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    ARCANO

    The Case for Spain

    Ignacio de la Torre, Ph. D.

    [email protected]

    November, 2012

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    Agenda

    Myths of the Spanish economy

    Spain is solvent

    Spain can grow

    Executive summary

    Conclusions

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    November 201The Case for Spain

    Executive Summary

    3

    Journalists and analysts have spread a number of myths that paint an excessively pessimistic picture of

    the Spanish economy. This presentation and its corresponding report address these misconceptions.

    Spain is facing difficult times, but its problems are often exaggerated

    Spain is solvent:

    Assets are valued over 700% of GDP while debts are below 270%

    After recapitalizing Spanish banks, the contagion effect with the Sovereign should be over

    A fiscal package to reduce the deficit by 11% of GDP is being implemented

    Spain is competitive and able to grow:

    Exports are at record highs (above 200 bn., 22% of GDP), and they should keep growing dueto a cheap and productive labor force

    Revenues from tourism and other services are also at historic highs (60 bn.) and continue to

    grow

    Entrepreneurs and SMEs, supported by world class large companies, should lead Spains

    economic growth model going forward

    With enhanced fundamentals and depressed valuations, we believe now is a fantastic moment

    to invest in Spain

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    Agenda

    Myths of the Spanish economy

    Executive summary

    Conclusions

    Spain is solvent

    Spain can grow

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    November 201The Case for Spain

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    Real leverage is 268%, not 363%, as financial corporations debts should not be double counted. If

    you owe 100,000 to your bank and the bank owes this 100,000 to a foreign investor, total debt is

    100,000, not 200,000

    Real leverage of corporations should be adjusted due to: i) amounts lent to corporations by Spanish

    banks, to avoid double counting (27% of GDP), ii) Inter-company loans, also double counted (27% of

    GDP), iii) 40% of GDP of this debt is real estate which is being provisioned at 20% of GDP (50% of

    total), iv) Debts related to investments made in international businesses, which do not contribute to

    Spanish GDP (44% of GDP)

    Source: McKinsey Global Institute, Debt and deleveraging: Uneven progress on the path to growth,January 2012, p. 13

    Myth 1: Spains Debt / GDP is 363%, therefore the country is near

    collapse

    Misrepresentation of Spanish Debt

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    November 201The Case for Spain

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    Myth 2: Spain is uniquely reckless in spending

    6

    Spains government spends less as a % of GDP than that of most other Eurozone countries and the

    UK, both before and after the crisis (Spain had close to a 2% fiscal surplus in 2007)

    Spains government is taking serious measures to correct the fiscal deficit, both through cost

    reduction programs (including controlling spending by regional and local governments) as well as tax

    increases. Local Governments are cutting costs 7% YTD

    In relative terms, Spains fiscal woes are more closely related to low tax revenues than to excessive

    spending

    30%

    35%

    40%

    45%

    50%

    55%

    60%

    2008 2009 2010

    France Germany Greece

    Ireland Italy Portugal

    Spain United Kingdom United States

    Government spending as a % of GDP

    Source: The Heritage Foundation

    N b 201Th C f S i

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    November 201The Case for Spain

    Myth 3: Spain is not competitive

    7

    As an index ofSpains competitiveness, Unit Labor Costs declined 4% since 2008, compared to that of

    Spains trading partners, which increased 5-10%

    Therefore, Spain has regained competitiveness of between 9-14% in cost terms, allowing exports to

    thrive

    Evolution of Spanish competitiveness (ULC) vs. main trading partners

    Source: Eurostat

    95

    100

    105

    110

    115

    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

    Germany Spain France Italy

    November 201The Case for Spain

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    November 201The Case for Spain

    17%

    12%

    5% 4%

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    12%

    14%

    16%

    18%

    20%

    Spain Germany France Italy

    Myth 4: Spain has no growth engine to end the crisis

    Spanish exports and gross tourism revenues are at a historic highs (above 200 bn. and 60 bn. per

    year, respectively)

    Low labor costs, increased labor flexibility, and world class social (particularly the healthcare system)and capital infrastructures create an environment conducive to growth, even if the country maintains

    low levels of public investment in the coming years

    Export growth evolution since 2008-2012

    Source: Eurostat

    Total number of tourists per year (thousands)

