ISLAM AND THE CHANGING MIDDLE EAST

Terrorist Nation or Scapegoat?Taking a Close Look at Iran and the "Islamic Threat"By Hooshang Amirahmadi

T he July 1994 criminal bombing Following the Buenos Aires bomb- later date when more information mayincidents in Buenos Aires and ing. in sharp contrast to their previous become available, it is possible to spec-London have refocused world approach, Israeli officials quickly ulate about some of the tactical and

attention on the alleged role of the focused attention on Iran and singled strategic concerns driving Israel towardIslamic Republic of Iran in promoting out the government (not any particular a change of policy toward Iran. To"fundamentalist" Islam and terrorism. faction) as the primary culprit for the begin with, Israeli officials have a legit-Once again talk of an "Islamic threat" bombings. The Nel~' York Times quoted imate concern about, and an obligationled by Iran is being thrown around. A Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to react to, the fact that the Jewish andstrident voice has been added to those as saying that "there is no longer the Israeli peoples and institutions are tar-accusing Iran of masterminding world slightest doubt that Iran stands behind gets of a worldwide vicious terroristterrorism, and that is Israel. After years the bombings." Why would Israel so campaign, which only since last yearof focusing mainly on its Arab adver- categorically accuse Iran and take an has resulted in the death of some 580saries, Israel has now singled out Iran unusually confrontational stand against Jews in various parts of the world; theyas the greatest threat to its security. But Tehran? The curiosity behind the ques- cannot afford to remain indifferentdo the facts really warrant Israel's new tion is particularly inspired by the fact given their perceived guardianship ofIran policy1 Is Iran truly leading a glob- that, according to the same news report, the Jewish people. Nor can they simplyal terrorist movement? senior officials and intelligence offi- blame groups like the Hezbollah,

cers in the Clinton Administration dis- Hamas, and neo-Nazis. Theagree with Israeli officials and view the Argentinean Jews, for example, shouldbombings as a direct outgrowth of not be paying a heavy price for thebattles between Israel and the Party Israeli conflict with the first two, and

of God (Hezbollah).* targeting the neo-Nazis as independentWhile a more informed response to actors has dangerous implications. As a

the question will have to wait until a result and because of other considera-

Hooshang Amirahmadi chairs theDepartment of Urban Planning andPolicy Development and is director ofMiddle Eastern Studies at RutgersUniversity. Dr. Amirahmadi has pub-lished numerous books and journalarticles. lectured in over 20 countries,and serves as a consultant to several

Bombing of the Jewish Community center July 18 in Buenos Aires

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 23}JCJ 6

I'

tions discussed below. Israelis havedirected blame toward Iran. which con-tinues to remain a supporter of anti-Israeli groups in the Middle East.

No wonder then that an emergingconfrontational Israeli policy towardIran has already been reported byIsraeli sources. According to Ron Ben-yishai, a "highly regarded" militaryreporter for Yediot Aharanot, Israel'slargest daily paper, this new approachtoward Iran may become unavoidable.Citing anonymous high-ranking Israelisecurity officials, he has said:"Questions are arising in Israel over thewisdom of avoiding a direct conflictwith the Iranians, as Israel has doneuntil now. ..Senior defense officialsthink it's time to change policy and goafter the Iranians, as we did {with] theinternational terror of Black Septemberand the PLa." (Quoted in August 5-1 I,I 994 issue of The Jewish Week)

To persuasively hold Iran responsi-ble for the bombings, the Israeli offi-cials and intelligence sources have tac-tically sought to link the incidents tothe Middle East peace process. Iranopposes the current peace negotiationsand could therefore be involved inefforts designed to terrorize the Jewishpeople and disrupt the peace process.This assertion assumes that Iran istotally oblivious of its national interestsand acts on the basis of some overarch-ing ideological imperative. Yet, thecountry's officials, including PresidentAli Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, havefrequently denied that Iran would doanything to sabotage the ongoing nego-tiations. In a June 7, 1994 press confer-ence, the President stated that Iran dis-approves of the peace process, but"does not wish to intervene in practiceand physically disrupt the process."

