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The ‘protection crisis’: A review of field-based strategies for humanitarian protection in Darfur

Sara Pantuliano and Sorcha O’Callaghan

HPG Discussion Paper

December 2006

HumanitarianPolicy Group

hpg

Overseas Development

Institute

i

Contents

Acronyms iii

Chapter 1 Introduction and background 11.1 History of the conflict 11.2 The impact of the conflict on the civilian population 2

Chapter 2 The protection crisis 52.1 Insecurity and protection in Darfur 52.2 Protection concepts and responsibilities 62.3 Why the ‘protection crisis’? 62.4 The international response to the ‘protection crisis’ 7

Chapter 3 Protection in practice in Darfur 93.1 The protection ‘egg’ and protection activities 9 3.2 Responsive activities in Darfur 93.3 Remedial action 123.4 Environment-building 13

Chapter 4 The challenges of protection programming 154.1 Lack of strategy and inadequate analysis 154.2 The ‘explosion of substitution’? 164.3 Protection by presence: myth or reality? 174.4 Protection and assistance: the difficulties of mainstreaming protection 174.5 Problems of skill and expertise 184.6 Protection in camps 194.7 Protection gaps: extortion and land 204.8 Assessing impact 20

Chapter 5 The media, politics and protection: a dangerous interface 215.1 Politics and protection advocacy in Darfur 215.2 Darfur in the media: playing to an international audience 215.3 The politics of protection 22

Chapter 6 Coordination, collaboration and confusion 236.1 The evolution of the UN’s role in protection in Darfur: turf battles and lack of leadership 236.2 The dilemmas of UNMIS’ leadership in protection 246.3 The experience of the Working Groups 256.4 Coordination with the AU: opportunities missed 256.5 Coordination with political actors 26

Chapter 7 Conclusions 29

References 31

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About the authors

Sara Pantuliano is a Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group.

Sorcha O’Callaghan is a Research Officer with HPG.

Acknowledgments

ODI would like to thank the wide range of individuals and organisations that assisted and support-ed this study. UN OCHA’s Internal Displacement Division, particularly Marc Vincent, Simon Bagshawand Vicky Metcalfe, provided valuable support to the study, which is gratefully acknowledged. ODIalso wishes to thank the Protection of Civilians Section of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan(UNMIS), especially Allegra Baiocchi, Dalia Aranki, Cate Staeins and Karin Perrin, for the researchand logistical assistance offered in the field. James Darcy, Nicholas Waddell and Daniel Large con-tributed to the design of the project and the background research.

ODI would like to extend its thanks to the many people who contributed in numerous ways to thestudy, including research support, the provision of documents and materials and comments on earli-er drafts. Particular thanks to Ramesh Rajasingham, Sarah El Rasheed and Annette Hearns (OCHA),Anne Zeidan, Simon Ashmore and Laurent Saugy (ICRC), Rebecca Dale, David White and JosephAguettant (IRC), Vance Colbert and Hanna Mollan (NRC), Salih Abdel Mageed (Oxfam America),Antonio Fernandez de Velasco (ECHO), Glyn Taylor (DFID), John Plastow (CARE) and independent con-sultants Sharath Srinivasan, Julie Flint and Sheilagh Henry. We are particularly grateful to the peopleof Darfur and key informants in Sudan, who gave generously of their time to be interviewed.

Finally, thanks to the many colleagues in the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI who provided com-ments and support to the study, particularly Matthew Foley, for his expert editing of the paper.

ODI is grateful to the United States government and other donor governments to HPG for their finan-cial support for the study.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondonSE1 7JDUnited Kingdom

Tel: +44(0) 20 7922 0300Fax: +44(0) 20 7922 0399Website: www.odi.org.uk/hpgEmail: [email protected]

ISBN-10: 0 85003 833 2ISBN-13: 978 0 85003 834 7

© Overseas Development Institute, 2006

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HPG DISCUSSION PAPER

Map of Darfur

Korni Um Baru, and Tina

Al Sireaf and Saraf Omra

Abata Rokoro

Nertiti

Galado Golo

Kabkabiya and Jebel Si

Dar al Salam

Tawila and Korma

Um Kaddada

Al Tawisha

Al Lait

Abu Karaynka

Adayla

Asalaya

Abu Gabra

Abu Matariq

Buram

Wad al-Ugam

Radum

Guz-al

Guhayna-al

Suntah-al

Rehed al BirdiUm Dafug

NyimeriAntikayna

TulusGirayda

Nyalal

Abu Agura

Yasin

Mahagriya

Natiqa

SheariaSharq Gabal

Mara

Malam

Um Dukhun

Mukjar

Bundis

For Baranga

Al Deain

Fardus

Balil

Damsu

Malha

Kutum Rural and Fato Borno

Mallit and Sayeh

Al Fasher and Kuma

Kulbus

Seleia

Sirba

Kerenek

Mornei

Azoum Zallingi Rural –Traige

Zallingi Rural –Traige

Um Kher

Kass

Shataya

Edd Al Fursan

KataylaMadkandi

Kubum

Masteri

Beida HabilahHabilah

Al Geneina

Kulbus

Kutum

Kabkabiya

Zallingi Jebel Marra

Edd al Fursan

Nyala

Shearia

Adayla

Tulus

Rehed al Birdi

Kass

Mukja

Wadi Salih

Mallit

Um Kaddada

Al Fasher

Al Deain

Buram

South Darfur

West DarfurChad

Central African

Republic

Bahr al Ghazal

West

Kordofan

North

Kordofan

North Darfur

Rural council boundary

Locality boundary

State boundary

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AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan

APGfS Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan (UK)

AU African Union

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DHP Darfur Humanitarian Profile

DLF Darfur Liberation Front

DPA Darfur Peace Agreement

DRC Danish Refugee Council

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation

HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission

HIC Humanitarian Information Centre

IAMG Inter-Agency Management Group

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICC International Criminal Court

ICG International Crisis Group

ICI International Commission of Inquiry

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IHL International Humanitarian Law

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

IOM International Organisation for Migration

JEM Justice and Equality Movement

JIM Joint Implementation Mechanism

KPSG Khartoum Protection Steering Group

KPWG Khartoum Protection Working Group

LoU Letter of Understanding

MCM Management and Coordination Mechanism

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MSF Médecins Sans Frontières

NCP National Congress Party

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PWG Protection Working Group

Acronyms

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RTE Real Time Evaluation

SD Sudanese Dinar

SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SRSG Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General

ToRs Terms of Reference

UN RC/HC United Nations Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WFP World Food Programme of the United Nations

WG Working Group

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This Discussion Paper is part of a study on ‘protection inpractice’ by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at theOverseas Development Institute (ODI). The study aims toexamine current practice in humanitarian protection andexplore strategies, programmes and initiatives undertaken indifferent contexts to support the protection of civilians.Focusing on roles, outcomes and the internal and externallimitations of humanitarian actors, the purpose of theresearch is to draw lessons and elicit best practice, rather thanevaluate specific programmes or agencies. This DiscussionPaper on Darfur, which is complemented by two BackgroundPapers on Colombia and northern Uganda, will inform acomprehensive HPG report on field-based strategies forhumanitarian protection due for publication in mid-2007. Thiswork forms part of a wider body of research by HPG on thesubject of civilian security and humanitarian protection, whichincludes separate studies aimed at understanding differentconcepts of protection (political, human rights andhumanitarian) as well as the relevance and application ofprotective status (refugee, IDP, civilian) for people’s security.

The Discussion Paper is based on an extensive review ofpublished and grey literature on the Darfur crisis and theprotection response by humanitarian actors. Documentsinclude relevant academic material on the region, policybriefings, conflict analysis reports, humanitarian assessmentsand evaluations, NGO and UN internal documents, reports byhuman rights organisations, media coverage and official papersby the International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) on Darfur. Thematerial reviewed informed questionnaires discussed with keyinformants and community groups. Primary data collectionincluded extensive in-depth qualitative interviews withrepresentatives from the Sudanese government, armedopposition groups, international and national humanitarianorganisations, Sudanese academics, Sudan analysts,representatives from diplomatic missions and donor agenciesand Darfuri communities in Khartoum, Nyala, Zalingei, Al Fashirand surrounding villages, undertaken during June 2006.

The conflict in Darfur is the first emergency to be characterisedas a ‘protection crisis’. This Discussion Paper demonstrates howthis emphasis has fundamentally shaped the nature of thehumanitarian response. An unprecedented number of agencieshave engaged in protection in Darfur, giving rise to anunparalleled level of protection programming and coordinationinitiatives. The findings highlight how these developmentshave, in certain instances, helped to save lives or at least reducethe level of threat for many people. However, they also signalthe limited role that humanitarian agencies can play inprotecting civilians under threat. Many believe that, despite theincreased emphasis on protection by humanitarian actors

operating in Darfur, there has not been a significantimprovement in the overall security of the civilian population.

The Discussion Paper analyses the evolution of the Darfurconflict and its impact on the civilian population, as well as themeasures civilians have taken in response to the differentthreats they face. The Paper explores the conceptualframework behind humanitarian protection, and discusses theresponse by the international community to civilian insecurityin Darfur. The response is then examined using the ICRC ‘eggframework’, which divides protection activity into threecomplementary spheres of action. This description is followedby an in-depth analysis of some of the major challengesencountered by humanitarian agencies undertakingprotection programming in Darfur, and of the gaps in theresponse. Finally, the Paper explores the politics of protectionin humanitarian settings, and describes the dilemmas ofleadership and coordination in Darfur.

1.1 History of the conflict

The Darfur1 conflict has often been portrayed by the media asa struggle between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’, sparked by ethnictension and competition over resources. However, as withmany other conflicts in Sudan, there is no simple or singularroot cause. A complex set of interrelated factors is driving thewar. Historical grievances, local perceptions of race, demandsfor a fair sharing of power between different groups, theinequitable distribution of economic resources and benefits,disputes over access to and control over increasingly scarcenatural resources (land, livestock and water), the proliferationof arms and the militarisation of young people, the absence ofa democratic process and other governance issues – all ofthese factors have contributed to the conflict, but none ofthem is a sole or primary cause. In the last few years, though,the new wave of conflict in Darfur has changed traditionalrelationships between ethnic groups and politicised them,giving local conflicts much wider political dimensions.

The current conflict started in 2003, after several years ofsporadic fighting between different Darfuri groups,particularly the Masalit and the Rizeigat and the Zaghawa andthe Awlad Zeid. By the end of 1999, these clashes haddisplaced over 100,000 people and turned 40,000 intorefugees in Chad. Although the government dismissed thefighting as ‘tribal’ clashes, in reality old animosities and localfractures were being increasingly politicised and mobilised bydifferent forces, including the government itself, for military

Chapter 1Introduction and background

1 The correct transliteration from the Arabic is Dar Fur. However, thecommon spelling used by most aid organisations and the media, ‘Darfur’, isadopted in this report.

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and political purposes (Johnson, 2003: 141; Flint and de Waal,2005). Starting in mid-2002, the self-proclaimed DarfurLiberation Front (DLF) conducted a series of attacks on policestations and other government targets. The DLF insurgents,mainly belonging to the Zaghawa and Fur ethnic groups,changed their name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army(SLM/A) and stepped up the scope of their attacks in early2003. In a joint operation with the newly formed Justice andEquality Movement (JEM) in April 2003, the border town ofTine was captured, and Al-Fashir airport was attacked.

The crisis in Darfur was exploited by hardliners in thegovernment, many of whom were opposed to the IGAD peaceprocess aimed at resolving the conflict in southern Sudan. Thegovernment decided to fight the rebellion outright but,mindful of the talks on the south and aware of the weaknessof its army, ‘outsourced’ the counter-insurgency to local militiaforces. Impoverished camel herding nomads from thenorthern Rizeigat, groups like the Zayadia, the Tarjam and theBeni Halba, small African tribes like the Gimir and the Tamaand former Islamic Legionnaires2 were reportedly providedwith supplies and armaments and given a free hand. Thesemilitias have come to be widely known in the internationalmedia and among aid agencies and human rightsorganisations as the ‘Janjawiid’.3 The counter-insurgency theywaged was conducted largely through attacks on the civilianpopulation, designed to curtail support for the insurgents andoccupy land. Meanwhile, despite repeated claims by thegovernment that it did not back the militias and was unable torein them in, the Sudanese army consistently supportedmilitia raids on villages, sometimes with helicopter gunshipsor fixed-wing aircraft (ICI, 2005: 54).

Violence continued throughout 2004 and 2005, despiteintermittent peace talks and the deployment of an AfricanUnion force (the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)) inAugust 2004 to monitor the N’Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement signed the previous April. The conflict wasfurther exacerbated in late 2005 by divisions within the maininsurgent group, the SLM/A, which frustrated peacenegotiations in the Nigerian capital Abuja. On 5 May 2006, theSudanese government reached an agreement with theZaghawa-dominated faction of the SLM/A, led by Minni ArcoiMinnawi. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), as theagreement was called, was rejected by the Fur-dominatedfaction of the SLM/A, led by Abdel Wahid Mohammad Nur, aswell as by the JEM, on the grounds that it did not meetfundamental demands concerning political representation forthe Darfuris, did not offer adequate compensation to thecivilian victims of the counter-insurgency and had insufficientguarantees with regard to the disarmament of pro-government militias. The signature of the DPA was followed by

a renewed wave of violence (ICG, 2006: 4). On 31 August 2006,the UN Security Council expanded the mandate of UNMIS, theUN peacekeeping operation overseeing the implementation ofthe Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), andauthorised its deployment to Darfur to replace AMIS. However,its deployment in Darfur is conditional on Sudanese consent.From the outset, the Sudanese government has stronglyopposed plans for a UN force on Darfur territory.

1.2 The impact of the conflict on the civilian population

Since the fighting began in earnest in February 2003, anestimated 200,000 people have been killed and a further twomillion displaced. The Sudanese army and pro-governmentmilitias have burnt and looted villages, raped women andkilled men, forcing the survivors to flee across the border intoChad or to seek refuge in government-controlled towns andcamps. Atrocities against civilians and human rights violationshave also been perpetrated by the armed oppositionmovements, although on a smaller scale. This is believed to bea reflection of capacity, rather than will: some of the violenceinflicted by the insurgents on civilians has been no lessferocious than that meted out by the pro-government militias(Flint, 2006a; Amnesty International, 2006). The scale of

2 The ‘Islamic Legion’ was created by Libyan President Muammar Qadhafiin the 1980s to prosecute Libya’s war against Chad and pursue Qadhafi’span-Sahelian ‘Arab belt’ ambitions.3 The term ‘Janjawiid’ was used for the first time in 1989 to denote groupsof Arab camel herders engaged in militia fighting.