    Source: INE

    8

    45,000

    50,000

    55,000

    60,000

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    November 201The Case for Spain

    Myth 5: Spain still has plenty adjustments to make, following theexamples of other crises

    9

    Spain has already tackled three key adjustments:

    As a result of the a significant drop in imports and an increased level of exports, excluding

    energy, an 8% trade deficit has turned into a 3% surplus by 2012, reducing the need for

    external financing to a minimum

    The financial sector is set to have provisioned close to 200 bn. by year-end 2012, as house

    prices are adjusting in line with those of other economies

    As discussed further in the forthcoming slides, the Spanish labor force has become much more

    competitive

    Trade deficit evolution

    Source: INE

    -8%

    -6%

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

    2%

    4%

    Energy Excluding energy

    November 201The Case for Spain

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    November 201The Case for Spain

    10

    Myth 6: Europe will let Spain exit the Euro

    Immediate insolvency of the ECB, due to

    TARGET2 imbalances

    Sizeable loses in the German and French

    banking books

    Contagion effect on Italy leading to a

    likely breakup of the Euro

    Sharp recession in export-led

    economies

    Potentially devastating implications to

    the European Union as an economic and

    political project

    An eventual exit of Spain from the euro zone would be far more costly than supporting its liquidity

    needs. The foreseeable consequences of a Spanish exit would be:

    November 201The Case for Spain

    http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/releases/20121114005856/tmp/scratch_4//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/da/TARGET2_balances.png
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    p

    11

    Effect on GDP Effect on employment

    (cumulative until 2020)(number of employed persons)

    (cumulative until 2020)

    Services Directive 1.2 39,000Labor Reform 4.5 1,763,000

    Pensions Reform 0.4 71,000

    Financial Sector Reform 1.6 96,000

    Law on Budget Stability and

    Financial Sustainability0.9 18,000

    Total 8.6 1,987,000

    Spain is carrying out an 11.3% fiscal adjustment, one of the broadest in the OECD in recent history.

    Supply side reforms can boost GDP by almost 9% in the coming years

    Fiscal reform already being implemented:

    Source: Spanish Treasury

    Myth 7: Spain will not reform

    2012 2013 2014

    ( bn.) ( bn.) ( bn.)

    April Adjustments 43.1 19.6 0

    July Adjustments 13.5 22.9 20.1Total 56.6 42.5 20.1

    % of GDP 5.4% 4.0% 1.9%

    Supply side reforms already being implemented:

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    p

    Myth 8: Spain is bleeding its deposit base

    12

    High quality deposits (resident retail and corporate deposits), which banks assume to be a stable

    funding source, are down only 2-3%; this hardly qualifies as a real deposit flight

    The drop in the total deposit figures (6.7% YTD as of July 2012) are mostly technical in nature and

    have not had a real negative impact on the financial system funding

    Retail and corporate deposits in Spain (bn.)

    Source: Bank of Spain

    0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1,000

    Dec-1

    0

    Jan-1

    1

    Feb-1

    1

    Mar-1

    1

    Apr-11

    May-1

    1

    Jun-1

    1

    Jul-11

    Ago-1

    1

    Sep-1

    1

    Oct-11

    Nov-1

    1

    Dec-1

    1

    Jan-1

    2

    Feb-1

    2

    Mar-1

    2

    Apr-12

    May-1

    2

    Jun-1

    2

    Jul-12

    November 201The Case for Spain

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    According to CDS spreads, Spain is riskier than Indonesia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Romania

    Last time Spain defaulted was in 1883

    Credit default swaps do not reflect political stability (democracy) nor stability provided by a strong

    middle class (built in Spain during 1960s)

    Countries default once they reach very high levels of Government debt (above 120% of GDP),

    cannot access liquidity and are not able to grow. Spain is not in this situation

    Sovereign CDS spread

    Source: Factset

    Myth 9: According to the CDS wisdom, Spain is riskier than manysmall emerging economies

    0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1,000

    1,200

    1,400

    Argentina

    Pakistan

    Ukraine

    Portugal

    EgyptSpainItaly

    Ireland

    Hungary

    Romania

    Bulgaria

    Latvia

    Lithuania

    Kazakhstan

    Turkey

    Indonesia

    Russia

    Israel

    Poland

    SouthAfrica

    France

    Philippines

    Brazil

    ThailandPeru

    Colombia

    CzechRep.

