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The Battle for Civil Rights: John F. Kennedy and The Politics of Persuasion

By

Robert E. Gilbert Northeastern University Abstract: Although he is often criticized for being slow in recognizing the need for major

civil rights legislation in the United States, John Kennedy ultimately became a pre-eminent leader in the struggle for equal rights. Not only did he speak out at press conferences and other venues for civil rights progress, but he also became the architect of the most far-reaching civil rights program in American history. Also significant is that Kennedy – sometimes described as a “dramatic” leader - became the nation’s foremost “teacher” on the issue of civil rights. More specifically, he delivered bold speeches about the issue not only in the north but also in the southern states (where resistance was greatest) and then gave to a nationwide television audience the most emotional and outspoken presidential address on the subject that has ever been given, before or since. Later, and most significantly, as Congress was considering his civil rights bill, Kennedy brought to the White House large groups of religious leaders, lawyers, journalists, business leaders and women’s group leaders in an effort to convince them to support the issue and then go home to do what they could to shape public opinion in their local communities and help ensure passage of this legislation. These sessions, involving some two thousand key “opinion leaders,” many from the south, have been described as one of the most extraordinary efforts by any president in the history of the nation to change the hearts and minds of major segments of the American public. At the same time, Kennedy lobbied committees of Congress and, a week before his assassination, those committees took action that paved the way to the bill’s passage in 1964. The enactment of this law represented a major Kennedy victory.

As a candidate for president, John F. Kennedy spoke frequently and eloquently about the need for civil rights progress in the United States. He did this not only in the north but in the south as well. On September 17, in Greensboro, North Carolina, for example, he advocated “an America where all persons are truly free and where all enjoy their full constitutional rights.” On October 19, in Warm Springs, Georgia, he asserted that “we must assure every citizen of the full protection of his constitutional rights and equal opportunity to participate with every other American in every phase of our national life.” On the same day, he argued in Columbia, South Carolina that progress in civil rights was needed in order to “be true to our ideals and responsibilities” and indicated that presidential leadership was necessary “so that every American can enjoy his full constitutional rights.”

The promise of presidential leadership in the area of civil rights emerged as a major theme in

Kennedy’s campaign. He attacked President Eisenhower for not using “his executive power fully in the fight for equal rights” and lambasted the Eisenhower Administration for not being “particularly rigorous in setting a moral atmosphere for the implementation of the Supreme Court decisions.” Kennedy told campaign audiences that “it is the President of the United States who can set the goals for the country in… equality of rights for all Americans, regardless of their

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race or color” and promised “moral and persuasive leadership by the President to create the conditions in which compliance with the constitutional requirements of school desegregation takes place.”

Moreover, Kennedy enunciated several specific civil rights goals as he traveled across the

country. In various locales, he promised to strengthen the President’s Civil Rights Commission and urged that the Attorney General be granted the power to enforce all constitutional rights. He asserted that discriminatory poll taxes and literacy tests must be eliminated and that “effective anti-bombing and anti-lynching legislation” must be passed. He promised to appoint more black federal judges and foreign service officers and, in a widely remembered remark, pledged to issue an executive order which would end discrimination in federal housing “by the stroke of a pen.”

Despite his campaign pronouncements and promises, Kennedy did not, in 1960, have a deep

personal interest in civil rights. Politically he had not had to develop a strong commitment to the cause previously since his constituency in both his House District and statewide in Massachusetts was overwhelmingly white. Socially his upbringing in a wealthy Irish-American household sheltered him from the struggles of Black Americans.

In these early years, Kennedy was viewed skeptically by a number of civil rights leaders.

Martin Luther King initially thought that the Massachusetts Senator had a “long intellectual commitment but that he didn’t quite have the emotional commitment… He had never really had the personal experience of knowing the deep groans and passionate yearnings of the Negroes for freedom because he just didn’t know the Negroes generally.”1 James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality saw Kennedy as “a man of good will and good intentions” but did not feel that “he was extremely knowledgeable in the civil rights field or that he had a feeling for it.”2

Executive Action

Some black leaders preferred Lyndon Johnson of Texas to Kennedy of Massachusetts as the best hope in bringing about civil rights progress. Yet it was Kennedy who became President on January 20, 1961 and Kennedy who shaped the contours of executive branch action on the issue.

At the beginning of his presidency, John F. Kennedy sought to minimize risks in the area of civil rights by emphasizing executive rather than legislative action. He demonstrated his interest in this approach on his first full day as president. After he noticed that all of the Coast Guard cadets marching in his inaugural parade were white, he exerted pressure on the Coast Guard to begin enrolling black students without delay. Soon he saw both black cadets and black faculty members recruited for the first time since the academy’s founding in 1876. Even a staunch Kennedy critic has written: “that Kennedy took such a strong personal interest in the recruitment policies of the Coast Guard on his first day in office demonstrated that on certain occasions, when he did not feel bound by political constraints, he could be extraordinarily responsive to black aspirations.”

Kennedy also tried to exert subtle influence over racial attitudes by the way he interacted

personally with African Americans and responded personally toward the issue of racism. He danced with black women at the inaugural balls in 1961 and invited more black guests to the White House than any president before him, socializing with them easily and with charm.

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Interestingly, when Theodore Roosevelt had invited the black writer Booker T. Washington to the White House in the early 1900’s, he was widely pilloried. Kennedy’s behavior in the early 60’s vindicated Roosevelt and set a new standard of presidential behavior. Also, early in his term, he told the press that he “personally approved” of his brother’s resignation from a segregated club in Washington, D.C. His overt inclusiveness helped foster stronger racial acceptance throughout American society and, in effect, it “represented a genuine paradigm shift in American racial politics.”3 As Roy Wilkins remarked, “it became in the circles in which he moved socially, himself personally, it became the thing [to do] and in the circles in which he did not move, but in which he inspired great admiration and personal affection, this became the American thing to do. …There were still people who didn’t like it, didn’t want it but they were now on the defensive…. After Kennedy, it’s no longer fashionable to be prejudiced, to exercise discrimination….”

In addition to the example he set, Kennedy took several more concrete actions. First, he

appointed a relatively large number of African Americans to major governmental positions. These included such posts as Assistant Secretary of Labor, Deputy Press Secretary, Special Assistant to the President, Ambassador to Norway, Ambassador to Niger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Housing and Home Finance Agency Administrator, U.S. Attorney for Northern California, and Federal Trade Commissioner. The President of Howard University commented at the time that “President Kennedy has done more in a few months to increase the respect and give prestige to Negroes than any President in my lifetime.”

Kennedy followed up these early initiatives when vacancies occurred in the judicial branch.

Whereas only three blacks had been appointed to the federal bench prior to 1961, Kennedy appointed five black lawyers to federal judgeships during his presidency. These included Thurgood Marshall whom he appointed to the federal court of Appeals in the Second Circuit. Although Kennedy might well have had an interest in naming William Hastie, a federal appeals court judge in the third circuit, as the nation’s first black Supreme Court justice, the idea was discussed with Chief Justice Earl Warren who raised objections. Warren argued that Hastie was not sufficiently liberal and “would be opposed to all the measures that we’re interested in.”4 As a result, the first black Supreme Court justice in the nation’s history, Thurgood Marshall, was appointed by Lyndon Johnson in 1967.

