John AdamsHistory

5-12-2008Graduate Historiography

The Prague Spring: Toward a Global Understanding

1968 was a monumental year. It was the year of the White Album, the

assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., the first manned orbit of the moon, the Tet

Offensive, and student uprisings that spanned from Mexico City to Paris. One of the

most significant events that marked 1968 was the Prague Spring. Directly after the

events of 1968 historians quickly began to argue about Prague Spring in terms reform or

revolution. It was an important question because the answer would determine the

western world’s perception of the east. This question quickly proved inadequate. A

question of reform or revolution did not speak to the Prague Spring’s importance in the

geopolitical reality. The historiography of the Prague Spring responded by formulating a

more global understanding. The historiography of the Prague Spring represents a

transformation in historical understanding toward the global.

The early historiography of the Prague Spring concerns an argument about

whether to consider it an event of reform or revolution. In The Intellectual Origins of the

Prague Spring: the Development of Reformist ideas in Czechoslovakia 1956-1967,

Vladmir Kusin argues in favor of considering the Prague Spring a reform movement. He

argues that the Prague Spring was a democratic and nationalistic movement that

developed domestically and gradually. In addition, the intelligentsia theoretically

developed the reform movement and gave it the objective of creating a new model of

socialism.

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Kusin begins his argument in 1956, stating that both Khrushchev’s de-

Stalinization and the suppressed revolutions in Hungry and Poland reverberated in the

Czechoslovak consciousness. Influenced by the suppressed revolutions and the de-

Stalinization, the Czechoslovaks engaged in a long and gradual process of reform. For

example, Kusin argues that the reform movement reached as far as the Czechoslovak

philosophical and artistic conception of man. The reformed idea of man was the

“ordinary man.”1 Kusin defines this man by what he was not: he was not a war hero, a

proletarian worker, a farmer, a unionist, or a party agent. He was simply an ordinary man

“with all his weak and strong points.”2 According to Kusin this type of reform ideology

seeped through the cracks of society and incorporated the legal system, the economy, the

historiography, the sciences, and the place of Kafka in the cultural consciousness. What

gradually developed were two independent strands of reform, one emanating from the

intelligentsia and one from the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It was only Dubcek, as a

moral and ethical Communist, who could represent a point of connection between the two

reform movements. For example, the intelligentsia called for an end of Communist

censorship of the press on moral grounds. A reform Communist of lesser ethics than

Dubcek could have simply ignored the intelligentsia and undertook Party reform with no

regard to their demands. Instead the intelligentsia appealed to Dubcek’s morality and

eventually united the reform movements into political action. The Prague Spring was a

unification of two reform movements under one nationally minded leader.

Kusin argues from an almost exclusively Czechoslovak source base, including

official documents, newspapers, and literary productions. By starting in 1956 and

1 Vladimir Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 59.2 Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring, 59.

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focusing on a multiplicity of topics, including law, economics, philosophy, politics, and

literature, Kusin creates a narrative that presents the rise of reform form bottom-up. He

creates an analogy between de-Stalinization and the release of a clamp. Once the clamp

is freed a unique Czechoslovak reform develops in its release. In this narrative Kusin’s

strongest argument is for the role the intelligentsia in the Czechoslovak consciousness.

He argues that throughout history, and in particular during the Hapsburg Monarchy,

Czechs and Slovaks rose to power, wealth, and prestige only through their roles as

educated bureaucrats, lawyers, scientist, and writers. When Czechs and Slovaks saw an

opportunity for political autonomy, the intelligentsia arose as the only class capable of

taking political action. After de-Stalinization the intelligentsia reasserted its role as a

political leading force and called for reform. For Kusin the role of the intelligentsia

stands as a uniquely Czechoslovak phenomenon and cannot be understated.

Kusin argued for the Prague Spring as a reform movement in 1971, five years

later, in 1976, H. Gordon Skilling challenged that argument. Skilling’s Czechoslovakia’s

Interrupted Revolution is a massive work that is considered “a classic” by many

historians to follow. Directly after praising Kusin and his argument, Skilling states, “in

my own opinion reform is too mild a term to describe accurately what was happening in

1968 and what was likely to happen thereafter.”3 Skilling adopts Kusin’s idea that there

was dual reform movement but criticizes Kusin for not drawing out the arguments

further. For example, Kusin writes, “this study is not concerned with the student

movement primarily because it had not in any significant way contributed to the

formation of reform theories.”4 In contrast Skilling argues that the intelligentsia and

3 H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 834.4 Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring, 138.