    SaudiArabia

    Mexico

    Estonia

    Malaysia

    China

    Chile

    AustriaJapan

    Netherlands

    Germany

    Ukraine

    SwitzerlandUS

    Sweden

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    Myth 10: Spaniards dont workhard

    14

    The Spanish labor force works more hours per year than that of most other countries in the world, inline with the UK and just below the US

    Comparing Spanish labor costs and its productivity per head, Spain is one of the most attractive

    countries in the world from an investment perspective

    Average hours worked per year

    Source: OECD

    Unit labor costs and GDP per hour worked (2011)

    Source: Eurostat, OECD

    1,200

    1,300

    1,400

    1,500

    1,600

    1,700

    1,800

    1,900

    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

    Spain France Italy UK USA Germany

    Norway

    BelgiumDenmark

    FranceLuxembourgNetherlands

    Germany

    Finland

    Austria Ireland

    Italy

    Spain

    UK

    Portugal

    0

    10

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    40 60 80 100 120 140

    Hourlywages()

    GDP per hour worked as % of US (USA=100)

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    Agenda

    Myths of the Spanish economy

    GRO

    UPPRESENTATION

    Spain is solvent

    Spain can grow

    Executive summary

    Conclusions

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    Solvency = Assets - Debt

    16

    Spanish assets (financial and real estate, assuming 50% cuts in real estate prices) are well above debts.

    Spain is solvent, but illiquid

    40% of GDP of corporate debt is real estate related, half of which is being provisioned

    Balance sheets of Spanish government, corporates, and households

    Source: Bank of Spain, Funcas, Arcano

    1,047

    202

    845

    0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1,000

    1,200

    Assets Liabilities + Equity

    Government

    Assets Net equ ity pos it ion L iabi li ti es

    5,061

    4,202

    859

    0

    1,000

    2,000

    3,000

    4,000

    5,000

    6,000

    Assets Liabilities + Equity

    Households

    Assets Net equ it y pos it ion L iabil it ies

    1,792

    661

    1,131

    0

    400

    800

    1,200

    1,600

    2,000

    Assets Liabilities + Equity

    Corporates

    Asset s Net equi ty pos it ion L iabil it ies

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    Spain is solvent, but illiquid

    17

    Almost 80% of wealth is in illiquid real estate. Active tax policies need to be undertaken to balanceSpains savings structure

    Asset split of households (% of total assets)

    Source: Oliver Wyman

    November 201The Case for Spain

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    0.9

    0.8

    1.1

    0.6

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    1.2

    1.4

    1.6

    1.8

    Loans Deposits

    Trillions

    Companies Households

    ECB and

    wholesale

    funding

    1.7 Trillion

    The Spanish financial system has addressed its main weaknesses

    18

    Although it has taken much longer than it should have, the Spanish financial system is successfully

    addressing its liquidity and solvency weaknesses:

    Liquidity: ECB has refinanced two thirds of the banks wholesale funding, mostly with 3-year

    maturity funds, providing Spanish banks with certainty of funding and enough time to execute a

    necessary deleveraging process, already underway

    Solvency: Total provisioning will reach 20% of GDP or about 15% of the systems loan book by

    2013 while increasing capital ratios. This massive effort has been tackled by a mix of (i)

    operating profits, (ii) asset sales, (iii) rights issues, and (iv) Government capital injections

    Financial System Loan Book Funding Structure

    Source: Arcano, Bank of Spain

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    Liquidity risk has been limited

    19

    International liquidity mechanisms are larger than Sovereign liquidity needs

    The risk of contagion between Spains Sovereign debt (85% of GDP) and banks wholesale debt (over

    50% of GDP) has been successfully addressed by: (i) the ECBs liquidity programs and (ii) the

    comprehensive financial sector reform carried out by the Spanish government, which will result in a

    much healthier and concentrated banking system

    ESM/EFSF resources and gross financial public needsin Spain and Italy (bn.)

