THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY

OF HONG KONG

ON THE RELATION BETWEEN HEGEL'S ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE

AND

HIS MISSION OF SOCIALIZATION AND HISTORICALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

IN THE

PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

A Thesis Submitted to

the Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for

The Degree of Master of Philosophy

by

SZE MAN-HUNG, STEPHEN

HONG KONG, MAY 1979..

CONTENT :

Preface

Introduction

1. Hegel v.s. Kant -- The Unity of Form and Content.

2. Positivity in Hegel's early Thought.

3. The Problem of Externalization.

4. Subjective Spirit -- Consciousness for-itself.

5. Objective Spirit -- Life in-itself.

6. The Living-form -- Socialization and Historicalizationof Absolute Spirit.

7. True Speculation and Negativity in Hegel.

8. The Task of Logos-metaphysics -exemplifiedby Hegel.

9. Negativity or Positivity ? -- a final word.

Footnotes

Bibliography

p.1

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p.68

For the Remembrance of Goethe's Fanst I.

Was bin ich denn, wenn es nicht m'dglich ist.

Der Menschhei t Krone zu erringen.

Nach der sich alle Sinne dringen?

(Faust 1803-1805)

(What am I, if I can never hope

to hold the crown of my humanity

which is the aim of all my senses?)

1Preface

If a preface cannot be a better introduction or a polemic

than Hegel' s 'Phenomenology of Mind,,. it can only serve as

an apology for a young obtrusion in the field of philosophy.

To write on Hegel' s 'Phenomenology' after nearly two cen-

turies of incessant toils of our fore-runners seems an un-

requited task in serveral aspects: Can anyone contribute more

still, after the publication of Jean Hyppoli te' s' Genese et

structure de la phenom4nologie de l' esprit d'Hegel'? More

still is the fact .that Hyppoli te' s work is rivalled by G.

Lukacs' 'Der junge Hegel,, H, Marcuse' s 'Reason and Revolution,

J. Habermas' 'Knowledge and Interest' and 'Theory and Practice',

and yet many more great commentators and re-interpretators.

Amidst this profusion of immense scholarship, however, one

easily deplores at the obscuratism of the present. age in

cajoling away Hegel as obscure and Teutonic, pledging a

world of excuses to refrain from understanding and thus

acknowledging his philosophical contribution to the world.

lorse still are scoffers that stand on their dogmatic po-

3i ti ons where the 'cunning' or 'storm' of reason has long

ago ravaged and annihilated. Time and again reason has to

saint 'its grey in grey', to remind of the vale of death

2where these pedagogic scoffers rest content with their me-

diocre complacency.

These people, on further reflexion, are as excusable as

they are pitiable; for the view-points, emphases, and in-

terpretations of the immense scholarship leave one con-

founded and astounded. To emerge with total mastery of the

schools of thoughts is a Herculean task, and is far beyond

our scope here. Yet a thorough study of the system of Hegel

has several pre-requisites. Here lies the traffic of our

toil

The 'Phenomenology' is the first mature system of Hegel

which he retained and clung onto for the rest of his life.

It was intended to be the first part to a 'System der Wissen-

schaft'. In his 'Science of Logic'. he mentioned that:

'In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have exhibited conscious-

ness in its movement onwards from the first immediate op-

position of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The

path of this movement goes through every form of the rela-

tion of consciousness to the object and has the notion of

science for its result. The notion therefore needs no justi-fication here because it has received it in that work and

it cannot be justified in any other way than by this emer-

gence in con-sciousness, all the forms of yhich are resol-ved into this notion as into their truth.'

Thus, Hegel's system presupposes a process of development.

This development is no less historical than it is epist-

emological, and here rests the furthest development of

German Idealism. The 'Phenomenology', unlike the works of

Kant and Fichte, presupposes no 'transcendental deduction'.

For Hegel, the necessary development of the reality is as

p.3

much method as it is Truth. Truth in its ultimacy is the

consummation of Being and thought in One. And it is the task

in this thesis to expose fully 'the Relation between Hegel' s

Absolute Knowledge and his mission of Socialization and His-

torization of Knowledge in the Phenomenology of Mind.'

It is my hope that the exposition can render more clear

the deep insight of Hegel, and to convince ourselves that

his philosophy not only transcends the former German Idea-

lists but is in many aspects the central problem, or rather,

acknowledged contribution in eternal philosophical activi-

ties.

4Introduction:-

It is an undeniable fact that German Idealism has,since

its appearance, exerted great influence upon philosophical

thought. It has 'brought under principles not only the utmost

possibilities of human knowledge but also, and above all,

the utmost possibilities of human morality, and presented them

in such a way that they were teachable and learnable for all

of humanity.' 2 Yet authors like Werner Marx still per-

haps fails to acknowledge the fact that the Idealism of He-

gel aims further-not so much to teach as to relate theory

and praxis. If Kant and Fichte succeeded in laying down prin-

ciples of human knowledge and morality, it was just the rever-

se that Hegel claimed his victory-- namely, the destruction

of all presuppositional principles, and to sublate (aufheben)

all pre-established positions and principles. Through this

Hegel arrived at his own conclusion, whereby the past philo-

sophical systems were transcended.

How did the hitherto philosophical systems err? We may say

that all philosophical systems up to Hegel have erred in their

initial positions of posing the opposition of subject and ob-

ject, thought and being, value and fact, mind and matter, as

well as reason and world. (In fact, this phenomenon is still

prevalent in philosophical circles today, to the changrin of

Hegel, who naturally would think that this has since him been

destroyed once and for all.)

5This error had been acknowledged by Schiller and Schelling.

The former expressed it quite unconsciously in his search for

a new genre of activity that unites in overcoming the opposi-

tion between the 'sensuous drive (der si nnli the Trieb)' and

the 'formal drive(der Formtrieb)', the latter overtly express-

ed that:

'... the separation arose originally in that man posited

himself as standing in contradiction to the external world.

... As in the creation story, Schelling sees the fall of man

in the fact that man ate of the tree of knowledge. What se-

=duced him was not the snake, however, but the spirit of know-l edge and the freedom intrinsic to it., 3

Thus Schelling posed a new outlook to transcend the old

dogma of the past philosophical systems, a new intellectual

intuition:

'If this higher term is only the principle of the identity

of the absolutely subjective and the absolutely objective, of

the conscious and the unconscious, which separate in free act-

ion in order to manifest themselves., then this higher term can-

not itself be either subject or object or both at once: it is

only the absolute identity, in which there is no duality and

which can never reach consciousness precisely because dualityis the condition of all conscious. 4

Thus the question emerges as: What justifications can we

put forward in supposing an absolute position whereby the

fundamental question in philosophy is always a subl ati on

of duality?

6

1. Hegel v. s. Kant-- The unity of Form and Content.

Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle has been

occupied in accounting for the correlation of Being and

Becoming, Form and Content, Mind and Matter. The philoso-

phy of subjectivity developed since Descartes as a con-

tinuation of the problematic raises the problem of 'the

thinking subject' and 'that which is thought'. The Empi-

ricists likewise, transform the question into the relation

of 'Understanding, and 'Knowledge', and this is the cen-

tral theme of G.Berkeley in demarcating 'mind' from *ideas',

Both idealistic attempts of Descartes and Berkeley aim at

resolving the opposition of 'subject' and 'object'. Des-

cartes through his hyperbolic doubt re-establishes the

subject as the ultimate arbitrator of 'Truth's and Berke-

ley resorts to mind as the perceiver of reality as ideas.

Eventually, both have recourse to God as the 'transcend-

ental ground' of the possibility of knowledge.

Kant surpasses this two forerunners first through a cri-

tique of both trends. In the investigation into the 'Sy-

stem of the principles of Pure Understanding' in his first

critique, he comes to a refutation of Descartes as problem-

atic and Berkeley as dogmatic in their justification of

the possibility of reality-- the ground of empirical

thought.

7

Kant' s refutation of idealism examines the two routes to

establish the concept of 'object', that of Descartes and

that of Berkeley. 'Idealism-- meaning thereby material id-

ealism-- is the theory which declares the existence of ob-

jects in space outside us either to be merely doubtful and

indemostrable (Descartes) or to be false and impossible

(Berkeley). 5 Thus Kant regards their attempts as both fail-

ures. The 'problematic idealism' of the former 'merely pleadE

incapacity to prove, through immediate experience, any exist-

ence except our own,...'' and object or reality as such can

only.be asserted problematically and never possibly proved.

Thus the unity of subject and object, or the identity in

difference, 'cannot be achieved', and Descartes cannot up-

hold experience with the mere retention of 'imagination of

outer things'. This leaves Descartes with a problematic

subject, still abstractly an arbitrator of truth, yet with-

out reality.

Berkeley's subjective idealism places him in a no less

awkward position. The nature of ideas as givenness to the

mind furnishes the reality as such, but this reality is

always reality for the mind. Besides, both Berkeley and

Hume have drawn no distinction of levels between 'ideas

of sensation' (impressions) and 'ideas of ref l exi on' (ideas),

they consider them to be different only in 'the degrees of

force and liveliness,...' 7 Thus, knowledge for the Empiri-

cists is reduced all to a matter of content, of the givenness

as such.

8

Kant approaches this problem from a critical point of view.

