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THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS DAVID G. BLANCHFLOWER and RICHARD B. FREEMAN* This study of workers' altitudes compares data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys for former commuiiisi coun- tries in Europe with ISSP data for Western countries over the period 1987-93, which covers the beginning of the transition to a market economy for the former communist countries. Omsistent with their hypothesis that communist-run economies left an altiiiidinal "legacy," the authors find that the citizens of former communist coiiirtries evinced a greater desire for egalitarianism, iess satisfaction with their jobs, and more support for strong trade unions and state intervention in the job market and economy than did Westerners. Over the course of the period studied, however, residents of the former communist F.iiropean counti ies perceived sizable increases in occupational earnings differen- lial.s, and they adjusted their views of the differeniials that "ought to" exist in their economies in the direction of greater inequality. L abor relations in communist t'cono- mies has diverged historically from that in free market economies. Under commti- nism nearly all workersjoined official "trans- mission belt" unions tliat operated as an arm of the state rather than as independent representatives of workers. The state set wages, prices, and enterprise budgets in ways that created huge job vacancies with •David Blanchflower is Professor of Economics ai DaninoLUh College itnd Research Associalc at the National Bureau oT Economic Research. Richard Freeman is Professor of Fxonomics at Harvard Uni- versiiy, Dirt'ctor of L.abor Studies at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Director ol ihe Programs in Discoiitintions Economics;U the London SchoolofEconomics. TheauthorsihankAlan Krueger for helpful suggestions on an earlier dralt of this paper. no open unemployment, and prodticed low real wages and narrow skill and sectoral pay differentials. These practices resulted in inefficieni allocations of labor (Freeman 1992). AI the same time, there was a social ethos favoring egalitarianism (Burawoy 1985; Kornai 1980). While most analysts believe that communist labor practices pro- duced demoralized and disgrtinlled work- ers, there have been no comparisons of worker attitudes in historically communist economies and market economies using comparable stirvey instrtiments that docu- ment or test this expectation.' 'Three papers have used attitudinal data to exam- ine the development of markets in general, but not specifically labor markets, in eastern Kmope. Akerlof andYellen (1991) looked at various attitudesof work- ers in East Germany and comparable workers in West Industrial and Labor Rrlations Revimi, Vol. 50, No. 3 (April 1997). 0019-7939/97/5003 $01.00 by Cornell University. 438

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THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF

COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS

DAVID G. BLANCHFLOWER and RICHARD B. FREEMAN*

This study of workers' altitudes compares data from InternationalSocial Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys for former commuiiisi coun-tries in Europe with ISSP data for Western countries over the period1987-93, which covers the beginning of the transition to a marketeconomy for the former communist countries. Omsistent with theirhypothesis that communist-run economies left an altiiiidinal "legacy,"the authors find that the citizens of former communist coiiirtries evinceda greater desire for egalitarianism, iess satisfaction with their jobs, andmore support for strong trade unions and state intervention in the jobmarket and economy than did Westerners. Over the course of theperiod studied, however, residents of the former communist F.iiropeancounti ies perceived sizable increases in occupational earnings differen-lial.s, and they adjusted their views of the differeniials that "ought to"exist in their economies in the direction of greater inequality.

L abor relations in communist t'cono-mies has diverged historically from that

in free market economies. Under commti-nism nearly all workersjoined official "trans-mission belt" unions tliat operated as anarm of the state rather than as independentrepresentatives of workers. The state setwages, prices, and enterprise budgets inways that created huge job vacancies with

•David Blanchflower is Professor of Economics aiDaninoLUh College itnd Research Associalc at theNational Bureau oT Economic Research. RichardFreeman is Professor of Fxonomics at Harvard Uni-versiiy, Dirt'ctor of L.abor Studies at the NationalBureau of Economic Research, and Director ol ihePrograms in Discoiitintions Economics;U the LondonSchoolofEconomics. TheauthorsihankAlan Kruegerfor helpful suggestions on an earlier dralt of thispaper.

no open unemployment, and prodticed lowreal wages and narrow skill and sectoral paydifferentials. These practices resulted ininefficieni allocations of labor (Freeman1992). AI the same time, there was a socialethos favoring egalitarianism (Burawoy1985; Kornai 1980). While most analystsbelieve that communist labor practices pro-duced demoralized and disgrtinlled work-ers, there have been no comparisons ofworker attitudes in historically communisteconomies and market economies usingcomparable stirvey instrtiments that docu-ment or test this expectation.'

'Three papers have used attitudinal data to exam-ine the development of markets in general, but notspecifically labor markets, in eastern Kmope. AkerlofandYellen (1991) looked at various attitudesof work-ers in East Germany and comparable workers in West

Industrial and Labor Rrlations Revimi, Vol. 50, No. 3 (April 1997).0019-7939/97/5003 $01.00

by Cornell University.

438

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 439

To what extent do workers in tradition-ally communist societies differ from work-ers in the West in their attitudes towardworking conditions, wage inequality, jobsatisfaction, and the role of unitjns and thestate in determining labor market out-comes? To what extent can any observeddifferences be attributed to the "legacy" ofthe communist past? How have attitudeschanged during the transition to a marketeconomy?

In this study we use data from the Inter-national Social Survey Programme (ISSP)to try to answer those questions."- Each yearthe ISSP focuses on a particular topic. Tbetopics most relevant to our area of inquiryare "social inequality" (the 1992 and 1987modules), "work orientation" (the 1989module, supplemented by preliminary evi-dence from the 1993 module),' and "therole of government" (1990).^ We haveinformation on seven ex-communist coun-tries: Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, East Ger-many, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Rus-sia. Most of these countries reported in the1992 module. For Hungary and Poland, we

Germany. Shiller et al. (1991) compared randomsamples of lhe Moscow and New York populaiionK intheir attUudcs toward free markeiH. In another pa-per, Sliiller ci al. (1992) studied individual atliludesin three ex-coinniiinisi coimtrifs—Russia, Ukraine,and East Germany—and compared them with indi-vidual attitudes in lliree adviuued capitalist econo-mies—the United Stares, Japan, and Wesi Germany.In addition, Rose and Haerpfer (1994) contrastedatliludes toward lhe transformation olex-communisisocipties. and Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorski (199. )examined Polish opinion concerning privatizationand !<tate interventionisni.

"•'The ISSP is a continuing program ol cross-na-tional collaboration carried out by a group of na-tional re.searcb institutes, each of which conducts anannual survey of social attitudes and values, li bringstogether pre-existing national social science surveysand coordinates iheir research lo produce a cotnnmnsel of questions asked in identical form in the partici-pating nations.

^We refer to this evidence as prelitiiinar\' becauseit is taken from means for the survey published hy lheISSP. The computer Illes were not available foranalysis al the lime of our study.

'Forearlierwork using these data, see Blanchflowerand Freeman (1992) and Blaiichflower and Oswald{1989, 1994).

have information in several ISSP modules,which allows us to analyze changes in laboroutcomes and attitudes over time. Appen-dix Table Al reports the number of re-sponses by counti-y and year.

Measuring The CommunistLegacy in the Labor Market

Like any other lengthy historical experi-ence, decades of commtmist rule in easternEurope and Russia have arguably left a"legacy" of effects on workers and the jobmarket that successor market economiesmust deal with. There is a potential labormarket outcome legacy: narrow wage dis-tributions; distinct work practices (Haraszti1978; Burawoy and Lukacs 1992); relationswith management that diverge from thosein historically capitalist economies(Burawoy 1985; Kornai 1980); high rates ofunion membership in unions dominatedby communist regimes; dependence of firmson the state; and enterprise provision ofmany social benefits. In addition, there isa potential "attitudinal legacy" in terms ofworkers' views about institutions and mar-kets due to experience tnidcr communismand decades of communisi propaganda.

