investigation reveals the presence of solvability factors, or ifit becomes apparent that the victim is highly distressed by his or her experience,then the crime desk may revert to its managerial (resource allocation) role and askthe control room to send an officer to the scene. If it then becomes apparent thatthe crime is part of a series or that there are other influential factors, the crime willbe allocated to a second investigator for further investigation. This may be anoperational (mobile) officer or the crime desk itself. Crime desk personnel willconduct further enquiries by analysing crime patterns, soliciting information fromother officers and the LIO with whom they maintain close links.

Crime desks generally investigate ‘minor’ and ‘bulk’ crime, including such offences astheft of a pedal cycle, criminal damage, theft from a meter, making off withoutpayment, minor burglary (non-dwelling) and other types of minor theft. Some forcesalso allocate theft of a motor vehicle (TOMV & TWOC) and theft from a motorvehicle (TFMV) offences for investigation by crime desks.

For example, in one force studied, allocation is usually decided according to theurgency of the call. Matters where police attendance is required but it can wait untila mutually convenient time, or matters recorded for information, or those incidentsthat do not require police attendance, are allocated to the crime desk for initialinvestigation. Details of all crimes are later passed to the crime desk for collation andanalysis.

Researchers expected each force to have precise operating procedures for the crimedesk. With a few exceptions, however, crime desks operated without clear guidelines.There were rarely any job descriptions and almost everything – with the exception ofa list of which crimes could be screened out – was left to the discretion of the officerin charge. Given the central crime management role of crime desks, their function


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needs more precise definition and regulation to ensure they achieve acceptablestandards.

Effective investigations depend on information. The police have minimal controlover how this is communicated but total control over how it is managed.Researchers looked at the various stages where information is an issue and identifiedareas where there is scope for improvement. Having developed the model there arenow aspects of the system, particularly investigative actions, that must be studied inmore detail. The next chapter will report on investigators’ views.

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3. Investigators’ perspectives on investigation

By knowing what investigators do and understanding the consequences of theiractions, it becomes possible to evaluate the different ways of allocating crime.However, individual crime reports contained very little detail on investigators’actions, especially those that failed to yield recognisable results. Hence, as analternative method researchers gathered information through a series of interviewswith investigators. The aim of the interviews was to ascertain investigators’experiences and perceptions of specific investigative actions and so evaluate crimeallocation practice.

In 655 interviews, officers were asked to identify and comment upon theirinvestigative actions in the most recent burglary or auto crime incident they hadbeen allocated. Further questions sought their views on the overall approach toinvestigating each type of offence. Three interview schedules were produced; one foreach of first investigators of burglary, first investigators of auto crime, and secondinvestigators of burglary.

To evaluate the process further, researchers asked secondary investigators toestimate the amount of time they spent on each action. Secondary investigation isrelatively rare for auto crime and a number of secondary investigators had not beeninvolved in a recent auto-investigation. However, those who had participated in oneduring the previous three months were questioned accordingly. Many now believethat further investigations into auto crime are more effectively conducted byspecialist squads following up intelligence on series offences gleaned from crimepattern analysis.

Auto crime: first investigating officers

Nearly all the officers interviewed were uniformed constables, although the samplerepresented a wide range of experience in both specialist training and length ofservice. Two hundred and forty five interviews related to auto crime, 56% involvingthe theft of a motor vehicle (TOMV), including the offence of ‘taking withoutowner’s consent’7 (TWOC), and 44% thefts from vehicles (TFMV). Atypically, GMPpolicy is for officers to attend every incident of auto crime so, not surprisingly,officers in Manchester were more likely to have investigated a TOMV than those inLeicestershire or Dorset.

The results that officers felt their actions achieved are represented in Table 3.

INVESTIGATORS’ PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTIGATION

23

7 Offenders cannot be charged with ‘theft’ if there is no evidence to prove an intention to ‘permanently deprive’ the owners of their property.

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Forty seven officers (19%) made an arrest at the time of attending the auto crimeincident, slightly higher than the equivalent figure of 15% for burglary. Similarly,recovery of property was higher with investigations of auto crime offences thanburglary, 47% compared with 27%. Property was three times more likely to berecovered following TOMVs and TWOCs than it was for TFMVs (because moststolen vehicles are dumped following a short ‘joy ride’). Officers also felt theirinvestigations had provided reassurance to victims in 64% of cases and had gatheredinformation that could be developed into intelligence in 56%. Both these figures arelower than the equivalent for burglary.

Auto crime offences were attended less urgently than many others. Some officersimplied that they felt less in earnest about crimes they knew would not beinvestigated further. Still, two-thirds of the officers interviewed arrived within fifteenminutes and most attended within one hour of notification by the control room.Very few investigations took more than one hour to complete and nearly all crimereports were completed at the scene.

During their investigations, 84% of officers carried out a search of the scene.Officers’ felt these searches were significantly more likely to result in the recovery ofstolen property in TOMV than for TFMV offences. House-to-house enquiries wereless common than in burglary investigations (39% compared with 69%). Officerstook witness statements and in 24% of cases felt they were the key determinant forallocating the case for further investigation.

The results they felt their actions had achieved are presented in Table 4.

(n = 244) Percent Number

Arrest made at the time 19.3 47

Arrest made later 12.7 31

Vehicle/item recovered 47.1 115

Victim reassured 64.3 157

Information gathered 56.1 137

Other 1.2 3

None 8.2 20

Table 3: Auto crime – results achieved by police officers during first investigation

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NB: Because some investigators suggested that their actions had more than one type of positive result thepercentages do not add up to 100% across the table. The individual cells show officers’ perceptions of the resultswhere a specific action was undertaken. For example, officers felt that, of the 160 cases where a PNC check wasundertaken, an arrest resulted in 17 cases (10.6%).

Officers’ perceived that area searches and witness statements yielded the mostresults. One-fifth of area searches and over a quarter of witness statements wereassociated with achieving an arrest. Witness statements were cited as particularlyeffective in obtaining ‘useful information’, i.e. information that contributed togenerating further positive lines of enquiry (sometimes concerning otherinvestigations). House-to-house enquiries generated fewer tangible results, althoughthe survey did not take account of any positive effects in reassuring neighbours, orotherwise promoting good relations with the public.

