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9/1/2014 Is Free Will an Illusion? - The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Education

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The Chronicle Review

March 18, 2012

Free will has long been a fraught concept among philosophersand theologians. Now neuroscience is entering the fray.

For centuries, the idea that we are the authors of our ownactions, beliefs, and desires has remained central to our sense of

self. We choose whom to love, what thoughts to think, whichimpulses to resist. Or do we?

Neuroscience suggests something else. We are biochemicalpuppets, swayed by forces beyond our conscious control. So says

Sam Harris, author of the new book, Free Will (Simon & Schuster), abroadside against the notion that we are in control of our own

thoughts and actions. Harris's polemic arrives on the heels of MichaelS. Gazzaniga's Who's In Charge? Free Will and the Science of the

Brain (HarperCollins), and David Eagleman's Incognito: TheSecret Lives of the Brain (Pantheon), both provocative forays into adebate that has in recent months spilled out onto op-ed and magazine

pages, and countless blogs.

What's at stake? Just about everything: morality, law, religion, ourunderstanding of accountability and personal accomplishment, evenwhat it means to be human. Harris predicts that a declaration by the

scientific community that free will is an illusion would set off "aculture war far more belligerent than the one that has been waged on

the subject of evolution."

The Chronicle Review brought together some key thinkers todiscuss what science can and cannot tell us about free will, and where

our conclusions might take us.

You Don't Have Free WillJerry A. Coyne

The Case Against the CaseAgainst Free WillAlfred R. Mele

Free Will Is an Illusion, butYou're Still Responsible forYour ActionsMichael S. Gazzaniga

Want to Understand Free

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http://chronicle.com/article/Jerry-A-Coyne/131165/

http://chronicle.com/article/Alfred-R-Mele/131166/

http://chronicle.com/article/Michael-S-Gazzaniga/131167/

http://chronicle.com/article/Hilary-Bok/131168/

9/1/2014 Jerry A. Coyne: You Don't Have Free Will - The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Education

http://chronicle.com/article/Jerry-A-Coyne/131165/ 1/16


March 18, 2012

You Don't Have Free WillBy Jerry A. Coyne

The term "free will" has so many diverse connotations that I'm

obliged to define it before I explain why we don't have it. I

construe free will the way I think most people do: At the moment

when you have to decide among alternatives, you have free will if

you could have chosen otherwise. To put it more technically, if you

could rerun the tape of your life up to the moment you make a

choice, with every aspect of the universe configured identically,

free will means that your choice could have been different.

Although we can't really rerun that tape, this sort of free will is

ruled out, simply and decisively, by the laws of physics. Your brain

and body, the vehicles that make "choices," are composed of

molecules, and the arrangement of those molecules is entirely

determined by your genes and your environment. Your decisions

result from molecular-based electrical impulses and chemical

substances transmitted from one brain cell to another. These

molecules must obey the laws of physics, so the outputs of our

brain—our "choices"—are dictated by those laws. (It's possible,

though improbable, that the indeterminacy of quantum physics

may tweak behavior a bit, but such random effects can't be part of

free will.) And deliberating about your choices in advance doesn't

help matters, for that deliberation also reflects brain activity that

must obey physical laws.

You Don't Have Free Will

Jerry A. Coyne

The Case Against the Case

Against Free Will



http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/





Alfred R. Mele

Free Will Is an Illusion, but

You're Still Responsible for Your

Actions

Michael S. Gazzaniga

Want to Understand Free Will?

Don't Look to Neuroscience

Hilary Bok

The End of (Discussing) Free Will

Owen D. Jones

Free Will Does Not Exist. So

What?

Paul Bloom

To assert that we can freely choose among alternatives is to claim,

then, that we can somehow step outside the physical structure of

our brain and change its workings. That is impossible. Like the

output of a programmed computer, only one choice is ever

physically possible: the one you made. As such, the burden of

proof rests on those who argue that we can make alternative

choices, for that's a claim that our brains, unique among all forms

of matter, are exempt from the laws of physics by a spooky,

nonphysical "will" that can redirect our own molecules.