To be sure, institutions, labor marketoutcomes, and attitudes are likely to differamong ex-communist countries, just as theydo among Western countries. Poland andHungary differ in the nature of their formercommunist systems and in the characteris-tics of their movement to a market economy,just as Sweden and Norway differ from theLfnited States and the United Kingdom.National differences notwithstanding, how-ever, the operative hypothesis of tbis studyis that the communist experience was suffi-ciently similar to leave an identifiable com-mon legacy affecting outcomes and views ofthe labormarket in the ex*<:ommuni.ststates.This is a hypothesis about cross-nationaldifferences due to comparable experiences,and as such is subject to the problems ofassessmentcommon to such analyses (Kohn1989).

A priori, what form might this legacy take?By itnposing narrow wage distributionsthrough governmental fiat, and pressing

440 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

an egalitarian ethos, communism shouldhave iniluenced attitudes toward earningsinequality and government interventionsin labor market outcomes. We anticipatethree differences in attitudes between work-ers in ex-communist and Western coun-tries: (1) employees in ex-communist coun-tries will be more favorable toward narrowwage distributions and government inter-ventions to attain them; (2) given the per-sistence of poor working conditions informer communist countries (in whichworkers were deprived of normal marketmodes of responding to such conditions,having neither the "exit" option of findingemployment outside the state-run sectornor lhe "voice" option of forming free tradeunicms), employees in those countries willevince less job satisfaction than workers inWestern countries; and (3) workers in ex-communist countries will have more posi-tive attitudes toward free trade unions thando workers in the West. In addition, assum-ing that attitudes toward inequality respondto actual levels of inequality, we expect thatthe views in ex-communist countries to-ward wage differences will change over time,as competitive markets produce greaterinequality.

We examine the ISSP for evidence ofsuch "legacies" in two ways. First, we con-trast responses to ISSP questions (bothoutcome and attitude items) in ex-commu-nist countries with those in Western coun-tries, controlling for respondents' indi-vidual characteristics. This is effectively anexercise in estimatingcountry dummy vari-ables: the test of the legacy hypothesis iswhether there is a common pattern amongthe dummy variables for ex-communistcountries. Second, we probe the correlatesand investigate possible objective causesfor any observed differences. This is aneffort to explain differences between ex-communist countries and Western coun-tries in terms of actual or perceived labormarket factors.

In attitude surveys, the validity and reli-ability of measures are invariably of someconcern. Because none of our data arelongitudinal, we cannot determine whetherthe same person would respond similarly to

the same question in a second interview,which would give us test-retest measure-ment errors. This does not mean, however,that we have no way to assess the quality ofresponses. We perform three checks onindividual responses: (1) we examinewhether individual responses fit a pattern—for instance, whether workers who are com-pletely satisfied with their jobs also expressmore willingness than others to work with-out pay; (2) we relate individual responsesto objective characteristics: are workerswho want a more narrow wage distributionhigh or low in that distribution?; and (3) weinve.stigate whether people with the samecharacteristics give comparable responsesin different surveys. The results of all ofthese checks suggest that responses on theISSP are consistent/'

Characteristics of ex-Communistand Western Data Samples

P'or our cross-section analyses of workersin ex-communist economies and marketeconomies, we rely heavily on the 1992ISSP, which provides data on seven ex-com-munist countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Re-public, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,Russia, and Slovenia) supplemented by the1993 ISSP. For our analysis of changes overtime, we use the 1987 and 1992 ISSP sur-veys, which contain comparable informa-tion for Hungary and Poland. None ofthese data files are ideal. Relatively few

•''As examples of our checks, we found that 24% ofihosf compleicly sjnisfied with iheir job agreedstrongly ihal they would work without pay, comparedto Ifss than 10% of those who were di.ssatisfied, 13%who were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and soon.Also, we conlirmcd that greater ine<]uality was fa-vored by the more educated (see Table 2) and thosewith high earnings (table available from authors onrequest); we found, from a comparison of responseson similar questions in 1987 and 1992, that year.s ofschooling had a comparable effect in both years (seecoefficients reported in Tahle 2); and we confirmedthat age. sex, and marital status al.so had comparableeffects in both years. In addition, we explfired indi-vidual differences in responses to the Table 7 ques-tions and found that people with similar demographiccharacteristics responded in the same direction.

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 441

workers in the ISSP for the ex-communistcountries report being in the private sec-tor, which prevents us from making infer-ences about differences between thoseemployees, who will constitute the bulk offuture employment, and employees of state-owned firms. For our comparison group wehave data from eleven OECD countries in1987 or 1992 (Australia, Austria, Canada,Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Switzerland, West Ger-many, and the United States) plus informa-tion on other variables of interest on sixother countries (Israel, Japan, tbe Philip-pines, Southern Ireland, Spain, and Swe-den) in other years of the ISSP.**

We compare the former communist stateswith a set of Western countries rather thanwith a single one because differences be-tween the eastern European countries andany particular Western country, such as theUnited States, could be due to the distinctcharacteristics of that Western countryrather than to the legacy of communistlabor practices vis-a-vis market economiesin general. The danger of this approach,however, is that we may miss importantcontrasts between more narrowly definedgroups, say between East Germany and WestGermany. To deal with this danger, wepresent all calculations with individualcountry dummies before giving broader ex-communist versus traditional marketeconomy contrasts.

Attitudes Toward Inequality

As a starting point for analyzing differ-ences in views toward inequality betweenpersons in ex-communist economies andthose in traditional capitalist economies,we examined responses to the 1992 ISSP

In a number of cases the data were coHecied in adilTerem year rrom ihat reported. For example,Crrai Briiain did iiol conduct a survey in 1988; ihereported data were collected in 1989. Half the 1089respondents were asked tlie quesuons tVom tlie 1988ISSP and the olher hall'were asked the qucsiions from(he 1989 romponent. In a few cases, such as Italy in1988. 1989. 1990. and 1991 and Auslria in 1987 and1988, lhe same group of respondents were asked thetwo years of questions.

qtiestion: "Are differences in income inthis country too large?" The differencebetween the ex-communist countries andthe West is stark.' Save for Italy, there isonly the barest overlap in the suiTey re-sponses. On average. 52% of respondentsin the ex-commttiiist countries expressed astrong belief that income differences weretoo large, compared to 30% of respondentsin Western countries. Most striking, per-haps, are the differences between citizensin the ex-communist countries and those inScandinavia, where incomes are moreequally distributed than in most capitalisteconomies and where the social democraticegalitarian ethos is strong. In Sweden andNorway, just 23-24% of respondents be-lieved income differences were too large.

We pursue the analysis of differences inviews toward inequality across countriesusing two questions on the 1987 and 1992ISSPs on pay by occupation. In those yearsthe ISSP asked individuals in difierent coun-tries "what people earn each year" and wbatthey "otight to earn" in 11 occupations. Ineach of the two years, seven of these occu-pational groups were identical, while fourwere different." We used the reported fig-ures on what people earn to estimate ameasure of "perceived differentials" andused the reported figures on what theyought to earn to estimate "appropriate dif-ferentials."'' We calculated from these re-

'The percentages agreeing strongly that differ-ences in income were too large were as follows: Bul-garia. 85%; Easl Germany 61 %; Russia. 59%: Slovenia,48%: Poland, 42%: C/,ech Republic, 3ti%. Hungary35%: Italy, 53%; Great Britain. 37%, Austria, 35%.WestGcrniany,31%.NewZealand, 30%, United States,28%. Canada. 2(i%; Sweden, 24%; Norway, 23%: andAustralia, 18%.

"The occupational categories available in bothyears were doctor, small shopkeeper, chairman oflarge national company, skilled factory worker, farmworker, unskilled factory worker, and cabinet minis-ter. In 1987 the remaining four categories werebricklayer, bank clerk, secretary, and bus driver,whereas in 1992 they wt-rtMcplaced by solicitor, shopassistant in a department store, owner/manager of afactory, and appeal court judge.

