the african union and nigeria

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UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES

CAVE HILL CAMPUS

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

TOPIC: Interrelationship between the African Union and Nigeria

NAME: Sandra Ochieng’-Springer

DATE: December 6, 2011

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The African Union (AU) is drawing near to its tenth anniversary in 2012. It was created in July 2002 to

succeed its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was founded in 1963 (Hanson

2011). It was created during what Lloyd terms the third wave of regionalism in which there was a spur

in regional agreements worldwide (2002). According to Tieku, the AU is an intergovernmental

organization that was designed to achieve three broad goals. First, it is intended to bring together the

plethora of sub regional institutions in Africa in order to pursue continent-wide co-operation and

integration amongst African states. Second, it aims at creating the conditions for African states to

engage in social, economic and political relations in a way that will make war between them unlikely.

Third, it attempts to design an institutional framework for African states to participate more effectively

in the international market and in international organisations on trade, finance and debt among other

things (2004).

The above three aims of the AU are based on liberalist, realist and institutionalist perspectives.

Institutions are sought as solutions for states to pursue their interests in an anarchic environment.

Institutions within the AU such as the Pan African Parliament, the African Investment Bank, the African

Court of Justice, the AU Peace and Security Council and the African Commission have been assigned a

leading role. This is tied into functionalism as prescribed by Mitrany who saw a proliferation of flexible

task oriented international organisations as the means to address the priorities dictated by human need

(In Rosamond 2000). According to Okumu, the AU was therefore established as a functional organization

with separate functional institutions that would deal with specific agenda such as peace and security

and good governance (2009). The Preamble of its Constitutive Act acknowledges one such issue that

requires functional attention and is assigned to the AU Peace and Security Council, “the scourge of

conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent

and the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our

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development and integration agenda.”1 However this functionalism is rendered futile because of the

continued emphasis on statist logic leading to domination by the most powerful states. The

intergovernmentalism within the AU has meant that states as key actors (such as Nigeria, South Africa

and Libya) seek to use their power to contest for their interests. This renders the regional integration

project and functional institutions created ineffective especially because of the antagonisms generated

by the emphasis on statehood and territory. Anderson supports this argument by claiming that, regional

unions are constructed in a manner analogous to the process of nation building, but they lack the

natural cohesiveness of nations (1991), to focus on statehood is therefore recidivist and an affront to

the regional integration process. Having functionalist organisations which answer to individual states

and have no power in themselves to act in the interest of members is considered backward by

proponents of neofunctionalism such as Haas, Lindberg and Schmitter (In Rosamond 2000). They view

neofunctionalism as a form of enhanced cooperation through common institutions where institutions

take on a greater role and have more authority in order to make significant contributions within the

regional arrangement.

The realist reasoning behind the creation of the regional organization brings to the fore the relations of

politics among nations and not within nations takes priority. This relates to the second aim of the

regional organisation and is confirmed by Mitrany who attests that, if nations are economically and

socially dependent and their national well-being depends upon the maintenance of peace, then war is

unlikely (1976). Liberalism’s concentration on the abolition of state imposed limitations on movement

between countries of goods and services and the retreat of state intervention resonates within the

establishment of the AU, this was in order to keep up with the deepening of globalisation and the

proliferation of open regionalism. On the one hand therefore, the AU is a statist regional project while

on the other hand it embraces liberal aspects. This is in keeping with Michael O’Neill’s argument that

1 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Preamble, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm

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the process of integration is ‘endemically syncretic’, that is it is driven by coexistence yet contradictory

logics such as economic globalisation on the one hand and the urge to retain the primacy of national

governance on the other (1996). The members have to find a way to adapt to a mixture of perspectives

which creates space for both the state and the region which will enhance their viability. Notwithstanding

the current problems facing the European Union (EU), this mixture has been achieved through the

adoption of a hybrid system of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism where in certain areas

decisions are made through negotiation between member states while in others, it is made through

supranational institutions. While not making a case for the replication of the EU regional integration

process because every region is unique in its own right and countries have their fair share of national

baggage, it is important to highlight that the institutions are by and large accepted by the citizens as

representative of their needs. By way of comparison, this critical process of acceptance of regional

institutions is lacking within the AU.

