texts in cybernetic theory

7/28/2019 Texts in Cybernetic Theory

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/texts-in-cybernetic-theory 1/123

CONFERENCE WORKBOOK

for

"TEXTS IN CYBERNETIC THEORY"

An I n- Dept h Expl orat i on of t he Thought of

HUMBERTO R. MATURANA

WI LLI AM T. POWERS

ERNST VON GLASERSFELD

A Conference of

THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR CYBERNETICS

October 18-23, 1988

Felton, California



TABLE OF CONTENTS

I . Conference Description

II. "An Outline of Control Theory" by William T. Powers

III. "An Exposition of Radical Constructivism" by Ernst von Glasersfeld

IV. "Ontology of Observing: The Biological

Foundations of Self Consciousness and The Physical Domain of Existence"

by Humberto R. Maturana

V. Notes Pages

(for your convenience)



TEXTS I N CYBERNETI C THEORY

Desi gned to provi de an opport uni t y f or i nf or mal , ser i ousst udy of t hree vi ewpoi nt s i n cybernet i cs, thi s speci al conf er -

ence of t he Amer i can Soci et y f or Cybernet i cs wi l l devot e eachof t he f i r st t hr ee f ul l days to readi ng, exami ni ng, el uci dat i ng,and di scussi ng a speci f i c t ext embodyi ng the pr i mary i deas of a par t i cul ar cyber net i c t heor et i ci an. The day' s aut hor wi l lr espond to quest i ons of expl i cat i on ar i si ng f rom smal l gr oupst udy of the t ext, as wel l as provi de addi t i onal el abor at i onof hi s t heoret i cal vi ewpoi nt and i t s i mpl i cat i ons i n an eveni ngl ectur e accompani ed by f ur t her quest i ons f rom the f l oor as wel las gener al di scussi on. The ai m of each "author day" wi l l be tounder st and the aut hor' s vi ewpoi nt . The f i nal day and a hal f wi l l engage the aut hors i n di al ogue and di scussi on of i ssuest hat have emerged i n t he previ ous days.

I n addi t i on to promot i ng a deeper under st andi ng of t hree

maj or poi nt s of vi ew i n cyber net i c t heory, t he conf erence wi l lpr ovi de three of our t heor i st s t he rare oppor t uni t y of bei nghear d ver y car ef ul l y—si mul t aneousl y of f er i ng each par t i ci pantan opport uni t y to exami ne more deepl y hi s or her own theor et i calconst ructs. I n shor t , t he conf er ence ai ms to f ost er a cont exti n whi ch al l of us can l ear n and expl ore t oget her , f r eei ng eachot her f r om the st i f l i ng mode of "my i deas agai nst your i deas"and i nst ead wor ki ng t oget her agai nst t he i deas: t o cl ar i f y asf ul l y as possi bl e some of t he maj or cur rent i deas i n cybernet i cs,as wel l as thei r i mpl i cat i ons.

Al l conf er ence par t i ci pant s wi l l be expect ed to have readt horoughl y each of t he t hr ee papers cont ai ned i n t hi s conf er-ence wor kbook pr i or to ar r i vi ng at t he conf er ence. Par t i ci pant scan f aci l i t at e di scussi on at t he conf er ence by maki ng not e of quest i ons whi ch ar i se as t hey f ami l i ar i ze t hemsel ves wi t h t het ext s i n t he weeks precedi ng the conf erence. At t he same t i me,si nce the whol e poi nt of t he conf er ence i s l ear ni ng t oget her ,no one shoul d l et r el at i ve l ack of f ami l i ar i t y wi t h al l t hemi nut i ae of one or more of t he t heoret i cal vi ewpoi nt s preventt hei r att endance. Al so, out of cour t esy to our speaker s andt o the t ot al weave of t he conver sat i on, al l par t i ci pant s areexpected to at t end t he ent i r e conf er ence, and t here wi l l be nol at e arr i val s.

Our t hree speaker s have worked har d t o provi de us excel l entsel f cont ai ned pr esent at i ons of al l t he maj or f acet s of t hei r

r espect i ve t heor et i cal vi ewpoi nt s—as you wi l l see i n thef ol l owi ng pages. I f i n r eadi ng t hese t ext s we exer ci se hal f t he car e t hey devot ed to wr i t i ng them, we wi l l have a f rui t f ulconf erence i ndeed. Come prepared t o work, and, as al ways i nt he ASC, t o have fun.

-- Rod Donal dson,Conf erence Chai r



An outline of control theory Powers p.2

on it, the mechanism will do nothing. Whatever it does do, it is caused to do.

This conception of life meant, of course, that to explain behavior we needn't refer to anything inside the organism. No concept of consciousness, thought, or will was needed, because if all behavior could be explained by referring to visible causes, what more could we add to the explanation by assuming inner causes as well? What would be left for them to cause? This line of argument, of course, assumed something that was very far from accomplished: that we could, in fact, account for behavior in terms of external causes.

As the twentieth century got under way, and as more and more scientists pledged alliegance to the principle of external causation, a disinterested observer might have noticed a peculiar fact. Every single attempt to explain behavior in terms of external causation failed. Each one failed, that is, in any terms a physicist or an engineer might apply. Instead of regular responses to outside stimuli, experimentalists kept finding only irregular responses, so irregular that it often took hundreds of trials or hundreds of experimental subjects to reveal that some regularity might lurk beneath the otherwise random-looking data. By the 1930s it had become obvious that the regularities of

behavior were all but hidden because of a new property that was named "variability."

So the sciences of behavior became mostly ways of applying statistics to ferret out suggestions of regularity. If there had not been such an enormous commitment to the causal picture of behavior, and so many earnest efforts to show that it was really correct, there would have come a time when these scientists would have stood back, assessed the situation, and given up the basic assumption as a failure. Any physical scientist would have done so long before.

By the 1930s the cause-effect assumption was, however, far too well established to be thrown out or even seriously questioned by mainstream scientists. Essentially all scientific work regarding behavior was based on looking for regular causes of regular behaviors — or at least for correlation coefficients that might be taken as hinting at such a relationship. The scientific world had settled on a general picture of the

mechanisms of behavior, and while there was continual wrangling

about just how this or that cause affected behavior, there was no disagreement about causality itself.

To this point, the concept of mechanism had essentially only one meaning: a sequence of causal links that began with some

primary effect and propagated, one link to the next, until it terminated in some observable event. One part of the mechanism affected the next, and so on to the final effect. But on the



An out l i ne of cont r ol t heor y Power s p. 3

mor ni ng of August 2, 1929, a Bel l Labor at or i es engi neer named H.S. Bl ack di scovered a pr i nci pl e t hat br ought a new ki nd of mechani sm i nt o vi ew. On t hat morni ng, on t he way to work, H. S.

Bl ack suddenl y underst ood how t o anal yze negat i ve f eedback.

The ar t i f i ci al cont r ol syst em

Bl ack di dn' t publ i sh hi s di scover y f or f our year s, but i tqui ckl y became t he f oundat i on f or a new appr oach t o t he desi gn of physi cal systems. The basi c pr obl em Bl ack had sol ved was t hi s:gi ven an el ect r oni c ampl i f i er t hat had par t of i t s out putconnect ed t o subt r act f r om i t s i nput , how coul d t hi s f eedbackar r angement be st abi l i zed, so i t woul d not " r un away?" Obvi ousl y,one answer i s not t o f eed back ver y much of t he out put s i f t hef eedback ef f ect i s ver y smal l , not hi ng unt oward wi l l happen. Butwhat i f t he net ampl i f i cat i on f actor, t r aci ng compl et el y ar oundt he f eedback l oop, wer e ver y l arge — say, 1000? Thi s woul d seemt o mean, under t he ol d causal anal ysi s, t hat any smal ldi st urbance woul d be f ed back t o t he same pl ace wi t h 1000 t i mest he ampl i t ude — and the next t i me around i t woul d have become1, 000, 000 t i mes as l arge, and so on. Bl ack showed how anampl i f i er wi t h any magni t ude of " l oop gai n" coul d be made st abl e,pr ovi ded t hat t he f eedback ef f ect opposed t he i ni t i al di st ur bance— t hat t he f eedback was negat i ve, not posi t i ve. The t r i ck Bl ackdi scovered was how t o make t he f eedback st ay negat i ve.

Syst ems wi t h l ar ge ampl i f i cat i on and st abl e negat i vef eedback soon pr oved t o have some f asci nat i ng pr opert i es. Thei rbehavi or seemed al most i ndependent of t hei r physi cal pr oper t i es.

Even t hough st abi l i zi ng t hem meant sl owi ng t hei r r esponsessomewher e i n t he f eedback l oop, t hey were capabl e of f ar f ast erand mor e pr eci se act i on t han syst ems wi t hout f eedback. The speedl ost t hrough t he sl owi ng f act or s was f ar more t han made up by t hef act t hat ver y hi gh ampl i f i cat i ons coul d be used.

Bl ack was pr i mar i l y a t el ephone syst ems engi neer , l ooki ngf or ways t o bui l d r el i abl e l ong- l i ved ampl i f i er s out of i mper f ectcomponent s. But t here was anot her br anch of el ect r i calengi neer i ng t hat f ound a di f f er ent use f or hi s pr i nci pl es, t hebr anch t hat event ual l y came t o be known, ear l y i n Wor l d War I I ,as cont r ol - syst em engi neer i ng. Dur i ng t he 1930s some engi neerswere l ooki ng f or ways of subst i t ut i ng aut omat i c machi nery f orhuman bei ngs i n cer t ai n tasks, pr i mar i l y t asks t hat t ook a whol ehuman bei ng' s at t ent i on f ul l - t i me j ust t o keep some si mpl ephysi cal var i abl e l i ke st eam pr essur e or ai r speed under cont r ol .

Ther e was not hi ng i n any exi st i ng t heory of behavi or t hat coul dexpl ai n how a human bei ng managed t o accompl i sh even t he si mpl estof t hese t asks. Theor i es of behavi or wer e l ong on met aphor andqual i t at i ve asser t i ons, but ver y shor t on i nst r uct i ons f or how t obui l d a machi ne t hat woul d behave as organi sms wer e assumed to

behave.




An engineer, some engineer once said, is someone who learns what is necessary to get the job done. In this case, what the engineers had to learn was how organisms really work. They solved this problem from scratch, inventing in the process a new kind of

machine. Being interested only in the machine, they didn't realize that they had revolutionized the sciences of life.

It is probably no coincidence that these engineers worked primarily with electronic systems. They were accustomed to systems in which there were no moving parts except at the output, systems in which everything interesting took place in the form of changing voltages and currents. An electronics engineer was

perfectly happy to point to a circuit chassis and say, "That s the RF signal, and here's where it gets turned into the IF, and here is the detector that turns it into audio, and here is where the music comes out." In fact, all those currents and voltages were just currents and voltages, until they were named and given functional meaning by the engineer. So there is something appropriate about the fact that engineers working with networks of anonymous and essentially identical electronic signals managed to discover how to build machines that imitate, in a rudimentary way, the kinds of behavior that are accomplished by a brain: a

brain in which there are no moving parts and everything that happens occurs in the form of networks of anonymous and essentially identical neural signals.

To shorten the story, the engineers eventually discovered that in order to control some physical variable, a control system had to have certain basic parts, connected in the right relationships. First, whatever was to be controlled had to be continuously represented by an electronic analogue signal. If a position of an object was to be controlled, some measuring device had to be attached to the object so that as the object moved from point A to point B, an electrical signal changed from magnitude A to magnitude B. This was the sensor.

Second, not surprisingly, the control system had to be able to affect whatever was to be controlled. An electronic signal inside the system had to be converted, through an effector, into some physical effect that acted on the variable to be controlled. If an object's position was to be controlled, then the effector would be a motor or a pneumatic piston or a solenoid. For the best control, the amount of action had to be essentially proportional to the amount of driving signal, although it was found that this proportionality could be very approximate.

Having thus dealt with the input and output processes, analogous to human senses and human muscles, the engineers then tackled the third problem, the heart of the matter. Exactly HOW did the sensory signal have to affect the output effector to get the result envisioned — control of the external variable?




It's clear that if the sensor indicates that the position or whatever — is in error, the sensory signal should operate the effector to make the position or whatever change back toward the right state. A positive deviation should lead to an effort having a negative effect on the deviation, and vice versa when negative and positive are interchanged. Negative feedback. The problem was that you can't simply connect the sensor's signal to the effector and get the right result. If you do that, the control system will energetically force the position/whatever toward the state that creates zero sensory signal. If all you want is to keep the

position/whatever nailed to the low end of its range of variation that will do fine (although a nail would also work), but what if you want to control something around some state other than zero, or around a variable state?

Consider the poor stationary engineer whose job it is to stand with one hand on a valve wheel and keep a steam pressure gauge at a constant reading. He may not even know that the wheel changes the draft in a furnace and varies the bailing rate of water in the pressure vessel. His job is to keep that needle at the right reading, and all he has to know to do this job is that turning the wheel clockwise will raise the reading and turning it counterclockwise will lower it. Or is that all he has to know?

Actually, he has to know one more facts the right reading. The dial tells him the present pressure, but not the right

pressure. If the dial indicates 328 pounds per square inch, that is too much, and he has to turn the valve counterclockwise. If it indicates 326 pounds per square inch, that is too little and he has to turn the valve clockwise. Only if the reading is 327 pounds per square inch is it all right not to turn the wheel. As the factory is putting widely varying demands on the steam supply, the engineer hardly ever gets to leave the wheel alone and think about philosophy.

So how is the control-system engineer to get that "right reading" into the control system? It's just one position of the needle among all the positions the needle might have, and a phone call from the production manager might result in making some other reading the right one, so 327 pounds now calls for turning the wheel right or left. There is clearly a reference-reading against which the actual reading is being compared, and that reference reading, to have any effect, must be carried inside the human being's head. So the control-system engineers had to provide a reference signal inside the control system they were building. The reference signal represented the intended pressure.

The sensor represents the state of whatever is being controlled as a signal, a voltage with an analogous magnitude. It

makes sense to compare one voltage to another, and that is what was done: the reference signal was also a voltage. In the nick of




time, the 6SN7 vacuum tube came along and (in a circuit called a differential amplifier or "long-tailed pair") provided the basis for an electronic comparator that could generate an output voltage that was reliably proportional to the difference between

two input voltages. One input voltage was the sensor signal, the other the reference signal. And now the output of the system could be zero when the input was NOT zero, A motor connected to the draft-adjusting valve could stop turning when the error signal coming out of the comparator was zero, which occurred when the sensor voltage was, say, 32.7 volts, just matching the reference voltage of 32.7 volts. The sensor and reference signals, of course, were calibrated so that one volt meant 10

pounds per square inch in this imaginary but generic design. The sensor didn't read the dial: it was the same pressure sensor that made the needle move.

Now if the pressure was too low the motor would turn one way, if it was too high the motor would turn the other way, and if it was "just right" — meaning that the sensor signal matched the reference signal, whatever its setting — the motor would not turn at all. The control-system engineer could then explain to the stationary engineer that his life of drudgery was over, and also that he had lost his job.

Verbal descriptions of the way control systems work are almost certain to be misleading unless critical details are spelled out with care. The sheer mechanics of speaking or writing stretches out the action so it seems that there is a sequence of well-separated events, one following the other. If you were trying to describe how a gun-pointing servomechanism works, you might start out by saying "Suppose I push down on the gun-barrel to create a position error. The error will cause the servo motors to exert a force against the push, the force getting larger as the push gets larger." That seems clear enough, but it s a lie.

If you really did this demonstration, you would say "Suppose I push down on the gun-barrel to create an error ... wait a minute. It's stuck."

No, it isn't stuck. It's simply a good control system. As you begin to push down, the little deviation in sensed position of the gun-barrel causes the motor to twist the barrel up against your push. The amount of deviation needed to make the counteractive force equal to the push is so small that you can neither see nor feel it. As a result, the gun-barrel feels as rigid as if it were cast in concrete. It creates the appearance of one of those old-fashioned machines that is immovable simply

because it weighs 200 tons, but if someone turned off the power the gun-barrel would fall immediately to the deck. Nothing but the effector, the motor's armature suspended on good bearings in a spinning magnetic field, is holding it in place. The motor does this because the control system is exceedingly sensitive to tiny deviations of sensed position away from the reference position.



An outline of control theory. Powers p.7

The gun is so well-stabilized that it resists any amount of push you can exert, without a tremor.

The operator of this gun, on the other hand, can easily make it swivel from one position to another just by turning a knob between two fingers. The knob varies the reference signal. When the reference signal changes, the definition of "zero error" changes, and the control system acts instantly to make the sensed position stay in a match with the new definition. If the operator twiddles the knob idly back and forth, the motor and gears may scream and the lights may dim, but the gun-barrel will also twiddle idly back and forth under precise control.

World War II started only six years after Black published the secret of negative feedback, and sophisticated control systems were pointing gun-barrels before the war s end (I learned to troubleshoot and repair control systems during that war). Into the middle of this feverish development came Norbert Wiener,

Arturo Rosenblueth, and Julian Bigelow. They were not the only people to see that control systems behaved in some mysterious fashion as if they were alive — even teenaged Electronic Technician's Mates could see that — but they were the only ones with an ingenious name for this phenomenons cybernetics, from a Greek word for steersmanship.

Cybernetics

In 1948 Norbert Wiener published Cybernetics: Control and communication in the animal and the machine. In this book he showed that the organization of a negative feedback control system was in one-to-one correspondence with the organization of certain neuromuscular "reflex arcs;" he even suggested new ways of looking at purposive or directed behavior as a whole in terms of control theory. This topic interested many others, and soon gave rise to the Macy Conferences, at which gatherings of scientists explored not only control-system theory, but other topics such as information theory, communication, and self — organizing systems.

The next major publication was W. Ross Ashby's Design for a brain, in 1952. Here Ashby took the basic control-theoretic idea and expanded on it in detail. Among other important concepts, Ashby introduced the idea of "ultrastability" , a special property that he gave to a m u l t i -control-system model that enabled it to maintain itself as a control system under drastic changes in its surroundings, even in its own circuitry. This was the first clear statement of a model of organisms showing how they could be responsible for their own organization.

Unfortunately, engineers were under-represented in the early ranks of cyberneticists, one primary exception being Bigelow, who considered himself, however, a proponent of information theory.



An out l i ne of cont rol t heory Powers p. 8

Per haps i f engi neer i ng expert s on cont rol t heory had been cal l edi n ear l y i n t he game, t hei r convent i onal and pract i cal knowl edgeof cont rol syst ems woul d have compl et el y st i f l ed t he

i nvent i veness t hat kept cybernet i cs goi ng. But a pr i ce was pai df or t hat i ntel l ectual f reedom.

I t was cl ear t o al l t he ear l y cybernet i ci st s that cont rolsyst ems behaved i n ways t hat were very di f f erent f romany conceptof behavi or t hat had exi st ed unt i l then. I nstead of act i on bei ngt he end of a causal chai n, i t was si mpl y one part of a cl osedcausal ci rcl e. The rel at i onshi p bet ween organi sm and envi ronment ,when organi sms were seen as cont rol syst ems, was no l onger one of obedi ence to external f orces. I nstead, t he organi sm i t sel f becamean act i ve agent i n t he wor l d, i t s i nner organi zat i on bei ngresponsi bl e f or what i t di d. The ear l y years of cybernet i cs weref ul l of t he exci t ement t hat comes f rom seei ng a f ami l i arphenomenon i n a new l i ght . The i mpl i cat i ons of ci rcul ar causal i t ywere si mpl y enormous. Studyi ng behavi or suddenl y became far l essi mport ant than st udyi ng t he i nner organi zat i on of t he brai ns i t si nner l ogi c, i t s use of l anguage, i t s capaci t y to do somet hi ngwi t h i ncomi ng st i mul i besi de respond t o t hem i n a bl i ndmechani cal way. Or gani sms began t o appear autonomous.

Al l t hese new concept s f ol l owed, however , f rom a basi c newconcept i on of mechani sm t hat f ew cybernet i ci st s underst ood. Mosto-f t hose who att ached t hemsel ves t o thi s movement were at t ractedby what seemed a ser i es of except i onal l y coherent i nsi ght s i ntot he natur e of behavi or , i nsi ght s that came, apparent l y, f romnowhere, or at l east f r om a f ew out st andi ngl y i ngeni ous mi nds.Most of t hese cybernet i ci st s underst ood t hat somewhere i n the

background was some t echnol ogi cal st uf f that had got t he whol et hi ng star t ed, but t hey wer e not t echnol ogi st s and weren' t veryi nt er est ed i n machi nes. I t was thi s new col l ect i on of concept st hat caught t hei r at t ent i on. So t hey began t o guess about howsuch syst ems mi ght be organi zed so as t o behave i n t hi s new way.

There i s where t he pri ce of i gnorance st art ed t o be pai d. I nf act t he basi c pr i nci pl es of operat i on of cl osed- l oop syst ems hadbeen worked out i n consi der abl e detai l before Wi ener and hi scol l eagues ever appeared on t he scene. Machi nes that i mi t ated t hepurposi veness of human behavi or had been desi gned af ter a carefulanal ysi s of how human bei ngs behaved i n t hat same way (al thoughwi t hout any i nt ent i on of expl ai ni ng human behavi or ) . Themathemati cs needed t o anal yze ci rcul ar causat i on, based l argel yon H. S. Bl ack' s work, had matured and was i n regul ar use byengi neers. The machi nes whose behavi or i nspi red t he bi r t h of cybernet i cs were al r eady underst ood. There was no need to guessabout how t hese newl y- appreci at ed phenomena came about .

What cyberneti cs had t o add to t hi s pi ct ur e was not anexpl anat i on of cl osed- l oop phenomena, but a creat i ve expl orat i onof t he si gni f i cance of t hese new pr i nci pl es as they appl i ed t o




human behavi or . I n l arge par t , and t o t he degr ee possi bl e at t het i me, t hi s was done. The way was paved f or r evi si ng some of ourmost basi c not i ons of what organi sms are and what t hei r act i ons

mean. But at t he same t i me, a body of spur i ous conj ect ureappear ed, pr oduced by peopl e unawar e of or uni nt er est ed i n t heexi st i ng knowl edge about cont r ol syst ems (or el se, aware of i t i na per i pheral way but convi nced that i t s essence coul d be capt ur edi n a f ew cl ever l y- st at ed r ul es of t humb) .

The most unf or t unat e aspect of t he conj ect ur es was t hat t heywer e al l gr ounded i n t he ol d cause- ef f ect concept i on of behavi or ;t he r adi cal swi t ch of vi ewpoi nt act ual l y r equi r ed was si mpl y t oof undament al t o be accompl i shed wi t hout basi c knowl edge of t hepr i nci pl es of cont r ol . Those pr i nci pl es, never f i r ml y gr asped,soon f aded f r om vi ew. The l eaders of cybernet i cs began, wi t houtknowi ng they were doi ng so, mi sl eadi ng. One person, who l at erbecame a pr esi dent of t he Amer i can Soci ety f or Cybernet i cs,

announced t hat he had al ways consi dered pur posi ve behavi or t o beadequat el y model ed by a dr op of water sl i di ng down an i ncl i nedpl ane under t he gui di ng i nf l uence of gr avi t y. Anot her f amouscybernet i ci st , summi ng up what had been l ear ned dur i ng t he MacyConf er ences, announced that no cl osed- l oop syst em coul d avoi dr unaway osci l l at i ons i f t he f eedback f act or wer e gr eat er t hanuni t y. St i l l anot her pr oposed t hat t he basi c pr i nci pl e of r egul at i on amount ed t o sensi ng t he cause of a di st ur bance, andconver t i ng t hat i nf or mat i on i nt o a pr eci sel y- comput edcompensat ory ef f ect on t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e. Many ot herspr ocl ai med t hat cont r ol was based on sensi ng er r or s, as i f er r orcoul d be observed i n t he out si de wor l d. Ot hers sai d t hat cont r olamount ed t o cal cul at i ng t he pr eci se pr ogr am of act i on t hat woul d

cor r ect an er r or , and t hen execut i ng i t. Many ot her s sai d t hati ncomi ng sensor y i nf ormat i on "gui des" behavi or , and another ver ypopul ar not i on was t hat cont r ol consi st s of l i mi t cycl es oral t er nat i ng sequences of er r or and cor r ect i ve act i ons. Ever ymi st ake t hat coul d be made was made, aut hor i t at i vel y.

Whi l e t hese vi ews mi ssed t he mai n poi nt , some of t hemnever t hel ess cont ai ned a gr ai n of t r ut h, and ser ved t o keep al i vet he f l avor , i f not t he subst ance, of cont r ol t heor y. The basi cphenomenon of ci r cul ar causal i t y cont i nued t o be r ecogni zed, andi t s i mpl i cat i ons expanded. Fur t her mor e, t he i dea t hat organi smsare act i ve agent s was cr uci al i n encour agi ng expl orat i ons of br ai n model s, comput er model s f or t he most par t , and i n l eadi ngt o t he devel opment of new phi l osophi cal st ances, al l per t i nent t o

cont r ol t heor y. The weakness at t he f oundat i ons was not f at al ; atl east t he i mpl i cat i ons of cont r ol t heor y cont i nued t o ber ecogni zed, and cont i nued t o at t r act peopl e who saw t hat t hi svi ew made more sense t han convent i onal ones, even i f t hey coul d

not def end i t.

We now come t o t he real subj ect of t hi s out l i nes t hecont r ol - syst em model I am t r yi ng t o i nt r oduce, or r at her r e-



An outline of control theory Powers p. 10

introduce, to cybernetics. It is not easy for cyberneticists to concede that there is something fundamental about their own discipline that they have missed, especially when the one who makes this claim seems to be an outsider. A certain amount of resistance, even hostility, is to be expected, and I assure the reader that I have already accepted it and discounted it. I have to do so, to remain consistent with the principles I believe to apply to human nature.

But something is demanded of cyberneticists, too; they must at least take under advisement the possibility of thinking the unthinkable. I ask no more than understanding of what I propose.

Cybernetic control theory

While I already knew a little about control theory at the time, my lifelong interest in applying it to human behavior began only after I read Wiener and Ashby in 1952. It seemed to me that they had uncovered a vastly important principle of behavior, new to the life sciences. Being unknown and feeling ignorant, I determined to learn more about control theory and its applications to behavior, so that some day I could enter those exalted halls of cybernetics with something to contribute.

This project began in 1953, in collaboration with a physicist, R. K. Clark. We were soon joined by a clinical psychologist, R. L. MacFarland, and began to learn control theory in depth, my role being that of an engineer/physicist who was designing and building control systems as part of the job of a

medical physicist. Clark really made the whole project possible by finding us both a position at the V. A. Research Hospital in Chicago, where I worked as his assistant. MacFarland was the Chief Clinical Psychologist there, and made important contributions in translating our somewhat austere models into terms that conventional psychologists might conceivably understand.

Our first paper describing the control-system model was published in 1960, in the shadow of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's book on the organization of behavior, where the TOTE unit acquired its unfortunate lease on life. I will not bore the reader with tales of the meager acceptance that greeted our

publication: cyberneticists have had their own problems, for similar reasons, with the Establishment.

This brief review of my own history is by way of saying that my interest in control theory was originally inspired by cybernetics, and was always intended, at least as a background hope, for use by cyberneticists (as well as psychologists). I thought, for many years, that I was simply catching up.




Neither will I bore the reader by re-running the laborious process by which we arrived at the final model, after backing out of many blind alleys. 1 will pass over the ensuing years of intermittent discouragement, the regrouping that ended with my book in 1973, my subsequent tentative forays into the American Society for Cybernetics, and the rise of the Control Systems Group, that rumor of Visigoths poised on the borders of cybernetic civilization ready to plunder and rape and otherwise violate the comfortable ways of the ASC. None of these matters will be important if the basic concepts of this theory are clearly understood. We have all been through the wars. We are all on the same side. Let's get to it.

The nature of control

The first thing that must be understood is that control is something that a control system does, not something that is done to it. The second thing is that in a control system there is no "controller." Control is a phenomenon that arises when an active system, constructed in a specific way, interacts with its immediate environment. The third thing is that the relationship

between control system and environment is not symmetrical. Even though each affects the other, only the control system controls. The word "environment" means here the passive physical environment that takes no action of its own, but behaves as it is

made to behave by natural forces: the world of the physicist. The presence of other control systems is a complication we will take up later.

A control system senses its environment and acts on it. Sensing means representing, and representing, if it is to mean anything reasonable, means analogizing. A sensor responds to some specific aspect of its environment, some variable outside the sensor, by generating a signal that is a quantitative analogue of the state of the variable. Bear with me for now: this concept of representation will become more interesting.

Acting means generating some physical effect whose magnitude and direction depend smoothly on the magnitude and sign of a driving signal inside the control system. Again, bear with me: we are speaking of the foundations of more complex actions.

As explained earlier, the sensor signal representing the external variable is compared with an internal reference signal that is of the same physical nature as the sensor signal. The result is an error signal that is zero only when the sensor signal matches the reference signal.

The action of the system is driven by the error signal.

In order for control to appear, the parts of this system must act in specific ways. The sensor signal, for example, must




vary over a range from minimum to maximum as the external variable goes through its whole possible range of change. This relationship establishes the range within which control is

possible.

The action of the system must affect the external variable at least in the dimension that is sensed. If an action caused by a positive error signal changes the sensed variable in one direction, the action caused by a negative error signal must change the variable — as sensed — in the opposite direction.

The overall effect of these relationships must be that the action driven by either sign of error signal must tend to alter the external variable in the direction that makes the sensor signal come closer in magnitude to the reference signal, so that the error signal becomes smaller. This is the basic requirement -for negative feedback.

These requirements give us the qualitative basis for control phenomena. But there is a critically important quantitative basis as well, which accounts for the asymmetry of control.

The error signal drives the output action. It makes a great deal of difference how much error is required to produce a given amount of action. The ratio of action to error is called the error sensitivity of the control system. The output function, the effector of the control system, not only converts from signal-

units to physical-world units of effect, but it enormously increases the level of energy that is involved in all variations. The output function is a transducer, but it is also an amplifier.

The output action of the system is connected to the external variable through an environmental link. In this link the laws of thermodynamics prevails no more comes out than went in. Between the action and the effect on the external variable there is usually some degree of loss of effect. There may be a change in energy level in passing from the external variable to its sensory representation, but if we normalize both variables to their total range of change, there is no amplification. Almost all of the amplification (that is not simply a change of units) that occurs in this control process occurs in the output function, in the conversion from error to action. Here thermodynamics means nothing: the system is supplied from outside with whatever amount of energy it expends. The books do not have to balances this is a

thermodynamically open system.

It is a peculiarity of control systems that causation often seems to reverse itself. If we compare two control systems with greatly different error sensitivities, our first guess might be that the system with the greater error sensitivity, all else

being equal, would produce the greater amount of action. What actually happens is that the system with the greater error



An out l i ne of cont r ol theory. Powers p. 13

sensi t i vi t y cont ai ns the smal l er er r or si gnal , and i t s acti on i sessent i al l y t he same as what t he ot her syst em pr oduces. I f youdoubl e t he er r or sensi t i vi t y, t he r esul t i s ver y near l y to hal vet he er r or si gnal , not t o doubl e the amount of act i on.

There i s one l ast consi derat i on t hat has not hi ng t o do wi t ht he pr ocess of cont r ol i t sel f , but whi ch i s one of t he maj orr easons why cont r ol i s necessar y: di st ur bances. The exter nalvar i abl e i s af f ect ed not onl y by t he syst em' s act i on, but by t hewor l d i n gener al . The t emperat ure of a house i s af f ect ed not onl yby t he f ur nace' s out put , but by heat ent er i ng, l eavi ng, or bei nggener at ed by ot her sour ces i n t he bui l di ng. The path of a car i saf f ect ed not onl y by t he dr i ver 's st eer i ng ef f or t s, but bycrosswi nds, t i l t s and bumps i n t he r oad, sof t t i r es, andmi sal i gnment of t he wheel s. A savi ngs- account bal ance i s af f ect ednot onl y by deposi t i ng and wi t hdr awi ng money, but by servi ce

charges, comput er er r ors , and cr ooked empl oyees. Var i abl es t hator gani sms cont r ol ar e cont r ol l ed because t hey wi l l notspont aneousl y come t o the st at es desi r ed by t he or gani sms, andeven when br ought t o t hose st at es, wi l l not st ay t her e.

The physi cal envi r onment i s i n a cont i nuous st at e of var i at i on, so much so t hat no speci f i c act i on can have onespeci f i c consequence. There can be no such t hi ng as comput i ng anact i on t hat wi l l have a desi r ed r esul t , unl ess one has t akengr eat pai ns t o shi el d t hose r esul t s agai nst al l nor mali ndependent i nf l uences. That may be appr oxi mat el y possi bl e i n t hel abor atory, but i t does not happen i n normal envi r onment s.

Fur t hermore, as we are begi nni ng t o hear , t he l awf ul ness of t he physi cal wor l d i t sel f i s l ar gel y i l l usor y even di scount i ngHei senber g. Many nat ur al phenomena are so sensi t i ve t o sl i ghtvar i at i ons i n i ni t i al condi t i ons that even t hough we can pr ove,by backward r easoni ng, t hat t hey ar e l awf ul , we cannot est abl i shi ni t i al condi t i ons accur at el y enough t o t ur n t hose deduct i onsi nt o r el i abl e pr edi ct i ons. The behavi or of hi gher or gani sms i scl ear l y one of t hese phenomena. Behavi or r esul t s f r om t heappl i cat i on of muscl e f or ces — not ver y repr oduci bl e i nt hemsel ves — t o t he masses of t he body. The resul t i s not"movement " but accel er at i on. Even t o t ur n an ef f ort i nt o aposi t i on r equi r es a doubl e t i me- i nt egr at i on, whi ch vast l ymagni f i es al l f orce var i at i ons, and by gr eat er and gr eat eramount s as t i me pr ogr esses. And t hi s does not begi n t o t ake i nt o

account t he i ndi r ect ef f ect s of l i mb movement s t hat , i n or der t opr oduce t he l ar ger pat t erns of behavi or, must be i nt egr at ed agai nand agai n, al l t he whi l e bei ng subj ect t o unpr edi ct abl edi st ur bances. I t i s not necessar y t o i nvoke cont r ol t heor y t oshow t hat t he ol d causal model of behavi or i s wr ongs al l we needdo i s l ook real i st i cal l y at what i s i nvol ved i n maki ng "t he samebehavi or " occur t wi ce i n a r ow i n a di st urbance- pr one and semi —

chaot i c uni ver se.




If organisms simply behaved blindly, the consequences of their actions would be essentially unpredictable. The same action applied ten times in a row would have ten different consequences, in most cases radically different. The physical world, uncontrolled, drifts in a kind of gigantic Brownian movement, showing order on an intermediate time-scale but for the most part simply changing aimlessly. Control systems impose order on this aimless drift. The automobile, buffeted by winds, jolted by

bumps, dragged by uneven friction, wearing out asymmetrically from one minute to the next, nevertheless clings to a path that deviates by no more than one or two feet from the right path in 100 miles. This regularity is wholly unnatural, and can be accounted for only by knowing that there is a control system at the steering wheel.

The fact that there is behavior at all shows us that there is control.

To grasp the behavior of a control system correctly, it is necessary to think of all parts of the system at once. Control is not a sequential process, but a process of continuously and energetically maintained equilibrium among all parts of the system and between the system and external influences. If a disturbance arises that tends to change the external variable

being controlled, the system does not wait to act until the disturbance has finished its work. Instead, the action of the system begins to change the instant there is any deviation of the sensor signal from the reference signal. Because this action opposes the error, it also opposes the effect of the disturbance.

As the disturbance increases and decreases, so does the action opposing it increase and decrease. The sensor signal, in this process, varies slightly away from the reference setting, but if the error sensitivity is reasonably high only a tiny amount of error is needed to keep the action balanced against the disturbance at all times. For all practical purposes the action prevents the disturbance from affecting the controlled variable.

You will notice that some familiar concepts customarily associated with control processes are missing here. The first missing factor is any ability of the control system to sense the cause of a disturbance of the external controlled variable. While a more complex system could sense the cause of the disturbance, doing so would not materially improve control. The control system responds only to deviations of its own sensor signal from the reference signal. Why there is a deviation, whether it is due to a single cause of disturbance or to the combined effects of a thousand independent causes all acting at once (the normal case), is irrelevant. All the control system needs to monitor is the controlled variable itself: if the controlled variable starts to depart from its correct state, the system acts directly on it to keep it where it belongs. There may be a few circumstances in which "feed-forward" would be advantageous, but it can never




subst i t ut e f or t he basi c pr ocess of cont r ol . I shoul d add t hatpur e compensat i on, i n whi ch onl y t he st at e of t he di st ur bance( not t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e) i s sensed and a compensat i ng act i on

i s cal cul at ed and appl i ed al ong wi t h t he ef f ect of t hedi st ur bance, wi l l not work at al l i n most ci r cumst ances. I t mayseem t o work on paper , wher e we can r epr esent var i abl es by si mpl ewhol e number s and gi ve t he i magi nary syst em knowl edge of al ldi st ur bances act i ng ( and of t he l i nks f r om each di st ur bance t ot he cont r ol l ed var i abl e) , but i n t he real wor l d i t can' t evencome cl ose t o expl ai ni ng what we observe.

