The Cold War and Organised Labour in Batista's CubaSteve Cushion (Institute for the Study of the Americas)

In order to gain popular support for its war against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the US

government encouraged reforming regimes in Latin America which introduced popular welfare measures and

granted workers the right to organise. However, following the defeat of the Axis powers, the USA looked for

ways to reverse the wartime reforms and to restore profitability in the difficult post-war economic

circumstances. The anti-communist hysteria, which was generated to justify US change of policy towards

the Soviet Union, was also used to cover the installation of authoritarian, pro-business regimes throughout

Latin America as a whole, such as the regimes of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and the Somoza family

in Nicaragua. These regimes began a generalised attack on working class living standards, while using anti-

communist rhetoric to provide cover the victimisation of militant shop stewards, irrespective of their politics.

This paper will argue that, in the case of Cuba, the dictatorship which followed Batista's 1952 coup is an

example of this trend. It will examine the use of anti-communism as part of a more general campaign to

reduce the proportion of the national income going to labour and to increase productivity by imposing

mechanisation and wage cuts.

1947 - Anti-communist purges

During the Second World War, the Cuban communist party's main priority was to support the

struggle of the USSR against Nazi Germany. To this end, it used its dominant position in the Cuban trade

union federation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) to work for internal social peace and

prioritised the war effort over the normal economic concerns of its working class and peasant supporters. As

long as the USSR was an ally of the United States, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), as the Cuban

communist party was then known, was an acceptable part of the governing coalition, but the situation

changed radically after the defeat of the Axis powers and the USSR became the new "totalitarian" enemy of

the self-designated "Free West". Under pressure from the US ambassador, the Cuban government encouraged

its supporters in the union federation, the Comisión Obrera Nacional Auténtica (CONA) led by Eusebio

Mujal, to take over the CTC.

Matters came to a head at the 5th CTC congress in 1947 when, following a violent dispute over

credentials, the Minister of Labour, Carlos Prío, suspended the congress and then used the powers of his

ministry to give control of the federation to the CONA. The PSP did not have sufficient active support to

combat this take over and an attempted general strike called by the displaced communist leadership failed,

with only the Havana dockers and tram drivers coming out in support.

In areas where government legal intervention proved insufficient to impose a new leadership,

gangsters linked to the governing party, the Auténticos, used violence to enforce the change of officials. This

included the murder of three of the most respected communist workers' leaders, the docker, Aracelio Iglesias,

the cigar-roller Miguel Fernández Roig and the sugar worker, Jésus Menéndez.1

1 "El no.1 de la cordialidad", Bohemia (October 24th 1948), quoted in Osa, En Cuba (2005) pp.1-5 McGillivray, Blazing Cane (2009) p.254

Thereafter Mujal, soon to become the new CTC

general secretary, used his links to the government to secure

enough economic gains for the union's membership to

maintain his position and to prove that his grouping, referred

to as mujalistas, were at least as effective as the communists

they had replaced. Thus, in 1950, a Havana tram strike, lead

by communists was defeated by police repression, while that

same year, bank workers were granted their demands on

condition that they affiliated to the Auténtico controlled

CTC. Reports from the British Ambassador in 1952 were still full of criticism of the "endless irresponsible

demands of the labour movement", which he blamed on Mujal who, he wrote, "imposed his will on President

Prío and secured satisfaction for his every whim, however irresponsible and prejudicial to the long term

interests of the country it might be".2 The removal of the communists from office may have suited the Cold

War foreign policy objectives of the US government, but did nothing in itself to improve the productivity of

Cuban workers.

Productivity Drive

If economic conditions had become more difficult generally in the capitalist world during the post

war period, Cuba was particularly badly hit by the drop in world sugar prices. The International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) , following the request of the Cuban government for a loan

in 1951, commissioned an American economist, Francis Truslow, to produce a report on the state of the

Cuban economy. The Truslow Report summed up the situation up as follows:

"employees strongly resist mechanisation and cost-cutting methods"

"the discharge of employees for legitimate cause [is] made difficult or impossible"

"higher wages, coupled with opposition to methods for increasing productivity, endanger the competitive position of the basic sugar industry itself ".3

This opposition to productivity measures was rooted in the island's high levels of unemployment and

underemployment, which explains the tenacity with which Cuban workers defended their jobs and the social

clauses in the constitution which helped them to do so. The Truslow report itself recognised that

unemployment deeply affected the consciousness of those in work, while Louis Pérez argues that job security

was always the principal concern of unionised workers.4 Truslow sums up the situation as follows:

