terrorism and homeland security, 7th ed

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Terrorism and Homeland Security,Seventh Edition

Jonathan R. White

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C H A P T E R1Terrorism Defined

LEARNING OBJECTIVESAfter reading this chapter, you should be able to:

> Explain why the term terrorism is pejorative.

> List and define some of the contexts of terrorism.

> Discuss the range of definitions of terrorism.

> Explain the strengths and weaknesses of typologies of terrorism.

> Describe various approaches to developing typologies of terrorism.

> Summarize terrorism within a tactical typology.

> Outline the major types of modern terrorism.

> Summarize various views about the metaphor “war on terrorism.”

> Discuss the changing meaning of war in the twenty-first century.

MIKEGR

OLL/Reuters/Landov

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Defining a word like “terrorism” is far more than an academic exercise.

Superficially, it means different things to different people, but in the depths of

social complexity the way terrorism is defined has deadly consequences. Defini-

tions can legitimize repressive state power and delegitimize peaceful struggles for

justice and peace. Interpretations may justify violence that would never be ac-

ceptable in normal circumstances, or they may encourage actions from a violent

group that randomly murders innocent victims under the banner of political rev-

olution. Nobody has been able to produce an exact definition. As a result, terror-

ism means different things to different people. To make matters worse, the

nature of terrorism has changed over the course of history. Violent activity called

terrorism at one point in time is called war, liberation, or crime in another period

of history. The media have influenced and helped shape the definitions of ter-

rorism, while scholars search for a definition applicable to almost every expres-

sion of terrorism. Legislators and lawyers want the elements of terrorism

identified by legal codes. Politicians vacillate between seeing a justice problem or

an act of war, while many politically disenfranchised people see the unjust appli-

cation of power as a form of terror. This chapter focuses on the problems inher-

ent in defining terrorism, and it discusses the social and political factors that

affect the meaning of the term.

The Pejorative Meaning of TerrorismThe term terrorism has spawned heated debate. Instead of agreeing on thedefinition of terrorism, social scientists, policy makers, lawyers, and securityspecialists often argue about the meaning of the term. H. H. A. Cooper(1976, 1977b, 1978, 2001) first approached the problem by stating there is“a problem in the problem definition.” We can agree that terrorism is a prob-lem, but we cannot agree on what terrorism is.

As discussions of the definition unfolded in the twentieth century, AlexSchmid (1992) pointed to the central issue. Terrorism is not a physical entitythat has dimensions to be measured, weighed, and analyzed. It is a social con-struct; that is, terrorism is defined by different people within vacillating socialand political realities. The definition of any social construct changes with thesocial reality of the group providing the definition. The social construction ofreality can be nebulous, or it can be threatening when one group imposes itsversion of reality on another.

The definition is not only produced from various social constructs butalso developed through the application of political power. How the term isdefined has consequences—life and death consequences. A person is politi-cally and socially degraded when labeled a terrorist, and the same thing

social construct: Theway people view reality.Groups construct aframework around aconcept, defining variousaspects of their livesthrough the meanings theyattribute to the construct.

4 PART 1 • An Introduction to Issues in Terrorism


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happens when an organization is called a terrorist group. Routine crimesassume greater social importance when they are described as terrorism, andpolitical movements can be hampered when their followers are believed to beterrorists. Governments gain power when their enemies are called terrorists,and citizens lose freedom in the name of greater security when the threat ofterrorism appears. The political nature of the definition implies that anyattempt to provide a common definition will be filled with debates about theuse of power. Consider the following examples:

A. In early 2010 a colleague returned from a U.S. State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance program in Jordan. He was working with twenty-seven Jordanian police officers, twelve Christians, twelve Muslims (allSunnis), and three agnostics. They never argued about religion, but theywere appalled when he outlined the operational methods of Hezbollah.The reason—the Jordanian police officers vehemently stated thatHezbollah was not a terrorist organization. It was a militia fighting theIsraeli Defense Force. Hezbollah is a Shi’ite group, but that made nodifference to the Sunni Muslim, Christian, and agnostic police officers.In their minds Hezbollah was a legitimate militia resisting Israeliaggression.

B. Many Lebanese have a similar view. Israel keeps a close eye on militantactivities in Lebanon, routinely violating Lebanese airspace with fighterjets. The Lebanese view these actions as a form of terrorism. They haveno capability to fly over Israel, but Israel can use its superior militarypower against Lebanon (Croft and Heller, 2010). Therefore, manyLebanese believe Israel to be the true source of terrorism. They believe theIsraelis use their superior military might to subjugate the Arabs withinand around their borders.

C. Israel would hardly agree with such an assessment, citing its experiencewith conventional war and terrorism since 1948. In February 2010, forexample, an Israeli soldier sat in a jeep at a checkpoint on the West Bank.A Palestinian police officer pulled beside him in another vehicle, walkedover to the soldier, and stabbed him in the chest. The police officer fled,and the soldier died of his wounds (Lappin, 2010). Most Israelis wouldliterally cite thousands of similar examples and claim that these areexamples of terrorism. Flights over Lebanon are merely self-defense fromenemies who have vowed that they will not stop fighting until the state ofIsrael is destroyed.