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party were the impetus for reform but that “all social groups were eventually drawn into

the quickening currents of political action.”5 With all social groups moving toward

reform they would reinforce each other creating a cumulative effect that “would have

been the metamorphosis of the entire system.”6 Although Skilling is careful to qualify

the difference between reform and revolution his analysis of the Prague Spring

definitively labels it a revolution. Inherent in Skilling’s argument is an interpretation of

what would have happened. Although Skilling admits, “the future was in some degree

open”7 his conclusion that Prague Spring was a revolution is based on the assumption of

what would have happened assuming that the Soviets did not invade and “interrupt” that

revolution. His conclusion is convincing because of the thoroughness of his arguments.

Skilling is able to interweave a narrative of the many divergent attitudes and social

groups in order to show that up until the point of Soviet intervention Czechoslovakia was

on a path of radical and comprehensive reforms. Skilling argues that such a radical and

quick transformation can only be seen as a revolution.

Skilling’s source base and methodological approach are similar to Kusin’s but

more comprehensive. From outside Czechoslovakia he incorporates official documents

from Russia and other members of the Warsaw Pact and from inside Czechoslovakia he

looks at a larger array of social organizations and makes a distinction between Czechs

and Slovaks. The larger source base is necessary for his argument of interruption. At the

same time his structure is similar to Kusin’s. Skilling argues that the reform movement

turned revolution was a result a culmination of a bottom-up build of events started by de-

Stalinization. Although he disagrees with Kusin on the speed, severity,

5 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, 834.6 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, 835.7 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, 835.

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comprehensiveness, and eventual objectives of the Prague Spring, they agree on its basic

causes and course of action.

The main point of contention between Kusin and Skilling is whether the Prague

Spring was a reform movement or a revolution. Both books were published in the

western press, Kusin’s at Cambridge and Skilling at Princeton. Whether or not to

consider the Prague Spring a reform or a revolution is an important question in the

context of the 1970s Cold War politics. In his last section of the book Skilling points to

the importance of Cold War through a question. He asks is the Prague Spring a “Model

for the future?” Skilling asks whether or not other communist countries can rally around

the Prague Spring as an inspirational model for future revolutionary independence. The

initial reaction he admits seems “discouraging” but at the same he calls for Czechs,

Slovaks, and other Eastern Europeans to view 1968 as a time of triumphant greatness of

their national communities against oppression. He argues that the Prague Spring should

encourage revolution in the future. Labeling the Prague Spring a revolution is not merely

about the relationship of Eastern European countries to Soviet Russia, but it is also about

the United States foreign policy. By labeling the Prague Spring a revolution rather than a

Communist reform, Skilling is calling for United States foreign policy to at least

problematize Czechoslovakia’s membership in the Warsaw Pact and to consider

Czechoslovakia as a possible dissident ally under an oppressive thumb.

The debate of whether or not the Prague Spring was a reform movement or a

revolution quickly lost its significance as Czechoslovakia was “normalized” into the

Soviet block and as the Cold War continued. Although the question lost its relevance the

Prague Spring did not. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the history of the Prague Spring

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transformed from a primarily bottom-up domestic history of Czechoslovakia to a means

of understanding Soviet and Communist world politics.

Jiri Valenta in Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a

Decision marks a decided change in the direction of the historiography. The Prague

Spring is no longer about Czechoslovakia but rather it is about Soviet-Czechoslovak

relations and how an understanding of that relationship defines Soviet global politics. Jiri

Valenta attempts to define a paradigm of Soviet decision-making. He begins is argument

by rejecting the “Rational Policy Paradigm,” which argues that the Soviets could only

view Czechoslovakia’s reform movement as a rapprochement with West Germany, which

was untenable policy direction for the stability of the Warsaw Pact. Valenta rejects this

argument in favor of the “Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm.” The “Bureaucratic-Politics

Paradigm” rejects the “Rational Policy Paradigm” as too simplistic. Valenta argues that

the Soviet decision-making process was a “pulling and hauling” of various personalities,

committees, and structures run by bureaucrats with competing agendas. Ultimately

Valenta argues that the Soviets invaded because they needed Czechoslovakia to be

“normalized” before the Communist Party Congress on September 9, 1968 because if a

reformed Czechoslovak Communist Party entered the Party Congress they would be

validated and “much more difficult” to deal with.8 The Soviets concern with deadlines

and the Communist Party Congress indicates that the Soviet decision-making process was

not just a monolithic top-down mandate but rather a complicated pushing and pulling of

various agendas, concerns, and policies based on competing strands of information and

competing interpretations of that information. According to Valenta, the KGB were the

8 Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 157.