Another key aspect of Kennedy’s early reliance on executive action was his use of Executive

Orders. Since Executive Orders had the force of law, he did not think that legislative action was needed, at least not in the early stages of his Administration. In light of his commitment to equal employment opportunity, Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 on Employment in March, 1961, just two months after his Inauguration. He remarked that:

through this vastly strengthened machinery, I intend to ensure that Americans of all colors and beliefs will have equal access to employment within the government and with those who do business with the government. I have dedicated my Administration to the cause of equal opportunity in employment by the government or its contractors… I have no doubt that the rigorous enforcement of this order will mean the end of such discrimination.” Kennedy then ordered the most comprehensive government-wide employment census ever

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undertaken, including the number of blacks employed and the employment grades they occupied.5 The Executive Order directed all agencies and departments of the federal government to take positive action to eliminate racial discrimination in their employment policies and fused the already existing Committee on Government Contracts and the Committee on Government Employment into a new and energized Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.6 The principal responsibilities of the Committee were to review the employment practices of the federal government in terms of race, make recommendations for improvement and establish anti-discrimination rules which all government contractors must follow. Also, the Committee was to foster aggressively the creation of educational programs by civic, religious and other nongovernment groups to help reduce or eliminate the basic causes of racial discrimination in employment.

Vice President Lyndon Johnson was designated as Chairman of the Committee and at its first meeting, he informed all Committee members of the President’s request that they not be represented at meetings by proxies -who would not be recognized as voting members - but rather attend all meetings in person. Johnson also remarked that “arbitrary and artificial restrictions upon individuals can no longer be tolerated, either morally or materially… There should be no doubt about our purpose or program, we mean business. We intend to eliminate discrimination in Government employment and in the training, recruitment, employment and promotion of personnel engaged in the performance of Government contracts.” 7

(1) drinking fountains, washrooms, cafeterias, work areas, time clocks and company sponsored recreational activities were desegregated;

As Committee Chair, Johnson then set up several subcommittees: Skill Improvement, Training and Apprenticeship, chaired by AFL-CIO President George Meany, Promotion and Upgrading, chaired by UAW President Walter Reuther, Vocational Education, chaired by HEW Secretary Abraham Ribicoff, Franchise Industries, chaired by American Gas and Electric Executive Vice President Donald Cook and Religious Cooperation, chaired by the Dean of Washington Cathedral, Francis Sayre.

When Kennedy addressed the Committee’s opening session, he indicated that “I am hopeful

and confident that from this time forward the Committee will exercise the great powers given to it by the Executive Order to permanently remove from government employment and work performed for the government every trace of discrimination because of race, creed or place of national origin.” He also pledged that “this is not going to be an honorary committee. This is not going to be one which issues a number of statements, relying upon exhortation. This Committee has powers and it has responsibilities, and I think when its powers and responsibilities are put together, it will be moving along a very important, useful and national road.”

One of the Committee’s first successes came in May, 1961 when it negotiated an agreement

with the Lockheed Corporation under which Lockheed signed a “Plan for Progress” which would lead to the recruitment, employment, promotion and training of minority group members throughout the company’s operations. Three days later, the Committee accepted a Report in which the steps taken by Lockheed at its Marietta, Georgia facility were outlined:

(2) a complete analysis of all present Negro employees was undertaken for the purpose of identifying the potentialities of each to assure consideration on merit for transfer and promotion;

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(3) intensive recruiting efforts were instituted among minority groups for apprentice training and employment in white collar work, including clerical, stenographic, engineers, draftsmen and mathematicians;

(4) two Negro university professors would be hired during the summer months to work as part of the company’s program to make universities more understanding of employment needs and opportunities at Lockheed;

(5) African Americans would be included in the company’s cooperative training program under which the trainees attend college part of the year and work part of the year until graduation;

(6) all company training, including on-the-job skill training, requalification training, supervisory training and career development training was desegregated.

In submitting the Report, the Air Force pledged to provide regular review and follow-up on each phase of the commitments that were made and the programs that were started. After just six months, black employment increased by 26 percent in all of Lockheed’s plants. During the summer of 1961, eight more major defense contractors – employing 760,000 people – signed Plans for Progress in which they pledged their voluntary support for equal employment opportunities. These included Boeing Aircraft, Douglas Aircraft, General Electric Corporation, Western Electric Company, North American Aviation, Radio Corporation of America, United Aircraft Corporation and the Martin Company. The Plans they signed pledged non-discrimination and committed the various signatories to take positive steps in bringing African-Americans and members of other minority groups into the work force in non-traditional positions.8

The President’s Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity instituted a program of plant visitation for all government contractors to check on their annual affirmative action reports

By the summer of 1962, 52 of the nation’s largest corporations had signed Plans for Progress. An August 1962 evaluation of these Plans disclosed that 37 of the signatories that had completed analyses reported a six month total employment increase of 3.1% while non-white employment had jumped by 10 %. Also, in salaried positions as distinguished from hourly paid jobs, 6.6 % of the new salaried jobs were filled by non-whites, whereas initially only 1% had been.

In 1963, with 91 corporations involved, total employment had increased by 12.4% while

nonwhite employment had increased by 14.7%. Also, in salaried positions, total employment had increased by 13.8% while nonwhite employment had increased by 23.5%. The 1963 Report’s overall conclusion was that:

employment of minority group Americans at responsible levels in private industry has increased, both through cooperative action and the committee’s compliance program. Breakthroughs have been achieved in jobs traditionally hedged with color or religious barriers. Responsible government positions have been filled by Americans who formally could not aspire to anything beyond the service and maintenance level.”

9 and carried out an annual survey of minority employment in the federal government itself. By 1963, it had entered into “affirmative action agreements” with 115 companies that

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employed more than 5,500,000 workers and with 117 AFL-CIO union affiliates, representing some 13,000,000 members. Also, the civil service system showed significant increases in black employment levels. Between 1961 and 1963, black employment in the high, middle and low grades of the civil service increased by 88%, 37% and 3%, respectively.

Vigorous steps were also taken within the government itself to make certain that employment

practices conformed to Kennedy’s goals. As an example, Robert Kennedy, as Head of the Justice Department, took vigorous action in implementing his brother’s Executive Order. In May, 1961, he wrote to the Deans of 131 law schools, asking for “the names of qualified Negro attorneys…who might be interested in coming into the Department.” Kennedy told them that “I have no desire to employ anyone on the basis of race. We are looking for qualified people here in the Department of Justice and ability is the primary consideration. However, I am anxious to take some steps to break down the barrier which apparently has existed.”

These efforts made a noticeable difference in Justice Department employment practices. In

his Report to the President on January 24, 1963, the Attorney General informed President Kennedy that “there were 10 Negro attorneys in the Department at the beginning of this Administration. Now there are more than 70….” Also, he pointed out that “15 of the 115 Deputy United States Marshalls appointed in this Administration are Negroes”; and of the “approximately 510 Assistant United States Attorneys appointed in this Administration, 32 are Negroes.” Finally, he pointed out to the President that Negro Deputy Marshalls were appointed in several southern and border states “where no one of their race had ever before served.”

In all, Executive Order 10925 was the most forceful step taken by the Executive Branch up to

that time to make equal employment opportunity a reality. It clearly improved the employment status of blacks and led the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins to remark that “JFK’s stamp on employment is clearly visible.”10

The Legislative Arena

Thurgood Marshall went ever further. He commented that “in the area of employment, …President Kennedy will go down in history as the President who actually put into effect the definite promise that Negroes were entitled to employment in the federal government and on every level without regard to race. Other presidents have said that but the record, whether you take numbers or positions, will show that it was the determination of President Kennedy to carry this out….”