    Source: Bloomberg

    0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1000

    Firewall Financial needs 2013-14

    IMF ESM lending capacity Spain Italy

    November 201The Case for Spain

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    Unparalleled fiscal adjustment underway (11.3% of GDP)

    20

    By 2014, Spains structural and fiscal deficits are expected to be reduced very significantly, even in theworst case economic scenario, allowing public debt to stabilize below 100% of GDP, which is lower

    than the expected level of France, UK, and USA

    2012 2013 2014 Acum. 2012-2014

    GDP growth -1.5% -0.5% 1.2% -0.8%GDP growth (IMF estimate) -1.5% -1.3% 1.0% -1.8%

    GDP growth (EU estimate) -1.4% -1.4% 0.8% -2.0%

    Target deficit (% of GDP) 6.3% 4.5% 2.8% 13.6%

    IMF estimated deficit (% of GDP) 7.0% 5.7% 4.6% 17.3%

    EU estimated deficit (% of GDP) 7.0% 6.0% 6.4% 19.4%

    Target structural deficit (% of GDP) 3.0% 1.5% 0.0% 4.5%

    Implied estructural adjustment (% of GDP) 3.0% 1.5% 1.5% 6.0%

    Announced adjustment (% of GDP) 5.4% 4.0% 1.9% 11.3%

    Estimated public debt (% of GDP) 85.3% 91.0% 95.6%

    Spains fiscal consolidation program (Governments projections unless indicated)

    Source: Spanish Treasury, IMF, EC (excludes accounting impact of valuation adjustments in bank aid; ECs 2014 forecast assumes tax

    cuts which are not realistic)

    November 201The Case for Spain

    H i d b i 2013 f 49% f ll

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    House prices are expected to bottom in 2013 after a 49% fall

    21

    House prices should fall 10% in 2013 and stabilize going forward. By 2013, house prices will reachhistoric averages vs. disposable income. Total decline between 2008-2013 should reach 49%. The

    contagion effect from real estate to banks should be over

    House prices

    Source: Ministry of Development

    -15%

    -10%

    -5%

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    1,000

    1,500

    2,000

    2,500

    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

    per square metre (LHS) % yoy (RHS)

    November 201The Case for Spain

    G t d bt li l f i it l

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    Government debt relies less on foreign capital

    22

    Foreigners hold 36% of Government debt (down from 55% in 2009), reducing refinancing risk as

    Spanish financial institutions have picked up the balance

    Spanish Government Debt by holder

    Source: Spanish Treasury, IMF

    33.5%

    13.3%

    2.3%

    13.9%

    36.2%

    Credit Institutions Pension, insurance, mutual funds and others

    Household and non financial companies Spanish of fic ia l institutions

    Non Residents

    November 201The Case for Spain

    P i t t f S i b i t

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    Private sector of Spain begins to save

    23

    Since 2010, the private sector of the economy has been saving almost 4% of GDP

    Breakdown of private savings

    Source: INE

    -12%

    -10%

    -8%

    -6%

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    2005

    2006

    2007

    2008

    2009

    2010

    2011

    Q1-2

    012

    %ofGDP

    Savings over GDP

    Non-financial f irms Households

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    Agenda

    Myths of the Spanish economy

    GR

    OUPPRESENTATION

    Spain is solvent

    Spain can grow

    Executive summary

    Conclusions

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Spanish exports at record highs and continue to grow

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    Spanish exports at record highs and continue to grow

    25

    Spain is already generating an ex-energy trade surplus

    Spain is entering into a positive trade balance of goods and services

    Evolution of Spanish exports ( mm.)

    Source: INE

    15%

    16%

    17%

    18%

    19%

    20%

    21%

    22%

    23%

    75,000

    95,000

    115,000

    135,000

    155,000

    175,000

    195,000

    2000

    2001

    2002

    2003

    2004

    2005

    2006

    2007

    2008

    2009

    2010

    2011

    2012e

    Exports Exports/GDP

    0

    50

    100

    150

    200

    250

    300

    350

    400

    Exports

    Imports

    Spanish exports and imports of goods and services

    ( bn.)