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primary advocates of the invasion and they manipulated the flow of information

accordingly, and as a result, its argument for intervention dominated the process.

Valenta’s purpose in arguing for “Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm” is to change

the United States assumptions about Soviet foreign policy. The implications of the

“Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm” are numerous and of great significance. First, it

implies that Brezhnev’s leadership may be viewed as a “consensus-orientated decision-

making process.”9 Second, the KGB is capable of providing disinformation for its own

agenda and as a result of foreign misdirection.10 Third, Dubcek is portrayed not as a hero

of Czechoslovakia, but rather as a “naïve” man of little foreign affairs experience.

Fourth, if the United States had reversed their hands-off policy and taken a

confrontational position “the invasion might not have come to pass.”11 Finally, as

Velenta admits in is section regarding new conclusions to the second addition, the book’s

argument is meant to inform western readers about Soviet decision-making in regards to

the invasion of Afghanistan (this book was published just weeks before the invasion

began). The Prague Spring stands as an example of the failure of Unites States foreign

policy to understand the Soviet decision-making process in terms of the “Bureaucratic-

Politics Paradigm,” a failure that Velenta implies should not be repeated in Afghanistan.

Valenta’s methodology is highly orientated around theory. His sources are almost

exclusively documents made public describing the political movements between the

Soviets and the Czechs, such as the Bratislava Conference. He admits a lack of sources

and complains that the inaccessibility of the Soviet archives greatly hampers his

arguments. The sources he has, he orientates around the “Bureaucratic-Politics

9 Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968, 159.10 Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968, 157.11 Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968, 158.

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Paradigm.” Despite his lack of sources his argument remains strong because the theory

seems aptly applied to Soviet structures. Both the actions of the Czechs and Soviets and

the sources he utilizes aptly fit within the paradigm. In terms of the historiography of the

Prague Spring, Valenta manufactures a shift in thought. The Prague Spring is no longer

about reform or revolution but rather takes a grander place in the global Soviet scheme.

Understanding the Prague Spring is about understanding Soviet global politics and the

elements of its unilateral application, whether to Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan.

Karen Dawisha in The Kremlin and the Prague Spring takes Jiri Valenta’s

arguments to the next logical step. She takes a step-by-step approach of analyzing the

chorology of the decisions made by individual Soviets. In effect she analyzes the

decision-making processes of the individual bureaucrats. To analyze the decisions she

applies a psychological model of crisis decision making developed by Charles Hermann

and Michael Brecher at the International Crisis Behavior Project (a research center at the

University of Maryland). The Hermann-Brecher model argues that as stress escalates the

decision-making process goes through stages that culminate into three psychological

characteristics that eventually control process. They are a greater propensity to rigidity, a

greater reliance on past experience rather then present information, and a focus on

immediate actions rather than long-term goals.12 For the Soviet leaders she identifies

three periods of decision-making: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. She argues that

during the crisis period “there was no indication that Soviet leaders wanted more

information or questioned the quality of the information they were receiving.”13 She later

softens this argument by stating that some leaders and possibly Brezhnev “may have

12 Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 342.13 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 356.

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remained receptive to new information.”14 In effect, Dawisha argues that the bureaucrats

entered a crisis mindset and based their decision on what they knew to be effective, that

is they based their decision to invade Czechoslovakia on events of Hungry in 1956.

Similar to Valenta, Dawisha sources are the select documents made public by

Soviets. In addition she conducted interviews of some participating Czechs and

incorporated United States documents that had previously been classified. Although

Dawisha’s application of the psychological profile to Soviet leaders is extremely suspect,

her book remains important for three reasons. First, it was well received and considered

by many to be a leap forward in the historiography the Prague Spring. Dawisha pushed

the models to truly investigate the behavior of the Soviets (which during the Cold War

was both important to understand and slightly mysterious). Second, Dawisha does

accurately represent the state and the course of to the historiography. The historiography

of the Prague Spring had transformed. The Prague Spring was a means of understanding

the Soviet global politic. Finally, the extent to which the Prague Spring had become an

element of the global politic becomes evident in her last chapter as she describes the

consequences of the invasion.