Anot her mi ssi ng f act or i s any pr ovi si on i nsi de t he cont rolsyst em f or comput i ng t he pr oper amount of out put t o cor r ect agi ven er r or . The onl y t hi ng appr oxi mat i ng an out put comput at i oni s t he ampl i f i cat i on of t he er r or si gnal , t he syst em' s er r orsensi t i vi t y. I n or der t o comput e t he r i ght amount of out put t opr oduce a gi ven ef f ect on t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e, t he cont r olsyst em woul d need a gr eat deal of i nf or mat i on t hat i t s si mpl esensor si gnal does not carr y. I t woul d need t o know t he moment arypr oper t i es of t he physi cal l i nk connect i ng i t s act i on t o t hecont r ol l ed var i abl e, and i t woul d need t o know what amount anddi r ect i on of di st ur bance wi l l be act i ng at t he t i me when t heout put cal cul at i on i s put i nt o ef f ect. To get t he r equi r edi nf ormat i on i t woul d need a vast ar r ay of ext r a sensors and aver y l arge comput er progr amed wi t h t he l aws of physi cs — and t heabi l i t y t o pr edi ct f ut ur e di st ur bances. Fur t her mor e, i t woul dneed t o know about i t s own pr opert i es, because t he i nst ant t hatt he out put comput at i on began t o have i t s ef f ect , t he i nputvar i abl e woul d change t o a di f f er ent st at e, maki ng thecomput at i on obsol et e. The concept of " comput i ng t he appr opr i at e

act i on" i s not onl y superf l uous, but amount s t o a ver y poordesi gn. I n t he real wor l d, human bei ngs of t en t r y t o cont r olcompl ex event s i n t hi s way, t hi nki ng t hat l ogi cal l y i t has towork, but i n f act such ef f or t s usual l y pr ove f r ui t l ess, aswi t ness t he at t empt s of t he Feder al Reserve t o r egul at e theeconomy by di ddl i ng i nt er est r at es.

Fi nal l y, al so mi ssi ng i s t he ent i r e concept of a "cont r ol l edact i on. " Cont r ol syst ems do not cont r ol t hei r act i ons: t hey var yt hem. What t hey do cont r ol i s t he var i abl e af f ect ed bot h by theact i on and by di st ur bances. And i n t he f i nal anal ysi s, what t heyr eal l y cont r ol i s t he sensor si gnal t hat r epr esent s t he ext er nalvari abl e. Al l t he r est of t he syst em f unct i ons t o mai nt ai n t hesensor si gnal i n a mat ch wi t h t he r ef erence si gnal . The act i on of t he syst em i s det ermi ned at ever y moment by t he nat ure of t hef eedback l i nk t o the cont r ol l ed var i abl e and by t he amount anddi r ect i on of net di st ur bance t hat i s act i ng. I f t he acti on i t sel f wer e cont r ol l ed, t he var i abl e coul d not be st abi l i zed agai nstdi st ur bance. I f t he dr i ver of a car cont r ol l ed t he st eer i ngwheel i nst ead of t he posi t i on of t he car , t he car woul d goi mmedi at el y i nt o t he di t ch, because no one posi t i on of t hest eer i ng wheel wi l l keep t he car on t he r oad f or ver y l ong.



Fig. 1: Generic control-system diagram




Fi g. 1 shows t he basi c rel at i onshi ps we have been t al ki ngabout .

A hi er ar chy of cont rol

What we have seen so f ar woul d probabl y be cal l ed a"homeost at i c" syst em. We have a syst em t hat mai ntai ns a one-di mensi onal var i abl e at a const ant l evel mat chi ng a f i xedr ef er ence si gnal . Thi s syst em mi ght behave ver y ener get i cal l y asdi st ur bances come and go, but t he net r esul t of i t s act i on woul dbe a var i abl e that i s hel d constant .

By now, however , i t shoul d be cl ear t hat t he cont rolsystem' s act i on f ocuses on mai nt ai ni ng i t s own sensor si gnal i n amat ch wi t h t he r ef er ence si gnal . Nothi ng was sai d t hat speci f i es

t he set t i ng of t hat r ef er ence si gnal , and not hi ng was sai d t ol i mi t t he r ef er ence si gnal t o a si ngl e f i xed val ue.

I f t he r ef er ence si gnal var i es i n magni t ude, t he f i r stef f ect wi l l be t o cr eat e error . I nst ead of t he sensor si gnaldepar t i ng f r om t he r ef er ence si gnal , t he r ef er ence si gnal depar t sf r om t he sensor si gnal , but t he r esul t i s pr eci sel y t he same: anerror si gnal t hat i s hi ghl y ampl i f i ed t o pr oduce act i on. Thebasi c ar r angement has not changed: t he syst em wi l l st i l l beor gani zed t o al t er t he sensor si gnal i n t he di r ect i on t hat makest he er r or smal l er . But now i t s act i on wi l l have t he ef f ect of maki ng t he sensor si gnal change, r ather t han hol di ng i t const ant .

I n a wel l - desi gned cont rol system, err ors ar e never al l owed

t o get ver y l arge. Consequent l y, when t he r ef erence si gnalchanges, t he out put act i on wi l l dr i ve t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e t ochange r i ght al ong wi t h t he r ef er ence si gnal . Thi s i s t he gunoper at or t wi ddl i ng t he cont rol knob. Changi ng t he r ef er encesi gnal i s a way of changi ng t he exter nal cont r ol l ed var i abl e i n apredetermi ned way — namel y, t he way the ref erence si gnalchanges. I f t he r ef er ence si gnal changes smoot hl y f r om a l owval ue t o a hi gh val ue, so wi l l t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e change,qui t e wi t hout r egar d t o any ot her physi cal i nf l uences act i ng oni t. The cont r ol l oop wi l l aut omat i cal l y pr oduce what everf l uct uat i ons i n act i on are r equi r ed t o make t he cont r ol l edvar i abl e obey t he r ef er ence si gnal r at her t han other i nf l uences.

So whatever i s capabl e of mani pul at i ng t he r ef er ence si gnali s al so capabl e of mani pul at i ng a var i abl e i n t he envi r onment of t he cont r ol system. The way t hat var i abl e changes i s determi nedby t he cause of t he r ef er encesi gnal changes, and more i mport ant ,ceases t o be dependent on al l t he physi cal l aws that woul dotherwi se determi ne how i t behaves. The cont rol syst em has takenover t hat var i abl e, cut i t out of t he normal f l ow of i nani mat enatur e and made i t behave as t he cont r ol - syst em— or as t hemani pul ator of t he r ef er ence si gnal — wi shes i t t o behave. The



An out l i ne of cont r ol t heory Power s p. 17

ai ml ess dr i f t t hat t he var i abl e woul d nat ur al l y exhi bi t i sr epl aced by pur posi ve change. Regul ar i t y has been i mposed on

Chaos.

Not e t hat we st i l l do not have pur posi ve act i on. The act i onsof t he syst em ar e st i l l di ct at ed by di st ur bances and by nat ur alr esi st ance of t he var i abl e t o bei ng changed. For any gi ven st at eof t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e, t he act i on mi ght be f ound anywher ewi t hi n i t s possi bl e r ange, dependi ng on what el se i s doi ngsomet hi ng t o t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e, or t r yi ng to. Pur pose canbe seen onl y i n t he cont r ol l ed var i abl e i t sel f — i n i t svar i at i ons t hat have been r ender ed i mmune t o t he normal f orcesaf f ect i ng i t . The pur posi veness of a home t hermost at i s not t o beseen i n t he f ur nace' s t ur ni ng on and of f . I t i s t o be seen i n t hest eady t emper at ur e of t he r oom where t he sensor i s l ocat ed: 68degr ees i n t he dayt i me, and 62 degr ees at ni ght , when t he l i t t l e

pur posi ve comput er l owers t he r ef erence si gnal f or t het emper at ure- cont r ol syst em. Rai n or shi ne, summer or wi nt er , t het emperat ur e st ays at one or t he ot her i nt ended l evel . The f ur nacet ur ns on and of f as i t must . Cont r ol l ed var i abl es, not act i ons,cont ai n t he evi dence of pur pose.

I n t he human body, at t he l owest l evel of behavi oralor gani zat i on, t here ar e somet hi ng l i ke 600 t o 800 smal l cont r olsyst ems, each of whi ch cont r ol s t he sensed amount of st r ai n i none t endon. The si gnal r epr esent i ng t endon st r ai n i s sent t o t hespi nal cor d, where i t i s compar ed ( by subt r act i on) agai nst ar ef er ence si gnal ar r i vi ng f r om hi gher cent er s. The r esul t i nger r or si gnal dr i ves t he muscl e associ at ed wi t h t he same t endon.

These syst ems ar e smal l , but t hey ar e not weak: t he r ange of

st r ai n t hat can be det ected and cont r ol l ed r anges f r om about at ent h of a gr am up t o somet hi ng over 300 ki l ogr ams, i n t he syst emassoci at ed wi t h a nor mal bi ceps muscl e.

The r ef er ence si gnal t hat r eaches t he spi nal comparat or hasbeen descr i bed r egul ar l y as a "command" si gnal , i t s f unct i onbei ng t o cause a speci f i c amount of muscl e cont r act i on. But t hati s not how i t works. The r ef er ence si gnal speci f i es how muchsi gnal i s t o be generat ed by t he sensors t hat detect t endonstr ai n. I f di st ur bances al t er t hat str ai n, t he l ocal cont r ol l oopwi l l aut omat i cal l y r ai se or l ower t he muscl e t ensi on t o l eave t henet st r ai n t he same. I t i s t he st r et chi ng of t he t endon, not t hecont r act i on of t he muscl e, t hat i s under cont r ol .

Mor e speci f i cal l y, i t i s t he si gnal , anal ogous t o t endonst r ai n t hat i s cont r ol l ed. I n each case, t hi s si gnal f ol l ows abr anchi ng pat h. One branch goes t o t he spi nal comparat or , asment i oned. The ot her br anch cont i nues upward, or i nwar d, car r yi nga copy of t he sensor si gnal i n t he di r ect i on f r om whi ch t her ef er ence si gnal i s comi ng. When everyt hi ng i s wor ki ng pr oper l y,t he upgoi ng copy of t he sensor si gnal var i es exact l y as t hedescendi ng r ef erence si gnal var i es. Fr om t he st andpoi nt of t he




higher systems generating the reference signal, the effect is to control a sensation of effort simply by varying a signal standing for the amount of intended effort. The brain "wills" an effort by emitting a reference signal: immediately, that same amount of effort is experienced. The lag is imperceptible, amounting to no

more than 20 milliseconds. It's no wonder that we have trouble separating the sense of willing an action from the experience of the action occurring. Paralysis, of course, makes the difference frighteningly obvious.

We have now created a class of control systems, the set of all effort-control systems. Everything that a human being does that could be called overt behavior is done by varying the reference signals reaching these systems. Everything. Whether a

person is playing a piano concerto, painting the Mona Lisa, pressing the button that starts a war, making a lying speech to skeptical constituents, skating for an Olympic medal, or pounding on the keys of a word-processor, the acts involved are all accomplished by varying the reference signals reaching these 600 to 800 first-order control systems.

No system higher than the first order can act directly on the environment by generating physical forces. The actions of all higher systems consist entirely of generating outgoing neural signals. There are no moving parts in this system above the first level. There are only signals, and systems that receive,

manipulate, and generate signals.

This is not the place to present 30 years of elaboration on this concept of levels of control. I will only try to sketch in the basic relationships that seem reasonable to propose. As far as I know, there is considerable neurological evidence in support of these suppositions, and nothing known to speak against them. But I am not pretending to be a brain researcher; I'm only trying to put together a feasible picture of an organization that has, within the bounds of what we know, a chance of actually existing. Perhaps these suggestions will raise some questions in the minds of real brain researchers. I'm far from the first to suspect control systems in the brain, but I don't believe that anyone else has approach the problem quite in this way (at least before I did). My little claim to fleeting fame.

Having isolated the first-order behavioral control systems, we now have a collection of incoming sensory signals, a subset of which is under control, and a collection of outgoing signals that become reference signals for the first-order systems. We can ignore the probability of cross-connections and other complications at this and other levels, in the interest of seeing the big picture first.

It's clearly possible now to think of a second level of control. At this second level, a control system would receive



An o u t l i n e of c o nt r o l t h eo r y Powers p .19

s ome s e t o f f i r s t - o r d er s e n s o r y s i g n a l s (mo st o f wh i c h come f r o m

r e c ep t o r s no t i n vo l v ed i n ef f o r t c o n t r o l ), and wo ul d r e - r e pr e sent

t h i s s e t o f s i g n a l s by c o mb i n i n g t h em i n p er c e pt u al c o mp ut i n g

•f u n c t i o n s t o c r e a t e a new s e t o f s i g n a l s . E ac h sec o nd - o r d erp e r c e p t u a l s i g n al t h us p r o d uc e d w i l l r e p r e s e n t s ome new t y p e o f

i n v ar i a nt o f t h e f i r s t - o r d er w or l d ( ev er y si n g l e- v al u ed f u nc t i o n

o f m ul t i p l e v a r i a bl e s g en er a t e s some s o r t of i n v a r i a n t ) . I hav er e as o n t o t h i n k , but w i l l s wal l o w t h e t e mp t at i o n t o el a bo r a t e ,

t h at eac h new l e ve l a c t u a l l y r e p r e s e nt s a new t y p e o f v a r i a b l e i n

e x ac t l y t h e s en s e o f R u s s e l l ' s T heo r y of T y pes .

On c e an as p ec t o f t h e f i r s t - o r d er wo r l d ha s b ee n r e pr e s en t e d

a s a o n e- d i men si o na l s ec o nd - o r d er p er c e pt u al s i g n a l , we c anq u i c k l y a s s emb l e a c o n t r o l s y s t e m. We n ee d a r e f e r e n c e s i g n al

f r o m s t i l l h i g h er u p , a nd a c o mp ar a t o r t o ge ne r a t e an e r r o r

s i g n a l . And we need an o ut p ut f u n c t i o n t h a t w i l l a mp l i f y t h e

e r r o r s i g n al and s end t h e r e s u l t i n t h e f or m o f r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l st o a l l t h e f i r s t - o r d er c o nt r o l s ys t ems t h at c an a f f e c t t h es ec o nd- o r d er p er c ep t u al s i g n a l . T he e f f e c t may be d i r e c t , t h r o ugh

p at h wa ys i n s i d e t h e b o dy , o r i n d i r e c t , t h r o ug h p at h wa ys t h a ti n c l u d e t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h e e f f e c t may b e a c h i e v e d t h r o ug h

a l t e r i n g t he ext e r n al wo r l d , or by a l t e r i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f

p a r t s o f t h e bo dy t o i t , a s when t h e e y es mo ve.

Ho w many s e c o nd - o r d e r c o n t r o l s y s t e ms mi g ht e x i s t ? A g r e a t

many : a be t t e r ques t i on woul d be , how many can be ac t i ve a t t he

s ame t i me ? He r e t h e r e i s a f u n da me nt a l l i m i t . T h e n umber o f

f i r s t - o r d e r c o nt r o l s y s t e ms s e t s o ne l i m i t on ho w manyi n de p en d en t c o m bi n at i o n s o f mu s cl e t e n s i o n c a n b e p r o d u c ed a t t h e

s ame t i me . T he number i s l a r g e , b ut i t i s no t i n f i n i t e .

A s ec o nd l i mi t e x i s t s , s e t b y t h e number o f d i f f e r e n t

f u n c t i o n s , i n d ep en de nt o f ea ch o t h e r , t h at a r e p e r c e p t u a l l y

c omput e d f r o m t h e s et o f a l l f i r s t - o r d er p e r c ep t u al s i g n a l s (at

a ny o ne t i m e ) . A t m o st , 6 0 0 t o 80 0 s uc h s i g n a l s mi g h t c o n c e i v a b l y

c o e x i s t , b ut i n f a c t t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f t h at many i n de pe nd en t

f u n c t i o n s be i n g di s c o v e r e d by t h e b r a i n ha s t o be v e r y s m al l . L e t

u s j u s t s a y t h a t t h e r e i s s o me number o f i n d ep e n de n t d i men s i o n so f t h e f i r s t - o r d e r wo r l d t h at c o ul d be s i m u l t a ne o us l y c omput e d,

and t h a t i t mus t be c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s t h an 6 00 .

Why i s t h i s l i m i t o n nu mb er s i mp o r t a nt ? Be c a us e of a

c o n s i d e r a t i o n l e f t o ut o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f a r . E ven j u s t on

a na t o m i c a l e v i d e n c e , we k no w t h a t e a c h s p i n a l c o mp ar a t o r n eu r o nr e c e i v e s no t j u s t o ne r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l , bu t i n mos t c a s es

h u n dr e d s o f t h em. T h e r e c a n b e o n l y o ne n et r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l a t a

t i me f o r o ne f i r s t - o r d er c o nt r o l s y st em, but b e c au s e t h ec o n v er g i n g r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l s c an ha ve bo t h p o s i t i v e a nd n eg at i v e

e f f e c t s on t h e net s e t t i n g , t h i s n et r e f er e nc e s i g n al h as t o be

c o n s i d e r e d a s t h e w ei g h t e d sum o f t h e o u t p u t s o f many h i g h e r —

o r d er s y s t e ms . We c an s ay " s e c o n d- o r d e r " s y s t e ms ; t h e r e ar e

ar g umen t s a ga i n s t r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l s s k i p p i n g o r d er s o n t h e way



F I G . 2

A HIERARCHY OF CONTROL

behaving

r r

r r

inp ut s

a n do u t p u t s

a r e sh o w nr r

i n p u t s o n l y

a r e sh o w n

outputs only are shown

en viro n m en ta l d i s t u r b a n c e s

organism/environme

b o u n d a r y




down in a control hierarchy (such signals would be treated as

disturbances and canceled).

We thus have a picture in which some number of

independently-acting second-order control systems act by sending

multiple amplified copies of their error signals to many first-

order control systems, specifically those whose actions can alter

the second-order perceptual signal directly or indirectly. The

second-order systems therefore share the use of overlapping sets

of first-order systems. No one second-order system determines the

net reference setting for any one first-order control system. The

net reference setting for one first order system is always a compromise among the demands of all the second-order systems that

affect it.

What's interesting about this arrangement is that it can

actually work. The crucial part of this sharing of control is not

the separation of output effects — those are simply added together, with the appropriate sign to maintain negative feedback

around each loop. What matters is that all the second-order input

functions produce perceptual signals capable of independent

variation: the input functions must be linearly independent.

Given these conditions, we have a well-known setup for the solution of large sets of simultaneous equations by analogue

computation. Digital computers can be set up to do the same

thing, far more slowly, using "methods of steep descent" and other arcanities. It is possible for many second-order control

systems to maintain quite independent control of their own

perceptual signals, despite having to act through a set of shared

first-order control systems.

Fig. 2, thought up and drawn by Mary Powers and a handy

program, shows a few of the arrangements possible in a large

hierarchy of control systems. Of course only a few connections

are shown, with some deliberately confined to input or output

effects for clarity. In the middle and on the right are shown

some short-circuit connections, in which the outgoing reference

signals bend back to become inputs to the same systems, without

involving lower systems or the environment. This is the

"imagination connection" that enables us to think to envision

the effect of doing things but without doing them. Above the

level of the imagination connection, the perceptions are

perfectly normal, except perhaps for the combinations in which

they can occur. We have a sense "that" something is happening,

without the lowest-level details to make it vivid or real.

This diagram has a vague resemblance to a real nervous

system, which would become much stronger if at each level we

stretched the connecting lines and clumped all the input functions together, and all the comparators and output functions

together. Then we would have a realistic picture of the sensory

nuclei, the motor nuclei, the upgoing and downgoing tracts, and

the collaterals that run crosswise at every level in the brain.



An out l i ne of cont r al t heor y Power s p. 21

At ever y l evel t hat may exi st , we can expect t he same sor tof ar r angement . Each new l evel of per cept i on cr eat es a new cl assof ent i t i es t hat can be cont r ol l ed by var yi ng ref er ence si gnal s

at t he next l ower l evel . I f you t r ace out any hi gher or dercont r ol system, you wi l l see t hat t he cont r ol l oop al ways ( exceptf or i magi nat i on) i nvol ves ef f ect s i n t he ext er nal worl d. Thi spermi t s us, as external obser ver s organi zed i n t he same way, t odi scover t he aspect s of t he shar ed wor l d t hat are under cont r olby anot her organi sm, even t hough t hose aspect s be hi ghl yabst r act . Al l t hat i s r equi r ed i s that we l ear n t o appl y t he samest ages (or equi val ent st ages) of percept ual comput at i on t o t hebasi c sensor y i nput we ar e get t i ng — f r om what we pr esume t o bea common envi r onment . Thi s i s how we at t ack t he probl em of communi cat i on under t he cont r ol syst em model .

Ther e ar e obvi ous quest i ons about t he hi ghest l evel of

cont r ol , and obvi ous answers t hat I wi l l not spend t i me on her e.I hope i t i s suspect ed that f ar mor e coul d be sai d about t hi shi er ar chy t han I have sai d. Most peopl e t ake about t wo years t oget t he f ul l pi ct ur e of t hi s model even when t hey' r e t r yi ng; wewon' t get t hat f ar i n one paper .

Ther e ar e t wo mai n subj ect s t hat st i l l r eal l y needdi scussi on — I wi l l abandon t he not i on of get t i ng i nt o t hebi ochemi cal cont r ol syst ems and evol ut i on, because t hi s i sal r eady a ver y dense and l ong pr esent at i on. One subj ect i sepi st emol ogy, whi ch t akes on a par t i cul ar l y i mport antsi gni f i cance i n t hi s model , and t he ot her i s r eor gani zat i on, t hekey t o t he devel opment of an adul t cont r ol hi erarchy and al so,al t hough I won' t go t hi s f ar , t he r out e t o under st andi ngphysi ol ogi cal gr owt h and t he evol ut i on of speci es. I want t o showhow t he cont r ol model bear s on two subj ect s t hat have becamecent r al l y i mpor t ant i n cyber net i cs over t he past t en or f i f t eenyear s. And I woul d l i ke t o say at l east a wor d or t wo, at t heend, about t he pi ct ur e of human exi st ence and aspi r at i ons t hatcont r ol t heor y can gi ve us.

The vi ew f r om i nsi de

To t hi s poi nt we have been l ooki ng at cont r ol syst ems andt he wor l d wi t h whi ch t hey i nt er act f r om a vi ewpoi nt t hat i sconveni ent but ar t i f i ci al . Fr om wher e we stand, or f l oat , we cansee t he physi cal envi r onment sur r oundi ng t he body, t he br ai n an

nervous syst em i nsi de t he body, and t he si gnal s spr eadi ng t hr oughmi l l i ons of channel s i n t he br ai n. Our X- r ay eyes penet r at e t heski n t o r eveal muscl es cont r act i ng and r el axi ng, put t i ng st r esseson t endons t hat gi ve way sl i ght l y, exci t i ng t he l i t t l e sensor yner ves embedded i n t hem. I n t he out si de wor l d we can see obj ect s,but al so t he f orces and i nf l uences t hat connect ed t hem t oget her .When we put mat t ers t hat way, i t has t o be cl ear t hat t hi s ent i r epi ct ur e i s i magi nar y. I t i s, i n shor t , a model : a model of abrai n i n a model of a worl d.




Her e i s a si mpl e quest i on: accor di ng t o t hi s model , wher e i st he model ? I f you l ook at Fi g. 2, you wi l l see t hose i magi nat i onconnect i ons t hat al l ow hi gher syst ems i n t he br ai n t o generat eper cept ual si gnal s f or t hemsel ves wi t hout causi ng t hem i n t henormal way by act i ng on t he external worl d. The model says t hatt hi s i magi nar y pi ct ur e of t he br ai n and t he exter nal wor l d exi st si n t he br ai n, and i s creat ed i nsi de t he brai n. My br ai n. Per haps,a l i t t l e bi t , your br ai n too.

I n par t i cul ar , t he model i mpl i es t hat al l t hese t hi ngs weexper i ence, whet her i n i magi nat i on or "r eal l y" ( t her e i s nor emarkabl e di f f er ence) , r esi de i n t he upgoi ng per cept ualpat hways. Thi s l eads me t o make a pr oposal f or whi ch t her e canbe, i n t he nat ur e of t hi ngs, no di r ect evi dence, but t hat doesmake a l ot of t hi ngs f al l i nt o pl ace r at her neat l y, I t i s t hi s:t he obj ect s of exper i ence of any ki nd exi st i n t he f or m of

per cept ual si gnal s cont i nual l y r i si ng t hr ough t he br ai n.

Thi s proposal i n no way pi ns down who, what , or wher e t heper cei ver i s, t he not i cer , t he obser ver . I t concer ns onl y t hatwhi ch i s obser ved. The obj ect s of obser vat i on, I am pr oposi ng,ar e neur al per cept ual si gnal s i n t he br ai n.

I f you wer e t o spend a f ew decades syst emat i cal l y andskept i cal l y exami ni ng t he real sol i d t hr ee- di mensi onal physi calwor l d t hat you see, f eel , hear , t ouch, and t ast e, I cl ai m t hatyou woul d f i nd i t t o consi st of a number of t ypes of exper i ence.Fr om si mpl est t o most compl ex, I cl ai m t hat t hese t ypes can benamed r oughl y t hi s ways i nt ensi t y, sensat i on, conf i gur at i on,t r ansi t i on, event , r el at i onshi p, cat egor y, sequence, pr ogr am,pr i nci pl e, and syst em. The words need some el abor at i on t o maket hei r i nt ended meani ngs cl ear , but you get t he f l avor .

These t ypes of exper i ence have an i nt er est i ng r el at i onshi pt o each ot her . The ones f ar t her al ong i n t he l i st — "hi gher "depend f or t hei r exi st ence on t he exi st ence of t ypes l ower i n t hel i st (I do many t hi ngs backwar d: my l i st goes f r om bot t om t o t op,and I wr i t e i t l ef t t o r i ght ) . Fur t her mor e, i f you want t o changea par t i cul ar exper i ence of a gi ven t ype, you wi l l f i nd i tnecessar y t o change exper i ences of l ower t ypes. Thoser el at i onshi ps, however , ar e not r eci pr ocal : a l ower t ype of exper i ence does not depend on a hi gher one, and can be changedwi t hout changi ng a hi gher one. As we go up t he l i st , t he

r el at i onshi ps bet ween t ypes ar e t he r el at i onshi ps bet weensuccessi ve st ages of i nvar i ant s, each st age abst r act ed f r om t hepr evi ous one by a new r ul e, as i n Russel l ' s Theor y of Types.

Thi s, not by acci dent , i s exact l y t he st r uct ur e of t heper cept ual par t of t he cont r ol hi er ar chy i n Fi g. 2. I t al so seemst o be t he st r uct ur e of t he per cei vi ng f unct i ons at var i ous l evel si n t he br ai n, gi ve or t ake some t opol ogi cal t r ansf ormat i ons, andal l owi ng f or t he f act t hat model s ar e al ways neat er t han nat ur e.




But t hi s i s not j ust a st r uct ur e of per cept ual f unct i ons: i ti s a st r uct ur e of cont r ol syst ems. A cont r ol syst em at any l evel

act s on a wor l d consi st i ng of l ower- l evel cont r ol syst ems, t hemeans of act i ng bei ng t o send var yi ng r ef er ence si gnal s t o someof t he l ower syst ems. These cont r ol act i ons ul t i mat el y r esul t i nt he l owest - l evel syst ems doi ng t hi ngs t o t he out si de wor l d, andt hus to t he l owest l evel of per cept ual i nput s i gnal s, t hei nt ens i t y s i gnal s . The f i r s t - or der s i gnal s ar e abst r ac ted tobecome second- or der si gnal s, and so on unt i l we r each t he syst emwe began wi t h, where t he ef f ect of t hat syst em' s act i on i s tomai nt ai n i t s own per cept ual si gnal i n a mat ch wi t h t he r ef erencesi gnal i t i s bei ng gi ven f r om above.

But her e we ar e f l oat i ng i n space agai n, whi l e t he poi nt , i f I haven' t ment i oned i t , i s t o see how i t i s t o be a syst em l i ket he one i n Fi g. 2.

When you ar e a sys t em l i ke t hi s, you f i nd t hat by act i ng youcan al t er t he wor l d you per cei ve. When you l earn i t s r ul es wel lenough, you can l earn how t o make many of t hose per cept i ons comet o st at es you have exper i enced bef or e and l i ked, or t o st ay awayf r om st at es you have exper i enced bef or e and di dn’t l i ke. When yousee a f l ower , you can move i t t o your nose or your nose t o i t ,use your di aphr agm t o pul l ai r i n, and exper i ence a scent t hatyou j udge as pl easant . I f i t ' s a pr et t y f l ower t hat ought t o havea scent but doesn' t , you can suppl y a scent i n i magi nat i on. Youcan suppl y a scent at a l ow l evel , l i ke a hal l uc i nat i on, or at ahi gher l evel , l i ke an i mpr essi on of ni ceness.

What ever you do al t er s your per cept i ons: t hat ' s how you knowyou' r e doi ng somet hi ng. You per cei ve your own ef f or t s and t hei ri mmedi at e ef f ect s such as s ki n pr essur e; you percei ve ef f ect s of t hose ef f or t s as obj ect s change t hei r ( vi s i bl e) pos i t i ons,or i ent at i ons, and vel oc i t i es . You use your abi l i t y to cont ro lyour l i mbs as ways of cont r ol l i ng ot her obj ect s; you use cont r olof ot her obj ect s t o cr eat e movement s and event s i n r el at i onshi pt o ot her movement s and event s; you cont r ol movement s and event st o mai nt ai n cer t ai n cat egor i es of exper i ence i n t he st at es youi nt end; you mai nt ai n t hese cat egor i es i n sequences t hatconst i t ut e pr ogr ess i ons of f ami l i ar ki nds; you adj ust t hesepr ogr ess i ons accor di ng t o r at i onal dec i s i ons, choi ces, t ests , andsymbol i c equi val ences; you car r y out r at i onal pr ocess es i n

suppor t of gener al pr i nci pl es t hat you def end, and you mai nt ai nt hose pr i nci pl es as a way of sust ai ni ng whol e syst ems wi t hi nwhi ch you l i ve and exper i ence and whi ch you t r y t o mai nt ai n,syst ems l i ke a sel f , a sc i ence, a soci et y, a cul t ur e, a worl d, a

uni ver se.

Al l of our act i ons, accor di ng t o t hi s cont r ol model , ar epar t of a pr ocess of cont r ol l i ng per cept i ons. To under st and t hi si dea pr oper l y, you have t o abandon al l t he meani ngs t he wor d



An o u t l i n e o f c o nt r o l t h eo r y Powers p. 24

cont r o l has accumu l a ted , mean ings t hat r ep r esen t , mos t l y , bad

g ue ss es a s t o what i s g oi n g o n. C o n t r o l l i n g do es no t f e e l l i k et r y i n g: i t i s l ac k of c ont r o l t h at f e e l s l i k e t r y i n g. Co nt r o l l i n g

i s j u s t d o i n g . You d o n ' t h ave t o " t r y " t o l ook at s omet h in g —you j us t l ook . Your ocul omotor con t r o l sys tems snap t he ob jec t

y ou want t o l ook at t o t h e c en t e r o f y ou r v i s u a l f i e l d , and t h er ei s no s e n s e o f t r y i n g at a l l . Y ou d o n ' t " t r y " t o wr i t e your n ame;you j u s t wr i t e i t . By f a r t h e maj o r i t y of c ont r o l p r o c es s es t h atgo on at al l t h es e l e v el s ar e s k i l l f u l , s wi f t as t h ou gh t , s t a bl e ,

and seemi ng l y e f f o r t l es s . You fo rm an i dea o f what i s t o happen

and i t happens at t he same t i me. You j us t do i t . Ther e i s nop r o c e ss of l a bo r i o u s l y s e l e c t i n g some i n t e n de d p er c e p t i o n ,f i g u r i n g o ut a way t o get c l o s er t o i t , and t h en p a i n f u l l ywor k i ng your way towar d zero er r or . That on l y happens when youd on ' t k now what y ou ' r e d o in g . Mos t l y ou r p e r c ep t i on s t r ac k our

i n t e n t i o n s wi t h no p er c e p t i b l e l a g. T h a t ' s wh y, s omet i mes ,

t h e y 'r e h ar d t o t e l l ap ar t .

Of c ou r s e at t he h i gh er l e v el s o f c o n t r o l , p ar t i c u l a r l y t h e

c o g n i t i v e l e v e l s , t h i n g s h appen mor e s l o wl y u n l e s s w e'r ei mag in i n g . Th er e h as t o be t i me f o r a l l t h e l ower - l eve l s y st ems

t o b r i n g t h e i r p er c ep t i on s t o wh at ev er t h e moment a ry n etr e f e r e n c e s i g na l s p e c i f i e s . T he l o wes t l ev el s ys t ems h av e a l a go f p e rh ap s 50 m i l l i s ec on d s , wher eas t h e h i g h es t on es , op e r a t i n g

at t he i r f as t es t , may l ag as much as ha l f a second o r a second .Some cont r o l pr ocess es may t ake much l onger t han t hat : I 'mi n v o l v ed i n one t h at h as been g o in g on f o r — l e t ' s s ee , 1988

mi n us 1 953 p l u s one — t h i r t y - s i x y ea r s . Of c ou r s e a w i s e per s ond o e s n 't t o l e r a t e p r o t r ac t e d e r r o r ; h e o r s he r e de f i n e s t h ec o n t r o l l e d q ua nt i t y so i t c an i n f a c t be h el d at i t s r e f er e nc e

l e vel wi t h o ut l a r g e e r r o r . I ' m mak i ng p r o g r e s s , t h a t ' s mor e l i k ei t .

To say t hat behav i o r ex i s t s i n o r der t o cont r o l per c ept i o ns

i s n ot t o s ay t h at a l l p er c e pt i o n s ar e u nder c o n t r o l . Much t h atwe can see happen i ng around us happens wi t hout benef i t o f ouradv i ce or e f f o r t . But we do come t o "expec t " t he wor l d to be ac e r t a i n way ; t h at i s , e ven wi t h o ut s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t e nd i n g t o do

so , we set up re f er ence s i gna l s aga i ns t wh ich we compar eper cept i ons even when we have no d i r ec t way o f a f f ec t i ng t hem: an

i nner model o f how t he wor l d shou l d be. As l ong as t he wor l dmatches t hese expec t a t i ons , we exper i ence no er r o r and go abouto ur a f f a i r s n o r mal l y . B ut j u s t l e t t h e s un r i s e i n t h e Wes t o ne

mor ni ng, and see how much er r or you woul d exper i enc e, and howf r a n t i c a l l y y ou wo ul d s t a r t t o ac t t o t r y t o do so met hi ng abo ut

t h i s g r o s s mi s t a ke.

You can s ee t hat t h i s model i mp l i es an epi s t emo l ogy . I f what

we e xp er i e nc e c o n s i s t s en t i r e l y o f p er c e pt u al s i g n al s i n t h eb r a i n , i t f a l l o w s t h at we do n ot e xp er i e nc e t h e c au s es of t h es es i g n a l s . T he c a us es l i e o u t s i d e , a c c or d i n g t o t h i s mo de l , bey on dour sensor y end ings wher e we, t he obser vers who exper i ence on l y



An out l i ne of cont rol t heor y Power s p.25

per cept ual si gnal s, hav e no cont act . Our mot or ef f or t s di sappeari nt o t hat wor l d, and we know not hi ng of what t hey do t o t he wor l dunt i l t he ef f ect s r et ur n t o cause changes i n our i nt ensi t y

si gnal s. What we can kno w of t hat ext er nal worl d consi st s onl y of what we can sense, and what we can i magi ne. Sensi ng and i magi ni ngoccur i nsi de, not out si de, t he br ai n.

