the basics of nuclear weapons · 2016-10-15 · not just a bigger bomb… the destrucve effect of...
TRANSCRIPT
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Hans M. Kristensen Director, Nuclear Information Project
Federation of American Scientists Phone: 202-454-4695
Email: [email protected]
Presentation to Introduction to WMD Nonproliferation Course
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Washington, D.C. February 8, 2016
The Basics of Nuclear Weapons: Physics, Fuel Cycles, Effects and Arsenals
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 2
NuclearChainReac.ons:FissionandFusionAnuclearweaponisaexplosivedevicethatusesacontrolleduncontrollednuclearchainreac4ontoreleasehugeamountsofenergy.
Nuclearweaponsmakeuseofoneortwoformsofinterac4onsbetweenatoms:
Fission:usesaneutrontosplitanucleustoreleaseneutronsthatsplitmorenucleitocreateasupercri4calfissionprocess.
Fusion:theoppositeoffission,combines(melts)twolightnucleiintooneheaviernucleus.Thereleasedneutroncan,ifnecessary,beusedtodriveanotherfissionevent.
Anuclearweaponusesoneoracombina4onofthesetwoprocesses.
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 3
NuclearFuelCycle
Allbombfuelcomesfromtheground(Uranium)but...
Uraniumoretypicallycontainslessthan1%uranium
Ofthat1%,only0.7%isU-235:
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 4
NuclearFuelCycle
Nuclearweaponsfuelcycleisfocusedonprocessingthefueltothoseisotopesmosteffec4veinweapons.
Uraniumweaponsrequiresimplerandshorterfuelcyclethanplutoniumweapons.
Plutoniumweaponsrequireprocessingofspentreactorfuelandextrac4on,purifica4on,andengineeringofplutonium.
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 5
NuclearFuelCycle
Threebasictypesofuraniumenrichment
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 6
NuclearFuelCycle
Enrichmenteffort(energyexpenditure)ismeasuredintermsof“separa4veworkunits”(SWU):
GradesofUranium:
Depleteduranium(DU):<7%U-235Naturaluranium:7%U-235Low-enricheduranium(LEU):>7%but<20%U-235Highly-enricheduranium(HEU):>20%U-235Weapons-gradeuranium:>90%U-235
• About4SWU!1kgofLEU(~3%)fromabout6kgofnaturaluranium*
• About200SWU!1kgweapons-gradeHEUfromabout200kgofnaturalU*
• About5,000SWU!1weapon(25kg)fromabout5,000kgofnaturalU*
• About100,000SWU!fuelfor1,000MW(e)LWRfor1year’sopera4on(e.g.Iran’sBushehrreactor)
ImportanttorealizethatmuchoftheSWU/kgworktoproduceweapons-gradeHEUisalreadydoneinproducingLEUfromnaturalU;star.ngfromLEUwouldgiveaproliferatorahugeheadstart
*Assumesanominalwasteassayof0.25%uramium.
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NuclearFuelCycle
Pu-239isreadilyfissionableandmoresothanU-235.Pu-239alsohasamuchhigherrateofspontaneousfissionthanU-235.
Plutoniumcoreproduc4onmodelallegedlyphotographedbyMordechaiVanunuinsidetheIsraeliDimonareactorcomplex
GradesofPlutonium:
ForweaponspurposesthePu-239percentageshouldbeaslargeaspossible:*
• Weapon-grade:<6%Pu-240andothernon-Pu-239isotopes;
• Fuel-grade:from6to18%Pu-240;
• Reactor-grade:>18%Pu-240.
• “Super-grade”:<3%Pu-240.
• “Weapon-usable”referstoplutoniumthatisinseparatedformandthereforerela4velyeasytofashionintoweapons.
*Butallplutoniumispoten4allyuseableforaweapon.
Plutoniumbuion(lej)allegedlyusedinNagasakibomb.Plutoniumring(right)usedforstorage.