Witnesses were present in 40% of auto crime cases. They provided descriptions ofoffenders in 82% of these and vehicle descriptions in 47%. Witnesses provideddescriptions of offenders in 84% of those cases allocated for further investigation(and sixteen cases that were not). The importance of the witness is self-evident.

The physical evidence officers found and the outcome of their investigations aredisplayed in Table 5.


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Action Perceived Result

Arrest Property Victim Info. Other Nonemade recovered reassured gathered

% No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No.

Area search 19.4 40 25.7 53 50 103 32.5 67 0.1 1 28.6 59(206)

House-to- 10.6 10 6.4 6 41.5 39 37.2 35 1.6 1 44.7 42house (94)

Witness 28.8 17 20.3 12 38.9 23 66.1 39 1.7 1 18.6 11statement(59)

PNC check 10.6 17 18.1 29 19.4 31 43.1 69 14.4 23 31.8 51(160)

Confer with 3.4 2 3.4 2 1.7 1 54.2 32 3.4 2 44 26LIO (59)

Table 4: Auto crime – officers’ perceptions of the results of specific investigative actions

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INVESTGATORS’ PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTIGATION

26

NB Percentages do not add up to 100 across columns

As physical evidence is rarely retrieved from crime scenes, its impact on crimeallocation decision making must be kept in the proper perspective. When found, itoften provided information which officers believed to be useful and it was also closelyrelated to achieving arrests.

It was rare for senior personnel to supervise investigations of auto crime directly andofficers considered it neither necessary nor desirable. Most believed that training ininvestigation did not influence results (only 15% had such training) and thatprevious investigative experience was more important in achieving an outcome.

Officers felt able to provide victims of auto crime with some form of assistance innearly all cases investigated, even if they failed to achieve an arrest. If this assistancewere recognised as a valid outcome of the police investigation there could be asignificant change in resource allocation decision making in the service becausedifferent criteria would affect the calculation of whether to allocate officers to thescene or not. This point will be discussed later.

Auto crime: second investigating officers

As already mentioned it was rare for auto crime offences to be routinely referred tosecond investigators. However, of the 111 second investigating officers questioned 48had arrested at least one suspect for an auto crime offence during the previous sixmonths and 30 of these had resulted from an investigation. Overall, auto crime was arelatively low priority for second investigators although a few cases were pursued.

Only slightly in excess of a third of second investigators (37%) felt that better use ofresources could be achieved by instigating more proactive operations; these tendedto favour targeting recidivist offenders. Moreover, only 25% of second investigatorsconsidered crime prevention advice to be the most effective way to reassure victims,


Arrest Property Victim Info. Other Nonemade recovered reassured gathered

% No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No.

Footprints – – – – – – – – – – 100 1(1)

Tools (37) 46 17 22 8 19 7 35 13 3 1 32.4 12

Clothing (7) 71.4 5 28.6 2 28.6 2 57.1 4 – – 14.2 1

Fingerprints 36.8 7 21.1 4 5.3 1 19.5 9 2.1 1 36.8 7(19)

Table 5: Auto crime – results officers’ perceived as being associated with certain types of physical evidence found during the most recent case

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whilst yet others felt that more publicity to police achievements would raise publicconfidence and deter offenders.

The evidence suggested that the police did not scrutinise recovered stolen vehiclesas thoroughly as they could. Some forces had special auto crime initiatives in whichall recovered vehicles were checked for fingerprints and other physical evidence byspecially trained constables, but few officers were aware of such strategies. Some ofthose who were felt they posed a difficult resource problem and risked neglectingother duties. Yet other officers suggested that special investigative strategiesprovoked offenders to extreme measures to evade detection, e.g. incinerating thestolen vehicle.

Burglary: first investigating officers

The researchers questioned 268 officers about their last investigation of a burglaryoffence; 42% from GMP, 32% from Leicestershire Police and 26% Dorset Police.Few differences emerged between forces, but where they did, it is indicated in thetext.

Most of the first investigating officers were uniformed constables. Seventeen per centhad served for fewer than two years, but 20% had completed at least ten yearsservice. Most officers had attended similar numbers of both domestic andcommercial burglaries.

Most burglaries were attended promptly; more than nine in ten officers said theyattended within half an hour of notification. Time spent at the scene of the crimevaried. About one third remained at the scene for up to 30 minutes, another thirdstayed for between half an hour and one hour, and the remainder spent over anhour. Half the officers said they completed their crime report before leaving thescene, and most of the remainder before the end of their shift.

As Table 6 (below) shows, nearly all officers (96%) indicated that they searched thescene of a burglary and over two-thirds (69%) conducted house-to-house enquiries.In about a fifth of cases (19%) officers took witness statements, conferred with LIOs(20%) and undertook property checks (23%). Just over one in ten officers hadsummoned a dog unit to the scene (n = 33).

Nearly all officers felt some advantage resulted from their investigation. The majority(84%) claimed they had given advice, reassured the victim (85%) and/or gathereduseful information (71%). Thirty-six officers (15%) made an arrest at the scene and66 (26%) recovered articles of stolen property. Furthermore, half the officersunderstood their case was later allocated for further investigation. Overall only threeofficers (1%) felt their investigation to have failed to achieve a positive outcome.The benefits of attending are, at least from the officers’ perspective, clearlydemonstrated.


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NB Percentages do not add to 100 across columns

Most officers searched the scene of the crime, achieving benefits principally inreassuring victims and gathering information. At the other extreme, conferring withLIOs, summoning dog units and checking stolen property lists were less commonactions. A third of officers took witness statements and about half of these felt thishad led to an arrest. House-to-house enquiries were justified because they providedinformation and reassured the victim. Officers located witnesses in less than a thirdof cases, although the majority of witnesses were able to describe the perpetrators(82%) or vehicles involved in the crime (33%).

As with auto crime, officers provided the victim with assistance in almost every casethey attended. Even where no arrest was made and no property recovered, officersattending the scene acknowledged that they had achieved positive outcomes.

About half of the officers uncovered physical evidence in the form of tools orimplements (21%), footprints (19%), fingerprints (16%), or clothing (4%). The mostuseful were the tools or implements. Thirteen of the 52 such findings contributed toarrests, whilst 16 were associated with the recovery of stolen property.