Among the motivators of a renewal of the African integration process reflected in its third aim is

globalisation and its ensuing realities in the post 1990s period. Globalisation involves the growing

integration of economies, markets and societies around the world. Okumu concurs and states that “the

formation of the Union was to provide Africa with a platform and voice to survive and benefit from the

wave of globalization” (2009: 93). The Constitutive Act also affirms that the Union was in response to

“the multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of social, economic

and political changes taking place in the world.”2 This global integration has had implications for

different countries’ (especially developing) socioeconomic and political policies. According to Jayasuriya

(2005) among these implications are that integrated global markets have limited governments policy

discretion as emphasis is placed on the dominance of market forces, the consequent open policies and

the retreat of state intervention within the economy, all neoliberal initiatives. This, coupled by the fact

2 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Preamble, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm

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that there are symmetrical relationships within the world system means that states have been forced to

seek mechanisms for minimizing threats to policy space and remain active members of world system in

spite of these advances. Mechanisms such as regionalism have been adopted to deal with these realities

in order to avoid marginalization (Ochieng’ 2010).

Marginalisation also takes place within the regional groupings as powerful nations seek to assert their

influence. Within the AU, financing is one way to determine which country wields power and which ones

are marginalized. Membership contributions are based on a formula that allows 5 countries (Algeria,

Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) to contribute 75 percent of these funds (Okumu 2009). Greater

contributions automatically mean greater say. Nigeria, due of its large financial contribution because of

‘petro dollars’ and its role of ‘big brother’ continent-wide, is a key actor whose interests were crucial to

the organization’s creation. Tieku argues that the election in 1999 of Olesugun Obasanjo and Thabo

Mbeki as presidents of Nigeria and South Africa respectively triggered the AU process (2004). These

leaders sought to reform the OAU to suit their foreign policy interests. In the case of Nigeria, Obasanjo’s

focus was on the reform of the conduct of governance and the reposition of the OAU at the center of

Africa’s developmental issues. For him, issues of security, stability, co-operation and development were

paramount. This was against a background of domestic political pressures and Nigeria’s geopolitical and

leading role in West Africa.

Nigeria’s influence in the AU cannot be understood in isolation, it is therefore critical to evaluate its

strategic and geopolitical importance in West Africa and in Africa in general. Nigeria is a mega state in

the African context, its estimated population of 155, 215, 273 attest to this, every one in five African is

Nigerian (IMF 2009). The country is also the leading exporter of oil in Africa and the eighth largest oil

producer in the world. Nigeria is a prominent member of and hegemon in the Economic Community of

West African States (ECOWAS) which is in the Customs Union stage of economic integration (Osaghae

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1998). It has assumed a natural leadership role since independence in 1960 embraced by both the

democratically elected leaders and military leadership. It has been a willing actor and arbitrar between

rebels and governments, having a large army; it has contributed a significant amount of troops for AU

and UN peacekeeping missions in different countries including Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia and

Angola (Falola and Heaton 2008). It also contributes significantly towards organisations that promote

West African cooperation in ways that the other countries are not able to; in addition, the country

organizes and funds programs to send doctors, teachers, lawyers and other professionals to other

countries (Eleazu 1988). Nigeria is therefore able to command such influence because of its power and

capability economically, militarily and in terms of human resource.

Ambe-Uva and Adegboyega argue that “it has become an axiomatic truth that the foreign policy of a

country is to a large extent determined by its domestic structure and factors. There are various

constituent elements in the political system - the government, political parties, pressure groups, civil

society, public opinion, leader’s personality and the press-operating within the democratic process

provided by the Constitution that exert direct or indirect pressure in shaping a country’s foreign policy”

(2007: 45). In Nigeria’s case it was public opinion and the leader’s personality that was a major factor in

shaping foreign policy.

From inception, Olesugun Obasanjo who was elected in 1999, for two terms, was an internationalist; his

focus was therefore on courting foreign investment and reforming the OAU. It is against this background

of Obasanjo’s internationalist nature and public opinion that he sought to assert Nigeria’s influence

within the AU. Obasanjo’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) government came to power at a time when

domestic opposition to Nigeria’s peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone was at its zenith.

Falola and Heaton state that, revelation during the campaign that Nigeria was spending $1 Million a day

on peace keeping missions in Sierra Leone provoked so much displeasure with the public that a drastic

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reduction in Nigeria’s involvement in Sierra Leone had become imperative for the new government

(2008). This was against a backdrop of economic hardship for the average citizen in Nigeria. Obasanjo,

being aware of the importance of Nigeria’s vanguard role in West Africa and at the continental level was

not prepared to abandon this position. He therefore sought to craft a new foreign policy towards Africa

that would spread the costs of peacekeeping among the other relatively well endowed countries and a

sharing of the burden of resolving conflicts in Africa. Tieku claims that, the reform package that

Obasanjo presented was crafted as an integration and co-operation package encompassing issues of

security, good governance and development (2004). Although Nigeria has been a willing leader in West

Africa, under both military and civilian rule, since 1999 when they had a democratically elected

government, they have used this as leverage to intervene further into the other West African and

continental countries to promote democracy and good governance.