In his earliest conversations with the new President’s key aides, Berl Bernhard, Staff Director of the Commission on Civil Rights, learned quickly that at least initially the Administration intended to concentrate on executive rather than legislative action in the area of civil rights. He was told that the climate just wasn’t hospitable to “basic legislative change” and concluded that “we weren’t going to initiate legislative action until there was a palpable demand for legislation and… the creation of an emotional demand for change.”

Six weeks after his Inauguration, President Kennedy himself confirmed this fact. Asked at a

press conference whether he saw the need for new civil rights legislation, Kennedy responded: I do believe that there are a good deal of things we can do now in administering laws

previously passed by Congress… and also by using the powers which the Constitution gives to the President through executive orders. When I feel that there is a necessity for a congressional

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action, with a chance of getting that congressional action, then I will recommend it to congress.11 The President was concerned that a bitter legislative battle over civil rights would shatter

American unity at the very time that tensions in Berlin were reaching crisis proportions and that it would also endanger the rest of his legislative program. He knew all too well that on the day that voters gave him a narrow victory for the Presidency, the Republican Party, although still in the minority, gained twenty-one seats in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate. This meant that Congress would be more conservative and that the political opposition to the Kennedy Administration would be greater.

Former Congressman Richard Bolling (D-Missouri) has estimated that the conservatives

enjoyed a 224-213 numerical majority in the House from 1961-1963 and that that majority would be increased to 227-208 in 1963. The conservative majority presented obvious difficulties for Kennedy with regard to his entire legislative program but no more so than in civil rights. In the summer of 1960, the 86th Congress had rejected strong civil rights legislation and that Congress had been less conservative than any that Kennedy would face as president.

Moreover, in 1959, the Republican members of the house had elected a new and quite

combative leader. Deposing the aging Joseph Martin of Massachusetts in part because he did not offer sufficiently aggressive leadership, Republicans chose conservative Charles Halleck of Indiana as their new minority leader. Halleck was an outspoken partisan pledged to lead an all-out assault on Kennedy’s legislative program. Under Halleck, the Republicans gave Kennedy less support than any opposition party gave any President between 1954 and 1970.12 Halleck went so far as to threaten to withhold campaign funds from Republican congressman who might be unwilling to toe the party line.13 He was finally replaced in 1965 by the more genial Gerald Ford of Michigan but Halleck was a formidable problem that Kennedy had to face throughout his presidency.

Also, Kennedy had grave problems with the southern wing of his own party. In Kennedy’s

day, Democratic congressmen and senators from the “old south” had very great power in the legislative arena. Of the twenty standing Committees in the House and the sixteen in the Senate during the early 1960’s, ten and nine respectively were chaired by southerners. More generally, the southern democrats and the Republican opposition enjoyed a potent alliance during Kennedy’s tenure. For example, in the January 1961 battle to expand the size of the House Rules Committee, 62 out of 98 southern democrats voted with a large majority of Republicans in a narrowly unsuccessful attempt to block the change.

President Kennedy was keenly aware of the potency and potential danger of this alliance and

worked hard to dissipate it. In fact, he realized only too well that in order to get any of his major legislative proposals enacted he would need the votes of approximately half the southern democrats. To propose civil rights legislation early in his administration might well be foolhardy for the President since he would risk losing the votes of these southern democrats not only on civil rights but on everything. He told Martin Luther King that “if we go into a long fight in Congress, it will bottleneck everything else and still get no bill.” 14

One final and very important factor that made Kennedy initially reluctant to go to Congress

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for civil rights legislation was simply the state of the national public consciousness. As president, Kennedy confronted a nation that was largely asleep to the problem. Although events eventually would shake the nation from its slumber, those events would not be brought to a peak until well into the Kennedy years. Genuine equality would entail such a fundamental change in American life that to propose significant civil rights legislation at a time when most of the nation failed to see the need for that legislation would only be a hollow gesture. Therefore, while Kennedy early on took executive action directly to advance the cause of civil rights, his legislative agenda - at least until 1963 - was designed only indirectly to benefit black Americans. An increase in the minimum wage, federal aid to education and Medicare were general purpose legislative proposals that were aimed at benefitting all persons in the middle and lower classes rather than any one particular group of Americans.

By 1963, however, the national climate in the United States was in flux. The battle over

the integration of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1956 only paved the way to much more intense civil rights activity in the early 1960's. Although the tactics of civil rights groups occasionally disconcerted President Kennedy, his commitment to the cause became increasingly evident over time and he finally emerged as the nation's most visible teacher and moral leader. Kennedy saw increasingly that civil rights progress was necessary at home and also essential to U.S. interests abroad. He had been trying to persuade African nations to move closer to the United States rather than the Soviet Union but racial turmoil at home was damaging his efforts.

Changing the Climate

John F. Kennedy was the first President to allow live television coverage of his press conferences. Videogenic, articulate, and knowledgeable, he was well-suited to the demands of the medium and his 63 press conferences, intended “to inform and impress the public more then the press,”15

Early in his Administration he spoke out about the very controversial issue of public school integration. On February 8, 1961 he told the press – and the nation – that “it is my

drew large audiences and generally won rave reviews. Kennedy's first press conference, held shortly after he took office, was tuned in by 65 million persons. Becoming afraid of overexposure, the Administration transferred future press conferences to daytime hours where they normally drew audiences of some 18 million. So impressive were these presidential appearances that the number of television sets in use each time the president went on the air jumped by 10 percent.

In short, Kennedy's meetings with the press captivated large audiences

and provided him with a powerful national pulpit. The number of questions pertaining to civil right which were put to Kennedy at press conferences escalated sharply during the years of his presidency, from a total of 10 in 1961 and 9 in 1962 to 25 in the 10 months of 1963 during which he served as President. Kennedy answered these questions in a way that made his commitment to the cause absolutely clear. No lack of conviction could tempt any opponent of civil right to take comfort in an ambivalent or equivocating chief executive. Unlike some other recent Presidents, Kennedy never used these questions as a vehicle for attacking the courts or indicating his disapproval of court decisions. Instead, he used them to teach the nation important lessons in both constitutional law and national civility.

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position that all students should be given the opportunity to attend public schools regardless of their race, and that is in accordance with the Constitution.”16 This represented the explicit presidential endorsement of the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that Eisenhower had never given. When asked about integration of schools in New Orleans, Kennedy promised to “attempt to use the moral authority or position of influence of the Presidency” and indicated that:

there is no doubt in my view: students should be permitted to attend schools in accordance with court decisions. The broader question of course is, regardless of the court decisions I believe strongly that every American should have an opportunity to have maximum development of his talents under the most beneficial circumstances, and that is what the Constitution provides. That is what I strongly believe. Six months later, Kennedy publicly congratulated the various public officials as well as

the parents, students and citizens of Atlanta for the “responsible, law-abiding manner in which four high schools were desegregated today.” He continued: “I strongly urge the officials and citizens of all communities which face this difficult transition … to look closely at what Atlanta has done and to meet their responsibilities as have the officials and citizens of Atlanta and Georgia, with courage, tolerance and, above all respect for the law.” On May 17, 1962 – the eighth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the separate but equal doctrine for whites and blacks – Kennedy was asked whether progress in this area had been rapid enough. He replied that “There is a good deal left undone, and while progress has been made, I think we can always improve equality of opportunity in the United States.”

