Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 1

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy PocketThe Korsun–Shevchenkovsky Offensive led to the Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket which took placefrom 24 January to 16 February 1944. The offensive was part of the Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive. In it, the 1st and2nd Ukrainian Fronts, commanded, respectively, by Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev, trapped German forces ofArmy Group South in a pocket near the Dnieper river. During weeks of fighting, the two Red Army Fronts tried toeradicate the pocket. German units inside the cauldron broke out in coordination with a relief attempt by otherGerman forces, with “roughly two out of three” encircled men succeeding in escaping the pocket,[1] "and almost onethird of their men ... dead or prisoners."[2]

January 1944In January 1944, the German forces of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Army Group South including GeneralOtto Wöhler's 8th Army had fallen back to the Panther-Wotan Line, a defensive position along the Dnieper river inUkraine. Two corps, the XI under Gen. Wilhelm Stemmermann, the XLII Army Corps under Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieband the attached Corps Detachment B from the 8th Army were holding a salient into the Soviet lines extending some100 kilometers to the Dnieper river settlement of Kanev, with the town of Korsun roughly in the center of the salient,west of Cherkassy. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov realized the potential for destroying Wöhler’s 8thArmy with the Stalingrad model as precedent and using similar tactics as were applied to defeat Paulus’ encircled 6thArmy. Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) to deploy 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts toform two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around a cauldron and then destroy the forces it contained,and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the trapped units. Despite repeated warnings fromManstein and others, Hitler refused to allow the exposed units to be pulled back to safety.General Konev held a conference at his headquarters at Boltushki on 15 January with his commanders and theirpolitical commissars to pass on the orders received from Stavka.[3] The initial attack was to be conducted by Konev’sown 2nd Ukrainian Front from the southeast by 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army, with 5th Guards Tank Army toexploit penetrations supported by 5th Air Army, to be joined in progress by 52nd Army, 5th Guards Cavalry Corpsand 2nd Tank Army. Additionally, from Vatutin’s First Ukrainian Front, 27th and 40th Armies were to be deployedfrom the northwest, with 6th Tank Army to exploit penetrations supported by 2nd Air Army.[4] Many of theseformations had received an inflow of new personnel. Red Army planning further included extensive deceptionoperations that the Soviets claimed were successful, however, the German 8th Army war diary shows clearly that theGerman staffs were more concerned with the real threat than the simulated one.[5]

EncirclementOn 18 January, Manstein was proven prescient when General Nikolai Vatutin’s 1st and General Konev’s 2ndUkrainian Fronts attacked the edges of the salient and surrounded the two German corps. The link-up on 28 Januaryof 20th Guards Tank Brigade with 6th Guards Tank Army of the First Ukrainian Front at the village ofZvenyhorodka completed the encirclement and created the cauldron or Kessel that became known as theKorsun-Cherkassy Pocket. Stalin expected and was promised a second Stalingrad; Konev wired: "There is no need toworry, Comrade Stalin. The encircled enemy will not escape."[6]

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 2

Soviet advances that created the Korsun-Cherkassy pocket.

Trapped in the pocket were under 60,000 men, a totalof six German divisions at approximately 55% of theirauthorized strength, along with a number of smallercombat units. Among the trapped German forces werethe 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, with the attachedSS Sturmbrigade Wallonien (SS Assault BrigadeWallonien), the Estonian SS Battalion Narwa, and"several thousand" Russian auxiliaries.[7] The trappedforces were designated Gruppe Stemmermann and thecommander of XI Corps, General WilhelmStemmermann was placed in command. Wiking had 30operational Panzer III/IV tanks and assault guns and 6

in repair.[8] The division further had 47 artillery pieces, including 12 self-propelled guns.[9]

Response and counter

The relief attempt begins. Tanks and halftracks of1st Panzer Division begin movements towards the

pocket, early February 1944[10]

Manstein moved quickly, and by early February the III and XLVIIPanzer Corps were assembled for a relief effort. However, Hitlerintervened and ordered the rescue attempt to be transformed into animpossible effort to counter-encircle the two Soviet fronts.