He observes the need of a 'call to reason to undertake anew

the most difficult of all its task, namely, that of self--knowr-

l edge,...' 8 Thus, in the eyes of Kant, skepticism has failed

in its task to negate reason while likewise in 'despising

all (to Kant) settled modes of life, (and) broke up from time to

time all civil society.' 9 Nor has rationalists succeeded in

employing' principles which it (reason) has no option save to

employ in the course of experience,...' 10 4Rising with their

aid (since it is determined to this also by its own nature)

to ever higher, ever more remote conditions,... it therefore

finds itself compelled to resort to principles which overstep

all possible empirical employment,... ,11

Critical philosophy emerges with the need to overcome all

the past difficulties, and the task is the setting up 'a tri-

bunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dis-

miss all groundless pretenti ons, not by despotic decrees, but

in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws,, This

tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason.' 12

The Copernican revolution of philosophy undertaken by Kant

finally arrives at the conclusion that 'experience is itself

a species of knowledge which involves understanding and un-

derstanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me

prior to objects being given to me,... 913

9

The full force of the critical philosophy of Kant emerges

when the' a priori concepts' of understanding and that of ex-

perience are established as the two fundamental and i ndi spen-

sible conditions of knowledge, and it rests in the 'Transcend-

ental Apperception, which is the 'highest principle in the

whole sphere of human knowledge.' It is through this synthetic

unity of apperception that the totality of the objective real-

ity is given to us as the 'object', which of course is never

the thing-in-itself, but rather the givenness to consciousness,

the objectivity to subjectivity. Kant makes this point clear-

ly:

'The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an ob-

jective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition

that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition

under which every intuition must stand in order to become an

object for me. For otherwise, in the absence of this synthesis,

the manifold would not be united in one consciouness. 014

Here, Kant has established the true root to the future tran-

scendental phenomenology, the unity of subjectivity and object-

ivity in the unity of consciousness and that which is being con-

scious of. It is this identity in difference of reason and re-

ality that furnishes the ground to Hegel' s idealism. Here, a

remark must be added that German Idealism since Kant with his

transcendental apperception has transcended the problematic

(and to Kant mere empirical conciousness of Descartes) ego of

consciousness and the mere factuality of experience.

10

Hegel upholds that transcendental apperception as the great-

est contribution of Kant's critical philosophy to true 'specu-

lative thought'. He stated explicitly that:

'This view has at least the merit of giving a correct express-

ion to the nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's

endeavours is to understand the world, to appropriate and sub-

due it to himself: and to this end the positive reality of the

world must be as it were crushed and pounded, in other words,

idealized. At the same time we must note that it is not the

mere act of our personal self-consciousness which introduces

an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this id-

entity is itself the absolute. The absolute is, as it were, so

kind as to leave individual things to their own enjoyment, andit again drives them back to the absolute unity.'14

This passage from the Lesser Logic of Hegel exposes the whole

development of thought of Hegel, from his early theological con-

cern in his Berne (1793-6) and Frankfurt (1797-1800) periods

to his development of his first mature system in the Phenomeno-

logy. One thing we have to comment on before we start with the

concept of 'positivity' of Hegel is that we can never belittle

the development of German Idealism in the final synthesis of

the subject and the object, the particular and the universal.

The passage quoted above indicates the route taken by Hegel,

which has been opened up by Kant, is that of the sublation

(Aufhebung) of the particular to the absolute. I f Kant has

11succeeded in establishing' subjectivity' that transcends the

particular and empirical ego, he still has not contrived to

overcome the difference (Different) between Reason and history,

theory and praxis, form and life in concrete that is to say,

Kant has subsumed successfully experience under concept, but

the particular, or reality in its givenness is never a living

form, it is never the developing Idea or Notion (Begriff), it

is mere the abstraction of living thought. The task of objective

idealism is to explicate the dialectical development of the 'No-

tion.'

12

2. Positivity in Hegel Is early Thoughts

The development of a social and historical notion of spirit

of Hegel begins at his earliest stage in Berne and Frankfurt.

His earliest concern is that of the 'positivity' of the Christ-

ian religion. 'Positivity, then, means primarily the suspens-

ion of the moral autonomy of the subject.' 15 It was the tran-

sition from the Greco-Roman world of classical antiquity to

medieval and modern world that-brought about a 'positive'

religion in which the religious tenets are posited by the

religious authority. These tenets claimed eternal truth ir-

respective of our concrete situations and cannot be held up to

any of our rational reflections. Hegel is, particularly nos-

talgic of the classical antiquity where explicitly religion

is as much art, belief is as much reality, devotion is as

much happiness, gods are as much nature, and fate of the nation

is as much individual adventure. The obssession of Hegel with

the noble calm and tranquil simplicity of classical antiquity

strongly contrasts that of his uneasiness with 'positivity'

of modern chri sti ani ty, and also that of the ethics of sub-

jective idealism. Furthermore, Hegel is highly conscious of

social and historical background of the era that provided

the possibility for the development of the noble and also

highly anthropomorphic religion which embraced reason with

beauty, mind and the senses. He stated rightly that:

13

'As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down

by themselves, obeyed men whom they had themselves appointed

to office, waged wars on which they had themselves decided,

gave their property, exhausted their passions, and sacrificed

their own lives by thousands for an end which was their own.

They neither learned nor taught (a moral system) but evinced

by their own actions the moral maxims which they could call

their very own.... His will was free and obeyed its own laws

...the command was given nowhere in words but ruled him in-16

visibly.

The social reality created in Medieval period a dismal re-

ligion, making all subjects subservient under the Almighty,

blindly obedient to the decrees of the Divine, and the tran-

sition was really momentous, shocking to the acknowledgement

of Hegel. The decline of classical antiquity from the 'adequa-

cy of the deeds to the soul's inner demand for greatness, for

unfolding, for wholeness...: (It is the age when) Being and

destiny, adventure and accomplishment, life and essence are

then identical concepts.' to the Middle Ages and Modern Era

was a total split of Man and his World.

'All activity and every purpose now had a bearing on some-

thing individual activity was no longer for the sake of a

whole or an ideal. Either every one worked for himself or else

he was compelled to work for some other individual. Freedom

to obey self-given laws, to follow self-chosen leaders in

peacetime and self-chosen generals in war, to carry out plans

in whose formulation one had had one's share-- all this van-

ished. All political freedom vanished also the citizen's

right gave him only a right to the security of that property

which now filled his entire world.... But since all his aims

and all his activities were directed on something individual,

since he no longer found as their object any universal ideal

14

for which he might live or die, he also found no refuge in

his gods.... Greeks and Romans were satisfied with (their)

gods so poorly equipped, with gods possessed of human weak-

ness, only because they had the eternal and the self-subsis-tent within their own hearts.' 17

Here Hegel echoes exactly what Schiller exclaimed of,Class-

i.cal Antiquity in its simple and great humanity

'Da die GOotter menschlicher noch waxen

Waren Menschen gottlicher.'

(There when the gods still more man-like were

Were men more god-like.)

Here we are reminded by Hegel of the sad plight of the

Christians:

'Without a country of his own, the citizen lived in a poli-

ty with which nojoy could be associated, and all he felt

was its pressure. He had a worship to whose celebration and

festivals he could no longer bring a cheerful heart, becausecheerfulness had flown away out of life.' 18

To trace the cause of this sad plight of Christians necess-

arily-arrives at the concept of 'positivity', whereby the

Christians escaped from the former unity of essence and exist-

ence:

'They had not attained truth and freedom by their own exert-

ions only by laborious learning had they acquired a dim sense

of them and certain formulas about them. Their ambition was to

grasp and keep this doctrine faithfully and to transmit it

equally faithfully to others without any addition without

letting it acquire any variations in detail by working on it

themselves.

15

Hegel deplores at the present situation as moral degradation.

Like the other German Idealists, he considered the greatest

fault of man as the 'inability to use one's own understand-

ing without the guidance of another.' So moral degradation

here exhibited by 'positive' Christianity is a function to

the loss of freedom. This despair of the present situation,

which in the phenomenology later is further developed into

a system of passages from despair to new transcendence, opens

up philosophical enquiry. Hegel questions the causes of such

a drastic change of world-views and poses urgent questions

of great relevance to modern man:

'How could a religion have been supplanted after it had been

established in states for centuries and intimately connected

with their constitutions (that of Greco-Roman religion)?

What can have caused the cessation of a belief in gods to

whom cities and empires ascribed their origin, to whom the

people made daily offerings, whose blessings were invoked

on every enterprise, under whose banners alone the armies had

conquered, who had been thanked for victories, who received

joyful songs and earnest prayers, whose temples and altars,

wealth and status, were the pride of the people and the glory

of the arts, and whose worship and festivals were but occa-

sions for universal joy? How could the faith in the gods

have been reft from the web of human life with which it had

been interwoven by a thousand threads? A habit of body can be

opposed by other physical capacities operating together with

the will the habitual exercise of one psychical capacity

(fixity of will excepted) can be opposed by other psychical

16capacities. But 'how strong must be the counterweight have been

to overcome the power of a .psychical habit which was not iso-

lated, as our religion frequently is today, but was intertw-

ined in every direction with all men's capacities and most

intimately interwoven even with the most spontaneously active of

them. 20

The deep insight of Hegel is revealed in his remark that

the phenomena are not enough, despite their startling changes

and great upheaval of the reality. He wants to go deeper into

the underlying roots which is true philosophical 12,bour. For

him•

The supplanting of paganism by Christianity is one of those

remarkable revolutions whose causes the thoughtful historians

must labor to discover. Great revolutions which strike the

eyes at a glance must have been preceeded by a still and

secret revolution in the spirit of the age, a revolution not

visible to every eye, especially imperceptible to contempora-

ries, and as hard to discern as to describe in words. It is a

lack of acquaintance with this spiritual revolution which

makes the resulting changes astonishing. The supersession of

a native and immemorial religion by a foreign one is a revo-

lution which occurs in the spiritual realm itself, and it is

thus of a kind whose causes must be found all the more direct-

ly in the spirit of the times. 1 21

Here we can trace the two roots to the future phenomenology.