My claim that free will as defined above is an illusion leads to a

prediction: Our sense of controlling our actions might sometimes

be decoupled from those actions themselves. Recent experiments

in cognitive science show that some deliberate acts occur before

they reach our consciousness (typing or driving, for example),

while in other cases, brain scans can predict our choices several

seconds before we're conscious of having made them.

Additionally, stimulation of the brain, or clever psychological

experiments, can significantly increase or decrease our sense of

control over our choices.

So what are the consequences of realizing that physical

determinism negates our ability to choose freely? Well, nihilism is

not an option: We humans are so constituted, through evolution



http://chronicle.com/article/Owen-D-Jones/131169/

http://chronicle.com/article/Paul-Bloom/131170/



or otherwise, to believe that we can choose. What is seriously

affected is our idea of moral responsibility, which should be

discarded along with the idea of free will. If whether we act well or

badly is predetermined rather than a real choice, then there is no

moral responsibility—only actions that hurt or help others. That

realization shouldn't seriously change the way we punish or

reward people, because we still need to protect society from

criminals, and observing punishment or reward can alter the

brains of others, acting as a deterrent or stimulus. What we should

discard is the idea of punishment as retribution, which rests on the

false notion that people can choose to do wrong.

The absence of real choice also has implications for religion. Many

sects of Christianity, for example, grant salvation only to those

who freely choose Jesus as their savior. And some theologians

explain human evil as an unavoidable byproduct of God's gift of

free will. If free will goes, so do those beliefs. But of course religion

won't relinquish those ideas, for such important dogma is immune

to scientific advances.

Finally, on the lighter side, knowing that we don't have free will

can perhaps temper our sense of regret or self-recrimination, since

we never had real choices in our past. No, we couldn't have had

that V8, and Robert Frost couldn't have taken the other road.

Although science strongly suggests that free will of the sort I

defined doesn't exist, this view is unpopular because it contradicts

our powerful feeling that we make real choices. In response, some

philosophers—most of them determinists who agree with me that

our decisions are preordained—have redefined free will in ways

that allow us to have it. I see most of these definitions as face-

saving devices designed to prop up our feeling of autonomy. To

eliminate the confusion produced by multiple and contradictory

concepts of free will, I propose that we reject the term entirely and

adopt the suggestion of the cognitive scientist Marvin Minsky:

Instead of saying my decision arises from free will, we might say,

"My decision was determined by internal forces I do not

understand."

Jerry A. Coyne is a professor in the department of ecology and

9/1/2014 Alfred R. Mele: The Case Against the Case Against Free Will - The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Education

http://chronicle.com/article/Alfred-R-Mele/131166/ 1/3


March 18, 2012

The Case Against the Case Against FreeWillBy Alfred R. Mele

Is free will an illusion? Recent scientific arguments for an

affirmative answer have a simple structure. First, data are offered

in support of some striking empirical proposition—for example,

that conscious intentions never play any role in producing

corresponding actions. Then this proposition is linked to a

statement about what free will means to yield the conclusion that

it does not exist.

In my book Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will

(Oxford University Press, 2009), I explain why the data do not

justify such arguments. Sometimes I am told that even if I am

correct, I overlook the best scientific argument for the

nonexistence of free will. This claim, in a nutshell, has two parts:

Free will depends on the activity of nonphysical minds or souls,

and scientists have shown that something physical—the brain—is

doing all the work.


Jerry A. Coyne


Against Free Will

Alfred R. Mele



Actions












Hilary Bok


Owen D. Jones


What?

Paul Bloom

As the majority of philosophers understand the concept, free will

doesn't depend at all on the existence of nonphysical minds or

souls. But philosophers don't own this expression. If anyone owns

it, people in general do. So I conducted some simple studies.

In one, I invited participants to imagine a scenario in which

scientists had proved that everything in the universe is physical

and that what we refer to as a "mind" is actually a brain at work. In

this scenario, a man sees a $20 bill fall from a stranger's pocket,

considers returning it, and decides to keep it. Asked whether he

had free will when he made that decision, 73 percent answer yes.

This study suggests that a majority of people do not see having a

nonphysical mind or soul as a requirement for free will.

If free will does not depend on souls, what is the scientific

evidence that it is an illusion? I'll briefly discuss just one study.