In Cuba it is usually easier, quicker and cheaper to divorce a wife than to fire a worker. Under prevailing conditions of chronic seasonal unemployment, it may also be easier to find a new wife

2 FO 371/97515 - AK1011/1 (1952) Annual Review of 1952 FO 371/97516 - AK1015/33 (1952) Cuban Political Situation [References to archival material to be found in the National Archive at Kew will be given starting with the folder reference, where FO 371 refers to records created and inherited by the Foreign Office, General Correspondence from Political and Other Departments from 1906-1966. This is followed by the document reference where AK refers to Cuba related material originating in the American Department of the Foreign Office]

3 Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) p.104 Pérez, Cuba (2006) pp.224-230

Aracelio Iglesias Jesús Menéndez

than to find a new job.5

In reply to these concerns, the report argues that increased productivity would attract investment,

promote diversification and thereby produce jobs, although it does recognise the workers' reluctance to co-

operate was based on their doubt that that the money saved would be invested productively.6 The report

further believed that wage levels were excessive:

With labor still making wage demands, it is believed that in many cases they have reached the limit that employers will tolerate.7

Thus, increased productivity would be achieved by mechanisation and longer hours of work, both policies

which would reduce the need for the existing number of workers in circumstances of a chronically high level

unemployment. To this was added the proposal for a cut or at least a freeze in wages. There was therefore

little prospect of workers voting for a party which intended to implement the Truslow report.

Coup d'État

While previous governments had found it difficult to increase the levels of productivity in Cuban

industry, the outlook for the 1952 general election appeared set to make matters worse from the employers'

point of view. There were three candidates for President, Fulgencio Batista, who had headed an earlier

regime in the 1940s, Carlos Hevia for the Auténticos, the current ruling party and Roberto Agramonte for the

Ortodoxos, a recently founded anti-corruption party. The PSP could not even get enough signatures to put up

a candidate.

The Ortodoxos were not a workers' party, but were relying on working class votes for their expected

victory. The main plank of their election platform was opposition to corruption allied to a vaguely expressed

economic nationalism which, while it did not go as far outright anti-imperialism, called for recovery of

national wealth and promised to implement measures of social equality. Such was the popular revulsion with

the level of corruption of the Auténtico administration that it was widely expected that the Ortodoxos were

going to win the election handsomely, while Batista seemed to be heading for a crushing defeat. The

Ortodoxos displayed no interest in implementing the Truslow report and the report's concerns with

productivity received no mention in their public statements. Carlos Alzugaray, in his recent study of US

diplomatic correspondence of the period, argues that this platform was more than enough to worry US

business interests and their allies amongst the Cuban bourgeoisie.8 Thus, when Batista and his associates in

the armed forces staged a coup on the 10th March 1952, it was quickly welcomed by the United States.

There was, in fact, remarkably little internal opposition to the army takeover, such was the cynicism

with politicians in general that had developed over the first fifty years of the republic. The only social group

to react strongly was the students.9 The ousted President went quietly, partly for fear that a victorious

Ortodoxo government might investigate and punish his corruption. There was then an unseemly scramble by

5 Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) p.606 Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) p.3727 Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) p.1368 Alzugaray, Crónica de un fracaso imperial (2008) p.72-789 Poveda-Diaz, Propaganda y revolución en Santiago de Cuba (2003) pp.17-48

the majority of professional politicians to reach an accommodation with the de facto government in the hope

of retaining their lucrative privileges.10

The coup was generally welcomed by capitalist interests, as it was felt that Batista would be more

business-friendly than the alternatives. In May 1952, the British Ambassador wrote:

I am more and more convinced that the basic reason for the Armed Forces having staged the revolution was their utter disgust at the growing and unrestrained power of Labour.11

and later that year he added:

The business community, industry and commerce have all welcomed the new regime... If the coup d'état had to come, no better leader could in their view have been found and no more opportune moment chosen.12