Hegel's dissatisfaction with the apparent change of the reli-

gious phenomenon as somethina self-contained. He rather would

17want to see the change as structured in the development of the

spirit of the age as a whole. Further, the correlation of the

religious phenomenon with that of the spirit of the age re-

sembles that-of the development of the phenomenology from

particular to totality, the phenomenal to the absolute.

Besides, there is also one particularly important aspect

that is shown by Hegel's careful investigation, namely, that

he is dissatisfied with his contemporaries in acknowledging

the necessary conflict of morals with reality, religion of

mere individuals with human secular happiness. Here rests

his accusal of his contemporaries not just in their inability

to discern but also to formulate such a question. A philoso-

phy that uphold a definite human nature can never account for

the concrete revertion of human living reality exemplified

by the transformation of religion from Classical Antiquity

that once flourished for centuries into that of a sickly

and enslaving Christianity of the modern world. Hegel open-

ly states his oppositions to those that assign a fixed human

nature to mankind. For him 'the general concept of human na-

ture admits of infinite modifications (and) ...the living na-

ture of man is always other than the concept of the same, and

hence what for the concept is a bare modification a pure ac-

cident, a superfluity, becomes a necessity, something living,

perhaps the only thing which is natural and beautiful.' 22

18

In rejecting the abstractions of traditional philosophies

in assigning mankind a nature, Hegel can proceed to develop

a system that can account for the transformation dynamically.

The former scales or metaphysical criteria cannot adequately

affix values to living human life at all. To Hegel, even

Kantian ethics sounds hollow in its attempt to conduct hu-

man lives. 'The (concept of the) freedom of the will is a

one-sided standard, because human manners and characteristics

together with the accompanying religion cannot be determined

by concepts at all.' 23 Hegel even go further to pose a trans-

cending consciousness (spirit) that is demanded by Nature

(i.e. Life) above understanding and reason. He argues that

religion in Classical Antiquity is natural to the demand of

naturalism. The loss of socio-historical setting with the

totality of the spirit of the age thus accounts for the posi-

tivity of Christianity. But Hegel further points out the fact

that the positivity of Christianity is not particular in it-

self, but rather, it reflects the 'nature of its time'. With

this Hegel arrives at the concept of 'alienation' (Entfremdung)

whereby the self in its impotence subjects itself to an uncon-

trollable reality which he fails to acknowledge to be his own

creation. The 'higher Being' seems the only recourse for

self-relief. Hegel succeeds in this way to contrast the two

19aspects of the human consciousness, the in-itself in Classical

Antiquity and the for-itself in Modern Era. The most signifi-

canct step is his positing a transcendance of the two, a sub-

lation (Aufhebung) when 'another mood awakens, when this natur

(human spirit)begins to have asense of itself, and thereby to

demand freedom in and for itself instead of placing it in its

supreme Being, .,,#24 then are all the previous contradictions

overcome. The early theological reflections of Hegel has al-

ready paved the way of a dialectical thought,

20

3. The Problem of Externalization.

If Hegel has realized the drastic change of the totality

of human living reality from Classical Antiquity to the Mo-

dern Era in the course of history which all previous essen-

tialistic philosophical systems (including the formalistic

or subjectivistic idealism of Kant) have failed to account

for, his only possibility of furnishing a solution can only

rest in attributing to new scheme of philosophical system in

which essence and existence, ideal and reality are never of

two permanent realms, whereby 'essence and existence are

actually interrelated in philosophy, and the process of prov-

ing the truth there has to do with the existing object itself.

The essence arises in the process of existence, and converse-

ly, the process of existence is a 'return' to the essence.25

However, Hegel is careful enough from falling into the opti-

mism of Leibniz with his 'the best of all possible worlds'

and the' pre-established harmony' of divine decree. His

pan-logism, instead, walks hand in hand with his pan-tragism,

and it is through mediation that the immediacy of the unity

of the individual with his world is lost. The loss is a new

starting point through which again the new identity in diffe-

rence is retrieved. This mediation is made possible through

'externalization' of the subject.

Hegel employs the term 'externalization' (Entausserung) in

21several levels of meaning in the course of the development

of his thought from the earliest stage. Hegel first makes

a distinction between 'externalization' (Entausserung) with

the more sombre 'alienation' (Entf rerndung). The first is of

a more general indication in the deprivation of the objects

of work (of the slaves) from the actual possession of the

producer. Hegel traces this development as the institution

of property in his 'Philosophy of Right'. 'The institution

of property Hegel here related to the fact that man had come

to live in a world that, though molded by his own knowledge

and labor, was no longer his, but rather stood opposed to his

inner needs-- a strange world governed by inexorable laws,

a dead world in which human life is frustrated.' 26 Alienation

is of a more specific use. It bears a strong sense of value

judgment and is used by Hegel in marking out the estrange-

ment (another way of translating 'Entfremdung') of the individ-

ual from culture, or that of the estrangement of actual life

from moral principles. It was during the Jena period that

the pan-logical notion of historical development also emer-

ged amidst the pan-tragical. Hegel observes the historical

necessity of human spirit to transcend the immediacy of the

identity of consciousness with the living reality. The natur-

al aspect of the ancient Greeks, of being immediately in har-

mony with 'nature' (undi f f errenti ated, meaning nature and so-

ciety at once), must be overcome, to be estranged before be-

ing re-identified.

22

It is through externalization that history and society in

their different stages of transformation are relevant to

thought, and the development of the human spirit is only

possible in and through the process of historicalization

and socialization of 'Experience' (Erfahrung). 'Experience'

in Hegel is more concrete than in Kant. In fact, Hegel has

the critique of the positivism of Kant in mind when he re-

marks that matter, or sensation is something abstract, and

Kant has failed to deal concretely with the' ob ject' (of course

a concept in German Idealism), which is manifested on several

different levels of 'Experience', save only (for Kant) in the

epistemological realm. With the positive residue of the gi-

venness of sense experience and the thing-in-itself behind,

the 'transcendental object x` in the first edition, at least,

of Kant's first critique, Kant has stated his refusal to pro-

ceed beyond the mere given, that which is representated.

This is precisely the point of departure of Hegel' s cri-

tique and construction:

'To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason

to bear on the object from the outside and so to tamper with

it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account

here it is mind in its freedom, the culmination of self-cons-

ciousness reason, which gives itself actuality and engenders

itself as an existing world. The sole task of philosophic

science is to bring into consciousness this proper work of

the reason of the thing itself. 27

23

For Hegel, there is no givenness but only that-which-is-

posited by human activity (of different levels) as object.

So Hegel proceeds to criticize the abstraction of sense ex-

perience still further:

'Matter offers resistance to me-- and matter is nothing ex-

cept the resistance it offers to me.-- that is, it presents

itself' to my mind as something abstractly independent only

when my mind is taken abstractly as sensation. (Sense-per-

ception perversely takes mind as sensation for the concrete

and mind as reason as the abstract.) In relation to the will

and property, however, this independence of matter has notruth.' 28

In Hegel' s phenomenology, he first develops his mature

system what the philosophy-system of Hegel is based on, and

the course of the phenomenology is that of externalization

on the each and every stage of the whole ascension of the

spirit. This is the idea of Hegel's 'Logic' of historicalization

and socialization of thought, and he has nowhere explained this

more clearly than in the later added preface to the 'Phenome-

nology of Spirit:

'... our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition.

The spirit of man has broken with-the old order of things hi-

therto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is

in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past

and to set about its own transformation.... But this new world

... comes on the stage to begin with in its immediacy.... In

the same way, the crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not

found complete in its initial stages. The beginning of the new

24spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in manifold

forms of spiritual culture it is the reward which comes afte

a chequered and devious course of development, and after much

struggle and effort. It is a whole which, after running its

course and laying bare all its content, returns again to it-

self it is the resultant abstract notion of the whole. But

the actual realization of this abstract whole is only found

when those previous shapes and forms, which are developed

anew again, but developed and shaped within this new medium,

and with the meaning they have thereby acquired. 29

That Hegel has deliberately contrasted his phenomenological

development of the Absolute with the immediate identity of

self and the Absolute in Fichte and Schelling is obvious,

and Hegel transcends all his forerunners because of his in-

troduction of the mediation between 'subject' and 'object',

'mind' and 'reality', through 'externalization'. Since the

period of Jena (1801-1803), Hegel has introduced the cate-

gory of 'labour'(Arbeit) as the root of externalization.

'The labour process is responsible for various types of so-

cial integrations, conditioning all the subsequent forms of

community that correspond to these types: the family, civil

society, and the state., 30 We may so conclude that even the

'Philosophy of Right'. as the late system of Hegel, is still

founded upon social labour, for the first instance of extern-

alization of mind in the book is that of property-- socially

appropriated labour.

25

It is social labour that creates human society in its va-

rious stages of transformation, and it is the historicity of

the finished products of labour that forms human history. The

totality of human reality is the creation of labour, in Hegel's

mind reflected. We must, however, prevent ourselves from draw-

ing over-sweeping conclusions of condemning Hegel as an idea-

list (this is what the coarse Marxists often do, and that I

agree with J.Hyppblite that G.Lukacs has successfully avoid-

ed in his 'Der junge Hegel'),. for Hegel has never forsaken

the intimate dialectical relationships of mind and its po-

sited reality. He never stops reminding his readers in his

'Phenomenology' of the entirety,or self-enclosedness, of the

structure of each stage in the whole course of development.

'The society (created by social labour) is, however, a com-

munal effort, a transaction of each and all, the object itself

but in this object the individual becomes alien to himself.