By linking the bombings with thepeace process, Israel also hopes tosecure American and Arab support fortheir emerging confrontational policytoward Iran. Americans have investedtremendous amounts of money, time,energy and, above all, prestige in thecurrent peace negotiations and want tosee them succeed. If Iran wasto be found involved in disruptingthe process, and given the already inim-ical relations that exist betweenthe two governments, the Clinton

Administration could lose its temperaltogether and take actions that wouldfurther isolate Iran and ultimatelystrangle it. The Arab states in the nego-tiations could also become seriouslyupset at Iran and take some form of col-lective action. themselves.

The campaign to de-couple Iranfrom Europe has also been stepped up.Following the Buenos Aires bombingthe Israeli government sent a delega-tion to the European capitals in aneffort to further isolate Iran. An August1994 issue of The Jerusalem Reportfocused on "Iran's use of terror toblackmail the West." The story"revealed" that "in exchange for immu-nity from Iranian terror operations ontheir soil, several European nationshave rescheduled Iran's debts, boostedtrade with Tehran and even releasedIranian murder suspects." Such revela-tions, Israelis hope, will embarrasscountries like France and Germany,and make them significantly reducetheir economic relations with Iran. Ifthis happens, Iran, already on inimicalterms with the United States andEngland, would be suffocated.

To focus attention on the IslamicRepublic and its "terrorist diplomats,"the Israelis have also sought to avoiddirectly linking the Lebanese Hezbollahto the incidents. According to Ben-yishai, the terrorists involved in thebombings in Buenos Aires "were notnecessarily Hezbollah, but locals, guid-ed by Iranian diplomats..' Here, Iran issuspected to have used neo-Nazis as"surrogates" so Iran can deny involve-ment even if the actual perpetrators wereto be caught. While such a scenario isnot all that impossible, it is hard tobelieve that Iran would ever rely uponsuch capricious elements to undertake aterrorist act of such magnitude and withsuch ramifications. The wisdom ofavoiding directly implicating theHezbollah is because the Israelis do notwish to confront Hezbollah with whomthey have now developed a unique com-bative relationship in south Lebanon.

As part of these tactical changes,Israelis are also avoiding direct con-frontation with Islam as a source ofthreat; instead, they are increasinglyimmersing "the Islamic threat'" in "theIranian threat." This emerging change

of focus is designed to parallel the newUS policy of distinguishing betweenIran and Islam and so avoid confronta-tion with certain Islamic nations andmovements whose support Israelis mayneed in confronting Iran. An emergingArab- Israeli alliance in the wake of thepeace negotiations would also require amore hospitable attitude toward Islamon part of the Jewish state.

This new Israeli strategy, however,does not always work. There arenumerous examples of Islamic move-ments that are quite obviously distinctfrom Iran. For instance, the anti-IsraeliHamas and Hezbollah movements arenot just "Islamic," but movements ofreal non-Iranian people. And evenIsraelis have not implicated Iran in themurderous bombing campaigns inIndia for which the Indian governmentblames the Pakistani government andradical Muslims. Iran has also beennotably silent about the death threat bythe Islamic fundamentalists againstTaslima Nasrin, the feministBangladeshi writer. More recently, Irantook a conciliatory stance at the popu-lation conference in Cairo that wassharply at odds with the hardline viewsof Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and theVatican, among others.

Israelis may have also becomeincreasingly concerned about theirstrategic importance to the UnitedStates in the post-Cold War era. Afterthe conclusion of the current peacenegotiations with its main Arab oppo-nents, Israel's importance as a strategicasset will further diminish. In theabsence of a serious regional threat tothe West's interests, the Jewish statewill become just another state to itsWestern allies. In such an eventuality,Israelis could not only lose billions ofUS dollars in foreign aid each year, butalso the strong commitment of theWest to its security and well-being.Iran, on the other hand, remains theonly country in the region with suffi-cient resources to become a futureregional power.