The official trade unions made a token show of resistance to the coup, with

Mujal first proclaiming a general strike and then rapidly calling it off before

most workers had even heard the call. The majority of the trade union

bureaucracy quickly came to an accommodation with the new regime and Mujal

went on to become one of Batista's most loyal collaborators. Enrique Cirules

goes so far as to suggest that Mujal, along with other senior Auténtico figures

such as Senator Masferrer and Vice-President Pujol, were involved in plotting

the coup beforehand, as they were frightened that the election of an Ortodoxo

government might reveal the extent of their own corrupt activities.13 In return for

this collaboration, the government turned a blind eye to corrupt practices within

the unions and obliged employers to deduct trade union subscriptions from

workers' wages by means of a compulsory check-off, which isolated the CTC

leadership from rank and file pressure. Mujal himself had been a member of the communist party until 1932,

but had left to pursue a more opportunist path. Having come to office by means of the anti-communist purges

of 1947, he had every reason to dislike and fear the PSP. Throughout the period of the Batista regime, he was

one of the most vociferous opponents of the communist party, condemning all militancy and any opposition

to his control as communist inspired.

The new de facto government used a lot of anti-communist rhetoric, broke diplomatic relations with

the USSR and, in July 1952, set up a commission of enquiry to investigate the extent of communist

penetration in Cuban public life.14 Nevertheless, the regime did not make any serious moves against the PSP

until the following year when, in the crackdown which followed Fidel Castro's attack on the Moncada

barracks in Santiago de Cuba on 26th July, the party was formally banned, its paper "Hoy" closed down and

some of its leaders arrested; this despite the PSP leadership roundly condemning Castro and his followers as

terrorists.15

10 Osa, En Cuba III, 1952-4 (2008) pp.33-3711 FO 371/97516/7 - AK1015/33 (1952) Cuban Political Situation12 FO 371/97516 - AK1015/18 (1952) Cuba under General Batista 13 Cirules, El imperio de La Habana (1993) pp.139-14014 FO 371/97517 - AK1015/43 (1952) Steps to combat Communism15 PSP de Luyano, Carta Abierta del PSP a los Putchistas y Terroristas (1953) Collection Reinaldo Suarez, Universidad de Oriente

Eusebio Mujal

1955

Batista planned his attack on working conditions carefully. He had reached an accommodation with

the CTC but could not move too quickly because, if he undermined Mujal's position, that accommodation

would be useless. His approach to restoring profitability was by defeating workers sector by sector, making

sure that the field of battle was always chosen by the government and that any chance of generalised

industrial action was avoided.16

The mujalista CTC bureaucracy facilitated this productivity drive by placing themselves at the head

of any dispute and then almost immediately surrendering. During 1955, this approach effectively undermined

a series of strikes on the railway, in the banking sector, by telegraph workers, by textile workers and finally

by 1/2 million sugar workers. Where workers refused to accept the actions of the trade union bureaucracy,

the government used the police and army with considerable brutality to overcome remaining resistance. In

return for the support of the mujalistas, the Ministry of Labour used its extensive legal powers of

intervention to prevent aggrieved union members voting the incumbent bureaucrats out of office. None of

these strikes were led by the PSP, although they did lend their full support where they had influence,

principally in the sugar industry. Nevertheless, the government repeatedly blamed the strikes on the

communists but, given the widespread sympathy with the sugar strike in particular, the liberal columnist in

the news weekly Bohemia, Andés Valdespino argues that these accusations rebounded to the credit of the

PSP17. As part of the process of intervention mentioned above, the principal leaders of the sugar strike were

removed from office and eventually expelled from the union accompanied by accusations of "communism";

16 The Economist (27th May 1978) pp. 21-23 17 Valdespino, Más allá del diferencial (1956) p.55

Ciudad muerta during the 1955 Sugar Workers' Strike

this despite, in many cases, a long history of political disagreements with the PSP. In the case of Mujal's

attack on Conrado Becquer, who had previously been vice president of the sugar workers' union and who

became the main public face of the strike, the use made of "guilt by association" is particularly striking.

Mujal's evidence for the accusation was that he had seen photographs of Becquer talking to known "reds".

Becquer's reply was that he had seen pictures of Eisenhower talking to known communist leaders such as the

Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, at the United Nations and then went on to ask if the FBI were investigating

the US President on the same basis.18

Similar accusations of communism were made in the case of the leaders of the railway workers in

Guantánamo, in this case an alliance of ex-trotskyists and revolutionary nationalists who were long term

political enemies of the PSP. Following the end of a bitter railway dispute in July 1955, these same local

leaders were arrested by military intelligence officers and charged with "communist activities".19 During a

strike in February of that year, a train driven by strikebreaking managers on its way to the US base at