This aliecation, which Hegel identifies with objectification

or the externalization of man through his labour, is a new

concept., 31 This externalization is where history, which ac-

cording to Hegel is 'never the place of good fortune' begins.

This history, we must note clearly, is not natural history,

nor that of history of mankind as a nature being, but it is

the history of the development of human civilization-- em-

bracing all the aspects of cultural activities of mankind.

26This history is the over-coming of the naturalness of man-

kind, of his being conditioned by nature. This is made pos-

sible by the organized social labour of mankind, and thus the

emerging of the human society, but here the subsumption of

the individual under the category of collectivity has meant

for mankind the oppression of the society, and this is ex-

plicated by the master and slave relationship of Hegel. The

great Hegel commentator A. Ko j've explains:

'...Man who works transforms given nature.... Where there is

work, then, there is necessary change, progress, historical

evolution.... Work is Bildung,... on the one hand, it forms,

transforms the World, humanizes it by making it more adapted

to Man on the other, it transforms, forms, educates man, it

humanizes him by bringing him into greater conformity with

the idea that he has of himself., an idea that-- in the be-ginning-- is only an abstract idea, an ideal.* 32

Hegel is a philosopher of the concrete in his development

of the, historicalization and socialization of humanity, he is

no idealist of abstraction like Kant, Fichte and Schelling.

If we want to label him still as a idealist following or

consummating German Idealism, then he is an idealist of a

very special kind. We have to let Hegel speak for himself:

'Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls

within its experience for what is found in experience is mere-

ly spiritual substance, and, moreover, object of its self.

Mind, however, becomes object, for it consists in the process

27

of becoming an other to itself, i.e. an object for its own

self, and in transcending this otherness. And experience is

called by this process by which the element that is immedia-

te, unexperience, i. e. abstract-- whether it be in the form

of sense or of a bare thought-- externalizes itself, and then

comes back to itself from this state of estrangement, and by

so doing is at length set forth in its concrete nature and

real truth, and becomes too a "possession of consciousness'32

The consummation of Hegel' s 'Phenomenology' is the consum-

mation of the whole 'logos-metaphysics, but the fundament

is the historicalization and socialization of human spirit

as 'experience'.

28

4. Subjective Spirit-- Consciousness for-itself.

The point of departure for Kant in his first critique was

the primacy of sensuous experience which had been asserted

since the 'idealism' of Berkerley. Despite the discontent

of Kant with the consequent possible skepticism engendered

by pushing empiricism to an extreme in David Hume., neverthe-

less, the givenness of sensuous experience is never doubted.

The acceptance of the primacy of sensuous experience which

with the power of intuition and understanding whereby the

world of 'objects' i.e. objectivity, is formed, renders the

idealism of Kant an epistemology. It is a critical epistem-

ology, a philosophical anthropology also, since strictly

speaking to elucidate the limit and scope of human know-

ledge is also to know man, to understand what man is, and

it is therefore no great surprise that Kant has always been

considered as a humanist, inheriting the tradition of Renai-

ssance and Enlightenment humanism,

The idealism of Kant and Fichte, in the eyes of Hegel, con-

stitutes only a very static and subjectivistic aspect, and there-

fore very limited view, of man. Subjective idealism not only

confines human activity in the mere speculative one on epistem-

ology-- the passive activity of sensuous experience and under-

standing the mere world of givenness (although it is the world

of givenness to man), it further conceives man as the perman-

ent knowing subject only, and never the creating subject in

29history. Even the moral subject of Kant is no creator of a

objective realm of human living reality, but only the ulti-

mate ground for the justification of the actions of a moral

subject. So it is not so appalling as it is to the Kantians

that when Kant talked of politics, he immediately shift to

utilitarianism, taking politics as a means to achieve an end

which can fulfill both the moral and the volitional needs

of man and history is only thought with a possible end

at which all actions aim but is never reached, the solemn

infinite progress in history of Kant can mean as well the

infinite scourge of man in history. Worse still, Kant can

but think of the future as hypothetical and the course of

development of human history as based on certain postulates. 34

The defects of Kant's idea of history cannot ebe more clear-

ly attributed but to his epistemological philosophy of man,

or his philosophical anthropology which is only confined

to the subject as knowing subject, and is knowing only of

what is given. This has always been what Hegel criticizes

as the limitation of subjective idealism, and it is to over-

come the limitation of a epistemologico_philosophical anthro-

pology that Hegel begins in the first part of his 'Phenomeno-

logy of Mind'-- the Subjective Spirit.

The subjective spirit is what-Hegel refers to as the levels

of human mind or consciousness. This investigation into the

structure of human understanding and the transcendental na-

ture of human subjectivity has been opened up by the British

30empiricists and the earlier German idealists. The only and

which is also the essential difference between Hegel and his

fore-runners is that Hegel not only relates the different le-

vels of consciousness, but also distinguishes them as the

outcome of the different levels of activity. A rough scheme

can be presented

A. Consciousness as such-- (epistemological)

1. Senuous Certainty-- passive sensation.

2. Perception-- the object as 'force' in the

philosophy of Aristotle and

T.Pini

3. Understanding-- the object as' ob j ectivity°.

B. Self-consciousness-- (of social labour)

1. Master and slave 4

2. Stoicism and Skepticism.

3. Unhappy Consciousness in Judaeism and Christ-

ianity.

C. Reason-- The first identity of objectivity and

subjectivity,

1. In the observation of Nature.

2. In the actuality of human praxical action.

31

The first step towards a development of the system-

atic science in Hegel is different from that of Kant

and Fichte, who begin with that of the transcendental

analytic in the former and self-certainty of the Ego

in the latter for Hegel, as Jean Hyppolite most aptly

comments 'One must begin with naive consciousness,which

knows its object immediately or, rather, thinks that

it knows it, and show that in the knowledge of its ob-

ject it is in fact self-consciousness, knowledge of it-

self.' 35 In fact, the course taken by the dialectic from

the immediate sensous certainty to the idea of 'object'

and then finally that of understanding, the faculty of

human knowledge is that natural development from the

Heraclitean flux to that of realism in Plato, Aristotle,

Locke and Leibniz, and finally the idea of objectivity

in the understanding of idealism in Kant. It is that coit-

tinuous negation of the mere givenness to that of the

correlation of 'objectivity with subjectivity', But here

the objectivity, together with the subjectivi ty are given-

ness in abstract, that is, they are still objectivity

and subjectivity for the mere thinking mind. The human

subject or spirit is still nod totally certain of itself,

not yet certain of itself as creator of the world where-

by mind and the world is one. This is the limitation of

32Kantian idealism which is merely epistemological. It

can never but be imnmedi at- e, of being immediately cer-

tain of its being one with the world, that is, the world

as objectivity, as knowledge, is possible only with res-

pect to the human mind, to reason, to the transcendental

apperception which renders unity to the form and content

of knowledge. This cognitive subjectivity of German ideal

ism has to be further 'transcended, although it is already

the consummation of all the past philosophical systems.

The greatness of Hegelian philosophy is due to his

insight into the levels of human activity in which the

cognitive aspect is one. The introduction of the cate-

gory of social labour of Hegel surpasses all previous

speculative philosophical systems in that Hegel takes

into consideration of organized knowledge and praxis

as transcending mere speculative knowledge. Further,

the consciousness of the self must be attained by the

process of social organized labour, must be mediated in

order to become certain of it truth. Knowledge and labour

are phenomena particular to human beings it is only th-

rough them that the we-consciousness is attained. As He-

gel relates:

'Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself,

33

in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-

consciousness, that is to say, it is only by being acknow-

ledged or recognized.... Self-consciousness has before it

another self-consciousness it has come out of itself.' 36

The Master-and-Slave relationship for Hegel is thus the

struggle for recognition between consciousness, and it is

through: sod'.'domination that human society and history

progress. Here we may go so far as to claim that Hegel' s

philosophy is no mere epistemology, it is a philosophy

of the concrete activity of man, which is no mere com-

prehensive but also creative, the creativity is no mere

morality (which Hegel values highly and is discussed in

objective spirit), but in actual development in history.

The section of Subjective Spirit is concerned only in

elucidating the levels of human consciousness or human

mind which are not merely interrelated in knowledge, but

further differentiated on the different levels of human

activity. Consciousness is for itself only insofar as it

is self-externalizing through its di f ferents of activi-

ties, and for Hegel the socialization and historicaliza-

tion of 'Experience' of man is made possible only through

Master-and-Slave relationship. It is an extreme form of

externalization through which the slave has to alienate

his world created by his work from his immediate recog-

34

nition and satisfaction to that of the master. The over-

coming of this externalization is the mission for Hegel 's

'phenomenology' to attain absolute self-certainty of Truth

and Reality created by the Spirit.

In the last part of the Subjective Spirit, Hegel poses

the activity of reason in two aspects, in the activity of

comprehending Nature-- in the various enquiries (intell-

ectual activities) of natural sciences, and that of the

actual activities in the civil society. With the reflex-

ion of self-consciousness in German idealism, Nature and

society are asserted to be that of the product of human

activities, and mind or spirit thus recognizes itself in

its activities. Nevertheless, the spirit remains a subject-

ive spirit in that it recognizes itself as for itself, that

is, it knows itself only as the mind, the spirit, despite

its own progress or development from consciousness to

self-consciousness and then reason -through activities,

it has never known itself as correlated with the actual

course of history or the actual 'life' of the spirit, and

this task is undertaken by Hegel in the second part, name-

ly, the objective Spirit.

