the 2011 arab uprisings and israel’s national...

THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY

Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 95

The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s

National Security

Efraim Inbar

© The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900 Israel

http://www.besacenter.org

ISSN 0793-1042

February 2012

The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies

The BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University was founded by Dr. Thomas O.

Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader. The Center is dedicated to the memory of

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who

concluded the first Arab-Israel peace agreement. The Center, a non-partisan and independent

institute, seeks to contribute to the advancement of Middle East peace and security by

conducting policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate to the

national security and foreign policy of Israel.

Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of

research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is

deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author's views

or conclusions. BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy summarizes the papers delivered

at conferences and seminars held by the Center, for the academic, military, official and

general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public

debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the

Middle East. The BESA Memorandum series consist of policy-oriented papers. The content

of the publications reflects the views of the authors only. A list of recent BESA Center

publications can be found at the end of this booklet.

International Advisory Board Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht

Vice Chairman: Mr. Saul Koschitzky

Members: Prof. Moshe Arens, Ms. Judy Ann Hecht, Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht,

Prof. Riva Heft-Hecht, Hon. Shlomo Hillel, Mr. Isi Leibler, Amb. Yitzhak Levanon, Sen.

Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Maj. Gen. (res.) Daniel Matt, Rt. Hon. Brian

Mulroney, Maj. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Amb. Meir Rosenne, Mr. Greg

Rosshandler, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Mr. Muzi Wertheim

International Academic Advisory Board Desmond Ball Australian National University, Ian Beckett University of Kent, Eliot A.

Cohen Johns Hopkins University, Irwin Cotler McGill University, Steven R. David Johns

Hopkins University, Yehezkel Dror Hebrew University, Lawrence Freedman King's College,

Patrick James University of Southern California, Efraim Karsh King's College, Robert J.

Lieber Georgetown University, Barry Posen Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Jasjit

Singh Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Research Staff BESA Center Director: Prof. Efraim Inbar

Research Associates: Dr. Efrat Aviv, Dr. Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Prof. Stuart A. Cohen, Dr. Gil

Feiler, Prof. Jonathan Fox, Prof. Hillel Frisch, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Col. (res.) Aby Har-Even,

Dr. Tsilla Hershco, Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Prof. Avi Kober, Dr. Yaakov Lifshitz, Prof. Ze'ev

Maghen, Mr. Amir Rapaport, Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Maj. Gen. (res.) Emanuel Sakal, Prof.

Shmuel Sandler, Dr. Eitan Shamir, Dr. Dany Shoham, Dr. Shlomo Shpiro, Dr. Max Singer,

Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum

Director of Public Affairs: David M. Weinberg

Program Coordinator: Hava Waxman Koen

Publication Editor (English): Ilana Hart

Publication Editor (Hebrew): Alona Briner Rozenman

The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT ............................................................ 2

The Weakening of Arab States and Increased Uncertainty .............. 2

The Regional Balance of Power ....................................................... 4

THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CLOUT ..................................................... 5

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL .......................................... 7

Strategic Surprises ............................................................................ 7

Regional Isolation ............................................................................ 8

Erosion in Israel’s Deterrence ........................................................ 10

Growing Security Risks ................................................................. 11

Threats to the Sea Lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean ................. 14

The Iranian Nuclear Challenge ...................................................... 17

ISRAELI RESPONSES............................................................................. 18

A Larger Defense Budget ............................................................... 19

The Imperative for Defensible Borders .......................................... 22

Forging Strategic Alliances ............................................................ 22

Responding to Iran ......................................................................... 24

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 24

The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security

Efraim Inbar*

INTRODUCTION

Dramatic events have unfolded in the Middle East since the beginning

of 2011. Large numbers of demonstrators have gathered in central

squares to voice outrage against their rulers while demanding

sweeping governmental reforms. Four long-time dictators have

already been removed from power. The Arab world is in turmoil and

authoritarian regimes are under great duress. The trajectory of these

events is not entirely clear, creating much political uncertainty. While

the nature of these domestic upheavals is novel internationally, the

ongoing Middle East turmoil only underscores current regional

trends. While the Arab states become weaker, non-Arab states – like

Turkey and Iran – are becoming relatively stronger; and the US is

slowly losing influence in the region.

This unstable environment indicates trouble for Israel. What follows

is an assessment of the implications of the changing regional

environment for Israel’s national security. The article first presents

the main elements of the changing strategic landscape around Israel:

the weakening of Arab states, changes in the regional balance of

power as radical anti-American forces appear to be gaining greater

influence, and America's apparent retreat from the Middle East. Part

two focuses on how these elements affect Israel’s national security.

Of foremost concern are the heightened risks of rapid change and

strategic surprises, greater uncertainty regarding the behavior of

leaders in neighboring states, increased terrorist activity, reduced

deterrence, growing regional isolation, emerging threats in the eastern

Mediterranean, and the continuing Iranian nuclear challenge. Part

three of the article discusses ways in which Israel must prepare itself

to meet the challenges of the deteriorating security environment.

*The author is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of

the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES

2

Notably, Israel must increase defense outlays to expand its standing

army, particularly the ground and naval forces, and make additional

investments in missile defense and research and development. Israel

must also insist on defensible borders, seek out new regional allies,

and maintain its special relationship with the US.

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The Weakening of Arab States and Increased Uncertainty

Despite over a century of Western cultural influence, the Arab world

has failed to modernize in many respects. As of yet, no Arab state has

evolved into a stable democracy.1 Several UN reports point out that

the Arab world lags behind the rest of the international community in

civil liberties, political rights, education, gender equality, and

economic productivity.2 This deplorable state of affairs is the root

cause of discontent and frustration, which fuels mass protest. Absent a

liberal-democratic political culture, however, mass mobilization in

pursuit of political change is unpredictable and is not necessarily

conducive to democracy.3 Heralding the “Jasmine Revolution” in

Tunisia or the “Lotus Revolution” in Egypt as model cases of popular

discontent in the promotion of democracy, freedom, dignity and

justice reflects a misunderstanding of complex political processes.

One should recall that the much welcomed 2005 “Cedar Revolution”

in Lebanon, which was steered by pro-Western political elements and

led to free elections, ended just four years later with Hizballah’s

takeover of the state. Similarly, free elections in the Palestinian

territories, pushed by a misguided American foreign policy, led to the

hardly-legitimate Palestinian presidency of Mahmoud Abbas and a

Hamas dictatorship in Gaza. It is therefore highly likely that the

newfound Arab hope for a more open and just political system will be

hijacked in free elections by Islamist parties whose commitment to

democracy is nil. Islam, “the heart and soul” of the identity of most

Middle Easterners, has always had great appeal in the region.4 This

reality makes Islamic political forces the strongest alternative to the

current dictators of the Arab states. The Islamists are likely to gain

power, whether by elections or by revolutionary means, as they are

usually the best organized political force outside the ruling

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY

3

government. Recent election results in Tunisia and Egypt amply

demonstrate this point.

The increasing Islamist influence in Arab states may generate regimes

with a variety of revolutionary zeal. Unfortunately for their neighbors,

revolutionary regimes generally tend to display warlike behavior in

the immediate years after taking power.5 Even if the weak democratic

elements in the Arab world, despite all odds, succeed in generating a

democratization process, this would still pose dangers for its

neighbors. While a democratization process is laudable, historical

records suggest that states in transition to a stable democracy are

more war-prone than autocratic regimes.6 Neither Islamic

revolutionary regimes nor fledgling democracies fare well for

regional stability.