When the Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, indicated that his state would never

yield to integration and seemed on the verge of testing the President’s resolve on the issue, Kennedy delivered an important lecture to the nation (and Wallace) at his May 22, 1963 press conference:

I know there is great opposition in Alabama, and indeed in any state, to federal

marshals and federal troops. And I would be very reluctant to see us reach that point. But I am obligated to carry out the court order. That is part of our constitutional system. There is no choice in the matter. It must be carried out, and laws which we do not like must carried out, and laws which we like. This is not a matter of choice. If it were a matter of choice, it would not be law. So these decisions must be enforced. Everyone understands that. We are a people of laws and we have to obey them. In other areas, Kennedy was equally forthright. Although 63% disapproved of the

Freedom Riders and former President Truman criticized them for being “meddling Northern busybodies,”17

I think the attorney general has made it clear that we believe that everyone who travels, for whatever reason they travel, should enjoy the full constitutional protection given to them by the law and by the constitution. They should be able to move freely in interstate commerce … Now I’m hopeful that that will become the generally accepted view. We naturally want these rights to be developed in a way which will permit them to be lasting

President Kennedy strongly supported their right to travel throughout the south. In July, 1961, he remarked:

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.…18 He was even more outspoken in his firm commitment to voting rights for all Americans.

During his first Presidential press conference, on January 25, 1961 he remarked “I am extremely interested in making sure that every American is given the right to cast his vote without prejudice to his rights as a citizen. And therefore, I can state that this Administration will pursue the problem of providing that protection with all vigor.” On November 8, 1961, Kennedy announced, “…there have been more suits filed to provide for voting and there will continue to be a concerted effort by this Administration to make it possible to vote under the laws and directions provided by Congress.” Ten months later, the President commended “ those who are making every effort to register every citizen. They deserve the protection of the United States Government, the protection of the state, the protection of local communities and we shall do everything we possibly can to make sure that that protection is assured….”

Reacting to the violence that often confronted civil rights workers in the south, Kennedy

expressed indignation and outrage. At a press conference on September 12, 1962, he remarked, “The United States Constitution provides for freedom to vote and this country must permit every man and woman to exercise their franchise. To shoot, as we saw in the case of Mississippi, two young people who were involved in an effort to register people – to burn churches in reprisal, I consider both cowardly as well as outrageous.” He went on to say, “The United States now has a number of FBI agents in there and as soon as we are able to find out who did it, we’ll arrest them….” On April 24, 1963 Kennedy asserted:

We had outrageous crimes, from all accounts, in the state of Alabama in the shooting of the postman who was attempting in a very traditional way to dramatize the plight of some of our citizens, being assassinated on the road. We have offered to the state of Alabama the services of the FBI in the solution of the crime.

Kennedy also indicated his disapproval with the status quo in the way black citizens were being treated in the south. On February 15, 1961 he was asked his reaction to the decision by the Civil War Centennial Commission that it had no authority to provide hotel rooms for blacks who attended meetings in the south. He answer was unequivocal: The Centennial is an official body of the United States government, federal funds

are contributed to sustaining it, there have been appointments made by the federal government to the Commission, and it’s my strong belief that any program of this kind in which the United States engages should provide facilities and meeting places which may – do not discriminate on the grounds of race and color. We cannot leave the situation as it is today.”

In early August, 1962, he took a similar position with regard to the status of black citizens of Albany, Georgia. Kennedy asserted that “We are going to attempt, as we have done in the past, to try to provide a satisfactory solution and protection of the constitutional rights of the people of Albany and I will continue to do so. And the situation today is completely unsatisfactory from that point of view.”

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In addition to speaking forthrightly concerning a number of specific civil rights issue areas, President Kennedy directed the attention of the country to the moral dimensions of the civil rights struggle, a struggle which he described on several occasions as “a national crisis of great proportions.” Many of his press conference remarks reveal that this President was trying to serve as a national educator, pointing out the role that must be played by individuals and by governmental and non-governmental groups in changing thought and behavior patterns in the area of civil rights. On May 6, 1961, he remarked:

Now the Federal Government cannot compel that. All we can do is indicate the need… We are asking the people of this country to try, regardless of their own personal views, to reach – to come closer to the constitutional concept of equality of opportunity for all Americans, regardless of their race or creed.

During a press conference on August 1, 1962, Kennedy commented on demonstrations in the state of Georgia by saying:

I find it wholly inexplicable why the city council of Albany [Georgia] will not sit down with the citizens of Albany, who may be Negroes, and attempt to secure them, in a peaceful way, their rights. The United States Government is involved in sitting down at Geneva with the Soviet Union. I can’t understand why the government of Albany…cannot do the same for American citizens.”

On May 8, 1963, the President spoke clearly of civil rights in the context of national morality, by saying that “I’ve attempted to make clear my strong view that there is an important moral issue involved in the equality for our citizens and that until you give it to them, you are going to have difficulties…the time to give it to them is before the disasters come and not afterwards.” Kennedy supplemented his press conference remarks on civil rights with major public addresses, some of which were delivered in the south. In Nashville, Tennessee on May 18, 1963, for example, he spoke at Vanderbilt University, warning that “any educated citizen who seeks to subvert the law, to suppress freedom or to subject other human beings to acts that are less than human, degrades his heritage, ignores his learning and betrays his obligation.” Further, he described attempts by blacks to secure their rights as being “in the highest tradition of American freedom.” A Kennedy critic described this speech as “arguably the strongest statement in support of basic civil rights that any sitting president had ever delivered below the Mason-Dixon line.” Scrutiny of Kennedy’s public remarks suggests strongly that the President was striving to shape public opinion on the practical and moral realities of inequality. Martin Luther King Jr. later remarked that President Eisenhower had never spoken of the moral dimension of civil rights but that “President Kennedy brought to the nation … the insistence on the morality of integration and the fact that the issue was more than a political, and economic issue but that it was, at bottom, a moral issue.” The Battle Shifts