Chun Siong Soon and colleagues, in a 2008 Nature Neuroscience

article, report the results of an experiment in which participants

were asked to make simple decisions while their brain activity was

measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI.

The options were always two buttons, and nothing hinged on

which was pressed. Soon and coauthors write: "We found that two

brain regions encoded with high accuracy whether the subject was

about to choose the left or right response prior to the conscious

decision," noting that "the predictive neural information ...

preceded the conscious motor decision by up to 10 seconds." The

science writer Elsa Youngsteadt represented these results as

suggesting that "the unconscious brain calls the shots, making free

will an illusory afterthought."






In this study, however, the predictions are accurate only 60

percent of the time. Using a coin, I can predict with 50-percent

accuracy which button a participant will press next. And if the

person agrees not to press a button for a minute (or an hour), I can

make my predictions a minute (or an hour) in advance. I come out

10 points worse in accuracy, but I win big in terms of time.

So what is indicated by the neural activity that Soon and

colleagues measured? My money is on a slight unconscious bias

toward a particular button—a bias that may give the participant

about a 60-percent chance of pressing that button next.

Given such flimsy evidence, I do not recommend betting the farm

on the nonexistence of free will.

Alfred R. Mele is a professor of philosophy at Florida State

University. He is the director of Big Questions in Free Will, an

investigation of the science, philosophy, and theology of free will,

supported by a $4.4-million grant from the John Templeton

Foundation.

9/1/2014 Michael S. Gazzaniga: Free Will Is an Illusion, but You're Still Responsible for Your Actions - The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Ed…

http://chronicle.com/article/Michael-S-Gazzaniga/131167/ 1/3


March 18, 2012

Free Will Is an Illusion, but You're StillResponsible for Your ActionsBy Michael S. Gazzaniga

Neuroscience reveals that the concept of free will is without

meaning, just as John Locke suggested in the 17th century. Do

robots have free will? Do ants have free will? Do chimps have free

will? Is there really something in all of these machines that needs

to be free, and if so, from what? Alas, just as we have learned that

the world is not flat, neuroscience, with its ever-increasing

mechanistic understanding of how the brain enables mind,

suggests that there is no one thing in us pulling the levers and in

charge. It's time to get over the idea of free will and move on.

Understanding the mechanisms of mind is both daunting and

thrilling, as well as a central part of modern knowledge and life.

We humans are about becoming less dumb, and making better

decisions to cope and adapt to the world we live in. That is what

our brain is for and what it does. It makes decisions based on

experience, innate biases, and mostly without our conscious

knowledge. It is beautiful to understand how that happens.


Jerry A. Coyne


Against Free Will

Alfred R. Mele



Actions












Hilary Bok


Owen D. Jones


What?

Paul Bloom

But brain determinism has no relevance to the concept of personal

responsibility.

The exquisite machine that generates our mental life also lives in a

social world and develops rules for living within a social network.

For the social network to function, each person assigns each other

person responsibility for his or her actions. There are rules for

traffic that exist and are only understood and adopted when cars

interact. It is the same for human interactions. Just as we would

not try to understand traffic by studying the mechanics of cars, we

should not try to understand brains to understand the idea of

responsibility. Responsibility exists at a different level of

organization: the social level, not in our determined brains.

Viewing the age-old question of free will in this framework has

many implications. Holding people responsible for their actions

remains untouched and intact since that is a value granted by

society. We all learn and obey rules, both personal and social.

Following social rules, as they say, is part of our DNA. Virtually

every human can follow rules no matter what mental state he or

she is in.

Thus Jared Loughner, who has been charged with shooting

Representative Gabrielle Giffords, is judged to be insane. Yet he

followed one kind of rule when he stopped to make change for the

taxi driver on the way to murder and cause mayhem. Should

society really allow that the act of not following another kind of

rule (not to kill anyone) be accepted as an excuse for murder?

Since responsibility exists as a rule of social interaction and not

normal, or even abnormal brain processes, it makes no sense to






excuse the breaking of one kind of social rule but not another.

We should hold people responsible for their actions. No excuses.