For Karen Dawisha the consequences of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

are global. She identifies three major areas of the global politic that were transformed by

the invasion of Czechoslovakia. First, the United States recognized Soviet hegemony in

Eastern Europe. This recognition allowed the Nixon administration to adopt the

“Sonnonfeldt Doctrine” which states that stability in Central Europe is in the United

States interest.15 Second, and related to “Sonnonfeldt Doctrine,” is that the invasion of

14 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 356.15 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 374.

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Czechoslovakia weakened Soviet-Chinese relations because the Chinese feared Soviet

interference on their northern boarders. As a result the Chinese sought rapprochement

with the Nixon administration. Therefore according to Dawisha, the United States and

Chinese rapprochement is a direct historical result of the Prague Spring. Finally, the

invasion of Czechoslovakia was overwhelming condemned by almost every international

Communist organization. In order to justify the invasion the Soviets produced the

“Brezhnev Doctrine.” The “Brezhnev Doctrine” states “the interest of maintaining

socialism in every country of the socialist commonwealth must take precedence over the

sovereignty of individual socialist states.”16 The two most immediate responses to

“Brezhnev Doctrine” were a Romanian national alert and an Albania break with Moscow

and turn to Peking. As the Soviets tightened their grip on Eastern Europe in the Prague

Spring, the rest of world Communism began to slip through their fingers.

Karen Dawisha and Jiri Valenta represent an important turn in the historiography

of the Prague Spring. For them the debate of reform or revolution was an outdated model

of thinking about the importance of the Prague Spring. Too many Cold War events had

occurred between the time that they wrote and the earlier historiographies of Kusin and

Skilling. In effect the Prague Spring comes to represent a moment, manifest in

Dawisha’s treatment the “Brezhnev” and “Sonnonfeldt” Doctrines, where historiography

accepts the divide of the world into two hegemonic superpowers. The acceptance of the

superpower paradigm made the domestic histories of the Prague Spring, such as the ones

written by Kusin and Skilling, irrelevant. The Prague Spring is important because of the

way it shaped the policies of Soviet Union, and concurrently, because of the Cold War,

16 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 376.

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those of the United States. As those foreign policies were global polices, the

historiography of the Prague Spring took on global interpretations.

As all the historiographies of the Cold War era admit their arguments are

hampered by a lack of source material. The Soviet and Czechoslovak achieves were

closed to the western academics. By 1997 when Kieran Williams wrote The Prague

Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics 1968-1970 the Cold War had ended and

“thousands of previously classified documents” had become available.17 His main

purpose in writing is to apply these new documents to the historiography.

Armed with new and more comprehensive source material Williams goes directly

after solving the historiographical debates. Williams divides his book into two parts.

Part I considers theoretical applications and the placement of the new sources into the

debates. Part II acts as a narrative of the events supporting his arguments. Williams

divides Part I into three categories: “Liberalization,” “Intervention,” and

“Normalization.” In the sections “Liberalization” and “Intervention” Williams attempts

to solve the lasting historical debates and offers an opposing interpretation.

In the first section, “Liberalization,” Williams wastes no time to argue that the

events in Czechoslovakia “should not be studied in the same terms as revolution.”18 He

argues that new sources unilaterally support the interpretation of the Prague Spring as a

reform movement. Williams argues that Dubcek undertook a path of obtaining more

‘liberal freedoms’ for the Czechoslovak people. Once granted these freedoms society

pursued its own goals. Dubcek did not intend for society to pursue a more radical course

of reforms and when society did and when Moscow responded, Dubcek fumbled between

17 Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ix.18 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 3.

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trying to please the Czechoslovak people’s demands and Moscow’s call greater

censorship.

In the second section, “Intervention,” Williams attempts to answer the debate

concerning Soviet decision-making process. Williams does not discount Jiri Velenta’s

“Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm” and admits that bureaucratic politics “existed in the

Brezhnev era.”19 At the same time Williams finds it an unsatisfactory model for

understanding the Soviet decision-making in 1968. Williams agrees that there was

bureaucratic pushing and pulling in Soviet structures but that ultimately the

“overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens” disapproved of the events of Czechoslovakia

and that the Soviet Politburo was “unanimous in their decision to invade.”20 The

“Bureaucratic-politics approach” successfully works as description for bureaucratic

process but its failure to incorporate information outside the bureaucracy makes it an

unsatisfactory method of understanding the decision. Williams also briefly criticizes

Karen Dawisha on the same grounds. Williams simply states that Dawisha sole focus on

the Soviet elites makes her explanation unsatisfactory.