    Source: Historical figures and projections provided by Eurostat

    November 201The Case for Spain

    The services and tourism sectors are at record highs

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    The services and tourism sectors are at record highs

    26

    Spanish touristic growth is structural

    Net revenue from tourism per year (m)

    Source: INE. Gross revenues left by foreigners into Spain less money spent by Spaniards abroad

    36,000

    38,000

    40,000

    42,000

    44,000

    46,000

    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Q3 2012

    November 201The Case for Spain

    allowing Spain to enter a current account surplus

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    allowing Spain to enter a current account surplus

    27

    By 2013, Spain should reach current account surplus through record exports and tourism. This will

    help Spain to begin reducing its external debtor position

    Current account ( bn.)

    Source: Bank of Spain, OECD

    -12

    -10

    -8

    -6

    -4

    -2

    0

    -40

    -30

    -20

    -10

    0

    10

    20

    1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

    Goods Services Factor income Current transfers CA (% of GDP)

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Enhanced productivity and lower real wages are making this possible

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    Enhanced productivity and lower real wages are making this possible

    28

    A productivity revolution and lower real wages have enhanced competitiveness, allowing companies

    to successfully substitute local sales with exports

    Labor productivity change (2007=100)

    Source: INE

    Real wages evolution (YOY%)

    Source: Eurostat

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

    Euro area (16 countries) Spain

    95

    100

    105

    110

    115

    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013e

    Spain EU

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Spain today has a highly competitive labor force

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    Spain today has a highly competitive labor force

    29

    Spanish labor is 30% cheaper than the euro zone average, but productivity difference is less than 10%

    Productivity/hour worked (US=100%, 2011)

    Source: The Conference Board

    Labor costs (/hour)

    Source: Eurostat

    0%

    20%

    40%

    60%

    80%

    100%

    120%

    140%

    160%

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    3540

    45

    50

    Norw

    ay

    Swed

    en

    Fran

    ce

    Netherlan

    ds

    Finla

    nd

    Irela

    nd

    Spain

    Cypr

    us

    Portugal

    CzechRepub

    lic

    Estonia

    Pola

    nd

    Lithuania

    November 201The Case for Spain

    that works hard and is increasingly flexible

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    that works hard and is increasingly flexible

    30

    Spaniards work harder than most of its trading partners, in terms of hours worked. Following thelabor reform, salary increases are no longer linked to inflation

    Difference between prices and salaries (YOY%)

    Source: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, INE

    0.0

    0.5

    1.0

    1.5

    2.0

    2.5

    3.0

    3.5

    4.0

    Jan-11

    Feb-11

    Mar-11

    Apr-11

    May-11

    Jun-11

    Jul-11

    Aug-11

    Sep-11

    Oct-11

    Nov-11

    Dec-11

    Jan-12

    Feb-12

    Mar-12

    Apr-12

    May-12

    Jun-12

    Jul-12

    Aug-12

    Sep-12

    Salaries YoY% CPI YoY%

    November 201The Case for Spain

    More new companies are being created than in the past

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    p g p

    31

    More than 320,000 new companies are being created every year, although one of the greatest

    challenges facing Spains corporate sector is to increase the average size of its companies

    Creation of gross new companies

    Source: Arcano, INE

    Breakdown of companies by sizes: Spain vs. Germany

    Source: Eurostat

    300,000

    310,000

    320,000

    330,000

    340,000

    2010 2011 20120%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    70%

    80%

    90%

    100%

    Spain Germany

    250 employees or more 50-249 20-49 10-19 1-9

    November 201The Case for Spain

    that, together with a higher value-added industrial sector, will

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    , g g ,slowly help drive up employment and eventually growth

    32

    The industrial and services sectors will be the main engine of Spains GDP growth and employment,with industries increasing their value-added products

    Most of the employment adjustments should end by 2013. With consumption currently at depressed

    levels, stabilization of employment might lead to consumption growth from 2014 onwards

    Evolution of Spanish value-added in the

    industrial sector

    Source: INE

    Unemployment QOQ growth evolution (EPA)

    Source: INE

    25,000

    30,000

    35,000

    40,000

    45,000

    2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

    -5%

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    30%

    2009 2010 2011 2012

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    Agenda

    Myths of the Spanish economy

    GROUPPRESENTATION

    Spain is solvent

    Spain can grow

    Executive summary

    Conclusions

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Conclusions

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    Conclusions

    34

    Spain in 2006

    11% Current Account deficit, the second largest in the world. For every 100 euros of GDP, 11

    were financed by foreigners through short term money. This is the origin of the liquidity crisis

    25% Credit Expansion. To grow GDP by one euro, Spain needed four euros of additional lending.

