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The Clash of Civilisations by Samuel P. Huntington -- From our Summer 1993 Issue

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The Clash of Civilizations?By Samuel P. Huntington From our Summer 1993 Issue

To celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the publication of “The Clash of Civilizations?,” we have compiled a new eBook collection featuring a broad range of Foreign Affairs content. The eBook includes Samuel Huntington's original article and the praise and criticism inspired in its wake, plus a new introduction by Editor Gideon Rose. Find out more.

THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be-the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes-emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western

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phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS

During the cold war the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.

Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH

Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

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First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good'' European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be ... an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

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Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America.

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China).... From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network-often based on extensions of the traditional clans-has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy.

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960s by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

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As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro- level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history-feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early

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twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.

After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:

We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations-the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.

Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox

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Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. This concern is well captured by Archie Roosevelt:

Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between the Slavs and the Turkic peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.‹

The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia, China has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and America.

The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at least on the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.

The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly predominates between the American and European subcivilizations of the West and between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are

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once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.

CIVILIZATION RALLYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME

Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen gradually emerging in the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilizational rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future.

First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only a few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he was highly popular among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than the Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal. He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq," as Safar Al-Hawali, dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, put it in a widely circulated tape. "It is the West against Islam." Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for a holy war against the West: "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and policies will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr." "This is a war," King Hussein of Jordan argued, "against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone."

The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics behind Saddam Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper their public statements. Arab governments opposed or distanced themselves from subsequent Western efforts to apply pressure on Iraq, including enforcement of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992 and the bombing of Iraq in January 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti-Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only the West and Kuwait against Iraq.

Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged, was using a double standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.

Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 stimulated Turkey to become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should show Armenia that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut Özal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Özal threatened again in 1993, would "show its fangs." Turkish Air Force jets

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flew reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended food shipments and air flights to Armenia; and Turkey and Iran announced they would not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its existence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to religious ones. Russian troops fought on the side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accused the "Russian government of turning 180 degrees" toward support for Christian Armenia.

Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup, Germany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other 11 members of the European Community to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the pope's determination to provide strong backing to the two Catholic countries, the Vatican extended recognition even before the Community did. The United States followed the European lead. Thus the leading actors in Western civilization rallied behind their coreligionists. Subsequently Croatia was reported to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central European and other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin's government, on the other hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox Serbs but not alienate Russia from the West. Russian conservative and nationalist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993 several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia.

Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, Iran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians. By the end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-à-vis the Serbs.

In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from countries that politically were fascist, communist and democratic. In the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."

Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all

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the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.

Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potent means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

The west is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates international political and security institutions and with Japan international economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other to the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries. Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.› Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Western peoples, the IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."

Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the West's use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. After defeating the largest Arab army, the West did not hesitate to throw its weight around in the Arab world. The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.

That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and there is a significant element of truth in their view. Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations.

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Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul has argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men." At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be a "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Indeed, the author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values in different societies concluded that "the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide." In the political realm, of course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights. Modern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed in non-Western societies it has usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition.

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. The costs of this course, however, are high, and few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.

THE TORN COUNTRIES

In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Attatürk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey will not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Özal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of

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Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.

During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat similar to that of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted to join Europe, Mexico has stopped defining itself by its opposition to the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the United States and to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are engaged in the great task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fundamental economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari described at length to me all the changes the Salinas government was making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most impressive. It seems to me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country." He looked at me with surprise and exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely what we are trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly." As his remark indicates, in Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam (Özal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's North American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara summit).

Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country. For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country. Globally the most important torn country is Russia. The question of whether Russia is part of the West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted it to Russian conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dominance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited Russians once again face that question.

President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking to make Russia a "normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the Russian elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. Among the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich argues that Russia should reject the "Atlanticist" course, which would lead it "to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While also rejecting an exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless argues that Russia should give priority to the protection of Russians in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote "an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinating Russia's interests to those of the West, for reducing Russian military strength, for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian people. Indicative of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian civilization.‡ More extreme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and urge Russia to redevelop its military strength and to establish closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia are as divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European Russia in the spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive attitudes toward the West and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly a torn country.

To redefine its civilization identity, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political

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and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be willing to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could again become distant and conflictual.

THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION

The obstacles to non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. Those countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, join the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and political power. They do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.

Almost without exception, Western countries are reducing their military power; under Yeltsin's leadership so also is Russia. China, North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are significantly expanding their military capabilities. They are doing this by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources and by the development of indigenous arms industries. One result is the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon States," and the Weapon States are not Western states. Another result is the redefinition of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal. During the Cold War the primary purpose of arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do this through international agreements, economic pressure and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West.

The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They also have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf War:

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"Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power. China, of course, already has nuclear weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability to deploy them. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attempting to acquire them. A top Iranian official has declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the president of Iran reportedly issued a directive calling for development of "offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."

Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed forces. It is purchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested a one-megaton nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities, acquiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft carrier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea are provoking a multilateral regional arms race in East Asia. China is also a major exporter of arms and weapons technology. It has exported materials to Libya and Iraq that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production. China has sold to Iran nuclear technology that American officials believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has shipped components of 300-mile-range missiles to Pakistan. North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology to Syria and Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from East Asia to the Middle East. There is, however, some movement in the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from Pakistan.

A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West. It may or may not last. At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual support pact, run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. In an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to

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global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like. If these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.

In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.

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ON THIS TOPIC

Essay, May/June 2008The Age of NonpolarityRichard N. HaassDownload The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a ...Read

Essay, Oct 1968World Order and American ResponsibilityCharles W. YostOne lesson of the last fifteen years, most conspicuous in the Viet Nam war, is that the capacity of even the strongest power to intervene effectively in other states has been eroded by time, space and history. Apparently the only state a great power can still attack with impunity is one of its ...Read

Essay, Jul 1972A WORLD RESTORED?Alastair BuchanIn the issue of Time of January 3, 1972, President Nixon is quoted as follows: "We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace is when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to ...