That keeps everything simple and clean. Once accountability is

established, we can then take up the more challenging questions

of what as a society we should do about someone engaged in

wrongdoing. We can debate punishment, treatment, isolation, or

many other ways to enforce accountability in a social network.

Those are truly difficult issues. Establishing how to think about

responsibility is not.

Michael S. Gazzaniga is director of the SAGE Center for the Study of

the Mind at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He is the

author, most recently, of Who's In Charge? Free Will and the

Science of the Brain (HarperCollins, 2011).

9/1/2014 Hilary Bok: Want to Understand Free Will? Don't Look to Neuroscience - The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Education

http://chronicle.com/article/Hilary-Bok/131168/ 1/3


March 18, 2012

Want to Understand Free Will? Don'tLook to NeuroscienceBy Hilary Bok

As a philosopher, I often find speculation about the implications of

neuroscience for free will perplexing. While some neuroscientists

describe free will in ways that I recognize, others, including some

distinguished and thoughtful scientists, do not. Thus Benjamin

Libet: If "our consciously willed acts are fully determined by

natural laws that govern the activities of nerve cells in the brain,"

then free will is "illusory."

Most philosophers disagree.


Jerry A. Coyne


Against Free Will

Alfred R. Mele



Actions




Hilary Bok


Owen D. Jones


What?












Paul Bloom

Among philosophers the main division is between compatibilists,

who believe that free will is compatible with causal determinism,

and incompatibilists, who believe that it is not. Almost all

compatibilists think that we are free. Most are not determinists,

but they believe that we would be free even if our actions are fully

determined.

With the exception of those who work within a religious tradition,

philosophers tend to be naturalists who see individual mental

events as identical with events in our brains. When we say that a

person's choice caused her action, we do not mean that she

swooped in from outside nature and altered her destiny; we mean

that an event in her brain caused her to act. On this view, the claim

that a person chose her action does not conflict with the claim that

some neural processes or states caused it; it simply redescribes it.

For compatibilists, therefore, the problem of free will is not that

neuroscience reveals our choices as superfluous. It does not. Nor

do compatibilists deny that our choices cause us to do things. The

problem of free will for compatibilists is not to preserve a role for

deliberation and choice in the face of explanations that threaten

them with elimination; it is to explain how, once our minds and

our choices have been thoroughly naturalized, we can provide an

adequate account of human agency and freedom.

How can we reconcile the idea that our choices have scientific

explanations with the idea that we are free? Determinism does not

relieve us of the need to make decisions. And when we make

decisions, we need some conception of the alternatives available

to us. If we define an alternative as an action that is physically

possible, then determinism implies that we never have more than

one alternative. But since we cannot know in advance what we will

choose, if we define "alternative" this way, we will never know

what our alternatives are. For the purposes of deciding what to do,

we need to define our alternatives more broadly: as those actions

that we would perform if we chose them.

A person whose actions depend on her choices has alternatives; if



she is, in addition, capable of stepping back from her existing

motivations and habits and making a reasoned decision among

them, then, according to compatibilists, she is free.

Whether this view provides an adequate account of free will is not

a problem neuroscience can solve. Neuroscience can explain what

happens in our brains: how we perceive and think, how we weigh

conflicting considerations and make choices, and so forth. But the

question of whether freedom and moral responsibility are

compatible with free will is not a scientific one, and we should not

expect scientists to answer it.

Whatever their views on the compatibility of freedom and

determinism, most philosophers agree that someone can be free

only if she can make a reasoned choice among various

alternatives, and act on her decision; in short, only if she has the

capacity for self-government.

Neuroscience can help us to understand what this capacity is and

how it can be strengthened. What, for instance, determines when

we engage in conscious self-regulation, and how might we ensure

that we do so when we need to? If the exercise of self-government

can deplete our capacity for further self-government in the short

run, what exactly is depleted, and how might we compensate for

its loss? Does self-government deplete our resources in the short

run while strengthening them over time, like physical exercise, or

does it simply weaken our ability to govern ourselves without any

compensating benefit?

Neuroscience can answer those questions, and it can provide

causal explanations of human action, but it can't resolve the

question of whether or not such explanations are compatible with

free will.