Arrest Property Victim Info. Nonemade recovered reassured gathered

% No. % No. % No. % No. % No.

Scene 12.1 29 21.8 52 60.9 145 55.5 132 14.3 34search (238)

House-to- 5.8 10 6.4 11 45.9 79 50.0 86 33.1 57house (172)

Witness 46.8 22 27.6 13 51.1 24 23.7 11 31.9 15statement (47)

Confer with 14.0 7 6.0 3 12.0 6 24.3 12 42.0 21LIO (50)

Summon 24.2 8 15.2 5 24.2 8 30.3 10 63.6 21dog unit (33)

Property 8.4 5 11.9 7 20.3 12 18.6 11 74.6 44check (59)

Table 6: Burglary – results first investigators felt they achieved as a result of specific investigative actions during the most recent case

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NB Percentages do not add to 100 across columns

Very few officers had received supervision at the scene of their last burglaryinvestigation, although those that had usually acknowledged it to be helpful. Threein ten of the officers interviewed had received specialist training in burglaryinvestigation. A few thought it had been helpful for making an arrest or recoveringproperty, but 11% felt it helped them reassure victims and 13% to gatherinformation. Officers viewed experience of dealing with many burglaries as providingthe greatest advantage in making an arrest, although this contention provedimpossible to test.

Many of the benefits generated by this stage of the investigative process may only berealised by second investigators. Furthermore, if the information gathered here isfully exploited it may also contribute to investigations into other types of offence.

Burglary: second investigators

The researchers interviewed 111 second investigating officers. The largest group(46%) were from GMP, with 23% from Leicestershire Police and 32% Dorset Police.Most were detectives; 69% detective constables and 15% detective sergeants. Allhad at least two years’ service and more than 80% had served in excess of five years.Respondents had investigated an average of 25 domestic burglaries and 18commercial burglaries within the previous six months. Approximately 45 per cent,however, had dealt with ten or fewer of the former category and just under 60 percent ten or fewer of the latter. Their last burglary had been detected in 62% of cases,and in 68% the suspects were arrested, although often by another officer. Thissuccess rate far exceeds the national clear-up rate of 19% (for burglary dwelling andburglary non-dwelling combined) and the comparable official average for the threeforces involved of 29%. It can be explained, however, because it applies only tosecond investigations, which the case allocation process judged to have a greaterlikelihood of successful resolution than those filed at this stage. Furthermore, asmore than one officer may be involved in a burglary enquiry so more than one officer


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Arrest made Property Info. gathered Victimrecovered reassured

% No. % No. % No. % No.

Fingerprints(40) 22.5 9 30 12 80 32 92.5 37

Footprints (48) 14.6 7 25 12 83.3 40 85.4 41

Tools (52) 25 13 30.8 16 76.9 40 73.1 38

Clothing (11) 54.5 6 72.7 8 81.8 9 63.6 7

Table 7: Burglary – results officers’ perceived as being associated with certain types of physical evidence found during the most recent case

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can legitimately claim a clear-up as a result. Consequently a clear-up figure based onindividual officers’ results will exceed that based on individual cases.

Stolen property was recovered in 43% of cases, half of these by the interviewees andhalf by a fellow officer. More than eight in ten officers claimed they had contributedto intelligence gathering.

This table suggests considerable success in arrests and/or detection of cases allocatedfor further investigation. What it fails to clarify is the reason for this success. It mayresult because those cases most likely to show a successful outcome were chosen forsecond investigation, but equally plausible is an explanation that secondinvestigations are themselves inherently successful. The decision to allocate cases forfurther investigation would appear to be something of a gamble. The question is,what more can be done to weigh the odds in investigators’ favour.

Result Positive Some No Not Not Sureindication indication indication applicable

% No. % No. % No. % No. % No.

ID of suspect 35 35 21 21 43 43 1 1 – –

Location of 9 9 12 12 67 67 7 7 5 5property

ID of vehicle 12 12 9 9 47 47 25 25 7 7

Links to other 16 16 22 22 55 55 2 2 5 5offences

Links to other 14 14 21 21 60 59 1 1 4 4incidents (n=99)

Means of 11 11 11 11 70 69 5 5 2 2prevention(n=98)

Table 9: Burglary – results indicated to second investigator by reading the crime report in the most recent case

Result Yes No Not applicable or not sure

% No. % No. % No.

Suspects arrested 67.6 75 30.6 34 1.8 2

Property recovered 43.2 48 51.4 57 4.5 5

Intelligence gathered 80.2 89 18.9 21 0.9 1

Table 8: Burglary – results achieved by second investigating officers in themost recent case

(n = 100 unless otherwise stated)

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The crime report, supplemented by written or verbal comments from the crimeallocator, provides the second investigator with an outline of the crime and asummary of police actions during the initial investigation. It may also indicate howbest to achieve a result and appeared particularly useful in identifying the suspect.For example, Table 9 shows that 35% of officers claimed that the crime report hadgiven a ‘positive indication’ and a further 21% ‘some indication’ of a suspect’sidentity. In addition, 16% said the crime report provided positive links with otheroffences, and a further 22% some indication of these.

Just over three-quarters of the second investigating officers who studied the crimereport estimated that they completed this action within fifteen minutes. About halfof these did so in five minutes or less.

Second investigating officers spent a mean time of 33 minutes visiting the scene of acrime. This gave some indication of the location of stolen property in 22% of casesand helped identify suspects in 38% and must therefore be considered a good use ofpolice time. Nearly 40% of second investigating officers claimed that by visiting thescene they were also able to make links with other offences, suggesting there wereadvantages to be gained from this action even after another officer had attendedduring the initial response to the crime.

Second investigating officers said they visited the scene of the crime mainly to orientthemselves to the subtleties of a case, but a general lack of confidence in thethoroughness of initial enquiries was an important secondary motivation.

Of the 35 second investigators who expressed doubts about first investigations, 29cited inadequate house-to-house enquiries as the main concern. Most seasoneddetectives consider this method to be an essential component of burglary


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(n=88) Positive Some No Not Not Sureindication indication indication applicable

% No. % No. % No. % No. % No.

