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The Afghanistan-Pakistan War:

Measuring Success (or Failure)

Anthony H. Cordesman

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

July 2008

1800 K Street, NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20006

Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Fax: 1.202.775.3199

Web:

www.csis.org/burke/reports

“Success: Version One”

2

Stable, unified, secular democracy(ies).

Islamist, extremist and other threats

eliminated.

Upper third of global economies and per

capita income.

Human rights and rule of law equal to

US standards.

Example transforms neighboring states

and region.

NATO and alliance structures

transformed

No narcotics.

“Success: Version Two”

3

Our strategic goals remain that Afghanistan

is:

1) a reliable, stable ally in the War on

Terror;

2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving

private sector economy;

3) capable of governing its territory and

borders; and

4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens.

Achieving these goals requires the application

of a whole-of-government approach, along

multiple lines of operation, including security,

governance, and development

OSD, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2008

“Success: Version Three”

4

Depart unstable state(s) with some

pluralistic elements.

Threats localized and contained.

Level of poverty reduced.

Rising educational standards.

Culture adapting to modern

economic needs.

NATO and alliance structures

undamaged.

No regional or global backlash

The Limits of “Success”

5

Cannot control the future after the

US leaves -- or even while it stays.

Cannot transform an entire society,

political system, or set of values.

Partnership means taking risks and

having a partner and not a client.

Pakistan may emerge as the more

critical challenge.

Risk and uncertainty remain local,

national, and regional.

The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

AFGHANISTAN

• Land Mass – 647,500 sq km

• Population – 31,900,000 people;

28% literacy

• Land locked, primarily agrarian

economy: $35.B GDP, $1,000 PC

•Budget: $2.6; $8.9B in aid

pledges

• Lacks both transportation and

information infrastructure: 34,782

Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved

• Restrictive terrain dominates the

country

IRAQ

• Land Mass – 432,162 sq km

• Population – 27,500,000 people;

84% literacy

• Economy dominated by the oil

sector: $100.0B GDP, $3,600 PCI

• Budget $48.4 billion; $33B+ in

aid pledges

•Comparatively developed

transportation and information

infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of

roads, 38,399 Km paved

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~176,000

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~49,000

AFGHANISTAN

IRAQ

“Success:” Counterinsurgency

vs. Armed Nation-Building?

7

“Stability operations” and

“counterinsurgency” are misnomers.

“Nation building” imposes special burdens.

The non-military dimension is as critical, or

more critical, than the military one.

Only the host country can ultimately win,

and it must win politically, in governance, and

in economics, as well as in security terms.

The Elements of Success

in a Joint Afghan-Pakistan-Regional

Campaign Plan - If We Only Had One

8

Ideology and Motivation

Political Accommodation

Security

Governance

Development

Strengthen The Nation

• Promote Afghan Ownership

• Sustain Momentum and Confidence in the Future

• Continue to Develop Afghan Leadership Capacity

• Support Afghanistan in Defeating the Insurgency

Counter-Insurgency Approach“REPLACE FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY WITH TRUST AND CONFIDENCE”

Connect People

to the

Government

Build Trust and

Confidence in

Government

Solidify Popular

Support of

Government

Degrade Destabilizing

Forces

• Isolate Insurgents

from People and

Government

• Disrupt Support

Networks

• Interdict Border

Infiltration

• Disrupt Movement

Build Capacity

• Develop Leadership

• Build a Trusted

National Security

Capability

• Promote Good

Governance

• Facilitate Growth

and Development

• Develop Momentum

Separate

Insurgents

from the People

Limit Options

to Reconcile,

Capture, Kill,

or Flee

Discredit

Insurgent Vision

and Ideology

INFORMATION DOMAIN

INFORMATION DOMAIN

10Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

Measure Success Where the Fight Is:

RC-East Assessment Summary

Secure environmentOccasional threatsFrequent threats Dangerous environmentActivities / operations impeded

Full authorityEmergingIneffectiveDysfunctionalNon-existent

Sustainable GrowthDependent GrowthMinimal GrowthStalled GrowthPopulation At Risk

Bamyan

Khowst

Paktika

Ghazni

Wardak

Parwan

Nuristan

Paktya

Konar

Nangarhar

Bamyan

Khowst

Paktika

Ghazni

Wardak

Parwan

Nuristan

Paktya

Konar

Nangarhar

Bamyan

Khowst

Paktika

Ghazni

Wardak

Parwan

Nuristan

Paktya

Konar

Nangarhar

• Areas with good governance have good security

• ANA showing increased capacity to lead, but lack combat

enablers: C2, intel, logistics, QRF, access to fires

• Lack of ANP leadership hinders development, but ANA

support and focused training is making progress

• Government increasingly identifying major issues such as

corruption but lacks accountability measures

• National and local government capacities are growing, but

won’t decentralize authorities and resources due to lack of trust

• Lack of Rule of Law and legal capacities impedes

accountability and discourages international investment

• Expansion of the road network facilitates Afghanistan's

role as an economic link to the Central Asian states

• Lack of large scale power limits industrial development

• Licit economy growing faster than the narco-economy, but

a black-market born of necessity hinders licit growth

Increased (88)