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http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/alastair-buchan

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24352/alastair-buchan/a-world-restored

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24008/charles-w-yost/world-order-and-american-responsibility

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/charles-w-yost



http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/richard-n-haass




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class="post-byline" Amarjyoti A. (Aug. 8, 2009) • 5 years ago

This looks like an old article by Prof. Huntington that also is from his seminal book - The Clash of Civilizations.Ignorance and bitter memories via identifications and identity-politics spring as immediate factors here. In brief: What is politics? What is religion? What do they mean by themselves and what is/are their end-objective(s) or goal(s)? Once that can be adequately answered, much of the answers are completed. I have written something that is related to the topic at hand and is found at www.johnlately.webs.com where it leads to the Freedom Network blog. Interested readers may read them. One however does feel that getting our semantics correctly (across the spectrum) over the terms that one uses and in their meanings (primarily by the actors themselves) in such contexts make for better sense, even as it lends to a better comprehension of differences. As one would find out - the answers are self-explanatory in many senses, while educating the rest of the world about and over the 'world' at play here!May we all get educated soon enough by the actors here - and thus move away from a topic that catches our attentions so in nervousness!

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class="post-byline" bremont • 9 months ago

The clash of civilizations.

American's the ones that believe they are part of western civilisation, they are NOT "Samuel

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Huntington included" they have being around from 1776, a somewhat short period of time so they Obama and the rest of the American government, do not really understand the western mind that created them, this is one of the reason why Washington behaves the way it does, kind of incivilities are common; and it is normal, western civilization has being around for more than 2000 years. in Europe Not America or New York!! 1776, is just a wink away. and 1840, is also not far away from today. education in fact is lacking most Americans do not even know were they came from and how they got there. the planet only hopes is the education and manners, civility and class of the American minds; it is indeed a clash of civilisations and is between the newly American 1766, civilisation and western European culture that is generating this clash's, something that Samuel Huntington quietly did not mention. and most of his media manipulations have no foundation of actual knowledge of the truth. The lack of capacity to fully understand the civilization that engender him, Mr: Samuel Huntington's is the logic of his writing's, nothing more than media manipulation.

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class="post-byline" Scott bremont • 5 months ago

1776 was a short time ago, but look at the changes since then. Do you perhaps believe that Rouse himself conceptualized the rights of man? This is a document that Europe hangs it's hat on as a guiding document of liberty. I would suggest the those who are interested read the Virginia declaration written mostly by George Mason with input by both Jefferson and Washington. I find it of interest that a document written 20 years prior to the rights of man has so must in common. We are America. some of us are educated and rude and some are just rude, but were are a diverse group. You suggest that we look to where we come from. We have reviewed our past. We are the unwashed and unwanted. We are the thieves and debtors that were cast from an old world to take our chances in a new. We were always the undesirables so why complain about us now. We are the west. We are the accumulation of every culture on the globe. East does not meet west in Istanbul, they meet at time square on a hotdog with sauerkraut. I have to say I agree with your stance on Huntington, what he knows of geography he lacks in history.

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class="post-byline" Correcto Rightington • a year ago

'Culture' & 'civilization' are vague, tenuous terms without enough for any individual to get a handle on, never mind manipulate. Knowing that much, the above read was a cute as hell.

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class="post-byline" Abu Billah • 5 months ago

American diplomacy and its imperialistic nature is now completely based on the principles of The Clash of Civilization. The first major breakthrough was made by the Americans was the creation of Taliban in Afghanistan and labeling a new form of Islamic rule there, banning education for women and forbidding them from jobs. The second step was to form Free Syrian Army to fight against Bashar Al-Asad using the the most tactical Shia and Sunni images. The Islamic state is another group originated by the help of Saudi Arabia and America. This is because initially they got encouraging support from them. Since the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq America has been arguing for an inclusive government in Iraq letting the ISIS capture a vast region of Iraq. Here is also using the Shia and Sunni as well as Kurdish issues. America and Israel are trying to make the Kurdish leader agree for an Independent Kurdish state. When Baghdad is trying to form an inclusive government in Iraq America is trying to supply weapons directly to Kurdistan to fight the ISIS bypassing the central government in Iraq. This is not a good attempt, I think. There might have an intention of making a powerful Kurdistan who will be able to go ahead with the process of Independence. Now America is in very good position to play her bargaining cards making an excuse of ISIS. This is the most dangerous time for the Middle East that it is facing at one way Egypt and Arabs appeared to be pets to America and Israel and on the other hand situation in Syria and Iraq is out of control for the lover of the Palestinians. Therefore, my humble request for the Egyptians and the Arabs to come forward breaking

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your contagious sleep; and stand against your stupid rulers and make them understand what to be done today for the safety of Palestine and the people of the world.