Finally, it is also possible thatIsraelis are genuinely fearful of Iran'sIslamic government, or at least of cer-tain anti-Israeli factions within theTehran regime. This fear is partly basedon the unsettled state of politics in the

24 MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT

nary sources. The fictitious side of thisperceived threat is largely a product ofcertain media misconceptions and pun-dits who explain the present day ten-sion between the Western and Muslimworlds as partly reflecting an allegedclassical Islamic view that regards thetwo as inherently inimical. One suchargument comes to us from the histori-an Bernard Lewis in his widely publi-cized 1990 article "The Roots ofMuslim Rage" from the At/anticMonth/.v. "In the classical Islamic view,to which many Muslims are beginningto return, the world and all mankind aredivided into two: the House of Islam.where the Muslim law and faith pre-vail, and the rest, known as the Houseof Unbelief or the House of War, whichit is the duty of Muslims ultimately tobring to Islam."

In itself, this is a recklessly abstractcharacterization of Islam, heldnowhere in the Muslim world today byany rational individual, group, orinstitution. Even the late AyatollahKhomeini, a leader of modem Islamicmovements who no one can accuse oflacking conviction, is not known tohave espoused such an extreme andobsolete view of Islam. Like otherworld religions, Islam is protective ofits borders and wishes to see non-Muslims convert. But to interpret thisas reflecting a Muslim design to bring

country and the fact that Iran is aresourceful nation whose capabilitiescould expand quickly. To be sure,Iran's consistent anti-Israeli pro-nouncements have further deepenedthis fear in recent years when theJewish state has become increasinglyvulnerable to both domestic and inter-national pressures. From this perspec-tive, Israelis may naturally thinkTehran must have had a hand in thebombings in Argentina and London.Meanwhile, Israelis remain confusedabout Iran's real intentions in theregion. Signals emanating from Tehranare not always consistent and theregime has spoken in many languagesover the years.

In short, a complex of factors haveinduced Israel to rethink its Iran policy,and design new tactics to facilitateimplementation of the emerging con-frontational approach. But. whileuncertainty exists about the real causesof the deteriorating relations betweenIsrael and Iran. it is quite clear that thisIsraeli-Iranian confrontation will notserve either party's immediate or long-term interests, and it could become anew source of regional instability andincreased terrorism. Such an outcomewould hardly be to anyone's benefitinside or outside the Middle East. It isthus imperative that world policymak-ers seek more accurate informationabout the real sources of terrorism inorder to form more informed opinions.eliminate such barbaric acts. and helpreduce tension between Iran and Israel.Policymakers in Iran and Israel mayalso wish to reconsider their ratherunproductive and often equivocationalapproach toward each other. Otherregional players must also take aresponsible approach to the emergingIranian-Israeli confrontation and help.with whatever means, to reduce ten-sions between the countries. At stakeare national development, regional sta-bility. and world peace.

Deconstructing the Islamic ThreatThe perceived "Islamic threat" that

causes all this tension needs to be fur-ther examined and stripped of some ofits myths. The "threat" is in fact rootedin a set of objective and subjective fac-tors that include both real and imagi-

the Western world to Islam is unjusti-fied. On the contrary, Muslims seethemselves threatened by adverseforces and are on the defensive. Thisfact is also emphasized by Leon Hadarof the Cato Institute in his 1993 article"What Green Peril?" from ForeignAffairs: "Far from being a unifiedpower that is about to reach again thegates of Vienna and the shores ofSpain, Islam is, in fact, currently onthe defensive against militant anti-Muslim fundamentalists."