D. The definition becomes even more complicated in war zones. In Afghanistan,North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are fighting twomajor enemies, a loose association of central Asian fundamentalistMuslims called the Students, or the Taliban, and another terrorist groupknown as al Qaeda. News reporters, politicians, and military officersoften lump the two organizations into a single group of terrorists, yetthere are profound differences. Al Qaeda operates as an internationalterrorist group while the Taliban form divergent regional militias and useselective terrorism to support guerrilla operations. More importantly, thetheological tradition of the Taliban differs from the violent interpretation

selective terrorism: Aterm used by MichaelCollins during the IrishWar of Independence(1919–1921). Collins didnot launch indiscriminateterror attacks. Rather, heselectively targeted theBritish military, the policeforce it sponsored, and thepeople who supported theUnited Kingdom.

Chapter 1 • Terrorism Defined 5


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of al Qaeda’s infatuation with a twentieth century militant Egyptiantheologian. Linking the two organizations under the single umbrella ofterrorism results in a profound misunderstanding of the Afghan war(Christia and Semple, 2009).

E. On November 5, 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan went on ashooting spree at Fort Hood Texas, killing thirteen people. There weremany reports that Hasan had embraced radical Islam and that he haddecided to attack his fellow soldiers as part of a global jihad against theWest (Simpson and Gorman, 2009). A former high ranking intelligenceofficer immediately called this an act of terrorism, yet many governmentofficials stated that it was an act of a mentally deranged soldier(Sherwell and Spillius, 2009). In this case, even the country victimizedby murder seemed unable to decide on a definition of terrorism.

As these illustrations suggest, terrorism is defined differently dependingon the context of the act of terror. Further confusion arises when peopleintertwine the terms terror and terrorism. The object of military force, forexample, is to strike terror into the heart of the enemy. Systematic terror hasbeen a basic weapon in conflicts throughout history. Some people argue thatthere is no difference between military force and terrorism. Many members ofthe antinuclear movement have extended this argument by claiming thatmaintaining ready-to-use nuclear weapons is an extension of terrorism.Others use the same logic when claiming that street gangs and criminals ter-rorize neighborhoods. Thinking that anything that creates terror is terrorismmakes the scope of potential definitions limitless.

All of these issues bring back H. H. A. Cooper’s observation nearly a halfcentury earlier. There is a problem with attempts to define the problem of ter-rorism. Terrorism is a pejorative term. When people use the term, they arelabeling the actions of their enemies as something sinister and devoid ofhuman compassion. Terrorism becomes an entity worse than war, torture, ormurder. A terrorist is almost demonic, not a fellow human being. Govern-ments may take actions against terrorists that would not be acceptable ifused against the harshest criminals or military enemies. The term terrorism isdifficult to define, and the pejorative nature of the term has deadly conse-quences whenever a definition is applied.

✔ Self-Check

> What does Cooper mean by a problem with the problem definition?> What is the relationship between the definition of terrorism and political

power?> What examples illustrate the different meanings of terrorism?> Why is terrorism a pejorative term?

The Context of DefinitionsOne of the primary reasons terrorism is difficult to define is that the meaningchanges within social and historical contexts. This is not to suggest that “oneperson’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” but it does suggest themeaning fluctuates. Changes in the meaning occur because terrorism is not a

Nidal Malik Hasan:(1970–) an American sol-dier of Palestinian descent.Hasan was an Army psy-chiatrist who apparentlybecame self-radicalized,embracing militant Islam.He went on a shootingspree at Fort Hood Texason November 5, 2009,killing thirteen people andwounding almost threedozen others. He waswounded, arrested, andcharged with severalcounts of murder.

pejorative term: A termthat is loaded with nega-tive and derogatorymeanings.



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solid entity. Like crime, it is socially defined, and the meaning changes withsocial change.

Common definitions of terrorism are worth reviewing (see Another Per-spective: Official Definitions of Terrorism), but it is more important to under-stand that definitions of terrorism may not be helpful. The definition alwaysappears in the social construct surrounding its interpretation. The definitionof terrorism changes with social and historical circumstances. Similar toSupreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s problem definition of pornography,we do not know how to define terrorism, but we know what it is when wesee it. The social context surrounding the term terrorism influences how it isdefined. Consider these social contexts that follow.

Official ContextsIt would seem logical to assume that the U.S. government would have a singledefinition of terrorism, but that is far from the case. The definition of terror-ism is related to the government entity defining terrorism. The official defini-tion from the U.S. legal code says terrorism is “premeditated, politicallymotivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnationalgroups or clandestine agents” (National Counterterrorism Center, 2010).This definition does not settle the issue. The Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against per-sons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian popula-tion, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”The FBI further describes terrorism as “either domestic or international,depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist organization.Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based and operateentirely within the United States and Puerto Rico without foreign directionand whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. government or popula-tion. International terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence commit-ted by a group or individual who has some connection to a foreign power orwhose activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property tointimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segmentthereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, 2010).

