the civil war ends, 1865

8/9/2019 The Civil War Ends, 1865

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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The


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CMH Pub 75–17

Cover: The Grand Review, by Frank Wright (Frank Wright)


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by Mark L. Bradley

Center o Military History United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

The


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Introduction

Although over one hundred fify years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-tive because o the significant issues involved: the existence o the

Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation. Tewar remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with oversix hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-year struggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conflict were sownin the earliest days o the republic’s ounding, primarily over theexistence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in the

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “hal slaveand hal ree,” and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, thesoldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passions

and emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates’ rights, or even justiying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were “worth” three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the proes-sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in thefight because o their comrades and because they do not want to

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andminié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Conederacy,


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the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Conederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. SEWAR, PH.D.Chie o Military History


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The Civil War Ends1865

Te year 1864 ended triumphantly or the Union armieso the Western Teater. On 16 December, Maj. Gen. George H.Tomas’ Army o the Cumberland routed Conederate GeneralJohn Bell Hood’s Army o ennessee at Nashville, ennessee.Five days later, Maj. Gen. William . Sherman’s army groupconcluded the “March to the Sea” by capturing Savannah, Georgia.In contrast, the Union war effort in the east appeared less thanimpressive. On Christmas Day, a Federal joint expeditionary orce

ailed to capture Fort Fisher, a massive earthen ort that guardedWilmington, North Carolina, the Conederacy’s last open seaport.In Virginia, the armies led by Union General in Chie Lt. Gen.Ulysses S. Grant and his Conederate adversary, General RobertE. Lee, remained deadlocked around Richmond—the capital othe Conederacy—and Petersburg. Despite the apparent stalematein the east, Grant and Sherman, the senior Union general in theWest, were confident that their strategy to deeat the Conederacy

was working. While Grant’s Army o the Potomac and Army othe James kept Lee’s Army o Northern Virginia pinned down inits ortifications, Sherman had torn a swath o devastation acrossGeorgia rom Atlanta to Savannah, and Tomas had crushed theConederacy’s second-largest field army.

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Te Union military strategy or ending the war in 1865remained much as it had been the previous year, with Grantseeking to annihilate Lee’s army and Sherman destroying theConederacy’s ability to wage war. With Hood’s army virtu-ally eliminated, Tomas’ orces would be available or combatoperations in Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina, includingar-reaching cavalry raids designed to wreck Conederate warresources that had thus ar managed to escape “the hard hand owar.” Te intent o the raids was not only to deprive the ConederateArmy o precious resources, but also to ensure that Southern guer-rillas would be unable to mount an effective resistance ollowingthe collapse o the Conederacy.

Many people mistakenly believe that the American CivilWar ended when Lee’s army evacuated Richmond and Petersburgafer a long siege and surrendered to Grant at Appomattox CourtHouse, Virginia, on 9 April 1865. Although the capitulation othe South’s premier field army oreshadowed the Conederacy’sultimate demise, important operations took place concurrent withthe struggle between Grant and Lee—operations which continuedinto May 1865. Tis brochure examines some o these events. Te

first hal deals with the most important operation aside rom thePetersburg-Appomattox Campaign in driving the Conederacy toits knees, the conquest o the Carolinas by General Sherman. Terest o the brochure describes how Federal commanders across theSouth compelled the Conederacy’s remaining organized militaryorces to lay down their arms in the spring o 1865.

Strategic Setting

Having concluded his March to the Sea by presenting the cityo Savannah to President Abraham Lincoln as a Christmas gif,Sherman considered his next step. He contemplated advancingnorthward through the Carolinas to Richmond, but General Granthad other plans or Sherman’s army. For the past eight months,the orces under Grant’s immediate command had ailed to deeat

Lee’s army. Believing that Sherman’s veteran soldiers would tipthe balance in his avor, Grant directed that they board ships atSavannah and sail to Virginia as soon as possible.

Sherman objected to Grant’s plan, arguing that his army onthe march would cut Lee’s supply lines to the Deep South and cause


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thousands o Conederatetroops rom that region todesert. He also noted that a longocean voyage would damagethe morale and conditioningo his men. In the end, Grantgave his approval only aferhe learned that the transer oSherman’s army by sea wouldtake at least two months,about the time required tomarch that distance. Sherman

received Grant’s revised orderson Christmas Eve and sent animmediate reply to the generalin chie. “I eel no doubtwhatever as to our utureplans,” he assured Grant. “Ihave thought them over solong and well that they appear

as clear as daylight.”As he had done on the March to the Sea, Sherman would

divide his army group into two wings. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard’sArmy o the ennessee was the Right Wing, while Maj. Gen. HenryW. Slocum’s Army o Georgia was the Lef Wing. Sherman’s armygroup consisted o our inantry corps and one cavalry division:Maj. Gen. John A. Logan’s XV Corps and Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair’sXVII Corps in Howard’s wing, Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’ XIV

Corps and Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams’ XX Corps in Slocum’swing, and Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick’s Tird Cavalry Division.At the start o the Carolinas campaign, Sherman’s army

group numbered 60,079 officers and enlisted men. Most o thesoldiers were veteran volunteers who had enlisted during thefirst two years o the war and then reenlisted afer their two- andthree-year terms had expired. Tese battle-toughened veteranswere the survivors o what one soldier described as “a rigorous

weeding-out process” effected by rebel bullets, hardship, anddisease. Moreover, prior to both the Savannah and the Carolinascampaigns, Sherman ordered the Medical Department toexamine all soldiers with health problems and ship out thosedeemed unfit or battle. As a result, the army group that Sherman

General Sherman (Library of Congress)


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led into South Carolina was a seasoned fighting orce that in theclosing months o the war had no equal.

Sherman based his campaign plan on the use o deceptionto keep the Conederates divided. He would begin the drive byeinting toward Augusta, Georgia, and its gunpowder works to thewest, and toward Charleston, South Carolina—the so-called Cradleo Secession—to the east. Tis would compel the Conederates tosplit their orces to deend the two important towns. Shermanwould then advance via Columbia, the capital o the PalmettoState, to Wilmington, North Carolina, or some other point on thecoast. At that time, he would rest and resupply his army beoreresuming the march to Raleigh, the North Carolina state capital,

in early spring. “Te game is then up with Lee,” Sherman wrote,“unless he comes out o Richmond, avoids you and fights me, inwhich case I should reckon on your being on his heels.”

On 2 January 1865, Sherman instructed Howard andSlocum to advance their orces into South Carolina. In mid-January, Howard’s wing established a lodgment at Pocotaligo,South Carolina, while Slocum’s wing and Kilpatrick’s cavalrybegan traversing the Savannah River at Sister’s Ferry, Georgia.

Beore Slocum could finish crossing, heavy winter rains carriedoff a portion o the Army o Georgia’s pontoon bridge and trans-ormed the roads into quagmires. Te flooding o the SavannahRiver compelled Sherman to postpone his campaign or almosta month.

While Sherman waited or the floodwater to subside, FortFisher ell to a second Federal expeditionary orce on 15 January1865, thereby closing Wilmington, the Conederacy’s last major

blockade-running port. Grant was doubly pleased with the result,knowing that Sherman had selected the city as a potential target.As the Union general in chie studied his map o North Carolina,he ound an even more advantageous objective rom Sherman’sstandpoint: the town o Goldsboro. Located about 450 milesnorth o Savannah, it was the inland junction o two coastal rail-roads—the Atlantic and North Carolina and the Wilmington andWeldon—providing rail connections with both Wilmington and

Morehead City. Goldsboro thus made an excellent location orSherman to resupply his army group.Grant thereore directed General Tomas at Nashville to transer

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield’s XXIII Corps to North Carolina, whereit would combine with Maj. Gen. Alred H. erry’s Provisional Corps,


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which had captured Fort Fisher. As commander o the newly rees-tablished Department o North Carolina, Schofield was to advanceon Goldsboro—either rom Wilmington, once it had allen, or romUnion-held New Bern—and secure the rail junction or Sherman.When he received Grant’s letter explaining these dispositions,Sherman designated Goldsboro as his ultimate destination.

Beore starting the march north, Sherman stripped his armygroup down to fighting trim. He reduced the number o wagons to2,500 and the ambulances to 600, and while the ordnance trainscarried an ample supply o ammunition, the commissary wagonshauled just seven days’ orage and twenty days’ provisions. As onthe March to the Sea, the Federals would have to live off the land,

relying on oragers, or “bummers,” to eed the army. Sherman alsoheld the number o cannons to sixty-eight, or roughly one gun perthousand men.