Nigeria’s leading role as the promoter of democracy on the continent is paradoxical because of Nigeria’s

governance record. Nigeria is a nascent federal democracy having gone through many discontinuities

with recurrent military interruptions in its political process. The country has been ruled by the military

for 30 years and it has been under civilian rule or 21 years.3 During the periods of civilian rule, the

country was governed under new or amended constitutions with ‘democratically’ elected civilian

government. However, corruption has rendered the democratic process less effective because control

of the federal and state governments translates to access to government funds, politicians therefore

have shown in the past willingness to go to extremes to win elections and stay in power, to lose office

means to be cut out of the system of patronage. Falola and Heaton state that Obasanjo declared that

ending corruption was one of the main tasks of his administration. One of the anti-corruption

institutions he created was the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate

instances of corruption among public officials and initially the EFCC was able to recover over $5 billion in

3 See Appendix 1 for chart on Political continuity and discontinuity in Nigeria

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stolen funds and prosecute offenders. Obasanjo however failed to reduce corruption in the country and

used the anti-corruption institutions that he set up to prosecute his political opponents, weaken them in

election years and to cripple opposition parties (2008).

This can be considered to be what Sodaro terms the paradox of democracy where institutions can be

subverted or manipulated in ways that contradict its basic principles even when the rules and

procedures are being followed (2004). Further, Obasanjo stepped down in disgrace after trying to

modify the constitution and prolong his tenure by vying for a third term. Nigerian politics can be

classified under what Haynes refers to as façade or minimal democracy in which rulers have few genuine

pretensions to democracy; regular but controlled elections; and alliances between the political rulers

and the military (In Hinds 2001: 6). Obasanjo himself was a military head of state between 1976-79. It

therefore has a kind of democratic form with minimum trappings of democracy but little democratic

substance. Despite these shortcomings in its democratic process, Nigeria has been able to convince the

AU to accommodate its interests. This is because of the power that it wields that allows it to remain

influential. Nigeria was also able to convince the AU to include a resolution and management of

domestic conflict in its agenda by virtue of the fact that the continent has a record of pervasive human

rights violations and threats to human security. This trend continues to manifest, Okumu attests to this

and makes the point that “the AU, after five years of existence, has little to show in terms of democratic

consolidation and promotion of a culture of human rights, human security and good governance” (2009:

101).

In terms of Obasanjo’s goal of courting foreign investment, South Africa’s interests within the AU come

to bear. Thabo Mbeki like Obasanjo adopted a neo-liberal strategy designed to make South Africa a

destination for foreign investment and a competitive global trading state. However, the location of

South Africa in a continent whose international image as a protector of rights including property rights,

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is tainted, the immediate challenge that the government of the day faced in its attempt to pursue these

twin objectives was finding the appropriate means to improve the image of Africa. It accomplished this

through its foreign policy indicating the promotion of democracy and human rights as the core of its

policy. Mbeki placed this neo-liberal agenda within a broader transformationalist agenda and

reintroduced ‘African Renaissance’ to serve as the conceptual framework for the new approach. He set

about reforming the OAU, played a vital role in the creation of the AU and influenced the AU to take a

number of pro-democracy decisions (Tieku 2004). South Africa’s interests in this case were compatible

with Nigeria’s and with each other’s support, they were able to wield a lot of influence within the AU as

two of the most powerful states on the continent. Their agendas were both neoliberal embracing the

twin pillars of free trade and democracy. This interplay of states within the AU places emphasis on its

intergovernmental nature in which sovereignty is preserved and the state takes a central role in

bargaining, with powerful states reaping the spoils because of their capacity and influence. Rosamond

posits that the emphasis on governance in this instance focuses on zero-sum notions associated with

sovereignty and a politics of absolutes (2000).