"Summaries of the mean earnings by country itithe two categories are reported in a data appendixthat is available on request from the authors.

442 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

sponses the standard deviation of the natu-ral log of the averages leported in theseappendix tables for each country.

The resultant statistic does not measurewhat survey respondents believe occupa-tional differentials should be. They werenot asked about occupational differentialsper se, but rather about occupatiotial pay.But itiiplicit in statements about pay fordifferent occupations are statements aboutdifferentials in pay. For instance, someonewho reports that the chairman of a largenational company earns or should earn Xwhile a bricklayer earns or should earn Y istelling us about the differentials he per-ceives to exist or believes should exist. Thelegacy hypothesis suggests that persons inex-communist countries should differ fromthose in capitalist countries both in theoccupational differentials they perceive toexist and in the differentials they believe tobe fair (that is, the differentials ihey believe"ought to" exist).

Table 1 gives the standard deviations oftbe tiatttral log of earnitigs from the 1987and 1992 ISSP modules.'" In 1987, workersin the two ex-communist couti tries for whichwe have data, Hungary and Poland, per-ceived smaller occupational differentialsthan did workers in most Western coun-tries. The unweighted country tnean forHungary and Poland in the standard devia-tion of perceived differentials is, for ex-ample, 0.57, which falls cotisiderably shortof the 0.81 for workers in the West and the

'"We also calculated the standard deviation of thelogoi waives or (where wages were unavailable) earn-ings in r(-'portin(f countries from the 1987 and 1992iSSP suneys. The only ex-communist country' lorwhich earnings data exist for 1987 is Hungary: itsmeasure of inequality is below that of all the capitalistcountries except West Germany. For the year 1992,we have data on all of the ex-communist countries inour sample. In the ex-communist sample, Hungaryttirns out to be among the low inequality countries,while Russia, Slovenia, and Poland have higher stan-dard deviations of log earnings. Among the capitalistcountries, Norway and Italy join (iermany as lowineqttality cotintries. Overall, incqtiality was stillhigher in 1992 in the ex-communist countries.

0.85 for those in the four large ex-commu-nist countries for which we have data inboth 1987 and 1992 (the United States,West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy).The second column in the table shows asimilar ex-communist/Western differencein the pattern of occtipational pay differen-tials that people believe ought to exist:persons in the ex-communist states favorsmaller differentials than persons in theWest. In the 1987 data, the average stan-dard deviatioti of the natural log of earu-ings perceived to be fair is 0.40 for Hungaryand Poland, compared lo an average of0.60 in the capitalist countries.

By contrast, in 1992, when the transitionto a market economy was under way, per-sons in Hiuigary atid Poland and in theother ex-communist countries for which wehave data reported very different percep-tions of pay differentials. The differentialsthey perceived were wider than those per-ceived by respondents in the Western coun-tries in the ISSP (which includes Norway,with an extremely narrow wage distribu-tion) and similar to those perceived byworkers in the big ex-communist countries.Similarly, what Hungarians and Poles be-lieved "ought to" be paid to workers indifferent occupations was much greater in1992 than in 1987. Because the "ought to"differentials are also high for workers inthe other ex-communist countries, theunweighted mean of the standard devia-tion of the natural log of earnings per-ceived to be fair is in the same range foremployees in the ex-communist coutiiriesas for those in the West; it is slightly higherthan the unweighted mean for all Westerncountries (inclusive of Norway) and slightlylower than the meati for the larger ex-communist countries.

In botb years, and in all countries, ex-communist and capitalist, there seems tobe a relation between the distribution ofperceived pay and the distribution of payperceived to be fair. The "ottght to" differ-entials are invariably stnaller than the per-ceived differentials, suggesting that work-ers may form their views of the appropriatepay by occupation on the basis of perceivedpay, scaling the latter down hy some amount.

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 443

Table I. Perceptions of Actual Earnings and Fair Earnings Across 11 Occupations: Responsesof Tbose Surveyed in Six Ex-Communist and Eleven Capitalist Countries, 1987 and 1992.

(Mean Standard Deviation of Log Earnings)

Covntty

1987PerceivedEarnings

1987Earnings Vieuvd

as Fair

1992PerceivedEarnings

1992Eamingx Viewed

ai Fair

Cx-CotnmunistBulgariaCzechoslovakiaEast (GermanyHungaryPoland 'Russia

Unweighted Mean

CapitalisiAustraliaAustriaCanada(Jreal BritainhalvNi'iht-rlandsNew ZealandNorwaySwitzerlandUniicd StatesWest GiTiiiany

Unweighted Mean

BIG 07 (US, we;. GB, It)

5954

57

5595

S4

74

858884

81

85

.41

.38

.40

.43

.64

.61

.59

.65

.68

.60

.60

.63

.771.35l.OS.941.021.09

1.03

.84

.8)

.99

.91

.81

.59

1.191.05

.90

1.04

.531.07.78.67.68.71

.74

.69

.63

.76

.77

,61.37

.83

.79

.68

.79.Sottrce: ISSP (1987, 1992). Calntlaled from data shown in Appendix Tables Al and A2.Kor a list of the occupations covered, see tcxi.

Perceived differentials increase between1987 aiul 1992, and so too do "ought to"diflercritials. Couiitrifswith high perceived{iilTcreniials have high "ought to" differen-tials.

To explore the relation between "oughtto" and perceived occupational pay, we cal-culated individual-specific measures of per-ceived aud "ought to" occupational earn-ing.s differeutlais. Specifically, for eachprr.sou in the .samples, we calculated thestandard deviation of that respondent'sperception of actual earnings across occu-pations and the standard deviation of theearning.s he or she believes "ought to" bepaid across those occupations. These sta-tistics differ from the statistics in Table 1.In Table 1 we calculated .standard devia-tions for the natural log of mean earningsacross occupations within a country (one

value per country). Our new statistic isbased on the standard deviation of tbe natu-ral log of earnings across occupations re-ported by each individual (one value foreach individual).

We then estimated ordinary least squaresregressions of these individual measures ofperceived and de.sired inequality on per-sonal characteristics, such as schtjoling, age,geuder, andcoiintry dummy variables, witbthe United States as tbe reference group.By including variables for individual char-acteristics, we perform ceteris parihus com-parisons of people in the ex-<:ommunistcountries and in tbe West and examine therelation between personal characteristicsand perceived/"ought to" pay differentials.Since the group of countries covered in1987 differs from that covered in 1992, weprovide separate calculations for the two

444 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

years. To summarize the ex-communistcountries/Western countries differentialsof concern, we also estimated a restrictedmodel in which we replaced tbe individualcountry dummies with the single summarydummy variable that takes the value 1 foran ex-communist country and 0 for theWestern coiuitries. Finally, to test infer-ences about changes over time, we furtherestimated our model on a pooled samplelimited to countries that appear in bothyears.

Table 2 presents the basic cross-sectionregression results. There are three find-ings. First, consistent with Table l,cohmin1 of Table 2 shows that, controlling forpcr.sonal characteristics, in 1987 persons inex-conuiuniist countries peiceived loweroccupational pay differentials than did re-spondents in the West, save for those inAustralia. C.olunui 2 shows that the Htni-gariaus and Poles also believed that thedifferentials "ought to" be less tban didrespondents in the West, including theAustralians. The coefficients on school-ing Iiniher show ihat persons wiih morepoieutial earnings power also perceivedgreater differentials and were more likelyto believe that sucb differentials werefair.

Column 3 adds the standard deviation ofthe natinal log of perceived diffcrt-tuials tothe "ought to" equation. What does this tellus? It shows what people in different coun-tries believt' the spread in occupational paysbould be, rcmditional on the spread theyperceive. For instance, the coefficient onthe dummy for Hungary' of-.0574 showsthat, takingaccount of the lower perceivedsprea<l in earnings, Hungarians still de-sired a smaller spread tban did persons intbe excluded United States.

