thailand 4.0 (…and the imf article iv) · thailand article iv—imf staff advice avoid a...
TRANSCRIPT
Thailand 4.0 (…and the IMF Article IV)
Ana Corbacho
IMF Mission Chief for Thailand
September 25, 2017
Tokyo
Thailand 4.0—Government’s vision
Transform Thailand into a value-added and innovation-driven economy
from commodities to innovative products;
from production-based to service-based;
…by creating an environment for investment and growth into the future
But relying on some old ways: target industries; tax incentives
Context—Cyclically-weak emerging market…
Persistent (small) negative output gap Inflation below target band
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Output Gap(Percent of potential GDP)
Source: IMF staff calculations.
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Jan-
10
Jun-
10
Nov
-10
Apr-
11
Sep-
11
Feb-
12
Jul-
12
Dec
-12
May
-13
Oct
-13
Mar
-14
Aug-
14
Jan-
15
Jun-
15
Nov
-15
Apr-
16
Sep-
16
Feb-
17
Headline CoreOld core target band Headline mid-point targetHeadline target band
Headline and Core CPI Inflation(Y/y percent change)
Sources: CEIC Data Co. Ltd.; and IMF staff calculations.
…that is saving too much, investing too little
Political transition
• 2014: Military regime
• 2016: Royal Succession
• 2017: Constitution endorsed
• 2018: General elections
…and faces long-term challenges today
Rapid Population Aging
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
SGPTHACHNVTNJPNKORIDN
INDMYSPHLHGK
USEUR
Years for the Old-Age Dependency Ratio to Increase from 15 to 20 Percent
Slowdown in Productivity
-1 0 1 2 3 4
VTNIDNPHLMYSINDJPNKORTHAHKGSGP
CHN
USOther AEs
Decline in TFP Growth Since Global Financial Crisis(In percentage points)
Where is Thailand heading?
• Strong exports and tourism are supporting growth, but investment has been disappointing—large infrastructure projects taking time
• Inflation is projected to undershoot the target band in 2017 and reach the lower end of the band (1 percent) only by end-2018
• Excessive current account is expected to persist into the medium term
Near-term growth is holding up, but downside risks dominate
Global financial volatility Entrenched low inflationA turn to inward-looking policies Household debt overhangHard landing in China Political uncertainty
Thailand Article IV—IMF staff advice
Avoid a low-inflation, low-growth trap through an expansionary policy mix and structural reforms:
1) Monetary policy easing and enhanced communication should steer inflation back to target 2) Macroprudential policy and regulatory reform can address emerging pockets of financial fragility3) Existing fiscal space should be used to remove infrastructure bottlenecks within a sustainable, medium-term framework4) Concerted reforms should foster inclusive and sustained growth
Reduce the excessive current account through a growth-driven process, boosting real incomes
1) Monetary easing and enhanced communication to steer inflation back to target
Trend inflation below target since 2015 Inflation dynamics less forward-looking
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trend inflation 1/Consensus Forecast (6-10 years)Inflation target (mid-point value)
Thailand: Trend Inflation(In percent)
Sources: Consensus Forecast; and IMF staff calculations.1/ Trend inflation estimates, from Garcia and Poon (forthcoming), are based on actual inflation dynamics and long-term survey inflation expectations, following Chan, J., Clark, T., and Koop, G., 2015, “A New Model of Inflation, Trend Inflation, and Long-Run Inflation Expectations,” FRB of Cleveland Working Paper No. 15-20.
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
7
9
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Trend inflation PersistenceEconomic slack (output gap) Import inflationOil price ResidualActual inflation
Thailand: Main Drivers of Inflation(In percent)
Sources: Thai authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Policy Rate Headline Inflation and Target Band(Percent) (Percent)
0
1
2
3
4
5
2017
Q1
2017
Q2
2017
Q3
2017
Q4
2018
Q1
2018
Q2
2018
Q3
2018
Q4
2019
Q1
2019
Q2
2019
Q3
2019
Q4
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2017
Q1
2017
Q2
2017
Q3
2017
Q4
2018
Q1
2018
Q2
2018
Q3
2018
Q4
2019
Q1
2019
Q2
2019
Q3
2019
Q4
Monetary policy alone is not enough—reinforce fiscal stimulus and expectations channel
Fiscal + monetary stimulus
No stimulus
2) Macroprudential policy and regulatory reform to address pockets of financial fragility
Assessment of risks
• Financial stability risks contained
• Pockets of fragility
High household debt—legacy from past rapid credit growth
Housing prices—fast appreciation in Bangkok condominium area
Regulatory arbitrage—shift in risks to shadow banking
Advice
• Monetary easing increases risks?