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 8
NuclearFuelCycle
TheIAEAdefinestheamountsoffissilematerial“requiredforasinglenucleardevice”as8kgofplutonium,8kgofU-233,and25kgofU-235.Butthatapparentlydependsontheskillsandtechnicalcapabilityoftheproducer:
ApproximateFissileMaterialRequiredforPureFissionNuclearWeapons*
Weapon-GradePlutonium(kg) Highly-EnrichedUranium(kg)
Yield TechnicalCapability TechnicalCapability
(kt) Low Medium High Low Medium High
1 3 1.5 1 8 4 2.5
5 4 2.5 1.5 11 6 3.5
10 5 3 2 13 7 4
20 6 3.5 3 16 9 5
*ReproducedfromThomasB.CochranandChristopherE.Paine,TheAmountofPlutoniumandHighly-EnrichedUraniumNeededforPureFissionNuclearWeapons,NuclearWeaponsDatabook,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,RevisedApril13,1995,p.9.
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 9
NuclearWarheadTypes
Gun-typefissionweapon:useschemicalexplosivestocombinetwosubcri4calmassesofHEUintoonesupercri4calmassofHEU.50-60kg(110-132lbs)Example:Hiroshimabomb(yield:~13.5kt).
Single-stage,fissionweapon:useschemicalexplosivestocompressHEU(12-18kg;26-39lbs)orPu(4-6kg;8-13lbs)subcri4calmassintosupercri4calmass.Example:Nagasakibomb(yield:~22kt).Canbe“boosted”bydeuterium-tri4umgasto~80kt.
Two-stage,thermonuclearweapon:combinesfissiondevice(primaryortrigger)withfusiondevice(secondaryorCannedSub-Assembly).AllUSnuclearweapondesignscurrentareofthistype.Yieldsrangefrom0.3to1,200kilotons;mostyieldcomesfromsecondary.
Abombisabombisabombisa…
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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 10
NuclearWeaponsEffectsNotjustabiggerbomb…
Thedestruc4veeffectofnuclearweaponsisunlikeanyothercreatedmyhumanbeings.
100%fissionof1kgPu-239orU-235canproduceanexplosionequivalenttomorethan18,000tonsofTNT.
DowntownHiroshimadaysajerairburstof13.5ktHEUgun-typebomb
(Above)ThemostpowerfulU.S.conven4onalbomb–theGBU-43/BMassiveOrdnanceAirBlast(MOAB)–hasanexplosiveyieldofapproximately0.011ktTNT,roughly304meslessthanthelowestyieldserng(0.3kt)ontheB61nuclearbomb(below).TheB61-12weighs850lbs(385kg),nearlythirty4meslessthattheMOAB’s22,600lbs(10,300kg).
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
• Fireball:x-raysinstantlycreatelargespheretensofmillionsofdegreeshot
• EMP:instantaneouslycrateselectromagne4cpulsethatcandestroyordisruptelectronicequipment
• Heatandlightwave:causesfiresandburnsinseconds(firescansignificantlyaddtoeffects)
• Promptradia.on:harmfultolifeanddamagingtoelectronicequipment
• Airblastwave(loweratmosphere):hundredsofmilesperhourwinds
• Shockwave(surfaceornear-surfaceburst):causesdamagetoundergroundstructures
• Residualradia.on:emiiedoverextendedperiodof4me
• Electronic:extendedinterferenceofcommunica4onsequipment
Maintypesofeffectsfromnuclearweaponsdetona4on:
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
Grabletest(15kt),Opera4onUpshot-Knothole,Nevada,May25,1953
Nucleartests(atmosphericbefore1963)wereusedtostudyeffectsofnuclearweapons–andtodevelopmoreeffec4venuclearweapons.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
Strikeplanningseekstomaximizeeffec4venessofnuclearblastagainstdifferenttargetstokilltargetbydetona4ngtheweaponsattheop4mumheightofburst(HOB).
Surfacetargetsaredestroyedbycombina4onofheatandblastwave.
Fireball
Blastwave
Blastwavebouncingbackfromsurface
Tanksandtrucks
Theinterac4onbetweentheblast(incident)waveandreflectedwavecreatesaprecursorwavethatreinforcestheincidentwavetravelingalongtheground.Becauseofthis,airblastismaximizedwithalow-airburstratherthanasurfaceburst.
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
Destruc4onofundergroundfacili4esrequireground-orshallowsub-surfaceburststoensureshockwavecausesanundergroundfractureor“damagezone”.