The coefficients on tbe standard devia-tion of perceived earnings are overwhelm-ingly statistically significanl. This impliesthat people's altitudes toward the spread ()fearnings that "ough t to" be paid are formednot in A vacuum but in fact depend uponwhat they sec in the marketplace. The 0.62coefficient implies, roughly, that individu-als believe the distribtitiou of occupationaldifferentials in tbeir country "ought to" be

scaled down from wbat they perceive it tobe by a factor of 0.62.

For example, if the standard deviation ofthe natural log of perceived occupationalearnings was 0.64 (the mean value in oursample in 1992), the estimated coefficientimplies, ciHeris paribus, individuals wouldlike earnings differentials tbat would yielda standard deviation of 0.57 {the standarddeviation of perceived pay of 0.92 nuilti-plied by 0.62). Conditional on perceiveddifferentials, persons in Hungary and Po-land favored a modestly more egalitariandistribution thau tbose in Western coun-tries: tbeex-communistdumtny variable inthe restricted regression isJust-.O2, thoughhighly significant.

Columns 3-6 of the table confirm tbemore complicated pattern for 1992. Per-ceived differentials vary considerably, withdummies for the ex-communist countriesshowing that workers in most countriesperceived less inequality than did personsin the United States (tbe big exceptionbeing Russia), but more tban in Norway.The summary measure shows that tbe ex-comnnniist dummy is a positive .10, due inlarge part to the low perceived inequality inNorway among the western countries. Theregression f(»r the spread in earnings that"<niglu to" be paid \n column "> shows asimilar pattern. Iiui in this case workers inall tbe ex-communist countries, includingRussia, have lower "ought to" differentialsthan in the United States. The coefficienton tbe dummy variable for ex-communistcountries in the summary regression is0.0277.

This finding might lead some to believethat people in tbe ex-communist countrieshave less desire for narrowing pay differen-tials than do people in the West. But ourhypothesis is that egalitarian desires aretempered by perceived market differen-tials. Tbus tbe appropriate equation toassess tlie desires is equation (6). Here thedummy variables for the ex-communistcovmtries are smaller than those in all West-ern countries except Norway, and tbedummy variable in the summary regressionis -0.029, with a t-stalistic of 8.19. Thesimilarity to the 1987 coefficient is impres-

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 445

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t94 CMo — I O OO I

o ^

r —

o —o in

' 00

O)so

l '

i nor

tn —.

r !N

in —>Ql .—. tO .—.

O O O iCi' lri i' <o

ffj — OC erj

O l OOID — Cef) © »— o o

OT 2 S ^— O O ffvi

&

o

O —

r 0^

— «

w W

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 447

sive, suggesting that lhe column (3) and(6) results represent a more stable patternthan the column (2) and (5) results.

How do the findings square with thosereported earlier based on the broader ques-tion of the percentages who agree stronglythat differences in uicome are too large? Ifthe responses to the occupational earningsquestions and tbe responses to the "AredifKerences in income loo large?" questionare capturing the same attitudes, we wouldexpect that including the responses to thelatter in the equations for tbe spread of"ought to" pay should greatly weaken tbedummy variables for tbe ex-communistcountries. Column 7 shows thai this isindeed the case. The coefficients on virtu-ally all of the country dummy variablesdecline, and the summary measure for ex-communist states drops to a bare -0.0055,which is not significantly different fromzero. Tbe underlying reason for tbe nega-tive ct)efficient in column (6) is thus thebroad desires for lower income differences.

Overall, the implication of Table 2 is thatindividuals in the ex-communist countriesmore strongly desired a narrowing of paydifferentials than did those in the West, butthat they substantially tempered that desirein the light of rising differentials duringtbe transition to a market economy. Thedata on which the regressions reported inTable 2 are based, however, differ acrossthe two years both in tbe mix of countriesincluded and in the set of occupations forwhich earnings were reported. To make afirmer assessment of changes over lime,and guarantee that any measured changesover time are not due to chatiges in thecomposition of our samples, we formed apooled sample of observations for individu-als in the ex-communist cotintries and forthose in the Western countries that reportedhi both years. This sample, which containsjust two ex-communist countries. Hungaryand Poland, and just four Western coun-tries, the United States, Great Britain, Aus-tralia, and West Germany, provides a rela-tively clean picture of changes over time.To capture the changes, we include dummyvariables for interactions between countryand year. Tbe dummy variable for 1992 is

included to capture actual changes acrossthe years as well as differences in tbe samplesof occupations between tbe two years.

Tabie 3 gives oiu' pooled regression re-sults. The dummy variables for Hungaryand Poland in column 1 show that in 1987perceived differentials were lower in thosetwo countries than in the West. The 1992country interaction terms show tbat tbedifferentials rose by about 0.20 natural logpoints over tbe five-year period. The re-gression coefficients for the 1992 interac-tions also show rises in perceived differen-tials in Western countries, but by smallermagnitudes. To obtain ihe perceived dif-ferentials in 1992, we must sum the coeffi-cients on country and countr\-year interac-tions. The rosultsof that analysis show thatperceived differentials in Hungary andPoland differed little from those in GreatBritain and Germany, were smaller than inthe United States, and were larger than inAustralia.

The spread of "ought to" differentials incolumn 2 reveals a general upward trend inthe differentials respondents believe "ougbtto" be paid: the 1992 interaction terms arepositive. The upward trend is weaker inHungaiT but not in Poland than in theWestern countries: the coefficients on thecountry-year dummy variable of .0473 forHungary suggest a smaller perceived in-crease than in the United States (the 1992dummy of .0869 reflects the United States)or in the other Western countries, whereasfor Poland, the .0997 coefficient is compa-rable to that for the United States andlarger than those for other Western coun-tries.

The bottom line calculations are in Table3, where we estimate tbe coefficients oncountry dummy variables, conditional onthe spread in perceived differentials. In1987 people in both Poland and Hungaryhad a lower spread in "ought to" differen-tials than tbose in the United States orAustralia. But their spread is similar to thatamong people in Great Britain and Ger-many. The sum of the coefficients on thecountry terms and the country-year interac-tion terms for 1992 shows that the spread inpay across occupations that was believed to

448 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Table S. Perceptions of Actual Earnings and Fair Earnings in Five Countries:Pooled Regressions, 1987 and 1992.

(t-Statistics in Parentheses)

VariabUt/Country

PerceivedEarnings

a)

Earnings Viewedas fair

(2)

ViewedFair

SD Perceived Earnings

Years of Schooling

Hiingar\-

Australia

Great Britain

West Germany

1992 Dummy

Hungary*1992

Poland*l9y2

Australia«1992

Great Britain*I992

West Germany* 1992

DFNRoot MSE

.0068(9,02)-.2556

(30.89)-.2973

(32.73)-.2992

(32.25)-.0835

(9.03)-.0765

(8.36).1466

(14.99).2115

(15.51).1922

(13.97).0688

(5.42).0571

(4.07).0579

(4.50)

.37611396013979.2151

.0101(12.49)

-.2156(26.31)

-.2380(26,60)

-.2019(21.86)

-.0924(9.76)-.0778

(8.42).0869

(9.13).0473

(3.65).0997

{7.57).0210

(1.66).0506

(3.60).0517

(4.07)

.2.'il41462814647.2218

.5992(86.28)

.0057(9.92)-.0592

(8.43)-.0530

(6.85)-.0225

(2.93)-.0431

(5.65)-.0432

(5.73)-.(J248

(3.02)-.0547

(4.83).0011

(0.09).0004

(0.04).0379

(3.29).0533

(5.01)

.50771S32413343.172S

Notes: Equations also include five age dummies aud a gender dummy. The excluded category is the UnitedSlates. Bfcausf the schooling variable was missing for Poland, in all cases for that country we imputed the meanfor the other countries.