So far, much of the old dictatorial order has survived, but its stability

has been undermined and the nature of any successor regimes is

uncertain. The audacious demonstrations of the Arab masses against

tyranny in a quest for more responsive governments challenge the

current political order. The potential for further deterioration in the

region and the risk of additional states being torn by turmoil and civil

war and sliding into “failed state” status has increased significantly.

Such political entities are characterized by the absence of a monopoly

over the use of force; delivery of very limited justice; inability to

sustain a legal and regulatory climate conducive to private enterprise,

open trade, and foreign investment; and difficulty in meeting the basic

needs of the population in terms of health, education, and other social

services.7 The harbingers of such a scenario are Libya and Yemen.

The possible disintegration of Iraq and Syria, two very different cases,

is also not a far-fetched scenario. Inevitably, the ruling governments

in the Arab world will be busy parrying increased domestic

challenges in the near future. The unrest in the Arab world, its

growing Islamization, and the greater potential for its fragmentation

testify to the socio-political crisis and decline in the region – a

growing trend. At the same time, the foreign policy of these states has

introduced much uncertainty, complicating the strategic calculus of

policy makers.


4

The Regional Balance of Power

The upheavals in the Arab world accentuate another regional trend –

the rise of non-Arab Middle East powers Iran, Israel and Turkey at

the expense of the Arab states.8 The further weakening of the Arab

states will have a meaningful impact on the regional balance of

power. The most important Arab states, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, face

serious domestic challenges. While Saudi Arabia and Jordan seem to

have weathered the crisis, they definitely have to pay greater attention

to their domestic arenas. With the exception of Bahrain, whose

destabilization required Saudi military intervention, the rest of the

Arab Gulf monarchic regimes appear to display greater political

resilience than their republican sisters.9 Nonetheless, the need to focus

on domestic problems will reduce the ability of all Arab states to

build national power, project power beyond their borders, and combat

the Iranian and/or Turkish regional influence.

The Islamic Republic of Iran regarded what occurred in Egypt,

Tunisia, Yemen and Libya as pure and virtuous revolutions inspired

by Imam Khomeini.10

Tehran and Ankara, both of whom are aligned

with radical Islamist forces, have welcomed the “Arab Spring,”

particularly the anti-Mubarak demonstrations designed to topple the

military-based regime.11

Historically, Egypt was perceived as a

regional rival to the Turks and Persians. An Egypt beleaguered with

domestic problems has little energy to focus on countering Iran’s and

Turkey’s aspirations and influence. Both vie for regional primacy and

are interested in gaining popularity in the Arab world, in which Egypt

occupies a prominent role. Moreover, growing influence by the

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt suits the ideological inclinations of

Iran’s and Turkey’s rulers. Indeed, the new Egypt has taken steps

toward rapprochement with Iran. At the same time, the United States’

exit from Iraq opens the door for Iran, as well as for Turkey, to

meddle in the affairs of another important Arab state, albeit a

weakened one, in order to gain greater regional power.

Turkey also actively supports the Sunni Islamist opposition to the

Alawite regime in Syria,12

whose fall would be quite a blow to Iran.

The instability in Syria has focused attention on the historic Turkish-

Persian rivalry in the region, signaling once more the dilution of Arab


5

power and decreased Western influence. Even if Syria remains a

source of conflict between Iran and Turkey, these two countries still

cooperate on many levels, including energy transactions, opposing

Kurdish nationalism, dividing spheres of influence in Iraq, and aiding

Muslim Brotherhood elements in the Arab world. They also share a

preference for an inactive US.

The decline in the relative power of Egypt enhances the leadership

role of Saudi Arabia as the only Arab state with the ability to

somewhat contain Iranian and Turkish influence. Not surprisingly, the

balancing game is complex. A Saudi-Turkish alliance has formed to

try to end Assad’s rule in Syria, an Iranian ally. The successful Saudi

intervention to protect the Sunni regime in Bahrain is another

example of curtailing Iranian influence. In this role, Saudi Arabia has

become a tacit ally of Israel.

Indeed, democratic and politically stable Israel is also a rising non-

Arab power and a player in the regional balance of power. The power

differential between Israel's national might and its neighbors has

further increased as it manages to prosper economically and to

develop a high-tech military.13

Israel is a de facto American ally

whose fortunes are linked to perceived US status in global and

regional affairs. As Cairo and Ankara dilute their pro-American

orientation and cool their relations with Jerusalem, the once favorable

regional balance of power, from Israel’s perspective, is deteriorating.

Finally, the key factor in the regional balance of power is the prospect

of Iran becoming a nuclear power. This would be a “game changer,”

affecting the destiny of the region.

THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CLOUT

In 2011, developments in the Middle East underscored the further

erosion of the US position in the region. This is partly due to the

Obama administration's deliberate, “multilateral retrenchment…

designed to curtail the United States’ overseas commitments, restore

its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global partners.”14

It

is also partly due to its confused, contradictory, and inconsistent

responses to the unfolding events in the Middle East. First, there was


6

a quick demand to oust then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, an

action unequivocally viewed in the region as betrayal of a loyal friend

and ally.15

Then, the American criticism of Saudi Arabia’s military

intervention in support of the Sunni ruling Al-Khalifa family in

Bahrain (March 2011) raised eyebrows in Arab capitals.16

Similarly,

many in the Middle East were puzzled by Washington’s slow

response to Gaddafi’s domestic troubles, leaving the initiative for his

removal to its West European allies. The desertion of the eccentric

Gaddafi, who in final analysis had cooperated with the West by

giving up his arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in

2003, was a surprise. Washington failed to grasp that the lesson

learned by Middle East leaders from the American attitude toward

Libya is that it is better to stick with the WMD programs, as

exemplified by North Korea and Iran, in order to prevent a Western

military intervention. In contrast, the brutal suppression of the local

opposition by the anti-American regimes in Iran and Damascus

elicited only mild and very late expressions of criticism from the

Obama administration. The American decision in July 2011 to

facilitate a dialogue with the anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood in

Egypt further eroded the credibility of the US as an astute political

player and credible ally.

While there are voices in the West denying any enmity between the

Muslim Brotherhood and the US, there is no doubt that the leadership

of such Islamist movements throughout the Middle East sees America

as a bitter enemy. In the Middle East, leaders have witnessed

America's retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan, its engagement (or

appeasement, in Middle Eastern eyes) of US enemies Iran and Syria,

and the desertion of friendly rulers. This strengthens the general

perception of a weak and confused American foreign policy.17

Moreover, American military power is extremely stretched and

increasingly constrained in terms of budget. Finally, the

empowerment of the mobs in the Middle East inevitably strengthens

anti-American elements. America and its ally, Israel, are the favored

scapegoats in the Middle East, reflecting deep-rooted anti-Western

attitudes by frustrated multitudes that yearn for the long-gone Muslim

Golden Age.18

Israelis wonder whether America is capable of

exercising sound strategic judgment and standing by its allies. The

animosity displayed by the Obama administration toward the


7

Netanyahu government only reinforces the bewilderment about

American Middle East policy. Thus, the growing consensus in the

region among America’s friends and foes is “Obama does not get it.”

The immediate impact of the US in the region has declined due to its

confused and hesitant responses to the turmoil in various countries

and to the apparent irrelevance of the US to the complex domestic

processes underway. But this may be transitory. The Arab countries

that are angry with America, such as Saudi Arabia, will continue to

depend on the US in more ways than one, while countries that are

trying to introduce change, such as Egypt, will require outside

assistance and support; and few powers apart from the US are well-

suited to offer it. Finally, potential change in the White House

following the November 2012 American elections leaves open the

possibility of reinstalled confidence in the US.