Inasub-surfacebursttheshockwavemovingupwardistrappedbythesurfacematerialandreflecteddownwardwhereitreinforcestheoriginalchockwave.This“coupling”effectenablesanearth-penetratortodestroyundergroundtargets2-54mesdeeperthangroundburstweapons.
1kt:destroystoafew10sofmeters1MT:destroystoafew100sofmeters
B61-11droptestintofrozensoil
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
Withapenetra4oncapabilityinhardrock(topright)of10feet(3meters),thedamagezonefroma400-ktB61-11blastwouldextendtoaround500feet(150meters).
Inwetsoil(boiomright),thedamagezonefroma400-ktB61-11blastat25feet(8meters)wouldreach1,200feet(365meters).
Source:CounteringProliferaMonofCompoundingIt?,NRDC2003
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
Radioac4vecontamina4onareaissignificantfortheyieldsrequiredtobeeffec4veagainsthardanddeeplyburiedtargets(~2,000sqkmforB61-11).
Radioac4vefalloutwouldalsocontaminateallies.
Source:CounteringProliferaMonofCompoundingIt?,NRDC2003 Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearWeaponsEffects:Strategies
(Very)Simplyspeaking,therearetwogeneraltypesofnuclearemploymentstrategies:
Counter-force:employsnuclearnuclearforces“todestroythemilitarycapabili4esofanenemyorrenderthemimpotent.Typicalcounterforcetargetsinclude:bomberbases,ballis.cmissilesubmarinebases,intercon.nentalballis.cmissile(ISBM)silos,an.ballis.candairdefenseinstalla.ons,commandandcontrolcenters,andweaponsofmassdestruc.onstoragefacili.es.Generally,thenuclearforcesrequiredtoimplementacounter-forcetarge.ngstrategyarelargerandmoreaccuratethanthoserequiredtoimplementacounter-valuestrategy.Counter-valuetargetsgenerallytendtobeharder,moreprotected,moredifficulttofind,andmoremobilethancounter-valuetargets.”
Counter-value:directsthe“destruc4onorneutraliza4onofselectedenemymilitaryandmilitary-relatedtargetssuchasindustries,resources,and/orins.tu.onsthatcontributetotheabilityoftheenemytowagewar.Ingeneral,weaponsrequiredtoimplementthisstrategyneednotbeasnumerousnorasaccurateasthoserequiredtoimplementacounter-forcetarge.ngstrategybecausecounter-valuetargetstendtobesojerandlessprotectedthancounter-forcetargets.”
Obamaadministra4ondidnotchangecounter-forcefocus:The2013NuclearEmploymentStrategy“requirestheUnitedStatestomaintainsignificantcounterforcecapabili4esagainstpoten4aladversaries.Thenewguidancedoesnotrelyona‘counter-value’or‘minimumdeterrence’strategy.”
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
Thereisno“clean”nuclearwar.
Even“limited”counter-forceaiackswouldhavecreateextensivecollateraldamage.
Limitedcounter-forceaiacksareimportantscenariosinpost-ColdWarplanning.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
Source:NuclearDeterrence,NuclearWarPlanning,andScenariosofNuclearConflict,FAS/NRDC,2014
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NuclearWeaponsEffects
Large-scaleaiacks,evenpurelycounterforce,wouldhavedevasta4ngcivilianconsequencesandcauseclima4ceffectsandfamineonaglobalscale.