Source: ISSP (1987, 1992).

lie "fair" was smaller for Hungarians andPoles than for Americans or other Western-ers, conditional on the perceived spread.

We concltide that respondents in the ex-communist countries had a greater prefer-ence for narrowing occupational earnings,conditional on perceived earnings, thandid Westerners, but that the difference inpreferencesdiminished greatly as perceiveddifferentials widened in those countries

more rapidly than they did in most Westerncountries.

Job Satisfaction, Happinessand the Role of Trade Unions

Because Htingary has been in the ISSPsince 1986, we have available nmre infor-mation on outcomes and attittides for thatcountry than for the other ex-communist

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 449

countries. The 1989 ISSP asked questionsabotujob satisfaction and working condi-tions. Tbe 1990 ISSP asked questions aboutunionism. Although we are leery aboutgeneralizing from a single country to all ex-communist countries, tfie differences inattitudes between Hungarian employeesand those in Western countries do provideinsight into the potential legacy of commu-liisni. They allow ns to examine tbe widelyheld view ibat communist labor relationspractices produced less desirable workplaceconditions and less satisfied workers tbanfree market practices. (See Haraszti 1978;for a contrasting view, bowever, see Burawoyand Lukacs 1992.)

Respondents to the 1989 ISSP were askedthe generic (and widely used) job satisfac-tion quesiion. "How satisfied are you inyotirjob?" Questions abotujob satisfactionare difficult tt) interpret due to the subjec-tive nature ofthe variable and problems inmaking interpersonal comparisons (Free-man 1978). Still, econometric analysesbased on satisfaction data have yielded in-teresting and consistent results across datasets that sbow links between satisfactionand economic and demographic variables,and also show tbatjob satisfaction is a goodpredictor of future quit bebavior—indeed,in many longitudinal surveys, tbe best sucbpredictor {see, for example, Hamermesh1977; Borjas 1979; Freeman 1978;BianchHower and Oswald 1992; and Clarkand Oswald 1997).

What is more troubling for our analysis istbat people in one country may "scale"responses differently from those in another{see Hofstede 1985 for studies of differentcountt-y responses to satisfaction-type ques-tions in a single multinational). For in-stance, Americans may be relatively opti-mistic, with an "everything will work out"mentality that leads them to respond morepositively than a comparable British grouplo the question "Are you satisfied with yourjob?" even though their true satisfaction,on some objective scale," is the same as tbat

"One objective scaling would be to delerminehow salisfaciion rt-spaiises map inici labor tiirnnvcr.

of tbe {possibly more reserved) British. Wedeal with tliis problem by examining an-swers to more objective questions regard-ing workplace conditions—such as bealthand safety conditions—and estimating anordered probii model in wbich we includeas controls responses to otber unrelatedquestions that might index national pat-terns of response.

In any case, relatively few Hungariansreported being very satisfied or completelysatisfied {13%) with their jobs compared toWesterners, among whom tbe proportionranged from 3.S% in Eire to 50% in tbeUnited States.'^ At face value, tbis confirmsthe notion that workersundercimimiinismare less satisfied tban workers under capi-talism.

Table 4 presents evidence on workerperceptions of objective workplace condi-tions tbat might explain the low job satis-faction reported by Hungarian workers. Itshows that Hungarian workers are far lesslikely to regard their jobs as interestingthan are Western workers {question 1) andfar more likely to see their workplace asinvolving dangerous conditions {question2) and unhealthy conditions {question 3).All of tbese perceptions are likely to feedinto lowjob satisfaction. To the extent thatthey reflect objective conditions, they sug-gest tbat the reported lower job satisfactionhas some groiniding in reality.

As our final check on the effect of com-munist labor relations on job satisfaction,we use the entire distribution of responseson tbe 1989 job satisfaction question toestimate the difference in job satisfactionbetween Hungarian workers and Western

Satisfaction correlates well with quit behavior, so ifthe same response It-d to similar quitting acio.'iKtoiin-trifs, we could view rt'sponst's as valid indicators ofone loriii ot objective behavior. However, we do nothave data contra.siiiig saiislactioii and quits atioss(oiintries.

'•The proportiunsof workers who reported being"very'or "cotnpletelv" satisfied with their jobs were asfollows: Hungary. 13%; Ireland. 33%; Italy. 34%:Israel, .37%; Great Britain. 39%; Netherlands. 39%;Norway. 43%; West Germany, 44%; Austria, 48%; andthe Llnited States, 50%.

450 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Table 4. Employees' Perceptions ofTheir Wctrk and Working Conditions, 1989:

Respondents in Hungary Comparedto Those in Eleven Capitalist Countries."

UnwrighlrdMean of

Response.^ inCapitalist

Response Hungary Countrins

(Ql) "My job is interesting" -Employed Respondeats Only (1989: V63)

Strongly Agree 6.6 25.7Agrt-e 60.4 49.5Neither 20.4 1. .3I)isat,'ree 10.8 6.7Sirongly Disagree 1.5 2.8N 603 6296

(Q2) "How often do you work indangerous conditions?" - Employed

Respondents Only (1989: V72)

Always 15.8 3.6Olten 13.0 6.4Sonn-times 16.3 17.7Hardly Ever 10.8 18.7Never 44.2 53.9N 602 6273

I

<Q3l "How oflen do you work inunhealthy conditions?" - Employed

Respondents Only (1989: V73)

Always 10.3 3.8Often , 9.8 6.4Somt-times 17.6 18.4HHr<lly Ever 12.4 19.5Never 49.9 51.8N 602 6206

•For a list of countries, sec Table 1 or text.SnurcK ISSP (1989).

workers in an ordered probit model. Or-dered probits are the appropriate statisti-cal procedure where, as in this case, re-spondents express their preferences in theform of an ordinal ranking.

Otninodel inrludosvarioii.s demographicvariables that arc known to influence jobsatisfaction, including gender, age, andmarital status. We also incltide a tinionismvariable, wh ich previous studies have found

is negatively correlated with satisfaction(Freeman 1978; Borjas 1979), and self-em-ployment, which has been found to be posi-tively related to satisfaction (Blanchflowerand Oswald 199S). In this analysis, thecoefficient on this dummy variable tells ushow the entire distribution of job satisfac-tion differs between Hungarians and West-erners, conditional on the diverse controlvariables.

Table 5 presents our results. Column 1gives a basic job satisfaction equation. Itshows that the "control variables" have theirexpected effects on Job satisfaction. Thus,the ISSP question on job satisfaction givesresults comparable to those in other sur-veys: unionism, in particular, is negativelyrelated to job satisfaction, while self-em-ployment is positively related. The coeffi-cient on the Hungary dummy is large, nega-tive, and statistically significant (-.53).

Column 2 controls, as best we can, forincome, on the hypothesis that Hungariansmay be less satisfied with their job not be-cause of any legacy of communist laborrelations but simply because they are lowerpaid than Western workers. For this ptir-pose. wf use an ISSP question that askedpeople whether they viewed their incomeas high: "For each of the following state-ments about yourjob, please tick one boxto show how mucli you agree or disagreethat it applies to yourjob: My income ishigh."

Consistent with lower income in formercommunist countries, Hungarians were farmore likely than Western workers to dis-agree with this statement. Some 70% ofHungarians disagreed or disagreed stronglythat their income was high, compared to48% ofthe Biitish, 27% of Germans, 33%of Italians, 43% of Americans, and compa-rable fractions of other Westerners. Work-ers who report that their income is low areless likely to be satisfied (that is, the coeffi-cients on the various categorical responsesare increasingly negative compared to theomitted group of persons who strongly agreethat their income is high). Tbe coefficienton tbe Hungary dummy falls to -.41 uponaddition ofthe "income is high" responses,

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 451

Tahle 5. Correlates of Job Satisfaction, 1989:Ordered Probits.