Decreased (7)

DISTRICT CHANGESINCE JULY: +81

Increased (55)

Decreased (15)

DISTRICT CHANGESINCE JULY: +40

Increased (78)

Decreased (15)

DISTRICT CHANGESINCE JULY: +63

SECURITY

GOVERNANCE

DEVELOPMENT

11

Success is Transfer to Afghan Hands:

“Building a Stable Afghanistan: The

Way Ahead”

Coalition LeadGIRoA Support

GIRoA Lead

Coalition Cooperation

GIRoA LeadCoalition Enablers

GIRoA LeadCoalition Support

Instability Security, Governance, Development

“Building Continuum”Stability

• Integrated governance, development and security framework

• Province focused, deliberate, condition-based approach

• Cooperative partnership and support

• Sustain national and international comprehensive counterinsurgency

approach

We are here

13

Success Must Be Measured in Realistic

Timelines: History Takes Time

Security

Governance

Gender Equality

Development

Universal Primary Education

Improve Maternal Health

Reduce Child Mortality

Control HIV/AIDS/Diseases

Build Global Partnerships

Environmental Stability

Eradicate Extreme Poverty

Security

Governance

Governance

Rule of Law

Human Rights

Econ & Social Development

Education

Health

Agriculture

Rural Development

Infrastructure

Natural Resources

Private Sector

Social Protection

United Nations Millennium Development GoalsAfghan National Development Strategy

Security

Enemy

Afghan National

Security Forces

Border

Governance

Government

Population

Legal Process

Development

Education

Health Care

Agriculture

Roads

2007 2008 2013 2020

1414

Measuring Success from the Lessons of Armed

Nation Building Conflict termination must treat the causes and not just the symptoms.

Tactical victories become meaningless without political , ideological,

information, and media dominance.

Operations must focus on stability operations, exercises in stability

and “nation-building

Success occurs where the fighting is: The local and regional level of

operations is as important as the central government.

Political accommodation and ideological operations have critical

priority.

Governance and provision of critical services in conflict and

vulnerable areas become critical aspects of “security.”

So is personal security for the population and preserving/creating

the rule of law.

“Dollars are bullets:” Value of economic incentives and aid, CERP,

immediate employment and career status.

Need incentives to convert, disarm terrorists, insurgents, irregular

opponents, not just force: “Carrots as well as sticks”

Finding Effective Measures

15

Accept complexity and uncertainty

Net assessment of all sides and resulting risks and cost

benefits.

Integration of intelligence, operations, and policy.

Ruthlessly demanding and objective intelligence analysis

Make honest assessments of timelines and costs.

Objective analysis of host country partner

Objective analysis of neighbors, allies, NATO/ISAF

Risk analysis: Model and game the full conflict,

including exit strategies and possible defeats.

Determine whether there are adequate military, civilian,

aid, and advisory resources.

Communication to the American people and Congress.

Is transparency and honesty possible?

The “Regional” Challenge

16

Afghan-Pakistan War at a Minimum: Battle for

Greater Pashtunistan

Ethnic, sectarian, political/ideological and

tribal “spillover” will be the rule and not the

exception.

Neighbors create partial sanctuaries and proxy

forces

US operations directly or indirectly involve all

neighboring states.

Even friendly and allies states have different

priorities and agendas.

NATO/ISAF is a major intelligence challenge,

and requires analysis as much as the threat.

“All Wars is Local”

17

Analyze Combat and enemy activity in local,

provincial, and district terms.

Compare threat activity with US, allied, and Afghan

forces, aid, development, and governance.

Success of forward deployment, and “win,” “hold,”

and “build” efforts at local level.

Success of efforts to strengthen local and provincial

governments, and tribal leaders.

Compare enemy extremism, mistakes with own and

friendly mistakes; local attitudes critical.

Impact of raids, air strikes, civilian casualties

collateral damage.

Joint Campaign Indicators - I

18

Separation of Afghanistan from Pakistan

“Dual standards” for US in East and

NATO/ISAF

Failure to realistically assess “success” in

Taliban, other Islamist, and Al Qa'ida terms:

They seek political and economic influence, and

outlasting US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan

government is victory.

Kinetic - war fighting emphasis; local tactical

versus broader district, provincial regional.

Explicit, comparative analysis of ANA. ANP.

Pakistani,and NATO/ISAF allied failures/limits.

Joint Campaign Indicators - II

19

ONE WAR: Not US, NATO/ISAF, Pakistan

Net assessment: Intel, ops, plans.

Localize incident, casualty, and trend analysis and tie

to patterns, risks, changes.

Look at overall violence: kidnappings, extortion,

corruption, displacement, intimidation US and allied

actions.

Map full range of Taliban, other Islamist, Al Qa’ida

activity: presence, economic and political influence,

intimidation, ideological impact.