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class="post-byline" Scott Abu Billah • 5 months ago

Mr. Billah, I can say that some of your facts are accurate but to a very small degree. The American government did support the fight against Russia in Afghanistan with weapons, money and training. It was the Afghanistan's that allowed the Taliban into their dwellings and corrupted their culture. I can not comprehend how American assisted in any way the creation of an Islamic state pan Syria/Iraq. I personally would love to see an independent Kurdish state. The kurds have been at the end of the whip by Iraq Turkey and Syria for decades. I would love the peoples of Iraq and Syria to find a path to self determination and enjoy freedom of choice that existed during the time of Hammurabi though not quite under that type of doctorial form. There is nothing in the region America wants or needs. We do not want the restrictive dominate religion of the area. We do not want the cultural tendencies of lies and agreements broken by the wind. You blame us for Palestine yet it was Jordan that murdered 5000 woman and children refugees. If you state fact, state all of the facts. America has many faults. Honduras, Giana, Vietnam, the Shaw in Iran, Panama, All of these were mistakes in decision making, but they happened. These efforts were seen as Cold War initiatives to keep communism at bay. They could and should have been handled with more care and forethought. On the other side the computer you type on and the cellular phone you use today originated from the very same American Cold War initiatives. In America we do not care if you are Shia, Sunni, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, or Christian. Americans care about the freedom to choose ones own destiny. All choice comes with consequence. We are experiencing the ramifications of government choices made 30 to 50 years ago. Those of an ancient land have a choice today, carry on and lose your freedoms or confront those of extreme Islamic practices. My best wishes to you and may all your decisions bring you peace, contentment and an active mind.

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class="post-byline" Abu Billah Scott • 5 months ago

Dear Mr. Scott. I just simply say that we are not against America but American policy. You said that "you love to see an independent Kurdish state. The kurds have been at the end of the whip by Iraq Turkey and Syria for decades". Then you should also have to show similar sympathy to the people of Palestine. As they are also trying to achieve their freedom; as well as get freed their land from Israeli occupation. You are doing a mistake. Taleban was not created to defeat the Russian troops in Afghanistan but it was the Mujahedin who fought against the Communist forces. Finally they were able to establish an inclusive state with a fair election and Burhanuddin Rabbani was the president. As Rabbani government was acting as yes-man to America Taleban was created initially in Pakistan and then entered Afghanistan and overthrown the Rabbani government they also Killed 40 Iranian people in Qandahar including Iranian diplomats. America was behind the scene everybody know this. But what was the next; America invaded Afghanistan with all of its mighty to overthrow the Taleban and brought back to power one of its pets Hamid Karzai. The further development you know. America now help the 21 century Pharaoh of Egypt Mr SISI on a very fragile demand by the Egyptians but it is silent when the people of Egypt nowadays chanting slogan against the present military dictator. I would also like to remind of you how American help Reza Shah to kill more than hundred thousand Iranian and injured 200 hundred thousand. In the case of our liberation war in 1971 America helped Pakistani Military ruler against our democratic right and independence. I do not to make you bored by putting more references. Just what is going on now is not a successful diplomacy; it is a crime against humanity. The quicker the Americans learn this good for the world peace.

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Mr. BillahI agree that American policy requires intense study and reengineering. American foreign policy has leaned to either the neoconservative right or the neoliberal left. I would like to see a more centered approach. I find no fault in your history of Afghanistan until you relate upon the Taliban. It is a simple fact that Pakistan is behind the creation of the Taliban. The American CIA ran out of money for it's support of the Mujahedin and the Pakistani ISS created, and was the soul supporter, of the organization. As the ISS ran out of money tosupport the Taliban, Afghan farmers were forced to plan poppies to support heroin production. Americans in general have a short attention span. In 1996 the United States was focused on the Olympics and the bombing that happenedthere. Afghanistan was outside of our global mindset at the time Rabbani was ousted. We did assist the Shah to power just as we did with Hussein in Iraq, Noriega in Panama, Robertson in Giana and probably a few more that I am unaware of. We do poorly in assisting the rebuilding of governments because a majority of Americans lack an understanding in human geography. The ideal wesought, to enable more democratic governments globally is a good ideal. The methods we used were poorly conceived. A Jewish state in Israel is the very reason religion and politics do not mix. Christian teaching informs that Israel was the home of the Jews for thousands of years. So of course we and the British agreed that it would make a fine home for Jews displaced by Russia and Germany. It was also the home of the People of the Sea, the Palatines for thousands of years. Both entities are covered in blame for the current circumstance. Both were refugees during the time of Jewish settlement and both had their hearts set on the same soil. Iwould take my queue from an ancient king of the area Solomon and split Israel down the middle. Whoever throws a stone at the other side gets shot. Quite frankly I am tired of the entire conflict. Thank you for the discussion! Please include as many references as you think necessary to establish your point of view. We are all bias in our perspectives. Ibn Khaldūn ,” found that to understand the nature and causes of historical events, it is necessary to have correct information; but to be able to distinguish correct information from false it is necessary to know the natureand causes of these events. I enjoy our discourse and think that perhaps we will both discover that the truth lies somewhere between us.

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class="post-byline" Abu Billah Scott • 5 months ago

Dear Mr. ScottYou have correctly referred to Ibn Khaldūn ,” found that to understand the nature and causes of historical events, it is necessary to have correct information; but to be able to distinguish correct information from false it is necessary to know the nature and causes of these events". I fully agree with Ibn khaldun. Nevertheless, there is no point with this type of references if we do not mean it. It is time for the Americans to have a self-criticism and realise whatever they are doing either for their own interest or to help set a pet ruler in the third world countries. They should understand that the people of the contemporary world, especially in this digital world with its all sorts of development in media and information technology, envisage the factual reality and the actions have been taking by the Americans and the other European states. The scope of undermining or duplicating the fact is diminishing day by day. The military or economic monopoly will not a matter of perpetual phenomena. We might see America a weaker state by next 30 to 50 years. Uprising as well as awakening of people might take a difference shape and style after half a century from now. So it is time for all conscience people of the world to think in a rational way with wistfully intelligence and perform to resolve the crisis accordingly. Creating kangaroo or puppet government or supporting or creating a terrorist organisation to order to face another terror is not a solution of the cause. It will create further problem and one day we have to pay for this. WE are at the tip of the iceberg. Taleban, ISIS, FSA, BOKO HARAM, all are the example of these crises. Israel is another and the most dangerous element to create problem against humanity.