Hilary Bok is an associate professor of philosophy at the Johns

Hopkins University. She is the author of Freedom and

Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 1998).

9/1/2014 Owen D. Jones: The End of (Discussing) Free Will - The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Education

http://chronicle.com/article/Owen-D-Jones/131169/ 1/5


March 18, 2012

The End of (Discussing) Free WillBy Owen D. Jones

The problem with free will is that we keep dwelling on it. Really,

this has to stop. Free will is to human behavior what a perfect

vacuum is to terrestrial physics—a largely abstract endpoint from

which to begin thinking, before immediately moving on to

consider and confront the practical frictions of daily existence.

I do get it. People don't like to be caused. It conflicts with their

preference to be fully self-actualized. So it is understandable that,

at base, free-will discussions tend to center on whether people

have the ability to make choices uncaused by anything other than

themselves. But there's a clear answer: They don't. Will is as free as

lunch. (If you doubt, just try willing yourself out of love, lust, anger,

or jealousy.)


Jerry A. Coyne


Against Free Will

Alfred R. Mele



Actions




Hilary Bok












Owen D. Jones


What?

Paul Bloom

All animals are choice machines for two simple reasons. First, no

organism can behave in all physically possible ways

simultaneously. Second, alternative courses are not all equal. At

any given moment, there are far more ways to behave disastrously

than successfully (just as there are more ways to break a machine

than to fix it). So persistence of existence consistently depends on

one's ability to choose nondisastrous courses of action.

Yet (indeed, fortunately) that choosing is channeled. Choices are

initially constrained by the obvious—the time one has to decide,

and the volume of brain tissue one can deploy to the task. Choices

are also constrained by things we have long suspected but which

science now increasingly clarifies.

For example, human brains are not general-purpose processors,

idly awaiting culture's activating infusion of consciousness.

Evolutionary processes pre-equip brains in all species with some

information-processing predispositions. Generally speaking, these

increase the probabilities that some combinations of

environmental circumstances—immediate physical and social

factors, contexts, and the like—will yield one subset of possible

(and generally nondisastrous) behaviors rather than others.

Also, we now know that brains, though remarkable and often

malleable, are functionally specialized. That is, different brain

regions have evolved to do different things—even though they

generally do more than one thing. As a consequence, impairments

to specific areas of the brain—through injury or disease, for

example—can impede normal human decision-making. And those

impediments can, in turn, relax inhibitions, increase impulsive

and addictive behaviors, alter the ability to make moral

judgments, or otherwise leave a person situated dissimilarly from

the rest of the population.

Which brings us to law. How will insights from the brain sciences




affect the ways we assess a person's responsibility for bad

behavior? Answer: only somewhat, but sometimes significantly.

Many people assume that legal responsibility requires free will,

such that an absence of free will necessarily implies an absence of

responsibility. Not true, as many scholars have amply

demonstrated. Full, complete, utterly unconstrained freedom to

choose among available actions might be nice to have, but it is not

in fact necessary for a fair and functioning legal system.

This is not to say that degrees of freedom are irrelevant to law.

Science hasn't killed free will. But it has clarified various factors—

social, economic, cultural, and biological in nature—that

constrain it.

The existence of constraints very rarely excuses behavior, as when

a person in an epileptic fit hits someone. But evidence of brain-

based constraints—which can vary from small to large—can be,

and indeed have been, relevant in determining the severity of

punishment. For example, some jurors in a recent Florida case

reported that evidence of abnormal brain functioning warranted a

murderer spending his life in prison, instead of being executed.

All behaviors have causes, and all choices are constrained. We

need to accept this and adapt. Brain sciences are revealing

complex and interconnected pathways by which the information-

processing activities of multiple brain regions coalesce to

influence human decision making. But this poses an advantage—

neither a threat nor a revolutionary transition—to the legal system.

In the near term, these complexities are more likely to inform than

to utterly transform law's justice-driven efforts to treat people

fairly and effectively.

Owen D. Jones is a professor of law and biological sciences at

Vanderbilt University. His book Law and Neuroscience, with Jeffrey

Schall and Francis Shen, is forthcoming from Aspen Publishers next

year.