ID of suspect 18.2 16 19.3 17 59.1 52 3.4 3 – –

Location of 10.2 9 11.4 10 69.3 61 5.7 5 3.4 3property

ID of vehicle used 5.7 5 4.5 4 58 51 25 22 6.8 6

Links to other 13.6 12 25 22 56.8 50 3.4 3 1.1 1offences

Links to other 17 15 23.9 21 55.7 49 3.4 3 – –incidents

Means of 30.7 27 20.5 18 43.2 38 3.4 3 2.2 2prevention

Table 10: Burglary – results indicated to second investigator by visiting the crime scene in the most recent case

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investigations, and a valuable public relations exercise that raises awareness of localcrime problems. However, there are several practical reasons why these may not becarried out. First officers at the scene may arrive when house-to-house enquiries areimpractical because people are at work or asleep. Second investigators are sometimesunenthusiastic about conducting house-to-house enquiries in high crime areasbecause of public reluctance to assist them, often through fear of criminal reprisals.In all, 53% of second investigating officers claimed house-to-house enquiries hadindicated the suspects’ identity, 19% that it helped to develop links with otheroffences and 21% with other incidents.

Second investigators had interviewed victims in 85% of all detected cases, spendinga median time of 30 minutes per case. These produced various positive results:information about the suspect’s identity in more than 40% of cases; they helpedlocate stolen property in 10%; and helped identify vehicles in a further 10%.

Interviews of witnesses by second investigators were even more successful; 82%resulting in arrests and 43% in the recovery of stolen property. Useful information,e.g. about the alleged offenders, their modus operandi or concerning related or similarincidents was provided in 83% of cases. It is likely, however, that some witnesseswere also suspects and this needs to be borne in mind when interpreting thesefindings.

Result Positive Some No Not Not Sureindication indication indication applicable

(n=46) % No. % No. % No. % No. % No.

ID of suspect 60.9 28 26.1 12 6.5 3 6.5 3 – –

Location of 15.2 7 15.2 7 58.7 27 8.7 4 2.2 1property

ID of vehicle used 26.1 12 13 6 23.9 11 32.6 15 4.3 2

Links to other 15.2 7 15.2 7 63 29 6.5 3 – –offences

Links to other 17.4 8 15.2 7 60.9 28 6.5 3 – –incidents

Means of 8.7 4 8.7 4 73.9 34 8.7 4 – –prevention

Table 11: Burglary – results indicated to second investigator by interviewing witnesses in the most recent case

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Officers found footprints in 10% of cases. In one such case the footprints linked theoffence under investigation with another unsolved crime; in others they providedpositive indications of future preventive measures because they gave a clearindication of the point and method of entry. Similarly, officers found suspects’clothing in 12% of cases but this only led to a positive identification of a suspect inone, although in a few other circumstances it was a source of help to other officers.

Tools or implements were found at the scene in 22 (20%) cases. This informationappeared to have been very helpful to the investigation. In a third of these casesthere was an indication of the suspects’ identity and in nine cases it was possible toindicate links with other offences owing to similar modus operandi (e.g. by recognisingmatching marks at the point of entry). Fingerprints were retrieved from 26 (23%)incidents and fifteen (58%) of these led to the positive identification of a suspectwhile two (8%) provided some indication of identity.

Property was stolen from the victim in 94 (85%) cases. When officers were askedwhether this helped them in any way 70 claimed it had. Nine said the type ofproperty stolen gave them a positive idea of who the offender was while another sixclaimed they had gained some indication. Similar proportions thought that the typeof property stolen indicated where to find it and enabled them to make links withother offences and incidents. This variable has rarely received attention, yet quiteclearly, identifying the type of property stolen can be a very helpful tool for thesecond investigating officer in dealing with the crime.

Investigators conferred with local, and occasionally divisional, intelligence officers in71 of the 111 cases, and in 64% of these cases it resulted in a detection. Forty-fourofficers said that conferring with the LIO gave some help in identifying the suspectand about half of these claimed it led to a positive identification. However, they alsonoted other advantages. Thirteen said that conferring with LIOs had given them atleast some idea of where to locate stolen property (often by indicating thewhereabouts of known ‘fences’), 19 said it helped to identify vehicles used in thecommission of the offence and 39 made links with other offences, and the samenumber with other incidents.

Twenty-two investigators (18%) received information from police informants.Conferring with informants generally took longer than with colleagues but there wasno link between the time spent and the result. Nevertheless, eighteen of this groupsaid that by conferring with an informant they gained either a ‘positive’ (15) or‘some’ (3) indication of the suspect’s identity. Ten were able to help locate stolenproperty, nine to identify vehicles, eleven to provide information which helped linkthe burglary with other offences, and nine provided information relating to otherincidents.

Thirteen second investigators received supervision from senior officers but onlyrarely was this felt to affect the outcome of the case. Sixty-six (73%) officers


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consulted colleagues and this seemed to help progress investigations more thansupervision. Of the 75 officers who responded to the question, 42 claimed colleagueshad helped to identify a suspect, 21 to locate stolen property, fifteen to identifyvehicles, 35 to establish links with other offences and 29 with other incidents. Thesefindings indicate the value of teamwork and help explain the high level of returnachieved. Information flow between colleagues was clearly crucial and the benefits ofcooperation are well illustrated.

Fourteen second investigators stated that a Watch scheme was operating in the areaof the burglary, and although none said that this had contributed to identifying asuspect, one officer did claim that the scheme helped provide a link with otheroffences.

Sixty-four second investigators (58%) had specialist investigative training (mostly inthe CID) and some had attended SOCO courses. In a minority of cases training wasperceived helpful in achieving some results during the most recent investigation,although it was rarely cited as helping identify a suspect.

All these officers were experienced; none had attended fewer than 100 burglariesand three-quarters claimed to have attended in excess of 500. Of the 106 who gavedetails, one third claimed their experience had helped them positively identify thesuspect, another third that it had provided some indication of the suspect, while theother third said that it had not been helpful. Forty-five (43%) said their experiencehad at least helped to locate stolen property, 35 to identify vehicles used in theburglary, 74 to make links with other offences and 76 with other incidents.

Police officers’ general attitudes to burglary and auto-crime

The following section discusses both first and second investigating officers’ responsesto a series of pre-written statements concerning burglaries and auto crimes. Theywere asked to grade how true they believed each statement to be on a scale from‘usually true’ to ‘usually false’.