More recently, Samuel Huntingtonof Harvard University has come upwith an even more explicitly banal the-ory of "civilizational conflict" betweenthe West and the Islamic world. In hiswell known 1993 article "The Clash ofCivilizations?" from Foreign Affairs,Huntington asserts that the fundamen-tal source of conflict in the new worldwill be cultural and that a possible thirdworld war, if it ever happens, will takeplace between the Western civilizationand its main antagonist, Islamic civi-lization. Similar views are alsoexpressed by a variety of other pundits,describing the so-called Islamic threatin such terms as "global intifada,""Islam international," and"Khomeinitern." Unfortunately, suchideologically inspired characterizationsof Islam have at times justified horrify-ing practices against even peaceful

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER25

to the West, As the Iranian experienceindicates. over time and as the revolu-tionary vision fails to be realized. radi-calism and anti-Westernism lose theirpotency and often are replaced bypragmatism with reactive behavior.cautious accommodation of the West.and realpolitik.

Islam and the Oil WeaponWhile misperceptions or ignorance

have caused the fictitious side of theperceived Islamic threat to dominatethe debate. one must not underestimatethe significance of an objective basisfor the West's concern. There are twosuch areas of concern remaining in thepost-Cold War era: access to oil andmaintenance of the status quo.

Some 75 to 77 percent of the worldoil is located in the Muslim world.where the majority of people havebecome poorer and live in a state ofspiritual unrest. Some 66 percent of thisoil comes from the Persian Gulf region.where corrupt and/or undemocraticregimes rule by decree and face prob-lems ranging from economic malaise topolitical instability. The Gulf reserveswill also last the longest among theknown world oil reserves and cost theleast to produce. The West depends onthis oil for a significant portion of itsincreasing energy needs. making itseconomy potentially vulnerable to dis-ruptions in supply from the region.

Yet. the West's dependency on theflow of oil from Muslim countries mustbe viewed in relation to an equally crit-ical dependency of the Muslim oil pro-ducers on oil revenues and Westernmarkets. Almost all petroleum statesface tremendous economic hardshipand depend on oil revenue for 90 to 99percent of their foreign exchange earn-ings. Oil revenue is needed to pay forballooning import bills for food. indus-trial inputs. military purchases. and debtservices among other foreign obliga-tions. This dependency on oil revenue issuch that it makes it impossible for anyof these states. even when they fall inthe hands of Islamic radicals as in Iran.to use oil as a weapon against the West.

A closer look at the geographic dis-tribution of Muslim oil reserves showsthat there is even less cause for concern

on the part of the West. In general, thecountries in which the Islamic move-ments are strong are those whose oilproduction is not critical for the West.These countries include Egypt, Turkey,Lebanon, Jordan, and the Sudan. Incontrast, in the Muslim countries whoseoil production is critical for the West,the Islamic movements are either weakor follow a moderate ideology-such asin Saudi Arabia and other smaller GulfArab states. Algeria remains a boilingpot, and it could see radicalism of his-toric proportion if the current repressionlasts longer and democratic forces failto take state power. Libya is neutral-ized, Iraq is devastated, Syria is fastbecoming moderate, and Iran is playinga waiting game.

While no single Muslim state canchallenge the West's access to oil, as waswell demonstrated during the Kuwaiticrisis, the prevailing conditions make theformation of a common Islamic fronteven more unlikely. Significant differ-ences exist among Persians, Arabs andTurks, as well as between Shi'ites andSunnis. OPEC is also manifestly inca-pable of bringing its producers togetherin any common action against the West.In reality, the organization is having ahard time just surviving. Equally unlike-ly in the foreseeable future are such sce-narios as external aggressive designs anda local dispute escalating into open war.The Iraqi blunder serves as a good lessonto any potential challenger. Thus, unlessthe political status quo in the Middle Eastchanges drastically, the West need notlose any sleep about an Islamic oil threat.