35

5. Objective Spirit-- Life in-itself.

The great German poet, Friedrich Schiller, has most beau-

tifully expressed his knowledge of the ancient Greeks in

their Classical Age that:

'If one recalls the beautiful nature that surrounded

the ancient Greeks if one ponders how familiarly this

people could live with free nature beneath their fort-

unate skies, how very much closer their mode of concept-

ion, their manner of perception, their morals, were to

simple nature, and. what a faithful copy of this their

poetry is, then the observation must be displeasing that

one finds so little trace among them of the sentimental

interest with which we moderns are attached to the scenes

and characters of nature. The Greeks is indeed to the high-

est degree precise, faithful, and circumstantial in des-

cribing them, yet simply no more so and with no more pre-

ferential involvement of his heart than he displays in the

description of a tunic, a shield, asuit of armour, some

domestic articles, or any mechanical product. In his love

of an object, he does not seem to make any distinction bet-

ween those which appear of themselves, and those which

arise as a result of art or the human will.... With

them civilization did not manifest itself to such an ex-

tent that nature was abandoned in consequence. The whole

structure of their social life was founded on perceptions,

not on a contrivance of art their theology itself was the

inspiration of a naive feeling, the child of a joyous

imaginative power,... At one with himself and happy in

the sense of his humanity he was obliged to remain with

it as his maximun and assimilate all else to it.' 37

Can there possibly be a more expressive and philosophical

36description and probing of the Classical Antiquity than

that of the scholarly and talented Schiller? This is life

of the Greeks, it is also the concept of 'life'- of German

idealism. Marcuse expresses the concept of life most re-

vealingly that:

'Dans la Pheriomenol ogi e de 1 'Esprit, le concept de Vie,

conformement au pro jet de 1' ouvrage qui est de d4velopper

l es differents modes de l 'esprit comme modes de 1' E spri t

dans son apparition, est centre expresse'ment sur la Vie

comme Esprit, sur la vie comme titre sachant et conscient,

comme 9tre se connaissant lui-meme.,38

(My attempted translation:) 'In the Phenomenology of Mind,

the concept of Life, in compliance with the project of the

work that develops the different modes of the spirit as

modes of spirit in its appearance, is centered overtly

in the life as spirit, in the life as knowing and con-

scious, as knowing itself as such.'

Hegel, in his theological writings, has already grasped

the concept of life as the 'naive' and 'sentimental' in

different epochs of history reminiscent of Schiller.

The Greek life in the eyes of Hegel is the in-itself

it is the immediate manifestation of the unity of the

individual with the reality, universal in the object.

37Objective Spirit is the externalization of the Subjective

Soirit. Spirit is no longer latent in the mind but is po-

sited and universalized as culture, as the living reality

of human world, as history. Being is self-actualizing th-

rough its own activity into the concrete universal, the

essence of the different periods of civilization.' It

is no longer the subjective certainty of discovering

itself immediately in being or of posing itself through

negating that being it knows itself as this world, as

the world of human history, and, conversely, it knows

this world to be the self.' 39 Thus, in Hegel 's philoso-

phical system, history is not something empirical and

contingent historicity is not originated through blind

forces, but is the result of organized effort of men in

the living reality. Mind and Reality are structured to-

gether as the totality, the entire universe of human

action and discourse. We can correlate the subjective

side with the objective side of human spirit as follows:

1. Consciousness-- The Greco-Roman world-- Immediate

Spirit

2. Self-consciousness-- Late Roman and-- Alienated

Medieval world Spirit

3. Self-certainty of-- Modern world-- Self-certain

Reason Spirit,

38

Here we can realize the full force of Hegel's idealism

which not just embraces the knowing subject, but also the

world as becoming with the knowing subject. This Becoming

of the spirit through its own historicity is history, not

just of a particular aspect, but universal history. The

being or better, becoming of this Spirit is' not distinct

from the action through which it poses itself.'

The first moment of life is manifested in the immediacy

of Greco-Roman world in which, as we have quoted Schiller

and Hegel, consciousness as such is life. Man is one with

Nature society is in harmony with the universe. Conscious-

ness makes no difference between self and the world. However,

this certainty is not yet Truth, it has not yet realized

its positing of a world that is the self. The immediacy

has to be overcome through externalization whereby the

self-certainty is lost. This is executed by the total

alienation in Master-and-Slave relationship. We may con-

clude that the Greeks were still unaware of the fact

that their greatness was built upon the subjugation of

the slaves under them, their glorious mastery of the state

and their unity of their humanity with nature were built

upon the negation of the reality of slaves. With the in-

39

c ess ant crises of wars and the ultimate decline of the

race and the rise of a universal empire in the period

of Imperium Romanum, culture was no longer indegenous

but foreign and subduing individual expressions. The

grandeur of the Imperium destroyed the unity of the ci-

tizen with the city state.

What followed was the universal state, which is an ab-

stract universal, as opposed to the individuals, in wh-

ich the individuals were self-conscious but only of their

negativity, only of their nothingness compared with the

state and the former essence of humanity the Greeks had

entertained was lost to man, the private individual, but

it is preserved as an ideal, as the omnipotent Christian

God. The former concern and unity of the citizen with the

city state was lost. Jean Hyppolite elucidates this new

moment most clearly:

'The citizen as such disappeared, and in his place the

private person appeared. The individual turned in on him-

self (since the in-itself with the former state was lost

and transformed only to the man for-itself)..o. The ab-

stract domination of the state and the individual's in-

terest, limited to his own preservation, replaced the beau-

tiful living relation between the individual and the whole,

... Private property is the goal of the individual, and

each individual can consider the state only as as alien

power which he tries to bend to his own interests., 40

40

The outcome of the new alienating state could main-

tain its abstract universality by 'Laws', with the de-

cline of the Roman Empire, these secular laws were re-

placed by divine laws of the Christian Church. The loss

of the naive freedom and autonomy is deemed necessary by

Hegel. For to him:

'... man's societal existence cannot be anything natu-

ral or immediate. The beautiful incarnation of such a na-

tural immediacy in Greek democracy, therefore, contains

within it the seeds of its own seeds of destruction. The

subject must steadily increase its own externalization,

estrangement, since it continually enters into new, rich-

er social relations and since its labour, its individual

efforts and activities turn it into the identical subject

object of these social relations.... Here then the ex-

ternalization of the human subject appears as the social

activities of the human race thanks to which a self-

created objective society comes into being drawing

its vital energy from the social activities of the

subject, grows steadily in complexity, richness and

scope, so that eventually it displaces what has been

lifeless substance and occupies it on behalf of the sub-

ject. In a word, by wholly estranging itself, the sub-

1I -e c.oct.11i.z.e.s. Inset f IE6ry ..a.rnd practice to be iden--

'tical with the substance o

The effort exerted by labour resulted in alienation of

the individual in post-classical era, and the incessant

labour that follows since the Renaissance and Enlighten-

41

ment is the effort to retrieve the lost identity. Culture

in German is' Bil dung', which also means 'formation'. To

Hegel, culture is alienation and its transformation.

'Culture and alienation are akin in meaning: the determi-

nate individual cultivates himself, and forms himself to es-

sentiality, through the alienation of his natural being....

To cultivate oneself is not to develop harmoniously, as in

organic growth, but to oppose oneself and rediscover oneselfthrough a rending and a separation.' 42

However, this retrieval of the self, the spirit, is only

possible first by the externalization through social labour

of the slave, and through history recognized, and this is

the meaning of the 'Phenomenology', the mission of Hegel in

his socialization and historicalization of Experience in

order to elucidate the stages through with the immediate

consciousness becomes spirit, the subject of Reason becomes

the World. Schiller also described the alienation of modern

culture and the consequent 'sentimental (sentimental is the)'

world that tempestuously yearns for the reunion of man with

Nature. To him it is because nature in us has disappeared

from humanity and we rediscover her in her truth only out-

side it, in the inanimate world. Not in our greater accord

with nature, but quite the contrary, the unnaturalness of

our situation, conditions,. and moods forces us to procure a

42satisfaction in the physical world, since none is to be hoped

for in the moral., 43 Here I must refer to the great Frankfurt

school philosopher and art critic T.W.Adorno who attributes

the most delicate analysis to lyric poetry in Modern Era.

For him, even the most lyrical poetry of modern times cannot

be but sentimental, and sentimental in a very uncontaminated

nature, that

'lyric expression, released from the heaviness of material

things, should evoke images of a life free of the impositions

of the everyday world, of usefulness, of the dumb drive for

self-preservation. This demand... is in itself social in na-

ture. It implies a protest against a social condition which

every individual experiences as hostile, distant, cold, and

oppressive(and).., protesting against these conditions, the

poem proclaims the dream of a world in which things would be

different.(But it is).,, only after a transformation into

human form can nature regain anew that which man's rule over

her has taken away. 144

We observe that Schiller, Hegel and Adorno all conceive

the pervertion of former unity of man and nature which pre-

dominated in Classical Antiquity by modern civilization of

a new way of social domination. Sentimental poetry yearns

for a re-union with nature, preoccupies itself with the pr-

aise of nature simply because nature is lost to man. How

J.W. von Goethe beautifully expressed this sense of nostal-

gia that is exemplified in his Faust I

43Wodurch bewegt er (der Dichter) alle Herzen?

Wodurch besiegt er jedes Element?

Ist er der Einklang nicht, der aus dem Busen dringt

Und in sein Herz die Welt zurucke schlingt?

Wenn die Natur des Fadens ew' ge Lange,

GleichgUltig drehend, auf die Sindel zwingt,

Wenn al l er Wes en unharmon'sche Menge

Verdriesslich durcheinander klingt,

Wer teilt die fliessend immer gleiche Reihe

Belebend ab, dass sie sick rhythmisch regt?

Wer ruft das Eizelne zur allgemeinen Weihe,

Wo es in herrlichen Akkorden schlagt?