I agree that the Jews lived hundreds years in the land of

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Palestine. But I would like to remind you of the fact that they had been migrated from Egypt. Therefore, the actual living place of the Israelite [Bani Israel - as appeared in the Quran] was Egypt. So I think you will be agree that they cannot claim that the Chesham region of Nile delta is Israeli land.

We have study the meaning and effect of historical migration of human being throughout the world and the events of transmigration and the construction and deconstruction of human civilizations. The Aryans one day came to India passing the Khyber Pass and they got permanent settlement here in the subcontinent. I do not think that they claim the Pamir height as their homeland as they were migrated from there. Your American history shows another good example of developing a nation with the influx of the migration from deference places as well as countries in the world. But the original citizen of the land the red Indians lost their country.

AS you referred to Ibn Khaldun - but to be able to distinguish correct information from false it is necessary to know the nature and causes of these events - I would like to mention that what was the cause of the Jews migration from Germany and Soviet Union? It was atrocities and genocide by Hitler during the Second World War. Then why should pay the Palestinians their blood for the cause related the Europeans - Hitler. After the post war why they did not return to their original country? Why they back to Palestine? If we consider that it was diplomacy in favour of the Jews. Then why the Americans as well as other Western powers helped Israel grab Palestinian and Arab lands making millions of Palestinians refugees? Think now Israel emerged as a monster or dinosaur but who are the backbone of it. Who has been providing all sophisticated weapons and technologies to this illegal state. I think you agree with me that people of the world nowadays understand well about the dubious character of American diplomacy. The so called slogans of weapon of mass destruction, freedom, and justice everything is clear to the people. Please have a look what is going on in post Gaddafi Libya, in post Saddam Iraq, In post Rabbani Afghanistan. It was due to American deceptive plan to destabilize the Muslim capability and to disintegrate the unity among the Muslim. All goes to Israeli benefit! The Case of Syria is the last nail on the coffin. If American plan become successful then Israel will be safe for at least next 50 years. As the same fate is awaiting for the Syrian as it is going on in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya ...All these have been happening due to American negligence to support powerful armies in those countries. America even did

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not supply f 16 or other minimum weapons for the Iraqi Army. They are using the weapons imported by Saddam from Russia. It is not right place to argue such a difficult and diplomatic issue. I think for maintain the peace and tranquility in the world a well-balanced and just diplomacy we need. I hope the Americans as well as the west will understand this reality soon. As a develop country they have the responsibility. I think this makes sense.

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Mr.Billah

I again notice a well found grasp of history in your response. I though you would enjoy my reference to the historian Ibn Khaldun. If you recall he wondered extensivelyin what is today Spain. I bring your attention to Spain because it is a country that has been conquered by many civilizations yet became a world power to rivalBritton. Britton itself was invaded and conquered by both Romans and Normans. The Britons later conquered Ireland, Scotland, India, Portugal, Spain and Belgiumbefore colonizing the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. For a time, Spain, France, England, Germany and Portugal all had colonies in what is today the United States. I can think of no country that has not been invaded at somepoint in history. You are correct that the Jews were once from Egypt. They were a tribe that the Egyptians paid as mercenaries. The Egyptians invaded their lands thinking they had become too powerful and so the tribe settled in Canaan, this was some time during the Akhenaten dynasty. The Palestinians known as the

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Peleset, of the Mycenaean civilization are also of Egypt but settled along the Mediterranean in Phoenicia after being defeated by RamsesIII. The Palestinians are the ones that introduced grapes and olives to the region. In 900 B.C.E both the Hebrew and Palestinian peoples lived as neighbors.Palestine had Gaza Ashkelon and Ashdod while the Hebrew tribes had Ekron, Jerusalem, Hebron, Samaria and Nazareth. It is a history that after centuries of coexistence the Palestine attacked the Hebrew shrine of Shiloh andestablished garrisons throughout Hebrew and denied them technology and access to trade. It was not until 1025 B.C.E that the Hebrew were able drive the Palestineto their original boarders. Canaan is much like Spain in that many civilizations held claim over the centuries, Palestiniansand Jews are just two of many.

I doubt America will cease looking after its own interests. What country in the world would? Actions have been taken by all of us over the centuries. In recentpost-colonial, Egypt attempted to invade Israel, Iraq and Iran have been at odds, Kurdistan and Turkey are constantly firing shots across the border. America has not been the protagonist in any of these conflicts. The Taliban,ISIS, FSA and BOKO HARAM have not been contrived by America. This is a revolting and false notion. America desires nothing more than stability in the region. You state that we support these groups to promote Israel in the region.Do you not know that Saudi Arabia, Jordon and even Iran sell technology and weapons to Israel through consolidated holdings in Singapore? Why is it Iran supplies both sides? Why did Saudi Arabia fail to denounce Israel in this lastconflict? America is not alone in raising puppet states, we just get caught more because we are so bad at it.

We did indeed have a hand in Libya and Egypt, but it was not to destabilize the Muslim culture as it has. The concept was to destabilize the Soviet Union. Both the Soviets and the Americans used the Middle East countries as proxies to entangle each other’s resources. From a certain perspective it worked. The Middle Eastern countries bought more weapons and sold more

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oil to America than it didto the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could no longer hold out and so collapsed under its own pressure.

China has now replaced the U.S. in both ofthose categories. With the U.S. finding shell oil in the Dakotas, we have lessened our purchase. China has no oil reserves and so now buys the bulk of Mid-Easternoil. France by the way has out sold the U.S. in weapons to the Middle East for decades and England is responsible for drawing the current boarders in the MiddleEast. You have to remember that until WWII America was an isolationist country. We seldom got involved outside our own boarders. Until 1945 we had very littlegovernment contact with the rest of the world. We are still new and inexperienced in the field of geopolitics.