How woul d a br ai n or gani zed as t hi s model i s organized everknow t hat an ext er nal wor l d, other t han the apparent one,act ual l y exi st s? Ther e ar e at l east t wo ki nds of evi denceavai l abl e. One ki nd i s t he f act t hat i n or der t o br i ng anypercept i on under cont r ol , t he br ai n must di scover how t omani pul at e r ef er ence si gnal s t o have t he r equi r ed ef f ects. Thi scan be done onl y by t r i al and er r or , wi t h perhaps a smi dgi n of genet i c hel p. The r el at i onshi p bet ween what must be done and t her esul t t hat i t has const i t ut es a model of some "pr oper t y" of t he

exter nal wor l d. The f act t hat st abl e pr oper t i es can be f ound i sevi dence t hat t her e i s somet hi ng l awf ul and st abl e out si de t heboundar i es of exper i ence. I n mor e f or mal sur r oundi ngs, t hi s i scal l ed "sci ent i f i c met hod" ( except i n t he behavi or al sci ences,wher e sc i ent i f i c met hod means assumi ng a cause- ef f ect model andt hen t hr owi ng out al l dat a t hat doesn' t conf or m t o i t) .

The second l i ne of evi dence i s f ound i n t he ver y f act t hatcont r ol i s necessary. The worl d wi l l not usual l y meet our needs,desi r es, or expect at i ons unl ess we do somet hi ng do i t , and evenwhen we have l ear ned how t o mai nt ai n t he wor l d as we wi sh i t t obe ( i n t he r espect s we can af f ect ) we f i nd t hat we st i l l have t ovar y our act i ons i n or der t o mai nt ai n i t i n any par t i cul ar state.I n ot her wor ds, t hose per cept i ons ar e subj ect t o i nf l uences ot her

t han our own act i ons. Di st ur bances. The dr i ver of a car candeduce t he di r ect i on and s t r engt h of a cr osswi nd t hat he cannotsense i n any way, si mpl y by obser vi ng how he i s hol di ng t hest eer i ng wheel . He qui t e aut omat i cal l y var i es t he posi t i on of t hest eer i ng wheel i n t he way r equi r ed t o keep t he scene i n t hewi ndshi el d const ant , showi ng that t he car i s i n t he r i ghtposi t i on on t he r oad. He has no pr ef erence f or wheel posi t i on. Thus he can "see" t he cr osswi nd, deduce i t f r om hi s own cont r olact i ons, wi t hout any ot her way of sensi ng i t. He coul d, of cour se, be wr ongs t here coul d be somet hi ng hor r i bl y wr ong wi t ht he car .

That ' s r eal l y a t hi r d l i ne of evi dence: we can be wr ong. We

can go t hr ough hal f a l i f et i me or mor e thi nki ng we have r eal l ygot somet hi ng nai l ed down, have f ul l cont r ol and a compet entmodel of what i s happeni ng, onl y to have some t r i f l i ng i nci dentt ur n our whol e i dea upsi de down, ut t er l y dest r oyi ng, f or a whi l e,our conf i dence i n our abi l i t y t o know anythi ng. Such anexper i ence, however , shoul d gi ve us mor e conf i dence, not l ess.What shoul d make us l ose conf i dence i s f i ndi ng that we can nol onger det ect t he mi st akes t hat t el l us we can st i l l , somehow, bei n cont act wi t h r eal i t y.




This is certainly not a philosopher's approach to epistemology; it's a purely practical approach. I think that

practicality, pragmatism of the right sort, is the key idea here. Knowi ng that it's all perception, we wi l l think in new ways about most of our own experiences and actions. But will we then give up making models, just because we know they are "only" models? That would be foolish, because then we would be giving up the basis for giving up models, wouldn't we? I think the best course is to admit that what we call knowledge consists entirely of models,

models of a body, of a brain, of a physical and chemical reality, of a society, of everything. Rather than giving up models, we should become conscious of the process of making models.

If we know we're making models, we won't go around telling people that they are wrong for trying out different models, or that they are right even if their models are sloppily constructed and unconnected with any other models. We should be looking to

make all of our models consistent with each other, and worrying very seriously when they are not, and being fussy about what we wi11 accept as a model. We ought to test the hel1 out of our models, because if they don't behave the way our experiences behave, they are worse than sloppy: they're delusory. They're useless. They're dangerous.

Of course when we know we're making models, we can be free to try out any ideas we please, as long as we realize that we're playing what is in the end a serious game. We are trapped in here, folks, and our very survival depends on making models that in some way reflect the regularities of the real universe that is

right out there, but that we can know only approximately and only by way of models. Fun and games make life interesting, but somebody has to take out the garbage. But it's not that bad.

Making models is really fun. Hello?

One last point before we leave this subject barely touched.I have made the claim that our experiences of the world fall into eleven types (more or less). Does this mean that the real universe is organized that way? I think my answer would be pretty obvious: of course not, although we can conjecture that there is some reason for these particular types to have evolved (the evolution-model). Basically, the types of perceptions are determined completely by the types of perceptual functions that are applied to each level of signal, and it is highly probable that each person organizes perceptions, within each type, quite differently. But there is a miracle going on that anyone interested in epistemology should acknowledge.

The miracle is that we can talk together at all about anything. Everything enters our nervous systems at the lowest level, becoming available to the brain first as a huge collection of identical intensity-signals. It takes many layers of




i nf or mat i on- pr ocessi ng bef or e t hose i nt ensi t i es can be t ur nedi nt o t he percept i on of a sent ence, and more yet bef ore a st r i ngof gr ammat i cal l y and synt act i cal l y or dered wor ds can be used t o

evoke a non- ver bal exper i ence, t he percept ual meani ng of t hesent ence. I must t ur n my meani ng i nto a sentence, and ut t er i t ,and you must t ur n t he sound- i nt ensi t i es back i nt o a sent ence andt he sent ence i nt o a meani ng bef ore anyt hi ng r esembl i ng what i s i nmy awar eness spr i ngs up i n your awareness. So how do we ever comet o bel i eve t hat t he meani ng you get i s t he one I i nt ended?

Very of t en i t ' s not t he same. We onl y t hi nk i t ' s t he same,and somet i mes f at al l y, assume i t ' s the same. Fi ndi ng out i f i ti s the same i s basi cal l y i mpossi bl e, but even r eachi ng some l evelof conf i dence i n t he sameness r equi r es a l ong process of back-and- f or t hi ng, of cr oss- checki ng, of "I f I under st and youcor r ectl y, t hen when I do t hi s, you' l l do t hat . "

Yet , l ook at t hi s: over t en t housand wor ds so f ar, and Ist i l l have some hope t hat you ar e wi t h me. What you have made outof al l t hese wor ds, I wi l l know onl y when you do or say somet hi ngr el evant t o t hem — as I i nt end t hei r meani ngs. Epi st emol ogy i s aver y f ai nt echo of t he r eal pr obl em, whi ch i s communi cat i on.

Wi t h t hat , l et us pass on t o t he f i nal t opi c.

Reor gani zat i on

I ' m goi ng t o gi ve shor t shr i f t t o t hi s subj ect par t l ybecause my endur ance i n sust ai ni ng t hi s l ong nar r at i ve i sbegi nni ng t o wear down about as f ar as the r eader ' s must be. Thi s

i s a cri t i cal l y i mpor t ant subj ect; unf or t unat el y, I don' t knowmuch about i t , and can speak onl y i n gener al i t i es. Thi s i s onepl ace wher e I r eal l y wi sh I were a good mat hemat i ci an.

The i dea of r eor gani zat i on i s an essent i al par t of t hi smodel , and has been si nce i t s begi nni ngs. I t was suggest ed —l ai d out pr et t y compl et el y — by W. Ross Ashby i n hi s not i on of "ul t r ast abi l i t y, " and i ndependent l y by Donal d T. Campbel l as"bl i nd var i at i on and sel ect i ve r et ent i on. ' The basi c i dea i ssi mpl e, and ol der t han ei t her Ashby or Campbel l .

Ther e ar e many f or ms of l earni ng, but t he most f undamentali s l earni ng somet hi ng f or whi ch t here i s and coul d be no basi s i npr i or exper i ence. Thi s i s the ki nd of l ear ni ng that has t o t akepl ace when you grab t he knob of an unmar ked door and t r y t o openi t. Wi t h no hi nt s avai l abl e, t he door mi ght r equi r e ei t her a pul lor a push: not hi ng i n nat ur e says i t has to be ei t her way. Sowhat do you do t o f i gur e out how t hi s door opens? You don' tf i gur e i t out . You pul l . Or you push. Whi chever comes t o mi ndf i r st . I f t he door doesn' t open, you have t he i nf ormat i on youneed: do t he opposi t e. I f i t opens, you al so have t he r equi r edi nf ormat i on: don' t change t he way you di d i t . But bef ore you




coul d get t hat i nf or mat i on, t o sel ect t he r i ght move out of t hepossi bl e moves, you had t o t r y somet hi ng f or no r eason.

Thi s i s what I assume t o be t he basi c pr i nci pl e of r eorgani zat i on, whi ch I coul d not put any bet t er t han Campbel ldi d. Act at r andom, and sel ect f ut ur e act i ons on t he basi s of t heconsequences.

Anot her way of put t i ng t hi s i s a l i t t l e mor e syst emat i c, andsuggest s at l east some sor t of organi zed syst em at wor k. Supposewe have a r eor gani zi ng syst em t hat i s capabl e of act i ng onanot her syst em (of whi ch i t act ual l y coul d be a par t ) t o changet he organi zat i on of t hat syst em. I n t hi s case I don' t mean t heorgani zat i on of t he behavi or of t he t ar get syst em, but t he ver yst r uct ur e of t hat syst em, t he physi cal connect i ons i n i t .Changi ng t he st r uct ur e wi l l , of cour se, change t he behavi or , butt he r eor gani zi ng syst em doesn' t act on t he behavi or di r ect l y. I tact s on t he behavi no syst em. That ' s how Ashby' s ul t r ast abl ehomeost at wor ks. I t doesn' t i nj ect si gnal s i nt o t he homeost at : i tswi t ches connect i ons.

The r eor gani zi ng syst em must not onl y be abl e t o al t erphysi cal connect i ons i n t he target syst em, but i t must know whent o stop al t er i ng t hose connecti ons. Thi s i s t he "sel ect i ver et ent i on" par t . Each change i n t he st r uct ur e of t he behavi ngsyst em wi l l al t er t he way t hat syst em i nt er act s wi t h i t senvi r onment . The change i n i nt eract i on wi l l have manyconsequences, most of whi ch, pr obabl y, ar e i r r el evant t o t hesys t em as a whol e. Some of t hese changes, however , wi l l havei ndi r ect ef f ects on t he wel f ar e of t he syst em i t sel f , i ncl udi ng

t he r eor gani zi ng syst em. These i ndi r ect ef f ect s ar e t he basi s f orsel ect i on, and t her ef or e t he basi s f or st ar t i ng and st oppi ng t hepr ocess of r eor gani zat i on.

Sel ect i on necessar i l y i mpl i es a sel ect i on cri t er i on. Somei ndi r ect ef f ect s of behavi or are " good" and some are "bad" , or atl east "not good enough. " But t hi s r eor gani zi ng syst em has t o bedumb. I t has t o work even when t he syst em i t i s wor ki ng on hasonl y t he bar est suggest i on of compet ence i n i t . I t has t o wor kwi t hout any t heory, wi t hout any knowl edge of an ext ernal wor l d,wi t hout any memor i es of pr i or exper i ence ( f r om t hi s l i f et i me,anyway) .

So t hi s syst em has t o be t ol d, somehow, what i s good or notgood enough, and per haps even t oo good. I t has t o be gi venr ef erence si gnal s f r om somewher e. For l ack of a bet t er i dea, I' 11say DNA.

Fur t her more, t hese r ef er ence si gnal s have t o have hi ghl yspeci f i c meani ngs. I t won' t do t o posi t a r ef er ence si gnal t hatsays " sur vi ve! ' How coul d a dumb r eor gani zi ng syst em wi t h nol i ngui st i c capabi l i t i es know what " sur vi ve" means? I t won' t do t o




say "organi se behavi or . " Ther e i sn' t any behavi or t o organi ze atf i r st . No, t hese basi c ref er ence si gnal s have t o be expr essed i nmuch mor e concr ete t erms that have di r ect meani ng t o the

r eor gani zi ng syst em. They have t o say t hi ngs l i ke "t hi s muchbl ood sugar " or "t hi s body t emper at ur e" or "t hi s car bon di oxi deconcent r at i on i n t he bl ood. " Of cour se t hey mi ght al so say morei nt er est i ng t hi ngs, l i ke "no more t han t hi s amount of t ot al er r orsi gnal i n t he br ai n, " or even "thi s pr et t y pat t er n of f orms i nyour vi si on. " We must n' t under est i mat e t he power of a bi l l i onyear s of evol ut i on. The sel ect i on cr i t er i a t hat maker eor gani zat i on work as i t does mi ght pr ove t o be ext r emel ysophi st i cat ed.

But we know one t hi ng t hey wi l l not be: i nt el l i gent .I nt el l i gence i s somet hi ng that gr adual l y f or ms as the br ai nbecomes or gani zed i nt o a hi erarchy of percept i on and cont rol .I nt el l i gence i s the pr oduct , not t he cause, of r eor gani zat i on.

The i nt el l ectual ski l l s f ound i n t he f ul l y- f ormed adul t cont r olhi er ar chy ar e not avai l abl e bef or e i t has been bui l t . Ther eor gani zi ng syst em has t o wor k f r om t he ver y begi nni ng of l i f e,so i t can' t t ake advant age of what i t has not yet br ought i nt obei ng.

The r ef erence si gnal s — l et ' s cal l t hem "i ntr i nsi c"r ef er ence si gnal s t o di st i ngui sh t hem f r om t he ki nd i n t heacqui r ed hi er ar chy of cont rol — can have no ef f ect byt hemsel ves; t hey ar e onl y speci f i cat i ons. The r eor gani zi ng systemhas t o be abl e t o sense the st at es of t he var i abl es t hat r el at et o the r ef er ence si gnal s. And the sensed st ates have t o becompar ed wi t h t he r ef er ence si gnal s; t he r eorgani zi ng syst em has

t o cont ai n compar at or s, one f or each i nt r i nsi c var i abl e. Ashbycal l ed t hese i nt r i nsi c var i abl es "cri t i cal var i abl es. " He saw t her ef er ence st at es as upper and l ower l i mi t s, whi l e I see t hem assi ngl e t ar get val ues, but t hat ' s t he sor t of di f f er ence we mi ghthope t o set t l e t hr ough exper i ment s, and i sn' t i mpor t ant here.

So we ar r i ve at t he i dea t hat t he r eor gani zi ng syst em i sr eal l y a cont rol system. I t i s, however , a ver y pecul i ar sor t of cont rol syst em, i n t hat i t s out put act i ons are random. I t doesnot act "agai nst " er r or s i t cont i nues t o act unt i l t he er r ordi sappear s. The er r or , of cour se, i s si mpl y t he t otal absol ut edi f f er ence bet ween t he sensed i nt r i nsi c st at e and the set of al lcor r espondi ng i nt r i nsi c r ef er ence si gnal s. Ashby di dn' t spel l outt he per cept ual f unct i ons or t he r ef er ence si gnal s i n hi sul t r ast abl e homeost at , but he di d bui l d t hem i nt o i t , per hapswi t hout even r eal i zi ng exact l y what he had desi gned.

One hel pf ul nat i on i s t he i dea of r at e of r eorgani zat i on,whi ch woul d be measur ed s i mpl y as so many changes per second, orhour. I f t her e i s a l ot of i nt r i nsi c er ror, t he r eor gani zat i onr at e wi l l be hi gh. As i nt r i nsi c er r or f al l s, assumi ng i t does,t he r at e of r eor gani zat i on wi l l sl ow, unt i l f i nal l y when t he




Control theory is above all a theory of living autonomous systems. Living systems are all control systems, the only natural ones, and the essence of their lives is to control what happens to them, rather than leaving their fates to wind, tide, erosion, and entropy. But the human control systems that concern us most are also very new control systems, largely ignorant of their own nature and prone to treat other living systems, including human ones, as little more than objects to be moved or disturbances to

be overcome. Indeed there have been times in human history when many people saw inanimate nature as full of purposive control systems, and human beings as only passive victims of nature's intentions.

It is not easy for control systems, human beings, to live together. Even when they attempt to cooperate, they end up pitted against each other over minor differences in perception or goal. They just can't help trying to keep their own errors corrected.

To be with others one has to learn deliberately to loosen the control, to lay back, to tolerate error, to be a little less skillful. To expect less, perhaps, of group efforts than of individual ones, but to value them, perhaps, more. To let reorganization ease the strain. To realize how isolated we are; how miraculous it is that we have any contact at all, mind to

mind. To appreciate the vast sea of mystery that fills the space between us, through which we would have great trouble steering without the touch of other human hands on the helm, the surprise of other human thoughts about the course.



D r a f t p r e p a r e d f o r " T E X T S I N C Y B E R N E T I C T H E O R Y " , Special Fall Conference o f A S C , 1 9 8 8

An Exposit ion of Radical Con stru ctiv ism *

Ernst von Glasersfeld

S R R I , H a s b r o u c k L a b o r a t o r y

U n i v e r s i t y o f M a s s a c h u s e t t s

A M H E R S T , M A 0 1 0 0 2

Mi chel de Mont ai gne i s of t en l i st ed among t he scept i cs.

Thi s i s a l i t t l e mi s l eadi ng bec ause he ac t ual l y used hi s

out s t andi ng wi t and er udi t i on to def end t he r eal m of r e -

l i gi ous fai th agai ns t t he t hr eat of t he Pyrrhoniens. Thes e

" Pyr r honi st s" wer e a subver si ve gr oup of t hi nker s who had

r edi scover ed Sext us Empi r i cus and hi s account of Pyrr ho, t he

f at her of scept i c i sm i n t he Hel l eni c wor l d. Mont ai gne mer el y

cut down t o si ze t he ef f or t s of human r eason. He put i t as

conci sel y as one can:

La peste de 1'homme, c'est l 'opin ion de savoi r . 1

The t r ans l at i on t hat seems t he mos t adequat e t o me woul d be:

Manki nd' s pl ague i s t he concei t of knowi ng.

Radi c al c ons t r uc t i vi s m i s an ef f or t t o el i mi nat e t hat

concei t . I t does not deny t he poss i bi l i t y of knowi ng, but i t

st r i ves t o show t hat knowl edge i s not t he commodi t y t he t r a-

di t i on of West er n phi l osophy woul d have us bel i eve. I ndeed,

const r uct i v i sm i s a t heor y of act i ve knowi ng, not a conven

t i onal epi st emol ogy t hat t r eat s knowl edge as an embodi ment

of Tr ut h t hat r ef l ec t s t he wor l d " i n i t sel f " , i ndependent of

t he knower . The bas i c pr i nc i pl es of r adi cal const r uct i v i smar e:

* T h i s t e x t i s a c o m p o s i t e a n d c o n t a i n s p i e c e s f r o m s e v e r a l p a p e r s , a m o n g w h i c h : " C o g n i t i o n ,

C o n s t r u c t i o n o f K n o w l e d g e , a n d T e a c h i n g " , t o b e p u b l i s h e d i n S y n t h e s e , 1 9 89 ; " T h e R e l u c t a n c e to

C h a n g e a W a y o f T h i n k i n g ”, t o b e p u b l i s h e d i n T h e I r i s h J o u r na l o f Ps y c ho l o g y , 1 9 0 8 ; " E n v i r o n -

m e n t a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n " , p re p a r e d f o r t h e A c t i o n G r o u p 1 , International Co n f e r en ce onMathemat- ics Education UCHE-ii, B u d a p e s t , A u g u s t 1 9 8 8 .



1 — a) Knowl edge i s not passi vel y r ecei ved ei t her t hr ought he senses or by way of communi cat i on;

— b) knowl edge i s act i vel y bui l t up by t he cogni zi ngsubj ec t .

2 — a) The f unct i on of cogni t i on i s adapt i ve ( i n t he bi o-l ogi cal sense of t he t er m) ;

— b) cogni t i on ser ves t he subj ect ' s or gani zat i on of t heexper i ent i al wor l d, not t he di scover y of an obj ect i ve ont ol ogi cal r eal i t y.

To adopt t hese pr i nci pl es means t o r el i nqui sh t he mai n-

st ays of an i nvet erat e concept ual net wor k. I t means get t i ng

out of habi t ual pat hways and r econcept ual i z i ng a di f f er ent

r at i onal vi ew of t he wor l d. I n shor t , i t i nvol ves a good

deal of t hi nki ng and, as Bet r and Russel l once sai d, peopl e

woul d r at her di e t han t hi nk, and t hey do.

K n o w l e d g e an d " R e a l i t y "

One of t he di f f er ences bet ween the vocat i onal pr act i ce of

t heol ogy and r el i gi on, on the one hand, and t he l ay pr act i ce

of sci ence and phi l osophy, on t he ot her , we wer e t ol d i n

school , i s that t he f i r st i s f ounded on a dogma that i s hel d

t o be absol ut e and i mmut abl e because i t st ems f r om di vi ne

r evel at i on; al l l ay pr act i ce, i nstead, i s t ent at i ve because

i t devel ops t heori es t hat ar e al ways open t o r ef ut at i on by

new ways of t hi nki ng, new f i ndi ngs, or novel exper i ment s

wi t h t hi ngs or t hought s. Sc i ent i st s and phi l osopher s, t her e-

f ore, ar e supposed t o be open- mi nded and t o wel come t he

sol ut i on of st ubbor n pr obl ems, even i f t he new sol ut i ons

ent ai l a change of i deas and t he demi se of concept s t hat

seemed wel l est abl i shed i n t he past . Mont ai gne and some of

hi s cont empor ar i es had a ver y cl ear vi ew of t hi s di chot omy.

They wer e scept i cs wi t h r egar d t o t he r at i onal knowl edge of

sc i ence and bel i ever s wi t h regar d t o t he tr adi t i onal t enet s

of r el i gi on.

A l ook at t he subsequent hi st ory of i deas, however ,

qui ckl y shows t hat sci ent i st s and phi l osopher s do not al ways

l i ve up t o t hi s i deal open- mi ndedness . The concept s and



methods they have grown up with frequently seem to be as un-

shakable as any matter of religi ous faith and the perpe trat - ors of innova tion tend to be treated as heretics. This hap - pened to Darwin and his theory of evolution, to Einstein when he first publishe d on relativity, and it happened to Alfred Wegener when he suggested the idea of continental drift. In these insta nces the break with traditi on advocat ed by the new theory was unmistakable and, consequently, trig- gered violent indigna tion on the part of those who were anxious to maintain the establ ished dogma. The new theories won eventually, because they enabled scientists to do things they were not able to do before and to cover a larger area of expe rience with fewer assumptions.

New ideas in philosophy do not often gain decisive vic- tories. I would not be so pre sum ptu ous as to off er an ex - planation why it is apparently so easy to live with profound epistemol ogical c on tr ad ic ti on s. Being a little cynical in that regard, I feel that t he quip I earl ier qu ote d fro m Bertrand Russell says somethi ng to the point. Besides, ther e is a Germa n saying (from Wi lhe m Busch, I belie ve) which, to

me, seems relevant: "Der Iiebe Gott muss immer zi eh n, dem Teufel faellt's von se lber zu." (The good Lord must fo rever

pull, but to the dev il things fall quite by themselves.) If one repla ces the ethical connot ation with one of straight thinki ng, it fits our sit uat ion well; It se em s qui te natural that philosophi cal pro ble ms will be shelved when th ere are cherries to be picked or enemies to be fought.

Be this as it may, it is an historical fact that the pre- Socratics al ready saw very clearl y what was to remain the major problem of Western philosophy for the next 2500 years: If one assumes, (a) that a fully structured w orld ex ists "out there", in depen dent of any experi encin g subject, and (b ) that the cogn izin g sub ject has the task of finding out what that world is "really" like, one hangs the mil lston e of an irreducible paradox arou nd one's neck. Whatever the subject perceives or co ncei ves will ne cessar ily be the result of the subject's ways and means of perceiving and c o n c e i v -



ing— and there is no way ever to compare these results with what there was in the -first place. The scep tics have not ceased to reiterate this, but it has not deterred philoso ph- ers -from trying to -find a way around the impasse. The urge to persevere in the quest for that unobtainable "objective knowledqe" seems almost ineradicable. (And therefore, some

philosophers concluded, objective knowledge must be obtain- able after a l l . )

The trouble was (and is) that the sceptics' arguments have always focused on the negative. By reiterating that true kno wledge of the objecti ve world is impossible, they have help ed to perpetuate the idea that knowledge, in order to be any good, would have to be about the objective world. This idea is at the very core of the Western ep istem ological trad ition and the occasional dissidents, who tried to get away from it, have had virtually no effect.

The last three decades, however, have manifested symptoms that may indi cate a ch an ge . It is certa inly not the first time that scientific develop ments are having an influence on the professional thinking of philosophers, but I believ e it is the first time that scientists are raising serious questions about the kind of epis temol ogy p hilosopher s have been defending. The disru ption shows itself in the discipline that has become known as the Philosophy of Science and awareness of trouble was spread to a much wider public by Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Rev olutio ns. There, un- disguised and for everyo ne to read, was the explicit stat e- ment that

... research in parts of philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and even art history, all conve rge to suggest that the traditional episte mological paradigm is somehow askew. That failure to fit is also made increasingly apparent by the historical study of scie nce ... . None of these crisis-p romo ting subject s

has yet produced a viable alternate to the traditional epistemological paradigm, but they do begin to suggest

4



what some of t h at p a r a d i g m' s c h ar a c t e r i s t i c s wi l l b e.

(Kuhn, 1970, p . 121)

Wh i l e t h e t r o u bl e s of t h e "t r a d i t i o n al e pi s t e mo l o g i c al

parad i gm" have shown no s i gn of subs i d i ng i n the year s s i nce

K u h n' s p u b l i c a t i o n , one c o ul d no t h o n e s t l y s ay t h at any s ub -

s t i t u t e h as bee n g e n e r a l l y ac c e p t e d. I n mo st h i g h s c h o o l s and

U n i v e r s i t i e s t e ac h i n g c o n t i n u es as t h o ugh no t h i n g had h ap -

pened and t he ques t f o r i mmutabl e ob j ec t i ve T r u t hs were as

p r o mi s i n g a s e v er . F or s ome o f u s , h o we v er , a d i f f e r e nt v i e w

of knowl edge has emer ged, not as a new i nvent i on but r at her

as t h e r e s u l t o f p u r s u i n g s u g ge s t i o n s made by much e a r l i e r

d i s s i d e nt s . T h i s v i e w d i f f e r s f r o m t h e o l d one i n t hat i t

d e l i b e r a t e l y d i s c a r d s t h e no t i o n t h at k no wl edge c o ul d or

s h ou l d be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a n o b s e r v e r - i n de pe nd en t w o r l d -

i n - i t s e l f . I t r e pl a c e s i t wi t h t h e demand t h at t h e c o n ce p-

t ual c o n s t r u c t s we c a l l k n o wl e dg e b e v i abl e i n t h e wo r l d a s

t h e k no wi ng s u bj e c t e xp er i e nc e s i t . ( T hi s i s , i n f a c t , q ui t e

s i mi l a r t o what t h e p r a g ma t i s t s ha ve been s a y i n g . )

Ludwi g F l ec k , whose monogr aph of 1935 Kuhn acknowl edged

as a f o r e r u n ne r , w r o t e an e a r l i e r a r t i c l e i n 1929 t h at went

v i r t u a l l y u nn ot i c ed a l t h ou gh i t a l r e ad y c on t a i n ed much t h at

p r esages what t he Young Tu rk s have been p r opos i ng i n r ec en t

year s :

The c o nt ent of our k nowl edge must be c o ns i der ed t he

f r e e c r e at i o n of our c u l t u r e . I t r e s embl es a t r a -

d i t i o n a l my t h ( F l e c k 1 929, p. 4 2 5) .

E ver y t h i n k i n g i n d i v i d u a l , i n s o f a r as i t i s a member

of some s o c i e t y , h a s i t s own r e a l i t y a c c o r d i n g t o

wh i c h and i n whi c h i t l i v e s ( p . 4 2 6) .

Not o n l y t he ways and means o f p r ob l em so l u t i ons a r e

s u bj e c t t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c s t y l e , but a l s o , and t o an

e ve n g r e a t e r e x t e n t , t h e c h o i c e of p r o b l e ms ( p. 4 2 7 ) .

V i c o - T h e F i r s t C o n s t r u c t i v i s t

The no t i o n of c o gn i t i v e "c r e a t i o n " o r , as I p r ef er t o

say , c on s t r uc t i o n , was adopt ed i n our cent ur y by Mark Ba l d -

wi n and t h en e x t e n s i v e l y el a bo r a t e d by J e an P i a g et . P i a q e t ' s



const uct i v i st t heor y of cogni t i ve devel opment and cogni t i on,

t o whi ch I shal l r et ur n l at er , had, unbeknownst t o hi m, a

s t r i k i ng f or er unner i n t he Neapol i t an phi l osopher Gi ambat -

t i s t a Vi co. Vi co' s epi s t emol ogi cal t r eat i se (1710) was wr i t -

t en i n Lat i n and r emai ned al most unknown. Vet no pr esent - day

const r uct i v i s t can af f or d t o i gnor e i t , because t he way Vi co

f or mul at ed cer t ai n key i deas and t he way t hey were br i ef l y

di scussed at t he t i me i s, i f anyt hi ng, mor e r el evant t oday

t hen i t was t hen.

The anonymous cr i t i c who, i n 1711, r evi ewed Vi co' s f i r st

expos i t i on of a t horoughl y const r uct i vi s t epi s t emol ogy ex-

pr essed a mi nor and a maj or compl ai nt . The f i r st wi t h whi ch

any moder n r eader mi ght agr ee— was t hat Vi co' s t r eat i se i s

so f ul l of novel i deas t hat a summar y woul d t ur n out t o be

al most as l ong as t he wor k i t sel f ( e . g. , t he i nt r oduct i on of

devel opment al st ages and t he i ncommensur abi 1i t y of i deas at

di f f er e nt hi s t or i c al or i ndi vi dual s t ages , t he or i gi n of

concept ual cer t a i nt y as a r esul t of abst r act i on and f or mal -

i zat i on, t he r o l e of 1anguage i n t he shapi ng of concept s) .

The r ev i ewer ' s second obj ect i on, however , i s mor e r el evant

t o my pur pose her e, because i t c l earl y br i ngs out t he pr o-

bl em c ons t r uc t i vi s t s r un i nt o , f r om Vi c o' s days r i ght down

t o our own.

Vi co' s t r eat i s e De aritiquissima Italorum sapientia

( 1710) , t he Venet i an r ev i ewer says , i s l i kel y t o gi ve t he

r eader "an i dea and a sampl e of t he aut hor ' s met aphysi cs

r at her t han t o pr ove i t . " By proof , t he 18t h- cent ur y r evi ew

er i nt ended ver y much t he same as so many wr i t er s seem t o

i nt end t oday, namel y a sol i d demonst r at i on t hat what i s as-

ser t ed i s true of t he "r eal " wor l d. Thi s convent i onal demand

cannot be sat i s f i ed by Vi co or any pr oponent of a r adi cal l y

const r uct i vi st t heor y of knowi ng: one cannot do t he ver y

t hi ng one cl ai ms t o be i mpossi bl e. To r equest a demonst r a-

t i on of Truth f r om a radi cal cons t r uc t i v i s t shows a f unda-

ment al mi sunder s t andi ng of t he aut hor ' s expl i c i t i nt ent i on

t o oper at e wi t h a di f f erent concept i on of knowl edge and of

i t s r el at i on t o t he " real " wor l d.

6



One of Vi co' s basi c i deas was t hat epi st emi c agent s can

know not hi ng but t he cogni t i ve st r uct ur es t hey t hemsel ves

have put t oget her . He expr essed t hi s i n many ways, and t he

most st r i ki ng i s per haps: "God is the artificer of Nature,

man the god of artifacts, " Agai n and agai n he st r esses t hat" t o know" means to know how to make. He subst ant i at es t hi s

by sayi ng t hat one knows a t hi ng onl y when one can t el l what

component s i t consi st s of . Consequent l y, God al one can know

t he real wor l d, becaus e He knows how and of what He has

cr eat ed i t . I n cont r ast , t he human knower can know onl y what

t he human knower has const r uct ed.

For cons t r uc t i vi s t s , t her ef or e, t he wor d knowledge r ef er s

t o a commodi t y that i s r adi cal l y di f f er ent f r om t he obj ec t -

i ve r epr esent at i on of an obser ver - i ndependent worl d whi cht he mai nst r eam of t he West er n phi l osophi cal t r adi t i on has

been l ook i ng f o r . I ns tead, knowledge r ef er s t o concept ual

st r uct ur es t hat epi st emi c agent s, gi ven t he r ange of pr esent

exper i ence wi t hi n t hei r t r adi t i on of t hought and l anguage,

consi der viable.

The mos t f r equent obj ec t i on t o r adi cal cons t r uc t i vi sm, at

t he begi nni ng of t he 18t h cent ur y as wel l as now, t akes t he

f or m of d i scar di ng i t as a k i nd of sol i ps i sm. I t i s t he mai n

obj ect i on t hat Geor ge Ber kel ey had t o cont end wi t h when hepubl i shed hi s maj or epi st emol ogi cal wor k, A treatise con-

cerning the principles of human knowledge , i n 1710 ( by a

st r ange coi nci dence, i t was t he same year t hat Vi co publ i sh-

ed hi s t r eat i se at t he ot her end of Eur ope) . I f one keeps

Ber kel ey ' s t i t l e i n mi nd, i t wi l l be c l ear t hat when he de-

c l ar es "esse est percipi" ( to be i s to be per cei ved) , t he

being he i s t al ki ng about i s t he onl y one t he human knower

can concei ve of , and t hat i s being i n t he wor l d of exper i en-

ce, being const i t ut ed by t he ki nd of per manence that r esul t sf r om i nvar i ant s c r eat ed by an exper i encer 's success f ul as -

s i mi l at i on (I s hal l expl ai n t hi s t er m l at er i n t he c ont ext

of P i aget ' s t heor y) . But Ber kel ey ' s opponent s , j us t as t o -

day ' s c r i t i cs of const r uct i v i sm, r eact ed as t hough he had

been t al k i ng about t he " wor 1d- i n- i t se l f " r at her t han about

7



the principles of human knowledge.

Both Vi co and Ber kel ey wer e concer ned wi t h t he human act -

i vi t y of knowi ng. Bot h had st r ong t i es wi t h t he r el i gi ous

dogma t hat cl ai ms an absol ut e, et er nal order of t he uni -

verse. Thei r way of r econc i l i ng t hei r b l at ant l y subj ect i vi st

t heor i es of knowl edge wi t h t he r equi r ement of an i mmut abl e

obj ect i ve wor l d wer e par al l el and equal l y i ngeni ous. For

Berkel ey t he uni t y and per manence of ont ol ogi cal existence

was assur ed by God' s per cept i on whi ch, because God i s con-

si der ed omni sci ent , was ubi qui t ous and al l - encompassi ng.

Vi co, i nst ead, mai nt ai ned t hat, whi l e t he human mi nd coul d

know onl y what t he human mi nd i t sel f had const r uct ed, God

knew t he wor l d as i t i s, because He had cr eat ed i t .

Some Recent Elements

Radi cal const r uct i v i sm i s l ess i magi nat i ve and mor e pr ag-

mat i c. I t does not deny an ont ol ogi cal "r eal i t y"— i t mer el y

deni es t he human exper i encer t he possi bi l i t y of acqui r i ng a

" t r ue" r epr esent at i on of i t . The human subj ect may meet t hat

worl d onl y wher e a way of act i ng or a way of t hi nki ng f ai l s

t o at t ai n the desi r ed goal — but i n any such f ai l ur e t her e i s

no way of deci di ng whet her t he l ack of success i s due t o an

i nsuf f i ci ency of t he chosen appr oach or t o an i ndependent

ont ol ogi cal obst acl e. Warr en McCul l och expr essed i t ver y

si mpl y: "To have pr oved a hypot hesi s f al se i s i ndeed the

peak of knowl edge" ( 1965, p. 154) . What we cal l " knowl edge" ,

t hen, i s t he map of pat hs of act i on and t hought whi ch, at

t hat moment i n t he cour se of our exper i ence, have t ur ned out

t o be viable f or us. Such a l i mi t at i on of t he scope of human

under st andi ng i s, of cour se, consi der ed danger ous her esy by

al l who, i n spi t e of t he scept i cs age- ol d war ni ngs, st i l l

cl i ng t o t he hope t hat human r eason wi l l sooner or l at er un-

r avel t he myst ery of t he uni ver se.