Source:TheNuclearWarPlan:ATimeForChange,NRDC2001
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NuclearArsenals:GlobalInventoriesMorethan125,000warheadsproducedsince1945
Peakof64,500stockpiledwarheadsin1986(70,300ifincludingre4redwarheads)
• USstockpilepeakedearly(1967)• Russianstockpilepeakedlate(1986)
Enormousreduc4onssince1986peak:
• ~54,000warheadstockpilereduc4on• ~47,000+warheadsdismantled
~10,000warheadsinstockpiles(~15,000ifcoun4ngre4redwarheadsawai4ngdismantlement)
USandRussiapossess90%ofglobalinventory(94%ifcoun4ngre4redwarheads);eachhasmorethan4.mesmorewarheadsthanrestofworldcombined;154mesmorethanthird-largeststockpile(France)
Decreasing:US,Russia,Britain,France
Increasing:China,Pakistan,India
Israelrela4velysteady;NorthKoreatrying
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NuclearArsenals:Trends Withmorethan90%ofworldinventory,USandRussiahavespecialresponsibilitytoreduce
Reduc4onofdeployedstrategicwarheadsfromsome23,000in1989to3,500in2015(NewSTARTcounts3,185)
Readinesslevelofremainingstrategicforcesishigh:about1,800warheadsonpromptalert
Noofficialde-aler4ng,butsignificantreduc4onofoverallalertnumbers:heavybombersde-alerted,USICBMsandSLBMsdownloaded,non-strategicforcesde-alerted
Trend:paceofreduc.onisslowing
UScutonly396warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith3,457warheadscutin2005-2009
Russiacutanes4mated1,100warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith2,600in2005-2009
Insteadofcon4nuingpaceorincreasingreduc4ons,USandRussianstockpilesappeartobelevelingoutforthelonghaul;newemphasisonmoderniza4on
Newini4a4vesneededtopreventstallingofarmscontrol
Note:re4red,buts4llintact,warheadsawai4ngdismantlementarenotshown
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NuclearArsenals:Non-Strategic• U.S.andRussiancombinedstockpilesofnon-strategic
nuclearwarheadsreducedbyroughly90percentsince1991.Neithersidehasdisclosedactualnumbers
• Russia:twopublicdeclara4ons:2005:Russian“non-strategicnuclearforces”havebeenreduced“byfour4mes”since1991.
2010:“theRussianarsenalofnon-strategicnuclearweaponsisreducedfour4mes[75%]*incomparisonwiththeUSSRarsenal.”Allareincentralstorage
*Note:PNIdeclara4onsdonotaddupto75%
• UnitedStates:twopublicdeclara4ons:2010:"ThenumberofU.S.non-strategicnuclearweaponsdeclinedbyapproximately90percentfromSeptember30,1991toSeptember30,2009.”
2014:"ThenumberofU.S.non-strategicnuclearweaponshasdeclinedbyapproximately90percentsinceSeptember30,1991.”
~180USB61bombsforward-deployedinEurope
• Some2,500warheadsremainassignedtonon-strategicforces(Russia~2,000;UnitedStates~500)
• Severalthousandsaddi4onalre4red,buts4llrela4velyintact,warheadsinstorageareawai4ngdismantlement
• Stockpileswilllikelycon4nuetodeclineinnextdecadewithorwithoutarmscontrolagreements
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NuclearArsenals:RussiaGradualphase-outofsoviet-erasystemsandpar4alreplacementwith“new”systemsbyearly-mid2020s
Replacementbegantwodecadesago
DiverseNuclearForces
Strategic
ICBM:3typesbeingreplacedby2in6versions
SLBM:2typesbeingplacedby1
Bombers:2typesbeingreplacedby1
Non-Strategic
Navy:SLCM,SAM,ASWmissiles,torpedoes,depthbombs
AirForce:cruisemissile,bombs
Army:short-rangeballis4cmissiles,intermediate-rangecruisemissile
Defense:ballis4cmissiledefense,air-defense,coastaldefense
OldSystem
NewSystem MIRV FirstDeployed
SS-18 Sarmat(RS-28) Yes 2020-2025?
SS-19 SS-27Mod1(TopolM)SS-27Mod2(RS-24)
NoYes
20972014
SS-25 SS-27Mod1(Topol-M)SS-27Mod2(RS-24)SS-27Mod3(RS-26)SS-27Mod4(Rail)
NoYesYesYes
200620102016?2020?
SS-N-18SS-N-23
SS-N-32(Bulava)SS-N-32(Bulava)
YesYes
2016-2018?2020-2030?
Tu-95MSTu-160
PAK-DAPAK-DA
2020-2030?2020-2030?