From the West's perspective, there-fore, preserving the status quo seems alogical thing to do. Yet, as has beenargued, this same status quo is a majorsource of radicalism and Islamic funda-mentalism in the Middle East. While anIslamic alternative would not seem toserve Western interests, any "prema-ture pressure," advises Bernard Lewis,will lead to the regimes' overthrow,"not by democratic opposition, but byother forces that then proceed to estab-lish a more ferocious and determineddictatorship." Examples include Iranand the Sudan. What then does theWest need to do? To go slow, to influ-ence events at the margin, recommends

Muslims. For example, Serbian nation-alists have justified their "ethniccleansing" policies as part of theWest's collective attempt to crush fun-damentalist Islam and prevent itsspread in Europe.

Some who use this monolithic char-acterization to explain Islam then con-tradict it with an equally fanciful divi-sion of Muslims into two groups, the so-called fundamentalists and non-funda-mentalists. This division. which ignoresthe rich diversity of Islam. Muslims andthe Muslim world, is taken to greaterheights of confusion when fundamen-talism is equated with radicalism andconsidered anti-West and inimical tocapitalism. Lost in these generalizationsare the realities that for most Muslimsthere is a distinction between anti-Westand anti-Westernism, that fundamental-ism and radicalism do not always coin-cide, and that fundamentalism is hardlyanti-capitalist.

What all these pundits choose toignore is the fact that the roots ofIslamic radicalism must be looked foroutside the religion. in the real world ofcultural despair, economic decline.political oppression, and spiritual tur-moil in which most Muslims find them-selves today. The Shi'a population ofLebanon was the largest and least rep-resented ethnic group in that country.The poor and oppressed Palestinians ofthe Gaza Strip form the backbone ofHamas. According to all objectiveaccounts, the Islamic Salvation Front(FIS) appeared to be the largest vote-getter in Algerian elections before itwas brutally and unjustly decimated bythe army. The Egyptian governmentadmits that the wretched slums of largeurban areas are the principal recruitingareas for the country's own increasing-ly powerful Islamic movement.

The most significant qualities ofIslamic radicalism and anti-Westernism are, therefore. their reac-tions to existing conditions and pastmemories, and their search for a utopi-an Islamic community. These qualitiesmake these Islamic movements moreephemeral than enduring. significantlyreducing the likelihood that they cancreate an Islamic model society, andthus diminishing their potential threat

MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT26

Judith Miller in her 1993 article '"theChallenge of Radical Islam" in ForeignAffairs. This would in practice mean,she asserts, "increased political partici-pation in government and the need for afreer press and freer public debate in allcountries in the region."

But is this possible? Jordan,Morocco, and Tunisia have indeedbeen practicing this formula with rela-tive success. A major factor of theirachievement has been the willingnessof those in power to incorporate a rangeof power contenders including Islamicgroups. While one would wish to seethe Persian Gulf Arab states. Egypt,and Algeria also implement similarpolitical reforms, their governments'current practices suggest a reversetrend. Fear of Islamic radicalism is thenused to justify resisting needed politicalreform. The West also seems contentwith the justification. Yet, thisapproach will only delay an inevitableresolution of the contradiction betweenthe need for reform and preservation ofthe status quo, making its peaceful res-olution increasingly impossible. TheWest needs to make a choice andquickly: to remain aloof of the growingneed for change and risk endangeringits interests, or exert pressure on itsallies for introduction of immediatemeaningful reforms.

Iran and Islamic MovementsIn the past several years, Algeria,

Egypt, Tunisia. and Jordan, as well asIsrael and the PLO, have battled tovarying degrees with so-called pro-Iranian Islamic fundamentalists.Among the groups alleged to haveclose ties with Tehran are Hamas in theOccupied Territories, the MuslimBrotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, theal-Nahda movement in Tunisia, theShi'a movement in .Iraq, and theIslamic Salvation Front (FIS) inAlgeria. Muslim guerrillas from thesemovements were supposedly trained inAfghanistan and Lebanon by Iranianagents in the 1980s (never mind that theCIA was operating several camps fortraining the Afghan mujahideen inPakistan and elsewhere in the world).Presently, the Sudan is considered themain training ground-second only to