Guantánamo bay was derailed by strikers. They were never caught, but this did not stop the local paper

stating that this was the action of "criminals, probably communists".20

The PSP did lead one campaign during 1955, a series of successful demonstrations against the mechanisation

of Cigar rolling. This campaign received considerable support in the opposition press, but nowhere outside of

the party's own newspaper was the leadership role of the communists mentioned.21

Divided Opposition

The strained relationship between the PSP and the rest of the anti-government opposition

demonstrates the divisive effect of Cold War anti-communist propaganda. The liberal anti-government

opposition, often referred to rather contemptuously as "los partidos burgueses" in PSP literature, did not

wish to antagonise the US by being seen to associate with communists. Thus, on November 19th 1955, the

fact that the PSP organised a large turnout to support an opposition demonstration was condemned as

"Communist sabotage" in the opposition press.22 The PSP wrote endless open letters to the "bourgeois

opposition" proposing a united front, although nearly always in terms which invited rejection, but they rarely

18 "Obreros" Bohemia January 15th 1956) p.6219 Voz del Pueblo (4th July 1955)20 Voz del Pueblo (February 7th 1955)21 eg "Tabaco", Bohemia (October 16th 1955) n.pag22 "Sabotaje Comunista" Bohemia (November 27th 1955)

if ever received a reply.23 Of course the PSP's uncritical support of the USSR, in particular its support of the

crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, played into the hands of its enemies.24 These attitudes affected

the relationship between the PSP and Fidel Castro's Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio (July 26th

Movement or M-26-7), which was formed in May 1955. The bad start to relations as a result of the

condemnation of the Moncada attack continued and a distinct anti-communist faction grew in the M-26-7,

particularly in Havana.

The division between these two organisations was much less

noticeable in eastern Cuba where, particularly amongst militant

workers, there was a much more collaborative attitude. This would

prove important when Fidel Castro returned to Cuba at the end of

1956 and the M-26-7 organised a series of strikes and armed attacks

in eastern Cuba in order to divert the authorities attention from

Castro's landing in the Granma.

The national leadership of the PSP was aware of the

impending Granma landing, but they thought that the whole scheme

was adventurist and wanted no part of it. However, the local PSP

organisation in Santiago had cordial relations with the July 26th

Movement and took a different view. As a result, the military actions

of the M-26-7 on 30th November 1956 received the support of the Santiago communists led by Ladislao

Carvajal, provincial secretary of the PSP, in defiance of a direct order from Havana.25 . This cordial

relationship was particularly important in the port where formal liaison was organised between the two

organisations by Sergio Valiente for the M-26-7 and José Pérez García for the PSP. Their co-operation

extended to help with distributing each other's clandestine propaganda to reduce the risk of police detection.26

So, on the morning of the 30th November, Juan Taquechel, the leading communist militant on the Santiago

docks, successfully pulled the port workers out on strike in support of the insurrectionary activities organised

by the M-26-7 as cover for the arrival of Fidel Castro and his comrades in the Granma.27

Death SquadsThis growth of unity in adversity was aided by the government response to the start of rebel guerrilla

activities in the Sierra Maesta. It was quite common for a jeep full of plain-clothes police or off-duty

soldiers to arrive outside the house of an opponent of the regime and shoot him in front of his family and

neighbours. This policy of employing government death squads can be seen developing in early 1957, with

the Santiago newspapers containing frequent stories of the discovery of the dead bodies of young people who

had been shot after being beaten and tortured.28 During this period, the communist clandestine newspaper,

23 eg Carta Semanal (July 4th 1956)24 Carta Semanal October 30th 1956)25 Taquechel & Poumier, Juan Taquechel López y el movimiento obrero en Santiago (2009) p.12026 Coya, El movimiento obrero en Santiago (1982) p.7927 Taquechel & Poumier, Juan Taquechel (2009)28 Poveda Diaz, Propaganda y revolución en Santiago (2003) pp220-224

Carta Semanal, contains numerous reports of communists being murdered, with a common method being the

reported release of the victim following a period of incarceration and then their body being subsequently

found hanged from a tree near their home, with the official verdict being suicide.29 Despite the fact that one

of the main organisers of this campaign of terror being called the Buró de Represión de Actividades

Comunista (BRAC), from 1957 onwards, any opposition figure risked assassination, the most prominent

being Dr. Peyayo Cuerro, national president of the Ortodoxos, who was murdered in March 1957.30

There were several mass demonstrations against this state inspired terror in the early part of 1957,

with perhaps the most successful being the town-wide general strike to protest against police and army

brutality in Manzanillo on 28th January 1957, supported by a partial stoppage in the towns of Santiago and

Contramaeste.31 Manzanillo had always been a communist party stronghold; it was, after all, the home town

of the party leader Blas Roca, and was now the nearest town of any size to the rebels in the Sierra Maestra.