Afghan, Pakistani perceptions critical at national,

regional, district, and local levels.

Afghan/Pakistan Security Force

Indicators - I

20

Trained and equipped, authorized, budget

close to meaningless.

Presence, and transition out of, embedded

advisors (SOF) and partner units.

Combat history by order of battle to battalion

level.

What is actually there down to local level,

linked to threat activity.

Pay, facilities, operational weapons, medical,

and benefits critical.

Afghan/Pakistan Security Force

Indicators - II

21

“Win, hold, build” or buy time/lose.

Army can win; police, rule of law (legal

process, courts, and jails), employment,

and governance “build, and hold.”

Proper balance of central, provincial,

district, and local power.

Viable sectarian/ethnic balance.

Acceptable corruption, levels of ghosts,

missing, and promotion/retention

problems.

Economic Indicators - I

22

Long-Mid Term Development currently

irrelevant.

National macro economic indicators -

GNP/GDP, PCI meaningless

Inputs in terms of budgets and aid

expenditures largely meaningless.

Project activity unrelated to lasting impact

and valid requirements meaningless.

Popular perceptions at the province, district,

and local level critical and usually ignored in

official reporting.

Economic Indicators - II

23

Current employment, income distribution, trends,

and perception with emphasis on combat/risk areas

Progress by key sector in meeting actual needs.

Roads, water, power, jobs.

Tie budget and aid spending to valid

requirements, measures of effectiveness, and polls.

Focus on combat and high risk areas.

For mid-term on, get real about demographics,

opportunities, impacts of programs.

Unity of government. Official, and NGO efforts.

Governance Indicators - I

24

People “do not live in the dawn of tomorrow; they live

in the noon of today.”

Central governments are hardest to fix, and will lack

core competence in many areas for length of campaign.

Inevitably linked to success in political

accommodation and security.

Governance can only win if present at the provincial,

district, and local level and “you win where you

govern.”

Following the money far more critical than compacts,

plans, strategies.

Laws and legislative action only meaningful in terms

of how actually enforced over time.

Focus on key tasks or paralysis and failure.

Governance Indicators - II

25

Legitimacy and popular support are not the

product of elections, but of the quality of

representation, day-to-day security, and services

that affect local populations.

Key tests are mix of:

Security and rule of law,

key utilities, education, and medical support,

local aid/spending impacts, and

level of of corruption.

Local legitimacy and security cannot be

separated from sectarian, ethnic, and tribal issues.

Patience: Long timelines, limited outside

competence in aid,

Local political culture will often survive

Narcotics Indicators - I

26

Eradication is not a measure of success, either

measured in area or estimated output.

Impacts on low income growers and lower levels of

traffickers meaningless = “Overhead.”

Displacing growing and trafficking into hostile and

Taliban-dominated areas is not success.

Alienating population is is not success.

Corrupt programs are not success.

Programs that do not impact decisively on world

consumption and street prices are not success.

Programs decoupled from agricultural development

and improved incomes for low income farmers are not

success.

Narcotics Indicators - II

27

Narcotics must be measured as subset of agricultural

and economic development.

Cannot succeed except through sustained

agricultural development and market-driven shifts to

other groups: Roads, power, water, capital.

Must measure in terms of impact on insurgency and

security: Reactions of impacted Afghans and income to

Taliban/Al Qa’ida etc.

Gains in counternarcotics must be measured in terms

of iimpact on high and mid-level traffickers, and

operations of processing and distribution networks .

No meaningful success unless affects global

distribution and street prices.

Ideology, Perception, and

Political Indicators - I

28

Mirror imaging Western/US values disguises actual

situation.

Polling or estimating nation-wide trends is pointless

and disguises what is happening in combat and high

threat areas.

Impact of psyops, public diplomacy, and information

warfare programs must be independently and critically

validated or results are worthless..

“Spinning” and validating policy and strategy cost

lives and make success far more difficult.

Ideology, Perception, and

Political Indicators - II

29

Measure success in Afghan terms and values

Measure perceptions and trends in all key areas,

including economics, governance, local security.

Analyze perceptions of threat, NATO/ISAF, and

Afghan government indirectly comparable terms.

Explicitly poll and measure perceptions of actions of

US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan government security

forces.

Identify key negatives and positives and trends.

Poll and track in Islamic, ethnic, and tribal terms.

Track all aid and governance activity in terms of polls

of impact on Afghan perceptions and attitudes.

How to Measure “Success” in Ways

That End in “Failure”

30

Try to measure success without a real-world strategy

that lays out the plan, budget, and resources necessary

to track success.

Say what you want to hear; downplay problems and

complexity.

Support policy and strategy for advancement and

career security.

Spin the situation to win short term public, media,

and Congressional support.

Compartment key parts of the the problem.

Lie by omission and don’t measure the entire set of

key variables.

Put alliance and host country considerations before

reality and the truth.

Use past measurements regardless of changes in the

situation.