Ri char d Ror t y, i n hi s I nt r oduct i on t o Consequences of

Pragmatism, announces t hi s shi f t of f ocus i n t er ms t hat f i t

t he const r uct i v i st 's posi t i on j ust as wel l as t he pr agma-

t i st ' s:

8



He ( t he pr agmat i st ) dr ops t he not i on of t r ut h as

cor r espondence wi t h r eal i t y al t oget her , and says t hat

moder n sci ence does not enabl e us t o cope because i t

cor r esponds, i t j ust enabl es us t o cope. ( Ror t y 1982,

p. XVI I )

Const r uc t i vi sm is a f or m of pr agmat i sm and shar es wi t h i t

t he at t i t ude t owar ds knowl edge and t r ut h; and no l ess t han

pr agmat i sm does i t go agai nst "t he common ur ge t o escape t he

vocabul ar y and pr act i ces of one' s own t i me and f i nd some-

t hi ng ahi st or i cal and necessar y t o cl i ng t o" ( Ror t y 1992, p.

165) .

When t he anonymous r evi ewer compl ai ned t hat Vi co di d not

prove hi s t hesi s, he i n f act r epr oached Vi co f or not havi ng

cl ai med f or hi s " met aphysi cs" ( whi ch was act ual 1y a t heor y

of knowi ng) t he cor r espondence wi t h an ahi st ori cal ont i c

wor l d as God might know it. But t hi s nat i on of cor r espond-

ence was pr eci sel y what Vi co— l i ke t he pr agmat i st s—i nt ended

t o dr op.

Pr esent - day const r uct i vi st s, however , i f pressed f or cor-

r oborat i on r at her t han pr oof i n t he t r adi t i onal sense, have

an advant age over Vi co. They can cl ai m compatibi1ity wi t h

sci ent i f i c model s t hat enabl e us t o "cope" r emar kabl y wel l

i n speci f i c ar eas of exper i ence. Far i nst ance, one mi ght

ci t e t he neur ophysi ol ogy of t he br ai n and quot e Hebb' s:

At a cer t ai n l evel of physi ol ogi cal anal ysi s t her e i s

no r eal i t y but t he f i r i ng of si ngl e neur ons ( Hebb

1958, p. 461) .

Thi s i s compl ement ed by von Foer st er ' s ( 1970) obser vat i on

t hat al l sensor y r ecept or s ( i . e. vi sual , audi t or y, t actual ,

et c. ) send physi cal l y i ndi st i ngui shabl e "r esponses" t o t he

cor t ex and t hat , t her ef or e, t he "sensor y modal i t i es " can

be di st i ngui shed onl y by keepi ng t r ack of t he part of t he

body f r om whi ch t he r esponses come, and not on t he basi s of

" envi r onment al f eat ur es". Such st at ement s make cl ear t hat

cont empor ar y neur ophysi ol ogi cal model s may be compat i bl e

wi t h a const r uct i vi st t heor y of knowi ng but can i n no way be

i nt egr at ed wi t h t he not i on of t r ansduct i on of " i nf or mat i on"

9



f r om t he envi r onment t hat any r eal i st epi st emol ogy demands.

Cognition as an Adaptive Function

Const r uc t i vi sm di f f er s f rom pr agmat i sm i n i t s pr edomi nant

i nt eres t i n how t he knowl edge t hat " enabl es us t o cope" i sar r i ved at. The wor k of J ean Pi aget , t he most pr ol i f i c con-

st r uct i vi st i n our cent ur y, can be i nt er pr et ed as one l ong

st r uggl e t o desi gn a model of t he gener at i on of vi abl e know-

l edge. I n spi t e of t he f act t hat Pi aget has r ei t er at ed i n-

numer abl e t i mes (cf . 1967a, pp. 210f f ) t hat , f r om hi s per -

spect i ve, cogni t i on must be consi dered an adaptive function,

most of hi s cr i t i cs ar gue agai nst hi m as t hough he wer e con-

cer ned wi t h t he t r adi t i onal quest -for "t r ue" knowl edge,

i . e. , knowl edge t hat coul d be sai d t o cor r espond t o an ont o-

l ogi cal r eal i t y.

Thi s mi si nt er pr et at i on i s t o some ext ent due t o a mi scon-

cept i on about adapt at i on. The t echni cal sense of t he t er m

t hat Pi aget i nt ended comes f r om t he t heory of evol ut i on. I n

t hat cont ext , adaptation r ef er s t o a st at e of organi sms or

spec i es that i s char act er i zed by t hei r abi l i t y t o sur vi ve i n

a gi ven envi r onment . Because t he word i s of t en used as a

ver b (e. g. t hi s or t hat speci es has adapt ed t o such and such

an envi r onment ) , t he i mpr ess i on has been gi ven t hat adapt a-

t i on i s an act i v i t y of or gani sms. Thi s i s qui t e mi sl eadi ng.

I n phyl ogeny no or gani sm can act i vel y modi f y i t s genome and

gener at e char act er i st i es t o sui t a changed envi r onment . Ac-

cor di ng t o t he t heor y of evol ut i on, t he modi f i cat i on of

genes i s al ways an acci dent . I ndeed, i t i s t hese acci dent al

modi f i cat i ons t hat gener at e t he var i at i ons on whi ch nat ur al

sel ect i on can oper at e. And nat ur e does not— as even Dar wi n

occasi onal l y s l i pped i nt o sayi ng ( Pi t t endr i gh 1958, p. 397) —

sel ect " t he f i t t est " , i t mer el y l et s l i ve t hose t hat have

t he char act er i st i cs necessar y t o cope wi t h t hei r envi r onment

and l et s di e al l t hat have not .

Thi s i nt er pr et at i on of t he t heor y of evol ut i on and i t s

vocabul ary i s cr uci al f or an adequat e under st andi ng of Pi a-

get 's t heory of cogni t i on. Knowl edge f or Pi aget , as f or

10



Vi co, i s never ( and can never be) a "r epr esent at i on" of t he

real wor l d. I nst ead i t i s t he col l ect i on of concept ual

st r uct ures t hat t ur n out t o be adapt ed or , as I woul d say,

viable wi t hi n t he knowi ng subj ect ' s r ange of exper i ence.

( Not e: Pi aget nevert hel ess uses t he wor d " r epr esent at i on" —

and so do I ; but i t i s i nt ended t o r ef er t o a re—presenta-

tion of a pr i or exper i ence, not a pi ct ur e of t he "ext er nal "

wor l d; hence, I spel l i t wi t h a hyphen, whi ch Pi aget di d

onl y oc cas i onal l y. )

Bot h i n t he t heor y of evol ut i on and the const r uct i vi st

t heor y of knowi ng, "vi abi l i t y" i s t i ed t o t he concept of

equi l i br i um. Equi l i br i um i n evol ut i on i ndi cat es the s t at e of

an organi sm or speci es i n whi ch t he pot ent i al f or sur vi val

i n a gi ven envi r onment i s t hought t o be genet i cal l y assur ed.

I n t he spher e of cogni t i on, t hough i ndi r ect l y l i nked t o sur-

vi val , equi l i br i um r ef er s t o a st at e i n whi ch an epi st emi c

agent ' s cogni t i ve st r uct ur es have i n t he past yi el ded ex-

pect ed r esul t s, and cont i nue t o do so, wi t hout br i ngi ng t o

t he sur f ace concept ual conf l i c t s or cont r adi c t i ons. I n

nei t her case i s equi l i br i um nec essar i l y a s tat i c af f ai r ,

l i ke t he equi l i br i um of a bal ance beam, but i t can be and

of t en i s dynami c, as t he equi l i br i um mai nt ai ned by a

cycl i s t .

To make t he Pi aget i an def i ni t i on of knowl edge pl aus i bl e,

one must i mmedi at el y t ake i nt o account ( whi ch so many i nt er -

pr et er s of Pi aget seem t o omi t ) t hat a human subj ect ' s ex-

per i ence al ways i ncl udes t he soci al i nt er act i on wi t h ot her

cogni z i ng subj ect s. But i nt r oduci ng t he not i on of soci al i n-

t eract i on, r ai ses a pr obl em f or const r uc t i vi s t s . I f what a

cogni zi ng subj ect knows cannot be anyt hi ng but what t hat

subj ect has const r ucted, i t i s c l ear t hat , f r om t he con

s t ruc t i vi s t per spect i ve, t he others wi t h whom t he subj ect

may i nt er act soci al l y cannot be posi t ed as an ont ol ogi cal

gi ven. I shal l r et ur n t o t hi s pr obl em, but f i r st I want t o

exp1i cat e t he basi s of a Pi aget i an t heor y of l earni ng.

11



The Context of Scheme Theory

Two of t he basi c concept s of Pi aget ' s t heor y of cogni -

t i on ar e assimilation and accommodation. Pi aget ' s use of

t hese t er ms i s not qui t e t he same as t hei r common use i n

or di nar y l anguage. Bot h t er ms must be under st ood i n t he con-t ext of hi s const r uct i v i st t heor y of knowi ng. Unf or t unat el y,

cont empor ar y t ext books i n devel opment al psychol ogy, most of

whi ch devot e at l east a f ew pages t o Pi aget , of t en f ai l t o

expl ai n t hi s. Thus one r eads, f or i nst ance:

Ass i mi l at i on i s t he pr ocess wher eby changi ng el ement s

i n t he envi r onment become i ncor por at ed i nt o t he

st r uct ur e of t he organi sm. At t he same t i me, t he

or gani sm must accommodat e i t s f unct i oni ng t o the

nat ur e of what i s bei ng assi mi l at ed- ( Nash 1970, p.360)

Thi s i s not at al l what Pi aget meant . One r eason why as -

si mi l at i on i s so of t en mi sunder st ood i s t hat i t s use as an

expl anat ory post ul at e r anges f r om t he unconsci ous t o t he

del i ber at e. Anot her s t ems f r om di sr egar di ng t he f act t hat

Pi aget uses t hat t er m, as wel l as "accommodat i on" , wi t hi n

t he f r amewor k of hi s t heor y of schemes. An exampl e may hel p

t o i l l ust r at e the t wo ext r eme f or ms of assi mi l at i on.

When t he nai l t hat hol ds up t he wi r e t o my comput er f al l sout of t he wal l i n my st udy and I use my shoe t o hammer i t

i n agai n, I am del i ber at el y assimilating t he shoe t o t he

f unct i on of a hammer . I t may wor k, or i t may not , but even

i f i t does work I am not l ed t o bel i eve t hat t he shoe is a

hammer . The ot her f or m of ass i mi l at i on— t he one so many de-

vel opment al psychol ogst s have mi sappr opr i at ed f r om Pi aget —

l acks t hat awar eness. I t i s t hi s second f or m t hat i s epi -

st emol ogi cal 1y mor e i nt er est i ng.

An i nf ant qui ckl y l ear ns t hat a r at t l e i t was gi ven makesa r ewardi ng noi se when i t i s shaken. Thi s pr ovi des t he i n-

f ant wi t h the abi l i t y to gener at e t he noi se. Pi aget sees

t hi s as t he "const r uct i on of a scheme" whi ch, l i ke al l

schemes, consi st s of t hr ee par t s:

12



(1) Recogni t i on of a cer t ai n si t uat i on ( e. g. t he pr esence

of a graspab1e i t em wi t h a r ounded shape at one end) ;

(2) associ at i on of a speci f i c act i vi t y wi t h t hat ki nd of

i t em (e. g. pi cki ng i t up and shaki ng i t) ;

(3) expect at i on of a cer t ai n r esul t (e. g. t he r ewar di ng

noi s e) .

I t i s ver y l i kel y t hat t hi s i nf ant , when pl aced i n i ts

hi gh—chai r at t he di ni ng tabl e, wi l l pi ck up and shake a

qr aspabl e i t em t hat has a r ounded shape at one end. We cal l

t hat i t em a spoon and may say t hat t he i nf ant i s assimilat-

ing i t t o i t s r at t l i ng scheme; but f r om t he i nf ant ' s per -

spect i ve at t hat poi nt , t he i t em is a rat t l e. I t i s a r at t l e

because what t he i nf ant per cei ves of i t i s j ust t hose as

pect s t hat f i t t he r at t l i ng scheme—and not what an adul t

woul d percei ve as t he char act er i st i cs of a spoon. 2 Then,

however , when t he i nf ant shakes t he i t em, i t does not pr o-

duce t he r esul t t he i nf ant expects: i t does not r at t l e. Thi s

gener at es a per t ur bat i on ( " di sappoi nt ment " ) , and per t ur ba-

t i on i s one of t he condi t i ons t hat set t he st age f or cogni -

t i ve change. I n our exampl e i t may si mpl y f ocus t he i nf ant ' s

at t ent i on on t he i t em i n i t s hand, and t hi s may l ead t o t he

percept i on of some aspect t hat wi l l enabl e t he i nf ant i n t he

f ut ur e t o r ecogni ze spoons as non- r at t l es. That devel opment

woul d be an accommodation , but obvi ousl y a r at her modest

one. Al t er nat i vel y, gi ven t he si t uat i on at t he di ni ng t abl e,

i t i s not unl i kel y t hat t he spoon, bei ng vi gorousl y shaken,

wi l l hi t t he t abl e and pr oduce a di f f er ent but al so ver y

r ewar di ng noi se. Thi s, t oo, wi l l gener at e a per t ur bat i on (we

mi ght cal l i t " enchant ment " ) whi ch may l ead t o a di f f erent

accommodation, a maj or one t hi s t i me, t hat i ni t i at es t he

"spoon bangi ng scheme" whi ch most par ent s know onl y t oo

wel l .

Thi s s i mpl e i l l us t r at i on of scheme t heor y al so shows t hat

t he t heor y i nvol ves, on t he par t of t he obser ver , cer t ai n

pr esupposi t i ons about cogni z i ng or gani sms. The or gani sm i s

supposed t o possess at. l east t he f ol l owi ng capabi l i t i es3;



— The abi l i t y and, beyond t hat , t he t endency t o est abl i sh

r ecur r ences i n t he f l ow of exper i ence; t hi s, i n t ur n,

ent ai l s at l east t wo capabi l i t i es ,

— r emember i ng and r et r i evi ng ( r e- pr esent i ng) exper i ences,

— and t he abi l i t y t o make compar i sons and j udgement s of

s i mi l ar i t y and di f f er ence;

— apar t f r om t hese, t her e i s t he pr esupposi t i on t hat t he

or gani sm l i kes cer t ai n exper i ences bet t er t han ot her s,

whi ch i s t o say, i t has some el ement ar y val ues.

The f i r st t hr ee of t hese ar e i ndi spens abl e i n any t heor y

of l ear ni ng. Even t he par si moni ous model s of cl assi cal and

Oper ant condi t i oni ng coul d not do wi t hout t hem. As t o t he

f our t h, t he assumpt i on of el ement ar y val ues, i t was ex-

pl i c i t l y embodi ed i n Thorndi kes Law of Effect: "Ot her t hi ngs

bei ng equal , connect i ons gr ow st r onger i f t hey i ssue i n

sat i sf yi ng st at es of af f ai r s" ( Thor ndi ke 1931/ 1966, p. 101).

I t r emai ned i mpl i ci t, i n psychol ogi cal l ear ni ng t heor i es

si nce Thor ndi ke, but t he subj ect i v i t y of what i s "s at i sf y-

i nq" was mor e or l ess del i ber at el y obscur ed by behavi or i st s

t hr ough t he use of t he mor e obj ect i ve soundi ng t er m " r ei n-

f orcement " .

The l ear ni ng t heor y t hat emer ges f r om Pi aget ' s wor k can

be summar i zed by sayi ng t hat cogni t i ve change and learning

t ake pl ace when a scheme, i nst ead of pr oduci ng t he expect ed

r esul t , l eads to per t ur bat i on, and per t ur bat i on, i n t ur n,

l eads t o accommodat i on t hat est abl i shes a new equi l i br i um.

Lear ni ng and t he knowl edge i t creat es, t hus, ar e expl i ci t l y

i nstr ument al . But her e, agai n, i t i s cruci al not t o be r ash

and t oo si mpl i st i c i n i nt er pr et i ng Pi aget . Hi s t heor y of

cogni t i on i nvol ves a t wo- f ol d i nst r ument al i sm. On t he sens-

ory—motor l evel , act i on schemes ar e i nst r ument al i n hel pi ng

or gani sms t o achi eve goal s i n t hei r i nt er act i on wi t h t hei r

exper i ent i al wor l d. On t he l evel of reflective abstraction,

however , oper at i ve schemes are i nst r ument al i n hel pi ng or -

gani sms achi eve a coherent concept ual net wor k t hat r e-

f l ect s t he pat hs of act i ng as wel l as t hi nki ng whi ch, at t he

14



or gani sms' pr esent po i nt of exper i ence, have t ur ned out t o

be vi abl e. The f i r s t i ns t r ument a l i t y mi ght be cal l ed "utili-

tarian" ( t he ki nd phi l o sopher s have t r adi t i onal 1y scor ned) .

The second, however , i s s t r i c t l y "epistemic" . As such, may

be of some phi l osophi cal i nt er est — above al l because i t en-

t ai l s a r adi cal shi f t i n t he concept i on of "knowl edge" , a

shi f t t hat e l i mi nat es t he par adox i cal concept i on of T rut h

t hat r equi r es a f o r eve r unat t ai nabl e ont ol ogi cal tes t . The

s hi f t t hat s ubs t i t ut es v i abi l i t y i n t he exper i ent i al wor l d

f or cor r es pondenc e wi t h ont ol ogi c al r eal i t y appl i es t o

knowl edge t hat r esul t s f r om i nduct i ve i nf er ences and gener -

al i zat i ons . I t does not af f ec t deduc t i ve i nf er ences i n l ogi c

and mat hemat i cs . I n P i aget 's v i ew, t he cer t a i nt y of con-

c l us i ons i n t hese ar eas pert a i ns t o ment al operat i ons and

not t o sensor y- mot or mat er i al (cf . Bet h & Pi aget 1961;

Gl asersf el d, 1985b).

The Soc ial Comp onent

I n connec t i on wi t h t he concept of v i abi l i t y, be i t “ut i l -

i t ar i an" or "epi s t emi c " , soc i al i nt er ac t i on pl ays an i mpor t -

ant r ol e. Except f or ani mal psychol ogi s t s , soc i al i nt er -

act i on r ef er s t o what goes on among humans and i nvol ves l an-

guage. As a r ul e i t i s al so t r eat ed as essent i a l l y di f f er ent

f r om t he i nt er act i ons human or gani sms have wi t h ot her i t ems

i n t hei r exper i ent i al f i el d, because i t i s mor e or l ess

t ac i t l y assumed t hat humans ar e f r om t he ver y out set pr i v i -

l eged exper i ent i al ent i t i es . Cons t r uc t i v i s t s have no i nt en-

t i on of deny i ng t hi s i nt ui t i ve human pr er ogat i ve. But i n-

sof ar as t hei r t heor y of knowi ng at t empt s t o model t he cog-

ni t i ve devel opment t hat prov i des t he i ndi vi dual o rgani sm

wi t h all t he f ur ni t ur e of hi s or her exper i ent i al f i el d,

t hey want t o avoi d ass umi ng any cogni t i ve st r uct ur es or

cat egor i es as i nnat e. Hence, t here i s t he need t o hypot hes-

i ze a model f or t he concept ual genesi s of " ot her s".

On t he sensor y- mot or l evel , t he sc hemes a devel opi ng

chi l d bui l ds up and manages t o keep vi abl e wi l l come t o i n-

vol ve a l ar ge var i et y of "obj ect s". Ther e wi l l be cups and

15



spoons, bui l di ng bl ocks and penci l s, r ag dol l s and t eddy

bear s— al l seen, mani pul at ed, and f ami l i ar as component s of

di ver se act i on schemes. But t her e may al so be ki t t ens and

per haps a dog. Though t he chi l d may at f i r st approach t hese

i t ems wi t h act i on schemes t hat assi mi l at e t hem t o dol l s or

t eddy bear s, t hei r unexpect ed r eact i ons wi l l qui ckl y cause

novel ki nds of per t ur bat i on and i nevi t abl e accommodat i ons.

The most moment ous of t hese accommodat i ons can be r oughl y

charact er i zed by sayi ng that t he chi l d wi l l come t o ascr i be

t o these somewhat unr ul y ent i t i es cer t ai n pr oper t i es t hat

r adi c al l y di f f ere nt i at e t hem f rom t he ot her f ami l i ar ob-

j ect s. Among t hese pr oper t i es wi l l be t he abi l i t y t o move on

t hei r own, t he abi l i t y t o see and t o hear , and event ual l y

al so t he abi l i t y t o f eel pai n. The ascr i pt i on of t hese pr o-

per t i es ar i ses si mpl y because, wi t hout t hem, t he chi l d' s

i nt er act i ons wi t h ki t t ens and dogs cannot be t ur ned i nt o

even moder at el y r el i abl e schemes.

A ver y si mi l ar devel opment may l ead t o t he chi l d' s con-

st r uct i on of schemes t hat i nvol ve st i l l mor e compl ex i t ems

i n her exper i ent i al envi r onment , namel y t he human i ndi vi d-

ual s who, t o a much gr eat er ext ent t han ot her r ecur r ent

i t ems of exper i ence, make i nt eract i on unavoi dabl e. ( As we

al l r emember , i n many of t hese i nescapabl e i nt er act i ons, t he

schemes t hat are devel oped ai m at avoi di ng unpl easant con-

sequences r at her t han cr eat i ng r ewar di ng r esul t s. ) Her e

agai n, i n or der t o devel op r el at i vel y r el i abl e schemes, t he

chi l d must i mput e cer t ai n capabi l i t i es t o t he obj ect s of

i nt er act i on. But now t hese ascr i pt i ons compr i se not onl y

per cept ual but al so cogni t i ve capabi l i t i es, and soon t hese

f or mi dabl e "ot her s" wi l l be seen as i nt endi ng, maki ng pl ans,

and bei ng bot h ver y and not at al l pr edi ct abl e i n some r e

spect s. I ndeed, out of t he mani f ol d of t hese f r equent but

never t hel ess speci al i nt er act i ons, t her e event ual l y emer ges

t he way t he devel opi ng human i ndi vi dual wi l l t hi nk bot h of

"ot her s" and of hi m- or her sel f .

Thi s r ec i pr oc i t y i s, I bel i eve, pr ec i sel y what Kant had

i n mi nd when he wr ot e:

16



I t i s mani f est t hat , i f one want s t o i magi ne a t hi nk-

i ng bei ng, one woul d have t o put onesel f i n i t s pl ace

and t o i mput e one' s own subj ect t o t he obj ect one i n-

t ended t o consi der . . . ( Kant 1781, p. 223)

My br i ef account of t he concept ual const r uct i on of "ot h-

er s " i s no doubt a cr ude and pr el i mi nar y anal ysi s but i t at

l east opens a possi bi l i t y of appr oaching t he pr obl em wi t hout

t he vacuous assumpt i on of i nnat eness. Besi des, t he Kant i an

not i on t hat we i mput e t he cogni t i ve capabi l i t i es t hat we

i sol at e i n our sel ves t o our c onspeci f i cs, l eads to an ex-

pl anat i on of why i t means so much t o us t o have our exper i -

ent i al r eal i t y conf i r med by ot her s. The use of a scheme

al ways i nvol ves t he expect at i on of a more or l ess speci f i c

r esul t . On t he l evel of r ef l ect i ve abst r act i on, t he expect a-

t i on can be t ur ned i nt o a pr edi ct i on. I f we i mput e pl anni ng

and f or esi ght t o ot her s, t hi s means t hat we al so i mput e t o

t hem some of t he sc hemes t hat have wor ked wel l f or our -

sel ves. Then, i f a par t i cul ar pr edi ct i on we have made

concer ni ng an act i on or r eact i on of an ot her t ur ns out t o

be cor r obor at ed by what t he ot her does, t hi s adds a second

l evel of vi abi l i t y t o our scheme; and t hi s second l evel of

v i abl i t y st r engt hens t he exper i ent i al r eal i t y we have con-

st r uct ed. (cf. Gl aser sf el d 1985a, 1986)

A Perspect ive on Communication

The t echni cal model of communi cat i on ( Shannon 1948)

est abl i shed one f eat ur e of t he pr ocess t hat r emai ns i mpor t -

ant no mat t er f r om what or i ent at i on one appr oaches i t: The

physi cal si gnal s t hat t r avel f r om one communi cat or t o an-

ot her — f or i nst ance t he sounds of speech and t he vi sual

pat t er ns of pr i nt or wr i t i ng i n l i ngui st i c communi cat i on do

not act ual l y car r y or contain what we t hi nk of as " meani ng".

I nst ead, t hey shoul d be consi der ed i nst r uct i ons to sel ect

par t i cul ar meani ngs f r om a l i st whi ch, t oget her wi t h t he

l i s t of agr eed s i gnal s , const i t ut es t he "code" of t he par t i -

cul ar communi cat i on syst em. From t hi s i t f ol l ows that , i f

t he t wo l i st s and t he convent i onal associ at i ons t hat l i nk

17



t he i t ems i n t hem ar e not avai l abl e t o a r ecei ver bef or e t he

l i ngui s t i c i nt er ac t i on t akes pl ace, t he s i gnal s wi l l be

meani ngl ess f or t hat r ecei ver .

F rom t he cons t r uc t i v i s t poi nt of vi ew, t hi s feat ure of

c o mmu n i c a t i o n i s of par t i c ul ar i nt er es t bec aus e i t c l ear l y

br i ngs out t he f act t hat l anguage user s must i ndi v i dual l y

construct t he meani ng of wor ds, phr ases, sent ences, and

t ext s. Needl ess to say, t hi s semant i c const r uct i on does not

al ways have t o st ar t f r om scr at ch. Once a cert ai n amount of

vocabul ar y and combi nat ori al r ul es ( "synt ax") have been

bui l t up i n i nt er act i on wi t h speaker s of t he par t i cul ar l an-

guage, t hese pat t er ns can be used t o l ead a l earner t o f or m

novel combi nat i ons and, t hus, novel concept ual compounds.

But t he basi c el ement s out of whi ch an i ndi vi dual ' s concept -

ual st r uct ur es ar e composed and t he r el at i ons by means of

whi ch t hey ar e hel d t oget her cannot be t r ansf err ed f r om one

l anguage user t o anot her , l et al one f r om a pr of i c i ent speak-

er t o an i nf ant . These bui l di ng bl ocks must be abst r act ed

f r om i ndi vi dual exper i ence; and t hei r i nt er per sonal f i t ,

whi ch makes possi bl e what we cal l communi cat i on, can ar i se

onl y i n t he cour se of pr ot r act ed i nt er act i on, t hr ough mut ual

or i ent at i on and adapt at i on (cf . Mat ur ana, 1980) .

Though i t i s of t en sai d t hat nor mal chi l dr en acqui r e

t hei r l anguage wi t hout not i ceabl e ef f or t , a c l oser exami na-

t i on shows t hat t he pr ocess i nvol ved i s not as si mpl e as i t

seems. I f , f or i nst ance, you want your i nf ant t o l ear n t he

wor d "cup", you wi l l go t hr ough a r out i ne t hat par ent s have

used t hrough t he ages. You wi l l poi nt t o, and t hen pr obabl y

pi ck up and move, an obj ect t hat sat i s f i es your def i ni t i on

of "c up" , and at t he same t i me you wi l l r epeat edl y ut t er t he

word. I t i s l i kel y t hat mot her s and f at her s do t hi s " i nt ui t -

i vel y" , i . e. , wi t hout a wel l - f or mul at ed t heor et i cal bas i s .

They do i t because i t us ual l y wor ks . But t he f act t hat i t

wor ks does not mean t hat i t has t o be a si mpl e mat t er. Ther e

ar e at. l east t hr ee essent i al st eps t he chi l d has t o make.

The f i r s t cons i s t s i n f oc us i ng at t ent i on on some spec i f i c

sensory s i gnal s i n t he mani f o l d of s i gnal s whi ch, at ever y

18



moment , ar e avai l abl e wi t hi n t he chi l d' s sensor y syst em; t he

par ent ' s po i nt i ng pr ovi des a mer el y appr oxi mate and usual l y

qui t e ambi guous di r ect i on f or t hi s act .

The second st ep cons i s t s i n i sol at i ng and coor di nat i ng a

gr oup of t hese sensor y s i gnal s t o f or m a more or l ess di s -

cr et e vi sual i t em or "t hi ng". The par ent ' s movi ng t he cup

gr eat l y ai ds t hi s pr ocess because i t accent uat es t he r e l ev-

ant f i gur e as opposed to t he par t s of t he v i sual f i el d t hat

ar e t o f or m t he i r r el evant gr o und. 4

The t hi r d st ep, t hen, i s t o as soc i at e t he i sol at ed vi sual

pat t er n wi t h t he audi t or y exper i ence pr oduced by the

par ent ' s ut t er ances of t he word " cup". Agai n, t he chi l d must

f i r s t i s ol at e t he s ens or y s i gnal s t hat c ons t i t ut e t hi s audi -

t or y exper i ence f r om t he backgr ound ( t he mani f o l d audi t or y

si gnal s t hat ar e avai l abl e at t he moment ) ; and t he par ent ' s

r epet i t i on of t he word obvi ous l y enhances t he pr ocess of

i sol at i ng t he audi t or y pat t er n as wel l as i t s assoc i at i on

wi t h t he movi ng vi sual pat t er n.

I f t hi s sequence of st eps pr ovi des an adequat e anal ysi s

of t he i ni t i al acqui s i t i on of t he meani ng of t he wor d "cup",

i t i s cl ear t hat t he chi l d' s meani ng of t hat word i s made up

exc l us i vel y of el ement s whi ch t he chi l d abst r act s f r om her

own exper i ence. I ndeed, anyone who has mor e or l ess met hod-

i cal l y wat ched chi l dr en acqui r e t he use of new wor ds, wi l l

have not i ced t hat what t hey i so l ate as meani ngs f r om t hei r

exper i ences i n conj unct i on wi t h wor ds i s of t en onl y par t i a l -

l y compat i bl e wi t h t he meani ngs t he adul t speaker s of t he

l anguage t ake f or gr ant ed. Thus the chi l d' s i ni t i al concept

of cup of t en i nc l udes t he act i v i t y of dr i nki ng, and some-

t i mes even what i s bei ng dr unk, e. g. , mi l k. I ndeed, i t may

t ake qui t e some t i me bef ore t he cont i nual l i ngui st i c and

soci al i nt er act i on wi t h ot her speaker s of t he l anguage pr o-

vi des occasi ons f or t he accommodat i ons t hat are necess ar y

f or t he concept t he chi l d associ at es wi t h t he wor d "cup" t o

become adapt ed t o t he adul t s' ext ended use of t he word, f or

i nst ance, i n t he cont ext of gol f gr eens or champi onshi ps i n

s por t .

19



The pr ocess of accommodat i ng and t uni ng t he meani ng of

wor ds and l i ngui st i c expr essi ons act ual l y cont i nues f or each

of us t hr oughout our l i ves. No mat t er how l ong we have spok-

en a l anguage, t her e wi l l st i l l be occasi ons when we r eal i ze

t hat , up t o t hat poi nt , we have been usi ng a wor d i n a way

t hat now t ur ns out t o be i di osyncr at i c i n some part i cul ar

r espect .

Once we come t o see t hi s essent i al and i nescapabl e sub-

j ect i vi t y of l i ngui st i c meani ng, we can no l onger mai nt ai n

t he pr econcei ved not i on t hat words convey i deas or know-

l edge; nor can we bel i eve that a l i st ener who appar ent l y

" under st ands" what we say must necess ar i l y have concept ual

st r uct ur es t hat are i dent i cal wi t h our s. I nst ead, we come t o

r eal i ze t hat " under st andi ng" i s a mat t er of f i t r at her t han

mat ch. Put i n t he si mpl est way, t o under st and what someone

has sai d or wr i t t en means no l ess but al so no mor e t han t o

have bui l t up a concept ual st r uct ur e t hat , i n t he gi ven con-

t ext, appear s t o be compatible wi t h the st r uct ur e t he speak-

er had i n mi nd— and t hi s compat i bi l i t y, as a r ul e, mani f est s

i t sel f i n no ot her way t han t hat t he r ecei ver says and does

not hi ng t hat cont r avenes t he speaker ' s expect at i ons.

Among pr of i ci ent speaker s of a l anguage, t he i ndi vi dual ' s

concept ual i di osyncr aci es r ar el y sur f ace when the t opi cs of

conver sat i on ar e ever yday obj ect s and event s. To be con-

si der ed pr of i ci ent i n a gi ven l anguage r equi r es t wo t hi ngs

among ot her s: t o have avai l abl e a l arge enough vocabul ary,

and t o have const r uct ed and suf f i ci ent l y accommodat ed and

adapt ed t he meani ngs associ at ed wi t h t he wor ds of t hat vo-

cabul ar y so t hat no concept ual di sc r epanci es become appar ent

i n or di nar y l i ngui st i c i nt er act i ons. When conver sat i on t ur ns

t o pr edomi nant l y abst r act mat t er s, i t usual l y does not t ake

l ong bef ore concept ual di scr epanci es become not i ceabl e— even

among pr of i ci ent speaker s. The di scr epanci es generat e per -

t ur bat i ons i n t he i nt er actors , and at t hat poi nt t he di f f i -

cul t i es become i nsur mount abl e i f t he par t i c i pant s bel i eve

t hat t he meani ngs t hey at t r i but e t o t he wor ds t hey use ar e

true representations of f i xed ent i t i es i n an obj ect i ve wor l d



apar t f r o m any s peak er . I f , i ns t ead, t he par t i c i pa nt s t ake a

cons t r uc t i v i s t v i ew and assume t hat a l anguage user ' s mean-

i ngs cannot be any t h i n g but s u bj ect i v e c ons t r u c t s der i v ed

f r om t he speaker ' s i ndi v i dua l exper i ences , same accommoda-

t i on and a da pt a t i o n i s us ual l y pos s i bl e.

F r om t hi s per s pec t i v e, t he us e of l a ngu age — f or i ns t anc e

i n t eac hi ng—i s f ar more c ompl i c at ed t han i t i s mos t l y pr e -

sumed t o be. I t cannot be a means of transferring " i nf or ma-

t i on" o r knowl edge to t he s tudent . As Ror t y says : "The ac t -

i vi t y of ut t e r i ng s ent e nc es i s one of t he t hi ngs peopl e do

i n or der t o c ope wi t h t he i r env i r onment " ( 1982, p. XVI I ) .

Thi s i nher ent and i nes capabl e i nde t er mi nacy of l i ngui s t i c

c ommunication i s somet h i ng t he best t eacher s have a l ways

known. I nt ui t i vel y , t hey have al so been aware of t he f ac t

t hat s t udent s who s e c ogni t i v e s t r uc t ur e s ar e not " pe r t ur be d"

by an exp er i enc e t hey t hems e l v es r egi s t e r as a f ai l ur e, wi l l

not "ac commodat e" t o f or m new concept s and new under st and-

i ng, but c ont i n ue t o "as s i mi l at e " new expe r i enc es t o t he

s t r uc t ur es t hey a l r eady have. Thus , i n depend en t l y of any

epi s t emo l ogi c al o r i ent a t i on, t hey hav e a l ways k nown t hat

" t e l l i ng" i s not enough, because under s t andi ng i s not a mat -

t er of pa s s i v el y r e ce i v i ng but of ac t i v el y bui l di ng up.

S o m e F u r t h e r C o n s i d e r a t i o n s

The pat t er n of as s i mi l at i on i s a pa t t er n of mai nt ai ni ng

c a t e go r i z a t i o ns , conc ept s , and, i ndeed, whol e t heor i es unt i l

some exper i ence makes t he i r adequacy ques t i onabl e . I t i s a

uni ver s al pat t er n f r om t he c ons t r uc t i vi s t poi nt of vi ew.

Whenever a t h i nk i ng subj ec t has t heor i es and concept s t hat

have pr oved usef ul i n t he pas t , t he subj ec t has , as i t wer e,

a c ons i de r a bl e v es t ed i nt er es t i n ma i nt a i ni ng t h e s t at us

quo. That i s t o s ay, t he ho l de r s of a t h eo r y wi l l a s s i mi l a t e

new exper i ences as l ong as t hey poss i b l y can, even i n t he

f ac e of c o ns i de r a bl e per t ur bat i ons .

Si l vi o Cec cat o, t he I t al i an pi oneer i n t he anal ys i s of

ment al ope r a t i ons and c ons t r uc t i on, onc e a f t e r a publ i c di s -

cuss i on of hi s work , over hear d an aged phi l osopher say: " I f

21



REFERENCES

Anonymous: 1711. 'Oss er vaj i oni ', Giornale de ' Letterati

d ' It aJi a ( Veni ce) , 5, ar t i c l e Vl l .

