TerrorismPolitical in aims and motivesThreatens to use or uses violenceDesigned to have far-reaching psychological impact

beyond immediate victim or targetConducted by organizations with chain of command, or

networks of individuals inspired by ideology of an existent terrorist group

Perpetrated by a subnational or nonstate entity

“These are public acts of destruction, committed without a clear military objective, that arouse a widespread sense of fear.”

Source: Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 40.

Source: Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 5.

Terrorism and religionReligion may be

Peripheral: underscore nationalist separatist movements (e.g., former Yugoslavia and KLA)

Central: deny the legitimacy and/or existence of enemy on theological grounds (e.g., Hamas and Hizbullah)

Religion serves to legitimate and justify the group’s activitiesNot exclusive to any one tradition “For the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act

or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators therefore often disregard the political, moral, or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists.” (Hoffman, p. 88)

“…in many of these cases religion has supplied not only the ideology but also the motivation and the organizational structure for the perpetrators.” (Juergensmeyer, p. 5)Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third edition

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

Religious terrorism not inconsequentialReligious terrorism now with us

1980: 4 percent of known international terrorist organizations had a religious basis

1994: 33 percent 1995: 46 percent 2004: 46 percent

Religious terrorism causes more fatalities:1998-2004: Religious terrorists responsible for 6 percent

of recorded incidents and for 30 percent of total deaths.1982-1989: Shi‘i Islamic terrorists responsible for 8

percent of international incidents and for 30 percent of total deaths.

1998-2004: Al Qaeda responsible for 0.1 percent of terrorist attacks and for 19 percent of total deaths.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 85-86, 88.

Islam: Martyrdom and suicide attacksMartyrdom is highly controversial

Suicide versus martyrdomSpecial status given to perpetrators:

Shaheed batal - martyr heroes Istishahadi - he who martyrs himself

According to some traditions, the martyr receives:Entry to Paradise; forgiveness of sins; 72 “black-

eyed women”, or virgins, or houris; entry to Paradise for 70 family members; glory

Family of the martyr will likely receive honor, material support

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 158-163.

Suicide versus martyrdom“A suicide takes his life….But what we are talking

about is killing yourself for your religion and your people. A suicide is someone tired of himself and Allah, but a mujahadin [holy warrior] is imbued with faith in Allah’s grace and generosity.”

Suicide attack as martyrdom: Sacrifice in the service of IslamOften seen as a “cost-effective” tactic

Clerics discourage use of indiscriminate violence Justifiable under Islam as a form of self-defense

(e.g., Hizbullah’s attacks on the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon)

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 160-161.

Pape on Suicide Terrorism:The ArgumentStrategic logic of suicide terrorism: allows

terrorist groups to coerce modern liberal democracies into making territorial concessions

Preferred strategy of an organizationMore destructive, 1980-2001 (excluding 9/11)

Suicide attacks killed 13 persons on average compared to about one in other terrorist incidents

only 3% of terrorist attacks suicide but accounted for 48% of total deaths

Demonstrates commitment to the causeSignals willingness to escalate costs

Supporting Evidence

Region Dispute Homeland Status Terrorist GoalTarget a

Democracy?

Lebanon, 1983-86 US/F/IDF military presence US/F/IDF withdrawal Yes

West Bank/Gaza, 1994-- IDF military presence IDF withdrawal YesTamils in Sri Lanka, 1990-- SL military presence SL withdrawal Yes (1950)

Kurds in Turkey, 1990s Turkey military presence Turkey withdrawal Yes (1983)Chechnya, 2000-- Russia military presence Russian withdrawal Yes (1993)Kashmir, 2000-- Indian military presence Indian withdrawal Yes

Saudi Peninsula, 1996-- US military presence US withdrawal Yes

Motivation and Targets of Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980-2001

Source: Table 2 in Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August 2003): pp. 343-361, p. 349.

Critique of PapePape misses the “global jihad”

Tends to only look at local, ethnonationalist fightsProblematic data: Pape counts only number of (general)

incidents rather than number of all attacksTerror campaigns not as successful as Pape claims

Pape: 54 percent success rate Moghadam: 24 percent success rate

Fails to explain Islamic flavor Pape does not explain why most suicide attacks are

perpetrated by Islamic groups or why those attacks have been on the rise.

Bottomline: Although Pape’s occupation thesis might explain some localized patterns of suicide terrorism, it falls short of explaining why a “globalization of martyrdom” has arisen. Source: Assaf Moghadam, ““Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 8 (December 2006): p. 707-729.

Campaign Date Outcome (Pape) Actual Outcome

1: Hezbollah vs. U.S., France Apr 83–Sep 84 Success Success

2: Hezbollah vs. Israel Nov 82–Jun 85 Success Success

3: Hezbollah vs. Israel, SLA Jul 85–Nov 86 No change No Change

4: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka Jul 90–Oct 94 Success Success

5: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka Apr 95–Oct 00No change No Change

6: Hamas vs. Israel April 1994 Success No Change

7: Hamas/PIJ vs. Israel Oct 94–Aug 95 Success No Change

8: BKI vs. India August 1995 No change No Change

9: Hamas vs. Israel Feb 96–Mar 96 No change No Change

10: Hamas vs. Israel Mar 97–Sep 97 Success No Change

11: PKK vs. Turkey Jun 96–Oct 96 No Change No Change

12: PKK vs. Turkey Nov 98–Aug 99 No Change No Change

13: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka Jul 01–Nov 01 Success Success

14: Al Qaeda vs. U.S. Nov 95–Ongoing N/A No Change

15: Chechen Separatists vs. Russia Jun 00–Ongoing N/A No Change

16: Kashmir Separatists vs. India Dec 00–Ongoing N/A No Change

17: Hamas / PIJ vs. Israel Oct 00–Ongoing N/A No Change

Total Success Rate 54% 24%

Table 4: Success and failure of the 17 suicide terrorism campaigns (from Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism,” p. 715)