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ICBM• SS-27Mod2(mobile):replacingSS-25satNovosibirsk,Tagil,Yoshkar-Ola• SS-27Mod2(silo):replacingSS-19satKozelsk• SS-27Mod2(rail):plannedbutuncertain• RS-26(compactSS-27):toreplaceSS-25satIrkutskandVypolzovo• RS-28(Sarmat):toreplaceSS-28satDombarovskyandUzhur
SSBN/SLBM• SS-N-23SLBMlife-extension(Sineva/Layner)inDeltaIVSSBN• BoreiSSBN:8planned(possibly10-12)• SS-N-32(Bulava):fielding
Bombers• UpgradesofsomeTu-160(Blackjack)andTu-95(Bear)• Newbomber(PAKPA)indevelopment• ALCM(Kh-102)indevelopment
Tac4cal• Tu-22M(Backfire)upgradeunderway• Su-34(Fullback)fielding• Yasen(Sverodvinsk)SSGNfielding• SLCM(SS-N-30,Kalibr)fielding• GLCMtest-launched;notdeployed• SSM(SS-26,Iskander)fielding• SAM(S-400/SA-21)fielding(nuclear?)• ABM(A-135)upgradeplanned
NuclearArsenals:Russia
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NuclearArsenals:Russia(ICBM)
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ThirdSS-27unit(39GuardsMissileDivision).
Firstregimentwith9SS-27Mod2(RS-24)placedon“experimentalcombatduty”in2013;secondin2014;thirdin2015.
SatelliteimagesshowupgradeofregimentbaseandmediaphotosshowSS-27Mod2launchers.
RemainingSS-25sarebeingphasedout.
SS-27 Mod 2 TEL under camouflage (top) and upgrade of first of several regiment bases.
NuclearArsenals:Russia(ICBM)
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FourthSS-27unit(42MissileDivision).
Partoffirstregimentwith6SS-27Mod2(RS-24)placedon“experimentalcombatduty”in2013;secondregimentin2014;thirdin2015.
Satelliteimagesshowcompletereconstruc4onofregimentbase(boiom)with9TELgaragesfor3SS-27Mod2baialions,aswellasupgradeofwarheadstorageandnewlyarrivedcamouflagedvehiclesatsupplybase.
RemainingSS-25sbeingphasedout.
Construction of SS-27 Mod 2 base (bottom); camouflaged vehicles at supply base (top left); upgrade to warhead storage (top right). Image: 2 Jun 2014
NuclearArsenals:Russia(ICBM)
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FijhSS-27unit(28GuardsMissileDivision).
Deploymentoffirstregimentwith10SS-27Mod2(RS-24)underway.First4becameopera4onalinDecember2014;firstregimentdonein2015.
Newsmediaphotosshowupgradeofsilos.
Plannednumbersareunknown,buttherewere60SS-19sin2006and60SS-27sweredeployedatTa4shchevo.
PreviouslywithSS-19(possiblyallgone).
Upgrade to SS-27 Mod 2 at Kozelsk missile field in 2012 (bottom) and 2013 (top).
NuclearArsenals:Russia(ICBM)
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Moderniza4onfromDeltatoBorei:
6DeltaIV,eachwith16SS-N-23(Sinevamodifica4on)
WilllikelybereplacedbyBoreiSSBNinlate-2020s
2-3DeltaIII,eachwith16SS-N-18
BeingreplacedbyBorei,star4ngin2015
8Borei(planned),eachwith16SS-N-32(Bulava)Russia’sSSBNfleetisbasedatYagelnaya(Gadzhiyevo)ontheKolaPeninsulaintheBarentsSea(top)andRybachiyontheKamchatkaPeninsulainthePacific.
ABoreiSSBNcapturedintheKolaBayon20July2014withtheaircrajcarrierAdmiralKuznetsov.
NuclearArsenals:Russia(SSBN)
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WeaponsSystem Missiles(2014)
Warheads(2014)
Missiles(2024)
Warheads(2024)
SS-N-18 48* 144 0 0
SS-N-23(Sineva) 96** 384 32 128
SS-N-32(Bulava) - - 112*** 672
Total 144 528 144 800
*ItispossiblethatonlytwoDeltaIIIswith32SS-N-18sareopera4onal.**NotallsixDeltaIVsareopera4onalanygiven4me;normally1-2boatsareinoverhaul.***Assume7of8plannedBoreiSSBNshaveenteredservice.
Implica.onsofmoderniza.on:
SSBNfleetwillremainrela4velystablearound8-10opera4onalSSBNs.
SLBMsstableatsome144missiles.
Significantincreaseinwarheadscapacityfrom528to800.