Okumu argues rightfully that, although the Preamble of the Constitutive Act envisions the AU as an

organization that would create “solidarity and cohesion among (African) peoples,” as well as a “united

and strong Africa” composed of “governments and all segments of civil society,” this Pan-Africanist ideal

has not been widely embraced on the continent” (2009: 106). There is no Africanist ethos that brings the

people on the continent together as one. This is compounded by the fact that individual countries are

themselves intensely divided along ethnic, linguistic, regional and religious lines. Nigeria for example

consists of over 200 ethno-linguistic groups, the country is also split mainly between two religions;

Muslims and Christians with 50% of the Sunni Muslims heavily concentrated in the North while

Christians make up 40% of the population and the other 10% consists of indigenous religions (Falola and

Heaton 2008).

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Based on the above factors and given the colonial historical background which entailed alteration of

political landscapes through the amalgamation of previously independent nations, the national question

is a nagging problem for most African states which struggle with developing a meaningful national

identity that supersedes the divisions. Unless a culture is created that can accommodate and embrace

shared values (political and social) at a national level, a similar task at a continental level will prove to be

futile. Okumu is of the opinion that “currently, the continent is bereft of Pan Africanist ideas, aspirations

and ambitions similar to those that guided Nkrumah and Nyerere to spearhead the African liberation

struggle and implant the seed of the ‘African Personality’ “(2009: 106). Sodaro argues that the success of

a democracy is dependent upon the attitudes and behaviours of the political elite (2004). This same

argument can be applied in this instance, political elite in the different countries should be willing to be

the driving forces behind a Pan Africanist spirit and create an environment for such an awareness to

develop to an extent that the project is people driven and not politicize the differences among the

people.

If we consider Machiavelli’s (1984) view of political culture and conduct of election and Mostesquieu’s

(1989) conditions for democracy, we may raise a brow against Nigeria’s quest for free and fair elections.

Machiavelli believed that to have a sound political culture, the actual conduct of politics and the “moral

habits” of citizens must coincide with the norms of behaviour prescribed by state’s constitution (1984).

The 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria provides such condition. Embedded in it are: Its

universal suffrage, representative government through competitive political party system, a presidential

form of government based on the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances amongst

other democratic values. All stable and successful democracies depend on these (Otonna 2011).4

4 The Tide. 2011. Nigeria’s Political Culture and Elections. December 05

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At the AU level, mechanisms such as the AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the

New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) establishing norms at the continental level have

been created. The Charter speaks consistently to the support, nurture, promotion and consolidation of

good governance, political pluralism, tolerance, consensus and a culture of democracy and peace

(African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 2007).

But it is not enough to have these features in the constitution or in charters. Montesquieu provides a

link between the constitution and value system. Looking at a democratic society, he concluded that its

main features may not lie in any neat institutional arrangement but in the spirit or intention behind

them, not in the laws but in the spirit of the laws. The political culture of many of African countries has

been left wanting in terms of consolidation of certain values and mores. Nigeria tops the list of countries

that whose democratic processes do not reflect the spirit behind the laws instituted. The country

remains marred by violence, rigging, intolerance of opposition, falsification of popular vote and

authoritarian democracy, all of which according to Otonna, have led to alienation in the political arena

(The Tide, December 05 2011)5.

The effects on the political culture in Nigeria has been a cross road between parochial and subjective

cultures. Parochial to the extent that citizens are indistinctly aware of the existence of federal

government, their existence seemingly unaffected by national decisions and subject to the extent that

they see themselves not as participants in the political process but as subjects of the government

(Hague et al 1998). At the AU level, the political culture is parochial where citizens are far removed from

its politics and maintain a passive relationship to the AU. They do not get to vote on any AU decisions

therefore they have no real influence on AU politics. Apathetic national political cultures have been

translated onto the regional level on the AU which has been referred to as a ‘dictators club and is also

trying to shake off the title of ‘talk shop’ (Tieku 2004 and Okumu 2009). These sentiments by average

5 The Tide. 2011. Nigeria’s Political Culture and Elections. December 05.

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citizens are warranted because since the AU was formed in 2001, it has very little to show. Okumu

contends that the regional organization still faces daunting challenges including the seemingly

intractable conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Niger Delta region in Nigeria, Darfur and

Somalia, agile militia and rebel movements in Uganda, DRC, Sudan, Central Africa Republic, flawed

elections in Kenya and Angola, acute democratic deficits in Zimbabwe, military take overs in Central

Africa Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, Guinea and Twice in Mauritania, recurrent territorial

disputes, xenophobic violence coupled with abject poverty, famine and malnutrition (2009). This

reinforces the point that principles and institutions can be rendered ineffective by lack of political will

and corruption which are antithetical to good governance.