    This is the origin of the banking crisis Constructions weight in the economy increased to 12% of GDP

    Tax collection increased 4% of GDP due to real estate. Yet the Government used this money to

    hire more civil servants. This is the origin of the fiscal crisis

    Despite these risks, asset prices were at historic highs, and Spain attracted record inflows of

    portfolio money (208 bn.)

    Spain in 2013

    Current Account surplus. 11% adjustment in 6 years. Yet GDP has only contracted 5%

    Loans down 5%. Private debt to GDP down 16% since 2009. Again, in spite of this, GDP only

    contracted 5%

    Construction is back to 6% of GDP, below historic average

    A fiscal package of 11% of GDP is being implemented. By 2014, structural deficit will reach 0%

    Despite lower risks, asset prices have plummeted, and significant portfolio money left Spain

    (80bn. in 2012)

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Conclusions (cont.)

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    Spain was not the best place to invest in 2006 but it could be in 2013

    Spains condition is not as weak as many believe. Investors should disregard misguided myths

    about Spain when making investment decisions and focus on fundamentals

    Spain is solvent, but illiquid. The EU has established sufficient mechanisms to support Spains need

    for liquidity. Spanish corporates, households, and the government are solvent

    Spanish banks are seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. There are 15 main banking groups left,

    leaving the sector well capitalized and with sufficient liquidity

    The contagion effect from real estate to banks, and from banks to the Government, should be over

    Spain is adjusting, fiscally and from a supply side point of view

    Spain is growing through external demand, as exports and tourism reach record highs

    Spains cheap labor costs and high productivity explain why this growth is structural, not short term

    driven

    The crisis is producing a new generation of Spaniards focused on entrepreneurship, SMEs and R&D

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Spain will emerge from its ashes, like the Phoenix!

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    p g ,

    36

    Thanks!

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Arcano: your local house of reference to invest in Spain

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    ARCANO37

    About Arcano (www.arcanogroup.com)

    A leading independent advisory services firm with presence in Europe and the United States. The

    company specializes in three areas: Investment Banking, Asset Management, and Multifamily

    Office Our team is formed by 70 qualified professionals that work to offer financial advisory services

    and tailored solutions for our clients with a unique, independent approach

    Arcanos Investment Banking unit is recognized as a leader in the small and mid-market segment

    of the Spanish market, including clients such as Private Equity firms, family owned companies and

    publicly traded corporations. Arcano also provides pre-IPO finance rounds to companies for

    deals ranging from 10 m. upwards to support expansion up to 2 years before the IPO; on the

    small cap side, Arcano helps small companies float on the Spanish Alternate Market (MAB) with

    offering sizes from 10 m. upwards, and it intermediates block trades in small caps in the Spanishequity markets

    About the author

    Ignacio de la Torre has been a Partner of Arcano since 2008

    Fifteen years of experience in investment banking and capital markets, having worked in the

    equity research and equity sales departments of Deutsche Bank and UBS Investment Bank

    The author is also a part time Professor of Finance and Economics at IE Business School. He

    holds an MBA from Insead, a Ph. D. in History from UNED, an M. Sc. from ICADE, and a M. A.from UNED. He has authored four books and won the Everis prize in 2009

    November 201The Case for Spain

    Disclaimer

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    Analyst Certification

    The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned lead analyst(s) about the subject issuer

    and the securities of the issuer. In addition, the undersigned lead analyst(s) has not and will not receive any compensation for

    providing a specific recommendation or view in this report. Ignacio de la Torre.

    This document has been prepared by Arcano Valores AV, S.A.U. (Arcano Valores). Arcano Valores is an investment firm regulated

    and registered under number 243 by the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV). This document is provided forinformation purposes only and must not be considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any financial instrument

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    All opinions and estimates included herein constitute the current judgement of the author as at the date of this report and are

    subject to change without notice. Arcano Valores has no obligation to update, modify or amend this report or to otherwise notify a

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