Opposing the Federal invasion o South Carolina was amotley array o Conederate orces led by General Pierre G. .Beauregard, the commander o the Military Division o the West.Te Conederate commander claimed to have 33,450 troops, but hebased this number on reinorcements he expected to receive as well

as soldiers on hand. Te actual number o officers and men presentamounted to about hal o Beauregard’s inflated estimate. Ratherthan risk his heavily outnumbered command by offering battle toSherman at the start o the campaign, Beauregard chose to holdCharleston and Augusta “or as long as it was humanly possible” inorder to negotiate rom a position o strength. Te “pending nego-tiations or peace” on which Beauregard based his strategy provedto be the Hampton Roads Conerence. Held on 3 February 1865,

the conerence at Hampton Roads, Virginia, between PresidentLincoln and Conederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephenswas amicable but ailed to end the war. Beauregard’s decision todivide his orces thus played into Sherman’s hands, or it enabledthe Federals to march virtually unopposed through the interior othe Palmetto State ( Map 1).

As Sherman’s army group entered South Carolina, the scat-tered Conederates attempted to unite and give battle. Following its

crushing deeat in the Battle o Nashville, the Army o ennesseehad fled into eastern Mississippi and made winter camp at upelo.“I not in the strict sense o the word, a disorganized mob, it was nolonger an army,” reported inspection officer Col. Alred Roman. InJanuary 1865, Conederate President Jefferson Davis had ordered


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H O WA RD

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23 MarMONROE’S

CROSSROADS10 Mar

AVERASBORO16 Mar

BENTONVILLE19–21 Mar

WILMINGTON22 Feb

FORT FISHER15 Jan

WISE’S FORKS

8–10 Mar

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A T L A N T I C

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N o r t h C a r o l i n a R R

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At la nt ic an d No r th Ca ro li na RR

Salisbury

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ChesterCheraw

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Brunswick

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Greensboro

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Clinton

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Augusta

Savannah

New Bern

RALEIGH

COLUMBIA

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Union Axis of Advance

Cavalry Axis of Advance

Battle

2 January–26 April 1865

C A R O L I N A S C A M P A I G N

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MAP 1


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Beauregard to send most o the remnant to South Carolina tooppose Sherman’s army group. Te Conederate soldiers coveredthe 500 miles rom upelo to Augusta on oot, by boat, and bytrain. Discipline was uncertain at best. Beauregard’s quarter-master, Capt. John M. Goodman, called the Army o ennessee “acomplete mob. I have never witnessed so much demoralization inmy lie. I have eared or my lie in contending with our own troopsand in the attempt to keep them in some kind o discipline.”

Operations

Sherman opened the Carolinas campaign on 1 February underless than ideal circumstances. Indeed, Beauregard had assumedthat heavy winter rains, combined with swampy terrain, wouldorce Sherman to abort the drive. General Joseph E. Johnston, wholived in Columbia at the time, later related how Lt. Gen. WilliamJ. Hardee, the Conederate commander at Charleston, had assuredhim that Sherman’s army group could never pass through theswamps bordering the Salkehatchie River in the southern part

o the state. But Hardee was mistaken. “When I learned thatSherman’s army was marching through the Salkehatchie swamps,making its own corduroy road at the rate o a dozen miles a dayor more, and bringing its artillery and wagons with it,” Johnstonadmitted, “I made up my mind that there had been no such armyin existence since the days o Julius Caesar.”

Sherman’s modern-day legions captured Columbia on 17February afer encountering only token opposition rom a small

Conederate orce. By the next morning, much o the SouthCarolina capital lay in ashes as a result o a conflagration causedby burning cotton—initially set afire by Southern cavalry—spreadby high winds and drunken Federal soldiers. In the meantime,Hardee’s command evacuated Charleston under orders romBeauregard, who realized that the all o Columbia had renderedthe port city untenable.

On 19 February, Sherman resumed his northward advance,

and Beauregard once again misjudged his adversary’s intentions.Believing that Sherman was en route to Petersburg, Virginia, viaCharlotte and Greensboro, North Carolina, Beauregard orderedHardee to board his troops on trains at Wilmington and to sendthem to Greensboro. Tere was just one problem: Schofield’s


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much larger Union orce was about to capture Wilmington. On21 February, General Braxton Bragg, the commander o theConederate Department o North Carolina, warned Hardeethat the Federals had cut the Wilmington and ManchesterRailroad, requiring a change o route to Cheraw, South Carolina.Wilmington ell to Schofield on the ollowing day, while Sherman’sarmy group abruptly shifed its advance in a more easterly direc-tion and threatened to beat Hardee to Cheraw.

By now the Conederacy’s newly appointed general in chie,General Lee, had concluded that Beauregard could not stopSherman. A subsequent message rom Beauregard outlining agrandiose scheme in which the Conederate army would deeat

Sherman and Grant separately and then “march on Washingtonto dictate a peace,” convinced both Lee and Conederate PresidentDavis that Beauregard could not come to grips with military reality.

Lee wished to replaceBeauregard with GeneralJohnston, but Davis haddismissed Johnston romcommand o the Army o

ennessee the previous July andhad since kept him in virtualretirement. Nevertheless, Leeobtained Secretary o WarJohn C. Breckinridge’s permis-sion—and by implicationDavis’ grudging consent—torestore Johnston to duty.

On 22 February, Lee wiredJohnston: “Assume commando the Army o ennessee andall troops in the Departmento South Carolina, Georgia,and Florida. Assign GeneralBeauregard to duty under you,as you may select. Concentrate

all available orces and driveback Sherman.”Like many other reugees rom Columbia, Johnston had

fled to Lincolnton, North Carolina, in late February, hoping thatSherman would bypass that backwater o the Conederacy. But

General Johnston (National Archives)


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Lee’s order thrust Johnston back into the thick o it. “It is too late toexpect me to concentrate troops capable o driving back Sherman,”Johnston replied. “Te remnant o the Army o ennessee is muchdivided. So are other troops.” He assumed command believing thatthe most the Conederacy could achieve by prolonging the warwas “air terms o peace.”

On 23 February, Johnston traveled to Charlotte to beginconcentrating his scattered orces. Afer meeting with Beauregardand appointing him second-in-command, Johnston assessed theremnants o his old Army o ennessee. As the commandinggeneral passed each brigade on review, “three cheers were givenin a joyul tone and manner expressive o great satisaction,” wrote

an Alabama soldier. “Te old general looks as usual hearty andsoldier like. He is the most soldierly looking general I have everseen. He is as well loved in this army among the men, as an officercan be. Tey have every confidence in him, and that alone willbenefit the army and the service.”

Tough Johnston was grateul or the enthusiastic welcomerom the Army o ennessee veterans, the reviews merelyconfirmed what he had suspected about his army’s condition. On

25 February, Johnston inormed Lee that his small army was “tooweak to cope with Sherman.” Altogether, the Army o ennesseecontingent, Hardee’s command, and the Conederate cavalry ledby Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton totaled ewer than 25,000 troops. Inthe words o Hampton, “it would scarcely have been possible todisperse a orce more effectually.”

While the Army o ennessee concentrated at Charlotte,Hardee’s corps evacuated Charleston and then raced Sherman’s

army group to Cheraw. According to Hardee’s chie o staff, Lt. Col.Tomas B. Roy, a “great many desertions” occurred on the marchrom Charleston, with some units being “almost disbanded bydesertion.” A South Carolinian in Hardee’s command believed that“the most influential cause o desertion was the news that reachedthe men o the great suffering o their wives and children, causedby the devastations o Sherman’s army.” On 22 February, Hardeeconsolidated his three divisions into two, having lost one-ourth

o his troops since the all o Charleston. Te attrition resultedrom straggling and desertion as well as South Carolina GovernorAndrew Magrath’s recall o several state militia units.

At first Hardee doubted that all o his command could reachCheraw ahead o Sherman. “Tis [rail]road, like all others in the


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Conederacy, is wretchedly managed,” Hardee complained on 28February. “With proper management I ought to have had every-thing here by this time. . . . A rapid march o the enemy will bringhim here tomorrow.” Hardee’s luck soon improved, however, asthe rest o his troops began arriving that afernoon, and torren-tial winter rains had finally stalled Sherman’s army group. Withthe Federals occupied or almost a week in crossing the floodedCatawba River and Lynch’s Creek, Hardee’s corps succeeded inreaching Cheraw beore the Union Right Wing.