Ber kel ey, G. : 1710. A Tr eat ise Concerning the Principles of

umart Under stan d ing. Open Cour t , La Sal l e, I l l i no i s ( 1963) .

Beth, E. W. , & Pi aqet , J . : 1961. Epistemolog ie Mat hem atique

et Ps y c h o 1 o g ie . Pr esses Uni ver s i t ai r es de France, Par i s .

Fl eck, L . : 1929. ' Zur Kr i se der " Wi r k l i chkei t " ' , Die Natur-

uissenschaften, 17, 23, pp. 425- 430. ( The excer pt s f r om t hi spaper were t r ansl at ed by E. v. G. )

Fl eck, L .: 1935. Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissen-

schaftlichen Tatsache. Benno Schwabe, Basel , Swi t zer l and.( Repr i nt ed: Suhr kamp, 1980, Noer dl i ngen, Germany. )

Foer s t er , H. von: 1970. ' Thought s and Not es on Cogni t i on' , i nP. Gar v i n (Ed. ) , Cognition; A Multiple Vi ew, pp. 25- 48. Spar -t an Books, New York.

Gl aser sf el d, E. von: 1985. ' Repr esent at i on and Deduct i on' ,i n L. St r eef l and (ed. ) , Proceedings of the 9th Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Vol .1, St at eUni ver si t y of Ut r echt , The Net herl ands, pp. 484- 489.

Gl aser s f el d, E. von: 1986. ' St eps i n t he Const r uct i on of "Ot her s" and "Real i t y" , i n R. Tr appl ( ed. ) . Power, Autonomy,

Utopia, Pl enum, London, pp. 107- 116.

Hebb, D. O. : 1958. ' Al i ce i n Wonder l and or Ps ychol ogy among

t he Bi ol ogi cal Sc i ences ' , i n Har l ow & Wool sey ( eds. ) , Bio — logical and Biochemical Bases of Behavior, Uni ver s i t y of Wi sconsi n Pr ess, Madi son, pp. 451- 467.

Kant , I . : 1781. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2, Auflage ( Ge—sammel t e Schr i f t en, Bd. I V) . Koeni gl . Pr euss i sche Akademi e,1910f f . , Ber 1i n .

Kuhn, T. S. : 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Uni ver s i t y of Chi cago Pr ess (2nd edi t i on) , Chi cago. ( Fi r s tpubl i shed 1962. )

McCul l och, W. S. : 1965. Embodiments of Mind. M. I . T. Press,

Cambr i dge, MA.

Mat ur ana, H. R. : 1980. ' Bi ol ogy of Cogni t i on' , i n H. R. Mat ur a-na & F . J . Var el a ( eds . ) , Autopoiesis and Cognition , Rei del ,Dor dr echt / Bost on, pp. 5- 58.

Nash, J . : 1970. Developmental Psychology . P r ent i ce - Ha l 1,Engl ewood Cl i f f s, New J er sey.



Pi aget , J . : 1937. La construction du reel chez l 'enfant. De-l achaux et Ni est l é , Neuchât el , Swi t zerl and.

Pi aget , J . : 1967 a. Biologie et connaissance Gal l i mar d,Par i s.

Pi aget , J , : 1967 b. Six Psychological Studies. Vi nt ageBooks, New Yor k.

Pi t t endr i gh, C. S. : 1958, ' Adapt at i on, Nat ur al Sel ect i on, andBehavi or" , i n A. Roe & G. G. Si mpson ( eds. ) , Behavior and Evolution , Yal e Uni ver s i t y Press, New Haven, pp. 390—416.

Ror t y, R. : 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism. Uni ver si t y of Mi nnesot a Press, Mi nneapol i s.

Shannon, C. : 1948, ' The Mat hemat i cal Theor y of Communi ca-t i on' , Bell Systems Technical Journal, 27 , 379—423 and623- 656.

Thor ndi ke, E. : 1966. Human Learning. M. I . T. Press, Cambr i dge,Massachuset t s ( f i r st publ i shed, 1931) .

Vi co, G. : 1710, De antiquissima Italorum sapientia. ( Wi t hI t al i an t r ansl at i on by F. S. Pomodor o, St amper i a de' Cl assi ciLat i ni , Napl es, 1858) .



T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

C O N T E N T P A G E

1 P U R P O S E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 T H E P R O B L E M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

3 N A T U R E OF T H E ANS WE R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

4 T HE S C I E N T I F I C D OMA I N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 . 0 P r a x i s o f L i v i n g a n d E x p l a n a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

4 . 1 S c i e n t i f i c E x p l a n a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

4 . 2 S c i e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

5 O B J E C T I V I T Y I N P AR E N T H E S E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

5 . 0 I l l u s i o n a n d P e r c e p t i o n : t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a p p r o a c h . . ....... 95 . 1 An I n v i t a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 05 . 2 O b j e c t i v i t y i n P a r e n t h e s e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 . 3 T h e U n i v e r s u m v e r s u s t h e Mu l t i v e r s a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

6 B A S I C N O T I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

6 . 1 T h e O b s e r v e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

6 . 2 U n i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 26 . 3 S i mp l e a n d C o mp o s i t e U n i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 26 . 4 O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d S t r u c t u r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3

6 . 5 S t r u c t u r e D e t e r m i n e d S y s t e ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4

6 . 6 E x i s t e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 66 . 7 S t r u c t u r a l C o u p l i n g a n d A d a p t a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

6 . 8 D o ma i n o f E x i s t e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

6 . 9 D e t e r m i n i s m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 76 . 1 0 S p a c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7

6 . 1 1 I n t e r a c t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 86 . 1 2 P h e n o me n a l D o ma i n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8

6 . 1 3 Me d i u m, Ni c h e , a n d E n v i r o n me n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8

7 B AS I S F OR T HE A NS WE R : T H E L I V I N G S Y S T E M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 97 . 1 S c i e n c e De a l s On l y wi t h S t r u c t u r e D e t e r mi n e d S y s t e ms .....1 9

7 . 2 R e g u l a t i o n a n d C o n t r o l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 97 . 3 L i v i n g S y s t e ms Ar e S t r u c t u r e D e t e r mi n e d S y s t e ms . . . . ....... 2 0

7 . 4 D e t e r m i n i s m a n d P r e d i c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 07 . 5 O n t o g e n i c S t r u c t u r a l Dr i f t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1

7 . 6 S t r u c t u r a l I n t e r s e c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4

7 . 7 T h e L i v i n g S y s t e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6My C l a i m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6I mp l i c a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6

C o n s e q u e n c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7

7 . 8 P h y l o g e n i c S t r u c t u r a l Dr i f t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8

7 . 9 O n t o g e n i c P o s s i b i l i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0

7 . 1 0 S e l e c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

2



8 T HE ANS WE R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 28 . 0 Do ma i n o f E x i s t e n c e a n d P r a x i s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 28 . 1 C o g n i t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 28 . 2 L a n g u a g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4

9 C ONS E QUE NC E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 . 1 E x i s t e n c e E n t a i l s C o g n i t i o n i n L i v i n g S y s t e ms . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 . 2 T h e r e Ar e a s ma n y C o g n i t i v e Do ma i n s a s t h e r e a r e

Do ma i n s o f E x i s t e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 79 . 3 L a n g u a g e I s t h e Hu ma n C o g n i t i v e Do ma i n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 79 . 4 Ob j e c t i v i t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 89 . 5 L a n g u a g i n g I s Op e r a t i o n i n a Do ma i n o f S t r u c t u r a l

C o u p l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 89 . 6 L a n g u a g e I s a Do ma i n o f De s c r i p t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 99 . 7 S e l f - C o n s c i o u s n e s s Ar i s e s wi t h L a n g u a g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 99 . 8 Hi s t o r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 09 . 9 T h e Ne r v o u s S y s t e m E x p a n d s t h e Do ma i n o f S t a t e s

o f t h e L i v i n g S y s t e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 09 . 1 0 Ob s e r v i n g Ta k e s P l a c e i n L a n g u a g i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1

1 0 T HE DOMAI N OF P HYS I C AL E XI S T E NC E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3

1 1 RE AL I T Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8

1 2 S E L F - C ONS CI OUS NE S S AND R E AL I T Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9

3



O N T O L O G Y OF O B S E R V I N G:

T HE B I O L OG I C AL F O UN DA T I O NS OF S E L F C ON S C I O US N E S SAN D T H E P H Y S I C A L DO MA I N OF E X I S T E N C E

Hu mb e r t o R. Ma t u r a n a

1 . P U RP O S EMy p u r p o s e i n t h i s e s s a y i s t o e x p l a i n c o g n i t i o n a s a

b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o me n o n , a n d t o s h o w, i n t h e p r o c e s s , h o w l a n g u a g ea r i s e s a n d g i v e s o r i g i n t o s e l f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r e v e a l i n g t h eo n t o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e p h y s i c a l d o ma i n o f e x i s t e n c e a s al i mi t i n g c o g n i t i v e d o ma i n . I n o r d e r t o d o t h i s , I s h a l l s t a r tf r o m t wo u n a v o i d a b l e e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a r e a t t h e s a met i me my p r o b l e m a n d my e x p l a n a t o r y i n s t r u me n t s , n a me l y ; a ) t h a t

c o g n i t i o n , a s i s a p p a r e n t i n t h e f a c t t h a t a n y a l t e r a t i o n o f t h eb i o l o g y o f o u r n e r v o u s s y s t e m a l t e r s o u r c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t i e s , i sa b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o me n o n t h a t mu s t b e e x p l a i n e d a s s u c h ; a n d b )t h a t we , a s i s a p p a r e n t i n t h i s v e r y s a me e s s a y , e x i s t a s h u ma nb e i n g s i n l a n g u a g e u s i n g l a n g u a g e f o r o u r e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h e s et wo e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e my s t a r t i n g p o i n t b e c a u s e I mu s tb e i n t h e m i n a n y e x p l a n a t o r y a t t e mp t ; t h e y a r e my p r o b l e mb e c a u s e I c h o o s e t o e x p l a i n t h e m; a n d t h e y a r e my u n a v o i d a b l ei n s t r u me n t s b e c a u s e I mu s t u s e c o g n i t i o n a n d l a n g u a g e i n o r d e r t o

e x p l a i n c o g n i t i o n a n d l a n g u a g e .

I n o t h e r wo r d s , I p r o p o s e n o t t o t a k e c o g n i t i o n a n d l a n g u a g ea s g i v e n u n e x p l a i n a b l e p r o p e r t i e s , b u t t o t a k e t h e m a s p h e n o me n ao f o u r h u ma n d o ma i n o f e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t a r i s e i n t h e p r a x i s o f

o u r l i v i n g , a n d t h a t a s s u c h d e s e r v e e x p l a n a t i o n a s b i o l o g i c a lp h e n o me n a . At t h e s a me t i me , i t i s my p u r p o s e t o u s e o u rc o n d i t i o n o f e x i s t i n g i n l a n g u a g e t o s h o w h o w t h e p h y s i c a l d o ma i no f e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s i n l a n g u a g e a s a c o g n i t i v e d o ma i n . T h a t i s ,I i n t e n d t o s h o w t h a t t h e o b s e r v e r a n d o b s e r v i n g , a s b i o l o g i c a lp h e n o me n a , a r e o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i ma r y wi t h r e s p e c t t o t h e o b j e c ta n d t h e p h y s i c a l d o ma i n o f e x i s t e n c e .

2 . T HE P R O B L E MI s h a l l t a k e c o g n i t i o n a s t h e f u n d a me n t a l p r o b l e m, a n d I

s h a l l e x p l a i n l a n g u a g e i n t h e p r o c e s s o f e x p l a i n i n g c o g n i t i o n .

We h u ma n b e i n g s a s s e s s c o g n i t i o n i n a n y d o ma i n by s p e c i f y i n gt h e d o ma i n wi t h a q u e s t i o n a n d d e ma n d i n g a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r o ra d e q u a t e a c t i o n i n t h a t d o ma i n . I f wh a t we o b s e r v e a s a n a n s w e rs a t i s f i e s u s a s a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r o r a s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n i n t h ed o ma i n s p e c i f i e d b y t h e q u e s t i o n , we a c c e p t i t a s a n e x p r e s s i o no f c o g n i t i o n i n t h a t d o ma i n , a n d c l a i m t h a t h e o r s h e wh o a n s we r so u r q u e r y k n o ws . T h u s , i f s o me o n e c l a i ms t o k n o w a l g e b r a — t h a t

4



is, to be an al ge br ai st -- we dema nd of him or her to perf orm inthe domain of what we consider algebra to be, and if according tous she or he perform s ade qua tel y in that domain, we accept theclaim. If the q uest ion asked is not answe red with what weconsider to be adequate behavior or adequate action in the domainthat it specifie s, the being asked to perform (the algebr aist)

dis int egr ate s or disap pears, it loses its class identi ty as anentity existing in the oper ationa l domain specified by thequestion, and the questioner proceeds henceforth according to itsnonexistence. In these circumsta nces, since adequate behavior(or adeq uate action) is the only crite rion that we have and canuse to assess cognit ion, I shall take ade qua te behav ior oradeq uat e action in any doma in specified by a question , as thephenomenon to be explained when explaining cognition.

3, NAT URE OF THE ANSWERI am a b iolog ist, and it is from my ex pe ri en ce as a

biolo gist that in this essay I am treating the phe nom eno n ofcogni tion as a biological phenomenon. Furthermore, since as abio log ist I am a sci ent ist , it is as a sci ent ist that I shallprovide a biological explana tion of the phenomenon of cognition.In ord er to do this: a) I shall make exp lic it what I shal lcons ide r as an a dequ ate behavi or in the cont ext of what Iconsider is a scientific explanation (section 4), so that all theimp lic ati ons of my exp lan ati on may be appa rent to the reader andshe or he may know when it is att ain ed; b) I shall make ex pli citmy epist emolo gical standi ng with respect to the notion of objec -tivity (section 5), so that the ontological status of my explana-tion may be apparent; c) I shall make explicit the notions that Ishall use in my exp lan ati on by showing how they belong to ourdaily life (section 6), so that it may be app are nt how we areinvo lved as human beings in the explan atio n that I shall provide;

and d) I shall ma ke exp lic it the na ture of the biolog icalphen ome na involved in my ex pla nat ion (sect ion 7), so that it maybe apparent how we are involved as living systems in the explana-tion as well as in the ph eno men on of cogn iti on itself. Finally,in the process of expla ining the phenomenon of cognit ion as abiolo gica l pheno meno n I shall show how it is that scie ntif ictheor ies arise as free cre ati ons of the human mind, how it isthat they explain human experience and not an independentobje ctive world, and how the physical domain of existe nce arisesin the expl ana tio n of the praxis of living of the obse rver as afeature of the ontology of observing (sections 8 to 11).

4. THE SCIENTIF IC DOMAINWe find ourselves as human beings here and now in the praxisof living, in the hap pen ing of being human, in langu agelanguaging, in an a priori exper ient ial s ituation in which every-thing that is, ever yth ing that happens, is and happ ens in us aspart of our praxis of livin g. In these circ ums tan ces , whateverwe say about how anyt hing happen s takes place in the praxis ofour living as a comment, as a refle ctio n, as a refor mulat ion, inshort, as an explanation of the praxis of our living, and as such

5



me nt s , a nd t he c o mmu ni t y of s t a n da r d o bs e r v e r s a s c i e n t i f i cc o mmu ni t y . Th a t i n p r i n c i p l e a ny h uma n b e i n g c a n b e l o ng t o t hes c i e n t i f i c c o mmu ni t y i s due t o t wo f a c t s of e x pe r i e nc e : one i st ha t i t i s a s a l i v i ng huma n be i ng t ha t a n o bs e r v e r c an r e a l i z ea nd a c c ep t t he s c i e nt i f i c e xp l a na t i on as t he c r i t e r i on of v a l i d a -t i on of h i s or he r s t a t e me n t s a nd be c o me a s t a n da r d ob s e r v e r , t he

ot he r i s t ha t t he c r i t e r i on of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e -me nt s i s t he op e r a t i on a l c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i on of a c t i ons a nds t a t e me n t s i n da i l y l i f e , e ve n i f i t i s not us e d wi t h t he s a mec a r e i n o r d e r t o a v oi d c o n f u s i o n of p he n o me n a l d oma i n s . I n de e d ,t he s e t wo e xp er i e n t i a l f a c t s c ons t i t u t e t he f unda me nt f o r t hec l a i m of un i v e r s a l i t y t ha t s c i e nt i s t s ma ke f or t he i r s t a t e me nt s ,but wha t i s pe c ul i a r t o s c i e nt i s t s i s t ha t t h e y a r e c a r e f u l t oa v o i d c o n f u s i o n of p he n ome n a l d oma i n s wh e n a p p l y i n g t h e c r i t e r i o nof v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s i n t he pr a x i s of l i vi ng .

C. Sc i e n t i s t s a nd p hi l os o phe r s of s c i e n ce us u a l l y be l i e ve t ha tt he o pe r a t i o na l e f f e c t i ve ne s s of s c i e nc e a nd t e c hno l ogy r e ve a l sa n i nd e pe nde n t o bj e c t i ve r e a l i t y, a nd t ha t s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me n t s

r e v ea l t h e f e a t u r e s of an i nde pe nde nt u ni ve r s e , of a n o bj e c t i v ewor l d . Or , i n ot he r wor ds , ma ny s c i e n t i s t s a nd p hi l o s o ph e r s of s c i e nc e b e l i e v e t ha t wi t hou t t he i nd e pe n de n t e xi s t e nc e of anob j e c t i ve r e a l i t y , s c i e nc e c oul d not t a ke pl a ce . Ye t , i f onedoe s , a s I ha ve done a bove , a c o ns t i t u t i v e , a n o nt o l og i c a l ,a na l ys i s of t he c r i t e r i o n of v a l i da t i on of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s ,one c a n s e e t ha t s c i e nt i f i c e x pl a n a t i o ns do n ot r e qu i r e t hea s s ump t i o n of ob j e c t i v i t y be c a us e s c i e n t i f i c e x pl a na t i o ns do note xp l a i n a n i n d e pe nde nt ob j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . Sc i e nt i f i ce x pl a n a t i o ns e x pl a i n t he pr a x i s of l i v i ng of t he o bs e r ve r , a ndt he y do s o wi t h t he o pe r a t i o na l c o h e r e n c e s br o ug ht f o r t h by t heob s e r v e r i n hi s or he r pr a xi s of l i vi ng. I t i s t hi s f a c t t ha tg i ve s s c i e n c e i t s b i o l og i c a l f o und a t i o ns and t ha t ma ke s s c i e nc e ac o g ni t i v e d oma i n b ou nd t o t he b i o l o gy of t he o b s e r v e r wi t h

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t ha t a r e de t e r mi ne d by t he o nt o l o gy of obs e r v i ng .

i i ) S c i e n c e . I n c onc l us i on , t he o pe r a t i o na l d e s c r i p t i on of wha tc on s t i t u t e s a s c i e nt i f i c e xp l a na t i o n a s t he c r i t e r i on of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s , r e ve a l s t he f o l l o wi n gc ha r a c t e r i s t i c s of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s i n ge ne r a l , a nd of s c i e nc e as a do ma i n of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me n t s i n pa r t i c ul a r :

A. Sc i e n t i f i c s t a t e me n t s a r e c on s e n s ua l s t a t e me n t s va l i d onl ywi t h i n t he c o mmu ni t y of s t a nd ar d o bs e r v e r s t ha t g e ne r a t e s t he m;a nd s c i e n c e a s t he doma i n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e me n t s doe s not ne e da n i n de p en de n t o bj e c t i ve r e a l i t y , nor doe s i t r e v ea l one . Th e r e -f o r e , t he o p e r a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e ne s s of s c i e nc e a s a c og n i t i v e

doma i n r e s t s on l y on t he ope r a t i on a l c o he r e n c e t ha t t a ke s p l a c ei n t he p r a xi s of l i v i ng of t he s t a nd a r d o bs e r v e r s t h at g e ne r a t ei t as a p a r t i c u l a r d oma i n of c ons e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o ns of a c t i on si n t he p r a xi s of t he i r l i v i ng t oge t he r a s a s c i e nt i f i c communi t y .Sc i e nc e i s not a ma nne r of r e v e a l i n g a n i n de p e nd e nt r e a l i t y ; i ti s a ma n ne r of b r i n gi n g f or t h a p a r t i c u l a r one bo und t o t hec o nd i t i o ns t ha t c o ns t i t u t e t he o bs e r v e r a s a h uma n be i n g.

B. Si n c e t h e me mb e r s of a c o mmu n i t y of s t a n d a r d o bs e r v e r s c a n

8



g e ne r a t e s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me n t s i n a ny ph en ome na l d oma i n of t hepr a xi s of l i v i n g i n wh i c h t h e y c an a ppl y t he c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a -t i on of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s , t he un i ve r s a l i t y of a pa r t i c ul a rbody of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e me n t s wi t h i n t he huma n do ma i n wi l l d epe ndon t he un i v e r s a l i t y i n t h e h uma n d oma i n of t he s t a n da r d o bs e r v e r st ha t c an ge ne r a t e s uc h a body of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s . Fi na l l y ,

s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s a r e va l i d onl y a s l ong a s t he s c i e nt i f i ce x pl a na t i o ns t ha t s u pp or t t he m a r e va l i d, a nd t he s e a r e va l i donl y a s l ong a s t he f our o pe r a t i o na l c on di t i o ns t ha t mu s t bec onj o i n t l y s a t i s f i e d i n t he i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a r e s a t i s f i e d f o r a l lt he p he n ome n a t ha t a r e d e du c e d i n t h e p r a x i s of l i v i n g of t hes t a nd ar d o bs e r v e r s i n t he do ma i n of o p e r a t i o na l c o he r e n c e s

s p e c i f i e d by t he p r o p os e d g e n e r a t i v e me c h a ni s m.

C. I t i s f r e qu e nt l y s a i d t h a t s c i e nt i f i c ex p l a na t i o n s a r er e du c t i o n i s t p r o pos i t i ons , a dd u c i n g t ha t t he y c ons i s t i ne x p r e s s i n g t he p h e no me n a t o be e x p l a i n e d i n mo r e b as i c t e r ms .Th i s v i e w i s i na de qua t e . Sc i e nt i f i c e xp l a na t i on s a r e c o n s t i —t ut i v e l y n o n- r e du c t i o n i s t e xp l a na t i o n s be ca us e t he y c ons i s t i n

g e ne r a t i v e p r o po s i t i o ns a nd not i n e x pr e s s i n g t he p he n ome n a of o ne d o ma i n i n p h e no me n a of a n o t h e r . Th i s i s s o b e c a u s e i n as c i e n t i f i c e x pl a n a t i o n t he p he n ome n on e xp l a i n ed mus t a r i s e a s ar e s u l t of t h e o pe r a t i o n of t he g e ne r a t i v e me c ha n i s m, a nd c a nno tbe p ar t of i t . I n f a c t , i f t he l a t t e r we r e t he c as e , t hee xp l a na t o r y pr o po s i t i o n woul d be c on s t i t u t i v e l y i n ade qua t e andwo u l d h a v e t o be r e j e c t e d . Th e p h e n o me n o n e x p l a i n e d a n d t hep he n ome n a pr o pe r t o t he g e ne r a t i v e me c h a ni s m c o ns t i t u t i v e l y

p e r t a i n t o n on i n t e r s e c t i n g p he n ome n a l d oma i n s .

I). The g e ne r a t i v e me c h a n i s m i n a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n i sb r o ug ht f o r t h by a s t a n da r d o bs e r v e r f r om h i s or h er d oma i n of e x pe r i e n c e s i n hi s or h er p r a x i s of l i v i n g a s a n ad hoc pr o po s i -t i on t ha t i n p r i nc i p l e r e q ui r e s no j us t i f i c a t i o n . Th e r e f o r e , t hec o mp o ne n t s o f t he g e n e r a t i v e me c h a n i s m, a s we l l a s t he p h e no me n apr ope r t o t he i r ope r a t i o n, ha ve a f ound at i o na l c ha r a c t e r wi t hr e s p e c t t o t he p he n ome n on t o be e x pl a i n e d, a nd a s s u c h t h e i rva l i di t y i s i n p r i nc i p l e a c ce pt e d a p r i o r i . Ac c or d i ng l y , e ve r ys c i e nt i f i c d oma i n a s a doma i n of s c i e nt i f i c s t a t e me nt s i s f ou nde don ba s i c e xp e r i e nt i a l pr e mi s e s not j u s t i f i e d i n i t , a nd c o ns t i -t ut e s i n t he p r a x i s of l i v i n g of t h e s t a nd ar d o bs e r v e r a d oma i nof o pe r a t i o na l c oh er e n ce s b r o ug ht f o r t h i n t he o pe r a t i o na lc o he r e n c e s e n t a i l e d i n t he g e ne r a t i v e me c h a ni s ms of t he

s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a na t i o n s t ha t va l i d a t e i t .

5. OBJ ECTI VI TY I N PARENTHESES

I f o ne l o ok s a t t h e t wos h a d o ws of a n o bj e c t t ha t s i mu l t a ne ous l y pa r t i a l l y i n t e r c e p t s t he pa t hs of t wo d i f f e r e n t l i ght s ,one wh i t e a nd one r e d, a nd i f one ha s t r i c h r o ma t i c vi s i o n, t h eno ne s e e s t h at t he a r e a of t he s h a do w f r om t he wh i t e l i g ht t ha tr e c e i v e s r e d l i g ht l oo ks r e d, a nd t ha t t he a r e a of t he s h a do wf r om t he r e d l i gh t t ha t r e c e i v es whi t e l i gh t l ooks b l ue - g r e e n.Th i s e xp e r i e n c e i s c o mp e l l i n g a nd u na v oi d a bl e , e v e n i f on e k no wst h at t he a r e a of t he s h a d ow f r o m t he r e d l i g ht s h o ul d l ook wh i t eor gr a y b e ca us e i t r e c e i v e s onl y wh i t e l i ght . I f on e a s k s ho w i t

9



Ther ef or e, i n t he pr ocess of bei ng a sci ent i st expl ai ni ngcogni t i on as a bi ol ogi cal phenomenon I shal l pr oceed wi t houtus i ng t he not i on of obj ect i v i t y to val i dat e what I say; t hat i s,I shal l put obj ect i v i t y i n par ent heses. I n ot her wor ds, I shal lgo on usi ng an obj ect l anguage because t hi s i s t he onl y l anguaget hat we have ( and can have) , but al t hough I shal l use t he

exper i ence of bei ng i n l anguage as my st art i ng poi nt whi l e I usel anguage to expl ai n cogni t i on and l anguage, I shal l not c l ai mt hat what I say i s val i d because t her e i s an i ndependentobj ect i ve r eal i t y t hat val i dat es i t . I shal l speak as abi ol ogi st , and as such I shal l use t he cr i t er i on of val i dat i on of sc i ent i f i c st at ement s to val i dat e what I say, accept i ng t hatever yt hi ng t hat t akes pl ace i s br ought f or t h by t he observer i nhi s or her praxi s of l i v i ng as a pr i mary exper i ent i al condi t i on,and t hat any expl anat i on i s secondar y.

i i i ) The uni ver sum ver sus t he mul t i ver sa. The assumpt i on of obj ec t i vi t y, obj ec t i vi t y wi t hout par ent heses , ent ai l s theassumpt i on t hat exi st ence i s i ndependent of t he obser ver , t hat

t here i s an i ndependent domai n of exi st ence, t he uni ver sum, t hati s t he ul t i mat e r ef er ence f or t he val i dat i on of any expl anat i on.Wi t h obj ec t i vi t y wi t hout par ent heses , t hi ngs , ent i t i es , exi s twi t h i ndependency of t he obser ver t hat di st i ngui shes t hem, and i ti s t hi s i ndependent exi s t ence of t hi ngs ( ent i t i es , i deas) t hatspec i f i es t he t r ut h. Obj ect i v i t y wi t hout par ent heses ent ai l suni t y, and, i n t he l ong run, r educt i oni sm, because i t ent ai l sr eal i t y as a si ngl e ul t i mat e domai n def i ned by i ndependentexi st ence. He or she who has access t o r eal i t y i s necessar i l yr i ght i n any di sput e, and t hose who do not have such access ar enecess ar i l y wr ong. I n t he uni ver sum, coexi st ence demandsobedi ence t o knowl edge.

Cont r ar y to al l thi s , obj ec t i vi t y wi t h par ent heses ent ai l saccept i ng t hat exi st ence i s br ought f ort h by t he di st i nct i ons of t he obser ver , t hat t her e ar e as many domai ns of exi st ence aski nds of di s t i nc t i ons t he obser ver per f or ms : obj ec t i vi t y i npar ent heses ent ai l s the mul t i ver sa . ent ai l s t hat exi s t ence i sconst i t ut i vel y dependent upon t he obser ver , and t hat t her e ar e asmany domai ns of t r ut hs as domai ns of exi st ence she or he br i ngsf or t h i n her or hi s di s t i nct i ons . At t he same t i me, obj ect i vi t yi n par ent heses ent a i l s t hat di f f er ent domai ns of exi st enceconst i t ut i vel y do not i nt er sect because t hey ar e br ought f ort h bydi f f er ent ki nds of oper at i ons of di s t i nc t i on, and, t her ef or e, i tconst i t ut i vel y negat es phenomenal r educt i oni sm. F i nal l y , underobj ect i v i t y i n par ent heses , each ver sum of t he mul t i ver sa i sequal l y val i d i f not equal l y pl easant t o be par t of , and

di sagr eement s bet ween obser ver s, when t hey ar i se not f r om t r i vi all ogi cal mi st akes wi t hi n t he same ver sum but f r om t he observer sst andi ng i n di f f erent ver sa, wi l l have t o be sol ved not bycl ai mi ng a pr i vi l eged access t o an i ndependent r eal i t y butt hr ough t he gener at i on of a common ver sum t hr ough coexi st ence i nmut ual accept ance. I n t he mul t i ver sa, coexi st ence demandsconsensus, t hat i s, common knowl edge.

1 1



6. BASI C NOTI ONSEver yt h i ng sa i d i s sai d by an obser ver t o anot her obser ver

t hat c oul d be hi m or her s e l f . Si nc e t hi s c ondi t i on i s my

exper i ent i al s t ar t i ng poi nt i n t he pr ax i s of l i vi ng as wel l as mypr obl em, I shal l make expl i c i t some of t he not i ons that Is hal l

use as my t ool sf or expl a i n i ng t he phenomena of cogn i t i on and

l anguage, and I shal l do so by r eveal i ng t he act i ons i n t hepr axi s of l i v i ng t hat t hey ent ai l i n our dai l y l i f e when we dosc i ence. I ndeed, by r eveal i ng what we do as obser ver s I am

mak i ng expl i c i t t h e ont ol ogy of t h e obs e rv e r as a c ons t i t ut i v e

human condi t i on .

i ) The obser ver . An observer i s, i n genera l , any bei ng operat i ngi n l anguage, or , i n par t i cul ar , any human bei ng, i n t heunder s t and i ng t hat l anguage def i nes humani t y . I n our i ndi v i dualexper i ence as human bei ngs we f i nd our sel ves i n l anguage, we do

not see our se l ves gr owi ng i nt o i t : we ar e a l r eady obser ver s bybei ng i n l anguage when we begi n as obser ver s t o r ef l ect upon

l anguage and t he cond i t i on of bei ng obser ver s . I n ot her wor ds ,what ever t akes pl ace i n t he pr axi s of l i v i ng of t he obser ver

t akes pl ace as di s t i nc t i ons i n l anguage t h rough l anguagi ng, andt hi s i s al l t hat he or she can do as such. One of ray t asks i s to

show how t he obser ver ar i ses.

i i ) Un i t i e s . The bas i c oper a t i on t hat an obs er v er pe r f o rms i n

t he pr axi s of l i vi ng i s t he oper at i on of di s t i nc t i on. I n t heoper at i on of di s t i nc t i on an obs er ver br i ngs f or t h a uni t y ( an

ent i t y, a whol e) as wel l as t he medi u m i n whi c h i t i s di s t i n -gui s hed, and ent ai l s i n t hi s l at t er al l t he oper at i onal

c oher enc es t hat mak e t he di s t i nc t i on of t he uni t y pos s i bl e i n hi s

or her pr axi s of l i vi ng.

i i i ) Si mpl e and c ompos i t e u ni t i e s . An obs e rv er may di s t i ngui s h

i n t he pr axi s of l i vi ng t wo k i nds of uni t i es , s i mpl e andcompos i t e uni t i es . A s i mpl e uni t y i s a uni t y br ought f or t h i n anoper at i on of di s t i nc t i on t hat c ons t i t ut es i t as a whol e bys pec i f y i ng i t s pr oper t i es as a c ol l ec t i on of di mens i ons of i nt er ac t i ons i n t he medi um i n whi c h i t i s di s t i ngui s hed.

Ther ef or e, a s i mpl e uni t y i s exc l us i vel y and compl et el yc ha rac t e r i zed by t he pr ope r t i es t hr ough whi c h i t i s br ought f or t h

i n t he pr axi s of l i vi ng of t he obs er v er t hat di s t i ngui s hes i t ,and no f u r t her expl anat i on i s needed f or t he o r i gi n of t hese

pr oper t i es . A s i mpl e uni t y ar i s es de f i ned and c ha rac t e r i zed by ac ol l ec t i on of pr oper t i es as a mat t er of di s t i nc t i on i n t he pr axi s

of l i v i ng of t he obs er ver .

A compos i t e uni t y i s a uni t y di s t i ngu i shed as a s i mpl e uni t y

t hat t hr ough f ur t her oper a t i ons of di s t i n ct i on i s dec ompos ed by

t he obser ver i nt o component s t hat t hr ough t hei r compos i t i on woul dc ons t i t ut e t h e or i gi nal s i mpl e uni t y i n t he domai n i n whi c h i t i s

di s t i ngui s hed. A c ompos i t e uni t y, t her ef or e, i s oper at i onal l y

di s t i ngu i shed as a s i mpl e uni t y i n a met adomai n wi t h r espec t tot he domai n i n wh i ch i t s component s ar e d i s t i ngu i shed because i t

r es ul t s as s uc h f r om an oper a t i on of c ompos i t i on. As a r es ul t ,t he component s of a compos i t e uni t y and i t s cor r e l at ed s i mpl e

12



uni t y ar e i n a const i t ut i ve r el at i on of mut ual spec i f i cat i on. Thus, t he pr oper t i es of a compos i t e uni t y di s t i ngui shed as asi mpl e one ent ai l t he pr oper t i es of t he component s t hatconst i t ut e i t as such, and conver sel y, t he pr oper t i es of t hecomponent s of a composi t e uni t y and t hei r manner of composi t i ondet ermi ne t he pr oper t i es t hat char act er i ze i t as a si mpl e uni t y

when di st i ngui shed as such. Accor di ngl y, t her e i s no such t hi ngas t he di st i nct i on of a component i ndependent l y of t he uni t y t hati t i nt egr at es, nor can a s i mpl e uni t y di st i ngui shed as acomposi t e one be decomposed i nt o an ar bi t r ar y set of component sdi sposed i n an arbi t r ar y manner of composi t i on. I ndeed, t her e i sno such t hi ng as a f r ee component f l oat i ng ar ound i ndependent l yof t he composi t e uni t y t hat i t i nt egr at es. Ther ef ore, wheneverwe say t hat we t r eat a si mpl e uni t y as a composi t e one, and wecl a i m t hat we do so by di st i ngui shi ng i n i t el ement s t hat whenput t oget her do not r egenerat e the or i gi nal uni t y, we i n f act arenot decomposi ng t he uni t y t hat we bel i eve t hat we are decomposi ngbut anot her one, and t he el ement s t hat we di st i ngui sh ar e notcomponent s of t he composi t e uni t y t hat we say t hat t hey compose.

i v) Or gani zat i on and st r uct ur e. A par t i cul ar composi t e uni t y i schar act er i zed by t he component s and r el at i ons bet ween component st hat const i t ut e i t as a composi t e uni t y t hat can be di s-t i ngui shed, i n a met adomai n wi t h r espect t o i t s component s, as apar t i cul ar s i mpl e uni t y of a cer t ai n ki nd. As such, a par t i cul arcomposi t e uni t y has bot h or gani zat i on and st r uct ur e. These can

be char act eri zed as f ol l ows:

a) The r el at i ons bet ween component s i n a composi t e uni t y t hatmake i t a composi t e uni t y of a par t i cul ar k i nd, speci f y i ng i t scl ass i dent i t y as a si mpl e uni t y i n a met adomai n wi t h r espect toi t s component s, const i t ut es i t s or gani zat i on. I n ot her wor ds,t he organi zat i on of a composi t e uni t y i s t he conf i gur at i on of

st at i c or dynami c r el at i ons bet ween i t s component s t hat speci f i esi t s cl ass i dent i t y as a composi t e uni t y t hat can be di st i ngui shedas a s i mpl e uni t y of a par t i cul ar ki nd. Ther ef or e, i f t heor gani zat i on of a composi t e uni t y changes, t he composi t e uni t yl os es i t s c l as s i dent i t y; t hat i s , i t di s i nt egr at es . Theorgani zat i on of a composi t e uni t y i s necessar i l y an i nvar i antwhi l e i t conser ves i t s c l ass i dent i t y, and vi ce ver sa , the c l assi dent i t y of a compos i t e uni t y i s necessar i l y an i nvar i ant whi l et he composi t e uni t y conserves i t s organi zat i on.

b) I n a composi t e uni t y, be t hi s st at i c or dynami c, t he act ualcomponent s pl us t he act ual r el at i ons t hat t ake pl ace bet ween t hemwhi l e r eal i z i ng i t as a par t i cul ar compos i t e uni t y char act er i zed

by a par t i cul ar or gani zat i on, const i t ut e i t s s t r uct ur e. I n ot herwor ds, t he s t r uct ur e of a par t i cul ar composi t e uni t y i s t hemanner i n whi ch i t i s act ual l y made by act ual st at i c or dynami ccomponent s and r el at i ons i n a par t i cul ar space, and a par t i cul arcomposi t e uni t y conserves i t s c l ass i dent i t y onl y as l ong as i t ss t r uc tu re r eal i zes i n i t t he or gani zat i on t hat def i nes i t s c l assi dent i t y. Ther ef or e, i n any par t i cul ar compos i t e uni t y theconf i gur at i on of r e l at i ons bet ween component s t hat const i t ut esi t s or gani zat i on must be r eal i zed i n i t s st r uct ur e as a subset of

13



al l t he act ual r el at i ons t hat hol d bet ween i t s component s asactual ent i t i es i nt er act i ng i n t he compos i t i on.