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As a result of the publicity engendered by the Freedom Rides, the battle to successfully integrate schools and the President’s strong words on the subject, public notice began to focus more heavily on civil rights as the administration matured. Taking advantage of this changing public climate, Kennedy sent his first civil rights message to Congress on February 28, 1963. The President urged that Congress pass legislation designed particularly to enhance the right to vote. Specifically, his message called for the establishment of a minimum presumption of literacy, the expediting of voting litigation, and the prohibition of two standards of voter qualification, one for blacks, the other for whites. Also, it urged provision for the appointment of temporary voting referees while a federal suit was being adjudicated, advocated a strengthening of the Civil Rights Commission and held out technical and financial assistance to desegregating school districts. This largely moderate proposal made scarcely a ripple in Congress and received scant notice throughout the country. However, events would soon occur that would allow the civil rights struggle to dominate the public consciousness. These same events would make Kennedy’s February proposals badly outdated. In April, 1963, civil rights groups began a nonviolent assault on the segregated institutions of Birmingham, Alabama. Sit-ins at lunch counters were the first tactic, and these were followed by marches and mass demonstrations. Representatives of the news media poured into Alabama and newspapers and television news programs began to give prominent coverage to the ensuing struggle. When arrest and imprisonment failed to stem the disturbances, the Birmingham police force turned to fire hoses and police dogs as an alternative. The nation watched in growing horror the spectacle of dogs snapping and snarling at protestors and high pressure hoses knocking men, women and children to the ground. Throughout other sections of the country, sympathy demonstrations erupted. The Justice Department has estimated that within ten weeks of the Birmingham crisis, almost 800 demonstrations took place in the United States and that during the summer of 1963, almost 14,000 demonstrators were arrested in the southern states alone. Now, at long last, the nation had been shaken out of its slumber. The civil rights movement had become a civil rights revolution. Across the entire country, public attention was riveted on the problem. Although he almost certainly never envisioned himself in this role at the beginning of his Administration, Kennedy boldly placed himself in the forefront of this revolution. Taking to the airwaves on June 11, Kennedy delivered one of his most memorable - and most emotional - addresses to the nation, speaking of civil right in both moral and legal terms. In a strong attempt to shape the environment in which the Civil Rights Bill that he would send to Congress eight days later would be considered, the President moved forcefully to change the thought processes of the American people toward the status of one of the nation’s largest minorities. Since the writing of this historic and dramatic address was not completed by air time, Kennedy delivered portions extemporaneously. He urged every citizen to “examine his conscience,” reminded his audience that “when Americans are sent to Vietnam or West Berlin, we do not ask for Whites only,” and warned that “the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened.” He then went on to say:

We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is

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as clear as the American constitution. The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public, if he cannot vote for public officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, then who among us would be content to have the color of his skin changed and stand in his place? Who among us would then be content with the counsels of patience and delay? We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it, and we cherish our freedom here at home, but are we to say to the world, and much more importantly, to each other that this is a land of the free except for the Negroes, that we have no second class citizens except the Negroes, that we have no class or caste system, no ghettoes, no master race, except with respect to the Negroes? … Next week , I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life and law.19

Notwithstanding this praise, the speech undoubtedly caused considerable rage in some quarters. A few hours after Kennedy spoke, civil rights leader Medgar Evers was shot to death

Here again, Kennedy was trying to teach the nation that new law was necessary - but not in itself sufficient. American norms and values would have to undergo fundamental change and the American people would have to treat each other differently than in the past. The theme of the President’s message was clear: racism would have to be confronted and overcome not only in the halls of Congress but also in the minds and hearts and consciences of the American people. Kennedy became the first president to say openly that racism and discrimination were immoral. Kennedy also indicated that he expected the black community to be responsible and to uphold the law. But then he added that the black community had “a right to expect that the law will be fair and that the Constitution will be color-blind” and warned that “we cannot say to 10 percent of the population that … the only way that they are going to get their rights is to go into the streets and demonstrate. I think we owe them and we owe ourselves a better country than that.” Interestingly, in this dramatic address, Kennedy aimed his remarks at the entire nation, not just at the South. He didn’t criticize the South, any southern leader or any southern practices. Instead, as Roy Wilkins noted, “he made a compassionate appeal, man to man, heart to heart… to the country. The problem was not a southern problem but an American problem. Every state, every city and every person could do better in terms of fostering and strengthening individual rights.” Martin Luther King described the speech as “the most eloquent, passionate and unequivocal plea for civil rights …ever made by any president.” Journalist Walter Lippmann wrote that Kennedy “had committed himself to lead the movement toward equality of status and opportunity for the American Negro. No President has ever done this before, none has ever staked his personal prestige and has brought to bear all the powers of the Presidency on the Negro cause.”

14

outside his Mississippi home by a member of the Ku Klux Klan, Byron De La Beckwith. It is not surprising that Kennedy believed that the speech on civil rights might be his “political swan song.” Talbot suggests that “because he had finally put his full eloquence behind the cause of equal rights, the president knew he was facing the mass defection of white voters not only in the south but in ethnic neighborhoods that were resisting integration in the north.” On June 19, President Kennedy sent to Congress a Civil Rights Bill that dwarfed his legislative requests of four months earlier. It was the most comprehensive package of civil rights proposals since the civil war. In fact, the package might well have represented the boldest proposals ever put by a president before Congress. This new legislation was designed to achieve a broad range of objectives. It prohibited denial of the right to vote because of immaterial errors or omissions on voting applications, prohibited the use of literacy tests unless such tests were administered to every individual and in writing, and made a sixth grade education in English presumption of literacy. In a key and controversial section, it guaranteed equal access to public accommodations such as hotels, motels, restaurants, and places of amusement. It empowered the federal government to stop federal funding for programs which were being administered in a discriminatory manner, entitled the Justice Department to enter into any pending Civil Right cases, extended the life of the Civil Right Commission by four years, and established a permanent Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity Relations Service within the Department of Commerce to try to resolve disputes based on race, color or national origin.20 Burke Marshall has said that “every single person who spoke about it in the White House – every single one of them – was against the President sending up that bill, against his speech in June, against making it a moral issue, against the March on Washington.” When Kennedy tried to enlist the support of former President Eisenhower, he found that Eisenhower was skeptical of new laws and thought that “changing minds” was more important than passing new legislation. But Kennedy pressed forward nonetheless. Kennedy followed up his submission of the civil rights bill by continuing to go public. On July17, 1963, he once again lectured the country as its most visible teacher, pointing out in frank terms during a nationally televised press conference:

Some of the people … who keep talking about demonstrations never talk about the problem of redressing grievances … you just can’t tell people, “Don’t protest,” but on the other hand, “We are not going to let you come into a store or restaurant.” It seems to me it is a two-way street … I would suggest – that those people who have responsible positions in government and in business and labor do something about the problem which leads to the demonstrations.

When he met with the press on August 1, 1963, the President again indicated the need for change. He remarked that:

…merely because the demonstrations have subsided does not seem to me, those who are in a position of responsibility, does not mean that we should go to sleep and forget the problem, because that is no solution … I would hope that if there is a period of quiet, we should use it and not merely regard it as an end of the effort.

15

One of the key tactics employed by civil rights groups in the summer of 1963 to demonstrate support for racial equality consisted of a massive “March on Washington.” Civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King and Bayard Rustin planned a large, peaceful demonstration in the nation’s capital as a reflection of support for the concept of equal treatment under the law as well as new legislation. At first, Kennedy was wary of the plan, fearing that incidents of violence would only endanger the bill’s passage and that members of Congress might feel threatened and retaliate by voting against the bill. “I don’t want to give any of them a chance to say ‘Yes, I’m for the bill, but I’m dammed if I’ll vote for it at the point of a gun. The wrong kind of demonstration at the wrong time will give those fellows a chance to say that they have to prove their courage by voting against us.”21 Eventually, however, the Administration came to back the march wholeheartedly, with the Attorney General so fervently in support that Bayard Rustin remarked, “He almost smothered us. We had to keep raising our demands to keep him from getting ahead of us.”22 The President publicly gave his blessing on July 17 when he described the march as being “… in the great tradition” and remarked “I look forward to being here. I am sure members of Congress will be here. We want citizens to come to Washington if they feel they are not having their rights expressed.”23 A month later, Kennedy told the press that “I have been asked for an appointment and I will be glad to see the leaders of the organizations who are participating on that day … what we are really talking about is a problem which involves 180 million people.”24 Despite Kennedy’s upbeat words, in a late August poll, 63% of adult Americans expressed an unfavorable opinion of the March. Although the President had declined to address the assemblage, he had worked hard behind the scenes to secure the participation of church groups and labor unions. Sensitive to the television coverage it would receive, as well as to the Congressional reaction, Kennedy wanted the march to be truly interracial in nature. As an example of this, the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice was involved in organizing Catholic participation. Its hope was to get 50,000 Catholics to participate. Catholic leaders were told that “priests are needed in the March” and that “the Washington Archdiocese will feed and house all those Catholics free of charge who require such services.” Further, they were told that they should try to exert their influence to include other Catholic organizations in the March “from parishes on up.”