NuclearArsenals:Russia(SSBN)
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Anewsubsonic,low-observablelong-rangebomber(PAK-DA)isunderdevelopment.ATupolevdesignapparentlywasselectedin2013.Expecteddeploymentinthemid-2020storeplace:
Tu-95MS(Bear):roughly60lejofwhichperhaps50areopera4onal.CarriesAS-15BALCMandbombs.Beingupgradedtoincreaseconven4onalcapability.
Tu-160(Blackjack):roughly15lejofwhichperhaps13areopera4onal.CarriesAS-15AALCMandbombs.Upgradetoincreaseconven4onalcapability.Reproduc4onannounced.
Su-22M3(Backfire):Intermediate-rangebutsome4mesconsideredstrategic.CarriesAS-4ALCMandbombs.Beingupgradedtoincreaseconven4onalcapability.
PAK-DAbomber(subsonic,stealthy)
AnewnuclearALCM(Kh-102)hasbeenunderdevelopmentforsome4me,possiblytoreplacetheagingAS-15ontheTu-95MSandTu-160bombers.
NuclearArsenals:Russia(Bombers)
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• WidelydispersedforcesinfourServices:tac4calairforce,navy,defense,andarmy(seemap)
• Warheadsnotonbasesbutincentralstorage
• Yetsomeupgradesofnuclear-storagesitesatbases(ShaykovkaTu-22base,boiomlej;Kaliningradboiomright)
May 2007 July 2007 October 2009
NuclearArsenals:Russia(Tac.cal)
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WeaponsSystem Remarks
AirForce
AS-4ALCM 1967:47yearsold.ForTu-22M3
Bombs ForTu-22M3,Su-24M,Su-34
Navy
SS-N-9(Malakhit) 1969:45yearsold.Forships.
SS-N-12(Bazalt) 1976:38yearsold.Forsubs.
SS-N-15(Vyuga) 1969:47yearsold.Forsubs/ships.
SS-N-16(Vodopad) 1981:33yearsold.Forsubs.
SS-N-19(Granit) 1980:34yearsold.Forships.
SS-N-21(Granat) 1987:27yearsold.Forsubs.
SS-N-22(Moskit) 1981:22yearsold.Forships.
SS-N-30(Kalibr) (2015).Forsubs.ReplacingSS-N-21?
Torpedoes(550/650mm) Forsubs.
DepthBombs ForASWaircrajandhelicopters.
Army
SS-21(Tochka) 1981:33yearsold.
SS-26(Iskander-K) 2005:ReplacingSS-21.
Defense
S-300/A-135/coastal Nuclearstatusofnewersystemsuncertain.
Largelejoverwarheadinventoryofalmosten4relySoviet-eraweapons.
Reducedbyatleast75%since1991.
Mostes4matesvaryfrom1,800to2,000warheads.DODmen4onsunofficiales4matesof2,000-4,000.
Allwarheadsincentralstorage;notwith/ondeliveryvehicles.
Ofcurrentforce,onlythreetypesarebeingmodernized.Futureplansareunknown.
“The general purpose forces – to include dual-use nonstrategic nuclear forces – will continue to acquire new equipment for the near-term, but deliveries will be small and largely consist of modernized Soviet-era weapons.”
US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013
NuclearArsenals:Russia(Tac.cal)
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Becausetheyaredual-capable,non-strategicnuclearforcesarequicklydrawnintoconflicts:RussiandeploymentofS-300air-defenseandSu-24bombersinCrimea(above);RussianTu-22bomberinterceptedoverBal4cSeabyFrenchMiragefighter(right).