Box 1: Land and conflict

Most Arab groups in Darfur do not own land on the basis ofthe hakura (landholding) system, the prevailing land tenuremanagement system in Darfur. This system, which datesback to pre-colonial times, was built upon by the Britishadministration which allotted dars (homelands) to varioussettled and transhumant tribes. Several Arab transhumantcamel herding groups, especially in North Darfur, were notassigned any land, though access to land and water alongtranshumant routes was generally accepted throughcustomary practices. The breakdown of co-operativerelations with their settled neighbours, particularly after thedevastating droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, left manypastoralists impoverished and deprived them of asustainable livelihood base. When the conflict broke out inDarfur, landless Arab groups saw an opportunity to expandtheir access to land and water. The conflict therefore becamepartly a violent assault by landless tribal groups againstgroups with land. The competition over essential livelihoodssources, which political marginalisation and poorgovernance have left unaddressed over the past threedecades, has increasingly assumed racial aspects, and manypeople in Darfur now perceive the current violence in a racialcontext. However, larger, richer and more powerful cattleherding Arab Baqqara tribes of South Darfur (the Rizeiqat,the Ta’isha, the Ma’alia, the Habbaniya, the Beni Hussein andpart of the Beni Halba) have not, as tribes, taken part inviolent activities against non-Arab groups. The BaqqaraRizeiqat enjoy good trading relations with the Zaghawa andthe Fur, and have greater access to land (Tanner, 2005: 22).


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sexual violence against women has been a particularly brutalfeature of the conflict.

In certain areas, people in camps remain vulnerable to militiaviolence, and many have inadequate access to externalassistance. The pro-government militias have deliberately aimedto destroy the food-producing capacity of their non-Arabneighbours, inflicting serious and lasting damage on thelivelihoods base of the local population and their livelihoodsstrategies. Crops and food supplies have been torched andpeople have been systematically stripped of their financial andphysical assets. Access to markets and opportunities for labourmigration (and related remittances) have been curtailed byinsecurity, both within Sudan and between Sudan andneighbouring countries. Journeys to obtain firewood, cultivateland or access markets expose civilians to the risk of murder,rape, looting and forced taxation at checkpoints. The conflict hasalso affected pastoralist groups: livestock has been looted andwells and ground water have been poisoned. Livestock migrationroutes have become increasingly inaccessible and livestocktrade is collapsing throughout the region (Young et al., 2005).

Most landless pastoralists saw in the government counter-insurgency a chance to seize land. The bestowal of secure land

tenure has been a long-standing demand of the nomadictribes in North Darfur, who have never had any entitlement toa dar (homeland). The local government has never been ableto adequately address this issue, and the central governmentin Khartoum has manipulated the predicament of the nomadsand used them to tackle security problems in the region. Manyanalysts believe that the pastoralist groups engaged incounter-insurgency operations have been promised anentitlement to the land of settled farming communities inreturn for their services in the war (de Waal, 2004a, 2004b;Polloni, 2005; Tanner, 2005; Pantuliano, 2005). Internal UNdocuments, interviews with Sudanese academics andanalysts4 and research conducted by NGOs show that thesecondary occupation of land has taken place in western andsouth-western Darfur, where nomadic Arab groups like theMahariya, the Missirya, the Salmat, the Beni Halba and theBeni Hussein have occupied grazing land originally inhabitedby non-Arab sedentary groups such as the Masalit and the Fur(Intersos, 2006). The area around Awalla-Nankuseh, nearGarsila, hosted more than 50,000 non-Arab communitiesbefore the conflict, but is today inhabited by nomadic groupsof Arab origin (ibid.: 12).

4 Interviews in Fasher and Khartoum, June 2006.


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2.1 Insecurity and protection in Darfur

The two main determinants of civilian (in)security in anyviolent conflict are the actions and motives of the parties tothe conflict, and the steps that civilians take to protectthemselves from the direct and indirect consequences of this(Darcy and Srinivasan, forthcoming). If the Sudanesegovernment and the other warring parties were adhering totheir obligations under international law, or if Darfuri civilianswere able to find viable ways of remaining secure in theirhome environments or in a place of refuge, the need for third-party intervention to protect civilians might not arise.Unfortunately, neither of those conditions applies in Darfur.

The conflict in Darfur has been waged in direct contraventionof international law. The International Commission of Inquiry(ICI) – which investigated violations of internationalhumanitarian and human rights law in Darfur in 2004 –established that the Sudanese government and its alliedmilitias were responsible for serious violations of theirresponsibilities under law, and that these violations mayamount to war crimes and crimes against humanity (ICI, 2005:3). The Commission found that government forces and militiashad systematically conducted a lengthy catalogue of horrificcrimes against Darfuris, including targeted and indiscriminateattacks on civilians, murder, torture, destruction of villages,rape and other forms of sexual violence and forceddisplacement. The Commission also reported that theinsurgents had committed serious violations of internationalhuman rights and humanitarian law, indicating that these toomay amount to war crimes. As the majority of insurgentattacks were, at the time, against government installationsand personnel, the ICI found no evidence that violations werewidespread or systematically targeted at civilians (ibid.: 69).However, the conflict has evolved significantly since the ICIinvestigation, as have insurgents’ tactics, which increasinglyinvolve the direct targeting of civilians.5

The second determinant of civilian security – the actions takenby civilians to survive or withstand violence – is often ignored(Bonwick, 2006: 274). Insecurity generally has the effect oflimiting, but not entirely removing, the choices that people canmake to stay safe. Even under extreme duress, a range of self-protection choices are often available to maintain assets,escape violence and mitigate threats. Faced with actual orimminent insecurity, people will tend to adopt risk-avoidancestrategies that may themselves be highly risky. Especially in

situations of active conflict, no safer options may be available(Darcy, 2005).

The main response of those who survived the attacks in Darfurwas to flee. Some travelled short distances, to nearby hills orcaves, where they sheltered from the violence before returningto their villages or moving to the relative safety of Darfur’sthree state capitals (Young et al., 2005: ix). Others walked tonearby villages, only to face attack and flight once again,sometimes up to three or four times before reaching a place ofsanctuary.6 Those with money paid to be transported straightto Khartoum or Darfur’s capitals, or found refuge in the largedisplacement camps on the outskirts of government-controlledtowns. An unknown number of families fled to areas under thecontrol of rebel groups, with reports of population increases ofup to 60% in some rebel-held areas (Buchanan-Smith andJaspars, 2006: 78). Many of these families are divided, withwomen and children seeking the assistance offered in theestimated 230 displacement camps littered across the threestates (OCHA, personal communication, 2006).

Less is known about the degree to which communities havejoined the conflict in an effort to stay safe. There is a high levelof popular backing for the insurgency in Darfur, with manycommunities providing military support. Reports indicate thatthere is also widespread forcible recruitment and abduction bymany of the parties to the conflict. The UN estimates thatthousands of children are actively involved in conflict in Darfur,many of them recruited against their will (United Nations,2006a: 4). In areas under SLA control, communities pay taxes incash or food to support the fighters and pay for protection.Others have sought to contain the violence. One example citedby local Darfuris is the negotiation of ‘independent areas’,secured by community defence forces. In these locations,communities obtain assurances from the warring parties thatthey will not deploy their forces in these areas, thus decreasingtheir military or strategic value. In areas such as Al Fashir, DarAs-Salaam and Umm Kaddada localities in North Darfur,agreement has been obtained from the Wali (the StateGovernor) that no government military or police personnel willdeploy, with corresponding agreement sought fromcommanders within the insurgent groups to avoid these areas.7

Different strategies have been employed in other locations,such as Mahla in North Darfur, where community shaikhs haveencouraged authorities to deploy military or security personnelin order to reduce the risk of attack by pro-government militias.As described below, others have less bargaining power andhave no choice but to pay so-called ‘protection’ money toaggressors to avoid being attacked.

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5 The UN Secretary-General’s Monthly Report on Darfur of 26 September2006 (S/2006/764) reported that SLA-Minawi elements had attackedvillages in North Darfur in July, looting livestock and killing at least 100civilians. These and other clashes resulted in almost 20,000 internallydisplaced persons arriving in North Darfur camps in July.

6 Community Meeting, Mershing, South Darfur, June 2006.7 Interview, Darfuri humanitarian official, Khartoum, June 2006.

Chapter 2The protection crisis


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2.2 Protection concepts and responsibilities

The fundamental objective of protection strategies is toreduce the risk and extent of harm to civilians by seeking tominimise threats of violence, coercion and deprivation, as wellas enhancing opportunities to obtain security. Theachievement of civilian security, or at least a reduction ininsecurity, thus lies at the heart of protection (Darcy andSrinivasan, forthcoming).

To the extent that there is a global framework for the protectionof civilians, it is principally enshrined in IHL, human rights lawand refugee law. The fact that the conduct of warring parties isthe primary determinant of the threats faced by civilians inconflict is reflected in IHL, which is concerned with limiting theeffects of armed conflict on designated categories of protectedpersons and property, chiefly through setting limits on themethods and means of warfare. The protection of civilians,whether understood primarily in physical or legal terms,remains first and foremost the duty of governments, a reflectionof their sovereign authority over, and responsibility for, all thoseliving within their territory. In situations of armed conflict, IHLimposes duties on all the parties to the conflict.

Whereas IHL is concerned to regulate the conduct of warringparties, human rights law has a primary focus on individualsand their general (not conflict-related) entitlements.International law also includes a number of treaties which areintended to prevent and punish specific violations of humanrights in conflict, including torture and genocide. Refugee lawprovides essential safeguards for those fleeing conflict and itseffects, including the provision that such people should not beforcibly returned to their place of origin if doing so wouldjeopardise their safety.

A growing concern for the effects of internal – as opposed tointernational – conflict on civilians has led to increasedinternational awareness of the need to reinforce the protectionof civilians of other countries where governments are incapableor unwilling to do this. International concern for the plight ofcivilians in conflict has, over the past ten years, beenincreasingly recognised in human rights and political arenas.The role of humanitarian actors in ensuring civilian protectionwas, in the past, largely understood as the responsibility ofUNHCR, the ICRC and UNICEF, whose mandates includedupholding the rights of refugees, non-combatants and children.However, the increasing deliberate targeting of civilians inconflict (including by their own government) has led many toconclude that other humanitarian organisations too have a roleto play in civilian protection in light of the fact that, in manycrises, the over-riding threat to civilians is a lack of safety.

The humanitarian community has broadly adopted thefollowing concept of protection, elaborated during a series ofprotection workshops hosted by the ICRC in the 1990s. Thisdefines protection as follows:

all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for therights of the individual in accordance with theletter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law(i.e. human rights law, international humanitarianlaw and refugee law). Human rights andhumanitarian organisations must conduct theseactivities in an impartial manner (not on the basisof race, national or ethnic origin, language orgender) (ICRC, 1999).

Three forms of humanitarian protection activities areenvisaged: responsive action, which prevents or halts a specificpattern of abuse or mitigates its immediate effects; remedialaction, which restores people’s dignity and ensures adequateliving conditions through reparation, restitution andrehabilitation; and finally environment-building, which fostersan environment conducive to respect for the rights ofindividuals in accordance with the relevant bodies of law (GiossiCaverzasio, 2001: 21). These activities should be taken forwardin parallel with other actors (political, military and human rights)as part of what is considered to be a collective responsibility toprotect civilians when the responsible actors fail to do so.

These all-encompassing concepts and activities have oftenconfused humanitarian actors searching for practicalmeasures to help alleviate the suffering of civilians in conflict.Legal frameworks render protection obscure or intimidatingfor some, and the lack of clearly delineated roles andresponsibilities can make the relationship between protectionand other humanitarian activities unclear. Debates continueon the scope of protection as it concerns humanitarian actors.Can all humanitarian programming be termed ‘protective’? Isprotection a new approach to be integrated across allhumanitarian work, or is it a new sector of activity with a set ofattendant programming options? This confusion has made itdifficult to translate protection into practice in complexemergencies such as Darfur.

2.3 Why the ‘protection crisis’?

While the level of insecurity faced by civilians in Darfur isacute, the nature and scale of the violence are not withoutprecedent, either within or outside Sudan. However, the wayin which this situation has been characterised by thehumanitarian community is different: Darfur is the firstemergency to be labelled a ‘protection crisis’. This descriptionis now so widely accepted that even displaced people incamps in Darfur have adopted the term, speaking about theabsence of security as a ‘lack of protection’.8

The emphasis on protection reflects the growing internationalrecognition of a collective responsibility to protect civilianscaught up in conflict. However, it also stems from acoincidence of other factors, which between them ensured

8 Community meeting, Kass, South Darfur, June 2006.


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that protection was central to the international response. Themost significant has been the level and type of violenceexperienced by civilians, including widespread sexual violenceagainst women (Minear, 2005: 88). Comparisons betweenevents in Darfur and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, drawnfirst by the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan,then by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, meant that therole of the international community in protecting civilians inDarfur has been put firmly on the agenda.

2.4 The international response to the ‘protection crisis’

Despite the importance accorded to protection, almost all of thehumanitarian actors in Darfur were late in responding to thecrisis, and slow in scaling up in the face of overwhelming andescalating needs (Minear, 2005: 77). Most arrived after theconflict peaked in 2003 and early 2004, when hundreds ofvillages were burnt to the ground, hundreds of thousands ofpeople were killed or displaced and there was widespread lossof subsistence and large-scale relief needs. Major humanitarianoperations did not get underway until after the governmenteased visa restrictions in May 2004, by which point over onemillion people had fled their homes (see Figure 1).

The timing of the response determined the type of protectionactivity that agencies prioritised, and established a templateof activities that persists today. The severity of the crisis andlimitations in capacity meant that agencies directed their life-saving assistance to areas of high need and populationdensity, where impact could be maximised. The approachinvolved targeting displaced populations squatting in make-shift encampments on the outskirts of Darfur’s capitals andlarge towns, or populations across the border in Chad.Although the agreed strategy was one of ‘protection bypresence’ (see Section 4.3), in practice activities were largely

focused on camp, rather than rural, settings. In protectionterms, this facilitated the (necessary) option of flight forcivilians at risk, but little analysis was undertaken todetermine whether other protection options could besupported, particularly for rural, non-displaced communities.With the number of conflict-displaced civilians continuing toescalate, this pattern has continued.

The implications of Darfur being characterised as a ‘protectioncrisis’ are still playing out today. One of the most obviousoutcomes is the unprecedented number of internationalhumanitarian actors involved in protection programming.Forty-one humanitarian agencies are currently listed in OCHA’squarterly report on humanitarian activities, the DarfurHumanitarian Profile (United Nations, 2006b), as havingprotection programmes; the figure in April 2004 was two.