On August 28, 1963, 250,000 persons of all races assembled in Washington, D.C. in order to communicate their support for the cause of racial equality. The speeches given were all non-confrontational and non-threatening. The high point of the gathering was when Martin Luther King spoke, telling the crowd – and the television audience - that he dreamed of a future in which his four children would not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. The leaders of the March were warmly received at the White House that afternoon by the President who was delighted that the march had gone so well and relieved that it had been so orderly. The President was thanked enthusiastically by those who had put together the day’s activities. They told him that he had played a key role by giving his blessing to the March. This had helped turn it into an orderly protest aimed at helping the government instead of a protest intended to hurt and embarrass it.

16

On the congressional front, however, the situation was confused. Democrats had divided essentially into three groups -northerners who supported the Administration's bill, northerners who wanted a stronger bill and about 90 southerners who were flatly opposed. Kennedy knew all too well that in order to get this bill through Congress, Republican support would be essential. In the House, the Administration viewed Congressman William McCulloch of Ohio, senior Republican on the Judiciary Committee, and House Republican leader Charles Halleck as keys to success. If they would support the bill, so would the bulk of their party. McCulloch wanted an “absolute, unequivocal assurance that the Administration would support and fight for what was passed in the House.”25 Fearing that he would be sold out in the Senate, the Ohio Republican at first withheld his support.

In the Senate, Minority Leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois was an important Administration target since he could provide Republican votes not only to help pass the bill but also to help break the inevitable filibuster. Rather than needing 51 votes to pass the bill, Administration forces first had to line up 67 votes in order to end debate. Dirksen, then, and the Republican forces were key to passage. Dirksen, who in 1961 had voted against making the Civil Rights Commission a permanent body26, was in something of a quandary. Although he was basically sympathetic toward the bill and felt that it was in the public interest, he had trouble with the public accommodations section. This led to an unusual legislative strategy: three different civil rights bills were submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The White House bill included a public accommodations section, a second bill (Dirksen’s own) excluded it and a third bill included only desegregation of public accommodations. The Judiciary Committee would have to work out the final version.

On the other side of the aisle, Kennedy was told by the Democratic leader, Senator Mike Mansfield, that the public accommodations section would have a hard time securing passage. Kennedy responded, “you’ve got to get it done. It’s the heart of the matter. These people are entitled to this consideration and I’m depending upon you to see that what I recommend is passed.”27

Can Clarence Mitchell [the NAACP’s Washington lobbyist] deliver 3 Republicans on the Rules Committee and 60 Republicans on the House floor? McCulloch can deliver 60 Republicans. Without him, it can’t be done. McCulloch is mad now because he thinks that an agreement he had with us on the language of the compromise has been thrown away by the subcommittee. So now he’s sore…. I’ll go as far as I can go, but I think

Another key congressional Democrat in the fight was Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. Celler was a strong supporter of the legislation but after a series of bombings in Alabama, and at the urging of the NAACP, decided to strengthen it by expanding the scope of the public accommodations section. In subcommittee, he hammered out a new bill with a public accommodations section which included private schools, law firms and medical associations and which made other changes to the Administration's original bill.

The President was infuriated by Celler’s actions, fearing that Republican support would

be lost. At a meeting with civil rights leaders, he expressed frustration over the Celler bill and great disappointment that some civil rights leaders were supporting it. With unconcealed irritation, he explained:

17

McCulloch has to come with us or otherwise it is an exercise in futility. Kennedy directed his staff to gather all the statements they could locate by leaders of

civil rights organizations praising the original bill submitted by the Administration in June.28 The Attorney General appeared before the House Judiciary Committee and publicly appealed for passage of the milder version. Soon Celler agreed to move back in the direction of the original Kennedy proposal, working closely with McCulloch in an attempt to reach an agreement that would guarantee Republican votes.

The President continued the drum-beat of pressure. At one point he brought the entire

House Judiciary Committee to the White House and appealed strongly to their sense of statesmanship. “We are confronting a very major, very serious crisis and something has to be done about it,” he told them. When McCulloch became convinced of Kennedy's unwavering commitment, he agreed to support the measure. At the same time, Kennedy engaged in conversations with many other members of Congress on both sides of the aisle.

In addition, the Attorney General and Burke Marshall met personally with every Senator,

including those who were opposed to the bill and every member of the House who were “not from a state that is simply impossible.”29 Attorney General Kennedy also testified before Senate and House Committees in an emotional way, urging inclusion of a public accommodations section. For example, he argued that public accommodations legislation was needed to demonstrate “to millions of our fellow citizens the very premise of American democracy – that equal rights and equal opportunity are inherent by birth in this land…. How can we say to a Negro in Jackson: ‘When a war comes, you will be an American citizen but in the meantime you’re a citizen of Mississippi and we can’t help you….’ The United States is dominated by white people, politically and economically. The question is whether we, in the position of dominance, are going to have not the charity but the wisdom to stop penalizing our fellow citizens whose only fault or sin is that they are born.”

At public forums, the President occasionally pressured business and other leaders to do

whatever they could in bringing about civil rights progress. When he met with the press on October 31, 1963, for example, he pointedly urged U.S. Steel in Birmingham, Alabama to “use its influence on the side of comity between the races. Otherwise, the future of Birmingham … is not as happy as we would hope it would be. In other words, it can't be decided, this matter, in Washington. It has to be decided by citizens everywhere.”30

Perhaps even more significant were the private meetings held by the President at the White House with key opinion leaders from around the country, many from the south. In an effort to develop a powerful network of grassroots support for civil rights, Kennedy met with large numbers of educators, labor and business leaders, newspaper publishers, church officials and other community bigwigs week after week and urged them to stop sweeping the problem of

Kennedy also urged Cabinet members to telephone business contacts they had in Birmingham, urging racial accord. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a Georgian, led the effort in making many such calls. On June 17, 1963, the Attorney General thanked Rusk, saying “these calls strengthened the determination of the individuals contacted to maintain a moderate position, in most instances and their contacting Governor Wallace has unquestionably caused him to re-evaluate his position.”