I apologize if my response seems abrasive or boorish, it has been a long day. You have given me things to think about. I never would have thought that our aim at theSoviet Union would be considered as a thrust at the Muslim culture. To me it is like saying the donkey can fly, it is such an obvious fiction that I would never think of it. It gives me great incite to your prospective and I can onlythank you for sharing it. I hope you have a peaceful day and that you find our discourse as enlightening as I do. Not so much that you believe what I say but I hope youbelieve that what I write is the truth as I see it. Again I think that the actualtruth lies between us,

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class="post-byline" disqus_Z4tjt7FeAD Scott • 3 months ago

Britain*

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class="post-byline" suzette C. (Aug. 7, 2011) • 3 years ago

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class="post-byline" Guest • 4 months ago

The use of religions is an interesting question. It was supposed that religion served to established connections of an individual with the God, who in turn gave orientations for moral choices and set goals that were good from the moral standpoint. Religion was directed inside personalities, in other words it was a spiritual matter. Now religion may work to form social identities. I.e., the good goal is already mentally chosen when religion is referenced, and the work of religion is directed outside of personalities, it is not a spiritual matter anymore. It works to establish connections among people. I don't know to what degree it is a trend, but, for example, these words were very characteristic by one of leaders of the separatist Donbass this summer (2014): "Orthodox Christianity is our weapon". Religion was used this way in prior days as well, as far as I know, but it seems that it is only now becoming forgotten that the original and natural role of religion is very different. Maybe un-secularisation that mr. Huntington mentioned is in part due to this fact?..

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class="post-byline" John Garrett Jones • 4 months ago

There has recently been a NATO summit meeting in Wales. Main items: how to react to the Islamic threat in Iraq and Syria and the Russian threat in Ukraine and the need for every NATO signatory to meet its commitment to pay 2% of GDP to NATO.It is our contention that these are matters for an empowered UN, not for one segment of the global population in opposition to other segments of the global population - which is simply tribalism writ large and a denial of our common humanity.It is not a human right to be able to wage war. In fact the war which began a century ago deprived 16 million human beings of their most basic right, the right to life. Another 21 million were wounded, many of them incapacitated for life. See http://www.garrettjones.talkta... andwww.futureworthhaving.co.uk


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class="post-byline" Scott • 5 months ago

The document that helped to steer the course of the Global War on Terror, The Clash of Civilizations demonstrates a gross failure in attempting to understand the nature and cause of events. From hypothesis to forecasting why civilizations clash, Samuel Huntington leaves holes in his argument. Failed attempts at logic in the segments detailing pattern of conflict, nature of civilization and why civilizations will clash will be addressed and exposed as meritless

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In an article titled The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington positions the hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. Huntington predicts that the divisions of humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural, and iterates that nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs. This reconfiguration of world order will eventually lead to a clash of civilizations that will dominate global politics. (Huntington,1993)

There is disagreement of Huntington’s proposal that nation states shall remain the most powerful actors in world affairs. Huntington's first failed articulation is the unexplained, well-funded global terrorists, armed with modern tanks and artillery. Terrorist organizations have forced increased spending on international domestic security. (Richelson, 2008) As Arundhati Roy points out, terrorism has no country, it’s transnational, as global an enterprise as Coke, Pepsi or Nike. (Roy, 2001) The very existence of capable terrorist organizations approximating nations state negate a primary postulation of Huntington’s hypothesis.

Explaining the nature of civilization, Huntington attempts to organize his argument. He states that first, second and third world definitions are no longer relevant in terms of political and economic development but rather culture and civilization. Edward Said, a geopolitical contemporary of Huntington, feels these concepts of ideological and economical transference to cultural and civilization as a position of conflict fits with the basic paradigm of the cold war. The Clash of Civilizations is simply a reformattingof the cold war opposition. Indeed Huntington himself provides the allusion ofa velvet curtain of culture replacing the iron curtain of ideology. In an article from The Guardian titled The Algebra of Infinite Justice, Arundhati Roy attacks the idea of ideological irrelevance as he points out that if the September 9/11 attacks were of cultural differences and American liberties, why were the targets symbolsof American economic and military might and not the statue of liberty? (Roy, 2001)

Huntington details a contemporary list of civilizations and identifies them as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, and Slavic-orthodox,. Huntington defines a civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. Nowhere in the Huntington definition of civilization are the concepts of identity bound to accepted indications of civilization. There is no mention of art, language, literature or geography. Huntington then reveals his deficiency in human geography and omits Persian as a civilization. Persia has long been considered a civilization apart from theArab and Turkic spheres and was identified by Ibn Khaldun[1] in his book titled History, Book 1 1382. As Iran and Afghanistan are Persian states that contain art, literature and science, they are still considered an independent civilization that share an Islamic culture. To group this classical civilization together with Arab and Turkic under the roof of Islam demonstrates an overwhelming misunderstanding ofMuslim culture and a bigoted form of cultural generalization.

Huntington states additional reasons for the clash that seem contradictory. Economic and social change will separate people from local identities and at the same time details a general non-western phenomena of returning to the roots of civilization. (Huntington, 1993) The fact is that a populace searching for roots will likely anneal multiple civilizations to local identities. Spain is a prime example of Huntington’sfailure to logically define this point. Said contends that civilizations “are not shut-down,

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sealed-off entities that have been purged of a myriad of currents and counter currents that animate human history” Said continues to state that history not only contain wars and imperial conquest but also exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing.” (Said, The Clash of Ignorance, 2014) In a previous work entitled Orientalism Reconsidered, Said demonstrates an unwillingness to believe that the basic differences in history, language, culture, tradition and religion Huntington proposes are true boundaries, but malleable intersections that ebb and flow through the centuries. (Said, 1985) This is a foreshadowing of Huntington’s alternative view and primary reasoning of why civilizations will clash.