While Sherman chaed at the delay, he learned that Johnstonwas back in command. Sherman later admitted, “I then knew thatmy special antagonist, General Jos. Johnston, was back with part

o his old army; that he would not be misled by eints and alsereports, and would somehow compel me to exercise more cautionthan I had hitherto done.” Sherman was right; Johnston would notbe as easily deceived as Beauregard had been.

On 3 March, Hardee’s corps evacuated Cheraw just ahead oHoward’s wing and marched toward Fayetteville, North Carolina.When it became apparent that Sherman would enter the Old NorthState, Lee assigned Bragg’s Conederate Department o North

Carolina troops to Johnston’s command. Bragg’s orce consistedmainly o Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke’s division—a veteran unitrom the Army o Northern Virginia—and the North CarolinaJunior Reserves brigade, whose ranks were filled with teenageboys. Johnston, meanwhile, traveled rom Charlotte to Fayettevilleto be nearer Sherman’s line o march. Encouraged by the Federals’difficult South Carolina river crossings, he planned to unite theArmy o ennessee contingent with Hardee’s corps in time to

attack a part o Sherman’s army group as it traversed the Cape FearRiver at Fayetteville. But Bragg, whose small orce had retreatedto Kinston, North Carolina, about eighty miles to the east, saw abetter opportunity on his ront and asked Johnston to send theArmy o ennessee troops to him.

THE BATTLE OF WISE’S FORKSIn early March, Schofield sent the Union XXIII Corps under

Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, about 12,000-strong, inland rom NewBern to secure Goldsboro or Sherman. But Bragg intendedto deeat Cox and prevent the junction o the XXIII Corps andSherman’s army group. Abandoning his plan o attacking Shermanat Fayetteville, Johnston granted Bragg’s request but directed him to


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send the Army o ennessee troops to Smithfield, North Carolina,as soon as possible or use against Sherman. Te troop transerled to an uneasy alliance between Bragg and Maj. Gen. Daniel H.Hill, the commander o the Army o ennessee contingent. Tetwo men had been bitter enemies since Bragg had dismissed Hilleighteen months earlier. Johnston closed his message ordering Hillto join Bragg with a plea “to orget the past or this emergency.”Hill swallowed his pride and reported to Bragg as ordered. Teaddition o the Army o ennessee contingent gave Bragg a total oabout 8,500 troops.

On 8 March, Cox’s Federals collided with Bragg’s Conederatesat Wise’s Forks, about our miles east o Kinston. At the start o

the battle, the Southerners routed a portion o the Union orce,capturing 1 cannon and 800 men. Te remainder o Cox’s troopsdug in that night, and the two sides skirmished the ollowing day.On 10 March, the Conederates renewed the offensive, but the well-entrenched Federals inflicted heavy casualties on the Southernattackers. Learning that Cox had been reinorced, Bragg withdrewto Kinston that night. Once again, the hapless Bragg had seen anapparent victory end in retreat. In the Battle o Wise’s Forks, the

Conederates sustained about 1,500 casualties compared to theFederals’ 1,100.

While Bragg ell back toward Goldsboro, Johnston resumedhis efforts to field an army against Sherman by means o the NorthCarolina Railroad, which ormed a 220-mile arc rom Charlotte inthe western part o the state to Goldsboro in the east. Unortunatelyor the Conederates, a 120-car backlog o troops, artillery, andsupplies had accumulated at Salisbury, North Carolina, while

another 65 carloads waited at Chester, South Carolina. Tebottlenecks had ormed because the width o the track narrowedat Salisbury, and most o the narrow-gauge rolling stock sent toBragg at Kinston had not yet returned rom the ront. AlthoughBragg’s monopolization o the railroad had caused the backlog,Johnston’s ailure to intervene only exacerbated the problem. Atstake was the Conederate chiefain’s ability to strike Sherman withevery available soldier. When the moment o truth arrived, many

o Johnston’s men would still be stranded at Salisbury.With the Federals advancing in superior orce on two ronts,the concentration o his own army impeded by delays on therailroad, and that army dependent on a sparsely settled region orsubsistence, prospects appeared bleak or Johnston. “I will not give


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battle with Sherman’s united army,” he inormed Lee on 11 March,“but will i I can find it divided.” Johnston, meanwhile, attemptedto gather his own scattered army in the desperate hope that hecould deeat either Sherman or Schofield beore the two Unionorces could combine.

THE BATTLE OF MONROE’S CROSSROADSA Sherman’s army group swept into North Carolina

during the irst week o March, Kilpatrick’s cavalry divisionled the way, clashing repeatedly with Hampton’s Conederatecavalry, which served as the rear guard or Hardee’s corpsduring the march to Fayetteville. On 7 March, Hampton discov-

ered that Kilpatrick had slipped around his lank and gottenbetween him and Hardee. “As soon as my command can beconcentrated,” Hampton inormed Hardee, “I shall move roundthe let lank o the enemy to his ront.” his maneuver provedmore diicult to execute than Hampton had anticipated, andKilpatrick continued to obstruct his progress. But the Unioncavalry commander remained unaware o his advantage untilthe aternoon o 9 March, when some captured Conederates

revealed that a large orce o Yankee cavalry had driven a wedgebetween Hampton and Hardee. Despite a recent order romSherman to avoid battle or the present, Kilpatrick decidedto block the roads to Fayetteville in an attempt to preventHampton rom rejoining Hardee. In doing so, Kilpatrick reck-lessly divided his command, which contained about the samenumber o horsemen as Hampton’s cavalry. Kilpatrick wasinviting Hampton to deeat him in detail, and the latter eagerly

accepted his invitation.On the evening o 9 March, Kilpatrick and two o his ourbrigades—numbering about 1,500 troopers—made camp atMonroe’s Crossroads. A torrential downpour and the presence oConederate cavalry prevented his remaining two brigades romtaking up their assigned positions, leaving the Union cavalrycommander’s bivouac isolated and vulnerable to attack—whichwas precisely what Hampton had in mind. During the cold, rainy

night, Conederate troopers deployed or an assault on Kilpatrick’scamp. Hopes ran high among the Southerners that they would dealthe Federals a stunning blow at Monroe’s Crossroads and perhapsbag “Little Kil” in the process. Hampton’s orce consisted o Maj.Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry corps and Maj. Gen. Matthew C.


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Butler’s cavalry division rom the Army o Northern Virginia,roughly 4,000 horse soldiers in all.

As dawn broke on the morning o 10 March, Butler’s cavalryburst out o the woods rom the north and Wheeler’s horsemenrom the west. Shrieking the rebel yell, they overran the lightlyguarded Federal camp. Kilpatrick witnessed the onslaught rom theporch o the Monroe house, which served as his headquarters. Hisfirst thought was, “My God, here’s a Major General’s commissionafer our years’ hard fighting gone up with an inernal surprise.”Wearing only his shirt, pants, and slippers, Kilpatrick fled into anearby swamp along with a large number o his men, but many othem had the presence o mind to carry their weapons with them.

Tis enabled the Union troopers to launch a counterattack whenthe initial Conederate charge lost momentum.

Afer a urious close-quarters struggle that lasted or over anhour, the Federals drove off the Conederates and regained theircamp. But the Southerners had opened the road to Fayettevilleand reed all o their captured comrades. Te Battle o Monroe’sCrossroads was a moral victory or the Conederates, who haddemonstrated that they still posed a substantial threat to the

Federals. It was also something o an embarrassment or Sherman’scavalry commander—afer all, waggish Union inantrymendubbed the rebel surprise attack “Kilpatrick’s Shirttail Skedaddle.”

Casualty figures or Monroe’s Crossroads are sketchy at best.Although Kilpatrick reported a total o 190 killed, wounded, andmissing, one o his two brigade commanders reported roughly thesame losses or his unit alone. Te Conederate casualty figuresare likewise incomplete, amounting to ewer than 90, while

Kilpatrick reported that his men buried about 80 Southern deadand captured 30 prisoners. Regardless o the Conederates’ totalcasualties, the battle cost Hampton’s cavalry dearly, resulting inthe loss o one regimental commander killed and six division andbrigade commanders with wounds o varying severity.