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL

From an Israeli perspective, the current Middle East trends are hardly

positive.19

Indeed, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has

frequently expressed his apprehensions about the direction of the

“Arab Spring.”20

Despite its economic and military strength, Israel

remains a small state with limited resources and diplomatic leverage

to shape its environment. It cannot attain what Arnold Wolfers once

called “milieu objectives.”21

Moreover, as a status quo power, it has

displayed little desire to play any leading role in regional affairs.

While ending the conflict with the Arab world has been a permanent

feature of Israel’s foreign policy, integration within the Middle East

was never an appealing objective. Israel carries some weight in the

international politics of the region; however, mainly it must adjust to

– rather than try to shape – regional and global developments. Israel,

then, must focus on emerging threats and prepare adequate responses.

Strategic Surprises

Over the years Israel has built a large and sophisticated intelligence

apparatus. Nonetheless, the unrest in the Middle East came as a

surprise. Israeli officials had speculated in recent years that the

forthcoming succession of an aging Mubarak could turn Egypt into an


8

“Iran next door.” But this conjecture was quashed by the predictions

of Israeli intelligence analysts and academic experts for a smooth

transfer of power. Similarly, Israel failed to gauge the strength of the

opposition in Syria. This is a stark reminder of the potential for rapid

change and political uncertainty in the Middle East. Strategic

surprises, as improbable as they are, still can happen. Consequently, it

is always necessary to prepare for a variety of scenarios, particularly

the worst-case ones. Furthermore, Israel must take greater care when

considering improbable but gravely threatening situations.22

Regional Isolation

As the Arab world looks less receptive to peace overtures, Israel must

prepare for greater regional isolation. The growing power of Islamist

circles and the deteriorating status of the US in the Middle East

negatively affect the historic peace process between Israel and its

neighboring states.23

This process, characterized by a reluctant

acceptance of Israel as a fait accompli in the region, was primarily the

result of the gradual realization that Israel could not be eradicated by

force due to its strength and that of its American ally.24

Another factor

which helped bring Arab actors to the negotiating table was the vital

diplomatic role played by the US in narrowing party differences and

endeavoring to reduce Israeli anxieties over taking risks for peace.

The Obama administration is less able than its predecessors to induce

Arab states to sign peace treaties with Israel and is less credible in

attempts to compensate Jerusalem for concessions that entail security

risks. Its financial incentives for the Jewish state are also more

limited.

Nowadays, the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan are under great

strain as anti-Israel domestic forces, particularly the Islamists, become

more influential and vocal.25

The Egyptian military, still in control of

the country, has announced its support for keeping Egypt’s

international commitments. But even if the vector of Egyptian politics

does not change dramatically in the near future, the current regime is

weaker than the previous one and, in all likelihood, does not wish to

be burdened with the Israeli relationship. The “cold peace” might,

therefore, become even chillier. Similarly, Jordan might prefer to


9

keep Israel at arm’s length so as not to expose itself to criticism by

radical opponents.

The current impasse in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians

complicates the situation. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been in

disarray since Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007, deeply splitting

the Palestinian national movement. In response to increasing regional

Islamist influence, the PA leadership in the West Bank signed a

reconciliation pact with Hamas in May 2011 designed to mend ties

between the two factions. While its implementation has been delayed

due to fundamental differences, a stronger Hamas role in Palestinian

politics makes the slim chances for bridging the Israeli-Palestinian

divide even more remote.26

The PA has actually defied American

calls to return to the negotiating table, opting instead for unilateral

action. Similarly, the political volatility in Syria disqualifies it from

being a peace partner whose commitments can be taken seriously.

Non-radical states in the Arab world are likely to relegate the

pragmatic cooperation with Israel to back channels or to minimize

their interactions with the Jewish state. The weaker Arab states are

becoming more vulnerable to radical penetration from Iran and to

domestic Islamist forces that are opposed to rapprochement with

Israel. For example, the new Tunisian government, in which the

Islamists play a major role, is gearing up to ratify a new constitution

that includes a section condemning Zionism and ruling out any

friendly ties with Israel. The Islamists' recent success in the region,

coupled with US' perceived departure, further encourage the radical

forces and validate their anti-American policies. In pro-Western

states, as US support is seen to be unreliable, rulers will begin

distancing themselves from the US and its ally, Israel.

Since the new Middle East is not conducive to peacemaking, the

“peace process” has seemingly frozen. The international community,

nonetheless, expects progress in the peace negotiations and many

blame the current impasse on Israel's reluctance to pursue peace

vigorously. This is detrimental to Israel, undermining its position as a

strategic Western asset in a turbulent region.


01

Furthermore, the rising non-Arab powers in the Middle East, Iran and

Turkey, are unfriendly toward Israel. Domestic changes, beyond

Israel’s control, have led to the foreign policy reorientation of these

regional powers that were once Israel’s allies. The 1979 Islamic

Revolution in Iran heralded the rise of an anti-Israeli militant

theocracy. In Turkey, the entrenchment of the Islamist AKP, after

successive electoral victories (2002, 2007 and 2011), moved this

pivotal state into the anti-Israel camp. Both instances indicate further

regional isolation for Israel.

Erosion in Israel’s Deterrence

America's decline in world affairs, particularly in Middle East

politics, may be temporary; yet, it has an immediate impact on the

region.27

US weakness negatively affects Israel’s deterrence

capability, which is not simply limited to its military power and

capacity to win conventional wars and low-intensity conflicts. The

perceived closeness of Israel to America, and the expectation that the

US will come to Israel's aid if needed, is an equally important

component of deterrence. The Obama administration, however, has

disappointed some of its Middle East allies, and its friendship with

Israel is no longer self-evident. As a result, Israel cannot necessarily

rely on Washington’s diplomatic, economic, or military support in the

event that it is attacked. Furthermore, Israeli use of force as a

preventive or preemptive move could exacerbate the strained

Jerusalem-Washington relationship – a pillar of Israel’s national

security. Such considerations are not new, but they are nowadays

more relevant than in the past as Israel considers military action

against Hamas, Hizballah and Iran.

Israel could find some consolation in the fact that the Middle East

crisis proves once again that it is America's most reliable strategic ally

in the region. In the future, it is likely that US planes will be able to

land safely in the Middle East only in Israel. Similarly, only Israeli

ports will be dependable for American contingency planning in the

eastern Mediterranean.

This does not mean that US declarations of commitment to Israel’s

security are fully credible. However, Israel has no alternative to its


00

alliance with the US, as its hegemonic status in world affairs is

unlikely to change in the next 20 years, at least. Therefore, in the

coming few years – particularly if Obama is re-elected in November

2012 – Israel must exercise caution vis-à-vis Washington.

Growing Security Risks

The Arab world is comprised of many weak states that are too busy

handling domestic affairs to invest in assembling a military coalition

against Israel or in building a modern conventional military force

capable of rivaling the Jewish state. In fact, the military, economic,

and technological gap between Israel and its neighbors has widened

over the years, making a large-scale conventional attack increasingly

unlikely – even if Jordan and/or Egypt were to abandon their peace

treaties with Israel.