Three organisations in Darfur have specific protectionmandates under international law: the ICRC, which is involvedin monitoring, training and confidential dialogue with partiesto the conflict to encourage compliance with IHL; UNHCR,which coordinates protection activities in West Darfur, and isactive in returns monitoring and camp coordination; andUNICEF, which is engaged in its traditional child protectionfunctions.9 The Office of the High Commissioner for HumanRights (OHCHR), which since January 2005 has beensubsumed into UNMIS Human Rights, has an agreement withthe government for the deployment of up to 100 human rightsmonitors to investigate and respond to violations in Darfur,and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) leads on issues relating

9 ICRC’s mandate derives from the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 andtheir two Additional Protocols of 1977, the Statutes of the International RedCross and Red Crescent Movement and the resolutions of theInternational Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent; UNHCR’sderives from the Refugee Convention of 1951 and UNICEF’s from theConvention of the Rights of the Child, 1989.

Figure 1: Timeline of the international humanitarian response to the escalating crisis

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8


to sexual and gender-based violence. The InternationalOrganisation for Migration (IOM), like UNHCR, is active inreturns monitoring as well as camp coordination, and UNDPand FAO are involved in issues relating to access to justice andland respectively. The level of penetration of UN agencies intoDarfur was very limited in the early days of the conflict, withmost confining themselves to the state capitals or Khartoum.While the situation has improved a little, very few UNpersonnel are based outside Darfur’s three capitals.

There are over 100 international and national NGOs workingin Darfur, around 30 of which carry out protection activities.Large INGOs with experience in protection undertake arange of stand-alone protection activities, including womenand child protection programming and access to justiceprojects. Many have also mainstreamed protectionapproaches across their relief activities. Working onprotection has resulted in antagonistic relations with theSudanese authorities, and as a result many other agencieshave limited their engagement in protection to lesscontentious programming, such as the provision of fuel-efficient stoves (described in Section 3.2). The crisis inDarfur has also attracted a large number of ‘new entrants’ toprotection, many of whom are engaging in protectionprogramming for the first time (see Section 4.5).

Humanitarian organisations share the protection field with anumber of other actors. The most significant of these is the7,700-strong AMIS. AMIS’s mandate includes the protection ofcivilians ‘whom it encounters under imminent threat and in theimmediate vicinity, within resources and capability’ (AfricanUnion, 2004). This relatively weak mandate, coupled with

inadequate troops and funding, lack of experience, poorlogistics and popular hostility (stemming from the AU’s role asmediator of the DPA) mean that the protection it can provide isvery limited. Furthermore, Darfur is host to the first field-based donor protection officer – an OFDA staff member basedin Nyala – and local diplomatic and donor representativeshave also engaged in initiatives to support the protection ofcivilians, although this activity has decreased during thelifetime of the crisis (see Section 6.5).

At a fundamental level, this proliferation of protection actorshas drawn humanitarian organisations into a highly-chargedand politicised arena. As roles have not been clearly defined orcommunicated, responsibilities and accountabilities havebecome blurred. On a conceptual level, there are concernsthat the emphasis on protection in Darfur has meant a focuson the actions of third parties, rather than the behaviour of thewarring parties and the responses of civilians at risk.Commentators believe that the emphasis on humanitarianactivities has resulted in limited efforts to advance more directpolitical solutions. There are reports of unrealisticexpectations being placed on ‘unarmed humanitarian actors’to prevent abuses in Darfur. From an operational perspective,the scale of humanitarian protection activities, and inparticular of monitoring and reporting, is unparalleled in anyother emergency and is accompanied by a constellation ofdifferent mechanisms to coordinate this work across Darfur.As described later, these developments have in certaininstances helped save lives or at least reduce the level ofthreat for many people. For the most part, however, this hasnot been achieved through obliging the parties to the conflictto meet their responsibilities towards civilians.


9


3.1 The protection ‘egg’ and protection activities

Figure 2 (page 10) shows the ICRC’s ‘egg framework’, whichwas developed in the late 1990s to depict the relationshipbetween patterns of abuse and protection activities(responsive, remedial and environment-building), as well asthe interdependent and complementary nature of theseprotection interventions. The main protection activitiesundertaken in Darfur have been positioned against this ‘egg’in order to illustrate the breadth and focus of activities.

According to this framework, responsive action involves anyactivity undertaken in order to prevent abuse resulting fromviolence, coercion or forced deprivation, or alleviate itsimmediate effects. These activities are carried out when abuseis threatened or in its immediate aftermath to try to mitigatetheir effects on civilians. Activities are urgent, and are aimed atreaching a particular population suffering the immediate effectsof a violation (Slim and Bonwick, 2004: 43). Action is alsointended to pressure the relevant authorities, either throughdialogue or public disclosure, into taking measures to stop theabuse and prevent its recurrence (ICRC, 2004). Examples ofresponsive action include: 1) providing direct services to victimsof abuse by being present in affected areas, transferring orevacuating people out of affected areas and providinginformation and communications (e.g. assisting familymembers to contact each other); and 2) alleviating victims’immediate suffering through the provision of emergencymaterial, medical assistance and psychosocial care (ibid.).

Remedial action focuses on assisting and supporting peoplewhile they live with the effects of abuse. These activities areaimed at ensuring adequate living conditions subsequent toviolence through rehabilitation, restitution, compensation andrepair. These actions can be similar to responsive activities butare longer-term, and are concerned with helping people torecover and restore their dignity. Examples of remedial actioninclude: 1) providing direct services to victims of abuse by beingpresent in affected areas, helping to bring about repatriation,resettlement, integration or final arrangements andestablishing systems to track down missing persons and reunitefamilies; and 2) providing appropriate material, medical andpsychosocial assistance or care, promoting justice for victimsand due process for perpetrators and supporting and protectingorganisations working to defend rights (ibid.).

The third sphere of protection activity is environment-building.This relates to fostering an environment conducive to respectfor the individual’s rights. It is concerned with moving society as

a whole towards political, social, cultural and institutionalnorms that prevent or limit violations and abuse. Examples ofenvironment-building action include promoting knowledge andrespect for human rights and humanitarian principles,supporting the drafting and adoption of treaties, assisting in theimplementation of international law at national levels and in thedevelopment of a fair system of justice and helping to developand establish such organisations at national and internationallevels, capable of enhancing respect for human rights andinternational law (ibid.).

As might be expected in a conflict involving such a high level ofcivilian insecurity, protection activities have been undertakenacross these three areas. Many, such as IHL dissemination,reporting and persuasion, are difficult to categorise as they fallunder the three different spheres of action, illustrating theextent to which protection activities are interdependent.However, as the conflict is ongoing, the focus has been onresponsive and, to a lesser extent, remedial actions, in an effortto prevent violence and mitigate its effects on civilians.Environment-building activities do not feature as prominently inthe current response, reflecting the limited potential of suchactivities during the height of a crisis as well as the difficultiesin implementation when the primary duty-bearer, the Sudanesegovernment, is a party to the conflict. As Figure 2 indicates,ongoing analysis which examines the evolving behaviour ofwarring parties, trends and patterns in civilian insecurity anddifferent opportunities to support the protection of civilians iscentral to an effective protection response. Unfortunately, suchanalysis and understanding were often lacking amongsthumanitarian actors working in Darfur (see Section 4.1).

3.2 Responsive activities in Darfur

Both mandated and non-mandated humanitarian agencies havetried to put pressure on the parties to the conflict to prevent orreduce the level of violence inflicted on civilians. The ICRC inparticular engages directly with the warring parties toencourage adherence to the rules of war through IHLdissemination, monitoring and education. Given the impact ofthe conflict on civilians, monitoring IHL compliance andconfidential dialogue with the relevant parties to indicate wherebreaches have occurred and to encourage action to limit theirrecurrence has been an area of intensive activity. Other actors,such as UNMIS Human Rights, UN agencies and some INGOs,have also undertaken ‘responsive’ action, for example byadvocating directly with the government to rein in the militias,or working with the warring parties at a local level to encouragethe release of children associated with the fighting forces. This

Chapter 3Protection in practice in Darfur


10

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11


work has been complicated by the fact that the number, profileand political allegiance of the warring parties have changedsubstantially during the conflict. Combatant parties have alsodemonstrated differing levels of interest in IHL, and as a resultlevels of interaction have not been uniform.

‘Protection by presence’ was accepted by the UN in 2004 asthe concept underlying all protection-related activities byhumanitarian organisations in Darfur. The thinking behind thisis that humanitarian actors, by their very presence, may havea deterrent effect on the behaviour of belligerents towardsendangered communities. Fourteen thousand aid workerspoured into Darfur when humanitarian access was granted,but the protective benefit of their presence has beenquestionable (see Section 4.3).

One disappointing characteristic of the protection response inDarfur has been the limited emphasis on understanding andsupporting community self-protection strategies. One exampleof working with communities has been the arrangement ofpatrols to protect women from sexual violence and abduction bymilitia while searching for firewood around camps.Humanitarian agencies have collaborated with AMIS toorganise weekly or bi-weekly firewood patrols from the majorcamps. For the individuals involved, these patrols had asignificant protective effect, but they were only carried out in alimited number of camps and were not consistently undertaken.

Another attempt to reduce the risk of sexual violence womenface has been the provision of fuel-efficient stoves. Fashionedfrom clay and water, these stoves cut down on firewood usageby up to 40%, thereby reducing the frequency with whichwomen have to travel outside the relative safety of camps insearch of fuel. Although such stoves had been introduced withgreat success elsewhere in Sudan and in northern Kenya,humanitarian organisations spent over a year debatingwhether they would be appropriate in Darfur on the groundsthat women who supported themselves by selling firewoodwould lose income – arguably a secondary consideration setagainst the risk of rape, and one that could have beenaddressed through complementary income generation. Whenthe concept was finally adopted, further time was lostselecting the stove model. Today, nearly every NGO engaged inprotection runs fuel-efficiency programmes, though concernshave been raised over the level of coverage of theseprogrammes, with complaints that communities in largercamps such as Abu Shouk are receiving repeat attention,while many others have not been targeted at all.

Other methods to prevent or reduce threats have been moreindirect, with humanitarian actors mobilising third parties totake action. While AMIS offers the most potential to intervenedirectly to help protect civilians, its restricted capacity andlimited coordination with humanitarian actors have reducedthe scope for complementary action. Nonetheless, somesuccesses have been reported. At times, humanitarian

agencies have passed on information about impendingattacks, enabling AMIS to undertake ‘preventive’ patrols.

One of the predominant features of the response to the Darfurcrisis has been the level of advocacy undertaken byhumanitarian actors to draw attention to the crisis, facilitatehumanitarian access and encourage action to protect civilians.Work has been done at local, national and international levels,with humanitarian agencies mobilising influential actors toput pressure on the parties to the conflict. This advocacy,which is described in more detail in Section 5.1, has attracteda great deal of attention to the Darfur crisis, and has resultedin some significant achievements, not least the deployment ofAMIS troops and the referral of the Darfur situation to theInternational Criminal Court (ICC).

For humanitarian agencies to act directly or indirectly toprevent or reduce violence, in-depth knowledge is required ofthe risks that communities face. Evidence is also needed tosupport local, national or international advocacy efforts. Thelevel of advocacy in Darfur has in turn created a significant

Box 2: Protection in action: lifting the siege of Kailek

In late February and March 2004, villages in Shattaya andHamiya in South Darfur were attacked by pro-governmentmilitias, with reports of between 11,000 and 13,000 peoplefleeing to Kailek, a larger town in the area (United Nations,2004). These people, along with the resident population ofKailek, were virtually imprisoned in what remained of thedestroyed town. Reports indicated that about 1,700 peoplewere trapped in Kailek for up to 50 days, during which timethey were subjected to abuse including the summaryexecution and torture of men, the repeated rape of womenand girls and deliberate deprivation of food (ICI, 2005: 75).

A CARE International emergency assessment team visitedKailek on 4 April 2004, and reported the abuse to the UN.Weeks passed before the local authorities granted a UNinter-agency mission permission to visit. The UN report onthe visit accused the government of deliberately misleadingthe UN as to conditions in the town, and charged it with a‘strategy of systematic and deliberate starvation’ against thepeople trapped there (United Nations, 2004).

On 28 and 29 April, shortly after the mission’s visit and thehigh level of pressure on the government of Sudan thatensued, the government moved 1,000 people to Kass campin South Darfur. Others were reportedly taken there by reliefagencies (Human Rights Watch, 2005b: 15). Many are stillthere, and while conditions may not be ideal, the camp hasoffered a measure of sanctuary and assistance. Thepresence, however transitory, of humanitarian workers inKailek and the advocacy that resulted from their reportssucceeded in saving lives and certainly alleviated the terriblesuffering of the people held there.


demand for and emphasis on data collection and monitoringviolations. An unprecedented number of protection officersare involved in this work. Some of the more experiencedprotection NGOs have developed networks among thedisplaced population to provide details of threats andincidents.

Another important aspect of the protection response in Darfurhas been its emphasis on dealing with the aftermath of abuse,and efforts to mitigate its impact on civilians. Arguably, thisreflects the limited capacity of humanitarian actors to directlyprevent or reduce insecurity during active conflict. While therehas been a large amount of mitigation work under the‘remedial’ sphere, the most tangible ‘responsive’ activity hasrelated to post-rape assistance, an area where medicalagencies have been very active. In some camps, referralmechanisms have been developed between different actors toensure that survivors have swift access to services.

Advocacy has been successfully undertaken to removelegislative obstacles to assistance for rape survivors. UnderArticle 48 of Sudan’s Criminal Code, rape victims were obligedto report the incident to the police in a ‘Form Eight’ reportbefore they could receive medical treatment. This was a majorbarrier to treatment as victims frequently did not trust theauthorities, and rapes were generally not reported (a factwhich the authorities used to substantiate their position thatclaims of sexual violence were fabricated). Sudanese medicalstaff were also concerned about retaliation from theauthorities, including harassment, intimidation and evenprosecution, if they did not comply (Human Rights Watch,2005a). Advocacy by UNICEF, the UNFPA, UNDP and the IRC,with support from local diplomatic representatives, led to thereporting requirement being removed. While poorcommunication of this change in policy by the Ministry of

Health has limited its effect, in areas where people areinformed it has allowed medical staff to treat survivorswithout fear of repercussions from the authorities.

Child protection programmes have also featured in the Darfurresponse, but to a lesser degree than SGBV programming.Camp-based activities have included direct support toabandoned ‘rape babies’, and education activities on thisissue. ICRC has also been active in family tracing, which can beviewed as both a responsive and a remedial activity as it spansshort- and medium-term programmes. While the number ofunaccompanied minors is low relative to the scale of theviolence, thanks to strong kinship ties within communities,significant resources have been invested in this area.

Similarly, monitoring the conditions of detention andtreatment of detainees is both a responsive and a remedialaction, in that it is critical to the prevention of‘disappearances’ and also helps people live with the effects ofconflict. This too has been an area of intense activity by theICRC and by UNMIS Human Rights.