THE BATTLE OF AVERASBOROSherman’s army group entered Fayetteville on 11 March

and remained there or our days. While most o the men rested,the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics demolished theConederate arsenal there on orders rom the commandinggeneral. Sherman, meanwhile, plotted the final leg o his 450-milemarch to Goldsboro. As usual, the plan included a eint—this time


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Te Battle o Averasboro began at dawn on 16 March, amid asteady rain that ell or most o the day. Troughout the morning,Kilpatrick’s cavalry and the Federal XX Corps probed Hardee’sfirst line or weaknesses. About noon, Sherman directed Slocum tosend a brigade around the Conederate right flank. Slocum choseCol. Henry Case’s XX Corps brigade, whose surprise flank attackrouted the Conederates o Rhett’s brigade manning the first line.“I was never so pleased in my lie as I was to see the rebs get up andtry to get out o the way,” wrote an Illinois soldier who participatedin the assault. Soon aferward, the Federals drove back the secondline held by Brig. Gen. Stephen Elliott’s brigade. As Brig. Gen.James D. Morgan’s division o the Union XIV Corps attacked on

the lef in an effort to outflank Hardee’s third line, two small divi-sions o Wheeler’s Conederate cavalry arrived just in time to plugthe gap. With Hardee’s line now extending rom the Cape FearRiver on his right to the swamps bordering the Black River on thelef, Sherman decided to postpone making a general assault untilthe next morning. At nightall, however, Hardee began to evacuatehis position. When Federal skirmishers advanced at dawn on 17March, they discovered that the Conederates had withdrawn.

Hardee’s delaying action at Averasboro had succeeded inchecking Sherman’s movement or one day, buying Johnstoninvaluable time to concentrate his orces. In doing so, Hardee alsohad given his green troops their first taste o field combat andboosted their sagging morale. For his part, Sherman had drivenHardee toward Smithfield, thereby opening the road to Goldsboro.Te Conederates suffered 500 casualties, most o them comingrom Rhett’s brigade, while the Federal losses amounted to 682.

O that number, 533 were wounded and had to be transportedwith the column, hence Sherman’s decision to press Hardee on 16March rather than risk a ull-scale assault because he knew thateach additional wounded man would urther slow his progress.

SETTING A TRAP FOR SHERMAN

On the eve o the Battle o Averasboro, Johnston had traveledto Smithfield, where his army was converging. He chose that town

as his point o concentration because it stood midway betweenRaleigh and Goldsboro, Sherman’s two most likely objectives.Arriving at Smithfield were Hoke’s division under Bragg andthe remnant o the Army o ennessee, which the Conederatecommander placed under Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart. Johnston


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ormed the Army o the South rom the our distinct orces underhis command: Hardee’s corps, Hoke’s division (which now includedthe Junior Reserves brigade), the Army o ennessee contingent,and Hampton’s cavalry. By mid-March, Johnston could field about20,000 troops against Sherman’s 60,000-man army group.

Afer the Battle o Averasboro, Hardee marched towardSmithfield to join Johnston’s army. He told the Conederate chie-tain that he believed Sherman was heading to Goldsboro. On theevening o 17 March, Johnston notified Hardee that it was timeto act. “Something must be done to-morrow morning,” Johnstonwrote, “and yet I have no satisactory inormation as to the enemy’smovements. Can you give me any certain inormation o the orce

you engaged yesterday?” Hardee’s reply is lost, but it probablyindicated that Hampton was better inormed as to the Federals’current status. Johnston ordered Bragg and Stewart to prepare tomarch at dawn. He then sent a message to Hampton instructinghim to send all the inormation he had regarding the position andstrength o the Federal columns, their distance rom Goldsboro,and whether Hampton thought it possible to intercept one o thecolumns beore it could reach its destination.

Hampton replied that the two Federal wings were indeedadvancing toward Goldsboro and were widely separated. He notedthat the nearest Union column—Slocum’s wing—marching upthe road rom Averasboro was more than a day’s march rom hisheadquarters at the Willis Cole plantation south o Bentonville.Te cavalry commander suggested that the plantation wouldmake an excellent site or a surprise attack and assured Johnstonthat he could delay the Federal drive long enough to enable the

Conederate army to arrive rom Smithfield.Johnston received Hampton’s reply at dawn on 18 March.A glance at the map indicated that the two Federal wings were adozen miles apart and separated by a day’s march. He thereoredecided to attack Slocum’s wing as it moved up the GoldsboroRoad. “We will go to the place at which your dispatch was written,”Johnston inormed Hampton. “Te scheme mentioned in mynote, which you pronounce practicable, will be attempted.” But

the Conederates were unaware that the maps were wildly inac-curate, leading Johnston to underestimate Hardee’s distancerom Bentonville while exaggerating the distance separating theUnion columns. Although Bragg and Stewart reached Bentonville


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at nightall, Hardee’s corps was still six miles north o the villagewhen it halted at 2100.

Te Federals, meanwhile, advanced to within five miles o theCole plantation on the afernoon o 18 March. Sherman remainedcautious as his army group approached Bentonville, the two Unionwings only a ew miles apart. “I think it probable that Joe Johnstonwill try to prevent our getting Goldsboro,” he wrote Howard about1400. A ew hours later, Sherman received two messages that causedhim to drop his guard. First, Kilpatrick inormed him that Hardeewas retreating toward Smithfield and Johnston was gathering hisarmy a ew miles south o Raleigh. (Apparently, the Union cavalrycommander had already orgotten the Conederates’ audacity at

Monroe’s Crossroads.) Second, XIV Corps skirmishers reportedthat the rebels had burned the bridge across Mill Creek on theSmithfield-Clinton Road. According to Sherman’s aulty map, theConederates had just cut their only approach route to Bentonville,indicating a retreat toward Raleigh. Unknown to the Federals,Sherman’s map omitted the Smithfield-Bentonville Road—or the“Devil’s Race Path”—that Bragg and Stewart were using. Shermannow believed that Johnston had conceded Goldsboro to him.

Although several Union oraging details returned to camp thatnight reporting stiff resistance rom Conederate cavalry, Unionsenior leaders ignored their warnings. On the evening o 18March, the Federals’ weak point was not the distance separatingtheir columns but their growing overconfidence.

While Sherman camped several miles to the southwest,Johnston conerred with Hampton at his headquarters inBentonville. Having arrived too late to reconnoiter the proposed

battlefield, Johnston relied on Hampton to devise a plan o attackbased on his own study o the ground. Te plan exploited the denselywooded terrain surrounding the Cole house, where Hamptonrecommended launching the assault. Te Conederate cavalrycommander suggested that Johnston deploy Hoke’s division acrossthe Goldsboro Road to block the Federals’ advance and concealHardee’s corps and Stewart’s Army o ennessee contingent in thethick woods north o the road. At a designated time, Hardee and

Stewart would burst out o the woods and rout the Union columnbeore it could deploy into line o battle. Although he regrettedthat Hardee’s corps stood arther than the Federal advance romthe battlefield, Johnston approved Hampton’s plan and directed the


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deployment to begin at dawn, bearing in mind that this might behis final opportunity to strike Sherman with any hope o success.

THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLESunrise on Sunday, 19 March, revealed a beautiul spring day.

Te awakening Union soldiers enjoyed the mild early morning airand the sight o budding apple and peach trees. Teir thoughtswere ar removed rom battle and ocused instead on reachingGoldsboro, where new shoes, clean clothes, and mail rom homeawaited them. “We eel in excellent spirits,” Lt. John M. Branumo Morgan’s XIV Corps division jotted in his diary. “Everythingpromises or a smooth entry into Goldsboro.” Tis entry was

Branum’s last, or within a ew hours, he would be killed in action.Believing that the danger o a Conederate attack had passed,

Sherman prepared to rejoin Howard’s wing at dawn on 19 Marchin order to communicate with Schofield. Beore his departure,Sherman conerred with Slocum and other Union generals at thecrossroads leading to Howard’s column. During the conversation,General Davis said that he thought his XIV Corps would have toace more than the usual cavalry opposition. “No, Jeff,” Sherman

replied. “Tere is nothing there but [Col. George G.] Dibrell’scavalry. Brush them out o the way. . . . I’ll meet you tomorrowmorning at Cox’s Bridge.” With that, Sherman led his staff andescort down the road toward Howard’s column, unaware thatSlocum’s wing would not reach Cox’s Bridge or another our days.