The statements were based on hypotheses concerning the effectiveness or otherwiseof common elements of an investigation. Although there were additional questionsrelating to the specific category of offence targeted by the interview, most of themwere common to all types of offences. The aim was to collect general views aboutinvestigating auto crime and burglary that were not purely related to the most recentincident investigated. It was hoped that this method would help to gather some ofthe benefits of second investigators accumulated expertise. These responses are,however, police officer’s perceptions. They have not been tested in this study.

‘However a burglary/incident of auto crime is graded, immediate arrival at the scene of thecrime is essential to the success of the investigation’

Most respondents agreed with this statement, although it was perceived to be morerelevant for burglary offences. A majority, 76%, of second investigating officers and

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72% of first investigators of burglary indicated approval, along with a slightly smallerpercentage (56%) of first investigators of auto crimes. Overall, prompt arrival at thescene is considered important by most officers.

‘In the absence of witnesses there is little chance of detecting a burglary/auto crime’

Nearly all of officers responded in a similar way, with 63% of second investigators,64% of first investigators of burglary and 64% of auto crime investigators agreeingthat this was ‘usually true’ or ‘more often true than false’. A greater percentage ofauto crime investigators, however, supported the former ‘usually true’ contention.There was a clear consensus that the presence of a witness was a very useful aid inthe detection of a crime.

‘In the absence of an identifiable suspect there is little hope of detecting a burglary/autocrime’

Most officers agreed with this statement. A majority (68%) of second investigatingofficers, 66% of first investigators of burglary and 66% of auto crime felt that this was‘usually true’ or ‘more often true than false’. On average only 10% of respondentsanswered ‘not sure’ and less than a quarter of respondents to each questionnaire feltthat the statement was untrue. Again, suspects are viewed as important factors inattempting to solve these types of crimes.

‘In the absence of a full or partial vehicle description (of any other vehicles involved) thereis little chance of detecting a burglary/auto crime’

First investigators of auto crime agreed (at least to some degree) with the statementin 54% of cases. Only 38% of first investigators of burglary and 24% of secondinvestigators stated the same.

‘In the absence of sound physical evidence there is little chance of detecting a burglary/autocrime’

Only 55% of respondents to the auto crime questionnaire agreed that physicalevidence was necessary, compared to 73% of first investigators of burglary and 68%of second investigators. This may be either because detective skills are rarely appliedto auto crime in the same way as they are to burglary as a consequence of screeningpolicies. A further factor in the disparity between these figures may be the increaseduse of proactive auto crime squads. Although physical evidence may providevaluable support to a charge, video evidence and officers’ testimonies are probablysafer in court. Thirty-seven per cent of auto crime respondents disagreed with thestatement, but only 18% of first investigators of burglary and 23% of secondinvestigators felt that the absence of physical evidence made little difference to thechances of detection. Physical evidence appears more important in burglaryinvestigations.


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‘Officers should always seek supervision from their supervising officer when investigating aburglary/auto crime’

Most interviewees disagreed with this statement (including 91% of first investigatorsof burglary and 93% of auto crime investigators). This was less the case amongstsecond investigators (75%) who, although more experienced, were involved in moredetailed investigations. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the statementshown clearly contradicts dominant police culture. Supervision is a conceptassociated with an inability to operate alone.

‘All officers should receive specialist training in the investigation of burglary/auto crime’

Sixty-five per cent of first and 77% of second investigators of burglary believedofficers should receive specialist training compared with only 50% of officersinvestigating auto crime. By contrast, only 14% of second investigators and 21% offirst investigators of burglary disagreed with the idea of training altogether, althoughthis figure came in at 38% for auto crime respondents. Quite clearly specialisttraining was felt to be more important by officers investigating burglaries than thoseinvestigating auto crimes.

‘All officers should have a minimum experience of investigating burglary/auto crime beforethey are allowed to take charge as first/second investigators’

Officers felt that a minimum experience of investigating burglary was essential to thesuccess of an investigation. But experience in auto-crime investigation was rarelyheld in high esteem because many officers regard it almost as a natural consequenceof urban life, and a problem to be recorded rather than investigated.

‘There is little chance of detecting a burglary/auto crime if SOCO does not attend the sceneof the crime’

Officers do not regard the attendance of a SOCO as always essential. About a third(34%) of those interviewed about auto crime felt the statement was ‘usually false’, asdid 21% of first investigators of burglary and 10% of second investigators. Thissuggests that investigators regard SOCO attendance at the scene of a burglary asmore important than at the scene of an auto crime, though both samples tended toplay down the value of a SOCO’s attendance.

‘There is little chance of detecting a burglary/auto crime if a CID officer does not attend thescene of the crime’

Auto crime investigators felt that CID attendance at the scene of a crime was notrelevant to the chances of detecting a crime. Second investigators, who were mostlyCID officers, were more inclined to see benefits in CID involvement. Yet even theyaccepted that a CID presence was not essential for a detection.

These findings confirm those obtained from interviews during the observationalresearch. There were no major differences between samples in terms of their

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priorities for the investigation. Immediate arrival at the scene was viewed asimportant whilst supervision by senior officers was considered a low priority.

Officers felt they had been able to provide victims of auto crime and burglary with someform of assistance in almost every case investigated. Moreover, the integrity of caseallocation decision making was to some extent endorsed, as there was considerablesuccess in achieving detections and arrests following allocation to ‘mobile’ secondinvestigators. However, it is not possible to gauge from this data whether the successrate could be maintained were more cases allocated for the same level of attention.

The purpose of this chapter was to represent investigators’ perspectives on the crimeallocation system. Two key points emerge. First, officers believed their actions whenattending crime scenes had been successful in achieving results, whether theyachieved an arrest or not. If results other than arrest are to be recognised by thecrime allocation system, this must be reflected in policy. Second, according to theinterviews some cases had more potential for results than others. Future researchneeds to confirm the characteristics of a crime that best indicate which types ofresult can be achieved. This information will enhance the quality of crime allocationdecisions.

What also needs to be taken into account is the victim’s perspective. This will becovered in the following section.


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VICTIMS’ PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTIGATION

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4. Victims’ perspectives on investigation

The methodological difficulties encountered in interviewing victims (as described inchapter 1) mean that this section must be regarded as exploratory and as a basis forfuture research. Nonetheless a number of observations can be made.