• Targeted action
Time-varying MPMs for riskier households
Tighter LTV; DTI for segments of real estate market
Regulatory reform for consistent risk pricing across banks and nonbanks
2) Macroprudential policy and regulatory reform to address pockets of financial fragility
Assessment of risks
• Financial stability risks contained
• Pockets of fragility
High household debt—legacy from past rapid credit growth
Housing prices—fast appreciation in Bangkok condominium area
Regulatory arbitrage—shift in risks to shadow banking
Advice
• Monetary easing increases risks?
• Targeted action
MPMs for riskier households
Tighter LTV; DTI for segments of real estate market
Regulatory reform for consistent risk pricing across banks and nonbanks20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
200
9
201
1
201
3
201
5
Household Debt
Trend 1991-97
Trend 2007-15
Household Debt, 1991-2016(Percent of GDP)
Sources: Authorities' data; BIS; and IMF staff calculations.
2) Macroprudential policy and regulatory reform to address pockets of financial fragility
Assessment of risks
• Financial stability risks contained
• Pockets of fragility
High household debt—legacy from past rapid credit growth
Housing prices—fast appreciation in Bangkok condominium area
Regulatory arbitrage—shift in risks to shadow banking
Advice
• Monetary easing increases risks?
• Targeted action
Time-varying MPMs for riskier households
Tighter LTV; DTI for segments of real estate market
Regulatory reform for consistent risk pricing across banks and nonbanks
8090
100110120130140150160170180190
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
5
201
6
Single-detached house 1/Town house 1/CondominiumLand
Source: CEIC Data Co, Ltd.1/ Including land.
Thailand: Real House Price Indices(January 2009 = 100)
Jan-1
6
Apr-1
6
Jul-16
Oct-16
Jan-1
7
Apr-1
7
Jul-17
2) Macroprudential policy and regulatory reform to address pockets of financial fragility
Assessment of risks
• Financial stability risks contained
• Pockets of fragility
High household debt—legacy from past rapid credit growth
Housing prices—fast appreciation in Bangkok condominium area
Regulatory arbitrage—shift in risks to shadow banking
Advice
• Monetary easing increases risks?
• Targeted action
Time-varying MPMs for riskier households
Tighter LTV; DTI for segments of real estate market
Regulatory reform for consistent risk pricing across banks and nonbanks
Thailand: Unrated Corporate Bonds
2) Macroprudential policy and regulatory reform to address pockets of financial fragility
Assessment of risks
• Financial stability risks contained
• Pockets of fragility
High household debt—legacy from past rapid credit growth
Housing prices—fast appreciation in Bangkok condominium area
Regulatory arbitrage—shift in risks to shadow banking
Advice
• Monetary easing increases risks?
• Targeted action
Time-varying MPMs for riskier households
Tighter LTV; DTI for segments of real estate market
Regulatory reform for consistent risk pricing across banks and nonbanks
3) Existing fiscal space should be used for infrastructure within a sustainable MT framework
Does Thailand have Fiscal Space?
On the positive side: On the negative side:The overall fiscal balance of the public sector has been close to zero in recent years suggesting a good track record of fiscal discipline.
Quasifiscal activities by some SOEs are not properly tracked or reported. Risks of contingent liabilities are hard to quantify with the available information.
The current cost of debt financing is low but likely to increase in the medium term. Now is the time for debt financing at fixed rates for new debt issuance.
Age-related spending is projected to increase steadily for demographic reasons, threatening fiscal sustainability beyond the medium term.
Public debt and gross financing needs paths are below standard vulnerability benchmarks and below the Cabinet debt ceiling of 60 percent of GDP.
Bottom line: Thailand has some fiscal space that should be used wisely.
3) Existing fiscal space should be used for infrastructure within a sustainable MT framework
Does Thailand have Fiscal Space?
On the positive side: On the negative side:The overall fiscal balance of the public sector has been close to zero in recent years suggesting a good track record of fiscal discipline.