Wer lasst den Sturm zu Leidenschaften wuten?

Das Abendrot im ernsten Sinne gluhn?

Wer s chuttet alle s chdnen Fruhl i ngsbl uten

Auf der Geliebten 'fade hin?

Wer flicht die unbedeuten grunen Blotter

Zum Ehrenkranz Verdiensten jeder Art?

Wer sichert den Olymp?vereinet Getter?

Des Menschen Kraft, im Dichter offenbart,

(Faust I,138-157)

(How-does the poet stir all hearts?

How does he conquer every element?

Is it not that music welling from his heart

Draws the world into his breast again?

When Nature spins with unconcern

The endless thread and winds it on the spindle,

When discordent masses of existing things

Sound their sullen dark cacophony,

Who divides the flowing changeless line,

Infusing life, and gives it pulse and rhythm?

44

Who summons each to common consecration

Where each will sound in glorious harmony?

Who bids the storm accompany the passions,

The sunset cast its glow on solemn thought?

Who scatters every fairest April blossom

Along the path of his beloved maid?

Who braids from undistinguished verdant leaves

A wreath of honor as a mark of merit?

Who safeguards Mount Olympus, who unites the gods?

Man's power which in the poet stands revealed.)

The greatness of Goethe rests not in his imagination of

pairing Nature with the sentiments of the poet, of linking

up the discordant spindle of life with harmonious rhythm,

of conducting individual voices into a heavenly chorus, of

binding storm with passions, thought with sunset, flowers

and beloved, verdant leaves with wreath of honour, and at

last Mount Olympus with the gods, but rather, in his des-

cribing a world that is indifferent to human imaginations

and poetical sentiments, in his accusal of a world of apathy

towards the discrepancy of human ideal and the despicable

human living reality. And it has always been the greatest

concern of Goethe and Schiller in recreating a new world,

not by political revolution, but by aesthetic education.

For to them, '...it is only through Beauty that man makes

his way to freedom.' 45 For Hegel, the task is achieved only

through philosophy, the absolute knowledge.

45

6. The Living-form --Socialization and Historicalization

of Absolute Spirit,

Schiller, in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education, has

mentioned a two-fold task that is needed to bring together

the phenomenal diversity of thought and reality--- of giv-

ing reality to the necessity within, and subjecting to the

law of necessity of the reality without.' 46 Jean Hyppolite

has maintained most persuasively that the task of Hegel 's

-Phenomenology is the de-objectification of the object, and

the de-subjectification of the subject. Truly Hegel's Phen-

omenology has exposed dialectically that the mind is only

knowable as the world, and the world is likewise only know-

able as the mind. To employ the terminology 'Structure' of

Structuralism can be very illuminating, and we can say that

mind and reality are a structured totality. It is through

the self-creating activities of man in various fields that

the essence and existence of man are manifested. Hegel thus

criticizes Classical and Modern philosophies like this:

'The manner of study in ancient times is distinct from that

of the modern world, in that the former consisted in the cul-

tivation and perfecting of the natural. mind. Testing life

carefully at all points, philosophizing about everything it

came across, the former created an experience permeated th-

46

rough and through by universals.// In modern times, however,

an individual finds the abstract form ready made. In straininc

to grasp it and make it his own, he rather strives to bring

forward the inner meaning alone, without any process of media-

tion, the production of the universal is abridged, instead of

the universal arising out of the manifold detail of concrete

existence.// Hence nowadays the task before us consists not

so much in getting the individual clear of the stage of sen-

suous immediacy, and making him a substance that thinks and

is grasped in terms of thought, but rather the very opposite:

it consist in actualizing the universal, and giving it spirit-

ual vitality, by the process of breaking down and supersed-ing fixed and determinate thoughts.' 47

Hegel forcefully contrasts his philosophy with that of his

fore-runners, the Platonic and Aristotelean systems that id-

entified being immediately with essence, and also that of

Kantianism which separated noumena from phenomena, form and

content. His philosophical system aims at the construction

of the 'Concrete Universal', the Living-form that Schiller

also aims at reconstructing. Thus what for Kant as 'essence'

which the ancients upheld as ultimate reality is but empi-

rical constructions based on the theorizing or epistemological

faculty of man, here Hegel transforms this into the 'Notion'

that develops through history. It is the living substance

that Hegel is concerned:

'The living substance, further, is that being which is

truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly realiz-

ed and actual solely in the process of positing itself, or in

mediating with its own self its transitions from one state

47

or position to its opposite. As subject it is pure and simple

negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting

up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplica-

ting and setting factors in opposition, which in turn is the

negation of this indifferent diversity and of the oppositionof factors that it entails., 48

If the coming into being of the externalized world is po-

sited, it is only with intention to re-integrate it into a

final identity that externalization is meant. 'For if the

objectivity of the world of objects is the product of a pro-

visional disunity in the identical subject-object, then in-

evitably, the criterion of the validity of the total process

can lie only in the demonstration that subject and object are

identical, in the self-realization of the identical subject-

object.' 49 And Hegel, in fact, has always presupposed the ul-

timate identity of subject-object well from the beginning:

'This transformation process is -a cycle that returns-into

it-self, a cycle that presupposes its beginning, and reaches

its beginning only at the end. So far as spirit, then, is of

necessity this self-distinction, it appears as a single whole,

intuitively apprehended, over against its simple conscious-

ness.1 50 We have earlier mentioned that Hegel has transcended

all his forerunners in developing social labour and history

as particularly pertaining to the' formation' (Bildunc5) of

48

man, and through this he has widen the concept of experience

which for Kant is only confined within theorectical exper-

ience, the course of socialization and historicalization of

knowledge embraces theory as well as social praxis, of theo-

rectical knowledge, of morality, of art and religion, and fi-

nally of speculative thought. The comprehension of the totality

of this experience and the attainment of the total conciousness

of being one with the world is the highest peak of speculative

thought-- of what Hegel calls the philosophical science as

such. The consummation is where:

'Spirit is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the world,

that which essentially is, and is per se it assumes objective,

determinate form, and enters into relations with itself-- it

is externality (otherness), and exists for self yet, in this

determination, and in this otherness, it is still one with it-

self.... This self-containedness, however, is first something

known by us, it is implicit in its nature it is substance

spiritual. It has to become self-contained for itself, on its

own account it must be knowledge of spirit, and must be con-

sciousness of itself as spirit. This means, it must be presente

to itself as an object, but at the same time straightway an-

nul and transcend this objective form it must be its own ob-

,, tin whirh J :L finds i tsel f r. 1ected. So far as its spi-

ritual content is produced by its own activity, it is only

we (the thinkers) who knows spirit to be for itself, to be

objective to itself but in so far as spirit knows itself to

be for itself, then this self-production, the pure notion,

is the sphere and element in which its objectification takes

49effect, and where it gets its existential form. In this way

it is in its existences aware of itself as an object in which

its own self is reflected. Mind, which, when thus developed,

knows itself to be mind, is science. Science is its realiza-

tion, and the kingdom it sets up for itself in its own nativeelement.' 51

One cannot help quoting the commentary of Kojc%ve in this

aspect that:

'Hegel was a microcosm, who incorporated in his particular

being the complete totality of the spatial-temporal realiza-

tion of universal being.... Hegel caused the complete whole

of the universal real process to penetrate into his individ-

ual consciousness, and then he penetrated this consciousness.

Thus this consciousness became just as total, as universal,

as the process that it revealed by understanding itself arid

this fully self-conscious consciousness is absolute Knowledge,

152...

To conclude, we can remark that the system of Hegel pre-

supposes the Phenomenology as much as the Phenomenology is

assumed through the first principle of identity of the subject

with the object. It is so and only so that we can claim Hegel' s

Phenomenology is structured with absolute knowledge that both

are indispensible to the other.

50

7. True Speculation and Negativity in Hegel.

Hegel openly claims that his philosophical system is true

speculation, and it differs from critical philosophy of that

of Kant. It is speculation in which reality is thought, and

it exposes a development which is dialectical of 'Experience'

in the various aspects of human activity. Unlike Kiantianism

which withdraws itself into a meta-theorectical enquiry, or

the question 'how knowledge is possible?', the concern which

'maintains thinking to be merely subjective thinking, abstract

universality as such, is exactly the same bare uniformity, is

undifferentiated, unmoved substantialityo..' S3 speculative

philosophy or 'the speculative' which in Classical Antiquity

thinks of 'Reality' as such, as the given, now' expressly rises

above such oppositions as that between subjective and object-

ive, which the understanding cannot get over, and absorbing

them in i t sedi f, evinces its own concrete and all-embracing

nature.' 54 Contrasting all previous systems of philosophy,

the Hegelian system negates all pre-established entities of

any system. For Hegel:

'Subjects and object, and so on, God, nature, understanding,

sensibility, etc., are uncritically presupposed as familiar

and something valid, and become fixed points from which to start

and to which to return. The process of knowing flits between

these secure points, and in consequence goes on merely along

the surface. Apprehending and proving consist similarly in see-

ing whether every one finds what is said corresponding to his

idea too, whether it is familiar and seems to him so and so or

51

55not'

The attempt of Hegel to criticize his forerunners is very

characteristic, for he mentions a little before that: 'Knowledge

is directed against this ideal presentation (of the totality)

which has hereby arisen, against this being-familiar and

well-known it is an action of universal mind, the concern

of thought.' 56 This attempt by 'defamiliarization' echoes that

of the later Russian Formalists in their development of the

theory of literrary criticism. This defamiliarization manifests

the characteristic of Hegelian philosophy as rendering a com-

letely new vision of the world to us-- as a totality, and

further indicates the break of Hegelian philosophical system

from all previous reified systems, which pose a presupposed

and never mediated entity as the starting point. 57

But this defamiliarization is in actual fact 'negativity',

it is the negation of any assumed entity, any primacy above

the actual course of development, and prior to 'Experience'.