The researchers interviewed 67 victims, 66% had recently been burgled and 33%had suffered auto crime. Approximately equal numbers of males and females werequestioned about each offence category. They were asked about how the policehandled their crime; the police response to the crime complaint, the subsequentinvestigation of the offence (both initial and secondary, as applicable), and thereasons given by the police for non-attendance. Victims were also asked about thesupport the police and related agencies provided, the role the police adoptedfollowing completion of their investigation and the results their efforts achieved.Finally, victims who stated that they would have preferred police attendance wereasked if they would feel the same way, even if it meant taking officers away frommore urgent duties.

The initial complaint from the public not only signals the beginning of theinvestigation, it also initiates contact with the victim. This first contact sets thescene for the entire interaction and is significant in determining levels of victimsatisfaction and the nature of the police investigation.

Ninety per cent of victims informed the police of ‘their’ crime by telephone. Theremainder of crimes were reported in person at the police station or electronically byintruder alarms. Most crimes were reported within an hour of discovery, threequarters by the victim, the others by someone close to the victim, such as a partneror neighbour.

No victim considered any of the police actions at this stage unnecessary. A numberdid not know whether they had made their report to a police officer or a civilian, butdid not regard this as important. Indeed, when asked if wanted a police officer totake their call, even if it meant taking him or her from other duties, most victimsstated they would be content with a civilian. This counters common police concernsabout victims’ perceptions of civilian involvement.

The police attended the scene for 73% of the victims shortly after the complaint wasmade. Almost two-thirds remained at the scene for about half an hour and only twostayed longer than one hour. They took statements from only 22% of the auto crimevictims but from 71% of burglary victims.8 The researchers asked victims whetherthey were satisfied or otherwise with the initial police visit. Only three said ‘no’; theremainder were all positive. Over half felt that the police visit had achievedsomething and 60% of these mentioned feeling reassured.

8 This figure exceeds that provided by the police and could be inflated because victims may have assumed that merely by giving details they had provided an official statement.

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Victims said that investigative actions conducted by the police included house-to-house enquiries in 61% of cases, fingerprints searches in 43%, while dog units weresummoned in only 4%. Only five victims believed the police could have done more(principally regarding house-to-house enquiries) and only one felt any police actionto have been unnecessary.

In response to the question ‘Would it have been acceptable if the police did notvisit’, only six victims (three for each type of offence and none aged over 50) said‘yes’. Comments included:

Police need to attend in order to catch criminals and to make contact withthe public.This is the main function of the police.There was little the police could do, [but] it is important that they attend thescene of domestic burglaries.There was evidence and they may have detected the crime, and alsoprovided reassurance.

This sample suggests, therefore, that victims value the presence of the police at thescene of the crime regardless of whether they expect them to make an arrest orrecover their property. This finding reinforces the need to define a ‘result’ morebroadly than detection alone.

Twenty of the people questioned, all of them burglary victims, had received a follow-up visit. This was invariably within 24 hours of the first visit, and usually by a plainclothes officer. The response to questions on these second calls may be affected byvictims’ confusion between second investigators and SOCO. Only four said these‘secondary investigation’ officers made additional enquiries and seventeen that theytook fingerprints. Still, most of the victims claimed something had been achieved inthe second visit, citing possible discovery of evidence and, to a lesser extent, addedreassurance.

Moreover, when asked whether it would have been acceptable for the police not tohave visited a second time, two thirds of the sample said ‘no’. This finding suggeststhat the police risk damaging relations with the public when they do not allocate thecase to a mobile resource (unless they can provide a good explanation). This wasespecially true when evidence had been recovered during the initial enquiries.Victims were particularly keen for physical evidence to be followed up, and manywould settle for nothing less, even if it did mean re-deploying officers from otherduties. Such a finding may be interpreted to suggest that the public will not accepttheir crimes being handled entirely by static resources. Yet it must be recognisedthat these results relate only to burglary victims and all forces remain committed tovisiting all burglary scenes.


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Eighteen of the 67 victims, one of burglary and seventeen of auto crime, had theirinvestigation dealt with entirely by telephone and were not visited by the police atany time. A third of these victims stated they had received no explanation for thenon-attendance. A further third stated that the police had indicated they would notvisit the scene because the low value of the items stolen precluded it. Not all victimssympathised with this policy. For example;

I asked the police when they would be coming out to see me and they toldme that it wouldn’t be necessary as they could take the details over thephone. When I asked them why they come out for other crimes and notmine, they said it was because it wasn’t worth much (the stolen item). Iknow it wasn’t worth much but that isn’t the point. My car was broken into,the police could at least come out and talk to me about it.

Victims who did not receive an explanation or were told that their case did notmerit a visit were often irritated, but when explanations were given most victims saidthat they were reassured and felt their case was being taken seriously. Nevertheless,victims do value a police visit and nine of the eighteen interviewees who were dealtwith by telephone claimed they would have preferred someone at the scene. Allinterviewees were asked whether they would still expect a visit, even if it meanttaking officers off patrol or other duties. Only three said ‘yes’, although most wereuncertain of how to answer. Indeed, researchers’ impressions were that althoughvictims recognised that other calls may be more important, they valued a police visit.

To ensure victim satisfaction during secondary static investigations the police mustreassure people that investigating crimes by telephone is not a policy of ‘screeningout’.

The researchers asked the victims if the police had provided direct reassurance,crime prevention advice and contact with a victim support agency. Thirty-fivevictims (52%) said the police reassured them, whilst 34% said they had not. Ahigher proportion of burglary victims claimed they were reassured. Victims weremore likely to be reassured if the police had paid a second visit, or if they hadtelephoned or written. Most (69%) thought it part of the police role to reassurevictims, and 33% of these wanted reassurance even if it meant taking officers awayfrom other duties.

A third of the victims said that crime prevention advice was important for them.Only six considered it was not part of the police role, and 28% (17) said they wouldwant such advice even if it meant taking officers away from other duties. The policehad put four in ten victims (mostly of burglary) in touch with a victim supportagency but the victims were divided over whether the police involvement washelpful or otherwise. Half of the victims did not think it the job of the police to putvictims in touch with a support agency, compared with a third who did.