At first the Federal advance, consisting o Brig. Gen. WilliamP. Carlin’s XIV Corps division, easily drove back Dibrell’s smallcavalry division. But the Southerners’ resistance stiffened at the

Cole plantation, where Carlin collided with a orce ar larger thanDibrell’s cavalry. Carlin deployed all three o his brigades and stillmet with fierce opposition. Ignoring Carlin’s plight, Slocum sentword to Sherman that he was merely skirmishing with stubbornrebel cavalry and needed no assistance rom Howard. Growingimpatient, Slocum then ordered Carlin to launch an attack todevelop the enemy’s position and strength. About noon, Carlinassaulted the Conederate line at several points, only to meet with

a bloody repulse.Undaunted, Slocum brought up Morgan’s XIV Corps divisionon Carlin’s right and was preparing to deploy the XX Corps onthe same line in a more determined effort to outflank Johnston’sposition. But a Union prisoner o war who had made his escape


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during Carlin’s attack brought Slocum some startling intelligence:Johnston’s entire army was on the field, and Joe Johnston himselhad ridden among his troops, telling them that they would crushone wing o Sherman’s army at Bentonville and then attack the otherwing and destroy it as well. I Slocum required additional evidenceo his predicament, he received it rom a XIV Corps staff officerwho reported, “Well, General, I have ound something more thanDibrell’s cavalry—I find [Conederate] inantry intrenched alongour whole ront, and enough o them to give us all the amusementwe shall want or the rest o the day.”

Slocum received the staff officer’s report about 1330 andimmediately shifed to the deensive. Te lef wing commander

kept his two XIV Corps divisions at the ront to absorb the shocko the expected Conederate onslaught while deploying his two XXCorps divisions on more deensible ground at the Reddick Morrisarm a mile to the rear. Slocum also sent Sherman a ar moreaccurate assessment o the situation. As the afernoon wore on,Slocum’s messages to the commanding general became increas-ingly urgent and were invariably accompanied by appeals or rein-orcements rom Howard’s wing.

For Johnston, the afernoon o 19 March was filled with aggra- vating delays. With only one approach route rom Bentonville tothe battlefield, the Conederates’ deployment “consumed a wearytime.” When Carlin launched his noontime strike, only Hoke’sdivision and Stewart’s Army o ennessee contingent were inposition, while Hardee’s corps was just arriving on the field. Worseyet or the Conederates, Carlin’s probing attack delayed Johnston’sown assault and led Bragg, the commander o Hoke’s division, to

call or reinorcements. In response, Johnston sent him McLaws’division o Hardee’s corps. Tis proved to be the Conederatechiefain’s worst blunder o the day. By the time McLaws reachedBragg’s position, Hoke’s division had already repulsed the Federalattack. Bragg then held the 4,000-man division or much o theafernoon, depriving Johnston o one-ourth o his inantry whenhe needed it most.

Johnston finally launched his assault at 1445. Hardee led

the right wing o Johnston’s army, consisting o the Army oennessee contingent and aliaerro’s division o Hardee’s corps.An onlooker thought that the Conederate advance “looked likea picture and was truly beautiul.” He also ound it “painul to seehow close their battle flags were together, regiments being scarcely


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larger than companies.” Despite its depleted ranks, Hardee’s wingoverran Carlin’s position north o the Goldsboro Road. “[We]stood as long as man can stand,” wrote a Michigan soldier inCarlin’s division, “& when that was no longer a possibility [we] runlike the duce.” During the rout, Hardee’s men captured two Unioncannons and drove off Carlin’s troops south o the road. Tus ar,the Conederate assault was an unqualified success ( Map 2).

Te Conederates’ accomplishment might have been greaterstill had Bragg’s wing, consisting o Hoke’s and McLaws’ divisions,attacked when ordered. Instead, Bragg waited until 1600, morethan an hour afer the time Johnston had designated. Bragg mayhave delayed his assault pending the outcome o Hardee’s charge,

but such a course is indeensible, since it would have been indefiance o Johnston’s orders. In any event, Bragg gave the Federalso Morgan’s division a precious extra hour to strengthen their fieldortifications.

Morgan’s stand south o the Goldsboro Road proved to bethe turning point o the 19 March battle at Bentonville. Attackedin quick succession by Hoke’s division along their ront and lefflank and by several brigades o the Army o ennessee rom

their rear, Morgan’s Federals stubbornly clung to their swampysalient. In the course o the struggle, the soldiers in blue ought onboth sides o their log works. Aided by the timely arrival o Col.William Cogswell’s XX Corps brigade, Morgan’s troops repulsedthe Conederates and turned the tide in the Federals’ avor.

Te Southerners’ final assaults o the day were launchedagainst the XX Corps’ position on the Morris arm. Spearheadedby troops rom aliaerro’s division and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F.

Cheatham’s corps o the Army o ennessee, the attacks consti-tuted the Conederate army’s high-water mark at Bentonville.Advancing several times to within point-blank range o the Unionline, the Southerners braved a blistering small-arms and artilleryfire beore Johnston called off the offensive and ordered his armyto return to its jump-off point. Afer some anxious moments, theUnion line at Bentonville had held, and the 19 March fight endedin a draw.

Sherman, meanwhile, received Slocum’s appeals or reinorce-ments and ordered Howard’s column to march to the Lef Wing’ssupport. Early on the morning o 20 March, the Union Right Wingheaded west on the Goldsboro Road toward the Conederate rear.While using his cavalry to delay the Federals’ advance, Johnston


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19 March 1865

B A T T L E O F B E N T O N V I L L E

AFTERNOON

MAP 2


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swung back Hoke’s and McLaws’ divisions on a new lef flank thatslanted northeast toward Bentonville. Howard’s vanguard reachedthe vicinity o Bentonville around noon. Johnston now aced aUnion orce three times the size o his own army. Te Conederatesoccupied a tenuous, our-mile-long bastion that deended theirsole line o retreat across a flooded Mill Creek at Bentonville.

Sherman was surprised that Johnston—contrary to his usualcautious nature—held his ground. “I cannot see why he remains,”Sherman wrote Slocum, “and still think he will avail himsel onight to get back to Smithfield. I would rather avoid a general battlei possible, but i he insists on it, we must accommodate him.” Whydid Johnston stay at Bentonville? Having ailed to deeat one wing

o Sherman’s army group, did he expect to are better against bothwings? Johnston provided two reasons or remaining. First, heintended to evacuate his wounded beore retreating, and second, hehoped that Sherman might attempt a costly rontal assault againsthis well-entrenched line. Perhaps Johnston had a third reason—his army’s morale. By standing toe to toe with Sherman’s largerarmy while evacuating his wounded, Johnston would achieve amoral victory, whereas i he abandoned the field on the night o

19–20 March, he would admit deeat. Johnston doubtless believedthat his army’s morale was worth the risk o staying at Bentonville.

Te Conederate commander’s decision to remain nearlyproved to be his undoing. On the morning o 21 March, the FirstDivision o the XVII Corps deployed on the extreme right o theUnion line. Commanding the division was Sherman’s most aggres-sive general, Maj. Gen. Joseph A. “Fighting Joe” Mower. Althoughunder orders to avoid a general engagement, Fighting Joe intended

to assail the Conederates, perhaps hoping to draw Sherman intothe pitched battle he did not want. Facing Mower’s division wasHampton’s cavalry, spread out in a utile attempt to cover theConederates’ vulnerable lef flank.

Mower began his assault about noon in a driving rain. Histwo attacking brigades struggled through the briar-inestedswamp that separated them rom Hampton’s position and thendrove back the heavily outnumbered Conederates. Hampton,

meanwhile, reported the breakthrough to Johnston, who assignedHardee the task o repulsing the assault. At stake was Johnston’sonly avenue o retreat across Mill Creek, which could not beorded in its flooded state. Fortunately or the Conederates,Mower halted his main line even as his skirmishers overran


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Johnston’s headquarters at Bentonville, enabling Hardee to coun-terattack with a hastily assembled orce. One o the regimentswas the 8th exas Cavalry—or “erry’s exas Rangers”—whosenewest recruit was General Hardee’s only son, sixteen-year-oldPvt. Willie Hardee. Te youth was mortally wounded whilecharging in the Rangers’ ront rank. Te Conederates managedto repulse Mower’s charge, but Fighting Joe was preparing toattack again when Sherman sent him orders to halt. Johnston’s

army had survived to fight another day.On the night o 21–22 March, the Conederates retreatedacross the Mill Creek bridge and marched toward Smithfield. Asiderom some skirmishing the next morning, the Battle o Bentonvillewas over. Te Conederates sustained about 2,600 casualties whilethe Federals lost roughly 1,500 killed, wounded, and captured. Mosto the losses occurred on 19 March, by ar the bloodiest day o thebattle. Te culminating event o Sherman’s Carolinas campaign,

the Battle o Bentonville, nevertheless proved indecisive. Althoughthe Federals had opened the road to Goldsboro, they had ailedto crush Johnston’s army, and, while the Conederates had wona moral victory, the Southerners had been unable to deeat evenSlocum’s wing.