Nonetheless, there remains a threat of other forms of military

aggression against Israel at the unconventional level, particularly due

to Israel's weakening deterrence capability. Unstable or failed states,

characterized by their complex and decentralized decision making

processes, are less deterrable than states with strong, centralized

political control.28

Consequently, the regional crisis augments Israel's

potential military challenges. This can happen particularly if the new

leaders are strongly motivated by hatred toward Israel, are

inexperienced, or miscalculate their steps. Moreover, neighboring

Arab leaders may decide to divert the attention of their populace from

domestic problems by starting a war of attrition with Israel or by

initiating terror attacks. For example, in the past, Syria’s Assad has,

under duress, organized civilian marches on Israel’s borders.

In addition, the domestic problems plaguing weakened Arab states

make them more terror prone. As leaders lose their grip over state

territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and

terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Such problems plague post-

Mubarak Egypt, where law and order have become more lax. For

example, in the Sinai Peninsula on Israel’s border, a pipeline

supplying Israel (and Jordan) with Egyptian natural gas has been

repeatedly sabotaged. Sinai has also turned into an unimpeded route

for Iranian weapons supply to Hamas and a base for terrorist attacks


02

against Israel. Hamas has even set up rocket production lines in Sinai

in an effort to protect its assets, as the group believes that Israel won't

strike targets inside Egypt due to the affect it would have on bilateral

relations.29

Furthermore, as weakened states lose control over their security

apparatus, national arsenals of conventional (and non-conventional)

arms become more vulnerable, which may result in the emergence of

increasingly well-armed politically dissatisfied groups who seek to

harm Israel. For example, following the fall of Gaddafi, Libyan SA-7

anti-air missiles and anti-tank RPGs seem to have reached Hamas in

Gaza.30

Similarly, in the event that the Syrian regime collapses,

Syria’s advanced arsenal, including chemical weapons, shore-to-ship

missiles, air defense systems, and ballistic missiles of all types could

end up in the hands of Hizballah or other radical elements.31

The domestic dynamics of certain unstable countries are of course

more consequential due to their strategic significance or politico-

cultural resonance in the region. For example, Egypt, the strongest

and most populous Arab state, plays a pivotal role in Middle East

politics. The praetorian, pro-Western Egyptian regime sacrificed

Hosni Mubarak, promised elections and reform, and formed an

alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, the only well-organized

political force outside the ruling government. It remains to be seen

how well the Egyptian generals can control the Brotherhood's

ascendance.

The prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its

seemingly great international acceptance will bolster the cause of the

radical Islamists all over. An Islamist takeover of Egypt would create

a strategic earthquake, strengthening the radical axis in the Middle

East and possibly reviving an Arab military coalition against Israel.

Israel’s fears center around the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty – a

main pillar of Israel's national security. Egypt's defection from the

Arab military coalition removed the strongest military component

from Israel’s list of enemies, thereby dramatically improving Israel's

strategic situation. Moreover, the peace with Egypt has prevented the

Arabs from launching a two-front war against Israel, thus allowing


03

significant cuts in Israel’s defense expenditures. The demilitarization

of the Sinai Peninsula further stabilized the strategic Egyptian-Israeli

relation by denying the two sides the option of surprise attacks. The

demilitarization arrangements, often seen in Egypt as an infringement

on its sovereignty, might now be violated, signaling a significant

change in Egyptian foreign policy. Such violations would elicit a

heightened threat perception in Israel and might be considered a casus

belli.

The erosion of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai, which borders Israel

and the Gaza Strip, has enabled Hamas to enhance its military

capabilities and freedom of action. Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood

offshoot that regards Israel as a religious aberration and is committed

to its eradication, encouraged by the developments in Egypt, might

adopt a more aggressive posture toward the Jewish state. The

Islamists in Egypt are not averse to this. In fact, the growing influence

of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo already led Egypt to lift

restrictions on traffic in and out of Gaza, easing the Israeli blockade.

This strengthens Hamas’ grip on Gaza and on radical Islamic

elements within the Palestinian national movement.

The political vacuum in Sinai creates several new security challenges

for Israel along the southwestern border. The area could become a

haven for terrorists, as has occurred in parts of Lebanon, or a base for

pirates, as in Somalia. It has already turned into a highway for

weapons smuggling to Hamas. Managing the situation requires a

larger military presence in the area facing Sinai. Under duress, Israel

might even be forced to recapture parts of Sinai.

As relations with Egypt have become somewhat uncertain, Jerusalem

is closely monitoring developments with Jordan, which signed a

peace treaty with Israel in 1994.32

While Israel regards Jordan as its

"strategic depth," or buffer zone between it and potential enemy lines

to the east, the Jordanian elite see Israel as an insurance policy against

invasions from its neighbors. So far, King Abdullah has successfully

ridden the Middle East storm with minimal damage to his rule or to

relations with Israel. However, even here the opposition is rising, and

if Iraq or Syria fell to Muslim radicals, the pressure on the Hashemite

dynasty would grow. Jordan’s fall would plant hostile forces along


04

Israel’s longest border and the one closest to its heartland – the Tel

Aviv-Jerusalem-Haifa triangle, which holds most of Israel’s

population and economic infrastructure.

Syria, on Israel’s northern border, is also in turmoil (at the time of

writing) and it remains unclear whether the Alawite regime will

survive or be replaced by a new Sunni leadership. In summer 2011,

Assad tried to ignite a diversionary war against Israel. This was a

warning signal for Israel to prepare for the future possibility of

hostilities along the now quiet Golan border, whether initiated by

Assad or his successor.

Regional events have detracted attention from the Palestinian issue,

particularly since the uprisings have largely ignored the Palestinians.

The PA's ability to harm Israel in order to reignite international

interest is very limited, and the renewal of a terror campaign against

the Jewish state could be very costly to the Palestinians. Yet, the weak

and illegitimate PA has come under increasing pressure from the

powerful and popular Hamas. A Palestinian strategic miscalculation,

leading to the eruption of another round of violence, is a possibility

that Israel cannot ignore.

Jerusalem must continue closely monitoring the threats posed by its

adjacent and more distant neighbors. The recent political turmoil has

generally weakened the Arab states, giving Iran greater opportunity to

extend its reach. Moreover, America's strategic fatigue and its

ideological inclination to shed overseas responsibilities have left an

opening for its Middle East rivals, China and Russia – not a welcome

scenario by Israel. Thus, the regional unrest is a warning bell for

Israel to better prepare its defenses in case the situation worsens.

Threats to the Sea Lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean

The turmoil in the Arab world is changing the strategic landscape

around Israel, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean basin, where

elements of radical Islam could gain control. In this region, Tunisia,

Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey display Islamist tendencies,

threatening the current unrestricted access to this area by Israel and

the West. About 90 percent of Israel’s foreign trade is carried out via


05

the Mediterranean, making freedom of navigation critical for Israel’s

economic well-being. Moreover, its chances of becoming energy

independent and a significant exporter of gas are linked to Israel’s

ability to secure free passage for its maritime trade and to defend its

newly discovered hydrocarbon fields, Leviathan and Tamar.

In Tunisia, the Islamists won the November 2011 elections. In Libya,

evolving political events after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi indicate

that radical Islamic elements will play a greater role in the future of

the country. If the transition to a new regime descends into civil war,

the ensuing chaos may allow greater freedom of action for Muslim

extremists from the shores of this Mediterranean country.