I t f ol l ows f r om al l thi s t hat the char ac t er i zat i on of theorgani zat i on of a composi t e uni t y as a conf i gur at i on of r el at i onsbet ween component s says not hi ng about t he char act eri st i cs or

pr opert i es of t hese component s ot her t han t hat t hey must sat i sf yt he r el at i ons of t he or gani zat i on of t he composi t e uni t y t hr ought hei r i nt er ac t i ons i n i t s compos i t i on. I t al so f ol l ows that thest r uct ur e of a composi t e uni t y can change wi t hout i t l osi ng i t sc l ass i dent i t y i f the conf i gur at i on of r el at i ons t hat cons t i t ut esi t s or gani zat i on i s conser ved t hr ough such st r uct ur al changes.At t he same t i me, i t al so f ol l ows that i f t he organi zat i on of acomposi t e uni t y i s not conser ved t hr ough i t s st r uct ur al changes,the compos i t e uni t y l oses i t s c l ass i dent i t y, i t di s i nt egr at es ,and somet hi ng el se appear s i n i t s st ead. Ther ef or e, a dynami ccomposi t e uni t y i s a composi t e uni t y i n cont i nuous st r uct ur alchange wi t h conser vat i on of organi zat i on.

v) St r uct ur e det er mi ned sys t ems. Si nce t he st r uct ur e of acomposi t e uni t y consi st s i n i t s component s and t hei r r el at i ons,any change i n a composi t e uni t y consi st s i n a st r uct ur al change,and ar i ses i n i t at ever y i nst ant necessar i l y det ermi ned by i t sst r uct ur e at t hat i nst ant t hr ough the oper at i on of t he pr oper t i esof i t s component s. Fur t her more, t he st r uct ural changes t hat acomposi t e uni t y under goes as a r esul t of an i nt eract i on ar e al sodet er mi ned by t he st r uct ur e of t he composi t e uni t y, and t hi s i sso because such st r uct ur al changes t ake pl ace i n t he i nt er pl ay of t he pr oper t i es of t he component s of t he composi t e uni t y as t heyar e i nvol ved i n i t s composi t i on* Ther ef ore, an ext ernal agentt hat i nt er act s wi t h a composi t e uni t y onl y t r i gger s i n i t ast r uct ur al change t hat i t does not det er mi ne. Si nce t hi s i s acons t i t ut i ve condi t i on fo r compos i t e uni t i es , not hi ng ext er nal to

t hem can speci f y what happens i n t hem: t here ar e no i nst r uct i vei nt er act i ons f or compos i t e uni t i es . F i nal l y, and as a r esul t of t hi s l at t er condi t i on, t he s t r uct ur e of a compos i t e uni t y al sodeter mi nes wi t h whi ch st r uct ur al conf i gur at i ons of t he medi um i tmay i nt er act . I n general , t hen, ever yt hi ng t hat happens i n acomposi t e uni t y i s a st r uct ural change, and ever y st r uct ur alchange occur s i n a composi t e uni t y det er mi ned at every i nst ant byi t s s t r uct ur e at t hat i ns t ant . Thi s i s so bot h f or s t at i c andf or dynami c composi t e uni t i es, and t he onl y di f f er ence bet weent hese i s t hat dynami c composi t e uni t i es ar e i n a cont i nuousst r uct ur al change gener at ed as par t of thei r st r uct ur alcons t i t ut i on i n the cont ext of thei r i nt er ac t i ons , whi l e s ta t i cones are not . I t f ol l ows f r om al l t hi s t hat compos i t e uni t i es

ar e st r uct ure det er mi ned syst ems i n t he sense t hat ever yt hi ngt hat happens i n t hem i s det er mi ned by t hei r st r uct ur e. Thi s canbe syst emat i cal l y expressed by sayi ng t hat t he st r uct ur e of acomposi t e uni t y det ermi nes i n i t at ever y i nst ant :

a) t he domai n of al l t he st r uct ur al changes that i t may undergowi t h conser vat i on of o rgani zat i on ( c l ass i dent i t y) and adapt at i onat t hat i nst ant ; I cal l t hi s domai n t he i nst ant aneous domai n of t he possi bl e changes of st at e of t he composi t e uni t y.

14



15

b) t he d oma i n of a l l t he s t r u c t u r a l c h a ng e s t ha t i t ma y u nd e r g owi t h l os s of or g a ni z a t i o n a nd a da pt a t i o n a t t ha t i ns t a nt ; I c a l lt h i s d oma i n t he i n s t a n t a n e o us d oma i n of t he p os s i b l e

d i s i n t e g r a t i o n s of t he co mp o s i t e u ni t y .

c) t he doma i n of a l l t he d i f f e r e n t s t r uc t u r a l c on f i g u r a t i o n s of t he me d i u m t ha t i t a dmi t s a t t ha t i ns t a nt i n i n t e r a c t i o ns t ha tt r i gg e r i n i t c ha nge s of s t a t e ; I c a l l t hi s doma i n t hei n s t a n t a n e ou s doma i n of t he pos s i b l e p e r t u r b a t i o ns of t he

c o mp os i t e u ni t y.

d) t he doma i n of a l l t he d i f f e r e n t s t r uc t u r a l c on f i g u r a t i o ns of t he me d i u m t ha t i t a dmi t s a t t ha t i n s t a nt i n i n t e r a c t i o n s t ha tt r i g ge r i n i t i t s di s i n t e gr a t i on ; I c a l l t h i s do ma i n t h ei n s t a n t a n e o u s doma i n of t he p os s i b l e de s t r u c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n s of

t he c o mp os i t e u ni t y.

Th e s e f o ur d oma i n s of s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r mi n i s m t ha tc ha r a c t e r i z e e ve r y s t r u c t u r e de t e r mi n e d s y s t e m a t eve r y i n s t a nt

a r e o bv i o us l y not f i xe d, a nd t he y c h a ng e a s t he s t r u c t u r e of t hes t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e d s y s t e m c h a ng e s i n t he f l ow of i t s owni n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r a l dyna mi c s or as a r e s ul t o f i t s i n t e r a c t i o n s .Th e s e ge ne r a l c ha r a c t e r i s t i c s of s t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e d s y s t e msha ve s e v er a l a dd i t i on a l c o ns e q u e nc e s of wh i c h I s h al l me n t i o ns i x. The f i r s t i s t h a t du r i ng t he o n t o ge ny of a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r -mi n e d s y s t e m, i t s f our d oma i n s of s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r mi n i s m c h a ng ef o l l o wi n g a c our s e c o nt i n ge n t t o i t s i n t e r a c t i o ns a nd i t s owni n t e r n a l s t r uc t u r a l dyna mi c s . The s e c o nd i s t ha t s o me s t r u c t u r ed e t e r mi n e d s y s t e ms ha ve r e c u r r e n t d oma i ns of s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r -mi n i s m be c a us e t he y ha ve r e c ur r e n t s t r u c t u r a l c on f i g u r a t i o n s ,wh i l e o t h er s do not be c a us e t he i r s t r u c t u r e c ha n ge s i n an on r e c u r r e n t ma nne r . The t h i r d i s t ha t a l t h ou gh t he s t r u c t u r e of

a s t r u c t u r e de t e r mi ne d s y s t e m d e t e r mi n e s t he s t r uc t u r a lc o nf i g ur a t i o ns of t he me di um wi t h whi c h i t ma y i n t e r a c t , a l l i t si n t e r a c t i o n s wi t h i n d e pe nde n t s y s t e ms ar i s e a s c oi nc i de nc e s , a ndt he s e c o i n c i d e n t a l i n t e r a c t i o n s c a nno t be p r e di c t e d f r o m t hes t r u c t u r e of t he s t r uc t u r e de t e r mi n e d s y s t e m a l one . The f our t hi s t ha t a c o mp os i t e u ni t y e x i s t s onl y whi l e i t mo ve s t h r o ug h t heme d i u m i n i n t e r a c t i o n s t ha t a r e p e r t u r ba t i o n s , a nd t ha t i t d i s -i n t e gr a t e s a t t h e f i r s t d e s t r u c t i v e i n t e r a c t i on . The f i f t h i st ha t s i n ce t he me d i u m c a n no t s p e c i f y wha t h a pp e ns i n a s t r u c t u r ed e t e r mi n e d s y s t e m be c a us e i t onl y t r i g ge r s t he s t r u c t u r a l c ha nge st ha t oc c ur i n t he s y s t e m as a r e s u l t of t he s y s t e m' s i n t e r -a c t i on s , a l l t ha t c an h a p p e n t o a c omp o s i t e un i t y i n r e l a t i o n t oi t s i n t e r a c t i o ns i n t he me d i u m i s t ha t t he c o ur s e f o l l owe d by i t ss t r u c t u r a l c ha ng e s i s c o nt i n ge n t upon t he s e q ue n c e of t he s e

i n t e r a c t i o ns . Fi na l l y , t he s i x t h i s t ha t s i nc e me c ha n i s t i cs y s t e ms a r e s t r uc t u r e de t e r mi n e d s y s t e ms , a nd s i nc e s c i e nt i f i ce xp l a n a t i o ns e n t a i l t he pr o p os i t i o n of me c h a n i s t i c s y s t e ms a s t h es y s t e ms t ha t ge n e r a t e t he p he n ome n a t o be e x pl a i n e d, i ns c i e n t i f i c e x pl a n a t i o ns we de a l , a nd we c a n onl y de a l , wi t h

s t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e d s y s t e ms .

v i ) Ex i s t e n c e . By pu t t i ng o bj e c t i v i t y i n p a r e n t h e s e s , we a c c ep t



pr opert i es, and a composi t e uni t y exi st s i n t wo— i n t he domai n of ex i s t ence spec i f i ed by i t s pr oper t i es as i t i s di s t i ngui shed as asi mpl e uni t y, and i n t he domai n of exi st ence speci f i ed by t hepr oper t i es of i t s component s as i t i s di st i ngui shed as acomposi t e uni t y. The ent ai l ment i n t he di st i nct i on of a uni t y of i t s domai n of exi st ence as t he domai n of al l t he oper at i onal

coher ences i n t he pr axi s of l i vi ng of the obser ver i n whi ch i tconser ves c l ass i dent i t y and adapt at i on, i s a const i t ut i ve condi -t i on of exi st ence of ever y uni t y. A uni t y cannot exi st out s i dei t s domai n of exi st ence, and i f we i magi ne a uni t y out si de i t sdomai n of exi st ence, t he uni t y t hat we i magi ne exi st s i n adi f f er ent domai n t han t he uni t y t hat we cl ai m t hat we i magi ne.

i x) Det er mi ni sm. To say t hat a system i s det er mi ni st i c i s to sayt hat i t oper at es accordi ng t o t he oper at i onal coherences of i t sdomai n of exi st ence. And t hi s i s so because due t o ourcons t i t ut i ve i nabi l i t y to exper i ent i al l y di s t i ngui sh bet ween whatwe soci al l y cal l percept i on and i l l usi on, we cannot make anycl ai m about an obj ect i ve r eal i t y . Thi s we acknowl edge by put t i ngobj ect i vi t y i n par ent heses. I n ot her wor ds, t o say t hat a syst emi s det er mi ni s t i c i s to say t hat al l i t s changes ar e s t r uct ur alchanges t hat ar i se i n i t t hr ough t he operat i on of t he pr oper t i esof i t s component s i n t he i nt er act i ons that t hese r eal i ze i n i t scomposi t i on, and not t hr ough i nst r uct i ve pr ocesses i n whi ch anext er nal agent speci f i es what happens i n i t . Accor di ngl y, anoper at i on of di s t i nct i on t hat br i ngs f or t h a s i mpl e uni t y br i ngsf or t h i t s domai n of exi st ence as t he domai n of oper at i onalappl i cabi l i t y of i t s pr oper t i es , and cons t i t ut es the s i mpl e uni t yand i t s domai n of exi st ence as a det er mi ni st i c syst em. At t hesame t i me, t he operat i on of di st i nct i on t hat br i ngs f or t h acomposi t e uni t y br i ngs f or t h i t s domai n of exi st ence as a domai nof det er mi ni sm i n t er ms of t he oper at i onal appl i cabi l i t y of t hepr oper t i es t hat char act er i ze i t s component s, i n t he pr axi s of

l i v i ng of t he obser ver . Accor di ngl y, t he oper at i on of di s t i nct i on t hat br i ngs f or t h a compos i t e uni t y br i ngs f or t h t hecomposi t e uni t y as wel l as i t s domai n of exi st ence, asdet ermi ni st i c syst ems i n t he cor r espondi ng domai ns of oper at i onalcoher ences of t he pr axi s of l i vi ng of t he observer .

x) Space. The di st i nct i on of a uni t y br i ngs f ort h i t s domai n of exi st ence as a space of di st i nct i ons whose di mensi ons arespec i f i ed by t he pr oper t i es of t he uni t i es whose di s t i nct i onsent ai l i t as a domai n of oper at i onal coher ences i n t he pr axi s of l i vi ng of t he observer. Thus, a si mpl e uni t y exi st s and oper at esi n a space speci f i ed by i t s pr oper t i es, and a composi t e uni t yexi st s and oper at es i n a space speci f i ed by i t s pr oper t i es as a

si mpl e uni t y i f di st i ngui shed as such, and i n a space speci f i edby the pr oper t i es of i t s component s i f di st i ngui shed as acomposi t e uni t y. Accor di ngl y, as a si mpl e uni t y exi st s andoperat es i n a si ngl e space, a composi t e uni t y exi st s and operat esi n two. Fi nal l y, i t f ol l ows that wi t hout the di s t i nc t i on of auni t y t her e i s no space, and t hat t he not i on of a uni t y out of space, as wel l as t he not i on of an empt y space, ar e nonsensi cal .A space i s a domai n of di st i nct i ons.

17



xi ) I nt er act i ons. Two si mpl e uni t i es i nt er act when t hey, as ar esul t of t he i nt er pl ay of t hei r pr oper t i es, and i n a mannerdet er mi ned by such i nt er pl ay, change t hei r r el at i ve posi t i on i n acommon space or domai n of di st i nct i ons. A composi t e uni t yi nt er act s when some of i t s component s as a r esul t of t hei ri nt er act i ons as s i mpl e uni t i es wi t h ot her s i mpl e uni t i es t hat ar e

not i t s component s, change t hei r manner of composi ng i t , sucht hat i t undergoes a st r uct ur al change. I t f o l l ows t hat a si mpl euni t y i nt er act s i n a s i ngl e space, i n the space t hat i t spr oper t i es def i ne, and t hat a composi t e uni t y i nt er act s i n t wo,i n t he space def i ned by i t s pr opert i es as a si mpl e uni t y, and i nt he space t hat i t s component s def i ne t hr ough t hei r pr opert i es,al so as s i mpl e uni t i es , as t hey const i t ut e i t s str ucture.

xi i ) Phenomenal domai ns. A space i s const i t ut ed i n t he pr axi s of l i vi ng of t he obser ver when he or she per f or ms a di st i nct i on.

The cons t i t ut i on of a space br i ngs f or t h a phenomenal domai n ast he domai n of d i st i nct i ons of t he r el at i ons and i nt er act i ons of t he uni t i es t hat t he observer di st i ngui shes as popul at i ng t hatspace. A si mpl e uni t y oper at es i n a si ngl e phenomenal domai n,t he phenomenal domai n const i t ut ed t hr ough t he operat i on of i t spr opert i es as a si mpl e uni t y. A composi t e uni t y oper at es i n t wophenomenal domai ns, t he phenomenal domai n const i t ut ed t hr ough t heoper at i on of i t s pr oper t i es as a si mpl e uni t y, and the phenomenaldomai n const i t ut ed t hr ough t he operat i on of t he pr oper t i es of i t scomponent s, whi ch i s where i t s composi t i on t akes pl ace.Fur t her mor e, t he t wo phenomenal domai ns i n whi ch a composi t euni t y oper at es do not i nt er sect and cannot be r educed one t o t heot her because t her e i s a gener at i ve r el at i on bet ween t hem. Thephenomenal domai n i n whi ch a composi t e uni t y oper at es as a si mpl euni t y i s secondar y t o t he composi t i on of t he composi t e uni t y, andconst i t ut es a met aphenomenal domai n wi t h r espect t o t hephenomenal domai n i n whi ch t he composi t i on t akes pl ace. Due t o

t hi s ci r cumst ance, a composi t e uni t y cannot par t i ci pat e as asi mpl e uni t y i n i t s own composi t i on.

xi i i ) Medi um, ni che. and envi r onment . I cal l t he medi um of auni t y t he cont ai ni ng backgr ound of di s t i nct i ons , i nc l udi ng al lt hat i s not i nvol ved i n i t s st r uct ur e i f i t i s a composi t e one,wi t h r espect t o whi ch an observer di st i ngui shes i t i n hi s or herpr axi s of l i v i ng, and i n whi ch i t r eal i zes i t s domai n of exi st ence. The medi um i ncl udes both t hat par t of the backgr oundt hat i s di st i ngui shed by t he obser ver as sur r oundi ng t he uni t y,and t hat part of t he backgr ound t he obser ver concei ves asi nt er act i ng wi t h i t , and whi ch i t obscur es i n i ts oper at i on i ns t r uc tu ral coupl i ng ( i n i t s domai n of exi s t ence) . I cal l t hi s

l at t er part of t he medi um oper at i onal l y def i ned moment by momenti n i t s encount er wi t h t he medi um i n s t r uct ur al coupl i ng, theni che of t he uni t y. Accor di ngl y, a uni t y cont i nuous l y r eal i zesand speci f i es i t s ni che by act ual l y oper at i ng i n i t s domai n of per t ur bat i ons whi l e conser vi ng adapt at i on i n t he medi um. As aconsequence, t he ni che of a uni t y i s not a f i xed par t of t hemedi um i n whi ch a uni t y i s di st i ngui shed, nor does i t exi st wi t hi ndependency of t he uni t y t hat speci f i es i t ; i t changes as t hedomai n of i nt er act i ons of t he uni t y changes ( i f i t i s a composi t e

1 8



o n e ) i n i t s d y n a mi c s o f s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e ( s e c t i o n v c ) . I nt h e s e c i r c u ms t a n c e s , a n o b s e r v e r c a n d i s t i n g u i s h t h e n i c h e o f au n i t y , r e g a r d l e s s o f wh e t h e r i t i s s i mp l e o r c o mp o s i t e , o n l y b yu s i n g t h e u n i t y a s a n i n d i c a t o r o f i t . F i n a l l y , I c a l l t h ee n v i r o n me n t o f a u n i t y a l l t h a t a n o b s e r v e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s a ss u r r o u n d i n g i t . I n o t h e r wo r d s , wh i l e t h e n i c h e i s t h a t p a r t o f

t h e me d i u m t h a t a u n i t y e n c o u n t e r s ( i n t e r a c t s wi t h ) i n i t s o p e r a -t i o n i n s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g , a n d o b s c u r e s wi t h i t s p r e s e n c e f r o mt h e v i e w o f t h e o b s e r v e r , t h e e n v i r o n me n t i s t h a t p a r t o f t h eme d i u m t h a t a n o b s e r v e r s e e s a r o u n d a u n i t y . T h u s , a d y n a mi cc o mp o s i t e u n i t y ( l i k e a l i v i n g s y s t e m) , a s i t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d i nt h e p r a x i s o f l i v i n g o f t h e o b s e r v e r , i s s e e n i n a n e n v i r o n me n ta s a n e n t i t y wi t h a c h a n g i n g n i c h e t h a t i t s p e c i f i e s wh i l e i ts l i d e s t h r o u g h t h e me d i u m i n c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e wi t hc o n s e r v a t i o n o f c l a s s i d e n t i t y a n d a d a p t a t i o n . A c o mp o s i t e u n i t yi n i t s me d i u m i s l i k e a t i g h t r o p e wa l k e r t h a t mo v e s o n a r o p e i na g r a v i t a t i o n a l f i e l d , a n d c o n s e r v e s i t s b a l a n c e ( a d a p t a t i o n )wh i l e i t s s h a p e ( s t r u c t u r e ) c h a n g e s i n a ma n n e r c o n g r u e n t wi t ht h e v i s u a l a n d g r a v i t a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s t h a t i t u n d e r g o e s a s i t

wa l k s ( r e a l i z i n g i t s n i c h e ) , a n d f a l l s wh e n t h i s s t o p s b e i n g t h ec a s e .

7 . B AS I S F OR T HE ANS WE R; T HE L I V I NG S Y S T E MT h e a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f c o g n i t i o n r e q u i r e s n o w t h a t we

r e f l e c t u p o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d o p e r a t i o n o f l i v i n g s y s t e ms ,a n d t h a t we ma k e s o me a d d i t i o n a l e p i s t e mo l o g i c a l a n d o n t o l o g i c a lc o n s i d e r a t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l i v i n g s y s t e ms mu s t s a t i s f y .

i ) S c i e n c e d e a l s o n l y wi t h s t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e d s y s t e m s . T o t h ee x t e n t t h a t a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n e n t a i l s t h e p r o p o s i t i o n o f as t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m a s t h e me c h a n i s m t h a t g e n e r a t e s t h e

p h e n o me n o n t o b e e x p l a i n e d , we a s s c i e n t i s t s c a n d e a l o n l y wi t hs t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e d s y s t e ms , a n d we c a n n o t h a n d l e s y s t e ms t h a tc h a n g e i n a ma n n e r s p e c i f i e d b y t h e e x t e r n a l a g e n t s t h a t i mp i n g eu p o n t h e m. Ac c o r d i n g l y , wh a t e v e r I s a y a b o u t l i v i n g s y s t e ms wi l lb e s a i d i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t a l l t h e p h e n o me n a t o wh i c h t h e yg i v e r i s e a r i s e t h r o u g h t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a s s t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e ds y s t e ms i n a d o ma i n o f e x i s t e n c e a l s o b r o u g h t f o r t h a s as t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e d s y s t e m b y t h e o b s e r v e r ' s d i s t i n c t i o n .

i i ) R e g u l a t i o n a n d c o n t r o l . As wa s i n d i c a t e d i n s e c t i o n 6 x i i ,t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o f a c o mp o s i t e u n i t y e n t a i l s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i nt h e p r a x i s o f l i v i n g o f t h e o b s e r v e r o f t wo p h e n o me n a l d o ma i n st h a t d o n o t i n t e r s e c t b e c a u s e t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a c o mp o s i t e u n i t y

a s a s i mp l e o n e i s s e c o n d a r y t o i t s c o mp o s i t i o n . As a r e s u l t ,t h e wh o l e c a n n o t o p e r a t e a s i t s o wn c o mp o n e n t , a n d a c o mp o n e n tc a n n o t o p e r a t e i n p l a c e o f t h e wh o l e t h a t i t i n t e g r a t e s . I nt h e s e c i r c u ms t a n c e s , n o t i o n s o f c o n t r o l o r r e g u l a t i o n d o n o tc o n n o t e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e c o mp o s i t i o n o f a c o mp o s i t eu n i t y , b e c a u s e s u c h o p e r a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e o n l y i n t h e r e a l i z a t i o ni n t h e p r e s e n t o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e c o mp o s i t e u n i t y ' sc o mp o n e n t s i n t h e i r a c t u a l i n t e r a c t i o n s . No t i o n s o f r e g u l a t i o na n d c o n t r o l o n l y c o n n o t e r e l a t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e i n a d e s c r i p t i v e

19



domai n as t he obser ver r el at es mappi ngs i n l anguage of hi s or herdi st i nct i ons of a whol e and i t s component s i n hi s or her pr axi s

of l i vi ng.

i i i ) Li vi ng syst ems ar e st r uct ur e det er mi ned sys t ems. I n ordert o expl ai n t he phenomenon of cogni t i on as a bi ol ogi cal

phenomenon, I must t r eat l i vi ng syst ems- as st r uct ur e det ermi nedsyst ems. I consi der t hat t o do so i s l egi t i mat e f or sever alr easons. I shal l ment i on t hr ee. The f i r st i s an operat i onalone: we know as a f eat ur e of our pr axi s of l i vi ng t hat anyst r uct ur a l change i n a l i v i ng system r esul t s i n a change i n i t schar act er i s t i cs and pr oper t i es , and t hat s i mi l ar s t r uct ur alchanges i n di f f er ent member s of t he same s peci es r esul t i ns i mi l ar changes i n t hei r char act er i s t i cs and pr oper t i es . Thesecond i s an epi st emol ogi cal one: i f we do not t r eat l i vi ngsys t ems as st r uct ur e det er mi ned syst ems we cannot pr ovi de sc i en-t i f i c expl anat i ons f or t he phenomena pr oper to t hem. The t hi r di s an ont ol ogi cal one: t he onl y syst ems t hat we can expl ai nsc i ent i f i cal l y are s t r uct ur e det er mi ned syst ems; t her ef or e, i f Iprovi de a sci ent i f i c expl anat i on of t he phenomenon of cogni t i on

i n 1i vi ng syst ems, I pr ovi de a pr oof t hat l i vi ng syst ems ar est r uct ure det er mi ned syst ems i n our pr axi s of l i vi ng as st andar dobser ver s, whi ch i s wher e we di st i ngui sh t hem.

i v) Det er mi ni sm and pr edi ct i on. The f act t hat a st r uct ur e det er -mi ned syst em i s det er mi ni st i c does not mean t hat an observershoul d be abl e to pr edi ct t he cour se of i t s st r uct ur al changes.Det er mi ni s m and pr edi c t a bi l i t y per t ai n t o di f f er ent oper at i onaldomai ns i n the pr axi s of l i v i ng of the obser ver . Det ermi ni sm i sa f eat ur e t hat char act er i zes a syst em i n t er ms of t he operat i onalcoherences t hat const i t ut e i t , and i t s domai n of exi st ence, as i ti s br ought f or t h i n t he oper at i ons of d i s t i nct i on of t heobser ver . Accor di ngl y, t her e ar e as many di f f er ent domai ns of

det er mi ni sm as domai ns of di f f er ent oper at i onal coher ences t heobser ver br i ngs f or t h i n her or hi s domai n of experi ences. Atdi f f er ence wi t h t hi s , a predi ct i on i s a comput at i on t hat anobser ver makes of the st r uct ur al changes of a st r uct ure det er -mi ned syst em as she or he f ol l ows t he consequences of t he oper a-t i on of t he pr oper t i es of t he component s of the syst em i n t her eal i za t i on of the domai n of det er mi ni sm t hat t hese pr oper t i esconst i t ut e. As such, a pr edi ct i on can onl y t ake pl ace af t er t heobserver has compl et el y descr i bed t he syst em as a st r uct ur edet ermi ned system i n t er ms of t he oper at i onal coherences t hatconst i t ut e i t i n hi s or her domai n of exper i ences. Ther ef ore,t he success or f ai l ur e of a pr edi c t i on onl y r ef l ec t s the abi l i t yor i nabi l i t y of an obser ver t o not conf use phenomenal domai ns i nhi s or her praxi s of l i vi ng, and to i ndeed make t he comput at i ont hat const i t ut es t he pr edi ct i on i n t he phenomenal domai n wher e heor she cl ai ms to make i t . I n t hese ci r cumst ances, t her e ar e t woocc asi ons i n whi ch an obser ver who does not conf use phenomenaldomai ns i n deal i ng wi t h a st r uct ure det ermi ned syst em wi l l not beabl e to pr edi ct i t s st r uct ural changes. One occasi on i s when anobser ver knows t hat she or he i s deal i ng wi t h a st r uct ur e det er -mi ned system by vi r t ue of exper i ence, i n t he pr axi s of l i vi ng,wi t h i t s component s, but cannot encompass i t i n hi s or her

20



i nt er dependent because, ei t her t hr ough t he i nt er sect i on of t hei rdomai ns of st r uct ur al det er mi ni sm, or t hough t he i nt ers ect i on of t he domai ns of st r uct ur al det er mi ni sm of t hei r component s, ort hr ough bot h, t hey af f ect each ot her ’ s st r uct ur es i n t he cour seof t hei r i ndependent l y gener at ed st r uct ur al changes, and al t hought hey may exi st as composi t e uni t i es i n di f f erent domai ns, t hei r

ont ogeni c dr i f t s i nt er sect f or mi ng a net wor k of coont ogeni cdr i f t s . Thus, an obser ver may di st i ngui sh i n t he st r uct ur alr eal i zat i on of a human bei ng as a l i vi ng syst em t he si mul t aneousor succ ess i ve i nt er sect i on of a mammal , a per son, a woman, adoct or , and a mot her , al l of whi ch ar e di f f erent composi t euni t i es def i ned by di f f er ent o rgani zat i ons t hat are s i mul -t aneousl y or successi vel y conserved whi l e t hey ar e r eal i zed i nt hei r di f f er ent domai ns of exi s t ence, wi t h par t i cul ar char ac-t er i s t i c s t hat r esul t f r om the cont i nuous b rai di ng of t hei rdi f f er ent ont ogeni c dr i f t s t hr ough t he cont i nuous i nt er pl ay of t hei r s t r uct ur al changes* Fur t her mor e, t hese s t r uct ur al i nt er -sect i ons r esul t i n dependent domai ns of di s i nt egr at i ons as wel las dependent domai ns of conser vat i ons whi ch need not be

r eci pr ocal , when t he conser vat i on of one c l ass i dent i t y ent ai l st he conser vat i on of st r uct ur al f eat ur es t hat ar e i nvol ved i n t heconservat i on of anot her . For exampl e, i n t he st r uct ur al i nt er -sect i on of a st udent and a human bei ng i n a l i vi ng syst em, t heconser vat i on of t he c l ass i dent i t y "s t udent " ent ai l s the conser -vat i on of t he cl ass i dent i t y " human bei ng, " but not t he r evers e:t he di s i nt egr at i on of t he st udent does not ent ai l t he di s i nt egr a-t i on of t he human bei ng, but t he di si nt egr at i on of t he humanbei ng car r i es wi t h i t t he di s i nt egr at i on of t he s t udent . Al so, apar t i cul ar composi t e uni t y may di s i nt egr at e t hr ough di f f er entki nds of st r uct ur al changes, l i ke di s i nt egr at i ng as a st udentt hr ough f ai l i ng an exami nat i on or t hr ough at t ai ni ng t he f i naldegr ee, wi t h di f f erent consequences i n t he net work of s t r uct ur ali nt er sect i ons t o whi ch i t bel ongs.

The s t r uc t ur al i nt er sect i on of sys t ems does not mean t hatt he same syst em i s vi ewed i n di f f er ent manner s f rom di f f er entper spect i ves, because due t o t hei r di f f er ent or gani zat i onsst r uct ur al l y i nt er sect i ng systems exi st i n di f f er ent phenomenaldomai ns and ar e r eal i zed t hr ough di f f er ent st r uct ur a l dynami cs.I t onl y means t hat t he el ement s t hat r eal i ze a part i cul arcomposi t e uni t y as i t s component s t hr ough some of t hei rpr oper t i es as s i mpl e uni t i es , par t i c i pat e t hr ough ot her of t hei rpr oper t i es as si mpl e uni t es as component s of ot her uni t i es t hatexi st as l egi t i mat el y di f f er ent ones because t hey have di f f er entdomai ns of di s i nt egr at i ons . The i nt er act i ons and r el at i ons i nwhi ch t he component s of a syst em part i ci pat e t hr ough di mensi ons

ot her t han t hose t hr ough whi ch t hey const i t ut e i t , I cal lor t hogonal i nt er act i ons and r el at i ons, and i t i s t hr ough t heset hat s t r uct ur al l y i nt er sect i ng syst ems may exi s t i n noni nt er -sect i ng phenomenal domai ns and yet have uni di r ect i onal orr ec i pr ocal r el at i ons of s t r uc tu ral dependency. Fi nal l y, i t i sal so t hr ough t he or t hogonal i nt eract i ons of t hei r component s t hats t r uct ur al l y i ndependent sys t ems t hat exi s t i n noni nt er sect i ngphenomenal domai ns may al so have coont ogeni c dr i f t s.

25



vi i ) Th e l i v i n g s y s t e m. I n 1970 I p r o p os e d t h at l i v i n g s y s t e msa r e d yn a mi c s y s t e ms c o ns t i t u t e d a s a ut o no mo us un i t i e s t hr o ug hbe i ng c l o s e d c i r c ul a r c on ca t e na t i o ns ( c l os e d ne t wor ks ) of mo l e c u l a r p r o d uc t i o ns i n whi c h t he di f f e r e nt ki n ds of mo l e c ul e st ha t c omp os e t h em p a r t i c i p a t e i n t he p r o du c t i o n of e a ch ot he r ,a nd i n wh i c h e v e r y t h i n g c a n c ha ng e e xc e pt t he c l o s e d c i r c u l a r i t y

of t he c o nc a t e n a t i o n of mol e c ul a r p r o duc t i o ns t ha t c on s t i t u t e st h e m a s u n i t i e s ( s e e Ma t u r a n a 1970, i n Ma t u r a n a a nd Va r e l a 1 980) .I n 1973 Fr a n c i s c o Va r e l a a nd I e xp an de d t hi s c ha r a c t e r i z a t i o n of l i vi ng s y s t e ms by s a y i n g: f i r s t , t ha t a c o mp os i t e uni t y who s eo r g a ni z a t i o n c a n be d e s c r i b e d a s a c l o s e d n e t wo r k of p r o d uc t i o nsof c omp one nt s t ha t t hr ough t he i r i n t e r a c t i o ns c on s t i t u t e t hen e t wo r k of p r o du c t i o ns t ha t p r o duc e t he m a nd s p e c i f y i t se xt e ns i o n by c o ns t i t u t i n g i t s bounda r i e s i n t he i r d oma i n of e xi s t e nc e , i s an a u t o po i e t i c s ys t e m; a nd s e c ond, t ha t a l i vi ngs y s t e m i s a n a u t o po i e t i c s y s t e m wh os e c o mp on e n t s a r e mo l e c u l e s .Or , i n o t h e r wor d s , we pr o po s e d t ha t l i v i n g s y s t e ms a r e mo l e c u l a ra u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms a nd t ha t a s s u ch t he y e xi s t i n t he mo l e c ul a rs p a c e a s c l o s e d n e t wo r k s of mo l e c u l a r p r o d uc t i o ns t ha t s p e c i f y

t h e i r o wn l i mi t s ( s e e Ma t u r a n a a nd Va r e l a 1973, i n Ma t u r a n a a ndVa r e l a 1 980; a nd Ma t u r a n a 1 975 ) . No t h i n g i s s a i d i n t h i sd es c r i p t i o n of t he mo l e c ul a r c on s t i t u t i o n of l i v i ng s y s t e ms asa u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms a b ou t t he r mo dy na mi c c ons t r a i n t s , be c a us e t h er e a l i z a t i o n of l i v i ng s y s t e ms as mo l e c ul a r s y s t e ms e nt a i l s t hes a t i s f a c t i o n of s uc h c on s t r a i n t s . I n f a ct , t he s t a t e me nt t ha t ac o mp os i t e un i t y e xi s t s as s uc h i n t he doma i n of e x i s t e n c e of i t sc omp on ent s , i mp l i e s t he s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c on di t i o ns of e x i s t e n c e of t he s e c o mp on e nt s .