3.3 Remedial action

Examples of remedial action in Darfur include advocacy,dialogue and persuasion, either directly with belligerents orindirectly through third parties. The aim has been to ensureconsistent humanitarian access to war-affected populations,and to prevent efforts to deprive civilians of their rights. During2004, the government repeatedly sought to forcibly movedisplaced people, in contravention of IHL. These efforts, whichoccurred for example in Otash, Al Geer and Kalma camps in

12


Box 3: Information uncertainties in protection

In early 2005, OCHA launched a ‘protection database’ tohouse information on protection incidents in Darfur. The aimwas to develop an accurate picture of violations and abuse inDarfur in order to inform analysis, advocacy andprogramming. Despite specific requests for this service, andthe months of work involved in setting up the system, thedatabase was soon abandoned because of lack of use.Humanitarian organisations were concerned about thepotential risk to themselves and to the victims of abuses inthe event of breaches of confidentiality. In the absence of acentralised system, agencies developed different methodsand models for collecting and sharing information, but theseare ad hoc and unsystematic. The failure to agree on acommon model exposes a lack of consensus withinhumanitarian organisations on their role in witnessing andreporting on violations, and points to a need for greaterdiscussion on the potential of different models in futureprotection crises.

Box 4: The LOU and MOU: preventing involuntary

return and relocation

Following the signature of the N’Djamena agreement in April2004, the government exerted increasing pressure ondisplaced people to return to their land for the plantingseason, in some cases using intimidation, harassment andforce. In response, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)was signed in August 2004 by the IOM, the government andthe UN. This set out a policy and procedures for thevoluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return andreintegration of IDPs. Subsequently, a similar Letter ofUnderstanding (LoU) was entered into by the governmentand UNHCR. These agreements also put in place aManagement and Coordination Mechanism (MCM) tomonitor and verify whether movement adhered to thesearrangements. The MoU and LoU were significant protectionachievements: only a handful of isolated cases of forcedmovement were recorded following their signature. Manybelieve that it was the combination of an agreed mechanismaround which to engage, as well as the involvement of localofficials in developing and implementing it, which were thekey to success in this area.


South Darfur, were frequently accompanied by force. OCHAdrew up principles on relocation, engaging with the localauthorities to encourage compliance and using advocacy toapply further pressure on the authorities to end this practice.

Much work has been done to help conflict-affected people inDarfur deal with the effects of violence. Child protectionprogrammes provide targeted medical, psychosocial andother forms of support to those most at risk. According toUNICEF, 431 ‘child friendly spaces’ have been created inDarfur’s camps, serving around 155,000 children. Theseprogrammes provide learning, recreational and otheractivities for pre-school children and young people. Similarly,women’s centres have been established in many campsacross Darfur where social and recreational assistance isavailable. These centres provide a supportive environmentwhere women can interact with each other, and attendclasses in literacy, nutrition, income generation, health andhygiene. They operate as an effective entry point forengagement with women, many of whom have sufferedsexual or other forms of violence. Medical, legal andpsychosocial referral is also available in many centres.

Rule of law programmes constitute one of the moreinnovative areas of work in Darfur. These initiatives train localactors on human rights and international law, establishcommunity-based paralegal networks and informationcentres and support access to legal aid for war-affectedcommunities. This emphasis on rule of law is unusual duringactive conflict, and there has been significant opposition fromthe local authorities, which have closed down centres in somelocations. Nonetheless, a number of cases have been broughtto court, including the successful conviction of a militaryofficer for rape.

In addition to this ‘stand-alone’ protection programming, manyhumanitarian agencies are also ‘mainstreaming’ protection intheir humanitarian interventions. ‘Mainstreaming’, ‘protection-oriented programming’ or ‘applying a protection lens’ involvesintegrating protection analysis and approaches into the designand implementation of assistance programmes. Humanitarianinterventions are framed in such a way that they maximise thepositive protection benefits that might accrue from assistance,and mitigate or prevent any related harm. Examples in Darfurinclude providing additional water points (beyond therequirements of the SPHERE standards) in key locations, tolessen potential conflict between opposing groups, andchoosing to work in rural areas to reduce the need for residentpopulations to move to access assistance. The challengesassociated with this form of protection programming aredescribed in Section 4.4.

3.4 Environment-building

A number of different initiatives are underway in Darfur tobuild a more protective environment for civilians. Training on

human rights and international humanitarian law has beenconducted with government officials and members of theinsurgent groups; UNDP and its partners, for instance,trained over 6,000 people in a 12-month period in 2005. Whilethese efforts are not having a significant impact on levels ofviolence, reports suggest that some individuals havechanged their behaviour as a result of the training. Work isongoing with displaced communities to foster a greaterunderstanding of rights and to develop or reinforce socialmechanisms which allow rights to be recognised, such as theincreased involvement of women in decision-making.Humanitarian actors have established or strengthenedwomen’s committees which are consulted in relation toissues regarding food distribution and sexual violence.Humanitarian agencies in Darfur are also implementingprogrammes aimed at building the knowledge and capacity ofnational organisations to undertake work in support ofhuman rights and international law. One concern in thisregard is that international organisations do not have thecapacity to protect local organisations from the heightenedthreats they face as a result of their increased involvement inprotection work.

At a policy level, the ICRC, UNICEF, UNMIS Human Rights andothers work to provide training, capacity-building and supportto build knowledge on rights and develop policies andinstitutions, where they are recognised. The ICRC is alsoworking with the Sudanese National Commission forIncorporation of IHL, which was established in 2003, and offerstechnical advice on drafting national IHL-related legislation.

13


Box 5: Mainstreaming protection in camp

coordination

Violence in one of Darfur’s largest IDP camps significantlyincreased in June 2006. Men on horseback were entering thecamp at nightfall, firing gunshots and terrorising and injuringcamp residents. The men, camel herders from a local village,were reportedly operating as government-aligned militia. Aninternational NGO, which had developed a large network ofprotection officers within the camp, established that theincursions were intended to retrieve camels stolen byresidents. With camel meat in short supply and prices high,butchers in the camp’s market were no longer insisting onseeing people’s papers before selling meat. Some campresidents used this as an opportunity to sell meat fromcamels stolen from Arab pastoralists. The NGO called ameeting with the butchers who – in an environment of suchconstrained means – had become powerful figures. Theyforcefully rejected the idea that they had any role inproviding for the security of the camp, but later acceptedtheir share of responsibility in the violence and agreed to bemore vigilant in asking for papers. The NGO’s in-depthknowledge of the camp, coupled with protection-orientedcamp coordination and supported by appropriate analysis ofrisks, meant that a significant security threat was mitigated.


14



15


4.1 Lack of strategy and inadequate analysis

The difference in focus amongst the various protection initiativesundertaken by humanitarian agencies in Darfur reflects not onlythe scale of the crisis, but also the lack of a clear, sharedprotection strategy. The inter-agency Real Time Evaluation (RTE)of the humanitarian response highlighted the fact that, althoughmajor efforts were (belatedly) made to develop a protectionstrategy in late 2004, there was ‘a lack of UN leadership andexpertise on this issue’ (Broughton et al., 2006: 5). Senior UNstaff in Khartoum recounted how, at the outset of the crisis,agencies vied amongst themselves to define roles andresponsibilities around protection. Three different system-wideprotection strategies were drafted between 2004 and 2006, butnone has been translated into collective action. Agencypersonnel interviewed for this study complained that thesestrategies were drafted without the adequate involvement offield staff. More importantly, they have failed to prioritise andsequence the most urgent protection concerns, focusing insteadon specifying roles and responsibilities. State-level strategiesagreed in the field through Protection Working Groups (seeSection 6.3) were more effective and better informed.

The absence of a common protection strategy has partlystemmed from insufficient analysis of the threats civilians face,and of the political economy of the conflict. While a phenomenalamount of data has been collected, the emphasis ofhumanitarian actors has been on collating incident reports,rather than on political, social and livelihoods analysis. Onedonor representative commented that, ICRC aside, there was noactor on the ground during the earlier stages of the emergencywith the capacity and expertise to adequately analyse protectionissues. The human rights and political analysis undertaken byUNMIS since 2005 has not been adequately shared with thehumanitarian community. The absence of in-depth analysis is notuncommon in the early stages of an emergency response.However, despite continued urging by the RTE and others,humanitarian agencies in Darfur have only recently begun toinvest in the requisite analysis in the form of the Inter-AgencyManagement Groups (IAMGs), state-level bodies set up toundertake research, analysis and priority-setting. Theresponsibilities of the IAMGs do not, though, include dedicatedprotection analysis relating to the levels of risk and threat facingcivilians.

The lack of informed analysis, and in particular the inadequateunderstanding of the interrelations between nomadic, trans-humant and sedentary groups, was recognised by the RTE to be‘the single biggest impediment to informed planning and effec-tive action in Darfur’ (Broughton et al., 2006: 7). Sudaneseacademics interviewed for this study commented that most

humanitarian agencies knew effectively nothing about Darfurand its socio-economic dynamics. Although they recognised thedifficulty of gaining such an understanding at the height of anemergency, they also felt that expatriate managers had madevery little effort to involve national staff and Sudanese academ-ics in analysis of the context and in the design of the response.

Inadequate situation analysis and the absence of a commonprotection framework have reportedly led agencies, whether

Chapter 4The challenges of protection programming

Box 6: Undermining protection: deadly ‘safe areas’ in

Darfur

On 5 August 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s SpecialRepresentative to Sudan (SRSG) signed a Plan of Action withthe Sudanese Foreign Minister, establishing seven ‘safeareas’ across Darfur. The government pledged to providesecurity in these areas through the deployment of armedforces and police. The Plan of Action also stated that theSudanese government ‘would provide secure routes to andbetween these areas’.

The Plan of Action was, however, signed without consultingthe AU, the SLA or the JEM (African Union, 2004a: 2). It alsocontradicted the security arrangements of the N’Djamenaagreement reached earlier in the year. Rather than increasingsafety for civilians, the Plan of Action sparked new violencebetween the government and the SLA. The designated safezones overlapped with SLA-held areas in North Darfur, thusarguably entitling the government to break the ceasefire andreclaim territory from the SLA in order to honour itscommitment to the plan. Government forces were drafted intothe areas as part of a so-called ‘road clearance exercise’ aimedat consolidating and expanding areas under governmentcontrol. Air attacks on Hashaba and Gallab villages, forexample, which resulted in civilian deaths and displacement,were found by the AU Ceasefire Commission to be directlylinked to the implementation of the Plan of Action (ibid.). Theinsurgents counter-attacked in many areas, resulting in freshceasefire violations which were seen as a major factor in thefailure of the first round of peace talks in Abuja (ICG, 2005: 7).The UN sought government commitments that it would notdeploy forces in rebel territory, but very quickly the entirepolicy was abandoned. As a bilateral agreement with thegovernment, the Plan of Action ignored the stipulations of IHL,which state that such arrangements can only be undertakenwith the consent of all warring parties. It also revealed anacute lack of understanding of the Sudanese context. A widelycriticised policy of ‘peace villages’ had been employed in themid-1990s in South Kordofan, which had been used to keepdisplaced populations in government-controlled camps(APGfS, 2004: 63).


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consciously or not, to collect information selectively,predetermine protection issues and prioritise needs on thebasis of their own capacity to address them. Whilst some inter-agency assessments have been conducted, these have tendedto be mono-sectoral and have often lacked a protectiondimension. Protection issues were given some considerationduring assessments, but reports generally lacked practicalsuggestions for action. Even UNICEF, a mandated agency, didnot carry out a specific situation analysis until December 2005.

4.2 The ‘explosion of substitution’?

As discussed in Section 2.2, the Sudanese government has theprimary responsibility for the safety and protection of itscivilians. However, the role played by the government in theconflict and its involvement in attacks on civilians has made itdifficult for humanitarian organisations to engage with thegovernment around civilian safety and risk, especially as it wasfelt that this would compromise the neutrality of theseorganisations. At the same time, the deployment of AU forces toDarfur created the (false) expectation that AMIS would take overfull responsibility for the protection of civilians. This has led tothe widespread perception that the failure to protect civilians inDarfur is the fault of the AU, rather than the Sudanesegovernment. The focus on AMIS, itself poorly mandated andinadequately resourced, reduced political pressure on thegovernment to improve its protection actions, above all byrestraining militia attacks on the civilian population. It has alsoled humanitarian actors – with the exception of the ICRC – toscale down their efforts to work alongside the government andthe armed forces to assist them to fulfil their obligations underIHL. As one informant remarked, efforts to responsibilise theauthorities were replaced by ‘an explosion of substitution’. Inother words, international actors have worked on theassumption that third parties could substitute for the protectiverole of national duty-bearers.

Whilst humanitarian agencies and other actors have sought toeducate the government about its protective responsibilitiesthrough training, capacity-building, reporting, persuasion,denunciation and other means, there has been a reluctance towork with the government on joint initiatives. The involvementof government officials from the Humanitarian Aid Commission(HAC) and other relevant bodies in coordination structures suchas the state-level Protection Working Groups and the KhartoumProtection Steering Groups, for example, was strongly opposedby the majority of the INGOs participating in such mechanisms.In turn, this has given rise to deep suspicions in governmentcircles of agencies’ protection work, and protection staff areperceived as pursuing a political agenda aimed at underminingthe government’s authority. By contrast, all the governmentofficials interviewed for this study praised the ICRC for dealingwith the government in a ‘transparent’ and ‘constructive’manner. Through sustained interaction, ICRC delegates had‘managed to reach consensus’ with the government authoritieson several issues related to the protection of civilians. While the

involvement of political actors in the co-ordination groups maynot be desirable, there are creative ways around the problem. InLiberia, for instance, two separate Protection Groups wereestablished, one public, the other more private.

Problems in the relationship between agencies and thegovernment have been particularly acute in IDP camps, wherehumanitarian organisations felt that working in closecollaboration with the government would have put their staff atsignificant risk, given the level of anger of IDPs against thegovernment. At the same time, however, this has madecollaboration on less contentious technical issues more difficult.Long-standing partners such as the Ministry of Social Affairswere kept out of the development of the response, and onlyrecently have agencies started to re-engage with governmentsocial workers and other partners in technical ministries. Thisbreakdown in relations with the government has extended to keyissues such as camp coordination. In many areas, the UN hasoutsourced camp management to international NGOs, such asthe Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Kalma and theInternational Rescue Committee (IRC) in Kass. Some 30 NGOsare involved in camp coordination. Agreements have been drawnup between OCHA and the NGOs concerned, excluding the HACand other government counterparts, which strictly speaking areresponsible for assisting and protecting IDPs, including in thecamps. As a result, any action undertaken by NGO campcoordinators relating to IDP protection puts them in jeopardy.