General Hermann Breith, commander of III Panzer Corps insisted thatboth the relief formations should unite and attempt to force a corridorto the trapped Gruppe Stemmermann. Manstein initially sided withHitler, although in deceptive fashion, and the attack was to be anattempt to encircle the massive Red Army force. The attack by theXLVII Panzer Corps' 11th Panzer Division quickly stalled. The veterandivision had only 27 tanks and 34 assault guns, therefore itscontribution was limited.[11] Realizing the encirclement was going tofail, Manstein ordered the III Panzer Corps to attempt to relieve thebeleaguered Gruppe Stemmermann. Breith began a push with 16th and17th Panzer Divisions toward the Gniloy Tikich River and made goodprogress, with 1st Panzer Division then moving up and 1st SS PanzerDivision LSSAH to cover the northern flank. After being initiallysurprised by the attack, Zhukov ordered Vatutin to rapidly assembletroops and armor of four tank corps "with the goal of cutting off theGerman spearhead and destroying it."[12] All progress began to bogdown with a change in weather, resulting in the thick mud of the rasputitsa – and the weakness of Germany’swheeled vehicles became evident. The Soviet four-wheel and six-wheel drive trucks supplied by the United Stateswere largely able to get through, whereas the German two-wheel-drive vehicles sat immobilized in the mud.[12]

For the night of 5–6 February, Konev issued orders to the 4th Guards Army and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps that would attempt to split the pocket and the two German corps it contained.[13] In the intense fighting the Soviet goal became clear to Stemmermann and Lieb; but the road "to Korsun had to be held at all costs." Stemmermann ordered Wiking’s armor to the scene and together with 72nd Infantry Division an immediate disaster was avoided.[13] Red Army efforts were renewed between 7–10 February. At this time, however, the Soviet units experienced supply shortages. The mud affected the situation, but it was not the only cause. III Panzer Corps’ penetrations toward the Gniloy Tikich River made the supply lines for Soviet formations such as Vatutin’s 6th Tank Army "much longer than

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 3

they were previously."[14] The Red Air Force then started to supply some units by air using Po-2 aircraft.[15]

Surrender demand and kessel feverOn 11 February, III Panzer Corps continued its drive east. The exhausted force reached the Gniloy Tikich stream andestablished a small bridgehead on the eastern bank. III Panzerkorps could advance no further, Group Stemmermannwould have to fight its way out.[16]

Both antagonists realized that the Wehrmacht relief efforts had come to a critical stage, yet despite heavy Sovietpropaganda inducements, very few German soldiers and no Waffen-SS men in the cauldron had surrendered.[17]

Zhukov thus decided to send parlementaires under a white flag with surrender demands.[18] A Red Army lieutenantcolonel, translator and bugler arrived in an American jeep and presented letters for both Stemmermann and Liebsigned by Marshal Zhukov and Generals Konev and Vatutin. The German officer on headquarters duty, a major atCorps Detachment B and a translator, received the emissaries.[19] After cordial talks, refreshments and a handshake,the Soviets departed without an answer – the "answer would be in the form of continued, bitter resistance."[20]

Ju 52s at Korsun airfield, Ju 87s in formationabove (January 1944).

As the day for the breakout approaches, more andmore units are crammed into the ever-shrinking

perimeter. At least the snow concealed theGermans from the omnipresent Red Air

Force.[21]

Unlike the debacle at Stalingrad one year before Cherkassy-Korsun,the Luftwaffe aerial supply performance into the cauldron was a "trulysuccessful" effort by the air and ground crews of the Junkers Ju 52transport aircraft.[22] A total of 82,948 gallons of fuel and 868 tons ofammunition plus four tons of medical supplies were delivered to thepocket and 4,161 wounded evacuated by air,[23] an all-importantmorale consideration for German troops on the Eastern front. After theKorsun airfield was abandoned on 12 February, deliveries wereparachuted, fuel drums and ammunition crates were dropped intosnowbanks by the transports flying just above the deck.[24]