To counter these arguments Williams offers what he describes as an argument of

“images and interaction.” Williams argues that since 1945 Soviets had established a

cultural “code” of expected behavior from their client states. This “code” had developed

through years of interaction, through such cultural messages as show trials and the

rejection of long hair.21 Through this “code” the Soviets expected a doctrine of “political

love,” in which Soviets demanded “trust and sincerity.”22 Williams argues that in 1968

19 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 30.20 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 34.21 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 36.22 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 36.

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Dubcek violated this “code.” Specifically, Dubcek’s government avoided meeting with

the Soviets, did not clearly ally themselves with the Soviet Communist Party, and

repeatedly promised to restore control in Czechoslovakia but never undertook any actions

to do so. By breaking the “code” Dubcek signaled to the Soviets that his intentions were

something other than reform. Williams concludes that although Dubcek only intended

reform, it was his bumbling between the demands of the Czechoslovak people and

Moscow the caused him to break the “code” and Soviets to retaliate through invasion.

Kieran Williams marks a shift in the historiography of the Prague Spring in two

respects. First, while writing in the post-Cold War era he is able to utilize a Soviet and

Czechoslovak source base. Access to a greater and more relevant source base allows him

to make the claim of improving upon the existing historical debates. Second, by talking

about foreign relations in terms of “codes,” Williams injects a cultural theory of history

into the relationship between two foreign states. Williams transforms the

historiographical understanding away form diplomatic foreign relations to an event of a

cultural relationship between two foreign states. This is an important historiographical

transformation. Williams takes the Prague Spring, what Valenta and Dawisha consider to

be a significant global political event, and transforms it into a cultural event. At same

time Williams does not consider it solely in terms of Czechoslovak culture, like Kusin

and Skilling, but rather as a culture event involving the relationship between two foreign

nations and cultures. Williams is methodical and exacting and the extent to which he is

able to make this transformation relies upon his sources and his portrait of Dubcek as a

character stuck between Czechoslovakian and Soviet “codified” language and political

demands.

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In 1968: The Year that Rocked the World Mark Kurlansky expands the

implications of Williams’ argument. Kurlansky seems to begin with the above two

premises: that the foreign relations of the hegemonic superpowers were global relations

and that these relations cannot be fully understood as solely diplomatic political

relationship. Kurlansky argues that a global cultural understanding is needed to better

understand the events of 1968. Kurlansky argues in favor expanding the idea of foreign

relations in terms of culture beyond Czechoslovakia and Russia and to include the whole

world.

In Kurlansky’s history the events of Prague Spring become one event in a global

series of events occurring throughout 1968. Kurlansky assigns special meaning to the

Prague Spring as a symbol of the relationship between the Soviet power structure and the

peoples it rules. Kurlansky sees the events of 1968 as a series of popular uprising of the

‘people’ against oppressive powers. He argues that each uprising is unique to its locality

but what makes 1968 special is the connection between all those localities via the global

information network and in particular television. For Kurlansky the events of 1968 are

all connected through the images that were broadcast around the world. Czechoslovakia

joins the revolutions of 1968, at least in part, because Dubcek ended Soviet censorship

and Czechoslovakia became inundated by a free and western press. Kurlansky builds an

image of the world based on cultural connectivity from bottom-up. He creates a narrative

of the ‘masses’ of people reacting against oppressive elite power structures connected by

television.

On the one hand Kurlansky’s argument is innovative and persuasive. He weaves

a tapestry, in which the events of 1968 form images interconnected by television as

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strands of yarn. The images of hippies and Vietnam broadcast the world and settle in

local consciences. For example, Kurlansky supplies a picture of Czechoslovak ‘hippies’

painted in flowers and marching down the street. On the other hand once pressed for

specific local effect, television as a source for Kurlansky falters. For example, the effects

of television or any cultural imagery on Dubcek’s interactions with Moscow are hard

pressed to find any collaborative documental sources and seem to be little more than a

narrative device employed by Kurlansky. The strands that Kurlansky uses to connect the

world seem to remain but a narrative of how the localities interpret those connections is

lacking. Much of Kurlansky problem regards source material. Although Kurlanksy uses

some primary source material he mostly scrounges from the secondary historiography. In

order to make a bottom-up argument Kurlansly would require primary source material

from a range of languages including Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Czech, which is

difficult to expect from one historian (and it is that true his arguments surrounding

America in 1968 are more tenable precisely because he offers more examples of

individuals’ cultural interpretations of the global events). Kurlansky’s argument that the

Prague Spring stands as one event in a global series of revolutions is a provocative in

theory but full of holes.