Although the anxiety felt by many humanitarian organisations isunderstandable, it is important to emphasise that thegovernment is not uniform in its approach to the Darfur crisis,and that a nuanced evaluation of potential ‘reformers’ withingovernment, both at the central and local levels, would havehelped to identify possible partnerships to promote moresustainable protective strategies (Mahony, 2006: 50). On someoccasions, where engagement with certain governmentauthorities has been sought, practical results were obtained. TheMoU/LoU on voluntary returns, described in Box 4, is one suchexample. Other examples have, however, been less successful.The State Committee for Combating Sexual Violence in Darfur,for example, was set up in early 2005, but many consider it atbest an empty gesture, at worst a mechanism deliberatelydesigned to restrict humanitarian activities in this area.

As this experience shows, engaging with the authorities onsensitive issues is difficult and not always fruitful, thoughcollaboration on less contentious questions such as returns ispossible and can be useful. Where opportunities exist to createmore effective partnerships with the government and otherduty-bearers, it is important that these are built uponconstructively. It should be recognised that the impact of theseinitiatives will often be limited, as they will not be able tochange fundamentally negative policy environments. At thesame time, however, substitution is not sustainable. While itmay be necessary in the emergency phase, ultimately the safetyand protection of civilians is in the hands of their government.


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4.3 Protection by presence: myth or reality?

Many organisations and donors are of the view that the simplepresence of humanitarian organisations on the ground hasprotective benefits for the local civilian population. Whilst thepresence of international organisations can add a layer ofprotection, the extent to which this is an effective andadvisable strategy must be analysed on the basis of recentexperience in Darfur. As discussed earlier, the paradigm of‘protection by presence’ was accepted by the UN as theunderlying concept of all humanitarian protection-relatedactivities in Darfur. However, no strategy was developed andlittle analysis was carried out to ascertain the protectivepotential of this approach.

International presence can have a protective impact bydeterring belligerents, inspiring confidence in communitiesand attracting global attention to a crisis (Mahony et al., 2005:20). It is felt to be particularly effective when it involvesexpatriate staff. In West and North Darfur, agencies reportedthat harassment of civilians had decreased, freedom ofmovement had increased and there was a heightened sense ofsafety among local communities. These gains appeared to bemore widespread in areas where agencies had been presentfor a long time, with a substantial number of expatriate staff.Specific examples included Orakuma, in Wadi Salih, whereapparent decreases in the rate of sexual violence and areduction in payments of protection money were linked to thepresence of expatriate humanitarian personnel. The increasein the number of international staff in Mukjar was also said tohave been accompanied by a corresponding decline insecurity incidents in the area. Unsurprisingly, it appears thatpresence is likely to have greater potential value in areaswhich are not of strategic or military priority to belligerents.One case in point is Gereida, where the presence of the ICRCand some INGOs, in addition to active dialogue with pro-government militias, is thought to have deterred attacks.However, following the renewed violence which hasaccompanied the signing of the DPA, Gereida has been the siteof intense fighting with severe consequences for the civilianpopulation, despite the presence of the ICRC and otherinternational agencies. This underlines how difficult it can beto quantify protection benefits and demonstrate a causal linkbetween civilian security and the presence of expatriate staff.

Whilst protection by presence may deliver a benefit in certaincircumstances, it is difficult to establish whether thisconstitutes deterrence, or whether the threat is simply delayedor deferred to a different area. The degree of protection affordedis, obviously, limited to periods when humanitarian staff arepresent, which in the context of Darfur can often be quitecircumscribed. As Sudanese interviewees commented,international organisations tend to restrict their presence tosafer areas and avoid areas where there is active violence.Almost one-third of South Darfur has been declared a no-goarea by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS),

and agencies tend to concentrate in IDP camps or in large urbancentres. Representatives of IDP communities consulted in SouthDarfur observed that agencies quickly remove their expatriatestaff in response to increases in the level of violence. Evenwhere agencies are present, this presence is often limited todaylight hours, with any corresponding protection similarlylimited. Nor can humanitarian workers protect civilians whenarmed groups are perpetrating violence against them and theyshould not be put in a position where their security iscompromised (Broughton et al., 2006: 16). The risk to aidpersonnel is very real in Darfur: in the summer of 2006, 12humanitarian workers were killed, often in deliberate attacks onhumanitarian organisations or convoys.

The emphasis on the protective impact of humanitarianpersonnel through their mere presence in a given area cancreate a false feeling of security in the local civilian community,which may actually make them more vulnerable to violence andthreats. The strategy also risks transferring responsibility fromthe Sudanese government to humanitarians. There is equally adanger of creating a false impression that the internationalcommunity is fulfilling its responsibilities towards the people ofDarfur by deploying young protection officers, a fact that wasreinforced by comments of many donors in Khartoum who feltthat there was pressure from their domestic constituencies tobe seen to be ‘doing something’ in Darfur.

4.4 Protection and assistance: the difficulties ofmainstreaming protection

‘Protection mainstreaming’ is the expression used to describethe integration of protection principles and concerns intoassistance programmes. Humanitarian interventions focusedon assisting people to meet basic needs, such as food, shelteror primary healthcare, may help mitigate or prevent harm tocivilians related to the induced deprivation which oftenaccompanies conflict. However, the delivery of assistance doesnot necessarily have a protective benefit unless carefulconsideration is given to analysing threats, risks, communityassets, livelihoods strategies and other elements in thedevelopment of adequate protection policies and strategies.This means that, for assistance to be protection-sensitive,protection considerations must be purposely integrated into thedesign and implementation of assistance programmes from theoutset (Interaction, 2004: 8). Protection can thus be considered‘as much an orientation and a way of approaching one’shumanitarian work as it is a set of particular activities’ (ibid.: 4).

In Darfur, the ICRC and NGOs with more experience inprotection have prioritised protection in their delivery ofhumanitarian assistance. This approach has determined howand where they work, resulting for instance in the targeting ofremote rural areas to reduce the flow of people to camps, orgreater engagement with Arab pastoralist groups to reduceperceptions of bias. For humanitarian actors new to protectiondiscourse, using a ‘protection lens’ in their assistance


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programmes in Darfur has proved challenging. Many non-protection staff and managers interviewed admitted to beingat a loss about how to translate protection into action, andknowing what their responsibilities should be. One CAREevaluation, for instance, noted considerable uncertaintywithin the organisation about how to develop or implement aprotection strategy, and how to assess the risks associatedwith engaging in protection work (Minear, 2005: 89). Someagencies complained about the lack of practical guidelinesand manuals on protection programming.

The difficulties around the practical application of protectionin Darfur have meant that many agencies have been reluctantto allow protection officers and advisors to interact with otherdepartments and inform programming. There is a belief thatprotection programming is political, and that doing it wouldjeopardise the work of the agency. Agencies and individualshave been threatened, and fears of repercussions on the widerassistance programme have led some agencies to reject theidea of integrating protection into programming in order toavoid conflict with the authorities. As a result, rather thanbeing integrated into the country programme asmainstreaming requires, protection officers have often beenisolated and marginalised, and have ended up focusing ondata collection and reporting. Many people in organisationsnew to protection programming have been deployed withunclear ToRs and an ambiguous scope of work. Somehumanitarian workers, particularly national staff, have evencome to perceive protection officers as spies, especially whereagencies have been less open and clear about the role theseofficers were meant to perform. In other instances, sectoralstaff have felt that trying to integrate protection andassistance is too time-consuming. At the other end of thespectrum, there is a perception among some donors that anumber of agencies, particularly INGOs, have placed too muchfocus on protection, particularly advocacy and reporting, tothe detriment of their assistance programming.

The difficulty of mainstreaming protection into assistancesuggests a clear need to enhance understanding of what theconcept means, and its application in practice amonghumanitarian staff. A range of actions are needed to strengtheninternal agency capacity to engage in more meaningfulprotection-sensitive programming. These actions includecareful consideration of attitudes and competences during staffrecruitment, training for specialists and non-specialists andgreater institutional support. Managerial backing is particularlyimportant to ensure that protection concerns inform needsassessments and assistance strategies, and that monitoringand evaluation systems are able to assess the multi-sectoralintegration of protection issues.

4.5 Problems of skill and expertise

Mobilising enough experienced personnel has remained asignificant hindrance to the expansion of protection

programming throughout the Darfur crisis. Very few agenciesand organisations have been able to recruit appropriatecapacity in a timely manner. Constant staff turnover hasresulted in communications gaps and poor institutionalmemory. Whilst staffing issues have been a general problemfor the wider response, they appear to have been particularlychallenging for protection programming, an emerging fieldwhere identifying and recruiting qualified protectionpersonnel is already difficult. Many of the protection staffdeployed in Darfur, particularly by organisations new toprotection programming, have been junior officers, when thesensitivity and complexity of the situation demanded staffwith a greater understanding of the normative frameworksbehind protection, and with previous experience of designingand implementing protection initiatives. Even UN-mandatedagencies have admitted finding it difficult to recruit qualifiedand experienced protection staff willing to serve in Darfur.These new and invariably junior officers have been offeredlittle institutional support and even less appropriate inductionor training, particularly by new protection actors. Somemedical NGOs have been more successful than organisationswith a multi-sectoral focus in training their protectionpersonnel and helping them integrate their work withinongoing programmes. Medical agencies have long been facedwith protection concerns relating to sexual violence, and soprotection personnel typically have clear roles in terms ofensuring appropriate treatment and support, monitoringcases and referral to other actors where necessary.

There is a general perception that some organisations havebeen re-fashioning their traditional assistance programmes inprotection language because they have detected thatprotection is a new funding fashion. Others have addedprotection elements to their programmes without a clearsense of direction or desired outcomes, often ending upfocusing on monitoring and reporting violations. Mandatedactors feel that the confrontational style adopted by some ofthe new organisations in raising protection issues has made itgenerally more difficult to operate in Darfur since theirantagonism to the government has made the authorities morereluctant to acknowledge and discuss protection issues.These actors are also worried about the lack of knowledge ofnormative frameworks by the new protection personnel andby their misinformed references to IHL, the ICC and humanrights law in meetings with the authorities.

The most important concern raised by the mandated actorshas been the overload of reporting to the authorities aboutspecific incidents. They point out that government authoritiespresently receive up to five different reports about violations(from the ICRC, the AU, UNMIS Human Rights, UNMISProtection (including the Child Protection Unit) and,depending on the violation, OCHA or an INGO in charge ofcamp coordination). Arguably, this proliferation of reportinghas provided the authorities with a justification toprogressively ignore reports. Furthermore, the fact that these


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reports are often based on individual testimony means that, insome cases, victims may be interviewed by an array ofdifferent actors, raising concerns about confidentiality and therisk that repeated questioning may increase trauma and leavevictims bewildered. There is a general perception that multipleactors are gathering the same information, and that in mostcases this process is unfocused and lacks a clear sense ofpurpose (Henry, 2006:17).

The inexperience of the new protection actors has translatedinto a lack of appreciation of indigenous protection responses,and an associated failure to build on them. Civilians haverarely been involved in the development of protectionresponses, often including those developed by mandatedagencies, and there have been very limited attempts tosupport indigenous protection strategies such as thosedescribed in Section 2.1. Engagement with Sudaneseacademics and civil society has been very limited, bothbecause of the constraints imposed by their limited capacityand their vulnerability particularly when based in Darfur, butalso because many of the new protection actors haveaddressed the crisis with a focus on external protectivecapacities, rather than those of civilians themselves, or otherSudanese. Senior national staff who have been operating inDarfur with international organisations for over a decadespoke of being sidelined in internal discussions on protectionand reporting, especially in the early stages of the crisis.

4.6 Protection in camps

Most of the humanitarian agencies in Darfur, with the notableexceptions of the ICRC, WFP and NGOs such as MSF Hollandand France, Oxfam GB and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC),have worked mainly in IDP camps in government-controlledareas of Darfur. Camps allowed a ‘safe flight’ option for manyIDPs as part of a deliberate strategy aimed at saving thegreatest number of lives at a time of acute emergency.However, little has since been done to counterbalance thisfocus on the IDP population with a greater presence in therural areas, especially as conditions changed in different partsof Darfur and opportunities to operate in specific areas arose,particularly between late 2004 and the signing of the DPA inMay 2006. A better understanding of protection concerns andtheir integration into needs assessments would probably haveencouraged greater efforts to address the vulnerable residentpopulation in rural areas throughout Darfur. Greater provisionof assistance in rural areas, wherever feasible in terms ofsecurity and access, would have helped residents makechoices about remaining or returning to their home areas,instead of being compelled to move to or stay in urban centresor IDP camps to receive aid. A survey conducted in mid-October 2005 by the ICRC (2005: 116–17) showed that, in allthree Darfur regions, targeting beneficiaries who hadrelatively secure access to farmland with staple- and cash-crop seeds helped them sustain their livelihoods, even thoughthe harvest still did not match pre-conflict levels.

Agency action was skewed campwards to some extent by theearmarking of funding for camps. Faulty analysis, includingsuggestions that rural areas had been emptied of theirpopulations, is also partly responsible (Mahony et al., 2005:13). Inadequate analysis of the security situation has alsoprevented humanitarian organisations from reaching moreremote areas. This is particularly true of UN agencies, whichhave been prevented from using routes travelled daily bysome INGOs and the ICRC because UNDSS has been unable toprovide regular and comprehensive security updates. This lackof balance in the provision of assistance has had a lastingnegative impact on the sizeable populations who are still inrural areas, and has contributed to the perception thathumanitarian agencies are biased (see Section 5.3). Whilst theneeds of resident communities continue to grow and remainlargely unaddressed, some camps have seen an over-concentration of agencies, particularly INGOs; Kalma and AbuShouk camps have 16 and 20 organisations respectively.

The absence of a strategy governing the progressiveencampment of the civilian population, the lack of siteplanning, ill-informed engagement with the IDP populationand shortfalls in camp management have contributed tovolatility in the camps, which now poses significant risks toNGOs. Senior UN officials have admitted that insufficientthought was given to preventing or mitigating violence in thecamps, reducing the density of the population and advisingthe government about appropriate forms of intervention.There has been an assumption that maintaining the camps asthey organically developed would allow greater control of thethreat posed by pro-government militias.

Within the camps themselves, a self-appointed and oftenhighly politicised leadership has emerged, which is oftenabusive towards camp inhabitants. These new camp shaikhshave replaced traditional leaders and established a powerbase which is often premised on the control or manipulation ofrelief assistance. In Kalma, for instance, many of these ‘fat catshaikhs’, as they were called, were said to have 50 rationcards each before an appropriate registration was carried out.In any crisis, there is always a certain element of manipulationof assistance, especially food. Nonetheless, greater effortsshould have been made to ensure that distributionmechanisms would not inflict further damage on alreadytraumatised communities, undermining their traditionalleadership and encouraging a shift in power to youngerleaders (Mahony et al., 2005: 14). Some of the camps havebecome sanctuaries for criminals,10 with no governance and nolaw and order; the police and AU forces are not allowed entry.People who kill and loot outside the camps seek refuge insidethem safe in the knowledge that their impunity will beguaranteed. Agency staff in Darfur spoke of alarming levels ofdomestic violence and SGBV within camps, but admitted thathumanitarian organisations were doing very little to drawattention to or address these violations.