Stemmermann began withdrawing troops from the north of thecauldron, reorienting the thrust of the escape direction, and attackingsouth to expand toward the relief forces on the north bank of theGniloy Tikich. The frenetic maneuvering within the Kessel confusedthe Soviets, convincing them that they had trapped the majority of theGerman 8th Army. The trapped forces, suffering from "kessel fever",were now to capture the villages of Novo-Buda, Komarovka, Khilkiand Shanderovka at the southwestern perimeter of the pocket to reach afavorable jump-off line for the breakout.[25]

On 11 February Major Robert Kästner’s 105th Grenadier Regiment ofthe 72nd Infantry Division captured Novo-Buda in a night assault.[26]

The following night Komarovka fell in similar fashion.[27] On theevening of 15 February the 105th Regiment again, using its lastreserves and with two assault guns, secured Khilki, defeating a Sovietcounterattack supported by armor.[28] However, of all the German divisions in the pocket, Wiking "did more than anyother to ensure the continued survival of Gruppe Stemmermann ..."[29] Since Wiking was the only truly mobile forceinside the pocket, the division’s tracked units were repeatedly shifted from one end of the cauldron to the other toshore up crumbling lines.

The pocket had "wandered" south and half-way toward its rescuers and rested on the village of Shanderovka. The settlement was heavily defended by the Soviets; had been captured by 72nd Infantry troops, was retaken by units of the Soviet 27th Army and recaptured by the Germania regiment of Wiking. By nightfall on 16 February, III Panzer Corps fought its way closer to the encircled formations, the spearheads were now seven kilometers from Group

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 4

Stemmermann.[30]

Breakout through Hell’s GateThe northward thrust toward the pocket by the III Panzer Corps had been halted by Red Army determination, terrain,and fuel shortages. After several failed attempts by German armored formations to seize and hold Hill 239 andadvance on Shanderovka, Soviet counterattacks by 5th Guards Tank Army forced III Panzerkorps into costlydefensive fighting. 8th Army radioed Stemmermann:

Capacity for action by III Panzerkorps limited by weather and supply situation. Gruppe Stemmermann mustperform breakthrough as far as the line Zhurzintsy-Hill 239 by its own effort. There link up with IIIPanzerkorps.[31]

The message did not specify that Zhurzintsy and the hill were still firmly in Soviet hands. Lt.Gen. Theobald Liebwas appointed by 8th Army to lead the breakout. Only seven kilometers lay between Group Stemmermann and IIIPanzer Corps, but in between Konev "was in the process of repositioning forces for a final crushing attack whichwould take place [on] 17 February."[32] His formidable force of "three armies – the 4th Guards, 27th , 52nd ... and5th Guards Cavalry Corps" – surrounded the cauldron and "elements of 5th Guards Tank Army had recently beenadded ... with the most powerful units, in particular armor, placed between Group Stemmermann and III PanzerCorps."[33] [34] General Stemmermann elected to stay behind with a rearguard of 6,500 men, the remaining,combined strength of 57th and 88th Infantry Divisions.[35] The cauldron was now a mere 5 kilometers in diameter,depriving Stemmermann of room to maneuver. Shanderovka, once seen as a gate to freedom, now became known asHell’s Gate.[36] The Red Army poured intense artillery and rocket fire on the area around the encircled troops, nearlyevery round finding a target. Sturmoviks of the Red Air Force bombed and strafed, only infrequently challenged byLuftwaffe fighters. Various unit diaries described a scene of gloom, with fires burning caused by Soviet nightbombing with incendiaries, destroyed or abandoned vehicles everywhere and wounded men and disorganized unitson muddy roads. Ukrainian civilians were caught between the combatants. On 16th February 1944, Field Marshalvon Manstein, without waiting for a decision by Hitler, sent a radio message to Stemmermann to authorize thebreakout. It said simply:

Password Freedom, objective Lysyanka, 2300 hours.[37]