General Mower’s charge, by James E. Taylor(Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper)


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CLOSING OPERATIONSAfer the battle, Sherman’s army group resumed the march

to Goldsboro and began arriving there on 23 March. Schofield’sXXIII Corps had occupied the town a ew days earlier, and themen ound the procession o Sherman’s tatterdemalion army acomic spectacle. Schofield’s troops “lined the road as spectators,cheered uproariously and laughed till the tears ran down theiraces whenever the panorama o raggedness became unusuallyludicrous,” recalled one o Sherman’s veterans. “It was as goodas a picnic and three circuses,” quipped a soldier in Schofield’scommand.

With his army group united and ensconced around

Goldsboro, Sherman traveled north to Grant’s headquartersat City Point, Virginia, hoping to persuade the Union generalin chie to postpone his upcoming campaign long enough toenable Sherman’s army group to participate in the deeat oLee’s army. Much to Sherman’s dismay, Grant reused to delaythe operation or even one day. While at City Point, Shermanhad an opportunity to coner with President Lincoln aboard thesteamship River Queen. Although they briely discussed the end

o the war, Lincoln gave no indication o the precise terms hewould oer the deeated South. Sherman nonetheless let CityPoint convinced that Lincoln “contemplated no revenge—noharsh measures, but quite the contrary. . . . I know, when I lethim, that I was more than ever impressed by his kindly nature,his deep and earnest sympathy with the alictions o the wholepeople, resulting rom the war.”

When Sherman returned to Goldsboro, he was pleased to find

“all things working well.” As supplies rolled in rom the coast, hisorce began to look like an army once more. On 6 April, momen-tous news arrived rom Virginia: Richmond had allen, and Grant’sorces were pursuing Lee’s army as it fled toward Danville, Virginia,and the North Carolina border in a desperate bid to link up withJohnston’s army. “Great rejoicing among us tonight—Victory!Victory!” Union staff officer Lt. C. C. Platter scribbled in his diary.In response, Sherman shifed his destination rom Richmond to

Raleigh, and he ordered the campaign to begin on 10 April. Withthe addition o Schofield’s command—which Sherman designatedthe Army o the Ohio—Sherman’s army group numbered roughly90,000 soldiers. Te Army o the Ohio consisted o erry’s X Corps(ormerly the Provisional Corps) and Cox’s XXIII Corps.


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While the Federals celebrated the news o the Conederatecapital’s all, morale plummeted in Johnston’s army, which wascamped around Smithfield. “Te shades o sorrow are gatheringupon us—horrible rumors!” wrote Conederate staff officer Capt.Bromfield Ridley. “We, today, have heard o the distressing newsthat the all o Richmond took place the [second] day o the month.. . . Heavens, the gloom and how terrible our eelings!” Johnston,meanwhile, renamed his orce the Army o ennessee and reor-ganized it into three corps commanded by Hardee, Stewart, andLt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, with Hampton retaining command othe cavalry. On 7 April, Johnston’s army numbered around 31,000soldiers, making it larger by hal than the command that he had

led at Bentonville, and yet it remained just one-third the size oSherman’s army group.

Te Federals broke camp early on 10 April and began thesixty-mile trek rom Goldsboro to Raleigh. In the meantime,the Conederate inantry at Smithfield ell back toward the statecapital about a day’s march ahead o the Union advance, whichskirmished with Hampton’s cavalry or much o the way. Shermanreached Smithfield on the afernoon o 11 April and made his

headquarters in the courthouse square. About 0500 on 12 April,two riders arrived at the commanding general’s tent and deliv-ered a dispatch rom General Grant announcing Lee’s surrenderat Appomattox Court House on 9 April. “I hardly know how toexpress my eelings, but you can imagine them,” Sherman wroteGrant. “Te terms you have given Lee are magnanimous andliberal. Should Johnston ollow Lee’s example I shall o coursegrant the same.” Te news spread like wildfire through Sherman’s

army group. As an excited courier galloped down the XXIII Corps’marching column shouting, “Lee has surrendered! Lee has surren-dered!” one wag yelled back at him, “Great God! You’re the manI’ve been looking or these last our years.”

Tat evening, Sherman met with a deputation rom NorthCarolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance requesting a suspension ohostilities in order to open peace negotiations with the U.S. govern-ment. While Sherman inormed the peace commissioners that

an immediate suspension o hostilities was unlikely, the generalalso told them that he intended to let Vance remain in office. Heassured the governor, “I will aid you all in my power to contributeto the end you aim to reach, the termination o the existing war.”Te peace delegation returned to Raleigh the next morning.


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While Sherman’s army group converged on the state capital,Johnston was trying to convince President Davis that the war waslost. Afer the all o Richmond, Davis and his cabinet had fledby train to Danville. While there, the Conederate president hadreceived an unofficial report o Lee’s surrender and had passedit on to Johnston. Continuing south to Greensboro, Davis metwith Johnston and Beauregard on 12 April. Instead o inviting thegenerals to brie him on the military situation, Davis launched intoa scheme to raise a large field army in a ew weeks by recallingthe thousands o men who had deserted or evaded conscription.Johnston argued that it would be impossible to persuade desertersand shirkers to rejoin or enter the army “upon mere invitation”

when the cause appeared lost. At that point, Davis abruptlyadjourned the meeting with the announcement that Secretary oWar Breckinridge was expected to arrive that evening with newso Lee’s army.

Breckinridge arrived as anticipated, confirming that Lee hadindeed surrendered. Johnston told Breckinridge that the presidenthad “but one power o government lef in his hands—that o termi-nating hostilities.” He offered to so advise Davis i the secretary o

war provided him with the opportunity, and Breckinridge said thathe would arrange a conerence or the next day.

Johnston and Beauregard met or a second time with Davison the morning o 13 April. Despite Lee’s surrender, the presi-dent remained confident that the Conederacy could prevail “iour people will turn out.” When Johnston had his opportunity tospeak, he described a Conederacy on the verge o collapse andargued that “it would be the greatest o human crimes to continue

the war.” Te general then urged Davis to “exercise at once the onlyunction o government still in his possession, and open negotia-tions or peace.” Te president asked Beauregard and his cabinetor their opinions, and with one exception, they agreed withJohnston. Davis yielded to the majority and dictated a letter toSherman requesting a suspension o hostilities “to permit the civilauthorities to enter into the needul arrangements to terminate theexisting war.” Johnston then signed the letter and ordered it sent at

once to General Hampton or delivery to the Federals.Te Union army, meanwhile, entered Raleigh on the morningo 13 April. A lone Conederate cavalryman fired on Kilpatrick’sadvance as it rode into town—a utile gesture that defied MayorWilliam H. Harrison’s ormal surrender o the state capital. Te


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Federals captured the Southern horseman and hanged him or violating the city’s surrender. Soon aferward, Sherman establishedhis headquarters at the Governor’s Palace and discovered thatVance had fled with Johnston’s army afer receiving a report thathis peace commissioners had been captured.

At midnight on 15 April, Johnston’s letter proposing an armi-stice reached Sherman’s headquarters. Te Union chiefain dashedoff a reply accepting his Conederate counterpart’s proposal. “Tata basis o action may be had,” Sherman wrote, “I undertake toabide by the same terms and conditions as were made by GeneralsGrant and Lee at Appomattox Court-House.” Sherman sent hismessage to Kilpatrick at Durham’s Station, North Carolina, with

instructions to orward it immediately to Hampton’s headquartersnear Hillsborough. Instead, the Federal cavalry commander heldSherman’s dispatch at his orward outpost or one day to makeit appear that the Conederates, who continued marching westtoward Greensboro, were willully violating Johnston’s proposedcease-fire. Sherman reused to be taken in by Kilpatrick’s subter-uge, however, and, afer receiving Hampton’s message proposinga conerence midway between the opposing picket lines on the

Hillsborough Road, the Union commander wired his acceptanceto Kilpatrick with a pointed order to orward it without delay.