10 Interview, UN official, Khartoum, June 2006.


4.7 Protection gaps: extortion and land

A key ‘forgotten’ protection issue is the payment of ‘protectionmoney’. IDPs in Kass reported that they had to pay substantialamounts before fleeing from Kailek to Kass to seek refugefrom militia abuse in January 2005. These payments havebecome common in most areas. They can be in kind (paymentsof up to 50% of the harvest were reported in Kebkabya) andcash (SD100, or approximately $0.40 for a woman and SD200for a man in return for ‘permission’ to move outside villages,for instance to go to the market). Movement outside of campsis also subject to these payments; in these cases, the currencyis humanitarian aid. In several locations, communities appearto be paying protection money to guarantee freedom fromattacks on their village. In Umm Kher, Bendisi, Garsila andother nearby areas, people talked of a ‘tax’ of SD75,000(approximately $300) per village. Similar problems werereported in West Darfur, for instance in Treje, while in NorthDarfur people reported paying a 10% levy on their produce tothe SLA. At checkpoints along main roads in North Darfur, forinstance between Zam Zam camp and Al Fashir, pro-government militia and SLA soldiers exact ‘tolls’ of betweenSD200 and SD500. Some humanitarian organisationsadmitted buying security along roads in critical areas.

A plan to allow greater support to resident communities fromhumanitarian organisations needs urgent consideration. Thecurrent enclavement is reshaping the ethnic geography of Darfur,as populations are redistributed on ethnic lines, with the indirectsupport of humanitarian agencies. This process is aggravated bythe secondary occupation of land in areas from which IDPs andrefugees have fled. Land was recognised as a major protectionissue at the Inter-Darfur Protection Working Groups meeting heldin Nyala in November 200511, which provided an excellentanalysis of secondary land occupation by nomadic groups inSouth and West Darfur. Yet no clear steps appear to have beentaken to address land issues. Once again, there seems to be alack of clarity as to which agency is responsible for leading onland and protection issues, and the valuable information andanalysis gathered by organisations is not acted upon.Throughout the field research for this study, national staff provedconsiderably more aware of key protection issues related to landand new power structures in the camps; expatriate personnelwould rarely refer to these problems unless prompted. Nationalstaff also reported with alarm that a reassignment of land titleshad been endorsed by the authorities in South Darfur, where Furland has allegedly been officially bestowed upon Bul Bul Arabsthrough the creation of a new nazirate.

4.8 Assessing impact

To date there has been little analysis of the effectiveness ofthe protection response by humanitarian actors in Darfur. Thisis unsurprising, for a number of reasons. Measuringsignificant change and attributing such change to particularactors or activities is always difficult. This is especially thecase in a field such as protection, which involves behaviouralchanges which are very difficult to attribute to specificactivities, apart perhaps from stand-alone protectioninterventions focused on remedial action. The protectiondiscourse is also very young and there is a limitedunderstanding of mechanisms to assess the impact ofprotection work. While recognising these challenges, it is alsofair to say, as many observers did during this study, that Darfuris acutely lacking in protection-related indicators anddeveloped mechanisms to assess protection work. Whereefforts have been made to develop benchmarks, as with theDarfur PWGs, these have been poorly supported at thenational and headquarters levels.

The urge to show results, particularly to donors, has ledseveral organisations to focus on protection activities whichhave quantifiable deliverables, such as numbers of peopletrained. However, there are initiatives whose impact, whileless quantifiable, is still felt to be significant. These include, toname a few, the increased international awareness of theDarfur crisis; the elimination of the reporting requirement forrape victims; positive perceptions about the effectiveness ofchild and women friendly spaces; the effectiveness ofparalegals mediating disputes in areas of South Darfur; andnotably the ending of forced relocations and returns as aresult of the MoU/LoU with the Sudanese government (seeBox 4).

In any attempt to work towards assessing the effectiveness ofprotection work, it is important first to clarify expectations ofwhat can reasonably be achieved by humanitarian actors.However, no such framework has been put in place. Efforts tothat end by the Protection Working Groups (see Section 6.3)have not been operationalised. The last iteration of the RTEemphasises the role of the Inter-Agency Management Group(IAMG) in analysis, benchmarking and evaluation, andhighlights the need for the Protection of Civilians Unit inUNMIS to link its work with the IAMG. There is clearly anurgent need for a much more considered approach todeveloping mechanisms for tracking the progress ofprotection efforts if learning is to be collectively captured andutilised.

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11 Copy of the minutes, on file with the authors.


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5.1 Politics and protection advocacy in Darfur

The role of advocacy in humanitarian action has given rise todebates about the politicisation of humanitarianism, andconcerns that greater engagement in advocacy undermineshumanitarian principles and threatens humanitarian space (deTorrente, 2004; O’Brien, 2004). Experience from the Darfurcrisis highlights how perceptions of politicisation can play outin practice, and underscores the difficulties engaging inadvocacy can present for operational humanitarian agencies.While it is difficult to demonstrate causality, the work ofhumanitarian agencies in channelling information to theoutside world has certainly increased international attentionto the crisis in Darfur, and has ensured a focus on civilianprotection. Public attention has in turn mobilised politicalaction. However, these political achievements have, as yet,done little to improve security for ordinary civilians.

There was a dearth of information about the conflict in Darfurduring 2003 and early 2004. The international communitywas, albeit hesitantly, embarking on a new period ofrapprochement with the Sudanese government followingprogress in the peace negotiations in the south.12

Consequently, any advocacy on the conflict in Darfurthreatened the position of the Sudanese government.Advocacy on protection issues was particularly sensitivebecause it exposed how the war was being conducted andraised questions about the sincerity of the government’scommitment to peace. Control over the amount and type ofinformation emerging from the crisis became, and hasremained, a major point of contention between humanitarianactors and the government.

The first major dispute concerned humanitarian access. Inearly 2004, when air and ground attacks were at their mostintense, humanitarian visas and customs clearances for Darfurwere taking up to three months to process, and humanitarianorganisations were able to reach only 15% of those in need(UN OCHA, 2004). High-level advocacy, most of it behind thescenes, resulted in a progressive easing of these restrictions.The existence of established advocacy mechanisms, such asthe Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM – see Section 6.5)and the UN Secretary-General’s monthly report to the UNSecurity Council, has meant that local efforts to relax

restrictions on humanitarian access have been backed up byhigher-level pressure. This has, for example, increased accessto war-affected populations in Shar’ia in West Darfur, andhelped to end a fuel embargo on SLA-controlled areas.However, problems have regularly resurfaced.

The sustained and high-level attention from political actors onhumanitarian access has caused some to ask whetheradequate attention has been given to political issues (Minear,2005: 101). The sight of government ministers concentratingtheir efforts on getting aid agencies’ vehicles out of customs,while the situation in Darfur was at its most alarming anddemanded greater political engagement, would lend credenceto this view. That said, these actions reduced the need forhumanitarian agencies themselves to engage in advocacywork over access, and this has been a much less sensitiveissue than protection.

Interaction with political actors, either through persuadinggovernments to take up their responsibilities or by mobilisinginternational actors to encourage them to do so, is critical toprotection. When humanitarian agencies began to advocateon sensitive protection issues and call governments toaccount, the fundamental tensions, risks and repercussionsassociated with this form of humanitarian action wereexposed. Press releases decrying ‘diplomatic dithering’ overDarfur led to the threatened expulsion of Oxfam GB’s head ofagency; similar threats were made against Save the Children-UK following a press release reporting the aerialbombardment of Tawila in November 2004. An MSF-Hollandreport documenting rape in West Darfur led to the arrest oftwo of the agency’s senior managers. Public advocacydramatically diminished thereafter. Between December 2004and April 2005, at least 20 aid workers, most of them fromorganisations publicly advocating on IDP issues, werearrested or detained (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

5.2 Darfur in the media: playing to an internationalaudience

Like humanitarian personnel, the media had very limited accessto Darfur until June 2004, when restrictions on humanitarianaccess were finally lifted. Since then, the crisis has beenregularly reported in the global media, and Darfur has become ahousehold name around the world. Highly evocative reports byAmnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlighted thehuman rights issues, and the tenth anniversary of the Rwandangenocide helped build a compelling storyline for the crisis, andone which continues to underpin media coverage today.

12 For example, then US Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested in 2003that the US would renew diplomatic ties and lift sanctions if Sudan reacheda peace accord on the north–south conflict and took further action againstterrorism. Powell, quoted in ICJ’s Chronology of Darfur, http://www.africaaction.org/resources/darfur_chronology/CIJ_Complete_Darfur_Chronology.pdf.

Chapter 5The media, politics and protection:

a dangerous interface


In order to sustain engagement with the media, severalhumanitarian organisations recruited communicationspersonnel who worked closely with protection officers andother advocacy staff on media activities. Many have courtedmedia coverage, with the use of celebrities and high-profileevents which, while successful in attracting public attention,have been of little strategic value to the protection agenda.The continued engagement of humanitarian organisationswith the media has been criticised. During the research for thisstudy, Sudanese academics and politicians suggested that theway the crisis has been portrayed has helped to polarise theconflict, and has influenced the attitudes of humanitarianactors towards the civilian population. Interviewees referredin particular to the distinctions between Arab and Africanhabitually made by the media, and their effect on the wayhumanitarian assistance has been provided. National andinternational political dynamics meant that this stereotypinghas resulted in a degree of unquestioning sympathy for theinsurgents’ cause.

One of the consequences of the internationalisation of theconflict has been to bolster the armed opposition movementsand raise the level of their political demands, making asolution to the conflict all the harder to find. The insurgentshave used the international media very effectively, and theincreasing publicity they received contributed to the divisionswithin the main rebel movement. It has also been suggestedthat the desire to attract media attention may have increasedcivilians’ exposure to violence. INGO personnel involved incamp management also commented that, in some camps,IDPs are very aware of their public position and have learnedto play to the media.

The most significant impact of increased media attention onthe humanitarian operation has undoubtedly been theeffect it has had on humanitarian agencies’ drive forvisibility. For many humanitarian agencies, public advocacyis partly seen as a way of maintaining profile. Darfur hasbecome a priority country for the media andcommunications departments of most humanitarian actors,and many have used advocacy not just to effect policychange, but also to gain exposure, not least for fundraisingpurposes. In some cases, headquarters staff have exertedpressure on managers on the ground to engage inprotection work, especially around SGBV, for which thesemanagers felt expertise was lacking. One intervieweecomplained that his colleagues in head office had littleappreciation of the impact that media exposure had on staffsecurity in the field. Many staff members we spoke tobelieved that the priorities of headquarters staff weredriven more by external pressure than by the advice andneeds of personnel on the ground.

5.3 The politics of protection

As discussed above, the bulk of the humanitarian response inDarfur has focused on IDPs and refugees living in camps ingovernment-controlled areas. This has created a widespreadperception, both in Darfur and in Khartoum, that humanitarianorganisations are somehow siding with the IDP population andneglecting resident communities, particularly Arab ones. Theprotection bias towards non-Arab IDPs and the apparent solid-arity with their ‘cause’ have meant that Arab pastoral com-munities have been overlooked, both in terms of assistance andprotection. Yet Arab pastoralists, especially those without a dar,have always been amongst the most impoverished andmarginalised communities in Darfur. Insurgent attacks, displace-ment and livestock losses during the conflict have only made thesituation worse; migration and trading routes have becomeinaccessible and complementary livelihoods sources, such aslabour migration and remittances, have been curtailed. Recentmedia reports citing the pastoralists themselves suggest death-rates of up to 20% in some areas and livestock deaths of 40%(Flint, 2006b: 2). The amount of humanitarian assistance thesegroups have received is minimal at best. In some areas,pastoralists complained that international aid was partial andprejudiced, with all assistance going to ‘African’ groups (Young etal., 2005: 158). This has often been a consequence of the still-widespread but inaccurate perception in humanitarian circlesthat all Arab groups are involved in the perpetration of crimes inDarfur. The neglect of the needs of Arab groups extends to theirrights; one relief worker was told that UNMIS Human Rights had‘never investigated a single incident of violence against an Arab’(Flint, 2006b).

The perception of bias has been reinforced by recruitmentpolicies, particularly amongst NGOs. There is a markedpreference for employing Fur, especially as administrative andsupport staff. NGOs claim that personnel from Arab groupswould not be accepted in IDP camps, and Arab staff have indeedbeen attacked and threatened by IDPs. There is however anobvious need for humanitarian organisations to apply clearstandards, and ensure that they gain a nuanced understandingof the ethnic dimensions of the conflict, and how these factorsaffect staff dynamics and local perceptions. If humanitarian aidfails to reach affected Arab groups and the perception of bias isnot redressed, this will almost certainly inflame tensions andcould contribute to the further harassment of humanitarianworkers. Several groups have apparently resorted to banditry,including looting and carjacking, for instance in the areabetween Gome and Gildu in West Darfur. Over the last year,agencies including WFP and some INGOs have begun to operatein pastoralist areas, but a more significant and collaborativeeffort is urgently required to address the needs of Arab groupsand non-displaced populations.

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6.1 The evolution of the UN’s role in protection inDarfur: turf battles and lack of leadership

Acknowledging Darfur as a protection crisis presented adilemma for the UN system. At the outset of the crisis, no UNagency had a clear mandate for protecting IDPs, althoughUNHCR has since been designated as the lead under the clusterapproach for the protection of conflict-generated IDPs.13 Theweaknesses of the ‘collaborative approach’14 to protection werethrown into stark relief by the fact that none of the threemandated UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF and OHCHR) wasprepared to take the lead in civilian protection. After muchdithering over roles and responsibilities, OCHA eventually tookon a coordinating function in early 2004. UNHCR later took thelead on protection, but only in West Darfur, a decision which hasbeen criticised by senior protection staff.

Reviews of OCHA’s performance are mixed. Remarkably, notleast given the outspoken position of the agency’s head,Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland, OCHA did notdeploy senior protection staff to Khartoum, and only relativelyjunior protection officers were deployed to the field. OCHA’slimited influence within the UN family made it difficult for theagency to raise protection issues, or to encourage the UNResident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) to prioritiseprotection. At a field level, however, the agency appearedmore effective, and both donors and NGOs commended itsdynamism. The high level of trust built up with operationalagencies meant that OCHA had very high-quality informationand analysis, which it often used to good effect, particularlyon issues such as humanitarian access, the relocation of IDPsand involuntary return. However, in the absence of a centralcapacity to analyse this information, opportunities foradvocacy and programming may have been missed.