Negativity is the power of 'Mind':

'But the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps

clear of destruction it endures death and in death maintains

its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utter-

Ly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, not by being a positive

qhich turns away from the negative, as when we say of anything

it is nothing or it is false, and, being then done with it, pass

Dff to something else: on the contrary, mind is this power only

Dy looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This

1welling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative

_nto being. That power is just what we spoke of above as sub-

52ject, which by giving determinateness a place in its substance,

cancels abstract immediacy, i.e immediacy which merely is, and,

by so doing, becomes the true substance, becomes being or imme-

diacy that does not have mediation outside it, but is this me-

diation itself.' 58

Negativity in Hegelian system means not refutation, but like-

wise also-,conservation of that which is deemed only one-sided.

The dialectical development in the Phenomenology exemplifies

the power of negativity in overcoming all movements in their

concrete relations with one another.

53

8. The Task of Logos-metaphysics exemplified by Hegel,

'What mind prepares for itself in the course of its pheno-

menology is the element of true knowledge. In this element the

moments of mind are now set out in the form of thought pure

and simple, which knows its object to be itself. They no long-

er involve the opposition between being and knowing they remain

within the undivided simplicity of the knowing function they

are the truth in the form of truth, and their diversity is mere-

ly diversity of the content of truth. The process by which they

are developed into an organically connected whole is Logic orspeculative philosophy.' 59

The effort exerted by Hegel in the 'Phenomenology' is to at-

tain one thing, which has always been the concern of philosophy

since Classical Antiquity, the reflection upon the ultimate un-

ity of self-consciousness and objectivity, thus the other deter-

minations such as the aforementioned disparity between thought

and being, value and fact, essence and existence,, The consumma-

tion of these differences is that of 'logos'. the speaking sub-

ject of' the word. What the Philosopher, Aristotle, has achieved

in Classical Antiquity is renewed, tasted in a new light by

Hegel. For to the Philosopher:

'Now thinking according to itself is of the best according

to itself, and thinking in the highest degree is of that which

is best in the highest degree. Thus, in partaking of the intel-

ligible, it is of Himself that the Intellect is thinking for

by apprehending and thinking it is He (the Divine, God or Voi•)

Himself who becomes intelligible, and so the Intellect and itsintelligible object are the same. 60

54However, what for Aristotle as Ultimate is achieved by the

'Divine, by Voiig is comprehended and consummated in the subject,

what for Aristotle that 'Thinking is the thinking of Thinking' 61

and that 'Thinking is the thinking of Himself through all eter-

nity., 2, what to Aritotle as object meant only 'Nature', is

in Hegel totally transformed. Mind is(or Spirit is) self-

reflecting only through history and living social reality.

Despite Aristotle has pointed to the concept of 'life' and that:

'Life belongs to God, for the actuality of the intellect is

life, and He is actuality and his actuality is in virtue ofitself a life which is the best and is eternal.' 63

Unfortunately, Aristotle in his static society could never

conceive life as historicity, and Divine as Spirit, and know-

ledge as speculative philosophy achieved only in the£human mind

by the philosopher. These are fully actualized by Hegel' s thou-

ght. The Absolute is not the immediate identity of 'life' and

'intellect', as Aristotle in his 'Naturalism' has achieved.

The Divine is the identity achieved by the 'Bildung' of the

individual and' the particular to the acknowledgement of the

totality and the universal. This is possible only by going

through the journey of the 'Phenomenology', by an 'an abs of ut-

izing of historicity or histbricizing of the absolute.' 64

This' B it dung' has always been the concern of the humanistic

tradition since the Renaissance. Hegel obviously has in mind

this tradition when he argues that the 'phenomenology' is a

55'ladder' for naive consciousness to achieve its status of self-

conscious' spirit, and that:

'The task of conducting the individual mind from its unscien-

tific standpoint to that of science had to be taken in its gen-

eral sense (the sense of the humanistic tradition since the Re-

naissance) we had to contemplate the formative development

(Bildung) of the universal or general individual, of self-con-

scious spirit. As to the relation between this two, the part-

icular and general individual, every moment, as it gains con-

crete form and its own proper shape and appearance, finds a

place in the life of the universal individual.' 65

The concern of Hegel' s phenomenology is cultural, unlike the

natural aspect of Aristotle's Metaphysics, the 'logos' is no

longer the identity of 'Nature' and 'Mind', and Neo-Spinozists

have wrongly boasted of having Hegel in their ranks, but 'logos'

is the toil of humanity in self-redemption after extefnalization

through the development of the phenomenology in order to ach-

ieve the.unity of 'History' and 'Mind'. Koj?ve is right in

saying that Aristotle has identified the 'eternal' as in time,

as telos, and Hegel transforms the 'eternal' as 'temporality', 66

So, Man is known not through any eternal 'essence', not through

any transcendental functions but only through his dialectical

development in history. Each step of his development is essen-

tial and indispensible in his coming to himself in existence

and in knowledge. Hegel remarks clearly that:

'Science lays before us the morphogenetic (structural) pro-

56

cess of this cultural development in all its detailed fullness

and necessity, and at the same time shows it to be something

that has already sunk into the mind as a moment of its being

and become a possession of the mind.... The length of the jour-

ney has to be borne with, for every moment is necessary and

again we must halt at every stage, for each is a complete indiv-

idual form, and is fully and finally considered only so far as

its determinate character is taken and dealt with as a rounded

and concrete whole '67

The 'logos-metaphysics' of Hegel is specific in its onto-

logic character: 'it reconciles being (hence its ontic charact-

er) and logos (hence its logical character) it is being as lo-

gos and logos as being.' 68 It renders life as rational. and the

rational as life. This is the true teleology which not just

poses an essence as the goal of life as in the philosophy of

Classical Antiquity, but-it is the comprehension or reflection

of the self-creation of humanity, the goal and the necessity

that are at once freedom. The impressive end of the 'Phenomeno-

logy' draws the correlation of consciousness and life into a

close, a consummation in Absolute Knowledge:

'The goal, which is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing it-

as Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of spiritual

forms as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the or-

ganization of their spiritual kingdom. Their conservation, look-

ed at from the side of their free existence appearing in the form

of contingency, is History looked at from the side of their in-

tellectually comprehended organization, it is the Science of the

ways in which knowledge appears. Both together, or History com-

prehended, form at once the recollelction and the Golgotha of

Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of itsthrone, without which it were lifeless, solitary, and alone.' 69

57The Absolute Idealism of Hegel has not only surpassed the

abstract principles of Kantianism, the non-conforming sensuous

experience and abstract reasoning of Empiricism and Rationalism,

all being one-sided abstractions, but further incorporated mind

with life. It is the most comprehensive and all-embracing system

of human thought.

58

9. Negativity or Positivity?-- a final word.

To suppose Hegel in his identifying being and thought as

pertaining only to tradition while posing a Heideggerian

mysticism as a new beginning is an over-simplication in the

former and blatant error in the latter. We have already point,

ed out the fact that the mission of Hegel's socialization

and historicalization of knowledge is to render life thinking

and thought living. It is itself a new philosophical depart-

ure. The great force of the Hegelian system is manifested in

its negativity against positivity.

'The dissimilarity which obtains in consciousness between

the ego and the substance constituting its object, is their

inner distinction, the factor of negativity in general., 70 In

other words, the moving force of the dialectic is the dia-

lectical reversal from the subjective to the objective and

vice versa in order to progress to the ultimate concrete

universal, the living form. J. Hyppolite further explicates

the movement of the dialectical negativity:

'Consciousness is consciousness of an object which consti-

tutes the truth of consciousness and which appears to it as

alien, as other than itself. But consciousness is also cons-

cious of itt-t own knowledge of this truth. The knowledge that

consciousness has is overlaid with a knowledge of its own

knowledge, with a subjective reflection--- that of the self

with respect to being or to substance. The disparity between

59these two moments is the motive force of phenomenological

development it is the mainspring of what is called exper-71

ience.'

When formerly all philosophical systems has taken man or

reality as something, as being of a particular essence, it is

the greatness of Hegel and his new dimension of posing man

as 'nothingness', as the 'desire of desire' and human his-

tory as the 'history of desired Desire.' 72 The. insight into

man as 'nothingness' renders possible human history which

is neither contingent as the Empiricists uphold, nor ever

recurring as the essentialistic traditions cling on, but

rather history is the development of man through constant

negation of the reality, of that which is reified and esta-

blished as such, Hegel has done a great sere i, ice in underst-

anding history as the sublation (Aufhebung) of particular in-

stances or moments of history and the established reality,

and consequently development in history is always understood

as praxis, as the result of human creative social. labour.

But in, the last instance Hegel is an Idealist, his aim is, too,

more to render the real rational through thought than the ra-

tioal real. This is best exemplified in his late system of

'Philosophy of Right', which is 'the endeavour to apprehend

a. Rd protray the. state. as something inherently rational,,...

60

it must be poles apart from an attempt to construct a state

as it ought to be (this, of course, has Hegel rightly crit-

icized the subjective idealists that always start from the

mere ought).... It can only show how the state, the ethi-

cal universe, is to be understood.

Hic Rhodus, hic saltus.