THE BENNETT PLACE NEGOTIATIONSOn the morning o 17 April, as Sherman prepared to board a

train or his meeting with Johnston, a coded message rom Secretaryo War Edwin M. Stanton arrived at the railroad depot. Te dispatchinormed Sherman that an assassin had shot President Lincoln on

the evening o 14 April and that he had died the next morning. “Ocourse it ell on me with terrific orce,” Sherman later wrote o thedispatch, “but I had dealt with death in so many amiliar ormsthat no one with me, rom my words or bearing, dreamed o thecontents.” Afer ordering the telegraph operator to say nothing toanyone about the contents o the message, Sherman rode the trainto Durham’s Station, where he was met by Kilpatrick. Te generalsand their escort o Federal cavalry headed west on the Hillsborough

Road until the Union flag-o-truce bearer met his Conederatecounterpart about our miles west o Durham’s Station. Shermanand Johnston saluted, shook hands, and introduced their respectivesubordinates. Te two commanders then entered the James Bennettarmhouse and began their conerence.


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Sherman opened the meeting by showing Johnston thetelegram announcing Lincoln’s assassination. he Conederatecommander reportedly said that “the event was the greatestpossible calamity to the South.” he Union chietain then statedthat he had not yet announced the news to his army and dreadedthe reaction o his troops. Johnston agreed that Sherman’s situ-ation was “extremely delicate” indeed. Speaking in a tone thatJohnston believed “carried conviction o sincerity,” Sherman

said that he wanted to spare the South urther devastation.Observing that Johnston’s army was hopelessly outnumbered,Sherman oered his Conederate counterpart the same termsthat Grant had given Lee at Appomattox Court House. Whileacknowledging that those terms were generous, Johnston alsonoted that Lee’s army had been surrounded, whereas he andSherman were a our days’ march apart, with the Federals campedaround Raleigh and the Conederates around Greensboro. he

Conederate commander then played his trump card, proposingthat they “make one job o it” by negotiating the surrender oall remaining Conederate orces. When Sherman asked how heintended to arrange such a capitulation, Johnston replied thathe would obtain President Davis’ authorization.

The Bennett Place, by Theodore R. Davis(Harper’s Weekly)


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Te two generals discussed the terms o the proposedsurrender. Sherman related Lincoln’s wish to end the war withouturther bloodshed, and he indicated that the late president’s firstpriority had been to preserve the Union. Johnston inerred thatall else—with the possible exception o emancipation—was nego-tiable. Te Conederate chiefain recalled that he and Shermanagreed to terms with one important exception—the Unioncommander’s reusal to include Davis and his cabinet in a generalamnesty. Sherman, however, remembered that his sole concernwas whether Johnston could secure Davis’ approval o the terms.Te two men ended their conerence at 1430 to give Johnstontime to communicate with Davis and to enable Sherman to reach

Raleigh beore word o Lincoln’s assassination could spread. Teyagreed to meet at the Bennett house at noon the next day.

When Sherman arrived at Raleigh, he discovered that thenews had already spread throughout the capital. A crowd oangry soldiers met him at the depot, shouting, “Don’t let Johnstonsurrender! Don’t let the Rebels surrender!” An Illinois soldierwrote in his diary: “Te army is crazy or vengeance. I we makeanother campaign it will be an awul one.” Afer writing the order

announcing Lincoln’s assassination, Sherman strengthened theguard patrolling Raleigh, posted pickets on the roads into town,and ordered all unauthorized soldiers in Raleigh arrested and jailed. He also spent the night riding through the surroundingcamps, attempting to calm his men. Despite these precautions, amob o several thousand soldiers rom the XV Corps advanced onthe capital amid shouts that Raleigh was “a Rebel hole and oughtto be cleaned out.” General Logan, the XV Corps commander,

conronted the mob on the outskirts o town and tried to reasonwith the men. When that ailed, he brought orward an artillerybattery and warned the troops that i they did not disperse, hewould order the cannons to open fire. Te men returned to theircamps. Afer an anxious night, dawn revealed that the NorthCarolina capital had been spared the ate o Columbia.

While Sherman attempted to save Raleigh, Johnston spentthe early morning hours o 18 April at Hampton’s headquarters

discussing the proposed terms with two Conederate cabinetofficials: Secretary o War Breckinridge and Postmaster GeneralJohn H. Reagan. Johnston related the details o his meeting withSherman, noting that the Union commander had reused to grantamnesty to Davis and his cabinet—a matter o obvious concern


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to Breckinridge and Reagan. When Johnston had finished hisbriefing, Reagan offered to write down the surrender terms. Laterthat morning, as Reagan made a clean copy o the terms, Johnstonannounced that he was going to his second meeting with Sherman.Leaving Reagan to complete his memorandum, Johnston andBreckinridge rode off or the Bennett arm at 1000.

Te flags o truce met beore the Bennett house at noonon 18 April. Sherman and Johnston entered the dwelling, andthe Conederate chiefain said that he now had the authorityto surrender all remaining Conederate orces. Johnston alsorequested that Breckinridge be allowed to participate in the nego-tiations, since he was responsible or the comprehensive surrender.

Sherman initially reused because the ormer U.S. vice presidentwas a member o Davis’ cabinet but relented when Johnston statedthat the Kentuckian was also a major general in the ConederateArmy. Te commanders repeated the main points o their discus-sion or Breckinridge. Te two Southerners conceded that slaverywas dead, but they stated that the Conederate soldiers desiredsome guarantees concerning their political status.

During the conversation, Reagan’s memorandum arrived

rom Hampton’s headquarters. Johnston read the document aloud,noting that it differed rom the terms discussed only insoar as itguaranteed universal amnesty. Sherman was unimpressed, findingReagan’s memorandum “so general and verbose” that he deemedit “inadmissible.” Johnston nevertheless handed him the paperto study. Breckinridge then gave a short speech in avor o theReagan document. At the conclusion, Sherman took out pen andpaper and wrote his “Memorandum or Basis o Agreement,” while

bearing in mind his conversations with Lincoln at City Point.Having dismissed Reagan’s terms as too verbose, Sherman’sown memorandum proved to run twice the length o the exan’s,and it offered the Conederates a good deal more. Tere were ourkey items. First, the units composing the remaining Conederatearmies were to proceed to their respective state arsenals anddeposit their arms there or use in maintaining law and order.Second, the president o the United States would recognize the

Southern state governments, provided their officials and legisla-tures took the oaths prescribed by the U.S. Constitution. Casesinvolving conflicting state governments established during thewar (such as the newly ormed state o West Virginia) would bedecided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Tird, the president would


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guarantee the Southern people their personal, political, andproperty rights as defined by the U.S. and state constitutions.As a courtesy to Johnston and Breckinridge, who conceded thatslavery was dead, Sherman omitted any mention o its demise inthis clause. Fourth, the president would grant a general amnesty tothe Southern people or their part in the war i they lived in peaceand obeyed the laws in orce in their respective states. Although hehad not consciously intended to, Sherman was thus granting a ullpardon to all Southerners, including Davis and his cabinet officers.Realizing that he had delved into political matters beyond hisauthority as a military commander, Sherman inserted a clause atthe end o his memorandum stating that he and Johnston pledged

to obtain the prompt approval o their respective civilian leadersbeore carrying the terms into effect.

Afer the two commanders had signed the agreement,Sherman returned to Raleigh with his copy. Late that night, he senta staff officer to Washington, D.C., with the surrender documentand a letter to Grant. “I inclose herewith a copy o an agreementmade this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and mysel,”Sherman wrote, “which, i approved by the President o the United

States, will produce peace rom the Potomac to the Rio Grande.”Supremely confident that his agreement would meet with noopposition, Sherman asked Grant to “get the President to simplyindorse the copy and commission me to carry out the terms.”

Grant received Sherman’s papers late on Friday afernoon, 21April. Reading the terms with growing concern, the Union generalin chie realized that he must notiy Secretary o War Stanton atonce. Stanton read Sherman’s agreement and then called a special

cabinet meeting or 2000 at President Andrew Johnson’s temporaryresidence. An outraged Stanton voiced his objections to the terms,calling it “a practical acknowledgement o the Rebel government”that would enable “the Rebels to renew their efforts to overthrowthe U.S. government at a later time.” He also contended that theagreement relieved the rebels o all “pains and penalties” or theircrimes and would enable them to reestablish slavery. Te presi-dent and his cabinet unanimously rejected Sherman’s agreement.