OCHA was not the only UN agency that struggled to find itsfooting in the protection quagmire of Darfur. In fact, as the RTEevaluation reports, the lack of UN presence, and in particularthe lack of leadership by mandated UN agencies, transferredresponsibility for shaping and driving the humanitarianresponse onto a core group of INGOs and the ICRC. This lack ofpresence critically undermined the UN’s ability to act as a

buffer between hostile authorities and NGOs working onprotection (Broughton et al., 2006: 5). Despite someimprovements in UN coverage, NGOs are still exposed. Forinstance, agencies reported access to justice programmesbeing closed by security officials, and then reopened followingrepresentations by visiting UN officials, only to be closedagain once the officials had departed.

This lack of presence and capacity has also made proactive andpractical responses to critical protection concerns difficult. TheRTE evaluation highlights how, despite the appalling impact ofthe crisis on children, there was little attention to childprotection issues. While UNICEF is now scaling up itsprogramming in Darfur, commentators report that its protectioncapacity is still significantly weaker than in other crises, such asin Sri Lanka. Leadership on SGBV was even more challenging.The decision to confer the role to UNFPA in the context of wide-scale abuse, gross impunity and an absence of medical,psychosocial and legal support for survivors and their familieswas widely questioned. Senior UN staff noted that the level ofoperationality that this role required was unprecedented forUNFPA, and the agency ‘struggled to coordinate or informactivities due to its lack of headquarters commitment,institutional experience, staff capacity and protectionexpertise’.15 Others pointed to the agency’s lack of presence inDarfur, with staff deployed to Zalingei, for instance, only inFebruary 2006. Faced with this lack of field capacity, UNFPA hastended to concentrate on policy issues, and work incollaboration with other actors with greater presence on theground. Despite successes such as the lifting of the Form Eightreporting requirements for rape victims, translating policyachievements into practical improvements in the lives of Darfuriwomen and girls has proved difficult. From an operationalperspective, SGBV has been viewed as a reproductive healthissue, rather than a protection concern (Broughton et al., 2006:65). The result has been a focus on medical treatment, withlimited attention to psychosocial and legal support. In effect,SGBV has been stripped of its thorny protection dimensions.

Individual agencies’ confusion over protection roles andresponsibilities reflects an overall lack of leadership on theissue by the RC/HC, who in Sudan also performs the role ofDeputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General(DSRSG). Senior UN staff bemoaned the RC/HC’s lack ofemphasis on protection, despite its status as a specificfunction of the post under the Revised Terms of Reference forHumanitarian Co-ordinators.16 Under these Terms ofReference, protection work is meant to encompass promotingrespect for humanitarian access and other elements of IHL and

Chapter 6Coordination, collaboration and confusion

13 For more discussion of UNHCR’s cluster lead on protection, see UNHCR,Working Session on Building Capacity for the Protection of IDPs, Geneva,14–16 December 2005.14 The collaborative response was initially outlined by the IASC in its Policyon the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (December 1999). It wassubsequently reaffirmed by the IASC as the preferred means of respondingto situations of internal displacement in the Supplementary Guidance toHCs and/or on their Responsibilities in Relation to Internally DisplacedPersons (April 2000) and the Guidance Note on the Collaborative Approach(March 2003). The collaborative approach to protection has been replacedby the cluster approach in conflict situations.

15 Interview with senior UN humanitarian official, Khartoum, June 2006.16 Adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on 29 August 2003.


human rights law, and advocacy with the local andinternational media. Many observers believed that combininghumanitarian and political functions in the position of theHC/DSRSG resulted in the demotion of humanitarian, andparticularly protection, issues, and felt that the HC wasreluctant to highlight IHL concerns for fear of jeopardisingpolitical relations with the government. This is reportedly acommon characteristic of HCs, especially in contexts involvingpeacekeeping operations (Paul and Bagshaw, 2004: 44).

6.2 The dilemmas of UNMIS’ leadership in protection

UNMIS is the first integrated mission to have a humanitarianprotection role.17 This was fashioned out of Security CouncilResolution 1590, which established a UN mission in Sudanwith the primary function of supporting the implementation ofthe Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The inclusion of aProtection of Civilians Section within UNMIS, rather than in ahumanitarian agency such as OCHA, reflects a more ‘coherent’approach to humanitarian protection, where the humanitarianarm can coordinate with political and military actors andleverage greater influence. It can also result in strategy oncivilian protection being led by the objectives of a politically-driven mission, rather than strictly by humanitarianimperatives. This, as we will see later, has resulted insignificant differences in interest and approach betweenUNMIS Protection and its humanitarian counterparts.

Unlike OCHA, UNMIS created a dedicated Protection Sectionin Khartoum from the outset in late 2005, with up to 15international and national positions, to coordinate generalprotection and child protection activities in Darfur and the restof the country. Like many actors working in Sudan, theProtection Section was beset with recruitment difficulties,especially as most OCHA staff did not elect to transfer intoUNMIS; in June 2006 many positions were still vacant.

There was widespread concern about the role of UNMIS inhumanitarian protection. At the field level, other humanitarianactors generally felt that it had very limited practicalrelevance. The assumption was that UNMIS was primarilyconcerned with monitoring and reporting. However, given theintegrated nature of the mission, most humanitarian agenciespreferred not to share information with UNMIS Protection dueto concerns that this information would be used for politicalpurposes. NGOs were under the impression that UNMIS’sagenda was driven by political rather than humanitarianconsiderations. As evidence, NGOs cited the mission’semphasis on returns, which was felt to be misplaced in acontext of continuing insecurity and displacement, and itsreluctance to engage with the protection issues emergingfrom the UN-facilitated DPA. Mandated protection actors

suggested that working with an integrated mission with apolitical oversight function undermined their perceivedneutrality and independence.

UNMIS’s focus on monitoring and reporting, in addition to itscore coordination role, has led to overlapping activities, andhas shifted the emphasis of humanitarian protection awayfrom practical interventions and towards a UN-focusedinformation system. This has left operational actors more,rather than less, exposed as they deal with local authoritieshostile to protection work and without practical support in theform of tools and guidance. Most organisations have as aresult continued to work with OCHA, but this is unsustainablegiven OCHA’s reduced capacity under the new configuration.

Implementing this new protection function within a UN missionhas been further complicated by a lack of clearly defined rolesand functions within UNMIS itself. The responsibility forprotection lies with the humanitarian arm of the mission, whilehuman rights and rule of law come within the remit of itspolitical component. However, senior protection and humanrights officers, both within and outside the mission, remainconfused about the different responsibilities of the Protectionof Civilians Section and the Human Rights Section. Thisconceptual ambiguity has translated into a tug-of-war inpractice, with the lack of cooperation and coordinationresulting in what Henry (2006) calls a ‘non-negotiable divide’between the two Sections. Indeed, at a field level, sharedinformation and analysis and joint planning were absent, withan observable lack of cooperation on specific incidents.

In many ways, UNMIS’s difficult experience in Darfur isunsurprising given that this is the first time that a civilianprotection component has been incorporated into thehumanitarian arm of an integrated mission. Issues ofmandate, roles and responsibilities take time to clarify. Themission’s mandate is also undeniably complex, addressing asit does both the implementation of the CPA in the south andthe ongoing crisis in Darfur. These difficulties are compoundedby the fact that missions are developed in situ, without thebenefit of institutional experience and support. However, theunclear division of roles between humanitarian, human rightsand political actors also has an impact. The focus ofhumanitarian actors is on the security of civilians, whilehuman rights and political actors focus more heavily on thestate and its institutions. Humanitarian protection is thusnecessarily focused on the daily experience of war-affectedcommunities. UNMIS Protection’s lack of operationality,coupled with its limited field presence in Darfur and lack ofengagement with field-based actors, makes it difficult forUNMIS to coordinate protection activities, provide practicalsolutions to field-based problems and maintain the level ofanalysis required to serve as an effective actor inhumanitarian protection. In this instance, these difficulties donot appear to have been offset by the greater politicalleverage that the integration of humanitarian, political and

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17 MONUC in DRC has a Human Rights Section whose objectives include ‘toprovide advice, training and assistance on international human rightsstandards to human rights NGOs and others in civil society and to provideadvisory services related to the promotion and protection of human rights’.


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military functions is intended to achieve. Given the difficultiesUNMIS has confronted in incorporating humanitarianprotection within an integrated mission, repeating theapproach in future missions will need careful consideration.

6.3 The experience of the Working Groups

In early 2004, OCHA established the Khartoum ProtectionWorking Group (KPWG) and subsidiary Protection WorkingGroups (PWGs) in the three Darfur states. By mid-2004, sub-groups focusing on child protection and SGBV were also takingshape, and there were efforts to establish regular protectioncoordination meetings with the government’s Humanitarian AidCommission (HAC). The aim of the PWGs is to share informationand analysis on protection, provide practical guidance, facilitatejoint assessments and coordinate common action. The role ofthe KPWG, renamed the Khartoum Protection Steering Group(KPSG) in 2006, is to act as a forum for exchanging informationand developing common policy on protection issues acrossSudan, including Darfur; address protection issues of commonrelevance; and develop or support advocacy activities onspecific issues requiring high-level action (Khartoum ProtectionSteering Group, 2005). The groups are constituted differently. InKhartoum, the KPWG, previously led by OCHA/UNHCR andcurrently led by UNMIS Protection, is made up of seniorrepresentatives of UN agencies, UNMIS civilian components,international organisations and international NGOs active inprotection. At a field level, the groups have developed moreorganically, and while all include international agencies workingin protection, some also extend to representatives from the AU;others limit attendance to international staff because of thesensitivity and confidentiality of the issues under discussion.UNHCR leads the PWGs in West Darfur, with UNMIS leading inthe other two states.

Many positive achievements have been recorded as a result ofagencies working together in the PWGs. The North Darfur PWGSurvey on IDP Return served as an excellent advocacy tool tohalt the authorities’ efforts to relocate displaced populationswithout providing the requisite level of security.18 Collectiveefforts to support the effectiveness of the AU and examinationof the protection implications of cuts in food aid by WFP wereall reported as positive outcomes of collaborative action.Further examples are mentioned by the RTE evaluation(Broughton et al., 2005: 35), which points to the moreconsistent inclusion of protection specialists in assessments,common analysis of trends, case management of specificincidents and joint briefing of visiting delegations. Accordingto reviews, the following characteristics of the PWGs haveenhanced collective action: consistent participation from thesame individuals (rather than simply the same organisations);specific experience within the group relating to the issuesraised; good-quality leadership of meetings, with clearagendas and action points; collective engagement withoutdependence on a single organisation or individual; the

establishment of taskforces on specific issues requiring moreintensive action; and a membership which was allowed bytheir agencies – indeed expected – to devote a significantportion of their time to joint work.

Despite these successes, senior protection staff report thatthe PWGs have devolved into simple information-sharing fora,with little dynamism or positive impact. The RTE evaluationpointed to the need for consistent support to these groups, sothat they can remain useful and relevant, and for them to be‘revitalised’ with seminars, strategy sessions and high-calibreguest speakers (Broughton et al., 2006: 77). A combination ofreticence to share information or analysis in public, reducedpractical coordination as a result of the transfer in leadershipfrom OCHA to UNMIS and the lack of protection experience ofattending staff were all highlighted as reasons for decreasedimpact. Where the PWGs were successful, they appear to haveachieved this success without the support or guidance of theKhartoum Protection Steering Group, which was felt to be tooUN-centric, lacking practical and field-oriented capacity andnot sufficiently influential to ensure that advocacy issuesraised at field level would be taken up at higher levels.

6.4 Coordination with the AU: opportunities missed

In the early days of its deployment in April 2004, AMIS waslargely open to engagement with humanitarian actors, andadvice was sought and followed regarding locations fordeployment and patrols. Despite limited resources, logisticsand troops, in certain locations AMIS interpreted its mandatecreatively and undertook preventive deployments; in Labadoand Muhajaria in late 2004 and early 2005, for example, itsucceeded in deterring or reducing attacks (O’Neill and Cassis,2005: 35). As described earlier, in many places AMIS alsoengaged in firewood and, to a lesser degree, cultivation andharvest patrols, which have had significant protection results.

AMIS troop numbers have increased progressively over thelifetime of the mission, from 3,320 in October 2004 toapproximately 7,700 today. As discussed earlier, the mandatehas also changed to include the protection of civilians incertain circumstances. However, the limitations of themission’s mandate, experience and capacity in the face ofDarfur’s widespread insecurity and vast geographical areahave become increasingly evident. With declining credibilityand morale, the proactivity which characterised the early daysof the AMIS deployment has been gradually replaced withindifference, for which it has been continually castigated bythe international community. Interaction with humanitarianagencies and conflict-affected populations decreased, as didengagement in joint initiatives. In May 2006, anti-AUdemonstrations took place across Darfur in reaction to theUnion’s role as mediator in the deeply unpopular Darfur PeaceAgreement. AMIS’ position has been further underminedduring 2006 by inconclusive efforts to replace the missionwith a UN peacekeeping force. In the words of one18 NGO internal protection paper, 2004, on file with the authors.


experienced aid worker, the troops are now ‘essentially holedup in barracks’.

Efforts by OCHA in 2004 and 2005 to establish mechanisms forconsistent engagement with AMIS on civilian protection andother humanitarian-related issues were largely unsuccessful.AMIS staff are not members of the KPSG, and their attendanceat other humanitarian meetings has been irregular, withcomplaints from humanitarian agencies about a lack ofconsistency within the AU on information sharing and follow-up,especially in reports of protection and security incidents in ruralareas. The deployment of AU Civil–Military Officers and thecreation of AU Civilian, Humanitarian and Human Rights Officersin 2005 has improved communication, as has attendance at thePWGs. However, the lack of a system for coordination has meantthat liaison between humanitarian and AU personnel has beenlargely sporadic and dependent on individuals.

AMIS’ deficiencies represent a significant missed opportunityin Darfur, but responsibility for any failings should not bepinned on the AU alone. The lack of a consistent mechanismfor engagement on issues relating to civilian protection hasreduced mutual understanding and limited opportunities forcoordinated action in Darfur. Despite AMIS’s unpopularity, insome areas IDPs continue to press for its presence, as well asits involvement in firewood patrols. Given ongoing insecurity,and with the deployment of UN peacekeepers lookingincreasingly uncertain, opportunities to inject renewed energyand commitment into relations with this key protection actorshould be explored. The newly established OCHA-led weeklymeetings between NGOs and AMIS are a positive first step,which should be developed across the region.

6.5 Coordination with political actors

Experience from other contexts indicates that mobilised andinformed donors and diplomats can, and often do, playimportant roles in persuading delinquent governments to fulfiltheir IHL obligations (Paul and Bagshaw, 2004: 6). OverDarfur, however, the diplomatic community has largely failedto exert its influence effectively.