Quasifiscal activities by some SOEs are not properly tracked or reported. Risks of contingent liabilities are hard to quantify with the available information.
The current cost of debt financing is low but likely to increase in the medium term. Now is the time for debt financing at fixed rates for new debt issuance.
Age-related spending is projected to increase steadily for demographic reasons, threatening fiscal sustainability beyond the medium term.
Public debt and gross financing needs paths are below standard vulnerability benchmarks and below the Cabinet debt ceiling of 60 percent of GDP.
Bottom line: Thailand has some fiscal space that should be used wisely.
Public health and pension spending is set to rise due to rapid aging
• The increase in spending is driven primarily by demographics (changes in the old-dependency ratio)
• Aging will also lower labor force participation and potential growth
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
JPN CHNKORTHA IND IDN LKAMYSPHLVTN
2015 2030
2050
Public Health and Pension Spending(In percent of GDP)
Left unchecked, age-related spending is a threat to long-term fiscal sustainability
-20
30
80
130
180
2000 2020 2040
China
-20
30
80
130
180
2000 2020 2040
Korea
-20
30
80
130
180
2000 2020 2040
Thailand
2022 Status Quo Aging Less optimistic r - g
Pu
blic
Deb
t (I
n p
erce
nt
of
GD
P)
A less favorable interest rate-growth differential adds further risk
-20
30
80
130
180
2000 2020 2040
China
-20
30
80
130
180
2000 2020 2040
Korea
-20
30
80
130
180
2000 2020 2040
Thailand
2022 Status Quo Aging Less optimistic r - g
Pu
blic
Deb
t (I
n p
erce
nt
of
GD
P)
3) Existing fiscal space should be used for infrastructure within a sustainable MT framework
Does Thailand have Fiscal Space?
On the positive side: On the negative side:The overall fiscal balance of the public sector has been close to zero in recent years suggesting a good track record of fiscal discipline.
Quasifiscal activities by some SOEs are not properly tracked or reported. Risks of contingent liabilities are hard to quantify with the available information.
The current cost of debt financing is low but likely to increase in the medium term. Now is the time for debt financing at fixed rates for new debt issuance.
Age-related spending is projected to increase steadily for demographic reasons, threatening fiscal sustainability beyond the medium term.
Public debt and gross financing needs paths are below standard vulnerability benchmarks and below the Cabinet debt ceiling of 60 percent of GDP.
Bottom line: Thailand has some fiscal space that should be used wisely.
A simulation with fiscal and monetary policy
• Asia Module of the Flexible System of Global Models• 16 countries for Asia; 8 blocks for the RoW
• Households (liquidity-constrained, saving); firms
• Fiscal policy plays a key role in the economy• Infrastructure investment and consumption
• Transfers (general and targeted)
• Taxes (VAT, PIT, CIT)
• Monetary policy generally follows inflation targeting
Thailand: Infrastructure push under different financing and monetary policy
• In the baseline, monetary policy reacts to the infrastructure push, crowding out private demand
• With monetary accommodation, a flat interest rate encourages investment/discourages saving.
• With debt and monetary accommodation, GDP (and consumption) increase further.
Lower transfers without monetary accommodation Lower transfers with monetary accommodation Debt with monetary accommodation
Public debt: + 1 % GDP
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Thailand: Real GDP (Percentage Points Difference)
Thailand: Infrastructure push under different financing and monetary policy
• In the baseline, monetary policy reacts to the infrastructure push, crowding out private demand
• With monetary accommodation, a flat interest rate encourages investment/discourages saving
• With debt and monetary accommodation, GDP (and consumption) increase further.