(2) (3)

VariableStandard Standard Standard

Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coeffinent Error

Dummy -.531.'! .0471 -.4149 .0479 -.3211

Male

MarriedAgfYf;ir.s of SrhoolingUnion Stutits

"My income is high ""AgreeNeither Agree Nor DisagreeDisagreeStrongly DisagreeCan't Choose

'My job is interesting'^AgreeNeither Agree Nor DisagreeDisagreeStrongly DisagreeCan't Choose

'Dtmgerotis conditions'OflenSometimesHardly EverNever

'Vnhratthy conditions'^OftenSometimesHardly EverNever

Threshold 1Thre.shold 2Tlireshuld SThicshold 4Threshold f>Threshold 6

Number of ObservationsChi-(7)Pseiido R-Log Likelihood

.0500

-.1207.3242.0207.0100.0002

-.0958

-2.2709-1.9239-1.3500-.7704.52091.4285

6399307.400.0170

8907.4.-122

.0271

.0468

.029R

.0011

.0044,0279

.0911

.0818

.0759

.0741

.0739

.0751

-.2015.3249.0011.0091

-.0089-.1030

-.2247-.5683-.8630-1.2801-.4569

-3.2536-2.8934-2.2885-1.6779-.3192.6355

684(i844.940.0471

-8555.3416

.0277

.0476

.0302

.0012

.0045

.02« 1

.0813

.0791

.0792

.0872

.1541

.1238

. 11 ti5

.11171100.1089.1091

-.1271.2334

-.0190.OOGfi

-.0356-.0708

-.149.'!-.3626-.5869-.9870-. 17.10

-..'.806-1.2294-1.5457-2.1059-1.0886

-.1899-.0442-.1519-.1096

.0647

.1185

.2159

.4109

-4.2908-3.8.=i75-3.1390-2.4:^10-.8877.1621

63122133.24

.1194-7866.71

.0296

.0487

.0308

.0012

.0047

.0288

.0832

.0814

.0917

.0895

.1730

.O3.'i3

.04H2

.0621

.0978

.2808

.0848

.0764

.0777

.0752

.0868

.0775

.0786

.0756

.1553

. 1469

.1411

. 1391

. 1373

.1370

Note: The sample consists of employed respondents only.Source: iSSP (1989).'The excluded category is "strongly agree."The excluded category is "always."

452 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

bul it remains substantial and significant.Al similar perceptions of income (if notsimilar incomes), Hungarians are less satis-fied with their jobs than Westerners. Fi-nally, column S includes a series of dummyvariables to distiugui.sb whether respon-dents considered their jobs to be "interest-ing" or their working conditions to be "un-healthy" or "dangerous" (as in Table 4).The inclusion of these variables reducesthe size ofthe coefficient on the Hungarydummy by approximately a quarter, al-though ihe coefficient remains statisticallysignificant. These factors contribute to thelow levels of saiisfaction in Hungary, butthey are not the whole story. All told, weinterpret ibe ordered probits as confirm-ing the reported lower job satisfaction ofHungarians with evidence about objectivefeatures of workplaces.

In addition to evidence on job satisfac-tion, we have reports of overall happinessby respondents, whether employed, unem-ployed, or out of tbe labor force. Sincework is such an important part of life, weexpect that this measure of attitudes oughtalso to be related to labor market experi-ences. Our "happiness" measure also hasone important advantage over job satisfac-tion: it covers all citizens, including thejobless. The 1991 ISSP provides data onperceived "happiness" for Slovenia, Poland,and Easi Germany, as well as for Hungaryand Western countries. Respondents wereasked; "If you were to consider your life ingeneral these days, bow happy or luihappywould you say you are, on the whole?" Fouroptions were given for tbeir replies—"notat all," "not very," "fairly," and "very."'Thirty-eight percent of Hungarians, 23%of East Germans, and 45% of Slovenes said

' Overall, the responses wert- as follows (%):

Noi Not No.at All Very Fairly Very Obs.

they were not at all happy or not very happy,compared to 11 % of West Germans, 8% ofthe British, 8% of Americans, 7% of theIrish, 10% of New Zealanders. and 11 % ofNorwegians. Only the Italians and Israelishad "not at all" or "not ver)'" happy percent-ages close to those of the eastern Europe-ans—22% for Italians and Israelis.

Table 6 reports a series of ordered probitequations to estimate country effects onhappiness, controlling for age, gender,marital status, andyears of schooling. Onceagain we report results including a full setotcounti7 dummies (the excluded countryis the United Slates) as well as the resultsfrom an equation that replaces the countrydummies with a single ex-communistdummy. Individuals in the ex-communistcountries reported being less happy thanthose in the Western countries in oursample. As can be seen from column 1, thelowest levels of bappiness among tbe West-ern countries were lo be found in Israel andItaly. The young, married individuals,women, and those with higher levels ofschooling reported the highest levels ofhappiness.

In order to obtain results comparable tothe job satisfaction evidence presentedabove, which was for workers only, in col-umns 2 and 3 we restrict the samples to theemployed and those unemployed or out ofthe labor force, respectively. The patternof results, including the country dummystructure, is remarkably similar to the jobsatisfaction pattern. In column 4, wheretwo dummies are added to control for labormarket status, we confirm the earlier find-ing of Oswald (1994) that the unemployedare less happy than the employed (the ex-cluded category). This negative unemploy-ment resuh is further confirmed in col-umns 5 and 6 of Table 6, where we reportseparate estimates for the 11 capitalist coun-tries and the 4 ex-communist countries.''*The main differences between these twoequations are the lack of significance ofthe

AllCapitalistEx-Communist

325

159

30

fiO6256

2227

y

17967128325135

'*The excluded countries are the United Slatesand Hungary, respectively.

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 453

Table 6. Reported Happiness in Capilalisl and Ex-Communist Countries, 1991: Ordered Probits.

Va rin bU/Cou n try

Ma It-

Age 25-34

Age 3r>-44

Age 4.'j-54

Age 55-64

Age 65-74

Married

Widowed

Divorced/Separated

Years of Schooling

Wesi Germany

Great Britain

Hungary

Netherlands

Italy

Eire

Northern Ireland

Poland

Slovenia

IMiilippiiK-s

New Zealand

Norway

Israel

East Germany

All(I)

-.0933(5.14)

-.1901(5.58)

-.2742(7.56)

-.2727(7.09)

-.2738(6.86)

-.1158(2.63)

.3659(13.24)

-.2261(4.75)

-.2604(5.88)

.0253(8.4«)

-.3661(7.74)

-.1231(2.55)

-1.0946(21.54)

-.2018(4.47)

-.8122(15.86)

.0863(1.70)-.0090

(0.17)-.9233

(17.72)-1.2245

(27.63)-.4325

(8.74)-.2824

(5.63)-.4417

(9.40)-.«I90

(15.83)-.8258

(17.81)

Employed(2)

-.0980(4.09)-.1748

(4.02)-.2888

(6.32)-.2930

(6.01)-.2823

(4.80).1.367

(1.19).3532

(10.22)-.1457

(1.77)-.2208

(3.8ff)

.0215(5.51)-.3574

(.5.89)-.1412

(2.15)-1.0500

(16.43)-.2147

(3.44)-.8222

(12.46).1638

(2.42).1081

(1.47)-.8681

(12.85)-1.2372

(21.79)-.4144

(6.58)-.2678

(4.24)-.4662

(7.87)-.6870

(10.36)-.8425

(14.45)

NotEmpluytd

(3)

-.1418(4.66)-.2785

(4.85)-.3113

(4.91)-.2774

(4.27)-.2277

(3.82)-.0869

(1.43).3816

(8.14)-.2440

(3.77)-.3068

(4.31).0270

(5.53)-.3819

(5.00)-.1031

(1.40)-1.2126

(I-!. 19)-.1755

(2,55)-.8047

(9.78).0149

(0.19)-.1142

(1.38)-.9875

(11.89)-1.2220

(16.89)-.4701

(5.81)-.2986

(3.58)-.39.58

(5.0S)-.9931

(11.87)-.8258

(10.62)