Another issue leading to conflict by Huntington’s estimation is that cultural characteristics are less malleable and less easily compromised than political or economic. Stephen Walt identifies this sentiment as false. “For the past 2000 years or so, assorted empires, city-states, tribes and nation-states have repeatedly ignored cultural affinities in order to pursuit particular selfish interests.” (Walt, 1997) Again proof in the lack of understanding in human geography while contemplated the reasoning behind The Clash of Civilizations.

Last of the reasons cited for the impending clash of civilizations is economic regionalism. As Huntington has set China, Japan and India into separate civilizations then the regional agreements between China, Japan and India should not exist. China has outpaced the U.S. as Japans largest trading partner simply because profit per unit sold makes a difference when calculating transportation costs. (Srinivasa-Raghavan, 2005)

Huntington failed to explain the ability of terrorist forces to assume nation state rolls and displayed an awkward misunderstanding of ideology and economics. Huntington contradicts loss of local identity with pursuing roots of a civilization and affirms the desire for regional economics among civilizations. Huntington proclaims cultural is lessmalleable and less easily compromised than political or economics when historicaltrends prove different. In attempting to define civilization with a broad brushby grouping cultures, Huntington failed to articulate his position. Perhaps Huntington should have studies the ancient works of Ibn Khaldūn and tried to understand the nature and cause of events.

Works CitedHuntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations?Foreign Affairs.

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.(2014, 09 06). Encyclopedia.com. Retrieved from Ibn Khaldun:http://www.encyclopedia.com/to...

Richelson, J. T. (2008). The U.S. IntelligenceCommunity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Roy, A. (2001). The Algebra of Infinite Justice. TheGuardian.

Said, E. W. (1985). Orientalism Reconsidered. CulturalCratique #1, 89-107.

Said, E. W. (2014, 09 06). The Clash of Ignorance.Retrieved from The Nation:http://www.thenation.com/artic...

Srinivasa-Raghavan. (2005, 07 02). Economic

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http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=0,2

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Ibn_Khaldun.aspx#1

http://Encyclopedia.com/


regionalism: The way to go. Retrieved from rediff.com:http://www.rediff.com/money/20...

Walt, S. M. (1997). Building Up New Bogeymen. ForeignPolicy, 176-190.

[1] Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406),Khaldūn’s major contribution to the history of social thought is his newscience of culture (‘umraūn). While writing his “Introduction,” he became aware that to understand the nature and causes of historical events, it is necessary to have correctinformation; but to be able to distinguish correct information from false it is necessary to know the nature and causes of these events. (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2014)

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class="post-byline" Guest Scott • 3 months ago

As for the statue of liberty, I think it (made in France, by the way, not in the USA) serves to define the American culture only in eyes of Americans. After all, it does not drink Pepsi and it does not wear jeans, and it does not own a ranch. Freedom is not an elementary notion, and it has many faces; so, such abstract concept cannot naturally serve to define a culture. The reason why it may have become for Americans something more of a sacred word than merely a tool of life (like for Europeans) may be the troubling feeling of lack of legitimacy of their own statehood, perhaps. Anyway, these are their (i.e. your) domestic issues, so the question why the terrorists did not choose the statue of liberty if the conflict had the cultural background is not well-based. In some eyes, a might of one's economy and military is a might of one's culture; this notion is very natural to appear... Such directions of thought indeed have a lot to do with "defensive self-pride" as Mr. Said puts it, only they do exist for real and inside real people, that is why their comprehension is important, in my opinion.


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Still, you could not negate that, for example, the Ukrainian crisis is exactly a "clash of civilisations", meaning at the very least that it is neither ideological nor exactly economical, and that it was grossly alimented and made possible by cultural differences between "Russians" (for the lack of a better term and in a broad sense) and "Westerners" (in which category pro-Maidan activists would like to belong as well, though with questionable success), could you? Then, no political model, based on a set of aggregative abstractions (culture, economy, ideology, law, anything), can have predictive power, because the laws of nature govern people, not societies; since a human is a creative machine, the laws of one person's behaviour cannot scale to entire populations, still producing exact relations among all notions at work. That means that the value of such models is different: its value is to give a framework, a paradigm that helps to classify events as they are going on. Mr. Huntington did in fact acknowledge this in the foreword ("предисловие", the original name may have been different) to his 1996 book. He said that the test of his paradigm is not to see whether it explains all events in the global politics; it is to see whether it provides thinkers with a clear and useful lens, through which to look at the events in the world. This lens helps in the Ukrainian case, for example.

Then, because Mr. Huntington's model was intended to be intuitive rather than strict, he did not in fact give any definition of a civilisation; he only tried to explain what he includes in this notion. The basic feature of a civilisation, in his treatment, was that all cultural "aliens" to the group of people comprising a civilisation are such "aliens" in an absolute sense and with decision-making consequences. A certain kind of "alienship" entails that "aliens" are thought of and dealt with in qualitatively different ways than people "inside", and that no other "kinship" prevents from such treatment; for a German, an Italian is an "alien" as he lives in a different country, but a "kin" as he lives in the European Union. For an American, a German is a "kin" in certain ways, but a Chinese, however he may respect or not respect the latter person, is generally an alien. Then, all of his other definitions of a civilisation were nothing more than guesses that Mr. Huntington did without, apparently, giving them any active meaning; they were questions rather than statements. He made guesses in terms of aggregative abstractions, but since such abstractions are random and were developed for other tasks, I think it would be more wise to treat them with greater suspicion, as they are not exactly appropriate here. The real differences should lie, I think, in tiny differences of psychology, produced by being raised in societies with given culture (the set of all ideas that are available for consumption, either conscious or unconscious) and language (which also gives ideas on kinship of terms and on preferable or most natural ways of thinking about such terms). There is no one true way of thinking about the world and in the world, so it is only natural that some exact

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ways of doing this are suggested to the young person by the society rather than by nature; such differences cannot be meaningfully caught by abstractions Mr. Huntington mentioned. Nevertheless, these guesses, I think, did not diminish Mr. Huntington's main idea.