Lower transfers without monetary accommodation Lower transfers with monetary accommodationDebt with monetary accommodation
Public debt: + 1 % GDP
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Thailand: Real GDP (Percentage Points Difference)
Thailand: Infrastructure push under different financing and monetary policy
• In the baseline, monetary policy reacts to the infrastructure push, crowding out private demand
• With monetary accommodation, a flat interest rate encourages investment/discourages saving
• With monetary accommodation and debt financing, GDP and consumption increase further
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Thailand: Real GDP (Percentage Points Difference)
Lower transfers without monetary accommodation Lower transfers with monetary accommodationDebt with monetary accommodation
Public debt: + 1 % GDP
To reap higher growth dividends, critical elements must be in place
• Simulation results hold if risk premium is contained
• More broadly, critical pillars are:
Quality projects that address country-specific gaps
Credible fiscal anchors that look long term
Inclusive and sustainable Social Security Reform
• Structural reforms in healthcare• Automatic adjustment mechanisms in pension• Better coverage and benefits—revenue mobilization
Pension reform to address design issues and population aging
Pension Reform Challenges
Harmonization The pension system is fragmented in regimes for public, (formal) private, and informal employees.Sustainability The retirement age, 55, and the contribution rate, 6 percent, are low.Coverage Over 60 percent of the working-age population is not covered by a formal pension.Adequacy The average replacement rate for private sector workers (19 percent) is too low.Fairness Pensions for civil servants are much more generous, with higher replacement ratios, than for private sector workers.Poverty Alleviation The old-age allowance (minimum pension for those without a formal pension) is low and untargeted.
How should revenue be mobilized?
Increase the low VAT rate
6
7
7.0
10
10
10
12
14.3
20.6
0 5 10 15 20 25
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Cambodia
Laos
Indonesia
Philippines
Average in America
Average in Europe
VAT Rates in 2015(In percent)
Source: IBFD.
Compensate low-income households
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Thailand: Consumption Loss per Decile After a 1 PercentIncrease in VAT Rate (In percent of total consumption per decile)
Source: IMF staff calculations.
4) Concerted reforms to foster inclusive, sustained growth
• Mitigate demographic drag
• Support capital accumulation
• Increase TFP
Close gender gap in LFP
Increase retirement age
Facilitate skilled migration
Reform education
Upgrade infrastructure
Relax limits to foreign equity stakes
Facilitate PPPs
Adopt best practices in doing business
Eliminate untargeted subsidies (agriculture)
Revamp competition law
Restructure SOEs
Reduce tax distortions (incentives for target sectors)
Robust mechanism to identify and compensate vulnerable households
Reduce the excessive current account through a growth-driven process
Substantially stronger external position Two-sided intervention; but reserves
Actual current account (CA) 11.4
EBA CA estimates Cyclical adjustment 0.3 Cyclically adjusted CA 11.1
CA norm 1.1
CA gap 10.0 Policy gap 2.3 Unexplained residual 7.6
Staff-adjusted estimatesCyclical and transitory adjustments [3.0, 7.0] Terms of trade [1.0, 1.5] Tourism [1.0, 1.5] Political uncertainty [1.0, 4.0]
CA gap [3.0, 7.0]
REER gap (elasticity 0.6) [-11, -6]
Thailand: EBA Estimates and Staff Adjustments
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Change in reserves Capital and financial accountCurrent account
Current Account, Capital and Financial Account, and Reserves (In billions of U.S. dollars)
Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; and IMF staff calculations.
EBA: Staff’s adjustments of cyclical/transitory factors helped interpret part of the unexplained residual
-6
-4
-2
0
2015Q
1
2015Q
2
2015Q
3
2015Q
4
2016Q
1
2016Q
2
2016Q
3
2016Q
4
Source: IMF staff estimates.1/ Rolling regression of private investment (percent of GDP) on the inverse ofICRG index (measuring political uncertainty), controlling for external demand.
Impact of Political Uncertainty on Private Investment 1/(Regression coefficient)
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Actual Trend 1/
Thailand: Tourist Arrivals(In millions of persons)
Sources: Authorities; and IMF staff calculations. 1/ Trend calculated using an HP filter since the mid-1990s.
Demographic factors are expected to increase the CA norm in coming years
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
Thailand World
Aging Speed 1/(Projected change in old-age dependency ratio )
Source: IMF staff calculations.1/ Projected change in old age dependency ratio in 20 years, relative to current level.World refers to other EBA countries.
95
145
195
245
295
345
395
445
495
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Thailand World
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 1/(Index; 1985=100)
Source: IMF staff calculations.1/ Population aged over 65 divided by population between 30 and 64 years old.
Final remarks
• Thailand’s economy is on a recovery path. Exports and tourism are engines of growth, but domestic demand (investment) and inflation are too weak
• Monetary policy should focus on returning inflation to target, while macroprudential policies address systemic risks
• Fiscal policy expected to do a lot. Infrastructure stimulus must be balanced against the fiscal cost of the rapid demographic transition
• Structural reforms are the only true long-term solution
Domestic and external rebalancing through inclusive growth