There was a personal relationship between many local militants of the PSP and the M-26-7 in Manzanillo.

Local communists, particularly members of the PSP youth wing, the Juventud Socialista, often helped in the

support networks for the rebel army, although how much of this was known the leadership in Havana is

uncertain.32 While there is evidence of co-operation at local level in Manzanillo, there was still considerable

distance between the manner in which the two organisations were organising against the government's

campaign of terror. Thus, the PSP's response in its stronghold of Manzanillo was a simple withdrawal of

labour while, in contrast, the day the dead body of Rafael Orejón, leader of the M-26-7 cell in Nicaro, was

returned to his family in Guantánamo, the workers in the electrical plant sabotaged the machinery and

plunged the town into darkness for the whole night.33

Decree 538Anti-communism was not just used as a justification for murdering opponents and Mujal continued

to use it as a means of ensuring his continued control of the trade unions. His personal rule of the CTC

eventually conflicted with the "loyal opposition" based around Angel Cofiño, the head of the electrical

workers union. The final split came over the government's decree 538, published on 13th March 1957. This

decree forbade employment of "communists" in public service and was warmly welcomed by Mujal. There

was considerable opposition to the wide ranging nature of this decree, which was summed up by the

Bohemia columnist, Andrés Valdespino, as giving the employers, who he described as the most reactionary

in the world, the right to denounce anyone who disagreed with the current economic order as a communist.34

Cofiño denounced the decree and Mujal immediately replied by removing him from office. The reaction of

the workers in the electrical industry surprised everyone as they had no tradition of militancy and were

considered by many to be part of the "aristocracy of labour". Workers occupied company offices and went on

29 Carta Semanal (January 23rd, April 10th 1957)30 Carta Semanal (March 29th 1957)31 Carta Semanal (February 20th 1956)32 Interview with Daniel Orozco, Historiador de Manzanillo, (March 2009)

Interview with María Antúnez, former PSP militant, (March 2009)33 Sección de historia, Reseña histórica de Guantánamo (1985) p.13134 Valdespino, El decreto 538: ¿Contra el comunismo or contra la liberdad? (1957) pp.51&99

wildcat strikes. Sabotage of the street lighting circuits started to occur and small bombs went off in

electricity sub-stations. Soldiers occupied the electrical plants, while a large number of rank and file

leaders, many of them women, were arrested. The dispute petered out under this level of repression, but at

the cost to the government of a further reduction in its credibility, as it was well known that the communists

had no influence in the electrical industry and that the use of an anti-communist decree against the electrical

workers' union was illogical.

The M-26-7 and the PSPIn the summer of 1957, Frank País, the M-26-7 National Co-ordinator of Action, was based in

Santiago from where he was working both to promote the movement's clandestine operations and to organise

support for the guerrillas in the nearby Sierra Maestra mountains. His murder at the end of July 1957 by a

local police chief produced a general strike in Oriente province, which was probably the biggest public

demonstration of opposition during the entire Batista dictatorship. Following his funeral, the whole city of

Santiago de Cuba was shut down by a general strike which lasted 5 days. The strike spread to cover the

entire eastern half of the island, but failed to reach Havana. Efforts to launch a strike in Havana on August

5th were unsuccessful outside of a few traditionally militant sectors such as public transport, due in part to

some swift action by the mujalista bureaucracy35. This strike gave the question of possible collaboration

between the M-26-7 and the PSP an increasing significance..

An well-established, unofficial network of M-26-7, PSP and independent militants operated in

Oriente. This had been able to spread the strike to the rest of the province, including a shut-down of the

entire railway network36. Thus, for example, Rogelio Arógestegui of the M-26-7 and Alvaro Vázquez Galago

of the PSP speak of working together on the railways in Camagüey, although they say that this occurred

against the wishes of the local middle class leadership of the M-26-7, commenting that the workers had a

different attitude to other social classes. They also criticise the PSP leadership for being slow to recognise the

26th July movement as a potential ally.37

As PSP militants had been involved in the strike actions in Oriente, the party leadership wished to

gain some credit for this. So, while the communist press extolled the strike, they counterposed the lucha de