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racial inequality under the rug and instead focus on the dire situation that confronted the black population in the United States. The President told group after group that everyone could “make a difference in trying to turn the country around.” The Attorney General and Vice President often participated, urging voluntary action against racial discrimination. Louis Oberdorfer, Assistant Attorney General at the time, later described the President's performance at these meetings:

I remember his saying over and over again to those groups, reciting statistics that showed a Negro child born in this country had how much less chance of earning ten thousand dollars a year, how much less chance of finishing college, how much less chance of finishing high school, how much greater chance of contracting tuberculosis, how much less life expectancy, and a whole gamut of figures to show the results of discrimination, namely the factual demonstration that the Negroes was deprived when compared to a white person born at the same time. On June 17, 1963, 241 religious leaders met with the President at the White House. To them, not surprisingly, Kennedy emphasized the moral position of racial equality: I would hope that we could attempt to establish as close a contact as possible –and I say this to the white members of the group - with the Negro clergy. They are [the] most responsible leaders. They have had the experience, they know their community better, they can offer the soundest judgment, they are local to the community and I would think that the best way to prevent the most violent situations would be by the closest co-ordination between the clergy of both Negro and white in each community. Four days later, again at the White House, Kennedy convened a meeting of 245 lawyers, including 50 from the south. This group became known as the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and included the presidents of the Bar Associations of 12 states, the Deans of 12 law schools, and many lawyers who had held key positions in other law associations such as the American Judicature Society and the American Law Institute. The President, Vice President and Attorney General addressed the group, stressing the important role that lawyers can play in assuring equal rights for all. They also stressed that lawyers have a special responsibility to take the lead in this critical area since solutions must be reached under the law of the land, including court decisions. The President suggested several objectives for the Lawyers’ Committee:

(1) the initiation, organization and participation in local bi-racial committees; lawyers are particularly well-suited for the task of bringing conflicting parties together for face to face discussion and helping them to resolve their differences in the atmosphere of understanding and cooperation;

(2) the Committee should take the lead in securing full public understanding

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of the judicial and legal processes involved in these controversies.

Vice President Johnson also addressed the group and turned in a strong performance. Burke Marshall assessed his comments to the lawyers’ group as being particularly impressive. He commented that “I thought he was very effective on occasion, particularly, I thought, with the lawyers… which you would not necessarily think would be his meat. I thought he was very effective, very good…. He spoke out of his own experience, he spoke as a southerner, and he spoke of it as just a question of what was right.” On July 9, the President met with some 300 leaders of women’s organizations. On this occasion, he voiced his special concern about school drop outs, urging women to work with local school boards and public officials toward the return of all children to school. Moreover, he encouraged them to work on community relations committees and to make certain that their own organizations were free from racial bias. Following this meeting, the National Women’s Committee was formed to “do all within its power to create public understanding of our moral responsibilities and to implement the President’s civil rights program.”

A few days later, the President met with the Business Council, a group consisting of 72 business leaders. These included the CEO of such large-scale business entities as U.S. Steel, General Electric, Sears Roebuck, Federated Department Stores, Standard Oil, Continental Oil, IBM, AT&T, Proctor and Gamble, J. C. Penney, Corning Glass, CBS, ArcherDaniels, Campbell Soup, Scott Paper Company and the New York Stock Exchange. He urged these high level business leaders to do all they could to increase minority hiring/advancement and to facilitate greater acceptance of African-American participation in corporate life.

In addition to appealing to the minds of his audience, Kennedy appealed to their emotions as well. He referred again and again to the “obvious injustice of not allowing a soldier to eat in a restaurant, or requiring a soldier and his family to travel hundreds of miles out of his way in order to find a place to sleep at night.” The President would always conclude by urging those to go back home and form a biracial committee and/or participate in one, make certain they were being personally fair and that their businesses were fully open to the public, reminding his listeners that “this is not only fair but we are liable to have an explosion if it doesn't happen.”

In Oberdorfer’s view, these private meetings represented a “monumental feat of

statesmanship on Kennedy's part.” The President was serving “not as commander-in-Chief, not as the director of the executive branch of government, not as a person with political leverage over the Congress, but as the leader and spokesman of the conscience of the people.” His personal involvement “changed the course of history.”

Legislative Strategy

Some 50 labor and civil rights groups were involved in lobbying the bill through Congress. Senator Dirksen endorsed the bill including the public accommodations section that he

20

had earlier opposed. Kennedy often found working with Halleck to be unpleasant and frustrating. One visitor to the Oval Office found the President “steaming” about the difficulties of doing business with the Republican leader. After one meeting with Halleck that had lasted two hours, Kennedy snapped that “trying to touch Charlie is like trying to pick up a greased pig.” On October 23, the president summoned Democratic and Republican leaders to the White House to discuss the Administration’s bill. On the following day, Halleck promised Kennedy that there would be enough Republican votes to secure a Committee majority. Five days later, the Kennedy bill won approval of the House Judiciary Committee by a 20-14 vote.

President Kennedy never saw his civil rights bill become the law of the land. Although Lyndon Johnson is credited with the enactment of the Civil Rights Law of 1964, the legislation undoubtedly would have been passed by Congress if Kennedy had lived. Mike Mansfield, then Senate Majority leader, remarked that “the assassination made no difference. Adoption of the tax bill and the Civil Rights Bill might have taken a little longer, but they would have been adopted.” Everett Dirksen agreed that "This program was on its way before November 22, 1963. Its time had come.” Charles Halleck believed that “The assassination made no difference. The program was already made” and Carl Albert, House Majority Leader at the time, pointed out that “The pressure behind this program had become so great that it would have been adopted in essentially the same form whether Kennedy lived or died.”

In sum, the Civil Rights Law of 1964 clearly bears the imprint of John F. Kennedy's hand. It was he who initially sponsored the legislation, he who lobbied the bill through the House Judiciary Committee and he who helped shape a national climate that made passage of this major legislation possible. Its passage was a tribute to his leadership of both Congress and the American public, although large segments of the American public remained resistant to the lessons he had tried to teach. Four years after his death, civil rights leader James Farmer said that there “was no question but that [Kennedy’s] attitude and the position he took on issues as well as his speeches helped us a great deal in building up the head of steam in the civil rights movement.”

Public Opinion: The President as the Nation’s Teacher: As his Administration matured, Kennedy’s growing commitment to the cause of civil rights was being recognized by the American people. Unfortunately, however, a number recognized it in negative terms. In the summer of 1962, about a third of Americans believed that the pace of racial integration being set by the Kennedy Administration was “just about right” but almost as many saw the Administration as pushing the issue too fast. Two months later, a marked shift in opinion had occurred. By October, 1962, Americans saw Kennedy pushing integration too quickly by a margin of 42-31 percent. As Table I reveals, this plurality would be a persistent one throughout the remainder of his presidency.

Table I31

National Opinion on Kennedy’s Pushing of Racial Integration

Too Fast Not Fast Enough Just Right

21

August 1962 32 11 35

October 1962 42 12 31

May 1963 36 18 32

June 1963 41 14 31

July 1963 48 11 41*

August 1963 50 10 40*

September 1962 50 10 40*

October 1963 46 12 31

*includes those with no opinion.

Between August 1962 and October 1963, the percentage of southern whites who believed that Kennedy was moving too quickly on the racial front increased from 59 to 73 percent. Even among non-southern whites, Kennedy’s actions and statements relevant to civil rights were increasingly perceived as pushing racial integration “too fast.” Table II presents data compiled over the final fifteen months of the Kennedy administration for whites outside the south and reveals trends that must have been at least somewhat disappointing to the President.