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The police provided sixty per cent of victims with a contact telephone number tohelp them keep track of any investigation, and about half of these (especially thoseof burglary and male victims) made further contact, mainly after realising that otheritems had gone missing. On the other hand, the police themselves had contactedover half the victims again, the vast majority following secondary investigations. Yetover a half of all victims claimed they would have found it unacceptable if the policehad not kept them informed of progress, while a quarter felt the police couldimprove performance.

Victims expect further information from the police, but most accept an explanationwhy this may have to take a low priority. Again, irritation appeared to result whenno such explanation was offered. Comments included:

I thought they could have done more, and there was no follow-up visit. Inever saw them again after that. You would expect to hear something, evenif it was just to say that no-one had been caught but they were still looking. Iknow they have lots on and I’m not the only one, but they need to take itseriously. The police seemed bored; they had done it all before and itshowed.

Seven victims were sure that an arrest had been made. Of these only one said thecase had gone to court; the six others said a court case was pending. Given this, itwas not possible to ascertain the extent to which the police kept victims informed ofresults at court. However, other successes were achieved; for example, in seven casesvictims said the police had recovered stolen property.

When victims were asked whether they were satisfied with the overall result, 79% ofthose who answered indicated that they were, whilst 8% said they were not. Sometypical comments included:

Yes, the police did all they could.

Yes, apart from the delay in initial response due to patrol being called toanother incident.

Give them five out of ten - dissatisfied!

Of the remainder, most were ‘mainly satisfied’, although they were critical of theslow police response or the lack of post-crime support.

Quite clearly, victims do not judge the police response solely by whether it achievesa detection. Those interviewed in this survey wanted the police to demonstrate thatthey were doing their best by conducting what investigations were practical and bymaking the most of the available evidence. They value reassurance that their case isbeing taken seriously, and view a visit from the police as the best indicator of this.Thereafter, there is potential for effective static investigations to meet victims’needs.


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Victims viewed very few police actions at the scene as unnecessary. It is interestingthat those who expressed an opinion about actions they felt the police neglectedmentioned house-to-house enquiries. As noted earlier, this is consistent with manyinvestigators’ views. It was noted earlier that in more than four in ten firstinvestigations of both auto crime and burglary, house-to-house enquiries hadreassured victims and in well over a third of the former and a half of the latter, theyhelped gather information.

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5. Conclusion and recommendations

This study aimed to examine how the police allocate crimes for investigation and theeffectiveness of their responses to burglary and auto crime. Identified effectiveoutcomes included not only the detection and arrest of offenders and the recovery ofstolen property, but also intelligence gathering and victim reassurance. The systemwas analysed from the time the initial crime complaint was made to that when thecase was filed or detected. The allocation of crime is complex and influenced by awide range of formal and informal factors. A diagram identifying key processes wasproduced to help make sense of the system and its components. This model can beused when forces are developing new practices and to help in the ‘fine tuning’ ofthose already in operation.

The police definition of a ‘result’ was found to be quite narrow; possibly aconsequence of long-standing police culture, or perhaps of the current focus onperformance indicators. Invariably it was expressed in terms of detections and arrestsand disregarded other useful products. Most police investigations reap some benefit,either in terms of intelligence gathering or victim reassurance. Both of these may beregarded as sound investments for the future. Interviews with victims revealed thatpolice efforts to reassure them were favourably received. Victims valueddemonstrations of care and interest and perceived a visit to the scene and theperformance of some investigative actions as indicative of this.

Most victims were realistic about the prospects of detection and their property beingrecovered. However, this did not lessen their demand for quality of service andreassurance. Many police officers have long recognised this need. Some cited caseswhere victims had found what they believed to be fingerprints or other items thatofficers knew from experience to be of little evidential value. However, theyresponded to the findings with enthusiasm out of deference to the victim. Theyviewed this as part of the process of reassurance and felt it was important not todiscourage victims from trying to contribute.

Some victims accepted that the police could not attend the scene but expected anexplanation why, as well as to be kept informed of any progress achieved by othermeans. In essence, they did not object to the concept of a static investigation once itwas explained. Their need, however, for the police to acknowledge theirvictimisation in a ‘tangible’ form cannot be removed from the equation.

Furthermore, the police service should better evaluate investigations to take intoaccount the full range and the utility of the products they generate. Moreover, crimescreening procedures which de-emphasise minor crime should be identified andeliminated. For example, this can relate to the efficient completion of what are oftenperceived as merely administrative tasks but have a huge effect on the practicalbusiness of investigations. A badly completed crime report provides crime managerswith insufficient information to make appropriate decisions on the future of the case.Interviews with second investigators indicated that crime reports were often a major

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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source of information, sometimes providing positive indications of suspects’ identity.There was evidence that at least some first investigators were less professional abouttheir work when they knew the case would be ‘screened out’. Many did not realisethe potential of static investigations and the possibility that cases could bereactivated at a later time.

The central question in the debate on the police role remains whether toconcentrate solely on fighting crime, or whether to provide a broader-basedcommunity service that integrates this alongside other functions. The way in whichthe crime allocation system operates will be decided by the choice made in answer tothis question.

At the moment there are two broad alternatives. If fighting crime is the main aim ofpolicing then a system that directs attention toward more serious or solvable crimesis advocated. If the objective is to provide community service then greater emphasismust be placed on ensuring victim satisfaction. However, one important irony is thatprioritising victim satisfaction may well reap positive contributions to future crimefighting endeavours. Victims are the link between the two styles of policing.Members of the public, are probably the greatest investigative resource available tothe police:

The clearance of most routine crimes … derives from the helpsupplied to the police by the public, rather than from the efforts of thepolice (Burrows and Tarling, 1985).

The majority of solvability factors referred to in any crime allocation system requireinformation from either the victim or a witness. Any systems design that de-emphasises victims’ expectations risks alienating the public and reducing theircommitment to assist the police. Although it is grossly unfair to compare theperformance and organisation of a rural force like Dyfed Powys with an urban onelike Greater Manchester, it is true that whilst one is able to use investigations as ameans of building trust and enhancing community relations, the other is afflicted bya near chronic disaffection by those living in the high crime inner-city areas. Wherethe police make no time to attend to victims’ needs this breeds a strong sense ofalienation and loss of common purpose. The end result of this is a reduction ininvestigative effectiveness. A similar consequence may result from the neglect ofcertain forms of investigative technique that require police officers to interact withthe general public. The report mentioned that many officers in urban areas were lessthan keen to perform house-to-house enquiries because they felt it extremelyunlikely for members of the public to cooperate with them. It is not unreasonable tointerpret these signs as indicators of a growing mutual mistrust in certain areas.