Libya’s eastern neighbor, Egypt, is still ruled by the military, but the

November 2011 elections catapulted the Islamist parties into a

dominant position in the emerging Egyptian political system. Apart

from having important ports on the Mediterranean, Egypt also

controls the Suez Canal, a critical passageway linking Europe to the

Persian Gulf and the Far East that could fall into the hands of the

Islamists. Significantly, Egypt has already opened the Suez Canal to

Iranian military vessels (February 2011). Access to the waterway

enhances the ability of radical Iran to supply its Mediterranean allies,

Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. Moreover, it

enhances Iran's access to Muslim Balkan states, namely Albania,

Bosnia and Kosovo, increasing its influence in that part of the

Mediterranean as well.

Even if the Egyptian military is able to curtail the Islamist forces at

home, its grip over the Sinai Peninsula is a different issue. As noted,

the tenuous control of Egypt over Sinai has further weakened since

the fall of the Mubarak regime. This could lead to the “Somalization”

of Sinai, negatively affecting the safety of naval trade along the

Mediterranean, the approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea. At

the same time, nearby Gaza is currently controlled by Hamas, a

radical Islamist organization allied with Iran. Israel's enforced naval

blockade on Gaza has increasingly been criticized by the international

community. Considering the recent political changes in Egypt and

their detrimental impact on Egyptian-Israeli relations, containment of


06

the Islamist threat from Gaza will become even more challenging in

the near future.

North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits Lebanon, a state

dominated by radical Shiite Hizballah, whose ports are inhospitable

from a Western perspective. Hizballah has already laid claim to some

of the huge Israeli-found gas fields in the sea, which could diminish

Europe’s energy dependence on Russia and Turkey. Moreover, Syria,

an enemy of Israel and current ally of Iran, exerts considerable

influence in Lebanon. Its Mediterranean shores, north of Lebanon, are

also hostile to the West and its ports even supply services to the

Russian navy. While the Assad regime in Syria faces great domestic

opposition and may fall, any Syrian successor regime could be

Islamist and anti-Western as well.

The next state on the eastern Mediterranean coastline is AKP-ruled

Turkey. The country has, over the past few years, shifted away from a

pro-Western foreign policy, adopting instead a radical foreign policy

stance. The Turkish government supports Hamas and Hizballah,

opposes sanctions on Iran, and holds a strident anti-Israel position,

which reflects the AKP's Islamic coloration. Moreover, Turkey has

displayed huge ambitions for leadership in the Middle East, Central

Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the eastern Mediterranean. A

combination of Turkish nationalism, neo-Ottoman nostalgia and

Islamic-jihadist impulses has pushed Turkey into an aggressive

posture on several regional issues. It has, for instance, flexed its naval

muscles by threatening Israel that it will escort flotillas trying to break

the blockade on Gaza.

Turkey has also threatened Cyprus regarding its desire to acquire a

share of the potential energy riches south of the island. Turkey is

interested in gaining control or partial ownership over the maritime

gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean as this would help fulfill its

ambitions to serve as an energy bridge to the West, thereby creating

dependence on it. This puts Ankara at loggerheads with Nicosia and

Jerusalem who share an interest in developing the hydrocarbon fields

in their exclusive economic zones and exporting gas to energy-thirsty

Europe. The conflict of interests might lead Turkish troops, stationed

in the northern part of divided Cyprus, to complete the conquest of


07

the island started in 1974. Such a Turkish takeover would not only

hurt Western geo-economic interests, but would constitute a

significant Western loss of the strategically situated island. The

Cypriot island served as a bone of contention in the past between

Persia and the ancient Greeks and between the Ottomans and

Venetians. In short, it represents the struggle between East and West.

West of Turkey is Greece, a democratic Western state with a stake in

the protection of the Cypriots from Muslim domination. Its current

economic crisis, however, might erode its limited military ability to

parry the Turkish challenge alone. With the exception of Israel, all

other eastern Mediterranean states would likely favor the return of

Cyprus to Muslim rule and the ascendancy of Islam in the eastern

Mediterranean.

Western influence in the eastern Mediterranean is being challenged by

the growing radical Islamic influence in the region. The access of Iran

to Mediterranean waters, the disruptive potential of failed states, and

the competition between countries for energy resources is

destabilizing the region. But it is not clear that Western powers,

particularly the US, are aware of the possibility of losing the eastern

part of the Mediterranean Sea to radical Islam or are preparing in any

way to forestall such a scenario. Foolishly, they seem to believe that

the so-called “Arab Spring” heralds an improved political

environment and that Turkey represents “moderate Islam.” Such

American naiveté and European gullibility could become extremely

costly in strategic terms.

The Iranian Nuclear Challenge

The upheaval in the Arab world has deflected attention from the

realization of Israel’s most feared scenario – a nuclear Iran.

Moreover, the Middle East turmoil has played into the Iranian

strategy to simply buy time in order to present the world a nuclear fait

accompli. In the meantime, Iran assiduously continues to work on its

nuclear project, hardly impressed by economic sanctions and

diplomatic displeasure. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency

published a report (November 2011) voicing its concern over Iranian

activities that do not easily fit with those of a civilian program.33


08

Israel is very concerned about the ineffective international response to

Iran's nuclear progress. This global passivity seems either to indicate

an inadequate understanding of the far-reaching implications34

or a

lack of political will to tackle a difficult strategic problem. A nuclear

Iran would generate further efforts of nuclear proliferation in the

region as states such as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would hardly

resist the rationale for adopting similar nuclear postures, thereby

turning a multi-polar nuclear Middle East into a strategic nightmare.

Iranian nuclear attainment would strengthen its hegemony in the

strategic energy sector by its mere location along the oil-rich Arabian

Gulf and the Caspian Basin – the "energy ellipse."35

A nuclear Iran

would also result in the West's loss of the Central Asian states, which

will either gravitate toward Iran or try to secure a nuclear umbrella

with Russia or China, countries much closer to the region. An

emboldened Tehran, after nuclearization, will also become more

active in supporting radical Shiite elements in Iraq and agitating those

communities in the Arabian Gulf states. Moreover, since Tehran is a

central backer of terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas and

Islamic Jihad, it may be reckless enough to transfer several nuclear

bombs to such proxy organizations, which will have no moral

constraints on detonating a nuclear device in a European or American

harbor. Iran's nuclear program – coupled with further improvements

in Iranian missiles – would initially put most European capitals, and

eventually North American, within range of a potential Iranian attack.

The Obama administration seems reluctant to orchestrate crippling

sanctions on Iran or to use force in order to stop it. Jerusalem realizes

that the time to decide whether to preempt against key Iranian nuclear

installations or live with a nuclear Iran is getting closer. Israel’s

inclination to remove the threat of a potential nuclear enemy is going

to be tested. Indeed, during the summer and fall of 2011, there was an

unprecedented flurry of statements by Israeli officials and former

officials on whether an attack on Iranian nuclear installations would

be necessary or wise.36

ISRAELI RESPONSES

Jerusalem realizes that the demonstrating crowds in the Arab streets

are not likely to be effective agents of democratization and that the


09

popular sentiment in the Arab world is largely anti-Western and of

course anti-Israel. While Israel would welcome peace-loving,

democratic neighbors, its strategic assessments must be based on a

worst-case scenario. After all, conflict and bloodshed have been a

historical constant in the region. Understanding that its survival is

largely dependent upon its national power, Israel has cultivated over

the years a remarkable military machine. As a result, the last large-

scale war fought by Israel was in 1973. Since then, the Israel Defense

Forces (IDF) has been preoccupied with small wars and non-state

actors. Yet, the changing strategic environment dictates more caution

and the need to meet a variety of threats. Maj. Gen. Eyal Eisenberg,

head of the Home Front Command, has warned that developments in

the Arab world increase the probability of an all-out regional war.37

While a multi-front ground war is still of low probability, it cannot be

ignored. As Israel’s strategic environment becomes more hostile, the

expansion of the IDF and the updating of its war-fighting scenarios is

a necessity.

A Larger Defense Budget

Israel has little choice but to increase its defense outlays in order to

meet future challenges, as outlined above. Israel must invest in

building a stronger force that is able to deal with a variety of

contingencies, including large-scale war. Israel needs a larger

standing army, particularly ground and naval forces. Since force

building is a lengthy process, appropriate decisions on force size and

structure, as well as budget allocations, must be made as soon as

possible. Several additional areas requiring special attention include

missile defense and research and development (R&D).

The southern border, which was quiet for a very long period of time,

once required only limited Israeli military presence. However, the

potential changes in Egypt, as well as in Syria, require the stationing

of larger forces on these borders. Moreover, the uncertainty over the

future of Egypt, Syria and Jordan arouses a worst-case scenario

assessment, which involves simultaneous military challenges of

different kinds on all of Israel’s borders.


21

The IDF has already deployed better quality troops to the Egyptian

and Syrian border areas. The tensions along the Egypt-Israel

demarcation line have also necessitated organizational changes, such

as establishing a new regional brigade next to Eilat.38

Israel has to

beef up its military presence along this border. A new division must

be deployed in Israel’s south in order to deal with Egyptian

contingencies as well as face the growing challenges stemming from

Gaza. Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Ganz has stated the need

for large-scale intervention in Gaza.39

A larger Israeli navy, responsible for hosting strategic systems, has

become increasingly important as Israeli territory, with its air force

bases and deployment areas, becomes more vulnerable to missile

attacks. This need, however, has not become a budgetary priority. The

modernization and expansion of the surface fleet (excluding

submarines) was neglected for some time and navy procurement plans

were not accommodated – this must be quickly rectified.

The political dynamics in the states on the shores of the eastern

Mediterranean, reviewed in the previous section, demonstrate the

growing threats to the sea lanes traversing this region as well as to the

new gas discoveries. The need to protect these waterways further

necessitates the upgrade and expansion of Israel’s surface navy.

Furthermore, dealing with missiles of a variety of ranges has been on

the national security agenda for at least two decades. Budgetary

constraints, anti-defense prejudices and strategic shortsightedness

have slowed the development and adequate deployment of a multi-

layered missile defense system. This situation needs to be remedied as

the motivation of radical forces to attack Israel grows – the entire

Israeli Home Front might come under intense rocket and missile

assault in any future conflict with Iran's proxies, Hamas and

Hizballah. To this end, the IDF has requested roughly $4 billion from

the treasury over the next five years to complete its missile defense

program.40

Meeting the missile challenge also requires improving passive

protection and active defense. Passive protection includes the

construction of shelters and fortified rooms in homes, and the


20

building of fortified areas within educational institutions and centers

of commerce and entertainment. Active defense refers, among other

things, to the adequate deployment of Iron Dome batteries for

intercepting missile threats of up to 70 kilometers, as well as the use

of David’s Sling missile defense systems for threats of up to 300

kilometers (not yet operational).41

Israel is working to integrate these

lower-tier missile defense systems with its upper-tier missile defense

components – upgraded versions of Patriot Advanced Capability

interceptors and Arrow-2 and 3 interceptors, designed to work against

long-range missiles. These systems, and their integration into a single

national command-and-control center, require greater funding.42

An

adequate missile defense system would expand freedom of action on

the political level. It could also potentially forestall the need for

ground operations in Gaza and southern Lebanon or limit their cost.

Israel’s main advantage over its adversaries is its superior manpower,

training, organization, and military technologies. While the defense

budget has only a marginal effect on the army education system and

available manpower, it has a great impact on R&D. The largely

privatized Israeli military industries have gradually become more

market-oriented, which has prompted a shift in their R&D priorities.

Unfortunately, they invest primarily in technologies that will give

them an advantage in the global market rather than in products that

suit the specific future needs of the IDF.43

Therefore, Israel must find

the resources to ensure continued R&D for enhanced deterrence and

for winning future wars.

While Israel’s flourishing and expanding economy can afford larger

defense outlays to meet its national security challenges, it has become

politically challenging to put this into practice, especially considering

the mass social protests of summer 2011. Indeed, reflecting the

popular mood that more money should be directed to meet domestic

needs, the Israeli cabinet decided in October 2011 to cut the defense

budget.44

The economic troubles in the eurozone, a main export arena,

and fears of a world recession also indicate the need for fiscal

stringency and belt-tightening.

A courageous Israeli leadership could nevertheless explain to its

people that changing circumstances require some austerity measures


22

that might freeze the standard of living for a while. Israeli society has

shown remarkable resilience and spirit in protracted conflict and

might respond positively to a well-crafted call from its political

leaders. Such an address must be accompanied by visible measures to

reduce military waste and genuine efforts to reduce the growing gap

between rich and poor in Israeli society in order to maintain social

cohesion.

The Imperative for Defensible Borders

As a result of the political volatility along its borders, Israel must

insist on defensible borders in any future peace negotiations with the

PA and Syria. Simplistic slogans about the decreasing value of

territory and topographical assets ignore the fact that historically

military technology has continuously fluctuated, occasionally

favoring defensive postures or offensive initiatives. The history of

armaments shows that each weapons system eventually has a counter

weapon. For example, the fire power of machine guns was neutralized

by tanks, which in turn were threatened by anti-tank missiles, which

then triggered the emergence of sophisticated tank defense systems.

The technology race is complex, and contemporary technological

advantages are always temporary as new technology is developed.45

Moreover, the technological offense-defense balance is not the

primary factor in determining military outcomes – topographical

constants can be a highly valuable asset. Strategists and militaries

around the world still confer great importance upon the topographical

characteristics of the battlefield.

Thus, the design of Israel’s future borders with Syria and the PA

should not be shaped by ephemeral current technologies that seem to

grant advantages to Israeli defensive capabilities. The history of

warfare demonstrates that technological superiority and better

weapons are not enough to win a war.46

Forging Strategic Alliances

Despite the decline of American influence in the Middle East, Israel

has no choice but to continue to nurture its strategic partnership with

the US. The US is likely to remain the dominant global power for a


23

long time, and its decline in the Middle East is probably temporary.

The shared values of the two countries and the large and stable

support for the Jewish state in American society makes this country

the best possible ally. Israel’s foreign policy should adapt to the

differences of opinion and even conflict of interests between a large

power and its small ally in such a way as to assure continued

American friendship and support. In the final analysis, the

developments in Washington are much more important for Jerusalem

than those in the region.

As long as Israel enjoys America's friendship, regional isolation will

be easier to overcome. Nevertheless, Israel has an obvious interest in

fostering good relations and maintaining peace treaties with Egypt

and Jordan. Its duty is to attempt to forge strategic partnerships with

regional powers so as to increase its freedom of action. Reducing its

isolation will also help in lessening the burden of the Israeli alliance

on Washington. Realpolitik can create partnerships between strange

bedfellows: for instance, a Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and a Jewish Israel

joined against Iran. This rationale may also appeal to the Sunnis in

Iraq or to the Kurds, who could reemerge as a useful ally for Israel,

limiting its isolation. The new state of South Sudan looks to Israel for

support and could become a regional ally. All anti-Islamist groups in

the region, primarily minorities such as the Druze, Christian

Lebanese, or Assyrians in Syria and Iraq are probably interested in

forging ties with a strong Israel, although they may fear that

cooperation with the Jewish state is too dangerous.

In truth, regional isolation is bearable. After all, a modern, affluent,

democratic and powerful Israel hardly wants to integrate into a region

characterized by despotism, corruption, ignorance and poverty. Apart

from modest economic benefits, the Middle East has limited attraction

for an Israel that basically wants to be left alone by its neighbors.

Furthermore, Israel can find partners in the eastern Mediterranean to

compensate somewhat for the loss of Turkey's friendship. Greece and

Cyprus are courting Israel, strengthening Western presence in the

eastern Mediterranean. Italy, in close proximity, also has excellent

relations with Israel, which can be further developed. Hopefully, the

US will recognize its reciprocal interests in this region and project


24

power through its 6th

Fleet to prevent this area from becoming an

Islamic lake.

Responding to Iran

The main challenge to Israel’s security, the Iranian pursuit of nuclear

weapons, has been unaffected by the Arab turmoil. However, the

dilemma vis-à-vis Iran becomes more acute as the Iranians get closer

to achieving a nuclear arsenal and the chances for a counterrevolution

seem to dim. Most Israelis, of all walks of life, do not believe that

economic sanctions can change the politico-strategic calculus in

Tehran and precipitate a decision to stop the nuclear program.

Therefore, the widespread conclusion is that only covert operations

and/or military force can delay or stop nuclear progress. The issue of

whether to preemptively strike Iran's military installations is being

hotly debated at the highest levels in Israel, as this is not an easy

decision to make. An unexpected muscular Western move may spare

Israel’s government the deliberations, but there is little hope that such

a scenario will materialize, thus once again leaving the Israelis to go it

alone.

CONCLUSION

The Arab Middle East remains a stagnant region in deep socio-

political crisis with small chances for positive change in the near

future. The current regimes may stay in power or be replaced by new

dictatorships, moderate or radical. In either case, the immediate future

will feature weak states grappling with domestic problems and facing

uncertainty over the direction of their foreign policy – this is mixed

news for Israel. The changing regional balance of power in favor of

Turkey and Iran, who both encourage radical elements in the region,

does not favor Israel. As well, the seeming decline of American clout

in the Middle East has negatively affected the peace process with

Israel and reduced its deterrence power. Israel is facing greater

regional isolation, more terror, threats to its sea lanes and energy

resources in the eastern Mediterranean, and the prospects of a nuclear

Iran.


25

While the changing security environment has deteriorated, Israel

remains a strong state. The power differential between Israel and its

neighbors is larger than ever, which allows Israel to meet most

challenges on its own. It must spend more money on defense,

however, and has to cultivate new relationships in the region. The US

remains its only important ally, and the preservation of good relations

with Washington is a central pillar in Israel’s national security. Israeli

society has displayed great resilience in the past when faced with

national security challenges. Most Israelis understand the reality of

living in the Middle East, but they must recognize that this rough

neighborhood may become even more brutish in the near future.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Gabi Ben-Dor, Hillel Frisch, Avi Kober, Shmuel

Sandler and Max Singer for their very useful comments and Timothy

McKinley for providing important research assistance. This paper,

which was generously supported by the Tikvah Fund, is a revised and

expanded version of a previously published article, “Implications of

Middle East Upheavals Upon Israel,” Middle East Quarterly, 19,

Winter 2012, pp. 39-46.

Notes

1 For an incisive analysis, see E. Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture,

London: Frank Cass, 1994. 2 For the reports, see http://middleeast.about.com/od/middleeast101/f/arab-human-

development.htm. For the Arab predicament, see also R.S. Humphreys, Between

Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age, Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1999. 3 For the road to modernity and democracy, see M. Singer, The History of the

Future: The Shape of the World to Come Is Visible Today, Lexington: Lexington

Books, 2011. For the necessary sequence in peoples’ attitudes conducive to

democracy, see R. Inglehart and C. Wetzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and

Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 4 Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire, p. 188.

http://www.amazon.com/History-Future-Shape-World-Visible/dp/0739164872/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1310051044&sr=8-3

http://www.amazon.com/History-Future-Shape-World-Visible/dp/0739164872/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1310051044&sr=8-3


26

5 S.M. Walt, “Revolution and War,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1992, pp.

321-68. 6 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,”

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 5-38. 7 For an analysis of this phenomenon, see R.I. Rothberg, ed., When States Fail:

Causes and Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 8 For an index of weak states, see

http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx. 9 H. Frisch, “Why monarchies persist: balancing between internal and external

vulnerability,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, September 2010, pp.

167-84. 10

M. al-Zaydi, “Not ignorance, but feigned ignorance,” Ashark Alawsat, December

11, 2011, available at: http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=27651. 11

For various official remarks in Ankara and Tehran, see "Egypt uprising is an

Islamic ‘awakening’: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei," The Toronto Star, February 4,

2011, available at: www.thestar.com/news/world/article/933539--egypt-uprising-is-

an-islamic-awakening-ayatollah-ali-khamenei; N. Barsoumian, "‘I Don’t Bear a

Hidden Agenda’: Erdogan Lays Out Vision for New Middle East," The Armenian

Weekly, September 27, 2011, available at:

www.armenianweekly.com/2011/09/27/erdogan-lays-out-vision-for-new-middle-

east/; J. Fleishman and N. Parker, "Mubarak says he won't seek reelection but will

stay in office 'for the next few months,'" Los Angeles Times, February 1, 2011,

available at: articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/01/world/la-fg-egypt-crowd-20110202.

For the Islamist turn in Turkish foreign policy, see E. Inbar, “Israeli-Turkish

Tensions and Their International Ramifications,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter

2011, pp. 132-46. 12

New York Times, May 4, 2011; The Jerusalem Post, May 8, 2011. 13

See J. Adelman, The Rise of Israel: A History of a Revolutionary State, London:

Routledge, 2008; D. Senora and S.Singer, Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's

Economic Miracle, New York: Twelve, 2009. 14

D.W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines

in Uncertain Times,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, July/August 2011, p. 58. 15

D. Hamilton, "Israel shocked by Obama’s 'betrayal' of Mubarak," Reuters,

January 31, 2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/31/us-egypt-

israel-usa-idUSTRE70U53720110131; A. Shavit, “Obama’s betrayal: As goes

Mubarak, so goes US might,” Haaretz, August 10, 2011. 16

For such criticism, see D. E. Sanger and E. Schmitt, "US-Saudi Tensions

Intensify with Mideast Turmoil," New York Times, March 14, 2011, available at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15saudi.html?pagewanted=a

ll. 17

Smith, “Weakened U.S. Influence,” pp. 6-8; N. Gardiner, “Barack Obama’s

‘leading from behind’ foreign policy: No wonder the US president looks weak and

confused,” The Telegraph, April 26, 2011, available at:

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100085078/barack-

obama%E2%80%99s-leading-from-behind-foreign-policy-no-wonder-the-us-

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2011/90/4

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15saudi.html?pagewanted=all

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15saudi.html?pagewanted=all


27

president-looks-weak-and-confused/; R. Kagan, “Obama’s Year One: Contra,”

World Affairs, January/February 2010, available at:

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JanFeb/full-Kagan-JF-2010.html;

H. Keinon, “Assad: US has lost influence in ME,” The Jerusalem Post, May 25,

2010. B. Gwertzman, “Weakened U.S. in Stormy Mideast,” Council on Foreign

Relations, available at: http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/weakened-us-stormy-

mideast/p24826. 18

See B. Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, September

1990, available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-

of-muslim-rage/4643/; B. Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,”

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, November/December 2002. 19

For Israeli perceptions of the changing environment, see D. Byman, “Israel’s

Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3,

Summer 2011, pp. 123-36. 20

See inter alia his statement before the Knesset on November 23, 2011, available

at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/8913577/Arab-

Spring-anti-democratic-says-Benjamin-Netanyahu.html 21

For the distinction between goals related to adding resources, “possession goals,”

and “milieu goals” that shape the environment in which the nation operates, see A.

Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962. 22

See Y. Dror’s discussion of mega-trends in the 21st century in Israeli Statecraft:

National Security Challenges and Responses, New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 37-

53. 23

For the decline of the interstate dispute and the ethno-national conflict between

Jews and Palestinians, see H. Ben-Yehuda and S. Sandler, The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Transformed: Fifty Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crises, Albany: SUNY, 2002; see

also E. Inbar, “Arab-Israeli Coexistence: Causes, Achievements and Limitations,"

Israel Affairs, Vol. 6, Summer 2000, pp. 256-70. 24

For the importance of systemic factors in peacemaking, see B. Miller, States,

Nations and the Great Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 25

See H. Keinon, “Anti-Normalization Forces Gaining Strength in Jordan,” The

Jerusalem Post, August 10, 2011, pp. 1,10; E. Lake, “Muslim Brotherhood seeks

end to Israel Treaty,” The Washington Times, February 3, 2011, available at:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-

to-israel-treaty/. 26

E. Inbar, "The Rise and Demise of the Two-State Paradigm," Orbis, Vol. 53, No.

2, Spring 2009, pp. 265-83. 27

For a refutation of the “American decline” arguments, see R.J. Lieber, The

American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, London and New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2005; C. Norrlof, American Global Advantage: US

Hegemony and International Cooperation, New York: Cambridge University Press,

2010.

http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/weakened-us-stormy-mideast/p24826

http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/weakened-us-stormy-mideast/p24826

https://webmail.biu.ac.il/owa/redir.aspx?C=c3ff8af8ba1544b28be476a725018a2b&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.telegraph.co.uk%2fnews%2fworldnews%2fmiddleeast%2fisrael%2f8913577%2fArab-Spring-anti-democratic-says-Benjamin-Netanyahu.html

https://webmail.biu.ac.il/owa/redir.aspx?C=c3ff8af8ba1544b28be476a725018a2b&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.telegraph.co.uk%2fnews%2fworldnews%2fmiddleeast%2fisrael%2f8913577%2fArab-Spring-anti-democratic-says-Benjamin-Netanyahu.html

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-to-israel-treaty/

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-to-israel-treaty/


28

28

For an analysis of the impact of politics on deterrence and deviation from

rationality, see P.M. Morgan, Deterrence. A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills:

Sage Publications, 1977, pp. 125-202. 29

Y. Katz, “Hamas sets up rocket production line in Sinai,” The Jerusalem Post,

December, 11, 2011, available at:

http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=248948. 30

"Israel says Gaza gets Anti-Plane Arms from Libya," Reuters, August 29, 2011,

available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-palestinians-israel-libya-

idUSTRE77S3UO20110829. 31

B. Opall-Rome, “Senior Israeli Commander Sees Danger in Syrian Collapse,”

Defense News, December 12, 2011, p.1. 32

The best account of Israel-Jordan relations is given by M. Zak, Hussein Makes

Peace (Hebrew), Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1994. 33

"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of

Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran", IAEA Director

General's Report, November 8, 2011, available at:

http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf. 34

J.M. Lindsay and R. Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.

89, No. 2, March/April 2010; and E. Inbar, "The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran,"

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2006, available

at: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html. 35

The term “energy ellipse” was coined by G. Kemp and R.E. Harkavy, Strategic

Geography and the Changing Middle East, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 1997, p. 113. 36

See inter alia, G. Weitz, "Barak to Haaretz: Iran won't drop nuclear bomb on

Israel," Haaretz, May 5, 2011, available at:

www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/barak-to-haaretz-iran-won-t-drop-nuclear-

bomb-onisrael-1.359870; Y. Melman, "Report: Mysterious blast in Iran's Isfahan

damaged key nuclear site," Haaretz, November 30, 2011, available at:

www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/report-mysterious-blast-in-iran-s-

isfahan-damagedkey-nuclear-site-1.398671; T. Buck, "Ex-Spymaster Opposes Iran

Attack," Financial Times, November 11, 2011, available at:

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fbbe0342-0c57-11e1-88c6-

00144feabdc0.html#axzz1fIqhg81d; Y. Lapin, "Strike fallout can never be as bad as

nuclear Iran," The Jerusalem Post, November 23, 2011, available at:

www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=246745.

For a confirmation of Israel’s alarmist view of the Osirak reactor, see H. Brands and

D. Palkki, “Saddam, Israel and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?”

International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, pp. 133-66. 37

S. Diaz, “The Probability for an All-out War Has Increased in the Middle East,”

Israel Hayom, September 9, 2011, p. 7. 38

“Creation of new regional brigade was necessitated by recent tensions along the

Israel-Egypt border,” IDF Spokesperson's Office, November 27, 2011, available at:

http://www.idf.il/1283-13961-en/Dover.aspx.

http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=248948

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/barak-to-haaretz-iran-won-t-drop-nuclear-bomb-onisrael-1.359870

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/barak-to-haaretz-iran-won-t-drop-nuclear-bomb-onisrael-1.359870

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/report-mysterious-blast-in-iran-s-isfahan-damagedkey-nuclear-site-1.398671

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/report-mysterious-blast-in-iran-s-isfahan-damagedkey-nuclear-site-1.398671

http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=246745


29

39

G. Allon and G. Golan, "Large military operation may be needed in Gaza, says

IDF chief," Israel Hayom, November 16, 2011, p. 9. 40

Yuval Azoulai , “IDF wants NIS 15b for Arrow missiles,” January 3, 2012,

available at: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-

Industry/2012/01/13/Israel-needs-39B-to-fund-Arrow-plan/UPI-

45861326477304/?spt=hs&or=si. 41

U. Rubin, The Missile Threat from Gaza: From Nuisance to Strategic Threat,

BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 91, Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University,

December 2011. 42

B. Opall-Rome, “Israel Integrating Upper-, Lower-Tier Missile Defenses,”

Defense News, June 20, 2011, p. 4. 43

Y. Lifschitz, Israel’s Military Industries, BESA Mideast Security and Policy

Studies No. 92 (Hebrew), Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, December 2011. 44

B. Opall-Rome, “Israel MoD Battles Budget Cuts,” Defense News, October 17,

2011, p. 6. 45

For the relationship between technology and war, see M. Van Creveld,

Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, New York: The Free Press,

1989. 46

For the overstated importance of technology in shaping military outcomes, see

K.A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology,

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

https://webmail.biu.ac.il/owa/redir.aspx?C=a1fc6b340c524ae99aa2fab87d381cf6&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.upi.com%2fBusiness_News%2fSecurity-Industry%2f2012%2f01%2f13%2fIsrael-needs-39B-to-fund-Arrow-plan%2fUPI-45861326477304%2f%3fspt%3dhs%26or%3dsi



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