In order to meet its integration agenda, the AU requires substantial financial resources. Okumu states

that the AU has an annual budget of $130 million. The financing is derived mainly from membership

contributions, private sector and foreign donors. Five of the most powerful and well-endowed countries

on the continent (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) contribute 75 percent of these funds.

Since its inception, the AU has operated on a deficit as there is the malpractice of non-payment of dues

and the accumulation of huge arrears was inherited from the OAU. This has led to a profound

overreliance on external support in implementing its programs related to peace and security agenda

(2009: 106). He further posits that, “without this support, the AU peace and security agenda would not

have been operational” (Ibid). The downside to this is that donors are the ones who have drawn

roadmaps for setting up key institutions and determined which aspects of the agenda are to be

implemented. Conditionalities and commitments of aid often reflect the character of the donor which

means a change in the character and outlook of AU policy making as it adapts to reflect the

requirements of the donors.

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Nigeria’s economy is largely dependent on oil revenues. The fact that oil revenues accrue mainly from

foreign-owned multinational corporations has led to the establishment of the “rentier state” in Nigeria –

a state in which the government is dependent solely upon “rents” paid to it by non-Nigerian clients

(Falola and Heaton 2008). Due to this, the Nigerian government has had little incentive to rule in the

best interest of its citizens, since its poor and money derive not from the population but from foreign oil

companies that pay the government for the privilege of drilling on Nigerian territory. This latter point

relating to Nigeria’s government disincentive to rule in the interests of its citizens can be juxtaposed to

the regional setting. Because of overdependence on foreign aid to build capacity and find solutions to

African problems, there are missed opportunities for self-sustainability as solutions are dictated by

outsiders who may not understand continental issues nor represent or be responsive to the needs of the

continent’s populations. Further, given the global financial crisis, support from the West will definitely

decrease and this will have a critical negative impact on the AU’s undertakings.

Tieku argues that the clash of interests and ideas of key actors and how they are accommodated within

the AU is important in understanding the dynamics of the AU. His work analyses the interests of three

key players within the AU; Nigeria, South Africa and Libya and how they have sought to use their

influence to reform the organization in line with their foreign policies. Although some of the interests of

Nigeria and South Africa were compatible, there was a clash between these two countries interests and

Libya’s interests. Unlike Libya which was unsuccessful in its quest for a federalist United States of Africa

which most members viewed as too radical; Nigeria and South Africa were able to lobby successfully for

their interests within the AU with each other’s support (2004). This clash of interests within the AU is

significant in this era because of the emergence of the Arab Spring that has led to the death of Qaddafi.

This leaves a large power vacuum within the AU and an opportunity for Nigeria to increase its clout and

position in the post Qaddafi era. As a major oil producer and the most populous country in Africa, its ‘big

brother’ role could expand. Personality politics also needs to be highlighted in this instance because

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Qaddafi was a charismatic head strong figure head within the AU who was a force to reckon with backed

by Libyan petrodollars. Obasanjo represented a similar personality within Nigeria and the AU. However,

since Obasanjo’s departure from power in Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan has been elected president. Mr.

Jonathan is not considered the charismatic tenacious type leader but is docile and might not be able to

take advantage of the power vacuum and Qaddafi’s absence within the AU. However, Nigeria through its

own political and financial clout within the Union and through the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) – of which Jonathan is currently chairman - could still loom larger and push its goals of

increased stability in West Africa and beyond through cost sharing.

The AU has to find a way to remain a viable regional institution in a globalized world system. Most

countries in the world are making such attempts at a regional and in the multilateral fora as well at an

increasing rate. The success of these attempts, determine the policy makers from the policy takers of

the globalisation process. The AU remains an incoherent and disorganized institution plagued by

handicaps ranging from the lack of a real African ethos to pervasive human rights violations and threats

to human security to severe scarcity of resources for governments to provide for their own citizens

leading to limited funding for such a mammoth organization to overdependence on external aid to weak

democratic institutions and institutional capacities, it is therefore a policy taker. All these factors have

contributed to its ineffectiveness and unresponsive to the needs of the continental population.

However, it is incumbent upon Africans to create a new situation on the continent; there is no choice

but to continue to treat the Union with unrelenting resolve. In order for this to happen, focus cannot be

placed fully on the state. Accommodation of local forces and non-state actors into the development

agenda is imperative. Sole focus on intergovernmentalism has meant that mainly the key actors have

been accommodated into the integration process because of their influence and capability. The AU is an

organization made up of 53 nations; all cannot be major players within the Union because they are

differently endowed but they have to be accommodated into it and the Union has be made to work for

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them as well. Further, intergovernmentalism has meant that the AU is state driven rather than people

driven. A regional integration project cannot work if people feel distant from it, remain largely

untouched by its activities and are uninvolved in its work which is the situation that obtains within the

continent both at regional and the national levels.

