the case against shareholder empowerment 158 u. penn. l. rev. 653 ( 2010) william w. bratton
DESCRIPTION
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professor of Business Law Georgetown University Law Center Michael L. Wachter William B. Johnson Professor of Law and Economics - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
11
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010)
William W. BrattonPeter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professor of Business LawGeorgetown University Law Center
Michael L. WachterWilliam B. Johnson Professor of Law and Economics Co-Director, Institute for Law and EconomicsUniversity of Pennsylvania Law School
SASE Annual MeetingJune 25, 2010
![Page 2: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2
Corporate legal theory
• Dominant view– Management power is the problem– The legal model empowers managers– Shareholder power is the answer– Defenders of the system bear the
theoretical burden of proof
![Page 3: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
3
This paper’s objective
• Reverse the theoretical burden of proof to fall on the law reform proponent
• Means to the end– (1) Clear the field of the conceptual inheritance of Berle
and Means– (2) Make transparent the theoretical assumptions that
motivate the shareholder case – (3) Show that management agency costs are not as salient
as claimed– (4) Show that shareholder empowerment would implicate
significant agency costs– (5) Decouple the financial crisis from the shareholder case
and recouple it with the case against
![Page 4: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
4
(1) Clear the field of the conceptual inheritance of Berle and Means
• Fama and Jensen (1983)– “Separation of ownership and control” is a
rational allocation of management functions• “Ultimate control” in board• Shareholders don’t know anything
– “Property” is split among decision initiators, monitors, and residual claimants
![Page 5: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5
(2) Make transparent the theoretical assumptions that motivate the shareholder case
• “Ultimate control” in shareholders • Incentives
– Managers are conflicted and self-serving– Shareholders have a pure incentive to maximize
value• But shareholders don’t know anything
– Market price = objective and accurate measure of pure shareholder maximand
• Manage to maximize the market price
![Page 6: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6
(3) Show that management agency costs are not as salient as claimed
• Shareholder win-win – Static agency cost picture dating from the 1980s
• Jensen and Meckling– Dynamic process of agency cost reduction
• Post 1980s developments– Managers become sensitive to shareholder value– Boards become better monitors– Discipline: Private equity buyouts– Hostility: Activist hedge funds
![Page 7: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7
(3) Show that management agency costs are not as salient as claimed
Payouts, 1987-2008
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year End S&P 500 Average Dividends Repurchases
![Page 8: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8
(4) Show that shareholder empowerment would implicate significant agency costs
• What does the market price teach?– (1) If markets were strong form efficient, the shareholders
would have a great case• Markets are not strong form efficient
– (2) The strength of the shareholder case varies depending on the content of public information and the governance issue
– (3) Information asymmetries are real and persistent– (4) Market prices are subject to speculative distortion
![Page 9: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9
(5) Decouple the financial crisis from the shareholder case and recouple it with the case
against
• They say– Management caused the financial crisis– Shareholder empowerment will restore trust
• We say– Shareholder empowerment is about market
control and the financial crisis follows from market failure
– Managers and shareholders made the same mistakes
![Page 10: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10
Figure II: S&P 500/S&P 500 Banks, 2000-2009
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Jan
uary
31, 200
0 =
10
0
S&P 500
S&P 500 Banks
(5) Decouple the financial crisis from the shareholder case and recouple it with the case
against
![Page 11: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 653 ( 2010) William W. Bratton](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022072013/56812b46550346895d8f5dfc/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
11
(5) Decouple the financial crisis from the shareholder case and recouple it with the case
againstFigure III: Sectoral Variations
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
S&P 500 Banks
Countrywide Financial
JP Morgan Chase
Bank of America