Table II

Non-southern white opinion on Kennedy’s pushing of racial integration

Too Fast Not Fast Enough

August 1962

Just Right

27 11 37

May 1962 34 17 33

June 1963 35 13 36

July 1963 48 n/a n/s

October 1963 45 12 30

Interestingly, among Democrats alone, support for Kennedy’s activism held constant and may even have increased somewhat. In October, 1962, 38 percent of Democrats viewed the Administration’s civil rights activities as “just right” while 35 percent felt they represented moving “too fast.” A year later, while national data indicated growing alienation from the Kennedy Administration’s civil rights stance, 40 percent of Democrats then viewed the intensity of Kennedy’s efforts on the racial integration issue as “just right,” while 36 percent felt that the

22

President was moving too quickly. Also, Kennedy’s insistence that individual state preferences concerning integration could

be superseded by federal law was supported strongly by Democrats and overwhelmingly by Kennedy partisans. The nation as a whole supported his position in this instance by 5 percentage points and those who classified themselves as politically independents by a similar margin. Republicans adhered strongly to the principle of states rights as, not surprisingly, did the south. Table III presents data from October 1963 for each of these groups as well as a more complete geographical breakdown.

Table III

Each state should/should not have autonomy on integration

Should

National

Should not

43 48

Easterners 36 54

Westerners 36 53

Midwesterners 33 58

Southerners 64 28

Democrats 36 56

Kennedy supporters 31 61

Republicans 53 39

Independents 42 46

Conclusions:

As the civil rights movement intensified, the President’s popularity began to erode. One poll disclosed that during 1963 alone, the civil rights issue had alienated some 4.5 million white voters from the Kennedy Administration. In particular, Kennedy’s support in the south had fallen sharply and Barry Goldwater led him there by 10 points. Nationwide, Kennedy’s standing in the Gallup Poll dropped from a 71 percent approval level to one of 57 percent, the lowest of his presidency. Even in a state like New Jersey, “… the frightening backlash flowing from the whole civil rights issue convinced the White House that they would have to do a great deal of work to win the state again.”32

At his August 1, 1963 press conference, Kennedy was asked by a reporter whether “civil

Kennedy told one African American leader that “this issue could cost me the election, but we’re not turning back.”

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rights are worth an election?” He responded:

This is a national crisis of great proportions … We are going to deal with it … every effort should be made to protect the rights of all our citizens., and advance their rights to equality of opportunity. Education, jobs, security, the right to move freely about our country, the right to make personal choices – these are matters which it seems to me are very essential, very desirable, and we just have to wait and see what political effect they have. But I think that the position of the government, the administration, is well-known, and I expect it will continue to follow the same course it has followed in the past.

A month later, Kennedy assessed more fully the political ramifications of the civil rights movement. During a September 2 interview with Walter Cronkite, he was asked whether the civil rights situation would affect his chances for re-election and whether he thought that he would lose some southern states in 1964. Kennedy’s reply was candid: “well, obviously it is going to be an important matter. It has caused a good deal of feeling against the Administration in the south – also, I suppose, in other parts of the country … I lost some southern states in 1960 so I suppose I will lose some, maybe more, in 1964 … I am not sure that I am the most popular figure in the country today in the south, but that is all right.

On September 12, 1963, shortly before his assassination, Kennedy was asked by a reporter for his reaction to a Gallup Poll that indicated that fifty percent of the American people felt that he was pushing integration too quickly. The President responded: “the same poll showed forty percent or so thought it was more or less right. I thought that was rather impressive because it is change; change always disturbs, and therefore I was surprised that there wasn’t greater opposition. I think we are going at about the right rate.”

Even though some of his aides believe that Kennedy was confident that he would have been re-elected in 1964, the President’s persistence in his support for civil rights in the face of declining levels of public support for his Administration is impressive. Surely he would have preferred to confront the civil rights revolution in his second term, if at all. But once the issue emerged in full force, he moved into a position of moral and political leadership. Moreover, he persisted in that leadership, apparently sharing the view of Franklin D. Roosevelt that “all great Presidents were leaders of thought at times when certain historic ideas in the life of the nation had to be clarified.”

Former Congressman Hale Boggs of Louisiana has said that Kennedy “was able to carry on a political dialogue which was as sophisticated and as mature as anything we have ever had in this country… This man did more for maturing political thought in America than any man in modern times in my judgment….” Boggs continued,

His whole effort was to temper conditions, to overcome disagreement, to unite the nation. This is why he took so long to come out with a civil rights bill. He had a thorough understanding of the difficulties that confronted the smaller communities…. His whole approach was one of understanding and sympathy, yet, once he decided on a course of action, he never hesitated.

Interestingly, Martin Luther King made a particularly telling point about John F.

24

Kennedy. In his thinking,

Historians will record that he vacillated like Lincoln, but he lifted the cause far above the political level. You could see emerging a new Kennedy who had come to see the moral issues involved in the civil rights struggle and who was now willing to stand up in a courageous manner for them…. He came to see in a way that he had probably never seen – and in a way that many other people finally came to see – that segregation was morally wrong and it did something to the souls of both the segregator and the segregated.

Those who criticize Kennedy for being slow to embrace the civil rights cause seem to

forget that he was president for only 34 months, a much shorter time than he had expected. In

that short time, however, he emerged as a dramatic, vigorous, and effective leader of the civil

rights revolution that swept the United States. Former NBC newscaster Tom Brokaw wrote that

“of all the changes that occurred in America in the Sixties, none was as important, dramatic,

ongoing, or more likely to endure as those involving race.”33

1 Martin Luther King, Oral History, March 9, 1964, p. 3, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 2 James Farmer, Oral History, March 10, 1967, p. 1, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

3 Nick Bryant, The Bystander, New York: Basic Books, 2006, p. 464. 4 Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys and kings: Making Sense of the Sixties, p. 169. 5 Bryant, The Bystander, p. 213.

6 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 3, The President, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 448.

7 Papers of John F. Kennedy, White House Staff File, Harris L. Wofford, Jr., Box 8, “President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. 8 Papers of Burke Marshall, Box 34, “Special Report, Southern Regional Council, Plans for Progress, Atlanta Survey, July, 1963, p. 1.

9 Burke Marshall, Papers, Box 3, p. 3, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. 10 Roy Wilkins, Oral History, August 13, 1964, p. 28, John F. Kennedy, Boston, MA.

Indisputably, John F. Kennedy

played a key role in bringing about that enduring change, one that profoundly transformed the

nation.

25

11 Public Papers of the Presidents, 1961, p. 157. 12 Ripley, Kennedy and Congress, p. 23. 13 Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 33.

14 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, p. 467.

15 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, p. 322. 16 Public Papers of the Presidents, 1961, p. 69, 572.

17 James Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, Lawrence: University of Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 166, 133.

18 Public Papers, 1961, pp. 10, 517, 703.

19 Public Papers, 1963, p. 469.

20 Public Papers, 1963, pp. 468-471, 487-494. 21 Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, p. 185. 22 Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice, New York: Atheneum, 1971, p. 183. 23 Public Papers, 1963, p. 572.

24 Ibid., p. 631.

25 Nicholas Katzenbach, Oral History, November 29, 1964, p. 132, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston Massachusetts.

26 Theodore C. Sorensen, Papers, Subject Files, Box 30, “Civil Rights 6/4/63-6/18/63,” John F. Kennedy Library. 27 O’Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, p. 846.

28 Benjamin C. Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy, New York: W.W. Norton, 1975, p. 222.

29 O’Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, p. 842.

30 Public Papers, 1963, p. 831, 1789, 1852, 1851.

32 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, Boston: Little brown, 2003, p. 688. 33 Tom Brokaw, Boom! Voices of the Sixties, New York: Random House, 2007, p. 40.