The German breakout

With extreme reluctance, Stemmermann and Lieb decidedto leave 1,450 non-ambulatory wounded at Shanderovkaattended by doctors and orderlies.[38] [39] [40] The troopsthen began to assemble at dusk into three leading assaultcolumns with Division Group 112 to the north, Wiking tothe south and 72nd Division in the center with thereinforced 105th Regiment in the first echelon to providethe assault power.[41] "By 2300 the 105th Regiment – twobattalions abreast – started moving ahead, silently andwith bayonets fixed. One-half hour later the force brokethrough the first and soon thereafter the second [Soviet]defense line."[42] All went well for several battalions and regiments who reached the German lines at Oktyabr by0410. Major Kästner and his 105th grenadiers reached friendly lines by cautiously approaching the forward positionof Panthers of 1st Panzer Division of the III Panzer Corps, bringing their wounded along and their heavy weapons,but losing the trailing, horse drawn supply column to Soviet artillery. The 105th entered Lysyanka at 0630.[43] Onthe opposite front of the cauldron, General Stemmermann and his rear guard held fast and thus assured the success ofthe initial breakout.[44]

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 5

At the left flank column, a reconnaissance patrol returned bearing grim news. The geographic feature Hill 239 wasoccupied by Soviet T-34's of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Despite energetic efforts to capture Hill 239 now from theinside of the cauldron, the high ground remained in Soviet hands and had to be bypassed. "As more and more unitsran up against the impregnable tank barrier atop the ridge dominated by Hill 239,"[45] the German escape directionveered off to the south toward the Gniloy Tikich River, thus ending for the bulk of troops at the wrong position ofthe stream with disastrous consequences to come. When daylight arrived, the German escape plan began to unravel.Very few armored vehicles and other heavy equipment could climb the slippery, thawing hillsides and the weaponshad to be destroyed and abandoned "after the last round of ammunition had been fired."[44]

General Konev, now realizing that the Germans were escaping, was enraged and then resolved to keep his promise toStalin not to let any “Hitlerites” or “Fascists” escape annihilation. Soviet intelligence, however, at this stage vastlyoverestimated the armored strength of III Panzer Corps, and Konev therefore proceeded in force. At this time the20th Tank Corps brought its brigade of the new Joseph Stalin-2’s to the Korsun battlefield.[46] Konev ordered allavailable armor and artillery to attack the escaping units, cut them into isolated groups and then destroy thempiecemeal.[47] The two blocking Soviet infantry divisions, 206th Rifle and 5th Guards Airborne, had been smashedby the German assault forces; without infantry support Soviet tanks then fired into the escaping formations from adistance. Sensing that no anti-tank weapons were in the field, T-34s commenced to wade into unprotected supporttroops, headquarters units, stragglers and red-cross identified medical columns with their wounded charges.[48] [49]

By mid-day, the majority of the now intermingled divisions had reached the Gniloy Tikich stream, turbulent andswollen by the melting snow. Despite the fact that the 1st Panzer Division had captured a bridge, and engineers haderected another, the panicking men saw the river as their only escape from the rampaging T-34s. Since the mainbody was away and south of the bridgeheads, the last tanks, trucks and wagons were driven into the icy water, treeswere felled to form make-shift bridges and the troops floundered across as best as they could, with hundreds ofexhausted men drowning, being swept downstream with horses and military debris. Many others succumbed toshock or hypothermia. Groups of men were brought across on lifelines fashioned from belts and harnesses. Othersformed rafts of planks and other debris to tow the wounded to the German side, at all times under Soviet artillery andT-34 fire. Gen. Lieb, after establishing a semblance of order at the banks throughout the afternoon, crossed theGniloy Tikich swimming alongside his horse.[50] When Wiking commander Herbert Otto Gille attempted to form ahuman chain across the river, alternating between those who could swim and those who could not, scores of mendied when someone’s hand slipped and the chain broke. Several hundred Soviet prisoners of war, a troupe of Russianwomen auxiliaries and Ukrainian civilians who feared reprisals by the Red Army, also crossed the icy waters.[51]

Toward the end phase of the breakout, engineers had built several more bridges and rear guard units of 57th and 88thInfantry Divisions crossed the river "dry," including "20 [horse drawn] panje wagons with ... about 600 wounded"aboard.[52]

That so many reached the German lines at Lysyanka was due in great measure to the exertions of III Panzer Corps asit drove in relief of Group Stemmermann. The cutting edge was provided by Heavy Armored Regiment Bäke(Schweres Panzer Regiment Bäke), named for its commander Lt.Col. Dr. Franz Bäke (a dentist in civilian life). Theunit was equipped with Tigers and Panthers and an engineer battalion with specialist bridging skills.[53]