The changes that have taken place in North Africa where citizens have demanded a new leadership and

change from dictatorships to a new kind of government are instructive of the wave and kind of activism

that is possible from civil society and other non-state actors. This might be an avenue that can be

explored where the promotion of the Union takes a bottom up approach as in South East Asia where this

kind of alternative regionalism is pursued and the non-government actors are made partners of

integration processes. There has to be creativity in the approach to regional integration, there are

lessons to be learnt from the EU model but total replication as is currently done might not work because

of the different realities presented by the different regions. A blend of different perspectives of

regionalism can be adapted, the main aim being to make the process work for the people, in turn for the

states involved as they deal with the inevitable globalized international arena; a new regionalist

approach. These prescriptions in order to work entail the work of individual nations and the community

of nations. The old adage ‘charity begins at home’ comes to bear, individual countries cannot pursue

and champion democracy, economic growth and peace and security, three core areas stated in the aims

of the AU while at the national level they are plagued by repressive governance systems, economic

decline and insecurity. This scenario classically represented by Nigeria and its involvement in the AU.

Within this same trail of thought, Marks et al speak of a multi level governance approach in which there

is an existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of government and the interaction of

political actors across those levels. In addition to avoid the exclusivity of the state as the only link

between domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining, other non political actors can be included

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in this process as well. This according to them avoids the traps of state-centricism and the treatment of

a region integration project as only operating from the headquarters (1996). Christiansen concurs and

adds that multi levels of government approach offers a horizontally as well as vertically asymmetrical

negotiating system (In Ougaard and Higgott 2002). This approach is worth exploring.

Although there is much debate on the high politics of the AU involving matters such as defense, funding

and foreign policy, much of what goes on within the regional organisation is about day to day technical,

regulatory policy making, in other words, low politics. Rosamond is rightfully of the view that there

needs to be more conceptualisation and analysis of low politics which is the operational arm of any

regional arrangement (2000). One cannot work without the other, both low and high politics issues need

to be tabled on the agenda and resolved if the AU is to be a thriving institution. There is much to be

done within the AU and national African polities in order to make them viable institutions and players in

an increasingly interconnected world, however, there is no question that the Union is extremely

necessary and effort must be made at the sub-national, national and regional levels to make it work.

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Trading Economics - IMF. 2009. Nigeria Population. http ://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigria/population-imf-data.html (accessed November 10, 2011)

Appendix 1

NIGERIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES, 1960-PRESENT

DATES NAMES TITLE ETHNICITY Cause of departure

19

1960-Jan. 1966 Tafawa Balewa Prime Minister Hausa-Fulani (North) Coup (killed)

1963-Jan. 1966 Nnamdi Azikiwe

President[appointed]

Ibo (East) Coup (Removed)

Jan-July 1966 Agusi Ironsi Military Head of State

Ibo (East) Coup (Killed)

July 1966-1975 Yakubu Gowon Military Head of State

Tiv (Middle Belt/North)

Coup (Removed)

1975-1976 Murtala Muhammed

Military Head of State

Hausa-Fulani (North) Coup (Killed)

1976-1979 Olesugun Obasanjo


Yoruba (South West) Handed power to civilian govt

1979-1983 Shehu Shagari President Hausa-Fulani (North) Coup (Removed)

1983-1985 Muhammed Buhari


Hausa-Fulani (North) Coup (Removed)

1985-1993 Ibrahim Babangida


Gwari (North) Forced out of office

June-1993 Moshood Abiola

President Yoruba (Southwest) Did not begin tenure

Aug-Nov 1993 Ernest Shonekan

Interim Head of State [appointed]“Military/Civillian”

Yoruba (Southwest) Forced out of office

Nov 1993-1998 Sani Abacha Head, Provisional Ruling Council“Military”

Kanuri (North) Died in office

1998-1999 Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar

Head, Provisional Ruling Council “Military”

Gwari (North) Handed power to civilian govt

1999-2007 Olesugun Obasanjo

President, Federal Republic of Nigeria

Yoruba (South West) Peaceful hand over of power after elections

2007-2010 Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua


Hausa-Fulani (North) Died in office

2011-Present Goodluck Jonathan


Ijaw (South South)

Source: Falola, Toyin and Mathew Heaton. 2008. A history of Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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