The r e c o gn i t i o n t ha t l i vi ng s y s t e ms a r e mo l e c u l a ra ut o p oi e t i c s y s t e ms c a r r i e s wi t h i t s e ve r a l i mpl i c a t i on s a ndc o n s e q u e n c e s of wh i c h I s h a l l me n t i o n a f e w:

A. I mp l i c a t i o n s : a) Li v i n g s y s t e ms as a u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms a r es t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n e d s y s t e ms , a nd e ve r y t h i n g t ha t a pp l i e s t os t r u ct u r e d e t e r mi n ed s y s t e ms ap pl i e s t o t he m. I n pa r t i c ul a r t hi sme a ns t ha t e v e r y t h i n g t ha t o c cu r s i n a l i v i n g s y s t e m t a ke s pl a c ei n i t i n t he a c t ua l o pe r a t i o n of t he pr o pe r t i e s of i t s c omp on en t st h r ough r e l a t i o n s of n e i g h b o r h o o d ( r e l a t i o n s of c o nt i g u i t y )c on s t i t u t e d i n t he s e ve r y s a me op er a t i on s . Ac c or d i n gl y , n ot i onsof r e gu l a t i o n a nd c on t r o l do not a nd c a nn ot r e f l e c t a c t u alo p e r a t i o n s i n t he s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of a l i v i ng s y s t e mb ec a us e t he y do not c o nn ot e a c t u al r e l a t i o ns of ne i g hb or h oo d i ni t . Th e s e no t i on s onl y r e ve al r e l a t i on s t ha t t he o b s e r v e re s t a b l i s h e s wh e n he or s h e c o mp a r e s d i f f e r e n t mo me n t s i n t hec our s e of t r a ns f o r ma t i o ns i n t he n et wor k of pr oc e s s e s t ha t t a ke

pl a ce i n t he s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i on of a p a r t i c ul a r l i vi ngs y s t e m. The r e f o r e , t he onl y pe c ul i a r t hi ng a bou t l i vi ng s y s t e msa s s t r u c t u r e d e t e r mi n ed s y s t e ms i s t ha t t he y a r e mol e c ul a ra u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms . b) Au t o po i e s i s i s a d yn a mi c p r o c e s s t ha tt a ke s pl a c e i n t he o ng oi n g f l o w of i t s o c c u r r e n c e a nd c a nn ot begr a s pe d i n a s t a t i c i n s t a nt a ne ou s vi e w of d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o mp on en t s . Th e r e f o r e , a l i v i n g s y s t e m e x i s t s onl y t h r o u gh t hec on t i n u o u s s t r uc t ur a l t r a ns f o r ma t i o n e nt a i l e d i n i t s a ut o p o i e s i s ,a nd onl y whi l e t hi s i s c on s e r v ed i n t he c o ns t i t u t i o n of i t s

26



ontoge ny. This cir cum sta nce has two basic result s: one is thatliving systems can be realized through many diff eren t changingdynam ic struct ures, the o ther is that in the gene ratio n oflineages through reprod uction , living systems are constitutiv elyopen to conti nuou s phy log eni c struc tura l change. c) A livingsystem either exists as a dynamic structure determin ed system in

structural coupling in the medium in which it is brought forth bythe observer, that is, in a relat ion of con se rva ti on of ada pta -tion through its cont inuou s structural change in the realizationof its niche, or it does not exist. Or, in oth er words, a livingsystem while living is necessa rily in a dynamic relation ofcorres ponden ce with the me dium through its opera tion in itsdomain of existence , and to live is to glide thro ugh a domain ofperturb ations in an ontog enic drift that takes place through thereal iza tio n of an ever chan ging niche. d) A liv ing system as astructur e determined system operates only in the prese nt— thatis, it is det erm ine d by the str uc tur e that it has at any instan tin the structural realiz ation of its auto poie sis in the molecularsp ace— and theref ore it is nece ssari ly open to the flow ofmol ecu les through it. At the same time, a living system as an

autopo ieti c system gives rise only to states in autopoiesis;otherwi se it disinte grates . Therefore, living systems are closedsystems with respect to their dynamics of states.

B. Co ns eq ue nc es : a) To the extent that a livin g system is astruc ture determined system, and everything in it takes placethrough neighb orhood relat ions between its comp onen ts in thepresent , notions of purp ose and goal that imply that at everyinst ant a later state of a sys tem as a whole ope ra te s as part ofits stru cture in the prese nt do not apply to livi ng systems andcannot be used to cha ract eriz e their operation. A living systemmay appear to opera te as a purposeful or goal -dir ecte d systemonly to an observer who, having seen the ontogeny of other living

syste ms of the same kind in the same circu mst anc es in his or herpraxis of living, confu ses phenomenal domains by putting theconsequences of its operation as a whole among the processes thatconst itute it. b) Beca use they are structure determi ned systems,for living syste ms there is no inside or o uts ide in theiroperat ion as auto poie tic unities; they are in autopo iesi s asclose d whole s in their dyna mic s of states, or they disinte grate.At the same time, and for the same reason, liv ing sys tem s do notuse or misuse an env iron men t in their operat ion as autopoieticunities, nor do they commit mistakes in their ontog enic drifts.In fact, a living sys tem in its oper ation in a medi um withconserv ation of org aniz ati on and adaptat ion as befit it as astructure determined system, brings forth its ever changing nicheas it realiz es itsel f in its domain of exist ence, the backgrou ndof operation al coh eren ces which it does not dis ting uish and withwhich it does not int erac t. c) Living system s nece ssa ril y form,through their recu rren t inte ractio ns with each other as well aswith the nonbiotic medium, coonto genic and coph ylo geni c systemsof braided struc tura l drif ts that last as long as they conserv etheir autopoi esis throu gh the conse rvation of their reciprocalstructur al couplings. Such is biological evolutio n. As aresult, every living system, including us human beings as

27



obs e r ve r s , i s a l wa ys f ound i n i t s s p on t a n e ou s r e a l i z a t i on i n i t sd oma i n of e x i s t e n c e i n c o n gr u e nc e wi t h a b i o t i c a nd a n on bi o t i cme d i u m. Or , i n o t h e r wor ds , e ve r y l i v i n g s y s t e m i s a t e v er yi n s t a n t a s i t i s a n d wh e r e i t i s a n od e of a n e t wo r k of c o on t o ge n i c d r i f t s t ha t ne c es s a r i l y i nv o l v e s a l l t h e e n t i t i e swi t h wh i c h i t i n t e r a c t s i n t he d oma i n i n wh i c h i t i s br ou ght

f or t h by t he o bs e r v e r i n hi s or he r p r a x i s of l i vi ng. As ac o ns e q ue n c e , a n o bs e r v e r as a l i v i ng s y s t e m c a n onl y d i s t i n gu i s ha n e n t i t y as a no de of t he n e t wo r k of c o o nt o g e ni c d r i f t s t o wh i c hi t be l ongs , a nd whe r e i t e xi s t s i n s t r u c t u r a l c oupl i ng. d) Theonl y t h i ng pe c ul i a r t o l i v i ng s y s t e ms i s t ha t t he y a r ea u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms i n t he mo l e c u l a r s p ac e . I n t he s e c i r c u m-s t a n c e s , a g i v e n p he n o me n o n i s a b i o l o g i c a l p he n o me n o n o nl y t ot he e xt e nt t ha t i t s r e a l i z a t i o n e nt a i l s t he r e a l i z a t i on of t h ea u t o po i e s i s of a t l e a s t one a u t o po i e t i c s y s t e m i n t he mo l e c ul a rs p ac e . e) Mo de r n p r o k a r y o t i c a nd e u ka r y ot i c c e l l s a r e t ypi c a la u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms i n t he mo l e c u l a r s p a c e, a nd be c a us e t he i ra u t o po i e s i s i s not t he r e s u l t of t he i r be i n g c o mp os e d by mor eba s i c a ut o p o i e t i c s u bs y s t e ms , I c al l t he m f i r s t or de r a ut o p o i e t i cs y s t e ms . I c a l l s e c o nd o r d e r a u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms s y s t e ms who s ea u t o po i e s i s i s t he r e s u l t of t he i r be i ng c o mp os e d of mor e ba s i ca ut o p o i e t i c u n i t i e s ; o r g a ni s ms a s mu l t i c e l l u l a r s y s t e ms a r e s uc h.Ye t , o r g a n i s ms ma y a l s o " be , " a nd I t hi n k t h a t mo s t of t h ema c t ua l l y a r e, f i r s t o r d e r au t o p o i e t i c s ys t e ms as c l os e d ne t wor ksof mo l e c ul a r p r o d u c t i o n s t h at i nvo l ve i n t e r c e l l u l a r p r oc e s s e s a smuc h a s i n t r a c e l l u l a r o ne s . Ac c o r d i n gl y , a n o r g a ni s m wo ul d e xi s ta s s uc h i n t he s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r s e c t i o n of a f i r s t or d era u t o po i e t i c s y s t e m wi t h a s e c o nd or de r o ne , bot h r e a l i z e d t h r o ug ht he a u t o p oi e s i s of t he c e l l s t ha t c omp o s e t he l a t t e r . Thi sha ppe ne d o r i g i n a l l y wi t h t he e u ka r y o t i c c e l l a s t hi s a r o s et h r o ug h t he e n d os y mb i o s i s of p r o k a r y o t i c on e s ( Ma r gu l i s 1981) .f ) An o r g a n i s m a s a s e c o n d o r d e r a u t o p oi e t i c s y s t e m i s a ne c t o c e l l u l a r s y mb i o nt c o mp os e d of c e l l s , u s u a l l y of c o mmon o r i g i n

but not a l wa ys s o, t ha t c ons t i t u t e i t t h r o ugh t he i r c oo nt og en i cdr i f t . An o r g a ni s m a s a f i r s t o r de r a u t o po i e t i c s ys t e m, howe ve r ,i s not c omp os e d of c e l l s e ve n t h ou gh i t s r e a l i z a t i o n d e pe n ds ont he r e a l i z a t i o n of t he a ut o p o i e s i s of t he c e l l s t ha t i n t e r s e c ts t r u c t u r a l l y wi t h i t as t he y c on s t i t u t e i t i n t he i r c oon t og e ni cdr i f t . The f i r s t a nd s e c ond or de r a u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms t ha ti n t e r s e c t s t r u c t u r a l l y i n t he r e a l i z a t i o n of an o r g a n i s m, e xi s ti n d i f f e r e n t n on i n t e r s e c t i n g phe nome na l doma i ns .

vi i i ) Ph v l o g e ni c s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t . Re p r o d u c t i o n i s a p r oc e s s i nwh i c h a s y s t e m gi v es or i g i n t h r o ug h i t s f r a c t u r e t o t wo s y s t e msc h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e s a me o r g a n i z a t i o n ( c l a s s i de nt i t y) t ha tc h a r a c t e r i z e d t he o r i g i na l one , but wi t h s t r u c t u r e s t ha t va r y

wi t h r e s p ec t t o i t ( Ma t u r a n a 1980) . A r e p r o d uc t i v e phy l og eny orl i ne a ge , t he n, i s a s u c c e s s i on of s y s t e ms ge ne r a t e d t h r oughs e q ue nt i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n s t h a t c o n s e r ve a p a r t i c u l a r or ga ni z a t i o n .Ac c or d i n gl y , e a c h p a r t i c u l a r r e p r o du c t i v e l i n ea g e or ph yl oge ny i sde f i ne d by t he pa r t i c u l a r o r g a ni z a t i o n c o ns e r v e d t h r ough t hes e qu e nt i a l r e pr o d u c t i o n s t ha t c on s t i t u t e i t . The r e f o r e , ar e p r o du c t i v e p hy l o ge ny or l i ne a ge l a s t s onl y a s l ong a s t heo r g a ni z a t i o n t ha t d e f i n e s i t i s c ons e r ve d , r e g a r d l e s s of h ow muc ht he s t r u c t u r e t ha t r e a l i z e s t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n e ac h s u c c e s s i ve

28



evol ut i on i s const i t ut i vel y a coevol ut i on, and t hat ever y l i vi ngsys t em i s at any moment wher e i t i s, and has t he st r uct ur e t hati t has, as an expr essi on of t he present st at e of t he domai n of oper at i onal coher ences const i t ut ed by t he net work of cophyl ogeni cs t r uct ur al dr i f t s to whi ch i t bel ongs . As a r esul t , t heoper at i onal coher ences of ever y l i v i ng system at ever y i nst ant

necessar i l y ent ai l t he operat i onal coher ences of t he whol ebi ospher e. e) The obser ver as a l i vi ng syst em i s not anexcept i on t o al l t hat has been sai d above. Accor di ngl y, anobser ver can onl y make di st i nct i ons t hat , as operat i ons i n hi s orher pr axi s of l i vi ng, t ake pl ace as oper at i ons wi t hi n t he pr esentst ate of t he domai n of oper at i onal coherences const i t ut ed by t henet work of coont ogeni c and cophyl ogeni c st r uct ur al dr i f t s towhi ch he or she bel ongs.

i x) Ont ogeni c poss i bi l i t i es . The ont ogeny of ever y st r uct ur edet er mi ned s ys t em s t ar t s wi t h an i ni t i al s t r uc t ur e t hat i s t hes t r uc t ur e t hat r eal i zes t hesyst em at t he begi nni ng of i tsex i s t ence i n i t s i ncept i on. I n l i vi ng sys t ems such i ni t i als t r uct ur e i s a cel l ul ar uni t y t hat may or i gi nat e ei t her a) as a

s i ngl e cel l or as a smal l mul t i cel l ul ar ent i t y t hr ough ar epr oduc t i ve f r ac t ur e f r o m a c el l ul ar mat er nal s ys t em whos eor gani zat i on i t conserves, or b) as a si ngl e cel l de novo f r omnoncel l ul ar el ement s . I n ever y l i vi ng sys t em t he sys t em’ si ni t i al s t r uc t ur e c ons t i t ut es t he s t r uc t ur a l s t ar t i ng poi nt t hatspeci f i es i n i t what an obser ver sees as the conf i gur at i on of al lt he cour ses of ont ogeni c dr i f t s t hat i t may under go underdi f f er ent c i r cumst ances of i nt er act i ons i n t he medi um. As ar esul t , what const i t ut es a l i neage i n l i vi ng syst ems i s t heconser vat i on t hr ough t hei r r epr oduc t i on of a par t i cul ar i ni t i als t r uc t ur e t hat spec i f i es a par t i cul ar conf i gur at i on of poss i bl eont ogeni c dr i f t s ; and what const i t ut es t he organi zat i on conservedt hr ough r epr oduct i on t hat spec i f i es t he i dent i t y of t he l i neage

i s t hat conf i gur at i on. Accor di ngl y, a l i neage comes to an endwhen t he conf i gur at i on of poss i bl e ont ogeni c dr i f t s t hat def i nesi t st ops bei ng conser ved. The conf i gur at i on of poss i bl eont ogeni c dr i f t s t hat spec i f i es a l i neage t hr ough i t s conserva-t i on I cal l t he ont ogeni c phenot ype of t he l i neage. I n eachpart i cul ar l i v i ng syst em, however , onl y one of t heont ogeni ccour ses deemed poss i bl e i n t he ont ogeni c phenot ype by t heobser ver , i s r eal i zed as a r esul t o f i t s i nt er nal dynami cs undert he cont i ngenc i es of t he par t i cul ar per t ur bat i ons t hat i t under -goes i n i t s domai n of exi st ence wi t h conservat i on of organi zat i onand adapt at i on. Consequent l y, and i n gener al , i t i s onl y wi t hi nt he domai n of poss i bi l i t i es set by t hei r di f f er ent or s i mi l ari ni t i al s t r uct ur es t hat di f f er ent compos i t e uni t i es may havedi f f er ent or s i mi l ar ont ogeni c st r uc t ur al dr i f t s under di f f er entor s i mi l ar h i s t or i es of per t ur bat i ons i n t hei r domai ns of exi st ence. I ndeed, not hi ng can happen i n t he ont ogeny of al i v i ng syst em as a composi t e uni t y t hat i s not per mi t t ed i n i t si ni t i al s t r uct ur e. Or , i n ot her wor ds, and under t heunder s t andi ng t hat t he i ni t i al s t r uc t ur e of a l i vi ng s ys t em i si t s genet i c const i t ut i on, i t i s apparent t hat not hi ng can happeni n the ont ogeni c s t r uc t ur al dr i f t of a l i vi ng sys t em t hat i s notal l owed i n i t s genet i c cons t i t ut i on as a f eat ur e of i t s poss i bl e

30



a l i v i ng s ys t e m, c o ns e r v a t i o n of l i v i ng ( c on s e r v a t i o n of a ut o-poi e s i s a nd of a da p t a t i o n) c on s t i t u t e s a d e qu a t e a c t i on i n t hos ec i r c u ms t a n c e s , a nd, he nc e , k nowl e dge : l i v i ng s y s t e ms a r e c o gn i -t i ve s y s t e ms , a nd t o l i v e i s t o k n o w. But , by s h owi n g t h i s Iha v e a l s o s h own t ha t a ny i n t e r a c t i o n wi t h a l i v i n g s y s t e m c a n bev i e we d by a n o b s e r v e r a s a q u e s t i o n p os e d t o i t , a s a c h a l l e n ge

t o i t s l i f e t ha t c on s t i t u t e s a doma i n of e x i s t e n c e whe r e he ors h e e x pe c t s a d e q ua t e a c t i o n of i t . And, a t t he s a me t i me , I ha vea l s o s h own, t he n, t ha t t he a c t u al a c c e p t a n c e by t he o bs e r v e r of a n a n s we r t o a q ue s t i o n pos e d t o a l i vi ng s y s t e m, e n t a i l s hi s orhe r r e c o gn i t i o n of a d e qu a t e a c t i o n by t he l i v i n g s y s t e m i n t hed oma i n s p e c i f i e d by t he q ue s t i o n, a nd t ha t t h i s r e c o gn i t i o n of a de qu a t e a c t i on c on s i s t s i n t he d i s t i nc t i o n of t he l i v i ng s ys t e mi n t ha t doma i n und er c o nd i t i o ns of c o ns e r v a t i o n of a u t o po i e s i sa nd a d a pt a t i o n. I n wha t f o l l o ws I pr e s e n t t hi s g e ne r a l e xp l a n a t or y p r opo s i t i on und e r t he gu i s e of a pa r t i c u l a r s c i e nt i f i ce xp l a na t i on :

a ) Th e p h e no me n o n t o be e x p l a i n e d i s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n by a l i v i n gs y s t e m a t any mo me n t i n wh i c h an o bs e r v e r d i s t i n g ui s h e s i t a s al i v i n g s y s t e m i n a c t i o n i n a p a r t i c u l a r d oma i n . And I pr op os et hi s as t he p he n o me n o n t o be e x pl a i n e d i n t he u nd e r s t a n d i n g t ha tt he a de qu a t e a c t i ons of a l i v i ng s y s t e m a r e i t s i n t e r a c t i ons wi t hc o ns e r v a t i o n of c l a s s i d e nt i t y i n t he do ma i n i n whi c h i t i sd i s t i n g u i s h e d .

b) Gi ve n t ha t s t r u c t u r a l c o up l i n g i n i t s d oma i n of e xi s t e nc e( c ons e r va t i on of a da p t a t i o n) i s a c ond i t i on of e x i s t e n c e f or a nys y s t e m d i s t i n gu i s h e d by a n o bs e r ve r , t he ge n e r a t i v e me c h a ni s m f ora d eq ua t e a c t i on i n a l i v i ng s y s t e m as a s t r u c t u r a l l y c ha ng i ngs ys t e m, i s t he s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t wi t h c on s e r v a t i o n of a da pt a t i ont h r o ug h wh i c h i t s t a y s i n c o nt i n uo us a d e qu a t e a c t i o n whi l e i tr e a l i z e s i t s n i c he , or d i s i n t e gr a t e s . Si n c e a s ys t e m i s

d i s t i ng ui s h e d o nl y i n s t r uc t u r a l c oupl i ng , whe n an obs e r ve rd i s t i ng u i s h e s a l i v i ng s y s t e m he or s he ne c e s s a r i l y d i s t i ng u i s h esi t i n a de qu at e a c t i o n i n t he doma i n of i t s d i s t i nc t i on , a ndd i s t i ng u i s h es i t a s a s y s t e m t ha t c o n s t i t u t i v e l y r e ma i ns i ns t r uc t u r a l c o up l i ng i n i t s doma i n of e xi s t e nc e r e g a r d l e s s of howmuc h i t s s t r u ct u r e , or t he s t r u c t u r e of t he me di um, or bot h,c ha nge whi l e i t s t a ys a l i ve .

c) Gi v e n t he g e n e r a t i v e me c h a n i s m pr o po s e d i n ( b ) , t he f o l l o wi n gp h e n o me n a c a n be d e d u c e d t o t a k e p l a c e i n t h e do ma i n of e x pe r i e n c e s of a n o bs e r v e r : i ) t he o bs e r v e r s h o ul d s e e a de qua t ea c t i o n t a ki ng pl a c e i n t h e f or m of c oo r d i n a t e d b e ha v i o r i n l i vi ngs y s t e ms t ha t a r e i n c o o n t o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l dr i f t wh i l e i n

r e c ur r e nt i n t e r a c t i o ns wi t h c on s e r va t i on of r e c i pr oc a la da pt a t i on ; i i ) t he o bs e r v e r s h oul d s e e t ha t l i v i ng s y s t e ms i nc oo nt o ge ny s e p a r a t e or d i s i n t e gr a t e , or bot h, whe n t he i r

r e c i p r o c a l a da pt a t i o n i s l os t .

d) Th e p h e n o me n a d e d u c e d i n ( c ) a r e a p p a r e n t i n t h e d o ma i n of e x pe r i e n c e s of a n o bs e r v e r i n t he d yn a mi c s of c o ns t i t u t i o n a ndr e a l i z a t i on of a s o c i a l s y s t e m, a nd i n a l l c i r c u ms t a n c e s of r e c ur r e nt i n t e r a c t i o ns b e t we e n l i vi ng s y s t e ms dur i ng t he i r

33



i n l anguage do not i nt er sec t , t hei r changes ar e coupl ed

or t hogona l l y t hr ough t he s t r uc t ur a l i nt e r a ct i o ns t hat t ake pl ac e

i n l anguage. As t he body changes, l anguagi ng changes; and as

l anguagi ng changes, t he body changes. Here r es i des t he power of wor ds . Words ar e nodes i n coor di nat i ons of ac t i ons i n l anguagi ng

and as such t hey ar i se t h rough s t r uct u ra l i n t erac t i ons bet ween

body hoods ; i t i s t hr ough t hi s i nt er pl ay of c oo rd i n at i ons of act i ons and changes of bodyhood t hat t he wor l d t hat we br i ngf or t h i n l anguagi ng becomes par t of t he domai n i n whi ch our

ont ogeni c and phy l ogeni c s t r uc t ur a l dr i f t s t ake pl ac e.

vi ) Language i s a domai n of descr i pt i ons. Language i s a syst em

of r ecu r s i v e c ons ens ual c oo rd i n at i ons of ac t i ons i n whi c h ever yconsensual coor d i nat i on of act i ons becomes an obj ect t hr ough ar ec ur s i on i n t he c ons ens ual c oo rd i na t i on s of act i ons , i n ap rocess t hat becomes t he operat i on of di s t i nc t i on t hatdi s t i n gu i s h es i t and c ons t i t ut es t he obs er ver . I n t hes e c i r c u m-

st ances , al l par t i c i pant s i n a l anguage domai n can be obser ver swi t h r espect t o t he sequences of coor di nat i ons of ac t i ons i nwhi c h t hey par t i c i pat e, c ons t i t ut i ng a s ys t e m of r ec ur s i vedi s t i n c t i ons i n whi c h s y s t ems of di s t i nc t i ons bec ome obj ect s of di s t i nc t i on. Such r e cur s i ve di s t i nc t i ons of di s t i nc t i ons i n t hehappeni ng o f l i v i ng i n l anguage t hat br i ng f or t h sys t ems of obj ec t s , cons t i t u t e t he phenomenon of desc r i pt i on. As a r esul t ,al l t hat t here i s i n t he human domai n ar e descr i pt i ons i n t hehappeni ng of l i v i ng i n l anguage whi ch, as happeni ngs of l i v i ng i nl anguage, become obj ect s of desc r i pt i ons i n l anguage. Desc r i p

t i ons , however , do not r epl ace t he happeni ng of l i v i ng t hat t heyc on s t i t ut e as des c r i pt i ons ; t hey onl y expand i t i n r ec ur s i onst hat f ol l ow i t s oper at i onal c oher enc es . Ac cor di ngl y, s c i ent i f i c

expl ana t i ons , as s y s t ems of des c r i pt i ons , do not r epl ac e t hephenomena t hat t hey expl ai n i n t he domai n of happeni ng of l i v i ng

of t he observer , but br i ng f or t h operat i ona l coher ences i n t hat

do mai n t hat al l ow f or f ur t her des c r i pt i ons i n i t .

vi i ) Se l f c ons c i ous ne ss ar i s es wi t h l a ngu age . F or a l i vi ng

s y s t em i n i t s oper at i on as a c l os ed s ys t em, t her e i s no i ns i de orout s i de; i t has no way of mak i ng t he di s t i nc t i on . Yet , i n

l anguage s uc h a di s t i nc t i on a r i s es as a par t i c ul a r c ons ens ualc oo r d i nat i on of ac t i ons i n whi c h t he pa r t i c i pant s ar e r e cur s i ve l y

br ought f or t h as di s t i nc t i ons of s ys t ems of di s t i nc t i o ns . Whent hi s happens , se l f consc i ousness a r i ses as a domai n of di s t i nc t i ons i n whi c h t he obs e rv e r s pa r t i c i pa t e i n t he c ons ens ualdi s t i nc t i ons of t hei r par t i c i pat i ons i n l anguage t hr ough

l anguagi ng. I t f ol l ows f r o m t hi s t hat t he i ndi vi dual exi s t s onl yi n l anguage, t hat t he sel f exi s t s onl y i n l anguage, and t hats e l f c ons c i ous n es s as a p henomenon of s el f di s t i nc t i on t akespl ace onl y i n l anguage. Fur t he rmor e, i t al s o f o l l ows t hat s i nc e

l anguage as a domai n of consensual coor d i nat i ons of act i ons i s a

soc i a l phenomenon, se l f consc i ousness i s a soc i a l phenomenon, andas such i t does not t ake pl ace wi t h i n t he anat omi ca l conf i nes of

t he bodyhood of t he l i v i ng syst ems t hat gener at e i t ; on t he

c ont r a ry , i t i s ex t er nal t o t hem and per t ai ns t o t hei r d omai n of

i n t er act i ons as a manner of coex i s t ence.

39



vi i i ) Hi s t o r y . The s i g ni f i c a n c e or me a n i n g of a ny gi ve n b e ha vi o rr e s i de s i n t he c i r c ums t a n ce s of i t s e na c t i on, not i n t hec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t he dy na mi c s of s t a t e s of t he be ha vi ng l i vi ngs y s t e m or i n a ny p ar t i c ul a r f e a t u r e of t he be ha vi or i t s e l f . I not he r wo r d s , i t i s not t h e c ompl e xi t y of t he i nn er s t a t e s of al i v i n g s y s t e m o r of i t s n e r v o us s y s t e m, nor a ny a s p e c t of t he

be ha vi o r i t s e l f , t ha t de t e r mi ne s t he na t ur e , me a ni ng, r e l e va nc e ,or c o nt e n t of a ny gi ve n be ha vi or , but r a t h e r i t s p l a c e me nt i n t heo ng oi n g h i s t o r i c a l pr oc e s s i n wh i c h i t a r i s e s . The hi g he r huma nf u nc t i o ns do not t a ke pl a c e i n t he br a i n: l a ngua ge , a b s t r a c tt h i nki ng, l ove , d e vo t i on, r e f l e c t i on , r a t i ona l i t y , a l t r u i s m,e t c . , a r e not f e a t u r e s of t he d yn a mi c s of s t a t e s of t he h uma nbe i ng a s a l i v i n g s y s t e m or of i t s n e r v o us s y s t e m as a n e ur o na lne t wo r k ; t he y a r e s o c i a l h i s t o r i c a l p he n ome n a . At t he s a me t i me ,h i s t o r y i s not pa r t o f t he dy na mi c s of s t a t e s of a l i v i ng s y s t e mbe c a us e t hi s l a t t e r t a ke s pl a ce onl y i n t he pr e s e nt , i n s t a nta f t e r i n s t a nt , i n t he ope r a t i o n of i t s s t r u c t u r e i n c ha nge s t ha to c c ur out of t i me . Hi s t o r y , t i me , f u t ur e , a nd p a s t — a s we l l ass p a c e — e x i s t i n l a n gu a ge a s f o r ms of e x pl a n a t i o n of t he ha p pe n i n gof l i v i n g of t he o bs e r v e r , a nd p a r t a k e of t he i n vo l v e me n t of l a n gua ge i n t hi s ha ppe n i ng of l i v i ng. Th er e f o r e , i t i s i n t hee x pl a n a t i o n of t he h a pp e ni n g of l i v i ng t hr o ug h t he c o he r e n c e s of l a ngua ge t ha t a n o bs e r ve r c an c l a i m t ha t t he s t r uc t u r e of al i v i ng s ys t e m t ha t de t e r mi n es i t s c ha ng es of s t a t e i n t he pr e s e n ta l wa y s e mb od i e s i t s h i s t or y of i n t e r a c t i o ns b ec a us e i tc on t i n u o u s l y a r i s e s i n t he pr e s e n t i n a s t r uc t u r a l d r i f t

c o nt i n ge n t t o s u c h hi s t or y .

i x) Th e n e r v ou s s y s t e m e x p a nd s t he do ma i n of s t a t e s of t he l i v i n gs y s t e m. For l i v i ng s y s t e ms t o ope r a t e i n l a ngua ge , t he d i ve r s i t ya nd p l a s t i c i t y of t he i r i n t e r n a l s t a t e s mus t ma t c h t he d i ve r s i t yof t he c ha n gi n g c i r c u ms t a nc e s ge ne r a t e d i n t h ei r r e c u r s i vec on s e ns u a l c oo r d i n a t i o ns of a c t i ons . I n o t he r wor d s , a l t h ou gh

l a n gu a ge d oe s n ot t a ke pl a c e wi t h i n t he b od yh oo d of t he l i v i n gs y s t e m, t he s t r u c t u r e of t he l i v i n g s y s t e m mus t p r o vi d e t hed i v e r s i t y a nd p l a s t i c i t y of s t a t e s r e q u i r e d f or l a ngua ge t o t a kep l a c e. The ne r vo us s ys t e m c on t r i bu t e s t o t he f u l f i l l me n t of t hi sr e q ui r e me n t by e x pa n di n g t he do ma i n of s t a t e s of t he o r g a ni s mt h r o u gh t he r i c h ne s s of i t s d yn a mi c s a s a c l o s e d n e t wo r k of c ha n gi n g r e l a t i o ns of ne ur on al a c t i v i t i e s ( s e e Ma t u r a n a 1983) ,a n d by e x p a n d i n g i n t he o r g a n i s m t he d oma i n of i t s c h a n g e s of s t a t e s t ha t f o l l o w i n i t a c ou r s e c o nt i n ge n t upo n bot h i t s ownc h a ng e s of s t a t e s a nd i t s i n t e r a c t i o ns i n t he me di u m. And t hi st he ne r v ou s s y s t e m doe s : a) by a d mi t t i n g t he i n t e r a c t i o ns of t heo r g a n i s m a s or t h og on a l p e r t u r b a t i o ns f r om t he me di um, a c o nd i t i o nt ha t ma ke s i t s s t r uc t u r a l d r i f t a s a c e l l u l a r n e t wor k , as we l l a s

t he s t r u c t u r a l dr i f t o f t he or g a ni s m a nd i t s p a r t i c i p a t i on i n t heg e ne r a t i o n of be ha vi or , c on t i n ge n t upon t he h i s t o r y of t hos ei n t e r a c t i o ns ; a nd b) by a dmi t t i n g o r t h o g o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s f r omt he c o mp on e n t s of t he o r g a ni s m, a c o n di t i o n t ha t ma k e s i t ss t r uc t u r a l d r i f t as a c e l l u l a r n e t wor k , a s we l l a s t he s t r uc t u r a ld r i f t of t he o r g a ni s m a nd i t s pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n t he g en e r a t i o n of be ha vi o r , r e c u r s i v e l y c on t i n ge n t u pon t he dyna mi c s of s t r uc t u r a lc ha ng es of t he or ga ni s m. The r e s u l t of a l l t hi s f o r t he o r g a ni s m( i nc l u d i n g i t s ne r v ous s y s t e m) i s t he p os s i b i l i t y of t he

40



g e ne r a t e a r e c u r s i v e d oma i n of c o or d i n a t i o ns of a c t i o ns . Th ati s , t he o pe r a t i o n of t he n e r v ou s s y s t e m a s a c l o s e d n e t wo r k of i n t e r a c t i o ns pe r mi t s o bs e r v i n g a nd t he o bs e r ve r t o a r i s e aso pe r a t i o ns i n l a ngua ge b r ough t f or t h t h r o ugh t he o pe r a t i ona lc o he r e n c e s of l a n gu a gi n g. Or , i n ot he r wor ds , s i nc e t heo pe r a t i o n of t he n e r v ou s s y s t e m a p pe a r s i n t he d oma i n of

o p e r a t i o n of t he o r g a n i s m a s s e n s o r y - e f f e c t o r c or r e l a t i ons ,o bs e r v i n g i s c o or d i n a t i o ns of b od yh oo ds of o bs e r v e r s t hr ou ght he i r ge ne r a t i on of a c h or e o gr a p hy of i n t e r l a c e d s e n s o r y —e f f e c t o rc or r e l a t i on s , be c aus e a l l t ha t t he r e i s f or t h e o pe r a t i o n of t hen e r v ou s s y s t e m of t he o bs e r v e r i n o bs e r v i n g i s i t s c l os e dd yn a mi c s of c h a ng i n g r e l a t i o ns be t we e n i t s n e ur o na l c o mpo ne n t s .I t i s onl y f o r a n o bs e r v e r who s e e s t wo or mo r e i n t e r a c t i n go r g a n i s ms i n hi s or he r p r a xi s of l i vi ng, t ha t t he s e n s or y -e f f e c t o r c o r r e l a t i o n s of t he s e o r ga ni s ms a pp e a r r e c ur s i ve l yi n vo l v e d wi t h e a ch o t h e r i n a n e t wo r k of r e c u r s i v e s e n s o r y -e f f e c t o r c o r r e l a t i o ns c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o ugh t he or t h o g o n a l i n t e r a c -t i ons of t he i r ne r v ous s y s t e ms . And, f i na l l y , i t i s onl y f or ano bs e r v e r t ha t s uc h a n e t wo r k of r e c u r s i v e s e n s o r y - e f f e c t o r c o r r e -l a t i o ns b e c ome s l a n gu a ge a nd c o n s t i t u t e s a me t a d oma i n ( wi t hr e s p e c t t o t he o pe r a t i o n of t he n e r v ou s s y s t e m) wh e r e e x pl a n a -t i o ns a nd o bs e r v i n g t a ke p l a c e , whe n t he o r g a n i s m' s r e c ur r e nti n t e r a c t i o ns be c ome a r e c u r s i v e s y s t e m of c o ns e n s u a l c o or d i n a -t i ons of c ons e n s u a l c o or d i n a t i o ns of a c t i ons .