The OutcomeThe Red Army encirclement of Cherkassy-Korsun inflicted serious damage on six German divisions, includingWiking; these units were nearly decimated and had to be withdrawn, requiring complete re-equipping after thismilitary disaster. Most escaped troops were eventually shipped from collection points near Uman to rehabilitationareas and hospitals in Poland, or were sent on leave to their home towns. The Soviet forces continued theirsteamroller drive westward with massive tank armies of T-34s, IS-2s and trucks and Shermans supplied by theirAmerican allies under the Lend-Lease program.[54]

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 6

Controversy exists to this day over casualties and losses. Soviet historian Vladimir Telpukhovsky claims that the RedArmy killed 52,000 Germans and took 11,000 prisoners, other Soviet sources claim 57,000 killed and 18,000prisoners - with Soviet casualty numbers officially unpublished. The high numbers given are attributed by sources tothe erroneous Soviet belief that all German units were at their full establishment and that most of the German 8thArmy was trapped.[55] German accounts state that the under 60,000 men originally inside the cauldron had shrunk inheavy fighting to less than 50,000 by 16 February, that 45,000 took part in the breakout and "that 27,703 Germansoldiers and 1,063 Russian auxiliaries had broken out unscathed. In addition 7,496 wounded" got through to IIIPanzer Corps plus the 4,161 wounded previously evacuated from the cauldron by air, leaving behind a total of19,000 dead, wounded, captured or missing.[56] Douglas E. Nash’s Appendix 7 “German Present for Battle UnitStrengths after the Breakout” in Hell’s Gate lists per unit survivors, with total escapees of 40,423, including thewounded flown out of the pocket and evacuated from Lysyanka.[57] By 19 February III Panzer Corps began to pullback from the Lysyanka salient; it was assumed that no more soldiers from Gruppe Stemmermann would berescued.[58]

General Stemmermann died fighting among his rear guard. Gen. Lieb survived the war and died in 1981. Thecommander of 2nd Ukrainian Front, Gen. Konev, was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union for his great victory. Gen.Vatutin was shot by Ukrainian Nationalist UPA insurgents on 28 February 1944 and died on 15 April 1944.

Assessment“In the context of World War II, the battle at Korsun was a minor one, but with an unusually high degree of drama.The Soviet commanders took advantage of their considerable numerical superiority on the Eastern Front and decidedto attack an exposed German position, which Hitler stubbornly decided to hold.”[59] Yet German field commandersinside and outside the cauldron grasped when a “now or never” order had to be given.[60] The German disaster, "amajor defeat,"[61] and escape is documented. On the Soviet side the attacks to eliminate the pocket did not work outas intended, did not proceed as planned, the Wehrmacht relief attempts could not be repelled as designed and theforces inside the cauldron were not annihilated as promised to Stalin or asserted in propaganda messages to thewestern Allies or penned in memoirs and staff studies. "There was no Stalingrad on the Dnieper, as the Sovietsclaimed ..."[61] “Nevertheless, the Soviet position, relative to the Germans, was stronger after the battle than before,so Korsun may be viewed as a Soviet victory, even though it was bought at a considerably higher price than it oughtto have been.”[62]

References[1] Nash, Hell’s Gate, p. 366[2] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 280[3] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 37[4] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 37-39[5] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 39[6] Konev, Battles Hitler Lost, quoted in Nash, p. 200[7] Nash, p. 27[8] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 335[9] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 336; a total of 253 artillery pieces were inside the pocket [p. 53][10] Image description abbreviated from nearly same image in Nash, p. 161[11] Perrett, Knights of the Black Cross, p. 167[12] Nash, p. 162[13] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 180[14] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 184[15] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 185[16] Group Stemmermann essentially consisted of six divisions: 57th, 72nd, 88th, 389th divisions, Corps Detachment B [Division Group 112],

all infantry formations with no armored components; and Panzer Division Wiking with the attached Wallonien and Narwa. The only unitsconsidered still capable of aggressive, offensive operations were 72nd Infantry Division and Wiking. (Department of the Army Pamphlet20-234, p. 19-20)