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class="post-byline" Scott Guest • 4 months ago

Hello Evgeniy

The Ukrainian issue is interesting only as it aligns along an ideological fissure between catholic and orthodox as Huntington points out in his book. I believe that current crisis is due more too economic realities and security perceptions than cultural traditions. I also am inclined to believe that there are tiers of reasoning so as culture and tradition do becomeinclusive in the conflict.

Tier 1 is the motivation of the political elite. Russia requires the farmland, infrastructure and a buffer zone that Ukraine provides. If the elite can gain access to these things with little cost and plausible deniability then the potential for gain is greater that the potential of loss. This then becomes the driving factor of the conflict and negates the civilization clash Huntington proposed.

Tier 2 is the more interesting point I think. I propose that the nature of most humans is not independent thought or action. Most, when unsure of an ethical motivation will follow traditional obligations or they simply follow others who seem surer of their actions. Some cultures have long practiced traditions and others relatively short (a hundred years or so). Newer traditions lack the ingrained social constructs developed over centuries. This disallows historical equivalents to be reflected in the actions of an individual or group. Will a mechanical devise be better assembled by one who is working from a single page pictogram or a manual of directions? Also take into account that most people live by planning a few months out, but fail to account for a generation forward. If this proposition is true then it would explain the mass of actors (revolutionaries) and also logically determine that they are the puppets of the Tier 1 elites.

So even if there are cultural divides across civilization boundaries the

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situation in the Ukraine fails to meet the loose definitions Huntington provides to support his propositions. The cause of the event is millennia old, you have what I want and I will take it ifI can. Tier 2 unknowingly enables Tier 1 in search for what they believe will be a better day and they do so without complete understanding of the foundational motivation.

Thanks for your interest in my discourse.

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Hello, Scott,

I agree with the factual content in what you say about the tiers of reasoning. However, you make the difference that the tier 1 reasoning "causes" events, and the tier 2 reasoning "makes them possible" (non-literal, but I think I get your idea), yet I think that the difference behind these verbs is only stylistical, they mean the same thing. Elites could use the intentions of the population and seek to work on the space of information surrounding the people so that some intentions be more probable than other intentions, but only individual people have enough physical power to ascertain and conduct historical events, and only individual people have enough will to take or approve a violent course of action when a conflict starts or develops. Also, the elites too get upbringing in their native countries, so they also could not avoid following the tier 2 reasoning. So, these verbs are synonims, and since the tier 2 includes more people, it is more important. You say about traditions and religions, but I think that what defines a culture is neither traditions nor religion: you could take a different claimed religion and change the political formation of your country, yet, I think, you could retain the same culture if such was your will. Since culture is about people, I'd venture the guess that culture should be defined by a set of cognitive pathways that people commonly choose to follow; these pathways don't have to do anything with traditions, though of course the traditions are a result of this choice as well.

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Concerning Mr. Huntington's idea in relation to Ukraine, I would first say that I saw actually two conflicts rather than one conflict (I totally discontinued following the events about a week ago, so I may miss something now). One conflict involves a military part; it is the conflict in Ukraine. The other conflict does not (and, I hope, never will): it is the conflict between Russia and the West (which some American commentators insist on calling for some reason "the entire world", though this is a different story). The two conflicts, of course, have connections, though they have no meaningful and simple connection. Now, Mr. Huntington's main idea hardly can be directly applied to the internal conflict: cultural distinctions inside Ukraine exist, but they never seemed to be so dramatic, that is to lack any uniting part. Yet, the point of such idea is not to predict events with certainty, but to provide with means to analyse events. So, first, even though the cultural distinctions were not unilaterally prevailing over similarities, they existed: some people liked what they perceived to be European ways, other people preferred to stay away from them, and this difference was supplemented, very likely, by real differences in pathways of cognition. Whatever you may say about the Russian military involvement, the conflict started when those people decided to avoid civilised (as Americans commonly put it, "democratic") ways of reaching an agreement and to turn to violence. So, even if failing to describe such events properly, Mr. Huttington's idea provides some help to understanding them: when groups of people think differently and, based on that, divide the world into aliens and kins, expect warring. Second, the idea of the Maidan side was exactly to choose the Western model of organisation of life and thought (whatever they meant by that), so, in this clash, they indeed had to represent an entire civilisation, and in this aspect Mr. Huntington's description is generally correct.

In the second conflict, Mr. Huntington's idea explains why the sanctions, imposed on Russia, did not have any peacifying effect. Hardly Americans thought that an average Russian would understand intricacies of economic development; rather, their idea may have been that Russians might understand the moral message and voice it (or threaten to voice it) on the political scene. However, three factors played a role: 1) difference of cultures: people of the two nations, following different cognitive pathways, speak different languages, and I don't just mean English and Russian; so, count mutual lack of understanding; 2) since people got used to such cultural differences, they expected and preferred to receive moral messages from "kins" rather than from "aliens"; 3) since the Soviet-style closedness is long gone, mistrust has developed to Americans (there is no contradiction here). People seldom analyse themselves, so much of what was said in response to the sanctions is irrational; yet I'd try to dig out the rational core. People feel (I think) that, like a Queen shall not judge another Queen, one nation shall not judge another nation, and the discussions shall centre on practical issues. Hard to tell whether this idea

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undermines the concept of the United Nations; anyway, it worked in 2003, when nobody judged the US. Americans seem to employ a different kind of thinking, namely that nations judge other nations based on reactions that are put forward by the Western civilisation (simply speaking, the West); different nations appear to follow different kinds of thinking, and this is exactly the idea behing the question why civilisation might clash, a mechanism behingd it that needs to be taken into account.