10. THE DOMAI N OF P HYSI CAL EXI STENCEA do ma i n of e xi s t e n c e i s a do ma i n of op e r a t i o na l c o he r e n c e s

e n t a i l e d by t he d i s t i n c t i o n of a uni t y by a n o bs e r v e r i n hi s orhe r p r a x i s of l i vi n g. As s u ch, a d oma i n of e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s a st he doma i n of t he o pe r a t i o na l va l i d i t y of t he p r o pe r t i e s of t heuni t y d i s t i n gu i s h e d i f i t i s a s i mp l e uni t y, or as t he doma i n of va l i d i t y of t he p r o pe r t i e s of t he c o mpo ne n t s of t he uni t y

d i s t i n gu i s h e d i f t he un i t y d i s t i n gu i s h e d i s a c o mp os i t e one . Asa c ons e q ue nc e , t he d i s t i n c t i o n of a uni t y e n t a i l s i t s doma i n of e x i s t e nc e as a c ompo s i t e un i t y t ha t i n c l u de s t he d i s t i n g u i s h e du ni t y a s a c o mp on e n t * Th e r e f o r e , t h e r e a r e a s ma n y d o ma i n s of e x i s t e n c e a s k i nd s of u ni t i e s an o bs e r v e r ma y br i ng f o r t h i n hi sor he r o pe r a t i o n s of d i s t i n c t i o n . I n t he s e c i r c ums t a nc e s , s i nc et he not i on of d e t e r mi n i s m a p pl i e s t o t h e o pe r a t i o n of t hep r o p e r t i e s of t he c o mp on e nt s of a uni t y i n i t s c o mp os i t i o n ( s e es e c t i o ns 6 i x , a nd 7 i y) , a l l d o ma i n s of e xi s t e n c e , a s c o mp os i t ee nt i t i e s t ha t i nc l ude t he un i t i e s t h a t s pe c i f y t he m, a r ed e t e r mi n i s t i c s y s t e ms i n t he s e n s e i nd i c a t e d a bove . Thi s ha sc e r t a i n c ons e q ue n ce s f or us l i v i ng s y s t e ms e xi s t i n g i n l a ngua ge ,a nd f or t he e x pl a n a t i o ns t ha t we g e ne r a t e as s u c h be i n gs . The

f o l l o wi n g a r e s o me of t h e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s :

i ) Our d oma i n of e xi s t e n c e a s t he c o mp os i t e u ni t i e s t ha t we a r ea s mo l e c u l a r a u t o po i e t i c s y s t e ms , i s t he d oma i n of e x i s t e n c e of our c ompon en t mol e c ul e s , a nd e n t a i l s a l l t he ope r a t i o na lc o he r e n c e s pr ope r t o t he mo l e c u l a r e xi s t e nc e . Th er e f o r e , oure x i s t e nc e a s a ut o po i e t i c s ys t e ms i mpl i e s t he s a t i s f a c t i o n of al lt he c on s t r a i n t s t ha t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of mo l e c ul e s e nt a i l s , a ndour op er a t i on as mo l e c u l a r s y s t e ms i mp l i e s t he de t e r mi n i s m

43



ent ai l ed i n t he di s t i nc t i on of mol ec ul es .

i i ) I f we di s t i n gui s h mol ecul es as c ompos i t e ent i t i es , t hey exi s t

i n t he domai n of exi st ence of t hei r component s, and as such t hei r

exi s t enc e i mpl i es t he s at i s f ac t i on of t he det er mi ni s m t hat t he

di s t i nc t i on of t he l at t er ent ai l s . The s ame appl i e s t o t he

decomposi t i on of t he component s of mol ecul es, and so onr ec ur s i v el y. Si nc e uni t i es and t hei r doma i ns of ex i s t enc e ar ebr ought f or t h and s pec i f i ed i n t hei r d i s t i nc t i on i n t he happeni ng

of l i vi ng of t he obs er v er , t he onl y l i mi t t o t he r ecu r s i on i n

di s t i nc t i ons i s t he l i mi t of t he di ver s i t y of e xper i e nc es of t he

obs er v er i n hi s or her happeni ng of l i v i ng ( pr ax i s ) .

i i i ) Si nc e t he obs er v er as a l i vi ng s ys t em i s a c ompos i t e ent i t y,t he obs er v er mak es di s t i n ct i ons i n hi s or her i n t e r ac t i ons as al i v i ng s ys t em t hr ough t he ope ra t i on of t he pr ope r t i es of hi s orher component s. I f t he obser ver uses an i nst r ument , t hen hi s or

her di s t i nc t i ons t ake pl ace t hr ough t he oper at i on of t hepr oper t i es of t he i ns t r ument as i f t hi s wer e one of i t s

component s . The r esul t of al l t hi s i s t hat an obser ver cannotmake d i s t i nc t i ons ou t s i de i t s domai n of ex i s t ence as a compos i t e

ent i t y .

i v) Des c r i pt i ons ar e s er i es of c o ns ens ual di s t i nc t i o ns s ubj ec t t or ecurs i ve consensua l di s t i nc t i ons i n a communi t y of observers .

Obser ver s operat e i n l anguage onl y t hr ough t he i r r ecur s i vei n t e r ac t i ons i n t he domai n of s t r uc t ur al c oupl i ng i n whi c h t hey

r ec ur s i v el y c oor di na t e c ons ens ua l ac t i ons as ope r a t i ons i n t hei rdomai ns of exper i ences t hr ough t he pr ax i s of t he i r l i vi ng.

Ther ef or e, al l i nt er act i ons i n l anguage bet ween obs er ver s t akepl ace t hr ough the oper at i on of t he pr oper t i es of t he i r component s

as l i vi ng s y s t ems i n t he domai n of t hei r r ec i pr oca l s t r uc t ur a lcoupl i ng. Or , i n ot her words, we as human bei ngs oper at e i n

l anguage onl y t h rough our i n t erac t i ons i n our domai n of exi s t enceas l i v i ng syst ems, and we cannot make descr i pt i ons t hat ent a i l

i nt erac t i ons out s i de t hi s domai n. As a consequence , a l t houghl anguage as a domai n of r ecur s i ve consensual di s t i nc t i ons i s open

to unendi ng r ecur s i ons , l anguage i s a c l osed oper at i ona l domai ni n t he sense t hat i t i s not poss i bl e to s t ep out s i de l anguaget h rough l anguage, and desc r i pt i ons cannot be char ac t er i za t i ons of

i ndependen t ent i t i es .

v) Si nce ever yt h i ng sa i d i s sai d by an obser ver to anot herobs er v er , and s i nc e obj ec t s ( ent i t i es , t hi ngs ) a r i s e i n l anguage,

we c annot ope ra t e wi t h obj ec t s ( ent i t i es or t h i ngs ) as i f t heyexi s t ed out s i de t he di s t i nc t i ons of di s t i nc t i ons t hat c ons t i t ut e

t hem. Fur t her mor e , as ent i t i es i n l anguage, obj ec t s ar e br oughtf o r t h as expl anat ory e l ement s i n t he expl anat i on of t he

oper at i ona l coher ences o f t he happeni ng of l i v i ng i n whi chl anguagi ng t akes pl ace. Wi t hout obser ver s not hi ng ex i s t s , and

wi t h obs er ver s e v er y t h i ng t h at e xi s t s exi s t s i n ex pl anat i ons .

vi ) As we put obj ect i v i t y i n par ent heses because we r ecogn i zet hat we cannot exper i ent i a l l y di s t i ngui sh bet ween what we

s oc i al l y c al l p er c ept i on and i l l us i on, we ac c ept t hat exi s t enc e

44



i s s p e c i f i e d by an o p e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i on : no t h i ng p r e - e x i s t si t s d i s t i n c t i o n . I n t hi s s e ns e , hous e s , pe r s o ns , a t oms ore l e me nt a r y pa r t i c l e s , a r e not d i f f e r e n t . Al s o i n t hi s s e ns e ,e x i s t e n ce as a n e x p l a n a t i on of t he p r a xi s of l i v i ng of t heob s e r v e r , i s a c o gn i t i v e p he n ome n on t ha t r e f l e c t s t he ont ol o gy of o bs e r v i n g i n s u ch pr a xi s of l i vi ng, a nd not a c l a i m a bo ut o bj e c -

t i vi t y. The r e f o r e , wi t h o b j e c t i v i t y i n pa r e n t he s e s , a n e nt i t yha s no c o nt i n ui t y b e yon d or o ut s i d e t ha t s p e c i f i e d by t h ec oh e r e n c e s t ha t c on s t i t u t e i t s doma i n of e x i s t e nc e as t hi s i sbr ought f or t h i n i t s d i s t i nc t i o n. The c l a i m t ha t t he hous e t owh i c h I r e t u r n e v e r y e v e n i n g f r o m wo r k i s t he s a me t ha t I l e f t i nt h e mo r n i n g , or t ha t wh e n e v e r I s e e my mo t h e r I s e e t h e s a mepe r s o n t ha t ga ve bi r t h t o me , or t ha t a l l t he p oi n t s of t he pa t hof a n e l e c t r o n i n a b ub bl e c h a mb e r a r e t r a c e s l e f t by t he s a mee l e c t r on, a r e c l a i ms t ha t c on s t i t u t e c ogn i t i ve s t a t e me nt s t ha td ef i n e s a me n e s s i n t he d i s t i n c t i o n of t he un i t y ( hous e , mot he r ,or e l e c t r o n) as t hi s i s s pe c i f i e d i n t he ope r a t i on of d i s t i n c t i o nt ha t b r i ngs i t f o r t h t oge t he r wi t h i t s doma i n of e xi s t e nc e .Si nc e a c c o r d i n g t o a l l t ha t I ha ve s a i d , c og ni t i ve s t a t e me n t s a r e

not , a nd c a nn ot be, s t a t e me n t s a bout t he p r o pe r t i e s of i n de pe nde n t o bj e c t s , s a me ne s s i s n e c e s s a r i l y a l wa ys a r e f l e c t i onby t he o b s e r v e r i n t he p r o c e s s of o bs e r v i n g i n t he d oma i n of e x i s t e nc e t ha t h e or s he br i ngs f o r t h i n hi s or he r d i s t i n c t i on s .Fur t he r mo r e , s i nc e no e nt i t y c an be d i s t i n gu i s h e d ou t s i de i t sd oma i n of e x i s t e n c e a s t he doma i n of o pe r a t i o na l c o he r e n c e s i nwhi c h i t i s pos s i b l e , e ve r y d i s t i n c t i on s p e c i f i e s a doma i n of e xi s t e nc e a s a d oma i n of pos s i b l e d i s t i nc t i o ns ; t ha t i s , e ve r yd i s t i n c t i o n s p e c i f i e s a d oma i n of e x i s t e n c e a s a v e r s u m i n t hemu l t i ve r s a , or , c ol l oq u i a l l y , e ve r y d i s t i nc t i o n s p e c i f i e s a

d oma i n of r e a l i t y .

vi i ) A s c i e n t i f i c e xp l a na t i o n e nt a i l s t he p r o po s i t i on of ame c h a ni s m ( o r c o mp os i t e e nt i t y) t ha t , i f r e a l i z e d, woul d ge n er a t e

t he p h e n ome n o n t o be e x p l a i n e d i n t he d oma i n of e x p e r i e n c e s( p r a x i s or ha p pe n i n g of l i v i ng) of t he o bs e r v e r ( s e e s e c t i o n 4) .The ge ne r a t i v e c ha r a c t e r o f t he s c i e nt i f i c e x p l a na t i on i s c o n s t i -t u t i ve t o i t . I n de ed, t hi s o n t o l o g i c a l c on d i t i on i n s c i e nc ec a r r i e s wi t h i t t he l e gi t i ma c y of t he f ou nd a t i ona l c h a r a c t e r of t he p he n o me n a l d oma i n i n wh i c h t he g e n e r a t i v e e x p l a n a t o r yme c h a ni s m t a ke s pl a c e , a s we l l a s t he l e g i t i ma c y of t r e a t i n ge ve r y e n t i t y d i s t i n gu i s h e d as a c omp os i t e uni t y, a s k i ng f o r t heor i g i n of i t s p r op e r t i e s i n i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a nd s t r u c t u r e . Andb e c a us e t hi s i s a l s o t he c a s e f o r our c ommo n s e n s e e x p l a n a t i o nsi n our e f f e c t i v e op e r a t i o n i n our d a i l y l i f e , i t s e e ms na t u r a l t ous t o a s k f o r a s u b s t r a t u m i n de p e nd e nt of t he o bs e r v e r a s t heu l t i ma t e me d i u m i n whi c h e v e r y t h i n g t a ke s pl a c e . Ye t , a l t h ou gh

i t i s an e p i s t e mo l o gi c a l ne c e s s i t y t o e xpe c t s uc h a s u bs t r a t um,we c on s t i t u t i v e l y c anno t a s s e r t i t s e xi s t e nc e t hr o ugh d i s t i n -g ui s h i ng i t a s a c o mpo s i t e e nt i t y a nd t he r e b y c h a r a c t e r i z e i t i nt e r ms of c o mp on e n t s a nd r e l a t i o ns b e t we e n c o mp on e nt s . I n o r d e rt o do s o, we wo ul d h a ve t o d e s c r i b e i t , t ha t i s , we wo ul d ha v e t obr i ng i t f or t h i n l a n gu a ge a nd g i v e i t f or m i n t he d oma i n of r e c ur s i ve c on s e ns u a l c o or d i n a t i o ns of a c t i ons i n whi c h we e xi s ta s h uma n b e i n g s . Ho we v e r , t o do s o wo ul d be t a n t a mo u n t t oc h a r a c t e r i z i n g t he s u bs t r a t u m i n t e r ms of e nt i t i e s ( t h i ngs ,

45



pr oper t i es ) t hat ar i se t hr ough l anguagi ng, and whi ch, as consen-

s ual di s t i nc t i ons of c ons ens ual c oor di nat i o ns of ac t i ons , ar e

const i t u t i vel y not t he subst r at um. Thr ough l anguage we r emai n i n

l anguage, and we l ose t he subst r at um as soon as we at t empt t o

l anguage i t . We need t he subst r at um f or epi s t emol ogi ca l r easons ,but i n t he s u bs t r at u m t her e are no obj ec t s , ent i t i es , or pr ope r -

t i es ; i n t he s ubs t r at um t her e i s not hi ng ( no- t hi ng) bec aus et hi ngs bel ong to l anguage. I n ot her words , not hi ng exi s t s i n t he

subst r at um,

vi i i ) Di s t i n ct i ons t ake pl ac e i n t he domai n of ex per i enc es , i nt he happeni ng or praxi s of l i v i ng of t he obser ver as a humanbei ng. For t hi s r eason, t he domai n of oper at i onal coher encest hat an obs e rv er br i ngs f or t h i n t he di s t i nc t i on of a uni t y asi t s domai n of exi s t ence, al so occur s i n hi s or her domai n of exper i ences as a human bei ng as par t of hi s or her pr axi s of l i vi ng. There f o re , s i nce l anguage i s operat i on i n a domai n of r ec ur s i v e c ons ens ual c oo rd i nat i ons of c ons ens u al c oo rd i nat i ons of act i ons i n t he domai n of exper i ences of t he obser ver s as human

bei ngs , a l l di mens i ons of t he domai ns of exper i ences of t heobservers ex i s t i n l anguage as coor d i nat i ons of act i ons bet weenobs er ver s . As s uch, al l de sc r i pt i ons c ons t i t ut e c onf i gur a t i o ns

of coor d i nat i ons of act i ons i n some di mens i on of t he domai ns of exper i ences of t he member s of a communi t y of obser ver s i nc oo nt ogeni c s t r uc t ur al dr i f t . Phys i c s , bi ol ogy, mat hemat i c s ,

phi l os ophy, c ook i ng, pol i t i c s, et c . , ar e al l di f f er ent domai ns of l anguagi ng, and as such ar e al l d i f f e r ent domai ns of r ecur s i vec ons ens u al c oor di na t i ons of c ons en s ual c oor di na t i ons of ac t i ons

i n t he pr axi s or happen i ng of l i v i ng of t he member s of acommuni t y of obser ver s . I n ot her wor ds , i t i s onl y as di f f e r entdomai ns of l anguagi ng t hat phys i cs , bi o l ogy , phi l osophy , cook i ng,

pol i t i c s , or any c ogni t i v e domai n ex i s t s . Yet , t hi s does notmean t hat al l cogni t i ve domai ns are t he same; i t onl y means t hat

di f f e ren t cogn i t i ve domai ns exi s t onl y as t hey ar e br ought f or t hi n l anguage, and t hat l anguagi ng const i t u t es them. We t al k as i f

t hi ngs exi s t ed i n t he absence of t he obser ver , as i f t he domai nof oper a t i ona l c oher enc es t hat we br i ng f or t h i n a di s t i nc t i on

woul d ope ra t e as i t ope ra t es i n our di s t i nc t i ons r ega rd l es s of t hem. We now know t hat th i s i s const i t ut i vel y not t he case. Wet al k, f or exampl e, as i f t i me and mat t er were i ndependent

di mens i ons of a phy s i c al s pac e. Yet , i t i s appar ent f r om myexpl anat i on of t he phenomenon of cogni t i on t hat t hey ar e not andcannot be. I ndeed, t i me and mat t er are expl anat i ons of some of

t he oper at i onal coher ences of t he domai ns of exi s t ence br oughtf or t h i n t he di s t i nc t i o ns t hat c ons t i t ut e t he ongoi ng l anguagi ng

i n t he pr axi s of l i v i ng of t he member s of a communi t y of

obs er v er s . Thus , t i me— wi t h pas t , pr es ent , and f ut ur e— ar i s es asa f eat ure of an exp l anat or y mechan i sm t hat woul d gener at e what

t he obser ver exper i ences as success i ve nonsi mul t aneous phenomena;and mat t er ar i ses as a f eat ur e of an expl anat or y mechani sm t hatwoul d gener at e what he or she exper i ences as mut ual l y

i mpenet r a bl e s i mul t aneous di s t i nc t i ons . Wi t hout o bs e r v er s

not hi ng can be sai d, not hi ng can be expl ai ned, not hi ng can bec l ai med, . . . i n f ac t , wi t hout o bs e r v er s not hi ng exi s t s , bec aus e

ex i s t enc e i s s pec i f i ed i n t he oper at i on of di s t i nc t i on of t he

46



expl anat i on i s cons t i t u t i vel y "a f ree c r eat i on of t he human mi nd"

bec aus e i t i s br ought f or t h c ons t i t ut i v el y a pr i or i i n t he pr axi s

of l i vi ng of t he obs er ver , t hat i s, wi t hout any ot her j us t i f i c a-t i on t han t he ad hoc gener at i ve char act er of t he phenomenonexpl ai ned. I t al s o f o l l ows f r om al l t hi s, t hat a s ci ent i f i c

e xpl anat i on c ons t i t ut i v el y expl ai ns t he uni ve r s e ( ver s um) i n

whi ch i t t akes pl ace because bot h t he exp l anat ory mechan i sm andt he phenomenon bei ng expl a i ned occur , i n a gener at i ve r e l at i on,

as noni nt er sect i ng phenomena of t he same oper at i onal domai n of t he pr ax i s of l i vi ng of t he observer . Or , i n ot her wor ds , i tal s o f ol l ows f r om al l t hi s , t hat si nce t he oper at i on of

di s t i nc t i on s pec i f i es t he ent i t y di s t i ngui s hed as wel l as i t sdomai n of exi s t enc e, a s c i ent i f i c expl ana t i on cons t i t ut i ve l yexpl a i ns t he uni ver se ( ver sum) i n whi ch i t t akes pl ace because i tbr i ngs wi t h i t the domai n of oper at i ona l coher ences ( t he ver sum

of t he mul t i ver sa ) of t he pr ax i s of l i v i ng of t he observer t hati t mak es i nt el l i gi bl e. St r i c t l y, t hen, t her e i s no par a dox:sc i ent i f i c expl anat i ons do not expl a i n an i ndependent wor l d oruni ver se ; t hey expl a i n t he pr axi s of l i v i ng ( t he domai n of exper i ences) of t he obser ver , maki ng use of t he same oper at i onalc ohe ren c es t hat c ons t i t ut e t he pr ax i s of l i vi ng of t he obs er v er

i n l anguagi ng. I t i s her e t hat sc i ence i s poet r y .

11. REALI TY The wor d " r ea l i t y" comes f r om t he Lat i n noun r es t hat means

" obj ec t " ( t hi ng) , and as i t i s c ommonl y us ed s i gni f i e sobj ec t i v i t y wi t hout par ent heses . The r eal , and somet i mes t her eal l y r eal , i s meant to be t hat whi ch exi s t s i ndependent l y of t he obser ver . Now we know t hat t he concept s ent ai l ed i n t hi s wayof s peak i ng cannot be s us t ai ned. Obj ec t s , t hi ngs , ar i s e i nl anguage when a consensual coord i nat i on of act i ons , by bei ng

c on s en s ua l l y di s t i ngu i s hed i n a r ec ur s i on of c on s ens u al c oor di n a-

t i ons of ac t i ons , obs c ur es t he ac t i ons t hat i t c oor di na t es i n t hepr axi s of l i v i ng i n a consensua l domai n. Si nce accor d i ng to t hi sc i r c ums t anc e, an obj ec t , a uni t y, i s br ought f or t h i n l anguage i nan ope ra t i on of di s t i n ct i on t hat i s a c on f i gu ra t i on of c ons ens ua lc oor di nat i o ns of ac t i ons , when an obj ec t i s di s t i ngui s hed i n

l anguage i t s domai n of exi st ence as a coher ent domai n of cons en-sual coor di nat i ons of ac t i ons becomes a domai n of obj ect s , a

doma i n of r eal i t y, a v er s u m of t he mu l t i v er s a s uc h t hat al l t hati s i n i t i s al l t hat i s ent ai l ed i n t he c ons ens ual c oor di nat i onsof ac t i ons t hat c on s t i t ut e i t . Ever y domai n of exi s t en ce i s adoma i n of r eal i t y, and al l d oma i ns of r eal i t y ar e equa l l y val i d

domai ns of exi st ence br ought f or t h by an obser ver as domai ns of c oher ent c ons en s ual ac t i ons t hat s pec i f y al l t h at i s i n t hem.

Once a domai n of r eal i t y i s br ought f or t h, t he obser ver can t r eatt he obj ec t s or ent i t i es t hat c ons t i t ut e i t bot h as i f t hey wer ea l l t hat t her e i s and as i f t hey ex i s t ed i ndependent l y of t he

oper at i o ns of di s t i nc t i on t hat br i ng t hem f or t h. And t hi s i s sobecause a domai n of r eal i t y i s br ought f or t h i n t he pr ax i s of l i v i ng of t he obser ver as a domai n of oper at i ona l coherences t hat

r equi r e s no i nt er nal j us t i f i cat i on.

I t f ol l ows f r o m al l t hi s , t hat an obs er v er oper at i ng i n a

48



domai n of r ea l i t y nec es s a r i l y oper at es i n a domai n of e f f ec t i v e

ac t i ons , and t hat anot her obs er v er c l ai ms t hat t he f i r s t one

commi t s a mi st ake or has an i l l us i on onl y when t he f i r s t obser verbegi ns t o ope ra t e i n a domai n of r eal i t y di f f er ent f r om t he one

t hat t he second obser ver expect ed. Thus , i f we spec i f y t heo per a t i on of di s t i nc t i on " ghos t , " t hen ghos t s exi s t , ar e r e al i n

t he domai n of ex i s t enc e br ought f or t h i n t hei r di s t i nc t i on, andwe can do e f f ec t i ve ac t i ons wi t h t hem i n t hat domai n, but t hey

ar e not r ea l i n any ot her domai n. I ndeed, ever yt h i ng i s ani l l us i on out s i de i t s domai n of ex i s t enc e. I n ot her wor ds , ever y

domai n of r eal i t y as a domai n of oper at i onal coher ences br oughtf or t h i n t he happeni ng of l i vi ng of t he obser ver i n l anguage, i sa c l os ed d omai n of ef f ect i v e c on s ens u al ac t i ons , t hat i s, a

cogn i t i ve domai n; and conver sel y , every cogn i t i ve domai n as adomai n of oper at i onal coher ences i s a domai n of r eal i t y . What i sunc anny , per haps , i s t hat al t hough di f f er en t domai ns of r eal i t yare seen by an obser ver as di f f er ent domai ns of coor d i nat i ons of

act i ons i n an env i r onment , t hey are l i ved by t he obser ver asdi f f e rent domai ns of l angu agi n g whi c h di f f er onl y t hr ough t hei rongoi ng t r ans f o rmat i on i n t he di f f e rent c i r c ums t anc es of r ec ur -s i on i n whi ch t hey ar i se. We as obser ver s can expl a i n t hi s nowby sayi ng t hat , as we oper at e i n l anguage t hr ough our c onsensual

i n t er ac t i ons i n t he happeni ng of l i v i ng of a commun i t y of obser -ver s , our s t r uc t u ra l dr i f t i n t he happeni ng of our l i v i ng bec omescont i ngent upon t he cour se of t hose consensual i nt erac t i ons , andt hat t hi s t akes pl ace i n a manner t hat keeps t he t r ansf or mat i onof t he happeni ng of our l i v i ng congr uent wi t h t he domai n of r eal i t y t hat we br i ng f or t h i n t hat communi t y of obser ver s , or wedi s i n t egr at e as member s of i t . I t i s t hi s t hat makes us obser -

v i ng syst ems sys t ems capabl e, t hr ough l anguage, of an endl essr ecurs i ve gener at i on of new cogn i t i ve domai ns ( new domai ns of r eal i t y ) as new domai ns of pr axes of observ i ng i n our cont i nuous

s t r uc t u r a l dr i f t s as l i vi ng s ys t e ms .

12. SELF - CONSCI OUSNESS AND REALI TY The sel f ar i s es i n l anguage i n t he l i ngui s t i c r ec ur s i on t hat

br i ngs f or t h t he obs er v er as an ent i t y i n t he expl ana t i on of hi sor her ope ra t i on i n a domai n of c ons ens ual di s t i nc t i ons . Sel f -c ons c i o us nes s ar i s es i n l anguage i n t he l i ngui s t i c r ec ur s i o n t hatbr i ngs f or t h t he di s t i nc t i o n of t he s el f as an ent i t y i n t he

ex pl ana t i on of t he oper at i on of t he obs er v er i n t he di s t i nc t i onof t he s el f f r om ot her ent i t i es i n a c ons ens ua l domai n of di s t i nc t i ons . As a r es ul t , r e al i t y ar i s es wi t h s el f -

c on s c i ous n es s i n l anguage as an expl ana t i on of t he di s t i n ct i onbe t ween s el f and non- s e l f i n t he pr ax i s of l i v i ng of t he

obs er ver . Sel f , s el f - c ons c i ous nes s , and r eal i t y exi s t i nl anguage as expl anat i ons of t he happen i ng of l i v i ng of t heobser ver . I ndeed, t he obser ver as a human bei ng i n l anguage i s

pr i mary wi t h r espect to sel f and se l f - consc i ousness , and t hesear i se as he or she oper at es i n l anguage expl a i n i ng hi s or her

exper i ence, hi s or her pr axi s of l i v i ng as such. That t he

ent i t i e s br ought f or t h i n our expl an at i ons s h oul d have an

unavoi dabl e pr esence i n our domai n of ex i s t ence, i s because we

ar e r eal i z ed as obs e rv er s as we di s t i ngu i s h t h es e ent i t i es i n t he

49



doma i n of o pe r a t i o na l c o h e r e n c e s t ha t t he y de f i ne a s wed i s t i n g ui s h t h e m. We do n ot go t h r o ug h a wa l l i n t he p r a x i s of l i v i n g b e c a u s e we e x i s t a s l i v i n g s y s t e ms i n t he s a me d oma i n of o pe r a t i o na l c o he r e n c e s i n whi c h a wa l l e x i s t s a s a mo l e c u l a re nt i t y, a nd a wa l l i s d i s t i n gu i s h e d a s a c omp os i t e ent i t y i n t hemo l e c u l a r s p a c e a s t ha t e n t i t y t h r o ug h wh i c h we c a n not go a s

mo l e c ul a r e n t i t i e s .

The o bs e r v e r i s p r i ma r y , not t h e ob j e c t . Be t t e r , o bs e r v i ngi s a g i v e n i n t he p r a x i s of l i vi ng i n l a n gu a ge , a nd we a r ea l r e a d y i n i t wh e n we be gi n t o r e f l e c t u po n i t . Ma t t e r , e ne r g y,i de as , not i ons , mi nd, s p i r i t , God, . . . a r e e xp l a na t o r y p r o po s i -t i ons of ( a b ou t ) t he pr a xi s of l i vi ng of t he obs e r v e r . Fu r t h e r -mor e , ma t t e r , e ne r g y, i de a s , not i o ns , mi nd, s p i r i t , or God, ase xp l a na t o r y p r o p o s i t i o n s e nt a i l d i f f e r e n t ma nne r s of l i v i ng of t he o bs e r v er i n r e c ur s i ve c on s e r v a t i o n of a da p t a t i on i n t hed oma i n s of o pe r a t i o na l c o he r e n c e s b r o ug ht f o r t h i n t he i rd i f f e r e n t d i s t i n c t i o n s . Thus , whe n t he o b s e r ve r ope r a t e s wi t hob j e c t i v i t y wi t h ou t pa r e nt he s e s , he or s h e ope r a t e s i n a n

e x p l a na t o r y a ve nue t ha t e n t a i l s ne g l e c t i n g t he e xp e r i e nt i a li n di s i n gu i s h a b i l i t y be t we e n wha t we c a l l p er c e p t i o n a nd i l l u s i on ,a nd wh e n he or s h e o pe r a t e s wi t h o bj e c t i v i t y i n p a r e n t h e s e s h e ors he op e r a t e s i n a n e x pl a n a t o r y a ve nue t ha t e nt a i l s a c c e pt i ng t h i si n d i s t i n g u i s h a bi l i t y a s a s t a r t i ng poi nt . I n t he e xp l a na t o r ypa t h of o bj e c t i v i t y wi t hout p a r e n t he s e s , t he obs e r ve r , l a ngua ge ,a nd pe r c e p t i o n c a nno t be e xp l a i ne d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y be c aus e i n t hi se x pl a n a t o r y p at h i t i s a s s u me d t ha t t he o bs e r v e r c an ma ker e f e r e nc e t o e n t i t i e s t ha t e xi s t i n de pe n de n t l y of wha t he or s hedoe s , a n a s s u mp t i o n whi c h i s i n c o nt r a d i c t i o n wi t h t he s t r uc t u r a ld e t e r mi n i s m of l i v i n g s y s t e ms ; wh i l e i n t he e x pl a n a t o r y pa t h of o b j e c t i v i t y i n pa r e n t h e s e s t he r e i s no s u ch c on t r a di c t i o n . Att he s a me t i me , a s on e o pe r a t e s wi t h i n a ny gi v e n d oma i n of r e a l i t yone c an o pe r a t e wi t h ob j e c t i v i t y wi t ho ut p a r e n t he s e s wi t h ou t

c on t r a d i c t i o n, but whe n a d i s a g r e e me n t a r i s e s wi t h a no t he rob s e r v e r , a nd one t h i n ks t ha t i t i s not a ma t t e r of a s i mp l el og i c a l mi s t a ke , one i s f o r c e d t o c l a i m a p r i v i l e g e d a c c es s t o anob j e c t i v e r e a l i t y t o r e s o l v e i t , a nd t o de a l wi t h e r r o r s a s i f t he y we r e mi s t a k i n gs of wha t i s . I f i n s i mi l a r c i r c u ms t a n c e s onei s o pe r a t i n g wi t h o b j e c t i v i t y i n pa r e n t he s e s , one f i nds t h a t t hed i s a g r e e i n g p a r t i e s o p e r a t e i n d i f f e r e nt d oma i n s of r e a l i t y , a ndt ha t t he d i s a g r e e me n t d i s a p pe a r s onl y whe n t he y be gi n t o o pe r a t ei n t he s a me one . Fu r t h e r mo r e , one a l s o f i n ds t ha t e r r o r s a r ec h a ng e s of d oma i n of r e a l i t y i n t he op e r a t i o n of a n ob s e r v e r t ha the or s he n ot i c e s onl y a p os t e r i o r i . Fi na l l y , by op er a t i ng i nt he e x pl a n a t o r y pa t hwa y of o bj e c t i v i t y wi t h ou t p ar e n t h es e s wec a nn ot e x pl a i n h ow a n o bs e r v e r o pe r a t e s i n t he g e ne r a t i o n of a

s c i e nt i f i c e xp l a n a t i o n be c a us e we t a ke f o r g r a nt e d t he a b i l i t i e sof t he o bs e r v e r . Co n t r a r y t o t hi s s t a t e of a f f a i r s , i f weope r a t e i n t he e xp l a n a t o r y p a t hwa y of o bj e c t i v i t y i n pa r e nt he s e s ,s c i e nt i f i c e x pl a n a t i o ns and t he ob s e r v e r a pp e a r as c ompo ne n t s i na s i ngl e c l o s e d g e ne r a t i v e e x pl a n a t o r y me c h a ni s m, i n whi c h t hep r op e r t i e s or a bi l i t i e s of t h e o b s e r ve r a r e s h own t o a r i s e i n ad i f f e r e n t p h e n ome n a l d oma i n t ha n t he one i n wh i c h i t s c o mp on e n t s

o p e r a t e .

50



We human bei ngs exi st onl y as we exi st as sel f - consci ousent i t i es i n l anguage. I t i s onl y as we ex i s t as se l f - consc i ousent i t i es t hat t he domai n of phys i cal ex i s t ence ex i s t s as ourl i mi t i ng cogni t i ve domai n i n t he ul t i mat e expl anat i on of t hehuman obser ver ' s happeni ng of l i vi ng. The physi cal domai n of

exi st ence i s secondar y t o t he happeni ng of l i vi ng of t he humanobser ver , even t hough i n t he expl anat i on of obser vi ng t he humanobser ver ar i ses f r om t he physi cal domai n of exi st ence. I ndeed,t he unders t andi ng of t he ont ol ogi cal pr i macy of obser vi ng i sbasi c f or t he under st andi ng of t he phenomenon of cogni t i on.Human exi st ence i s a cogni t i ve exi st ence and t akes pl ace t hr oughl anguagi ng; yet , cogni t i on has no cont ent and does not exi stout s i de t he ef f ec t i ve ac t i ons t hat cons t i t ut e i t . Thi s i s whynot hi ng exi s t s out s i de t he di s t i nct i ons of t he observer . Thatt he physi cal domai n of exi st ence shoul d be our l i mi t i ng cogni t i vedomai n does not al t er t hi s . Nat ur e, t he wor l d, soci ety, sc i ence,r el i gi on, t he phys i cal space, at oms , mol ecul es , t r ees , . . . i ndeedal l t hi ngs , ar e c o g n i t i v e ent i t i es , expl anat i ons of t he pr axi s orhappeni ng of l i vi ng of t he obser ver , and as such, as t hi s ver y

expl anat i on, t hey onl y exi st as a bubbl e of human act i onsf l oat i ng on not hi ng. Ever y t hi ng i s cogni t i ve, and t he bubbl e of human cogni t i on changes i n t he cont i nuous happeni ng of t he humanr ecur s i ve i nvol vement i n coont ogeni c and cophy l ogeni c dr i f t swi t h i n t he domai ns of exi st ence t hat he or she br i ngs f or t h i nt he pr axi s of l i vi ng. Every t hi ng i s human r espons i bi l i t y .

The at om and t he hydr ogen bombs ar e cogni t i ve ent i t i es . Thebi g bang, or what ever we c l ai m f r om our pr esent pr axi s of l i vi nggave or i gi n t o t he phys i cal ver sum, i s a cogni t i ve ent i t y, anexpl anat i on of t he pr axi s of l i v i ng of t he obser ver bound to t heont ol ogy of obser v i ng. That i s t hei r r eal i t y. Our happen i ng of l i v i ng t akes pl ace r egard l ess of our expl anat i ons , but i t s cour sebecomes cont i ngent upon our expl anat i ons as t hey become part of

t he domai n of exi st ence i n whi ch we conser ve or gani zat i on andadapt at i on t hr ough our s t r uc t ur al dr i f t s . Our l i vi ng t akes pl acei n s t r uct ur al coupl i ng wi t h t he wor l d t hat we br i ng f or t h, andt he wor l d t hat we br i ng f or t h i s our doi ng as obser ver s i nl anguage as we operat e i n st r uct ural coupl i ng i n i t i n t he pr axi sof l i vi ng. We cannot do anyt hi ng out si de our domai ns of st r uct ur al coupl i ng; we cannot do anyt hi ng out si de our domai ns of cogni t i on; we cannot do anyt hi ng out si de our domai ns of l anguagi ng. Thi s i s why not hi ng t hat we do as human bei ngs i st r i vi al . Ever yt hi ng t hat we do becomes par t of t he worl d t hat wel i ve as we br i ng i t f or t h as soc i al ent i t i es i n l anguage. Humanr es pons i bi l i t y i n t he mul t i v er s a i s t ot al .

51



ONTOL OGY OF OBSE RV I NG

52



NOTES

texts in cybernetic theory

Documents