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 7

[17] Nash, p. 194[18] Perrett, p. 167[19] DA Pamphlet 20-234, p. 22[20] Nash, p. 198[21] Description from same image in Nash, p. 287[22] Nash, p. 119[23] Nash, Appendix 8, p. 399[24] In addition to the cauldron supply operation, the Luftwaffe delivered 325 tons of ammunition, 74,289 gallons of fuel and 24 tons of food to

spearheads of the relief formations [Nash, Appendix 8, p. 399][25] DA Pamphlet 20-234, p. 19[26] The regiments of this division were raised in the city of Trier and the Mosel valley in western Germany[27] Nash, p. 212-214[28] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 245[29] Nash, p. 369[30] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 255[31] Nash, p. 258[32] Nash, p. 287[33] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 244[34] Nash, p. 296, map of disposition of forces during the breakout[35] Carell, Scorched Earth, p. 418[36] Nash, p. 280[37] Carell, p. 417[38] Perrett, p. 168[39] Nash, p. 283[40] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 242[41] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 257[42] DA Pamphlet 20-234, p. 27[43] Nash, p. 300[44] DA Pamphlet 20-234, p. 40[45] Nash, p. 301[46] Nash, p. 267[47] One such isolated group of stragglers from the Wallonien brigade was set upon by a “swarm of Cossacks” [Carell, p. 430]. The vengeful

cavalry hacked at the escapees with their sabers in “an orgy of slaughter” [Perrett, p. 169][48] Nash, p. 308[49] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 267[50] DA Pamphlet 20-234, p. 31[51] Carell, p. 430[52] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 272[53] Perrett, p. 169[54] Lend-Lease: Cooperation for Victory. Northern Convoys to USSR (http:/ / www. ruvr. ru/ main. php?lng=eng& q=20741& cid=189& p=25.

12. 2007)[55] These Soviet claims can be safely questioned. The numbers appear in a Soviet General Staff Study of the 1944 Korsun operation with

after-war amendments. The study is critiqued by Swedish historian Niklas Zetterling as "anything but accurate" and "completely unreliable."(See “Comments on the Soviet General Staff Study on the Korsun-Shevchenkovskii Operation” (http:/ / www. militaryhistory. nu/ critiques/PDF/ korsunstudy. pdf) September 2002.)David Glantz now generalizes that “Soviet and Russian estimates of German losses are wildly inaccurate since these sources routinely inflateGerman and Axis losses as greatly as they understate their own.” (David M. Glantz. Red Storm over the Balkans. Lawrence: University Pressof Kansas. 2007, p. 381)Douglas E. Nash as well points to Soviet overstatements; e.g., the Soviet 5th Cavalry Corps and 4th Guards Army "claimed that they hadpractically wiped out most of Wiking [on 6 February 1944], though this was not remotely close ... In fact, Wiking’s biggest battles in the pocketwere yet to come" (Nash, p. 110). The Soviets claimed "to have downed more than 329 aircraft” during the aerial supply operation; thatnumber would have been more planes than the Luftwaffe had operational in its Korps area during this entire period and "should be regarded asan example of the degree of exaggeration to which the Soviets were prone. This would not be the last wildly inflated claim they would make"(Nash, p. 120).

[56] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 277-278[57] Nash, p. 398[58] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 281[59] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 297

Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 8

[60] Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and General Hermann Breith gave such orders, as well as numerous other officers and NCO's with theirown micro-view during the battle

[61] Nash, p. 382[62] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 298

Bibliography• Armstrong, Richard N. Red Army Tank Commanders. The Armored Guards. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer

Publishing Ltd., 1994. ISBN 0-88740-581-9• Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth. New York: Ballantine Books, 1971. ISBN 0-345-02213-0• Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-234. Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.• Glantz, David & House, Jonathan M. When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence:

University Press of Kansas, 1995. ISBN 0-7006-0717-X• Nash, Douglas E. Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January-February 1944 (http:/ / search.