35 PCC, Historia del movimiento obrero cubano (1985) pp.333-436 Zanetti & García, Sugar and Railroads (1998) p.39437 Rodrígiez López & Martínez Rodríguez, La huelga de 9 de abril de 1958 en la cuidad de Camagüey (1984)

masas to armed action in barely concealed criticism of the M-26-7. Denying the government charges of

terrorism, the PSP called for a united front of all opposition movements, including the M-26-7, to fight for a

democratic solution to the crisis.38 At this stage, the denunciation of "terrorism" was quite sincere and in line

with their strategic approach which aimed at the steady reconstruction of their working class base as their

contribution to the cross-class popular front which they believed would defeat Batista. Nevertheless, the

leaders of the PSP recognised the political importance of the M-26-7 and were well aware that they were

starting to compete with them for influence in a working class that the PSP thought of as its private

constituency.

The leaders of these two opposition groups therefore drew very different conclusions from the

August 57 strike, both using the experience to reinforce an entrenched position. Fidel Castro's view of a

general strike was still based on the concept of an armed popular insurrection in support of the rebel army.39

The PSP, on the other hand, concluded that the strike had weakened the government and had proved that

strike action alone was the sufficient and only way to bring down the government.40 With both organisations

committed to a general strike, albeit with a completely different understanding of the term, there was some

basis for the discussions which started in February 1958 with the arrival in the Sierra Maestra of a PSP

delegate, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who was under instructions to try to bring the M-26-7 into the PSP's

proposed popular front41.

April 9th 1958

Discussions with the PSP had not advanced greatly by the time the M-26-7 called a general strike on

9th April 1958. This strike, which received almost no working class support, was a complete disaster and

cost the lives of many of the movement's best underground activists as Batista's chief of police issued the

instruction: "No wounded, No prisoners".42 Julia Sweig's researches also provide evidence that anti-

communist elements in the Havana M-26-7 underground were unhappy with Castro's discussions with the

PSP and refused to organise joint strike committees with communists for sectarian reasons.43

The process of picking up the pieces began with a meeting on May 3rd at Los Altos de Mompié in

the Sierra Maestra. From the point of view of working class involvement in the insurrection, two important

decisions were taken, one of which was to give future priority to the guerrilla struggle, the other was to

reorganise the M-26-7 workers' section, now called the Federación Obrera Nacional (FON). David Salvador,

a sectarian anti-communist, was replaced as leader of the M-26 by Ñico Torres, who, was not only more

efficient, but also had much greater experience of revolutionary trade union activity.44 A new theme of the

reorganised FON was a call to unity, which reflected the realignment towards the communists that was

emerging from the discussions between Fidel Castro and the PSP delegate, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.

38 Carta Semanal (21st August 1957) pp.1-339 Franqui, Carlos, Diary of the Cuban Revolution (1980) pp.220-22140 Carta Semanal (21st August 1957) p.341 Karol, Guerrillas in power (1970) pp.150-15142 Cabrera, Sagua la Grande escribó su nombre en la historia,(1959) pp.36-39&122-343 Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution ( 2002) pp.126-13144 Tennant, Dissident Cuban Communism (1999) p.302-319

In a much quoted article written in 1964, Che Guevara speaks of Ñico Torres being given

instructions to work with the PSP in the labour movement and of his reluctant but disciplined agreement to

do so.45 It is however likely that his reluctant attitude was shared by others in the leadership who might have

been convinced of the need to work with the PSP, but who were not happy with the prospect. Be that as it

may, these discussions took place in the aftermath of the failure of the April strike and, while the PSP had

been informed of the likelihood of a strike, they had been given no details and had not been involved in its

planning. The party journal, Carta Semanal, was vitriolic, attacking the M-26-7 for sectarianism and for

sterile commando raids producing the unnecessary deaths of brave young people.46 Carta Semanal also noted

the relative greater success in the eastern provinces and condemned divisions in the opposition; the subtext

here being that in the east there was a greater tradition of united working class action involving communist

workers.47

The terror unleashed by the regime following the strike, widely reported in the party's press, started

to convince the PSP leadership that there was no possibility of a legal solution to the crisis and that there was

a need for armed protection before workers would take further action.48 It had also become clear that the M-

26-7 was now, irrespective of the defeated strike, the centre of opposition to Batista and other political

organisations would have to orientate to them. The PSP national leadership therefore decided, towards the

end of April, to publicly support the guerrillas.49

Convergence

There was much common ground between the egalitarian nationalist politics of the M-26-7 and the

orthodox communist notion of the "Popular Front", as policies were based on a cross-class alliance fighting

for democracy and national independence. The differences between the two organisations were on the

tactical rather than the strategic level: differences that were compounded by the success of the omnipresent

anti-communist propaganda. Thus, the failure of the strike on April 9th caused both the M-26-7 and the PSP

to change their approach and we see the start of a process of tactical convergence between the PSP and the

M-26-7, although the organisational convergence would be much slower.