Other than Hezhollah (above) Iran hasestablishing positive relations with mosIran itself-for Iran's "internationalIslamic extremists." "What is fascinat-ing to me:' pointed out John Espositoat a conference on US-Iran relations inWashington, D.C., in September of1993, "is that after a year-and-a-half oftalking about Iran's influence in theSudan, and given the capabilities of ourintelligence services and the self-inter-est of many governments in the region,no one is coming forward with signifi-cant evidence about the size and num-ber of these camps:'

It is hard to believe that a generallyweak and economically crippled Irancould create a vast network of under-ground training and support activities,and then use it for so many disparategoals around the globe to create a so-called global intifada. Note also, thatmost Islamic movements are Sunniwhile Iran is a Shi 'a theocracy. Thisfact explains why, except with theLebanese Hezbollah and the Hamas to

27SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER

had difficultyt Islamic groups

some extent, Iran has not been success-ful in developing entrenched and last-ing relationships with many of the mostsignificant Islamic movements in theArab world, including the FIS, theIslamic Brotherhood. and al-Nahda.Even Shi 'ites have not always respond-ed to Iran's calls for help; for example,Iraqi Shi 'a soldiers, in spite of theirhatred for the Iraqi Sunni regime,fought a fierce and nationalistic battleagainst Iran, disregarding the lateKhomeini's repeated pleading, askingthem to desert the "infidel" Iraqi armyand join their Shi 'a brothers on the"Islamic" Iranian side.

Needless to say, as an Islamicregime, Iran does have a significantimpact on the Islamic movements. Atthe very least, it is a source of inspira-tion for them because of the obviousfact that it espouses a similar ideologyand supports their anti-status quo pos-ture. In certain cases Iran can be direct-

ly linked to these movements as in thecases of the Lebanese Hezbollah andthe Palestinian Hamas who receivelogistic support from Tehran. Hamaswas originally created by the Israelis asa counterweight to the PLa. The orga-nization soon began receiving fundsfrom Saudi Arabia. Iran was the last tosupport Hamas. Iran's relation withsmaller more extremist groups, like theIslamic Jihad in Palestine and Egypt, isthe least congenial. While Iran some-times sympathizes with their causesand wishes to give them some logisticalsupport, it is fearful of their rather vio-lent approach, doubts if their acts couldever be brought under control, andremains dubious about their longevity.No wonder those who wished to showconnection between the terrorist bomb-ing of the World Trade Center and Iranwere basically disappointed.

In most cases, as in Algeria andEgypt, the popularity of the Islamistforces are the direct result of the acute-ly inept economic forces of the existinggovernments and not because of anyactions in the part of Iran. In the case ofthe Hezbollah, Iran became an institu-tional and material source of supportfor a sector of the population that hadbeen historically excluded from thepdlitical process. Here, however, Iran'sultimate influence has been to moder-ate the force (as opposed to Hamas.upon whom Iran has had a radicalizinginfluence). With Iranian persuasion,Hezbollah released all Westernhostages it was holding and joined theLebanese parliament. In July 1993,Hezbollah acted upon Iran's advicewhen it accepted a cease-fire withIsrael in southern Lebanon. It must benoted, however, that in the course ofthe last several years of confrontation,Israelis and Hezbollah have developedtheir unique problem, independent ofthe Palestinian issue, Syrian connec-tion, or Iranian-Israeli relations.

The case-specific and opportunisticnature of the relationships between Iranand the Islamic movements in theMiddle East should be readily apparentto many pundits. Yet, their approachhas thus far been to generalize suchrelationships and make them look strict-ly ideological and insane. In their 1993

ideological interests when formulatingpolicies. This rational behavior is evenmore evident in Iran's relationshipwith Islamic movements. In particu-lar, Iran carefully plans the directionof its impact on these movements andconsiders the pros and cons of theiractions for its foreign relations andnational interests.