NuclearArsenals:Russia(Tac.cal) OverthepastthreeyearsRussianexercises“includesimulatednuclearaiacksonNATOAllies(eg,ZAPAD)andonpartners(eg,March2013simulatedaiacksonSweden)…”
NATOSecretaryGeneralAnnualReport2015
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Stockpilepeakedin1967;deployedstrategicwarheadspeakedin1986
Stockpileanddeployedstrategicwarheadshavenotchangedsignificantlysince2009
NuclearArsenals:USA
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NuclearArsenalsICBM
• MinutemanIIIlife-extensioncomple4ng• Warheadfuzes/interoperablewarheadplanned• GBSD(ICBMreplacement)indevelopment
SSBN/SLBM• TridentIID5SLBMlife-extensiondevelopment• SSBNreplacementdevelopment(12planned)• W76-1warheadlife-extensiondeploying• W88-1warheadlife-extensiondevelopment
Bombers• UpgradeofB-2andB-52underway• LRS-Bnext-genera4onbomberindevelopment• B61-12guidedstandoffbombindevelopment• LRSO(ALCM)replacementindevelopment
Tac4cal• F-35Anuclearcapabilityindevelopment• B61-12guidedstandoffindevelopment
Infrastructure• UraniumProcessingFacility(secondaries)construc4on• Plutoniumproduc4onfacili4es(primaries)construc4on• Warheadsurveillance/simula4onfacili4esupgrade
NuclearArsenals:USA
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Next10years:
$350billionformaintainingandmodernizingnuclearforcesandinfrastructure.
Comprehensivemoderniza4on:• Allthreelegsofstrategictriad• Tac4caldual-capableaircraj• Warheadproduc4oncomplex
Consolida4onandmodifica4onofwarheadtypes.
Somedelayshappening;moreexpected.
Extendingnucleardeterrentthrough2080.
NuclearArsenals:USA
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Allegedadvantages:
• Fewerwarheadtypespermitreduc4onofhedge
• Modifiedwarheadswithincreasedsafety,usecontrol,andperformancemargin
• Fewerwarheadswillbecheapertomaintainanddeploy
Possiblerisks:
• Modifiedwarheadsfurtherfromtesteddesigns;reliabilityissues?
• Reducedstockpilediversity• Complexandexpensiveprograms
pronetodelaysandcostoverruns• Modifiedwarheads“new”?• Costshighlyuncertainandes4mates
probablyunderrated
Fundamentalques4ons:
• Whyishedgingnecessaryformissilewarheadsbutnotbomberweapons?
• WhymustUShedgewhenBritainandFrancedonot?
• Whyis“deployed”warheadsthesameinthefuture?
3+2strategy:reduc4onfrom12warheadversions(8basicdesigns)to5types:
3“Interoperable”or“adaptable”warheadsonICBMandSLBMIW-1(W78/W88-1),IW-2(W87/W88-1),IW-3(W76-1)
2non-interoperablewarheadsonbombersandfightersALCM(LRSO)withW80-1orW84B61-12guidedstandoffbomb
NuclearArsenals:USA
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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• 180U.S.B61bombsscaieredin87undergroundvaultsunderneath87aircrajsheltersatsixbasesinfiveEuropeancountries:
• Addi4onalbombsintheUnitedStatesforextendeddeterrencemissionselsewhere.
• 50FrenchASMPAcruisemissilesatthreebasesfor3squadrons(2airand1naval).
NuclearArsenals:USA(Tac.cal)
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:China
ICBM / MRBM • DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) fielding • DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 2) with MIRV • DF-26 introduced • New mobile ICBM test-launching • Development of new mobile ICBM capable of
delivering MIRV
SSBN / SLBM • Jin (Type-094) SSBN fielding (4-5 expected) • JL-2 (CSS-N-14) SLBM in development • Type-096 SSBN possibly in development
Cruise Missiles: • ALCM (CJ-20 on H-6 bomber) in development* • GLCM (DH-10/CJ-10) fielding**
Note: China is the only of the P-5 (NPT declared) nuclear-armed states that is increasing its nuclear arsenal.
* Listed in 2013 AFGSC briefing. ** Listed by NASIC as “conventional or nuclear,” the same designation as the Russian nuclear-capable AS-4 Kitchen ALCM.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:China(ICBM)
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Approximately80nuclear(DF-21andDF-21A).
AlmostcompletelyreplacedDF-3A.
VasttrainingareainDelinghaandDaQaidam.
DF-21CandDF-21Dconven4onalversionsdeploying.
NuclearArsenals:China(MRBM)
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:China(MRBM)
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:China(MRBM)
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:China(SSBN)
Buildingclassof4-5JinSSBNsEachwith12JL-2.
Firstseenin2007oncommercialsatellitephotos.
4inservice,butJL-2notyetfullyopera4onal.
All4saidtobebasedatSouthSeaFleet.
Bigunknown:willChinabegintodeploynuclearwarheadsonlaunchersinpeace4me?