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9/1/2014 Paul Bloom: Free Will Does Not Exist. So What? - The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Education

http://chronicle.com/article/Paul-Bloom/131170/ 1/8


March 18, 2012

Free Will Does Not Exist. So What?By Paul Bloom

I have a genetic condition. People like me are prone to violent

fantasy and jealous rage; we are over 10 times more likely to

commit murder and over 40 times more likely to commit sexual

assault. Most prisoners suffer from my condition, and almost

everyone on death row has it. Relative to other people, we have an

abundance of testosterone, which is associated with dominance

and aggression, and a deficit in oxytocin, associated with

compassion. My sons share my condition, and so does my father.

So, yes, I am male. The neuroscientist David Eagleman uses this

example to illustrate how our genetic blueprint partially

determines our actions, including our moral behavior. The rest is

determined by our environments; by the forces that act upon us

throughout our journeys from zygotes to corpses. And this is it—

we are physical beings, and so our natures and our nurtures

determine all that we are and all that we do.


Jerry A. Coyne


Against Free Will

Alfred R. Mele



Actions













Hilary Bok


Owen D. Jones


What?

Paul Bloom

This conclusion does not feel right. Common sense tells us that we

exist outside of the material world—we are connected to our

bodies and our brains, but we are not ourselves material beings,

and so we can act in ways that are exempt from physical law. For

every decision we make—from leaning over for a first kiss, to

saying "no" when asked if we want fries with that—our actions are

not determined and not random, but something else, something

we describe as chosen.

This is what many call free will, and most scientists and

philosophers agree that it is an illusion. Our actions are in fact

literally predestined, determined by the laws of physics, the state

of the universe, long before we were born, and, perhaps, by

random events at the quantum level. We chose none of this, and so

free will does not exist.

I agree with the consensus, but it's not the big news that many of

my colleagues seem to think it is. For one thing, it isn't news at all.

Determinism has been part of Philosophy 101 for quite a while

now, and arguments against free will were around centuries before

we knew anything about genes or neurons. It's long been a

concern in theology; Moses Maimonides, in the 1100s, phrased the

problem in terms of divine omniscience: If God already knows

what you will do, how could you be free to choose?

More important, it's not clear what difference it makes. Many

scholars do draw profound implications from the rejection of free

will. Some neuroscientists claim that it entails giving up on the

notion of moral responsibility. There is no actual distinction, they

argue, between someone who is violent because of a large tumor

in his brain and a neurologically normal premeditated killer—both






are influenced by forces beyond their control, after all—and we

should revise the criminal system accordingly. Other researchers

connect the denial of free will with the view that conscious

deliberation is impotent. We are mindless robots, influenced by

unconscious motivations from within and subtle environmental

cues from without; these entirely determine what we think and do.

To claim that people consciously mull over decisions and think

about arguments is to be in the grips of a prescientific conception

of human nature.

I think those claims are mistaken. In any case, none of them follow

from determinism. Most of all, the deterministic nature of the

universe is fully compatible with the existence of conscious

deliberation and rational thought. These (physical and

determined) processes can influence our actions and our

thoughts, in the same way that the (physical and determined)

workings of a computer can influence its output. It is wrong, then,

to think that one can escape from the world of physical causation

—but it is not wrong to think that one can think, that we can mull

over arguments, weigh the options, and sometimes come to a

conclusion. After all, what are you doing now?

Paul Bloom is a professor of psychology and cognitive science at

Yale University. His next book, Just Babies: The Origins of Good

and Evil, will be published next year by Crown. You can follow him

at @paulbloomatyale.

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andreology • 2 years ago

I am sorry that in spite of achieving tenure at one of the world's most prestigousuniversities, Mr. Bloom experiences himself as a "mindless robot." Many of uswho are not philosophers find that life is filled with a sense of purpose. It ispossible to experience real, though not absolute, power to influence othersthrough love.

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• Reply •

Robert Sidney LaVelle • 2 years ago andreology

Difficult though it may be to accept, Bloom isn't addressing only yourpersonal experience. I'm sure Prof. Bloom would be quite happy for youto continue telling yourself comforting little stories about purpose.

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