AU(f)

-.0960(5.11)-.2068

(6.04)-.3003

(8.22)-.3037

(7.85)-.2994

(7.39)-.1373

(3.00).3547

(12.81)-.2385

(5.00)-.2584

(5.83).0229

(7.63)-..3748

(7.92)-.0980

(2.03)-1.1122

(21.85)-.1961

(4.31)-.8143

(15.89).1165

(2.28).0111

(0.21)-.9003

(17.25)-1.2226

(27.56)-.4343

(8.77)-.2856

(5.65)-.4459

(9.48)-.7888

(15.21)-.8114

(17.46)

Capitalist

-.1232(5.37)-.2025

(5.10)-.2844

(6.64)-.2898

(6.34)-.2921

(6.06)-.0839

(1.59).3670

(11.35)-.2129

(3.71)-.2548

(4.84).0175

(4.91)-.3904

(8.17)-.1055

(2.19)n/a

-.2006(4.38)-.8234

(15.88).1127

(2.18).0025

(0.05)n / a

n / a

-.4492(8.92)-.2884

(5.71)-.4537

(9.57)-.7774

(14.85)n / a

Ex-Cammunist

(6)

-.0403(1.22)-.2181

(3.18)-.3406

(4.79)-.3376

(4..'J5)-.3087

(3.89)-.2994

(3.16).3004

(5.48)-.3299

(3.77)-.3133

(3.73).0377

(6.70)n / a

n / a

n / a

n / a

n / a

n / a

.1752(.3.23)-.1301

(2.85)n/a

n/a

n / a

n / a

.2898(6.00)

Continued

454 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Table 6. Continued

Variable/Cou nlry

Nut Ex-All Employed Employnl AU Capitalist Communist(1) (2) (3) (4) 0) 16)

Unemployed

Oui ol' lhe Labor Korce

Threshold 1Threshold 2Threshold 3Chi-NPseudo R''

Separate EquationsEx-Comnuiiiist Dummy

-2.4193-1.2745

.60722780

16529.0820

-.8439(28.58)

-2.5888-1.3891

.57.5815039733

.0787

-.7082(26.88)

-2.3017-1.1936

.584513256796

.0901

-.7322(22.36)

-.4549(11.24)

-.0424(1.86)

-2.5224-1.3687

.52212907

16529.08.58

-.8348(28.23)

-.4995(9.89)-.0452

(1.70)

-2.4040-1.4735

.4700I no

11655.0502

n / a

-.3583(5.27)-.0360

(0.75)

-1.4934-.10641.6800

4024874

.0393

n/a

the Unittd St;itts is the excluded category in (;olumn.s 1-5. Hungary is excluded in column 6.Source: ISSP (U)91).

gender variable in eqttation 6and the higherlevels o( happiness of those age 6;J-74 incqtiation 5contpared with the middle-aged.Individtials Uving in cx-cointttttnist couti-tries report lower levels of happiness and, ifemployed, lower levels oi job satisfactionthan are found in otir control grotip ofWestern couniries. Tbis is further confir-tnation of the legacy hypothesis.

Attitudes Toward Unions

One interpretation oi" the restths on jobsatisfaction is that it is a legacy of transmis-sion belt unions and the absence of a freelabor market. If the lack of independentvoice is, in fact, an impuiiatit factor, wewottid expect to see Hungarians and per-sons in otbet ex-commutiist cotnitrics dif-fer from people in Western cotnitries inihcir attitudes toward trade iniiotis.

The 1990 and 1993 ISSP contains severalquestions about attitudes toward unionismthat enable us to test tbat interpretation.Table 7 records the responses of Hungar-ians, Hulgarians. and Czechs as well as ISSPrespondents from Western countries toqtiestions regarding unionism in those sur-

veys. The responses to the qttestion "Howgood are trade/labor titiiods for the coun-uy as a whole?" show tbal persons in the ex-communist countries bad less favorableviews of union.s in their country than didWesterners. Forty-two percent of Hungar-ians, 45% of Bulgarians, and 37% of Czechsreported that unions were "not very good"or "not good at all," cotnpared to 16% ofWest Germans, 27% ofthe British respon-dents, 25% of American respondents, andso on.

A large number of Italians (44%) alsoreported that unions were "not very good"or "not good at all." But the reason forthe dissatisfaction witb ttnions in ex-com-munist cottntries differs markedly fromthe reason for Italian dissatisfaction.Asked "Do you think that trade unionsbave too mucb poweror too little power?",the easterti Europeans overwhelminglythought that unions had loo little power,whereas Italians disapproved of unionsas having too mtich power (responses toquestioti 2). Moreover, the proportionof Htmgarians who expressed the belieftbat strong trade unions are needed toprotect workers (question 3) exceeded

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 455

Tnhh 7. Pcrccptitms of lhe Role of Trade Unions in Nine Couniries, 1990 and

(QI) "How good are trade/labor unions for the country as a whole?"(1990: V45 and 1993 preliminary for Bulgaria & Czech Republic)

Unweighted Means

Hirsptinse

ExcelicniVery GoodFairly GoiidNiil Very GoodNni Good at AllN

Hungary Bulgaria1990

2.730.425.126.fi15.2782

1993

10.121.423.121.224.2822

Czfchliepublif

1993

4.015.657.618.83.9

865

Ex-Commumst1990*1993

5.622.535.322.21 4 4

2469

Capitalist1990

3.317.3r>3.519.9fi,0

7189

WestGermany

1990

5.726.053.313.2

1.8

2303

Gli1990

2.015.755.320.76,2

971

USA1990

2.917.254.319.7b.l

943

Norway1990

3.721 958.612.2

3 6

1271

hrael1990

3.315.25.3.121.3

7.1

7. 0

Italy1990

1.97 9

-16.532.411.3

951

(Q2) "Do you think that trade/labor unions in this country have too mucb power?"(1990: V42 and 1993 preliminary Tor Bulgaria 8e Czech Republic)

Unweighted Means

Response

Far Too MuchPower

Too Much PowerAboui RightToo I.iitle PowerFar Too LitUe

PowerN

(QS)"

Rtsponse

Strongly Agree.ARieeNeitherDisagreeStrongly DisagreeN

Hungary liulgnria1990'

5.812.418.333.7

29.8782

1993

5,119.920.732.6

21.7

792

'Workers need

Hun^try

28.847.412.010.0

1.8

880

Czech Ex-Ittfpuhlir Communist (

1993 1990*1993

\A6.8

26.750.2

14.8

849

4.113.021.938.8

22.12423

Capitalist1990

13.425.444,014.3

2.8

7195

WestGermany GB

1990

8.419.557.912,3

1.8

2303

1990

9.126.849.313.0

1.7

971

USA1990

14.732.039.311.5

2.4

943

Strong trade unions to protect their interests"Ceipilali.U

UnweightedMean

21.339.818.815.05.1

18273

WestGrrman^

31.541.715.49.12.3

1288

( GB

12.129,623.228.8

6.3

1085

USA

10.62.5.526.225.412.3

1231

Austria

24.449.011.012.23.3

1631

Norway

23.741.219.2U.I

4.8

16,=»2

NoTwirf1990

12,324.952,2

9,5

t.l

1269

(1989:

Nfther-tands

17.748.222,5

9.12.6

1487

Israel1990

7.830,433.225.3

3.2

779

V23)

Israel

24,242.816.212.24.7

1003

Italy1990

28.218.932,214.3

6.4

930

Italy

26.639.017.013.04.3

946

S,,urr>-: ISSP (1990. 1993),

that in all Western countries except Ger-many.'''