Stanton then ordered Grant to “proceed immediately” to Sherman’sheadquarters “and direct operations against the enemy.”Grant’s appearance at the Governor’s Palace in Raleigh on 24

April, both “surprised and pleased” Sherman, but he was neithersurprised nor pleased to learn that the president had rejected his


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terms and ordered him to resume hostilities. Since penning hisagreement, Sherman had come to realize that the mood in the U.S.capital ollowing Lincoln’s assassination was hardly conciliatory.As instructed, Sherman notified Johnston that the truce would endin orty-eight hours as agreed on, that there could be no civil nego-tiations, and that the troops affected would be limited to Johnston’simmediate command. “I thereore demand the surrender o yourarmy on the same terms as were given General Lee at Appomattox. . . purely and simply,” Sherman wrote. Pleased with Sherman’shandling o the situation, Grant disregarded Stanton’s order to“direct operations.”

At 1700 on 24 April, Johnston received President Davis’

approval o Sherman’s terms. (Davis and his entourage had sincemoved to Charlotte.) One hour later, Sherman’s dispatches arrivedending the truce, rejecting the agreement, and demanding theConederates’ surrender in accordance with the Appomattox terms.Johnston immediately wired Breckinridge or instructions, but theConederate commander was at no loss or a course o action: “Wehad better disband this small orce to prevent devastation to thecountry.” Tis was the last piece o advice that Davis wanted rom

his ranking field commander. Te Conederate president expectedJohnston to maintain his army as long as the Federals reused tooffer acceptable terms. Breckinridge adroitly couched Davis’ orderas a suggestion to disband the inantry and artillery while sendinga mounted orce to the rans-Mississippi. In response, Johnstonsummoned Beauregard and his corps and division commandersto a conerence at 1000 on 25 April. Tis meeting proved to bethe Army o ennessee’s final council o war. Johnston asked his

subordinates to assess Breckinridge’s proposal and the conditiono their orces. Te consensus was that the troops would no longerfight and the secretary o war’s plan was impractical. Johnstonnotified Breckinridge and suggested, “We ought to make terms orour troops and give an escort o cavalry to the President.” In themeantime, Johnston replied to Sherman’s dispatches, proposinganother armistice to resume negotiations.

Due to a railroad accident, Johnston arrived at the Bennett

arm at 1400 on 26 April, two hours behind schedule. AlthoughGrant had remained in Raleigh, Sherman brought several high-ranking subordinates with him, including General Schofield. Tetwo commanders shook hands and entered the Bennett house.Teir third conerence began inauspiciously. Sherman offered


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the Appomattox terms, but Johnston called them inadequate andinsisted on additional guarantees or his men. While he concededthe need or supplementary terms, Sherman doubted that theywould be approved in Washington. Afer urther discussionproved ruitless, the Union commander summoned Schofield toresolve their impasse.

Schofield suggested drafing a surrender document almostidentical to the Appomattox agreement and a second documentlisting the additional terms that Johnston sought or his men. “Ithink General Schofield can fix it,” Johnston said. Sherman directedhis lieutenant to put the “new” terms in writing. Schofield’s “ermso a Military Convention” strongly resembled the terms Grant had

offered Lee at Appomattox Court House. Te crucial fifh provi-sion ensured that all officers and men in Johnston’s commandcould return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the U.S.government as long as they observed their paroles and the lawsin orce where they resided. On 27 April, Johnston would draf alist o eight “Supplementary erms” based on his discussion withSherman and Schofield at the Bennett house. Schofield would thenwrite a revised version consisting o six “Supplemental erms” that

permitted each brigade or independent unit to retain one-seventho its small arms, that enabled the soldiers to keep their horses andother personal property, and that provided water-borne transpor-tation or troops rom the rans-Mississippi. A ew days later, hewould offer rail transportation to Johnston’s troops as well. TeBennett Place surrender was the largest o the war, embracingalmost 90,000 Conederates stationed in North Carolina, SouthCarolina, Georgia, and Florida. Both Sherman and Johnston

would announce the momentous news to their troops on 27 April.On the evening o 26 April, Sherman returned to Raleighand submitted the surrender agreement to Grant, who approvedthe terms and complied with Sherman’s request to sign thedocument. he general in chie then carried the documentback to Washington. Sherman now believed that the trouble-some matter “was surely at an end.” He could not have beenmore mistaken.

Johnston, meanwhile, traveled to Greensboro. In compliancewith the surrender agreement, he ordered his corps commanders tomake out their muster rolls in duplicate and to collect all cannons,artillery equipment, and draf animals, as well as our-fifhs o thesoldiers’ small arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. (He did not


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and supplies in North Carolina and Virginia that could aid theConederate Army. Grant directed that, “As this expedition goes todestroy and not to fight battles, but to avoid them when practicable. . ., it should go as light as possible.”

Stoneman was ortunate to be leading the cavalry operation.He enjoyed the dubious distinction o having been the highest-ranking Union prisoner o war, ollowing his capture near Macon,Georgia, during the disastrous raid in July 1864 by him and Brig.Gen. Edward M. McCook. Secretary o War Stanton was no admirer,calling Stoneman “one o the most worthless officers in the service.”But he had a staunch supporter in General Schofield. In September1864, afer Stoneman’s release

rom captivity, Schofield, thencommanding the Departmento the Ohio, had appointedthe cavalryman as his secondin command. Stoneman hadrepaid Schofield’s unwav-ering aith in him by leadinga successul strike into

southwestern Virginia inDecember 1864. wo monthslater, Stoneman was namedcommander o the District oEast ennessee. He had beeneager to launch a raid intoSouth Carolina in support oSherman’s march, but several

delays had orced him toabandon that undertakingand shif his ocus to NorthCarolina and Virginia.

Stoneman’s raiders struck first in western North Carolina.As he would do throughout the operation, Stoneman divided hisorce to maximize its destructive potential. On 28 March, oneUnion mounted column rode into Boone, where the bluecoats

routed a home guard unit and burned the town’s jail. Tat evening,a second Federal column headed south and torched Patterson’sFactory, a large cotton mill in Caldwell County. Te raiders nextheaded east to Wilkesboro and then swung north in early April,making a brie detour into southern Virginia. On 8 April, one

General Stoneman (Library of Congress)


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o Stoneman’s columns pushed as ar north as Lynchburg, justtwenty miles west o Appomattox Court House, putting theFederal raiders in an excellent position to cut off Lee’s retreathad such a maneuver been necessary. Te next day, a secondUnion column briefly clashed with the 6th ennessee Cavalry atHenry Court House, about thirty miles west o Danville, wherePresident Jefferson Davis and his cabinet had halted ollowingtheir flight rom Richmond. On the same day as Lee’s surrenderto Grant, Stoneman’s cavalry reentered North Carolina. Tetiming was ortuitous, or Lee’s surrender had made Johnston’sarmy the main target o Stoneman’s raid ( Map 3).

In late March, as Stoneman headed east, Johnston had

entrusted General Beauregard, his second in command, with thetask o stopping the Federal raiders. He also had directed GeneralBragg—lef without a command since the Battle o Bentonville—to assist Beauregard. ogether, Beauregard and Bragg assembled apatchwork deensive orce consisting o various inantry, cavalry,and artillery units, which they deployed at several key points alongthe railroad rom Chester northward to Danville.

Unaware o these dispositions, Stoneman once again

divided his orce. At Germanton, North Carolina, he directedCol. William J. Palmer’s brigade to strike Salem, twelve milesto the south, and then proceed twenty-ive miles east toGreensboro, destroying railroad bridges and supply depots onhis route. Stoneman, meanwhile, led his other two brigadestoward Salisbury, his main geographic objective. ColonelPalmer reached Salem on the aternoon o 10 April and burned7,000 bales o cotton. hat night, he sent out several detach-

ments to the south and east. At noon the ollowing day, the irstdetachment destroyed the Piedmont Railroad bridge spanningReedy Creek, ten miles north o Greensboro. Unknown to theFederal raiders, the train carrying President Davis and hiscabinet had crossed that bridge just an hour beorehand. Wheninormed o his close call at Reedy Creek, Davis had remarked,“A miss is as good as a mile.” But the destruction wrought byother detachments o Stoneman’s cavalry would prevent the

Davis party rom traveling beyond Greensboro by rail.Palmer’s second detachment made a bold eint on Greensboro.Afer routing the 3d South Carolina Cavalry in a surprise assault,the Federals rode to within a ew miles o Greensboro, where theycut a telegraph line and burned the North Carolina Railroad bridge


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the civil war ends, 1865

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