The Effects of IslamicMovements on Iran

While current literature emphasizesIran's impact on and use of Islamicmovements, it hardly pays any seriousattention to the reverse influence ofthese movements on Iran. To beginwith, the Islamic movements provideIran with significant opportunities toboost its domestic image and interna-tional bargaining power. At the sametime, they have also become a source oftremendous constraint On Iranian rela-tions with the West and neighboringstates. This contradictory impact ofIslamic movements on Iran is a maincause of instability and incoherence inIran's foreign policy.

The Islamic movements around theMiddle East contribute to Iran's pres-tige in the region in three major ways:they boost Iran's power and bargainingleverage; they act as legitimizing toolsfor the whole concept of Islam as apolitical ideology; and they are asource of strategic purpose and direc-tion. The power-boosting function ofthe Islamic movements stems from thefact that they are popular and standagainst mostly unpopular regimes inthe Islamic world. They could, there-fore, be easily utilized as a source ofpressure on domestic politics. Besides,the Islamic nature of the state in Iranaffords it a better position to manipu-late the movements for its regionaldiplomatic aims. As such, these move-ments have the potential to increaseIran's bargaining power vis-a.-vis cer-tain states and their foreign protectors.

The magnitude of the gain for Iran,however, depends on how intelligentlythis aspect of the Islamic movements isutilized. Generally, whenever Iran'ssupport of these movements paralleledthe West's interests, or enjoyed itscooperation, Iran's gain has been sig-

article "Ambitious Iran, TroubledNeighbors" from Foreign Affairs,Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson pre-sent Iran as the callous party in theserelations. Its real aim is not to help thegroups but to use them toward its"satanic objectives" of overthrowingreactionary Arab regimes, exporting theIslamic revolution, disrupting the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, murderingleaders of its opposition, blackmailingthe West or blasting its holdings, takinghostages, hijacking planes, and destroy-ing Israeli or Jewish targets. If youasked why would Iran undertake suchsenseless terrorist acts and how wouldsuch acts achieve their national or ideo-logical interests, the authors would pos-sibly say such questions never arise foran "irrational" and "outlaw" extremistregime, and that the prime mover ofIran for involvement in terrorist politicsis its avowed anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-status quo,and anti-democratic nature. To createan even more monstrous picture of Iranthe article also alleges that "Iranappears to have launched a program toacquire nuclear weapons."

Yet, the actual practice of Iran,when seen in its totality, does not sup-port such a monolithic and one-sidedcharacterization of the regime inTehran. One only needs to recallIran's principled stand during theKuwaiti crisis or its responsibleCentral Asian diplomacy to concludethat Tehran is not all that irrational ormindless. Then, of course, there is theother side of Iran's behavior: dogmat-ic, fiercely uncompromising, andunrealistically skeptical of the West'sintentions toward Muslims. Tehran'sother problems relate to its reactivebehavior or policies and the fact itbelieves in international conspiracytheory. Iran has also shown at timesthat it miscalculates its capabilitiesand constraints, and misunderstandssome of the world's major trends andevents. These problems have often ledTehran to design agonizing or unfortu-nate policies.

Iran, like any normal state, calcu-lates its moves to the best of its abili-ty, accounts for the pros and cons of itsactions, and considers its national and

28 MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT

international relations and breedscoherence. This in turn gives Iran acertain identity and creates a distinctframework for its behavior and poli-cies. Iran's attempts to expand its rela-tions with Islamic nations is a reflec-tion of this sense of Islamic direction.In reality, however, such attempts havenot always been successful becausethis sense of Islamic purpose anddirection often contradicts the interestsof the states in the Muslim world.where most regimes are antithetical toIslamic movements.