The other decision taken by the M-26-7 at Altos de Mompié, to give priority to the guerrilla struggle,

while at first sight looking like a turn away from the tactic of a general strike, in fact produced the conditions

that would make such a strike possible. Faustino Pérez recalls in a later interview that one of the reasons for

the failure of the April 9th strike was that workers would not strike without adequate armed support.50 The

turn to a more militaristic approach by the M-26-7 was not taken with a view to rectifying this inadequacy,

but it did have that effect in the long term. Going on strike in Batista's Cuba could be a life or death decision

and workers had to feel some confidence in their chances of survival and in the possibilities of successfully

45 Thomas, Cuba, (1998) pp.1002-7 Guevara, Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (2001) p.245

46 Carta Semanal (23rd April 1958) pp.1-447 Carta Semanal (16th April 1958) pp.448 Sims, Cuban Labor and the Communist Party (1985) p.5549 García-Montes & Alonso-Avila, Historia del Partido Comunista de Cuba (1970) p.52650 Bohemia (19th April 1959) pp.111-2

gaining a result that would be in their political and economic interests. In the summer of 1958, however, the

guerrillas still had to beat the encircling forces of Batista's army, which outnumbered them enormously. The

army and police, while they had demonstrated ruthless efficiency when shooting down poorly armed students

or unarmed striking workers, were not nearly so determined when faced with well trained and politically

motivated guerrillas, who rapidly gained the military upper hand in the second half of 1958. There was a

parallel growth in financial support coming from workers through late summer and autumn, as well as the

increase in membership of the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, which was estimated at 15,000 by the end of the

year.51

The growth in the M-26-7's own workers' organisation removed the urgency from the discussions

with the PSP on the question of merging the FON and the CNDDO and, while discussions aimed at uniting

all oppositional workers' organisations started on 21st June at a meeting convened by the M-26-7, final

agreement was not reached until 10th November when the the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido (FONU) was

launched.52 This new organisation adopted a 12 point programme that called for a 20% wage increase, for

opposition to mechanisation along with other measures against unemployment, for an end to racial

discrimination, for social protection for women, children and the unemployed, for the reinstatement of

victimised workers, for trade union democracy and the end to the compulsory check-off as well as for the

reinstatement of the 1940 constitution.53

On 8th December, Raul Castro, who commanded the "Frank País Second Front" in the Sierra Cristal

mountains convened, in the name of the FONU, a congress of workers' delegates that endorsed the 12 point

programme as well as formally repudiating the mujalista control of the CTC and adding to the list some

demands specific to the sugar industry. This congress was not without its sectarian tensions and some

delegates walked out in protest at the presence of communists, despite an appeal by Raul Castro for unity.

The decisions taken in the Sierrra Cristal were subsequently endorsed at the First National Conference of

Sugar Workers in Liberated Territory held on 20th and 21st December in the area controlled by Camilo

Cienfuegos54. Here, there appears to have been a much better atmosphere and Camilo Cienfuegos, who had

appointed a communist, Gerardo Nogueras, to head his workers' commission, asked the veteran PSP sugar

worker, Ursinio Rojas, to address the congress.55

The success of this unity drive varied from region to region with Santiago providing most evidence

of real unity. The first of a series of surviving leaflets produced by the Comité Municipal de Unidad Obrera

from Santiago de Cuba is dated October 195856, thereby pre-dating the formal setting up of the FONU. Other

Comités de Unidad Obrera were set up as the rebel army advanced on Havana.