barnesandnoble. com/ booksearch/ isbninquiry. asp?r=1& ean=0965758435). Southbury, Connecticut: RZMPublishing, 2002. ISBN 0-9657584-3-5

• Perrett, Bryan. Knights of the Black Cross, Hitler's Panzerwaffe and its Leaders. New York: St. Martin’s Press,1986. ISBN 0-7090-2806-7

• Shukman, Harold, ed. Stalin's Generals. New York: Grove Press, 1993. ISBN 1-84212-513-3• Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders. The Korsun Pocket. The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in

the East, 1944. Drexel Hill (Philadelphia), Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers. 2008. ISBN 978-1-932033-88-5

Gallery

Dispatch rider from aheavy tank battalion... as a Tiger I passesby, February 1944

(descriptionabbreviated from

same image in Nash,p. 238)

Gunners from Art.Rgt. 188, 88th Inf. Div.(description abbreviated from same image in

Nash, p. 145)

Panzer IV's of the relief force laden withaccompanying infantry move out (description

abbreviated from near identical image inNash, p. 159)

Korsun–Shevchenkovsky Offensive on Youtube (http:/ / www. youtube. com/ watch?v=P5YGBSEGWWo)

Article Sources and Contributors 9

Article Sources and ContributorsBattle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=465410369  Contributors: 14thArmored, Aldis90, Alex Bakharev, Altenmann, Amakuru,Andreas1968, Andrei nacu, Andrwsc, Ansbachdragoner, Auntieruth55, Balcer, Bedivere.cs, Blablaaa, Bobby D. Bryant, Broux, Bryan Derksen, Buckshot06, DJ Sturm, DMorpheus, DanMS,Diannaa, DocYako, Dodo19, Doug Nash, El C, Freetrashbox, Frietjes, Gamahler, GeneralPatton, Gian piero milanetti, GreatWhiteNortherner, Grutness, Gsl, Hailey C. Shannon, HansHermans,Illythr, Jaan, Jake V, Jayanta Sen, Joe N, Koalorka, Kurt Leyman, Loopy, Lowe4091, Maralia, Mgaved, MisterBee1966, Mrg3105, Mzajac, Niteowlneils, Oberiko, Paracel63, ParappaYo, Pashko3, Rjwilmsi, RobNS, Russian Power, SS451, Soz101, Spot87, StoneProphet, SuperDeng, The-Q, TheCheeseManCan, TheParanoidOne, Thestor, ThreeBlindMice, Tim!, Tim1357, Treesareas11,Tswold, Volker89, Woohookitty, WorldWarTwoEditor, Wwoods, Ynhockey, 89 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsImage:OEF-map-6.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:OEF-map-6.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Bobby D. Bryant, John commons, Mogelzahn,TFCforever, Vasyatka1Image:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-090-3913-24, Russland, Schützenpanzer und Panzer im Winter.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-090-3913-24,_Russland,_Schützenpanzer_und_Panzer_im_Winter.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Germany  Contributors: EtzholdImage:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-1280, Russland, Kessel Tscherkassy.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_141-1280,_Russland,_Kessel_Tscherkassy.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Germany Contributors: Felix Stember, Mtsmallwood, Vasyatka1, 1 anonymous editsImage:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-711-0438-05A, Russland-Süd, Marsch auf unbefestigter Straße.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-711-0438-05A,_Russland-Süd,_Marsch_auf_unbefestigter_Straße.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Germany  Contributors: MenzendorfImage:OEF-map-5.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:OEF-map-5.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Bobby D. Bryant, Mogelzahn, TFCforeverImage:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-279-0946-20, Russland, Krad vor Panzer VI (Tiger I).jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-279-0946-20,_Russland,_Krad_vor_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0Germany  Contributors: Bergmann, JohannesImage:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-277-0847-11, Russland, leichte Feldhaubitze in Feuerstellung.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-277-0847-11,_Russland,_leichte_Feldhaubitze_in_Feuerstellung.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike3.0 Germany  Contributors: JacobImage:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-277-0835-02, Russland, Infanterie auf Panzer IV.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-277-0835-02,_Russland,_Infanterie_auf_Panzer_IV.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0Germany  Contributors: Jacob

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