'"'We initially expected one additional ISSP ques-linii—"In gent-ral. how would you describe relationsat your workplace between nianaHfrncnt and employ-ees?"—to bf intoi niaiive on possible aiiiiiidt-.s towardihf i ieed lor unions. But ihe responst-olMiingariansrelative to Westerrier.>i here was ambigiions, .A muchsmaller proport ion (11.5%) stated lliai labor-man-agement relations were ver)' good ihaii in any West-ern (:ounir>- ( the Nether lands was the next lowest at

Why do persons from ex-communisi east-ern European countries and Westernersrespond so differently to the union cjnes-tions in the ISSP? How can we rationalizethe view of workers in ex-communist coun-

I8.f>%), bnt at the same time, the propor t ion ofHungariansdescribinj^ labor relations as quite or verybad (3.1%) was m u i h smaller than the propor t ion ofworkers in Western countries ( the IK- \ [ lowest wasIsrael, with 4%).

456 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Table S. Percentages Who Strongly Favor Government Intervention in the I.ahor Market:Seven Ex-Communisi Couniries and Fifteen Capitalist Countries, Various Years.

Country

Ex-communistBulgaria

Easl GermanyHungaryPolandRussiaSlrtvenJH

Unweighted Mean

CapitalistAustraliaAustriaCanadaGreat BritainIsraelItalyJapanNcihfrlandsNew Ze;iiiiiid

NorwaySpainSwedenSwitzerlandUSAWest GermanyUnweighted Mean

ReduceIncome Differences

1987

3236

34

35

21

17

US

1718

1992

6123423330393133

10271727

40

1617

16

102020

1993

6334393838323239

122232293013151519

72.i

20

Control Wagesby l.-aw

1990

5016

33

62421

7

79

12

ProvidejobsforAU

1987

70

4572

62

36

24

23

17173525

1992

36555250753651

10311621

57

1937

26

172226

Provide BasicIncome for All1987

40

40

20

20

10

127

1714

7992

77SO505147712750

13131928

37

2135

9

101920

Source: 1S8P (1987, 1990, 1992. 1993).

tries that unions are not good for the coun-try, are too weak, and are needed to protectworkers? Our explanation is that theseresponses reflect two aspects of" the experi-ence with unions under communism: thepast role of unions as transmission belts ofthe state, and the weakness of newly emerg-ing or changing traditional unions—one ofseveral legacies of the country's communistlabor sys;tem.

Attitudes Toward (heState in Economic Life

Under communism, the state dominatedeconomic life, with adverse consequencesfor economic progress and for worker andcitizen satisfaction. By overiurning com-munism, these countries have committed

themselves to developing a market economywith a much smaller governmental role ineconomic affairs than in their past. Still,the decades of governmeni-doniinated eco-nomic life and communist egalitarian ide-ology may have left a legacy of "statism" inthese countries that would produce atti-tudes toward state ititerventions in wageand eniploytnentdifferentfrom those foundamong people brought up in market econo-mies.

Table 8 presents responses to ISSP ques-tions from the 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1993modules that cast light on this issue. Itshows a wide difference in attitudes towardstate interventions between eastern Euro-pean and Western countries, and some dif-ferences atnong the ex-communist coun-tries as well. The figures under the heading

THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS 457

"Reduce Income Differences" show that alarger proportion of workers in the formercommunist countries than in the capitalistctmntries believe that the government isresponsible for reducing dilterenccs in in-come. In 1987, 34% of persons in the twoex-communist couniries for which we havedata, Hungar) and Poland, strongly agreedwith this statement, proportions that farexceed those in Western countrie.s save forAustria. In 1992, for which we have infor-mation for seven ex-communist countries,the results are similar. On average, 33% ofpeople in the ex-communist countriesagreed strongly that governments shouldreduce income differences, compared tojust 20% in the capitalist countries (thoughmany in the capitalist countries agreedsomewhat). The sole countries whose re-sponses overlap those in the other set ofcountries in this contrast are Italy and Aus-tria among the Western countries andCzechoslovakia among the ex-communistcountries. The figures for 1993 show aneven greater divergence between the ex-communist and the capitalist countries, withnrt overlap at all!

There is less consistency among theformer communisi countries in whetherrespondents support controlling wages bylaw. The East Germans strongly favor suchcontrols, but the Hungarians do not. Thecontrast between the East and West Ger-mans on tliis isstie is striking.

On the employment side, the ISSP askedin 1987 and in 1992 whether the gcwern-ment sbould providejobs for all. Tbe re-spondents in the two eastern Europeancountries covered in 1987, Hungary andPoland, were far more likely to agree withthis proposition than were respondent's inthe Western countries. In 1992, when theISSP asked this same question in six ex-comnuuiist countries, the unweighted av-erage proportion of persons in those coun-tries wbo agreed strongly was 51%, com-pared to 2f)%> in the capitalist countries.

The greater support for government play-ing a role in income and employment de-termination in former communist coun-tries shows up. finally, in responses to thefollowing question: "Should government

provide basic income for all?" Only Hun-gary provided data on thisquestion in 1987.There, tbe proportion strongly agreeingwas 40%, far above the corresponding pro-portion in capitalist countries. The differ-ence in 1992, for which we have data forseven ex-communist countries, is evengreater.

In sum, while ibere art- some coimtrydifferences, the overwhelming pattern inthese data is a greater proclivity for relyingon the state"'among persons ironi ex-com-munist couutries than among Westerners-—consistent with the legacy hypothesis.

Conclusions

We have uncovered substantial differ-ences between survey respondents in formercommunist countries and those in Westerncouniries in responses to diverse questionsabout attitudes toward earnings inequality,job satisfaction, working conditions, unions,and tbe role ofthe state in regulating labormarket outcomes. In ISSP surveys con-ducted over the years 19H7-93, tbe citizensof former communist countries evinced agreater desire for egalitarianism, less satis-faction with tbeir jobs, more support forstrong unions, and more support for stateintervention tban did most Westerners. Atthe same time, as perceived occupationalearnings differentials widened in thesecotmiries over the course of tbe breakdownof communism and the transition to morecapitalistic systems between 1987 and 1992,tolerance for those differentials increa.sedsubstantially, Without gainsaying the im-portant differetues in outcomes and atti-tudes among ex-communist countries andamong Western countries, we believe thatit is reasonable to interpret the broad pat-tern of differences between the two groupsas reflecting a legacy of communist eco-nomics.

"•Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorski's (1993) analy-sis of Polish public (ipiiiion polls gave resull.s thai areconsislcni witli ours. Table 7 in Rose and liacrpfer(1994) also shows suhsEaiiiial "tollcciivist values" ineastern European countries, iliongb will) variationamong countries and qucsiioiis.

458 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Appendix Table AIResponses to the ISSP, 1987-1992

Gtmniry

Ex-Conununist:BulgariaC/.erhnslovakiaEast (JcrmaiiyHuiigai7PolandRussiaSlovenia

Capitalist:AustraliaAustriaCanadaEireGreat BritainIsraelhalvNeihertandsNew ZealandNorwaySwedenSwitzerlandUSAWest GermanyTo ml

1987

2606394 S

1574972

1212

1027I63«

98715641397

16920

1989

1000

23981997

9721297113310281690

1S48

14531575

16391

1990

1028977

10051197991983

1517

12172812

11727

1991

148610001063

20S0

10051257991983

163510701506

13591346

16781

1992

1198IIOI10941250163619831049

22031027iOO4

1066

996

12391538749

12732297

22703

1993

1183100510921167164119311032

1467957

1261119810001852127114141414

15571014

25969

AU

2381210647008000828339144161

61753996247139397290431360176815358078232163

9878423

10441107978

Notes: Data for 1993 were obtained from the ISSP 1993 Source book (ZA Study 2450). Data are also availablein the ISSP {but not used in this paper) for Northern Ireland and the Philippines for a number of yearsand Spainand Japan IIM 1993 only.

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