51 Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection, (1974) p.263 Alexander, History of Organized Labor in Cuba (2002) p.159

52 PCC, Historia del movimiento obrero cubano (1985) pp.352-36053 Alexander, History of Organized Labor in Cuba (2002) p.16154 Bonachea & San Martín, Cuban Insurrection, (1974) p.27855 "Camilo", Bohemia (October 27th 1972)pp.59-6456 Comité Municipal de Unidad Obrera de Santiago de Cuba (1958) IHC archives, ref:1/8:13/40/1

It is true that the communists did not make a great contribution to the guerrilla struggle, but that was

never their area of strength or expertise. The party's main influence was in the working class movement and

it was this that they offered when negotiating with Fidel Castro. The course of those negotiations are

shrouded in mystery as both parties played their cards close to the chest and Castro had the added difficulty

of trying to get the PSP into the alliance without alienating his more anti-communist supporters. It is also

true that, after they decided to support the guerrilla campaign, the PSP were much keener on reaching an

agreement than was the M-26-7, who correctly recognised the relatively small contribution the communists

could make to the advance of the rebel army, which was their main area of interest.

Thus we see a process of political convergence between the M-26-7 and the PSP that was

accompanied by growing, but still passive, support for the rebels within the working class. The flight of

Batista, however, would give rise to the need for more active mass participation.

Truimph of the RevolutionThose members of Batista's general staff who had been left behind were clearly plotting with the US

ambassador in a last minute attempt to prevent the victory of the M-26-7 and, despite Castro's swift

deployment of the columns commanded by Guevara and Cienfuegos to Havana, there was a danger that an

army coup, particularly if it had an honourable patriotic officer at its head, could have split some of the

middle class support away from the M-26-7 and prolonged the civil war.57 Whether or not this danger was

serious is immaterial, the possibility of such an intervention was greatly feared at the time, as can be seen by

Lazaro Peña, communist ex-secretary of the CTC, writing of his concerns in the previous November58. Fidel

Castro called for a general strike over Radio Rebelde on 1st January 1959, a strike whose overwhelming

success provided such powerful evidence of the overwhelming popularity of the rebel victory that the army

chiefs quickly abandoned their plans for a military coup.

The politics of the PSP and the M-26-7 may have converged through 1958, but their organisational

differences and the mutual distrust remained. The M-26-7 used the general strike, which lasted from the 1st

to the 8th January 1959, to consolidate their hegemonic position in the now triumphant revolution.

Meanwhile Castro arranged for Ñico Torres and Conrado Bécquer, two important revolutionary workers'

leaders, to fly directly to Havana and supervise the seizure of the CTC headquarters.59 This they did in the

name of the Sección Obrera of the M-26-7, whose leaders took all the seats on the CTC provisional

executive committee60. The PSP were excluded and they wrote a furious letter to David Salvador, newly

appointed provisional general secretary of the CTC, complaining that Torres and Bécquer had told them that

the FONU was now dissolved and excluding them from decision making and even from entering the

building.61

57 Karol, Guerrillas in power (1970) pp.167-16858 Peña, Cuban Workers and People Resist Batista's Brutal Dictatorship (1958) p.18 59 Bohemia (11th January 1959) p.10260 Del-Cueto, El 26 de Julio en la dirección sindical (1959) pp.50-5161 Carta a David Salvador, 13 enero 1959 (1959) IHC archives, ref:1/8:13A1/1.1/104-6

The M-26-7 controlled press now started to contain articles which were highly critical of

communism in general and of the PSP in particular.62 The M-26-7 trade union cadres did not hesitate to use

fairly crude anti-communism to ensure that they won the trade union elections which took place throughout

the early part of 1959. This served to buy time for the revolutionary regime. The British and US governments

were unsure, but on balance thought that Castro was not influenced by Communists. By he time he was

ready to admit PSP, roughly at the time of the 10th Congress of the CTC, which took place at the end of

1959, the communists were prepared to accept his terms as very junior partners. Meanwhile, Castro had

established full control without US intervention. It would, however, take until September 1960 and the

inauguration of the Buró de Coordinación de Actividades Revolucionarias, which planned the integration of

the PSP and the M-26-7, for real organisational convergence to occur63.

ConclusionWe see in the Cuba of the 1950s, a case study in the variety of political uses of Cold War anti-

communism. Reactionary pro-business regimes could use the accusation, real or invented, of communism to

attack any militant worker who attempted to organise resistance to government policy. In this way, it served

as political cover for a productivity drive aimed at restoring profitability in a difficult economic climate.

Anti-communism also served to divide and thereby weaken anti-government opposition.

In the extreme, however, anti-communism could be a double edged sword. When the policy went as

far as extra-judicial murder by government death squads, the indiscriminate nature of this tactic caused its

victims to bury some of their differences in a common desire for survival.

62 eg Bohemia (February 8th 1959)63 Rojas, Primer Partido Comunista 3 (2010) chap.3

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