In early 2004, a monthly Technical Meeting was established,involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Humanitarian AidCommission and political and humanitarian actors in Khartoum.These meetings were disbanded shortly after the establishmentof the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM). The JIM wascreated in the wake of the UN–Sudan Joint Communiqué of 3July 2004, an agreement between the Sudanese governmentand the United Nations on political, human rights andhumanitarian issues, reached following a visit by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to Sudan on 29 June–3 July 2004. The JIM ismeant to report on the implementation of the Communiqué. AProgress Matrix was developed to monitor implementation ofspecific humanitarian, human rights, security and politicalagreements. Humanitarian organisations felt that this provided

a useful mechanism to press for compliance, at least in the earlystages. Joint Verification Missions were undertaken to assessthe situation in Darfur, and findings were fed into the UNSecretary-General’s monthly report on Darfur to the SecurityCouncil. These Missions have turned out to be a crude andunwieldy instrument for evaluating progress, especially giventhe intimidation and harassment of witnesses in Darfur and thegovernment’s failure to acknowledge reported abuse. Asubsidiary JIM (Sub-JIM) was later established to monitorhuman rights and protection issues. Commitment to the JIMhas, however, waned. A Verification Mission has not beenundertaken since October 2005, and there is disappointment atwhat is considered diminishing interest on the part of localembassies.

Monitoring and reporting on a large scale is ineffectivewithout prompt and appropriate action on the issuesreported. Political actors require detailed information andevidence if they are to remain active and involved in protectionissues, and the challenge in Darfur has been to createeffective channels for this. The regular reports disseminatedby UNMIS Protection are considered informative in thisrespect, but donor representatives do not believe that they areeffectively linked to action. On the other hand, there isdisappointment among humanitarian agencies at the leveland quality of donor participation and engagement, withcomplaints that diplomatic missions send junior staff tomeetings on protection issues, who have no influence orcapacity to effect policy change. Donors for their part feel thatthe main mechanism for coordination between the diplomaticand humanitarian communities, the Donor Protection LiaisonGroup, is more focused on information-sharing than onsubstantive action. This lack of consistent, strategic andcoordinated action between the humanitarian and thediplomatic and political communities has reduced theeffectiveness of the protection response in Darfur.

Engagement with political actors can present difficulties forhumanitarian actors, and interaction in Darfur has not beenwithout controversy. In North Darfur in 2004, a donorrepresentative repeatedly attempted to attend a PWGmeeting, but was asked to leave after a vote in favour ofexpulsion by the humanitarian actors present. Concerns wereraised about the use of the sensitive information underdiscussion and the politicisation of humanitarian activitiesand fora as a result of such close association with politicalactors. PWG members were also concerned to ensureconsistency in governmental involvement, feeling that if onedonor representative was allowed to attend, then the forumhad to be open to others, including the Sudanese government.Since then, political actors have not been granted permanentmembership of the PWGs.

The protection rhetoric which became the storyline of the crisisduring 2004 led several key donors to encourage humanitarianorganisations to increase their involvement in protection

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activities. Some actors reported that, given the failure to deploya successful ceasefire monitoring operation or to apply effectivepressure on perpetrators to stop the violence, some donorsdeveloped unrealistic expectations about the capacity ofhumanitarian organisations to affect the security situation in

Darfur and protect civilians. Reportedly, it was donor pressurewhich led many organisations to become involved in protectionfor the first time, which many believe may signal an attempt onthe part of the diplomatic community to substitute politicalaction with humanitarian action.


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The response to the Darfur crisis has been unprecedented in itsfocus on protection issues. The attention and level ofinvolvement of humanitarian actors in protection programmingmean that there is a wealth of experience from which to learn.This report has attempted to capture the range of activitiesundertaken, and the challenges which these responses haveconfronted. Some of the key lessons are summarised here inorder to help inform future responses, both in Darfur and inother similar crises.

The emphasis on protection in the Darfur crisis reflects awelcome increase in international awareness of the risks andthreats to which civilians are exposed in violent conflict. Theproliferation of new protection actors and the expansion ofprotection programming have not, though, led in the majorityof cases to a significant improvement in the security of thecivilian population of Darfur. As discussed in this report, it isunreasonable to expect unarmed humanitarian actors toprotect civilians, especially amid open conflict. However,humanitarian organisations can play a significant role inhelping civilians limit their exposure to security threats, andmitigate the effects of such exposure, if their programmes areinformed by an in-depth analysis of risks and anunderstanding of the political economy of the conflict, throughwhich appropriate response options can be developed.

Many of the difficulties identified in this report derive frominsufficient collective efforts to gain a better analysis of thepolitical and socio-economic dimensions of the crisis, and of itsconsequences in terms of civilian security. Whilst this failing iscommon to many emergency responses, in light of theemphasis on protection in the Darfur crisis there was an evenstronger rationale for serious efforts to identify and make use ofkey resource people, both national and international experts,for this purpose. Such investment in analysis should be aconstant feature of ongoing responses. The lack of contextualanalysis has been aggravated by a generally inadequateunderstanding of the conceptual framework of protection andits practical application to Darfur, particularly among actors newto protection. There has been no holistic analysis of the evolvingrisks and threats facing civilians. This has resulted inimbalances in the response and an undue focus on monitoringand reporting, which is poorly linked to action.

Inadequate analysis and ill-informed strategies have largelyresulted from a lack of clear leadership. The protectionresponse in Darfur was shaped and driven by non-mandatedagencies, many of which were new to protection and did notbenefit from sufficient guidance from more experiencedprotection actors. The lessons from the Darfur crisis point tothe need for the UN system and other humanitarian

organisations to identify clear roles and responsibilities toensure that future responses are informed by protectionanalysis from the beginning, and that a framework forengagement with communities, duty-bearers and warringparties is in place from an early stage. At the global level, theUN has tried to address the need for leadership on protectionthrough the development of the cluster approach, though thishas not been tested in Darfur. In any case, there are inherentweaknesses in the proposed global Protection Cluster(currently led by UNHCR), since its specific focus on displacedpeople means that it is not premised on an analysis of therisks facing the entire civilian population in a crisis. This mayhave the effect of predetermining the protection response in acrisis, skewing assistance towards people in IDP camps, ashas happened in Darfur. The experience of Darfur demands are-evaluation of the cluster approach, based on a broaderinterpretation of the concept of protection and renewedattention to the civilian population as a whole.

While roles, mandates and responsibilities are examined atthe global level, the lack of effective protection coordination inDarfur requires urgent attention by the most senior levels ofthe UN system. Leadership from the top is critically needed toensure that respective strengths in the system are built upon,and constructive synergies are developed with the ICRC andkey NGOs. Efforts should be made to move beyondcoordination towards inter-agency complementarity, in orderto develop unity of effort (Slim and Bonwick, 2005: 45).Complementarity will only be feasible in the context of acommon assessment of risks and desired outcomes, as well asa shared analysis of community self-protection strategies andopportunities for joint engagement with duty-bearers.

A specific issue of concern in Darfur, though it can also be ofwider relevance, relates to whether UNMIS should coordinatethe protection function on behalf of the UN system. Whilstthere is a debate about the appropriateness of an essentiallypolitical structure taking on a humanitarian function (albeitthrough its humanitarian arm), it is important to acknowledgethe merits of having a dedicated protection function within apeacekeeping mission, in particular the potential to promotepolitical action in favour of civilian protection. The benefits ofhaving an identified lead agency with appropriate capacity tocoordinate and guide the protection response cannot be over-stressed. However, UNMIS has not demonstrated that it hasthe capacity to fulfil this function. It is essential that the seniorleadership of UNMIS together with the UN Country Teamenables and equips UNMIS Protection to play an effective leadrole, which includes being able to act as an influentialinterlocutor between the authorities and NGOs, particularlythose responsible for camp management. Failing this, another

Chapter 7Conclusions


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lead should be identified, ideally from amongst the UNmandated agencies.

There is a critical need to review some of the currentapproaches to protection, and to redress problems where theyare found. The most pressing concern is engagement withnon-displaced civilians. The relatively limited presence ofhumanitarian organisations outside the camps has been aclear shortcoming of the Darfur response to date. The largenumbers of people in rural areas have received only limitedassistance. Furthermore, there has been an almost total lackof aid provision to Arab pastoralists, fostering the perceptionthat aid is biased along ethnic lines. This needs to be urgentlyaddressed since it weakens the credibility of the internationalresponse and undermines the principles of neutrality andimpartiality which should underpin humanitarian action.

Another broad strategy that needs careful review is that ofprotection by presence. Its limitations are apparent, its impacton security remains inconclusive and it potentially exposeshumanitarian workers to security risks. More detailed analysisto determine the merits of humanitarian actors’ presence as aprotective strategy is therefore required, particularly in thelight of increasing insecurity in Darfur. Regardless of theeffectiveness of such presence, it can be no substitute formore direct political action.

More in-depth analysis is also needed in order to identify newand emerging threats to the civilian population. This isfundamental in order to avert the danger of aid and places ofsanctuary like the camps being co-opted by belligerents andabusive power structures. The manipulation of aid in thesecontexts makes civilians vulnerable to ‘extortion, threat anddeprivation’ (Slim and Bonwick, 2005: 46). In Darfur, thecamps are increasingly dominated by exploitative newleaders. It is therefore essential that risks and threats withinthe camps are more thoroughly examined, including throughdialogue with a broad range of community members,particularly women and young people.

Appropriate analysis and strategic leadership are alsorequired to better identify opportunities for humanitarian

organisations, particularly those new to protection work, toengage more significantly with duty-bearers on issues ofcivilian safety and risk. So far, humanitarian actors have foundit difficult to work closely with governmental authoritiesbecause of the role played by the government in the conflict.However, there have been insufficient efforts to findopportunities to develop a constructive relationship wheresuch possibilities exist. A nuanced evaluation of potentialreformers in government, and openings arising at the locallevel, is critical in order to achieve a progressive engagementby the government and other duty-bearers in the protection ofcivilians, which is ultimately a governmental responsibility.

The mandated agencies are critical players in strengtheningthe overall protection response. While all actors need toenhance their understanding of their role and need toimprove their performance, the mandated agencies shoulduse their expertise to help strengthen the collectiveresponse. This can be done through supporting new, seriousentrants in the protection field, as well as informingoverarching strategy and promoting good practice. Newentrants should invest more in developing adequate capacityif they wish to continue to engage in protection. Recruitingisolated protection personnel has proved inadequate,suggesting the need for the broader integration of protectioninto overall assistance strategies. This requires afundamental shift in approach and genuine institutionalsupport and investment from the top down. However, it alsopresents humanitarian organisations with an importantdilemma. Many see their engagement in protection as raisingproblems for their operationality, since involvement inprotection has often led to a restriction in humanitarianspace, especially where protection activities have focusedon monitoring, reporting and public advocacy.

The emphasis placed on protection in the Darfur crisis hasbeen appropriate and important. At the same time, however, ithas raised a wide range of challenges for humanitarian andother actors, challenges which need to be seriously debatedand addressed if the rhetoric and resources now beingdevoted to protection are to translate into meaningful benefitsfor the people whose safety is at risk.


African Union (2004a) AU Peace and Security Council (PSC),Communiqué, PSC/PR/Comm (XVII), 20 October 2004. AddisAbaba: African Union.

African Union (2004b) Commission Cease-Fire Violation Report onthe Attack in Hashaba and Gallaba Villages on 26th August 2004,4 September. El Fasher: Headquarter Ceasefire Commission,African Union in Sudan.

Amnesty International (2003) Sudan: Immediate Steps To ProtectCivilians and Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur, publicstatement, 29 August. London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (2006) Crying Out for Safety, 5 October.London: Amnesty International.

APGfS (Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan) (2004) Sudan’sOpportunity for Peace and Development? Visit to Sudan 27th

June–4th July 2004, compiled and edited by Sultana Begum.

Bonwick, A. (2006) ‘Who Really Protects Civilians?’, Developmentin Practice, vol. 16, nos 3–4, pp. 270–77(8).

Broughton et al. (2006) Real Time Evaluation of the HumanitarianResponse to the Darfur Crisis, report commissioned by OCHA.Geneva/New York: OCHA.

Buchanan-Smith, M. and S. Jaspars (2006) Darfur LivelihoodReport. Khartoum: WFP.

Darcy, J (2005) Seeking Safety: Civilians, Protection and theAvoidance of Threats, background paper presented at the WiltonPark conference ‘The Responsibility to Protect’.

Darcy, J. and S. Srinivasan (forthcoming) Concepts of Protection.London: Overseas Development Institute.

de Torrente, N. (2004) ‘Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’sFalse Promise’. Ethics - International Affairs, vol.18, no. 2, pp. 3–12.

de Waal, A. (2004a) ‘Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap’, LondonReview of Books, 5.

de Waal, A. (2004b) ‘Tragedy in Darfur: On Understanding andEnding the Horror’, Boston Review, vol. 29, no. 5.

Flint, J. and A. de Waal (2005) Darfur: A Short History of a LongWar. London and New York: Zed Books.

Flint, J. (2006a) ‘A Steady Drip of Death’, Daily Star, 20 June.

Flint, J. (2006b) ‘The Arabs Are Victims, Too’, Washington Post, 19November.

Giossi Caverzasio, S. (2001) Strengthening Protection in War: ASearch for Professional Standards. Geneva: ICRC.

Henry, S. (2006) Mini Evaluation. Protection Issues in Darfur.Khartoum: OCHA.

Human Rights Watch (2004) Darfur in Flames. Atrocities in WesternSudan, 2 April. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch (2005a) Darfur: Arrest War Criminals, not AidWorkers, press release, 31 May. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch (2005b) Targeting the Fur: Mass Killings inDarfur, 21 January. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch (2005c) Darfur: Aid Workers Under Threat,press release, 5 April. New York: Human Rights Watch.

ICG (2005) ‘Darfur: The Failure To Protect’, Africa Report, no. 89.Nairobi/Brussels: ICG.

ICG (2006) ‘Getting the UN into Darfur’, Africa Briefing, no. 43.Nairobi/Brussels: ICG.

ICI (2005) International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report tothe Secretary-General, Geneva, 25 January.

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Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2004) Civil–Military Relations inComplex Emergencies, IASC Reference Paper, 28 June. Geneva:IASC.

InterAction (2004) Making Protection a Priority: IntegratingProtection and Humanitarian Assistance, paper from InterAction’sProtection Working Group. Washington DC: InterAction.

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31


References


32


United Nations (2005) An Engaged Protection Presence, KhartoumProtection Steering Group, March. Khartoum: United Nations.

United Nations (2006a) Report of the Secretary-General on Childrenand Armed Conflict in the Sudan, S/2006/662, 17 August. NewYork: United Nations.

United Nations (2006b) Darfur Humanitarian Profile, 1 October2006. Khartoum: United Nations.

UN OCHA (2004) UN Welcomes Announcement of IncreasedAccess to Darfur, 10 February. New York: United Nations.

Young, H. et al. (2005) Darfur 2005 – Livelihoods Under Siege. FinalReport. Boston, MA: Feinstein International Famine Center, TuftsUniversity.


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