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Expansion of Hainan submarine base.
First Jin SSBN presence in 2008.
Base includes demagnetization facility, underground submarine pier, SLBM handling and transportation system.
NuclearArsenals:China(SSBN)
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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Important new capability, but…
Jin SSBN noisy compared with Russian SSBNs.
To target USA, a Jin SSBN would have to sail far into Pacific or Sea of Japan.
Command and control capability is limited.
NuclearArsenals:China(SSBN)
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:France
SSBN/SLBM• TNOwarheadonM51.2SLBM.• M51.3SLBMdevelopment.
Bombers• RafaleK3toreplaceMirage2000NatIstresAirBase.• Next-genera4onALCMindevelopment.
Infrastructure• MegajouleatCESTAdevelopment.• Airix/EpurehydrodynamictestcenteratValducdevelopment(partlyJointFrench-UKwarheadsurveillancetes4ngcenter).
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:Britain
SSBN/SLBM• SSBN(Vanguardreplacement)indevelopment(3-4planned).• SLBM(TridentIID5LE)indevelopment(USA).• Mk4A/W76-1typewarheadfielding.
Infrastructure• JointUK-Frenchwarheadsurveillancetes4ngtechnologycenterdevelopment.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:PakistanMRBM/SRBM
• ShaheenIIIMRBM(Ha�-6)indevelopment• ShaheenIIMRBM(Ha�-6)fielding• NASRSRBM(Ha�-9)indevelopment• AbdaliSRBM(Ha�-2)indevelopment*
CruiseMissiles• GLCM(Babur/Ha�-7)indevelopment• ALCM(Ra’ad/Ha�-8onMirage)indevelopment• SLCM(navalversionofBabur)indevelopment?
Infrastructure• Khushab-IVreactor#4construc4on• Uraniumenrichmentfacilityupgrade
*ListedbyPakistaniISPRbutnotby2013NASICreport
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NuclearArsenals:Pakistan
Shaheen-IImobilelauncher.DetectedTELsfirngoutatNa4onalDefenseComplex.Notyetdeployedin2009,butprobablynowpartof110-130warheades4mate.Extended-rangeShaheen-IIIindevelopment.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:IndiaICBM/IRBM/MRBM
• AgniVIICBMdevelopment(MIRV?)• AgniVICBMindevelopment• AgniIVIRBMindevelopment• AgniIIIIRBMfielding
SSBN/SLBM• ArihantSSBNdevelopment(3+expected).• K-15/K-4SLBMdevelopment.• DhanushSLBMfielding.
CruiseMissiles• GLCM(Nirbhay)development*
Infrastructure• Oneplutoniumproduc4onreactordeveloping.• Breederreactors?
*Reportedbynewsmediabutnotlistedin2013NASICreport.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:Israel
IRBM• JerichoIIIIRBMdevelopment?
SSG/SLBM• DolphinSSGfielding• SLCM(PopeyeTurbo/Harpoon)rumored*
Bomber• F-35Aacquisi4on
*Reportedbynewsmediabutdeniedbyofficials.USpublicintelligencereportsomitreferencestoIsraelinuclearforces
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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NuclearArsenals:NorthKorea
ICBM/IRBM/MRBM• NoDongMRBMfielding• MusudanIRBMindevelopment• Hwasong-13(KN-08)ICBMindevelopment(fielding?)• TaepoDong2SLV/ICBMindevelopment
SSBN/SLBM• SSBN/SLBMinearlydevelopment• FakedSLBMlaunch
CruiseMissiles• KN-09coastaldefensecruisemissileindevelopment?**
Infrastructure• Yongbyonplutoniumproduc4onreactorre-start• Uraniumenrichmentproduc4onconstruc4on
Bigunknown:DoesNorthKoreahaveminiaturizedandweaponizedwarheadthatcanbedeliveredbyballis4cmissile?
*Despitethreeundergroundnucleartests,thereisnoknownpublicevidencethatNorthKoreahasminiaturizeditstestdevicessufficientlyfordeliverybyballis4cmissiles
**Listedby2013AFGSCbriefingbutnotin2013NASICreport.2014updateofAFGSCdoesnotlistKN-09
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
QUESTIONS?
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55Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide