Working Paper

09.1e

Lessons for Tanzania onAchieving the Right to Information:

The 2003 Campaign of Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda

Tony Baker

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Lessons for Tanzania on Achieving the Right to Information:

The 2003 Campaign of Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda1

Tony Baker2

The problems of Africa, and Uganda in particular, are caused by leaders who overstay in power, which breeds impunity, corruption and promotes patronage.

—President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Inauguration Address, 1986

1. IntroductionThe case study presented below concerns an anti-corruption campaign that occurred in Uganda in 2003. That year, the focus of the campaign was on a piece of potential legislation that would further the right to access information. This right is seen as a primary component to anti-corruption efforts as it provides citizens, civil society, and even parliamentarians with a means of monitoring government activity. In the end, a more productive citizenry and government arise, resulting in greater progress nationwide.

This case study is written not only to tell the story of a people’s movement that took place throughout Uganda in 2003 but also to supply lessons from which Tanzania may learn and employ. Currently in Tanzania, a coalition of civil society organizations has placed the Right to Information Bill 2007 into the hands of the Minister of Information. The legislation has stalled there, as a similar bill did in Uganda. Thus, the account below offers insights into various means Tanzania may proceed further in its own campaign for access to information.

2. ContextAfter independence from Britain in 1961, Uganda underwent decades of political upset until achieving relative calm in 1986 and continuing to the present. Despite this resolution, “chronic political instability and erratic economic management produced a record of persistent economic decline that left Uganda among the world’s poorest and least-developed countries” (Bureau of African Affairs, 2008). According to the World Bank (2008), Uganda was the 14th poorest country with a gross national income of $340 (USD) per capita in 2007. Corruption is rampant.

1 An earlier version of this paper was submitted as part of fulfillment for an MA in Sustainable Development—Policy Analysis and Advocacy at the SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA. Many thanks are given to Professor Jeff Unsicker.2 Originally from the U.S. and having completed his undergraduate work there, Tony Baker went on to live for 2 years in a village on Mt. Hanang in northern Tanzania. Living and working side-by-side with rural farmers, he gained insight into popular struggles as well as the policy measures that undercut their progress and effectively create pov-erty. With the belief that policy change can address the root causes of poverty and injustice, he returned to the U.S. to study the field. Tony is currently an SIT Master’s student carrying out his practicum at the Policy Analysis and Advocacy unit of HakiElimu.

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Uganda’s Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) estimates that over U Sh330 billion (US$184 million) is lost every year to corruption in procurement, which accounts for 70 percent of the government’s annual budget. An estimate by the Uganda Debt Network puts the amount lost to corruption at U Sh200 billion (US$108 million) annually. Paul Onapa, spokesman for Transparency International’s Uganda chapter, believes more than half of government funds are lost to corruption. That figure that would total a staggering U Sh1.76 trillion (US$950 million). (Biryetega, 2006)

A recent article printed by The New Vision, Uganda’s leading multimedia publishing house, stated that “Uganda loses about sh600b annually in procurement frauds by government officials” (Businge & Bugembe, 2008). Clearly, there is a large discrepancy among estimates of the amount of money lost by corruption in Uganda; regardless, it is undeniable that the problem is real.

Both the government and civil society are aware of this issue and have begun to take action. Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda materialized in 1999 (ACCU, 2008). The year 2000 saw the creation of the Africa Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC). The effort to address corruption in Uganda was gaining momentum.

3. AdvocatesThe anti-corruption advocate on which this case study is centered is Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda, or ACCU. Formed in 1999 and registered as an non-governmental organization (NGO) in 2004, ACCU is “an independent, non-partisan, non-political, non-governmental and non-profit making coalition” (ACCU, 2008, p.2) that “brings together 70 civil society organisations, individuals, religious leaders, academicians, media practitioners, the youth, women, politicians and key institutions” (Kisige & Lule, 2008) in efforts to “mobilise and enhance their capacities into one strong voice and force that can lay effective strategies to formulate a results-oriented agenda in the fight against corruption” (ACCU Secretariat, 2007, p. 3). ACCU organizes “education, advocacy, and lobby activities” at the national, regional, and district levels aimed at reducing corruption (MS, 2007).

The stated objectives of ACCU outline it as a civil society organization (CSO) that endeavors to “build a strong anti-corruption crusade in Uganda,” “increase the capacity of civil society to promote transparency, accountability and engage in other anti-corruption activities,” and “promote increased awareness and advocacy programmes against corruption” (ACCU, 2008, p. 3).

One of the most notable aspects about this coalition is the strength in its organizational framework. Rather than being an organization based in one location attempting to work throughout the country, ACCU is comprised of twelve regional anti-corruption coalitions which individually service multiple districts. According to ACCU’s website, these regional groups consist of the following:

Anti Corruption Coalition Koboko (ACCK) West Nile Anti Corruption Coalition (MAYANK/MACCO) Northern Uganda Anti Corruption Coalition (NUAC) Karamoja Anti Corruption Coalition (KAC)

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Eastern Uganda Anti Corruption Coalition Teso Anti Corruption Coalition (TAC) The Apac Anti Corruption Coalition (TAACC) Mid-Western Anti Corruption Coalition (Bunyoro) Rwenzori Anti Corruption Coalition (RAC) Central Uganda Anti Corruption Coalition Anti Corruption Coalition of Ankole Kick Corruption Out of Kigezi (KICK) [Previously South Western Uganda Anti

Corruption Coalition (SWUAC)](ACCU: Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2008)

With the work of these twelve coalition members, most of Uganda is covered geographically with their presence, as illustrated in the map below:

Adapted from Wikimedia, 2006

These regional anti-corruption coalition members comprise the General Assembly, ACCU’s decision-making body (ACCU, 2008). It is difficult to further ascertain the true natures of these regional members, whether they are independently active, only participate by ACCU directives, or exist almost in name only. Judging by their presence on the web, it seems that some have grown enough to be independently notable entities. RAC is active enough to maintain an updated webpage on the Rwenzori Region Information Centre Network website (www.ricnet.info/RAC.HTML). Meanwhile, it appears that SWUAC grew to such an extent that it merited a name-change to Kick Corruption Out of Kigezi (KICK) and has currently established its own website (www.ugandakick.net) complete with its constitution, programs, members, photos, and news.

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Along with the regional coalition members, ACCU partners with international NGOs including Transparency International (TI), ActionAid, Oxfam Great Britain, World Vision, FIDA, the Human Rights Network (HURINET), and the MS Danish Association for International Co-operation (ACCU: Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2008). ACCU also partners with national NGOs such as the Uganda Debt Network (UDN), Interfaith-Based Action for Ethics and Integrity (INFOC-Uganda), the Development Network of Indigenous and Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) as well as individuals (ACCU: Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2008). These organizations do not hold seats on ACCU’s General Assembly as do the regional members; rather, they contribute to ACCU through finances and strategic support.

4. PolicyIn 2003, Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda focused its attention on access to information. In Uganda, the legal right of access to information was made explicit by Article 41 of the 1995 Constitution which states

(1) Every citizen has a right of access to information in the possession of the State or any other organ or agency of the State except where the release of the information is likely to prejudice the security or sovereignty of the State or interfere with the right to the privacy of any other person.

(2) Parliament shall make laws prescribing the classes of information referred to in clause (1) of this article and the procedure for obtaining access to that information.

(Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995)

As above, government documents are publicly accessible as long as their release does not endanger the state or violate the right to privacy of another person.

Though on the books is a right of access to information, in reality Article 41 typically enforces a denial to information. Its lack of clarity begs several unanswered questions: Who decides what information is potentially damaging to state security? How is it known when privacy invasion has occurred? Because of this, corrupt government officials are able to use this part of the law as a flexible and convenient tool to cover any crooked practices (Uganda Press, Media, TV, Radio, Newspapers). This came to the attention of ACCU particularly after observing the extreme difficulty organization members had in monitoring the allocation and flow of government funds at the local level where poor work results were most common. It was this condition that led ACCU to protest in 2003 that “corrupt leaders and bureaucrats were hiding under the state of no access to information to serve their selfish interests” (ACCU, 2003).

By the time that ACCU began speaking out in 2003, the government of Uganda had already been forced to acknowledge this issue but had had limited progress in addressing it. A bill had begun to be drafted originally by the Ministry of Public Service and then was relegated to the Ministry of Ethics and Integrity. Thereafter, the task was again transferred to the Ministry of Information (ACCU, 2003). Whether this bureaucratic stalling was a symptom of government inefficiency or conscious avoidance of the issue cannot be said for certain. Either way, ACCU deemed it best to solve the policy problems of Article 41 by demanding that the government put this bill

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concerning the access to information on the national agenda within six months and thus set a goal for “parliament to commit itself on the enactment of a transparent legislation on access to information with a minimum of exceptions” (ACCU, 2003). Within six months, they wanted to see the draft of the bill finalized, presented to parliament for a vote, and passed.

5. PoliticsTo place in context the political targets of this campaign, it will be helpful to first take a glance at the structure of the government sector of which we are discussing. Under Uganda’s new constitution of 1995, the president is the head of state, government, and the armed forces and is assisted by a vice president and a cabinet. Cabinet members have the power to formulate policy proposals to submit to parliament, the body that has the authority to turn the proposal, or bill, into a law (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). Along with the president and vice president, the cabinet is comprised of two categories of members: cabinet ministers and ministers of state (The Cabinet of Uganda Government). It is a member of this latter category that received the most focus of the ACCU campaign.

Since the responsibility of providing parliament with this bill currently lay in the Ministry of Information, it became the primary target of Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda. More specifically, the power lay in the hands of one man, Dr. Nsaba Buturo, the Minister of State for Information (ACCU, 2003). Politically speaking, it was he who could most easily and directly commit the government to present this bill within six months.

At the same time, ACCU targeted secondary government institutions and officials who could put pressure on the Minister of State for Information. First and foremost, seeing as this issue centers on government corruption, ACCU sought an ally in the Inspector General of Government (ACCU, 2003), an official who upholds the rule of law, promotes good governance, investigates corruption in efforts to eliminate it, and raises public awareness about government values (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). The Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity, who last held the duty of drafting the bill before it was relegated to the Ministry of Information and intimately knew the issues and procedures surrounding it, was also targeted for support (ACCU, 2003). The Speaker of Parliament, who is the most public representative of Parliament and determines its agenda (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995), was a powerful potential ally as well, for he would serve as a symbol of Parliament’s welcoming of the future access to information bill. Finally, ACCU sought out the support of the Vice President (ACCU, 2003), who, as a member of the cabinet, works closely with the Minister of State for Information. All of these secondary political targets held a stake in the topic at hand: since the drafting of the bill was originally governmentally initiated, to not champion it now would appear to undermine their very own efforts.

Alongside their regular members, ACCU made further advocate allies for this specific issue. This long list includes the Boys and Girls Brigade of Uganda (BGBU), the Uganda National Students Association (UNSA), Uganda Women Together for Development (UWOTODEV), Jubilee Plus – Uganda, the International Anti-corruption Theatrical Movement (IATM), the Network of Professional Organisations (NEPRO), Steadfast Peace, Africa Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC), and the Young Parliamentary Association (YPA) (ACCU, 2003).

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6. Strategy In a report later produced detailing their aims and activities, Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda clearly outlined their strategy for this policy campaign:

To put the need for public access to information on the national agenda during the subsequent six or so months.

To create awareness among grass root communities on their existing rights as enshrined in the constitution and encourage them to demand for these rights and make use of them.

To use all media and sensitise all social strata of the Ugandan society on the importance of transparent legislation. This would then pave way for involving all stake holders ranging from policy makers to the grass root to speak as one voice and demand to be involved in the ensuing process to develop the legislation on access to information.

Gather information and case studies on the difficulties encountered by civil society in accessing information at local government.

To create awareness and participation about corruption among children and the youth as well as enhancing use of interactive theatre in anti corruption activities.

To publicise ACCU and give her increased visibility. (ACCU, 2003)

Though it was a multi-faceted approach, the core of this strategy centered on raising public awareness to get the issue on the national agenda.

7. TacticsTo carry out their strategy, ACCU employed numerous tactics, all under an umbrella event called Anti Corruption Week which took place from October 26th to November 2nd, 2003 in the districts of regional coalition members countrywide. Mostly centrally fundraised by the ACCU, money was distributed to coalition members by the secretariat. Then, in a decentralized coordination of a variety of anti-corruption activities, ACCU members and partners came to life for a vibrant week to get their voices heard (ACCU, 2003).

First, in preparation for Anti Corruption Week, an ACCU media committee worked to invite the public to participate in the upcoming activities. Supplements were printed in a mix of national and regional newspapers. A press conference was aired over 27 radio talk shows and two television programs nationwide. Airtime paid by the Inspector General of Government broadcast pre-recorded talk shows, audio skits, and messages on the freedom of access to information (ACCU, 2003).

Serving as the official launch of the week, processions, organized by Jubilee Plus and complete with signs, banners, and floats mounted on vehicles, marched and rallied in Kampala’s Constitutional Square where central and local government representatives were present with members of civil society. ACCU had the Inspector General preside over the ceremonies. In another district, IATM led a procession, and the Speaker of Parliament officiated the opening. Other districts held their own marches in their regional capitals (ACCU, 2003).

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Likewise in Kampala, INFOC-Uganda organized a national conference officially opened by the Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity. Here, 200 delegates from the government, parliament, and civil society shared experiences on the difficulty of accessing information and focused on the need for lawmakers to address this urgent matter. On another day in Kampala, NEPRO hosted a conference for professional organizations to discuss the topic. Throughout other districts, similar conferences were conducted (ACCU, 2003).

Districts all through Uganda held public dialogues and discussion panels on corruption and accessibility of information. Jubilee Plus, IATM, Transparency-Uganda, DENIVA, or ACCU regional coalitions organized and facilitated each event (ACCU, 2003).

In 12 districts, UNSA conducted school debate competitions in which the topic was the need for access to information and its importance as a tool for fighting corruption. The best debaters went on to compete regionally and then nationally, all within the week. Similarly, other school and public debates were held (ACCU, 2003).

Some districts orchestrated theme song competitions to raise awareness of the campaign. In all, 29 local artists, 25 secondary schools, and several choirs composed anti-corruption songs and performed in competitions. The most informative and theme-oriented songs were then professionally produced and distributed by CD to radio stations which played them in their daily mix (ACCU, 2003).

Drama and theater were likewise utilized. Eighteen forum theater performances were acted out in various marketplaces. IATM performed interactive theater throughout nine districts (ACCU, 2003).

In other districts, resource materials were developed during the week. Citizen surveys on their experiences regarding access to information were conducted. ACCU members debuted three small books on anti-corruption to civil society. Brochures and a booklet targeting parliament on the issue of access to information were produced. Finally, a manuscript for a drama on the topic entitled The Curtain was written (ACCU, 2003).

Lastly, a few other tactics were employed. The religious arena was accessed as sermons about the immorality of corrupt officials were administered. Regional coalition members along with INFOC-Uganda circulated petitions. Even a soccer tournament called the Anti-Corruption Soccer Cup took place in which members of civil society organizations played against local government officials (ACCU, 2003).

8. EvaluationLooking at the process of this advocacy campaign, Anti Corruption Week proved to be impactful. VeneKlasen and Miller’s (2002) ten points of message development will be used as a framework for analysis of its effectiveness. They include

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1. Know your audience. 7. Adapt the message to the medium.2. Know your political environment and 8. Allow the audience to reach their moment. own understanding.3. Keep the message simple and brief. 9. Encourage the audience to take 4. Use real life stories and quotes. action. 5. Use precise, powerful language and 10. Present a possible solution. active verbs.6. Use clear facts and numbers creatively. (pp. 232-234)

These points are discussed below.

First, ACCU knew their audiences and approached them on several levels. Government officials were directly engaged, a network of CSOs was assembled, national and international NGOs were involved, and efforts were taken to educate, incorporate, and mobilize the public from a large variety of tactical directions. Clearly ACCU knew their political environment. Rather than solely focusing on confronting the government about its corruption, ACCU came to the political scene as allies trying to help the government accomplish something it already wants to do. Government officials were equal participants in Anti Corruption Week and even funded some of the activities. Tactics were not only issue-oriented but also aimed at building camaraderie and personal bonds, as with the friendly soccer tournament. Given a political environment that would most probably react unproductively in the face of an attack, ACCU’s positive approach greatly facilitated their agenda in this political sphere.

Real life stories of inaccessibility to information came from participants of public dialogues, discussion panels, and surveys nationwide and were then incorporated into resource materials. The message was subsequently adapted into an array of media including radio, television, books, a play, booklets, brochures, signs, banners, songs, conferences, public debates and discussions, street theater, sermons, and even sports. Each of these different vehicles for the message reached people in different ways and definitely demonstrated creative uses of facts and information. ACCU’s tactical focus was on raising public awareness and encouraging them to contribute to the political process by offering a range Anti Corruption Week activities so that everyone might have participated in those that appealed to him or her the most. Finally, a solution was presented, namely that a new bill clarifying and empowering Article 41 be put on the parliament’s agenda and passed.

However, it does not appear that ACCU created one specific, brief message, and it perhaps would have aided them to have united their countrywide efforts under one slogan as a means for visibility. Likewise, the tactics of Anti Corruption Week 2003 were highly persuasive and, in the case of the sermons, even could be perceived as coercive. This definitely raises doubts as to its success with the criterion of letting the audience to reach their own conclusion. With these two exceptions, ACCU demonstrable built an effective campaign in accordance to VeneKlasen and Miller (2002).

In evaluating the effectiveness in terms of its outcomes, Anti Corruption Week 2003 appeared to be a huge success. In “Comparative Lessons from Social Justice Advocacy Case Studies,” Gabrielle Watson (2001) outlines some indicators of success of social justice advocacy (p. 238) that can be used to determine the impact of the ACCU campaign.

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The first is from the perspective of policy—“Policy, law, program, precedent, etc. instituted and implemented” (Watson, 2001, p. 238). By the closing ceremonies on November 2nd, the Minister of State for Information, Hon. Dr. Nsaba Buturo, who was the primary target for the policy campaign, had made a statement of commitment that the Ministry of Information would present the principles of the bill to the cabinet by December 2003 and then have the draft ready for parliament by March 2004 (ACCU, 2003). This pledge was a large step and a direct outcome of Anti Corruption Week. Subsequently, the Access to Information Act 2005 was passed by parliament in 2005, received presidential assent on July 7, 2005, and took effect on April 20, 2006. In summary,

The Act promotes an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable government, giving effect to Article 41 of the Constitution, protecting whistle blowers, promoting transparency and accountability in all the organs of the State as well as empowering the public to effectively scrutinise and participate in government decisions that affect them. (Babalanda, 2006)

With this, it is evident that as for policy outcomes, Anti Corruption Week 2003 was quite effective.

Second is that of governance structures—“Democratic space expanded; New channels for participation; Freedom of action, engagement; Position, credibility, and power of campaign participants strengthened” (Watson, 2001, p. 238). Anti Corruption Week 2003 seems to be successful in this light as well. The credibility of the myriad players in this campaign was definitely strengthened with the success of the week; however, effects of this type were mostly realized a couple of years later with the passing and implementation of the Access to Information Act 2005 which made way for new means of democratic participation and freedom of governmental engagement.

Third is the indicator surrounding civil society:

Strong grassroots organizations and NGOs with representative and accountable structures; Ability to articulate rights (political, civil, social, and economic) and formulate proposals to assert these rights; Increased awareness of members and other sectors of civil society and public about issues at stake. (Watson, 2001, p. 238)

The response, efforts, and strengthening of CSOs during Anti Corruption Week 2003 was enormous. The right to access of information was incredibly publicized to the point that Ugandan citizens nationwide were aware of it and discussing it openly in a variety of venues, so, again, this ACCU campaign proved to be successful.

9. Lessons LearnedThe actions and events in the Ugandan case study above provide lessons for policy advocacy in Tanzania concerning its own campaign for access to information. These lessons are transferable due to the similarity of circumstances that surround both cases. As in Uganda, corruption in Tanzania is a persistent stumbling block and is becoming a more and more highlighted issue in the media, parliament, and the citizenry as a whole. Similarly, civil society in Tanzania is

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beginning to respond. In August 2007, a coalition of CSOs drafted and submitted to the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Sports the Right to Information Bill, their response to the government’s own Freedom of Information Bill that was deemed by civil society to be a Draconian piece of legislation that would in actuality repress the right to information rather than enhance it. And just as the access to information bill sat stagnant in the Ministry of Information in Uganda, Tanzania’s own Right to Information Bill has reached a similar standstill with its Minister of Information, despite repeated promises to put it on parliament’s table (Moshiro, 2008).

Now, as advocacy efforts have been stifled for the moment in Tanzania, the access to information campaign led by Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda offers vital lessons to Tanzanian civil society on how to push the campaign forward from its captive position. Five key advocacy strategies stand out from the ACCU campaign that seem most pertinent to Tanzania’s current situation.

First and foremost, while Tanzanian advocates have successfully formed themselves into the Coalition for Freedom of Information and Expression—an 11-member coalition comprised of local and international CSOs—much as ACCU has done with its partners, the organizational structure of ACCU is radically different and remarkably contributed to their victory. Typically NGOs and CSOs are centrally based, perhaps with a few regional offices, and attempt to administer projects and campaigns countrywide. In Tanzania’s case, the vast majority of CSO activity is more or less localized to Dar es Salaam. This holds true for the Coalition for Freedom of Information and Expression as all of its in-country members are based in Dar es Salaam. While this trend undeniably achieves some results, certain campaigns, such as perhaps this one for the right to information, require an entire nationwide groundswell to overcome opposition. In other words, as long as most voices are only coming from Dar es Salaam, the Minister of Information has less reason to introduce this national bill to parliament. The decentralized, regionally-intensive nature of ACCU overcame this dilemma. As observable from the map above, the areas in which the twelve regional coalition members operate nearly cover the entire country. When Anti Corruption Week 2003 came around, it was not a large, singular event taking place in the capital; rather, it was a simultaneous, coordinated series of myriad anti-corruption activities initiated at once all over Uganda. Its presence was irrefutable.

It is this capacity to deepen relationships into nationwide strongholds that is needed in the Tanzanian campaign. Many CSOs, such as those of the coalition, are moving in that direction but stop short. Groups often have partner organizations all over the country, but these turn into individuals with whom they occasionally communicate or see at conferences rather than coordinate on a weekly basis to ensure the implementation of a consistent advocacy strategy. Likewise, other CSOs have countrywide members, but these are seldom organized to form regional heads. All of these instances present opportunities to form regional-based constituencies such as those with ACCU that may be more easily mobilized to achieve a nationwide movement.

Second, as alluded to above, the positive, productive approach ACCU made towards the government turned out wonderful results. In the midst of an issue concerning corruption in which the government and its officials could have been easily targeted as opponents in a fight against civil society, ACCU spun it into a united partnership of the government and civil society in a fight against something both parts wanted to better. This led to a far more successful campaign than a negative, anti-government battle would have done.

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This is a particular challenge in Tanzania where CSOs have come to be regularly viewed by the government as hostile rabble-rousers who occupy themselves by “leveling unfair criticisms” and “frustrating efforts” of the government (Mwakalebela, 2009). Consider the following statement concerning the relationship between CSOs and the government made by a Member of Parliament during a recent civil society exhibition on parliamentary grounds in Dodoma: “The two are antagonistic despite the fact that both serve the same purposes—to serve the people. Civic organizations are treating MPs as enemies” (Mwakalebela). This situation is very dangerous to campaign efforts as these MPs ultimately have the power to give the coalition what it wants—for the Right to Information Bill to be passed into law. Much work is needed to transform this relationship into one of a collaboration with the government to attain a common goal, as was accomplished by ACCU.

Third, the multitude of tactics carried out by ACCU during Anti Corruption Week 2003 demonstrated tremendous dedication and creativity that achieved superior results in raising public awareness. Looking at it in sum, citizens were the recipient of an onslaught of events and activities that informed them of the right of access to information. Again, this derived from the decentralized nature of ACCU that brought about the manifestations of individual, inspired ideas and contributions of all regional members. In the end, during Anti Corruption Week 2003, an Ugandan may have watched a street theater performance, witnessed a public discussion panel, marched in a procession, tuned into a televised talk-show, and listened to a new song on the radio, all concerning anti-corruption and the access to information.

These aspects culminate into a fourth lesson from ACCU’s access to information campaign. All in all, Anti Corruption Week 2003 offers an exemplary case of how to advocate in the midst of invisible power structures. As defined by VeneKlasen and Miller (2002), invisible power is defined as “processes, practices, cultural norms, and customs [that] shape people’s understanding of their needs, roles, possibilities, and actions in ways that deter effective action for change” (p. 50). Controlling access to information is central to this type of power and “can reinforce feelings of powerlessness, ignorance, and self-blame” (p. 49). Deny people the access to information long enough, and they believe that is the norm, that they have not right to it, and that they were wrong to ask for it in the first place. This holds true for Tanzania, where the power and knowledge distance between citizens and the government has historically been wide. These effects deepen advocacy work from problem-solving down to a more base-level starting place of problem-seeing. Advocacy becomes not just proffering a solution but raising awareness in people so that they perceive that the problem actually exists. Hence, in a structure of invisible power, VeneKlasen and Miller prescribe education, collaboration, political awareness, sharing stories, and speaking out as the appropriate advocacy tools (p. 50), tools that ACCU applied effectively in their access to information campaign and that could be most helpful in that of Tanzania.

Finally, while citizen-wide awareness-raising is essential, so is focusing on the exact targets of the campaign. Simply put, targets are those who have the power to give advocates what they want. In both the Ugandan and Tanzanian cases, the targets are the same—the Minister of Information has the power to introduce the access to information bill and the Members of Parliament have to power to make it law. These are very specific individuals, and while great efforts need to be made to mobilize citizens as a whole, it must not be forgotten that the campaign ultimately hinges on a small number of government officials. ACCU made allies with the Inspector General, Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity, and Speaker of Parliament and went as far as being able to have

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them officiate certain events of Anti Corruption Week. Likewise, it is critical that the Coalition for Freedom of Information and Expression identify and ally itself with potentially supportive political actors such as the Minister of State for Good Governance, the Public Leaders’ Ethics Secretariat, and the Controller and Auditor General and heads of certain governmental institutions such as the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) and Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG).

Clearly, orchestrating a right to information campaign is no simple matter. It takes finesse and balance. While attention must be put on certain government officials, raising awareness in the general populace is necessary too. While frustrations arise when working with a sometimes noncompliant government, care must be given nevertheless to preserve those relationships. All of these are areas in which Tanzania’s campaigners for the right to information can learn from those of Uganda.

10. ConclusionUganda continues to struggle with corruption in many forms. The battle is far from over, but the movement of civil society grows everyday. The success of Anti Corruption Week 2003 has inspired ACCU to continue the use of this tactic over more recent years to raise awareness of corruption in the fields of public procurement, primary education, and health care. With the work of such organizations as Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda, there is hope that citizens and the government will persist in their efforts to build a better future together and that neighboring countries such as Tanzania will be able to follow their example.

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