To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, be-

cause what is, is. reason. Whatever happens, every individual

is a child of his time so philosophy too is its own time ap-

prehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a

philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is

to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jumpover Rhodes.' 72

The determination in the last instance in Hegel's system

is still that of mind, it is the consummation of logos-

metaphysics in reconciliation of all externalization and

estrangement of history, of social labour, of negativity in

general by thought it is the 'overcoming in the final inst-

ance of praxis by theory it is the negation of the negati-

vity by a positivity and Hegel becomes the greatest slave

of thought, and his final positing of 'Absolute Spirit' mere

abstract labour of the mind, and his system in the last in-

stance uncritical positivism, by upholding all contradictions

as comprehended historicity in the mind, and transformed in-

to harmony through efforts of the mind.

In fact, we can trace that the fault of Hegel is his attri-

buting differences as pertaining to the discrepancy between

61

the objective and the subjective (both being one-sided) and

are sublated possibly by recollection (Erinnerung), the re-

turn to the first presupposition of an immediate identity.

The last step of re-identification in concrete of the pre-

vious immediate identity are likewise intuitive, and this

has nothing to do with dialectics. For dialectics is nega-

tivity, it is pre-suppositionless, W. Marx is wrong in at-

tributing the supremacy of self-consciousness, an idealistic

principl e, to critical theory of Frankfurt school, for in

actual fact, 'dialectics is the ontology of the wrong stgtte

of things. The right state of things would be free of it:

(it is)- neither a system nor a contradiction.' 74 True

dialectics, as pure negativity, is operative in contrasting

the ideal of a system of established reality (ideological

aspect) with the actually manifested reality, it is the im-

manent negation of a system itself. Thus, the Absolute in

Hegel' s philosophy is its own negation in face of it pheno-

menological development, for if he claims phenomenological

development as the ladder to scientific knowledge, he has to

foresake the insistence of immediate identity, or else, with

the presupposition of absolute identity in mind, phenomenolo-

gy becomes superfluous, likewise then is its function of

'Bildung', and Hegel is no less right in pushing his latter

position to an extreme by upholding his philosophy of iden-

62titys

'one word more about giving instruction as to what the

world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on

the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world,

it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried

after its process of formation has been completed. The teach-

ing of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson,

is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal

first appears over against the real and that the ideal ap-

prehends this same real world in its substance and builds it

up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When

philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life

grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be reju-

venated but only understood. The-owl of Minerva spreads itswings only with the falling of the dusk.' 75

Nothing is more impotent that a philosophy whose task is

to justify the established reality: Yet no greater philoso-

phical insight is more invaluable than the concept of the

'negativity' in dialectics: The relation drawn by Hegel bet-

ween his Absolute Knowledge and his mission of socialization

and historicalization of knowledge rests in his idealism,

and the consequent dilemma or contradition of his system

is due to the new spirit of dialectics in the old wine-skin

of logos-metaphysics.

63FOOTNOTES

1. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Science of Logic. 'Trans. by A. V.Miller

(George Allen Unwin, London.1969)p.48.

2. Ma -X, Werner: Reason .and. .Worl-d..-- between Tradition and

another Beginning. (Martinus Ni jhoff, The

Hague.1971) p.l.

3. Marx,Werner: Op. cit., p.4.

4. Marx,Werner: Op. cit.,p.4.

5. Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. by ICI. K. Smith

(MacMillen, London and Basingstoke.1973.) p.2440

6. Kant, I.: Op. cit.,p.244.

7. Hume, D.: A Treatise of Human Nature. (Penguin, Middlesex.

1969) p.49.

8. Kant, I.: Op. ci t.,p.9.

9. Ibid., p.8.

10. Ibid.,p.7.

11-.. Ibid., p.7.

12. Ibid., p.9.

13. Ibid., p.22-23.

14. Hegel, G.W.F. Logic-- being Part One of the Encyclopae-

dia of Philosophical Sciences. Trans. by

William Wallace (OUP, London. 3rd ed. 1975)

p.69-70.

15. LukScs, Georg: The Young Hegel. Trans. by R. Livingstone

(The Merlin Press, London. 19750) p.18.

16. Hegel,G.W.F.: Early Theological Writings, Trans. by T.M.

Knox (Univ. of Penn. Pr., Philadelphia, 1977)

p.154-5.

17. Ibid., p.156-7.

18. Ibid., p.157-8.

199 Ibid., p.81.

20. Ibido, p.152-3.

64

21. Ibid., p.152.

22. Ibid.,p.169o

23. Ibid., p.169.

24. Ibid., p.170.

25. Marcuse, HerbertReason and R.erol.utio.n.-- Hegel and the

Rise of Social Theory. (RKP, London

Henley. 2nd ed. 1977 rep.) p.99

26. Ibid., p.34.

27. Hegel, G. W. F.Philosophy of Right. Trans. by T. M. Knox(OUP, London. 1973.) p. 35.

28. Ibid., p.45.

29. Hegel- G.W.F.The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. by

J. B. Baillie (Harper Torchbooks, New YorkEvanston. 1967.) p.75-60

30. Marcuse, HerbertReason and Revolution. p. 75 a

31. Hyppolite, JeanStudies i.n Marx and Hegel. Trans. by

J.O'Neill (Heinern. Ed. Bks., London.

1969.) p.79.

32. Koj've, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Trans.by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Basic Books, N. Y.1969.) p.51-2.

33. Hegel, G.W.F.The Phenomenology of Mind. D.96.

34. Here I refer without quoting the articles written on

history by Kant, trans. L.W.Beck.(Library of LiberalArts, N.Y.)

..............35. Hyppolite, Jean

Genesis and Structure of He ells Pheno-

menol ogy-, of-- Spi ri --Trans:- by- S. Cherni ak

J: Heckman. (Northwestern U. Pr., Evan-

ston. 1974) p.77.

36. Hegel, G. W. F.: The Ph enomenol oay o f Mind, p. 229.

37. S chiller, F.: Naive and Sentimental Poetry/ On the Sublime.

Trans: -by--3 A -Elias -(Ungar, -N.Y. 1975) p. 102

65

3 8. Marcuse, Herbert: L' Ontolo. ie de He el et la Theorie

de 1' Hi stori ci to. Tradui t de 1 'All e-

mand par G. Raulet et H.A. Baatsch.

(Les editions de Minuit, Paris. 1972)

p.235.

39. Hyppolitoy J.: Ge.nesis and Structure of He el's Phenomeno-

loay- of -Spirit: p.326.

40. Ibid., p.367-8.

41. Lu cacs, G.: The Young Hegel. P.490-1.

42. Hyppolite, J.: Genesis and Structure. D.42.

43. Schiller, F.: Naive and Sentimental Poetry/ On the Sublime.,-, If)

44. Adorno, T. W.: Lyric Poetry and Society. (Telos: a Journal

of Theory and Society, St.Louis. Vol.20, 1974)

p.58-9.

45. Schiller, F. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Trans. by

E.M. Wilkinson L. A. Willoughby (OUP, London.

1967) p.9.

46. Ibid., p. 79.

47. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.94.

48. Ibid., p.80.

49. Luk6cs, G.: The Young Hegel. p.532-3.

50. Hegel, G. W, F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.801

51. Ibid.., p.86.

52. Ko jive, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p.35.

66

53. Hegel, G. W. F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p. 80

54. Hegel, G., W. F.: Hegel's Logic. (Lesser Logic) p.120.

55. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p,,92.

56, Ibid., p.92.

57, I refer to Victor Shklovsky's famous essay on 'Art

as Technique' in Russian Formalist Criticism: 4 essays.

Trans. and ed. by L. T. Lemon M. J. Reis. (Univ. of

Nebraska Pr.) and F. Jameson: The Prison House of Lan-

quage, (Princeton U. Pr., N. J. 1972).

58. Hegel, G. W. F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.93-4,

59, Ibid., p.97.

60. Aristotle: Metaphysics. 1072b.

61. Ibid., 1074b.

62. Ibid., 1075a.

63. Ibid., 1072b.

64. Marcus e, Herbert: On the Problem of the Dialectic.

(Telos: a Journal of Theory and

Society, St, Louis, Vo127, 1976) p.210

65. Hegel, U.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.89

66. Ko jive, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.

I refer to ch.5 'A Note on Eternity, Time

and the Concept.' p.100-149

67. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.90.

68. Hyppolite, J.: Genesis and Structure, p.583.

69. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.808,

70. Ibid., p.96o

67

71. Hyppolite, J.: Genesis and Structure, p.575-6

72. Kojeve, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Heck. ems., p. 6.

73. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Philosophy of Rights p.ll.

74, Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, Trans. by E. B. Ashton.

(RKP, London. 1973.) p.11.

75. Hiegel, G.W.F.: The Philosophy of Right., P.12-3.

68Bibliography:

A. Hegel' s works concerned-

1. The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. by J.. Baillie

(Harper Torchbooks, N. Y. Evanston. 1967)

2. Early Theological Writings. Trans. by T. M. Knox

(Univ. of Penn. Pr., Phil adel. 1977.)

3. Science of LoTrans. by A. V. Miller

(George Allen Unwin, London. 1969.)

4, Hegel 's Logic (Lesser Logic), Trans. by W. Wallace

(OUP, London. '3rd ed. 19x15.)

5. The Philosophy of History. Trans. by J. Sibree

(Dover Publi. Inc... N. Y. 1956.)

6. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Trans. by F.S.

Haldane F.H. Simson

(RKP, London, 1896, rep. 1968.)

69

B. Related works to the study r-

1. Adorno, T. W.: Negative Dialectics. Trans. by E. B. Ashton

(RKP, London. 1973.)

2. Adorno, T.W.: Lyric Poetry and Society. (Telos: a Journal

of Theory and Society, St. Louis. Vol.20, 1974.)

3. Adorno, T.W.: The Actuality of Philosophy, (Telos: a Journal

of Theory and Society, St. Louis o Vol. 31, 1977.)

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