Islamic movements also tend tocripple Iran's foreign policy by con-tributing to the negative image that

ed through their ideological stand, Irancannot normalize relations with theWest. The difficulty is confoundedbecause the subjective side of theWest's fear of Islam and Iran is hardlyaddressable in the immediate future.The objective side must be, therefore,carefully confronted by the Iranianleadership. It is only by changing thenature of this objective concern thatIran will be able to mitigate its diffi-culties with the West. In particular,Iran must take care to diffuse tensionswith Egypt and Israel, which arepresently the main forces behind theUS fear of Islamic movements. Underthese conditions, Iran must formulate,and consistently apply, a long-termregional foreign policy that reducestension with the West.

The West (particularly the UnitedStates) Iran, Israel, the Arab nations,and the Islamic movements in theMiddle East all have a major stake inchanging the current course of eventsin the region; it serves no worthwhilepurpose to waste resources andincrease hatred. A new approachwould promote comprehensive region-al peace, political stability, and eco-nomic justice; it would account for theconcerns and interests of all involvedwithin a framework of compromiseand compassion. This requires a trulyintegrative approach; no individual,group, party, or country should be leftbehind; no claim or complaints shouldbe ignored. It also demands that theparties involved further their under-standing of each other's complaints,intentions, capabilities, and con-straints. They must also develop anattitude for mutual respect and a will-ingness to cooperate. Those in powermust accommodate those seekingpower, and those seeking power mustunderstand that they cannot be accom-modated overnight. A balance betweenthe two attitudes has to develop-something that may not come automat-ically. The West, Islamic leaders,regional governments, and othersinvolved have moral and temporalresponsibilities to make this happen.No other alternative exists if theMiddle East is to prosper in the fore-seeable future. .

movements also tendto cripple Iran'sforeign policy by

contributing to thenegative image thatIran suffers from in

the West

nificant as in the cases of Afghanistanand Iraq. In sharp contrast, whereverthe opposite has been the case, Iran hasended up paying a heavy price. Thegain also depends on the nature of themovements themselves: the more pop-ular and extensive the movements are,the better they are for Iran's image. Insharp contrast, movements identifiedwith terrorist actions have proven themost damaging to Iran's global statureand prestige. The Islamic Jihad is acase in point.

The identifying and legitimizingfunctions of the Islamic movements forIran emanate from their ideologicalspecificity. The collapse of the bipolarideological system has given theIslamic movements an opportunity todefine themselves as a new non-Western pole. As long as Iran and theIslamic movements espouse congruityof purpose, the visibility of Iran and itsstrength in international politics will beenhanced. This ideological similarityand its attendant solidarity also enableIran to claim worldwide leadership ofIslamic movements.

The Islamic movements are also asource of strategic purpose and direc-tion for the Islamic Republic. For one,these movements are indicative of arevitalized and dynamic ideology.They also function as a reminderwhenever there is a tendency in theIranian leadership to drift from its ide-ological commitments. Iran's tendencyto re-ideologize its foreign policy aftera period of pragmatism and modera-tion is a case in point. This tendencywas partly motivated by politicaldevelopments in Central Asia, Algeria,Egypt, and Afghanistan, supposedlyindicating a growing strength inIslamic movements. In practice, how-ever, Iran avoided mixing ideologywith imperatives of national interests,particularly in Central Asia, where Iranhas successfully established variousbilateral links.

Iran's gains from the Islamic move-ments must be viewed in relation to itsactual and potential losses, or difficul-ties these movements often created forTehran's diplomacy. For example, theideological uniqueness of the Islamiccamp creates a given space for Iran in

Iran suffers from in the West. Theperceived Islamic pole and Iran'sself-appointed leadership of it has ledto a new Western paradigm of Islamicand Iranian threat. very much in thesame way that communism and theSoviet Union were seen as insepara-ble and dangerous to Western inter-ests. Over time. this paradigm hasincreasingly become redefined interms of demonizing Iran. Phraseslike the "outlaw nation and "Iranianmenace" are now frequently heardfrom top Western policymakers. Nodoubt, this is why Iran has beenincluded under the Administration's"Dual Containment policy.

As long as the Islamic movementsand the Islamic Republic are connect-

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 29