Kurlanksy stands on the cusp of two important developments in methodology.

First, Kurlanksy writes form a World History theory. Patrick Manning, one of the

forefathers of World History, describes World History as, “a story of connections within

the global community…the source material ranges from individual family tales to

migrations of peoples.”23 1968: The Year that Rocked the World precisely fits this

definition. It is a book primarily concerned with the connectivity of a global culture and

23 Patrick Manning, Navigating World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3.

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in that story the source material ranges form individual stories, to political events, to

picture imagery. Kurlanksy’s application of this theory to the Prague Spring is derived

from the Cold War foreign relations historiography. As the Cold War ended and the

world settled into a new paradigm, the historiography of Prague Spring transformed from

interpreting the foreign relationships of hegemonic superpowers to understanding the

interconnectivity of a global community. Rather than a means of interpreting the division

of the world, Kurlansky turns the Prague Spring into an interpretation of the world as

connected. The second important development in historiography Kurlansky embodies is

the admittance of the historical “I.” Kurlanksy admits that he was of the 1968 generation

that “hated” the Vietnam War. He admits that he is not objective and claims that the

book is a result of his relationship with his personal history. The development is

important because as Kurlanksy admits his biases he informs the reader and thus allows

the reader a higher degree of textual penetration. By being directly informed of the

writer’s biases, the reader gains insight into his structural and narrative approach. The

effect of the historical “I” is that Kurlanksy places, himself, his book, and his text within

a specific historical context.

The historiography of the Prague Springs represents a move in historiography

toward a global understanding. The understanding of the Prague Spring transforms form

a local political/cultural event, to a world political event, and finally to a global cultural

event. This transformation parallels the political developments of the Cold War. The

parallel development is important because it implies that the historiography is culturally

contingent. This is significant when applied to the Prague Spring because it creates the

World History theory and the global interconnectivity paradigm as a result of the Cold

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War. The Cold War divided the world into relationships dependent upon the two

superpowers. Once the Cold War ended that idea of division was replaced by an idea of

connectivity. It created a paradigm that can be summarized by the cliché phrase “think

globally.” By understanding the Cold War origins of the global interconnectivity

paradigm, the historian understands the paradigm’s biases and becomes empowered to

utilize or not to utilize it more aptly.

The global interconnected paradigm has for the historian both advantages and

disadvantages that can be seen in the relationship between sources, narration, and theory.

One advantage is that the global paradigm allows for a more comprehensive narrative.

For example, Kurlansky builds a relationship between the Mexican Olympics, the Tet

Offensive, and the Prague Spring. The idea that the world is connected allows individual

stories to be bound in a more comprehensive narrative. On the negative side, such a

grandiose narrative limits the local understanding and often places a theoretical burden

upon the sources. For example, Kurlanksy use of television is a persuasive theory about

cultural interconnectivity that is compellingly narrated, but in the end his presentation

lacks sources. Part of Kurlanksy’s problem may be languages, but it may also be in part

the nature of television and mass media. It raises for historian two interesting questions:

what is the nature of global connectivity and how does the historian utilize the global

information network as a source? For example, on the one hand the historian can know

that millions watch television and are affected by it, but on the other hand the responses

of the masses to its imagery are more or less without sources. Kurlanksy solves this

problem through emphasizing narration. In effect, Kurlansky de-emphasizes textual

source analysis and emphasizes narration in order to build the connectivity that television

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creates. Ultimately these are question left to the historian and the purposes of his

argument, but it does raise an important question of how to utilize sources in relation to

narration and theory.

The importance of the historiography of the Prague Spring is how it represents the

shift in thought toward the global. I think most interesting aspect of the historiography

of the Prague Spring is that throughout the debates no one lost, rather the parameters of

the debate changed. It creates for the contemporary historian a multitude of perspectives

that is well summarized by a cliché phrase prevalent in my culture: “think locally not

globally.” It is a statement that seeks not to discount the interconnectivity of the global

community, but rather to place the emphasis on the local story within the global story.

This emphasis maintains the strength of the sources and then seeks to connect them

theoretically out, rather than the other way around. This understanding makes the Prague

Spring one event in the long list of events in 1968 that is significant both for its

uniqueness and local origins but also for its important repercussions in global world. It

creates for the historian a dance between the local sources and the global paradigm.

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