This is my thinking. I hope it makes sense to you.

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class="post-byline" Scott Guest • 4 months ago

Evgeniy

You have more faith in people than I. I do not believe thatthe will of the populace dissuades the ruling elite from initiating actions ontheir behalf. I think that the majority of the populace wishnothing more than to follow. The populace in general do not educate themselvesabout the concern of the elites until their lives become affected. The elites (having the power of the purse) areable to broadcast their desires to the masses while the average citizen inhalesthe ideals as though they are fresh mountain air. I have to consider your perspectivein more detail in order to draft a reply that your correspondence deserves. From my initial reading, I think that perhaps yougive more credit to the people than I or perhaps I am more jaded than you. Iwill attempt a proper response this weekend if my studies allow. Thank you foryour continued discourse on the subject.

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Scott


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Hello Scott,

I think that my argument is based not really on more faith in people's goodwill and their ability to choose well-based actions (though indeed I don't believe in some natural desire to obey as a first principle driving all actions of many people), but instead on lack of faith in channels of communication among people. Even if the elites really wanted it and had all means possible that could be bought or gained for this use (use of mass media, consultation of psychologists, reputation of being the right rulers, and so on), they would not be able to transmit information in shape that conserves well enough to direct people's actions and thoughts in ways that are well defined.

There is even more than lack of communication to this question: there is also lack of will. I believe that the notion that our actions are described by complete schemes and are directed by free will is false. This notion arises because of an illusion of perception: such thoughts that have practical effects should be decided at will, or rather at what we perceive as will, but we tend to notice only such thoughts and actions that have practical effects and not pay attention to the rest. We force the practical thoughts to follow some schemes that we take as established means of thinking, but in reality our ideas don't have to follow them, and they don't when we don't succeed in forcing them to follow those schemes or when we don't even try to force them. So, that has two effects: first, the space of what can be tweaked in someone's mind is much bigger than ability of words and pictures to transmit information, i.e. this

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lack of will undermines the channels of communication even more; second, elites too, like all regular people, don't have to know why they do this and not do that, these choices are also influenced by their personal histories, i.e. by the local culture.

For example, someone may call the same person who does the same things a scoundrel in one mood, but a hero in another mood; even if both moods are accessible to the same person, which, because of some details of his personal history, may be not the case, he, while being in one mood, may not be even aware that so many other moods are possible, whatever he watches on the TV or gets from Internet. These mass media are just one part to his personal history, there are many more parts, but whatever influences his behaviour, the end result is usually not rational. After all, why does it have to be rational, if the backbone machine behind all thoughts and moods, the neural system, should base its work on using experience rather than reason.

People make choices because of their own inner causes; images and perceptions of powerful personalities may take part in their inner pictures of the world, but I don't think that this part is crucial for everything. Wrong leaders are deposed by populations, or even not ever passed into leadership at all. It may be noticed in life that it is nearly impossible to convince anyone of anything using words; people change their opinions mainly by themselves, if these opinions concern something that matters. If the opinions do not concern something that matters, then, of course, people may sincerely repeat opinions of those that they trust, but one would not put much weight in what does not matter anyway.

I am afraid the resulted text is too obscure for reading, but I leave it here...

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class="post-byline" jmurphy • 5 months ago

I wanted to look at this because of the 2 op-eds in the NYT today by John McCain (let's go right to war with ISIS) and John Kerry (let's build a coalition to defeat terror because it worked so well in Iraq).

I wanted to go to one of the sources of this current moment, to see the best expression of this view that conflict between the West and Islam will define this century.

Wow, all I can say is, I see how we got here. First, I agree with an earlier post that the terms culture and civilization are vague and ill-defined. But let's accept that when he says the West or Islamic civilization the terms have some positive sense. His thesis then, is that it is opposition between civilizations that will define conflict. Let's test the model's predictive power:

"If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians."

This is not a trivial point. He is trying to identify causal factors. What do we do with a model that is so spectacularly wrong?


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class="post-byline" Fred B. jmurphy • 5 months ago

His analysis does not take into account that Ukraine is split down the middle, with the eastern half largely Russian and Orthodox, the western half largely Catholic and much more western. Ukraine is currently caught in the middle of a tug-of-war between Russia and NATO. Brzezinski's Grand Chessboard helps fill in the details

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when he identifies Ukraine as a critical pivot point of geostrategic importance. Clash of civilizations is an important factor, but not the only factor.


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class="post-byline" jmurphy Fred B. • 5 months ago

In fact it does: "The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine...." I think the problem is rather his argument tries to identify causal factors based on unsupported generalizations about "the West."


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class="post-byline" Scott Fred B. • 5 months ago

he does reference the religious split under THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS. This was written in 93 and should be read along with The Clash of Ignorance by Edward Said.

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class="post-byline" eurodatum .. (Sep. 19, 2009) • 5 years ago

In this sense, it is absolutely necessary that the EU straucture is reformed. This is why the Lisbon Treaty is so necessary (it will provide the EU with a single and -more or less- sound foreign affairs policy and a number Kissinger can call to).

www.eurodatum.com


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class="post-byline" eurodatum .. (Sep. 19, 2009) • 5 years ago

What should the role of Europe be? EU's values and experience should be enough to be able to build bridges amongst civilisations.

Spanish Prime Minister's initiative to launch an Alliance of Civilisations constitutes a good example, and has been backed by the UN. However, internal tensions within the EU (growing islamic population + economic crisis) are putting these efforts at risk.

The EU should in any case play a key role to avoid any clash, although during the Bush era it was unable to take any leadership.

www.eurodatum.com

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