Overall, the findings suggest that the police underestimate their effectiveness andtheir criteria for success is too narrow. When judged more broadly and in line withvictims’ views, they fare much better.

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Recommendations

• Forces should develop their own good practice for investigating high volumecrime, and the crime allocation system model discussed in this report can be usedto identify potential influences on investigations.

• All personnel who receive communications from the public, switchboardoperators in particular, must be made aware of information gatheringopportunities and the need to leave complainants with a favourable impression.Whilst their main role is to provide a service, they also participate in the crimeallocation system.

• Everyone who comes into contact with a crime complaint will influence theensuing investigation and the likely results. Yet most participants are unaware ofthe implications of their actions on subsequent processes. This awareness shouldbe enhanced in police training, organisational structure, and communication linksbetween those working at different stages of the investigative process. This couldbe a valuable aid in promoting teamwork and in reconciling police culture withpolicy.

• Civilians employed in relevant areas (e.g. crime desks, control rooms andreception areas) are an investigative resource and the police organisationalstructure and training should reflect this fact.

• The initial police response affords the greatest opportunity to achieve results, andfirst officers at the scene need to be allowed sufficient time to undertake thoroughinvestigations and to generate a comprehensive crime report.

• First investigators must complete all crime reports with proper care and attentionbecause both secondary and static investigators depend on good qualityinformation and evidence of thorough initial enquiries.

• The role and investigative methods of the crime desk should be better publicised.Most members of the public (and many police officers) have no understanding ofstatic investigations, and therefore the potential for police effectiveness andvictim satisfaction is greatly reduced.

• Static methods of investigation should be developed and taught as a separateinvestigative discipline to maximise their benefits. Furthermore, personnelconducting such enquiries need better access to the appropriate technology andother resources. At present, these investigations often amount to little more than‘counting crime’.

• Witnesses provide good information and first investigators should be encouragedto do more to locate them. Neglecting to do house-to-house enquiries (which isone means of locating witnesses) was frequently lamented by second investigators.


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• The police should inform victims at the earliest opportunity how police enquirieswill proceed, whether officers attend the scene or not.

• Victims do not appraise the police solely on their ability to make an arrest ordetect crime. They value assurance that their case is taken seriously and regardthe traditional visit to the scene as a demonstration of this concern. Whendecisions are made not to attend the scene, it is important to bear in mind thepossible consequences for victim satisfaction and their perceptions of policeefficiency.

• It should also be recognised that successful outcomes include not only the arrestof suspects and the recovery of property but also the gathering of intelligence andvictim reassurance. This point should be promulgated; presently police officersunderestimate their own effectiveness.

• More research is needed on the impact of the various influences identified by thesystem model. In addition, while this report has documented police perspectives,further research should evaluate the effectiveness of investigative actions inachieving specific results.

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REFERENCES

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References

ACPO (1989) Progress Report (II) of the Detection of Crime Working Group. London:HMSO.

Audit Commission (1993) Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively. PolicePaper No 12. London: HMSO.

Burrows, J., Heal, K. and Tarling, R. (1985) Policing Today. London: HMSO.

Diez, L. (1995) The use of call-grading: how calls to the police are graded and resourced.Police Research Group Paper No. 13. London: Home Office.

Jolowicz, C. & Read, T. (1994) Managing Demand on the Police: An Evaluation of aCrime Line. Police Research Group Paper 8. London: Home Office.

Maguire, M. (1985) ‘Victims’ Needs and Victims’ Services: Indications for Research’,Paper to Third International Institute on Victimology, Lisbon, reprinted inVictimology: 10: 617-30.

Shapland, J., Wilmore, J. & Duff, P. (1985) Victims and the Criminal Justice System.Aldershot: Gower.

Sussex Police (1994) An Integrated Crime Strategy for Sussex. Internal report.

Zedner, L. (1994) ‘Victims’ in Maguire, M., Morgan, R. & Reiner, R. (eds) OxfordHandbook of Criminology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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POLICE RESEARCH SERIES PAPERS

1. Video Taping Police Interviews with Suspects - an Evaluation.John Baldwin. 1992.

2. Effective Shift Systems for the Police Service. Richard Stone, TimKemp, Bernard Rix and George Weldon. 1993.

3. Opportunities for Reducing the Administrative Burdens on thePolice. Paul Cresswell, Graham Howarth, Mike Dolan and JohnHedges. 1993.

4. Investigative Interviewing Courses For Police Officers: AnEvaluation. Barry McGurk, Michael Carr and Debra McGurk. 1993.

5. Management and Supervision of Police Interviews. JanetStockdale. 1993.

6. Royal Commission Research Papers. A Policing Perspective.Jane Hirst. 1993.

7. Part-Time Working and Job Sharing in the Police Service. RichardStone, Tim Kemp and George Weldon. 1994.

8. Managing demand on the Police: An evaluation of a Crime Line.Chlöe Jolowicz and Tim Read. 1994.

9. Court Attendance by Police Officers. Bob Eames, Andrew Hookeand David Portas. 1994.

10. Assaults on Police Officers: An examination of thecircumstances in which such incidents occur. Ben Brown. 1994

11. Assessing the Expandable Side-handled Baton. Egmont Korch,Tim Kemp and Bernard Rix. 1994.

12. Traffice Organisation and Activity Study. Adam Ogilvie-Smith,Elizabeth Ransom and Alan Downey. 1994.

13. The Use of Call Grading: How Calls to the Police are Graded andResourced. Lara Diez. 1995.

14. Initial scene visits to house burglaries. Mike Taylor and Jane Hirst.1995.

15. The Presentation of Police Evidence in Court. Janet Stockdale andPeter Gresham. 1995.

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Home OfficePolice Policy Directorate

Pap

er 16: The Crim

e Allocation S

ystem:

Pap

er 16:P

olice Investigations into B

urglary and

Auto C

rime

Martin G

ill, Jerry Hart, K

en Livingstone, Jane Stevens

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the crime allocation system: police investigations into...

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