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal, state, local, andtribal law enforcement agencies vowed to work together against terrorism.Sometimes the level of cooperation has been less than stellar, and that hasbeen demonstrated by the competing definitions of the subject. For example,in designating foreign terrorist groups, the U.S. Department of State definesterrorism “to be an activity that (1) involves a violent act or an act dangerousto human life, property, or infrastructure and (2) appears to be intended tointimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a govern-ment by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government bymass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking (U.S. Depart-ment of State, 2010). The Department of Defense says “terrorism is theunlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or prop-erty to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political,religious, or ideological objectives” (Zalman, 2010.) The Department of

social context: Thehistorical, political,and criminologicalcircumstances at a givenpoint in time. The socialcontext affects the wayterrorism is defined.



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Homeland Security (DHS) does not even bother to define the term. The agencytalks about terrorism in several places on its Web site, apparently assumingthat readers will know the meaning of the word (DHS, 2010).

In the defense of the federal government, as well as state and local coun-terparts, most of the people arrested in conjunction with terrorism arecharged with felonies from the criminal code. When military forces confrontterrorism, they are concerned about the specific immediate threat. The defini-tion of terrorism is immaterial.

Historical CircumstancesThe meaning of terrorism has changed over time. It is almost impossible totalk about terrorism without discussing the historical context of the terroristcampaign. Modern terrorism originated from the French Revolution (1789–1799). It was used as a term to describe the actions of the French govern-ment. By 1848, the meaning of the term had changed. It was employed todescribe violent revolutionaries who revolted against governments. By theend of the 1800s and the early 1900s, terrorism was used to describe the vio-lent activities of several groups, including labor organizations, anarchists,nationalistic groups revolting against foreign powers, and ultranationalisticpolitical organizations.

After World War II (1939–1945), the meaning of terrorism changedagain. As people revolted against European domination of the world, nation-alistic groups were viewed as terrorist groups. From about 1964 to the early1980s, the term terrorism was also applied to the actions of violent left-winggroups, as well as those of nationalists. In the mid-1980s, the meaning chan-ged again. In the United States, some of the violent activity of hate groupswas defined as terrorism. Internationally, terrorism was viewed as subna-tional warfare. Terrorists were sponsored by rogue regimes.

As the millennium turned, the definitions of terrorism changed yet again.Today, terrorism also refers to large groups who are independent from astate—violent religious fanatics, and violent groups that terrorize for a partic-ular cause, such as the environment. It is important to realize that any defini-tion is influenced by the historical context of terrorism.

War and ViolenceThe meaning of terrorism fluctuates with type of war. In times of conven-tional war, armies use commando tactics that look very much like terrorism.In the American Civil War, the federal army unleashed Major John Andersonto destroy Confederate railroads. The Confederates captured Anderson andaccused him of being a spy, but he remained a hero in the North. He did notwear a uniform, and he did not fight by the accepted norm. Armies routinelyuse such tactics in times of war and never define their actions as terrorism.

In guerrilla war, guerrillas use terrorist tactics against their enemies andmay terrorize enemies and their supporters into submission. In total war, airforces may destroy entire cities with fire. The Luftwaffe, the German airforce, did so at Stalingrad in 1942, and the British and American air forcesdid the same at Dresden in 1945. Neither side believed it was practicing



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terrorism. Although it is possible to cite many other examples and endlesscontradictions, you should realize that the definition of terrorism changeswith the nature of conflict. The term terrorism is more likely to be employedto describe violent activity that explodes during a peaceful period.

The insurrection in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion illustrates the com-plexities introduced by conflict. When the post invasion conflict began, indi-vidual American soldiers were assassinated by underground Iraqi units ledmainly by former Baathists in Saddam Hussein’s regime. Violence soon grewand so did the number of players and victims. Individual religious zealotsfrom foreign countries came to fight the American-led coalition. They soontargeted every foreigner in Iraq, including humanitarian aid workers and UNpersonnel. Eventually, they began targeting Iraqis. Religious sects formedmilitias and began attacking one another. Nationalists were drawn to theBaathist insurgency and violence grew. In November 2006, President GeorgeW. Bush blamed the violence on terrorism, caused by al Qaeda instigators.Former Secretary of State Colin Powell disagreed, claiming that Iraq was inthe middle of a civil war. The line between terrorism and insurrection was abroad band at best.

Political PowerThe definition of terrorism depends on political power. Governments can in-crease their power when they label opponents as terrorists. Citizens seem will-ing to accept more abuses of governmental power when a counterterroristcampaign is in progress. “Terrorists” do not enjoy the same humanitarianprivileges as “people.” In the public mind, illegal arrest and sometimes eventorture and murder are acceptable methods for dealing with terrorists. Label-ing can have deadly results.

For example, the United States detained several individuals associatedwith radical Islamic movements after its offensive in Afghanistan in late2001. The people were given a variety of names, such as “combatants,”“fighters,” “Islamofascists,” and other paramilitary terms. They were housedin a special prison established at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba so that theywould not have the protection of the U.S. Constitution. The American gov-ernment justified this by labeling the people “terrorists.”

RepressionClosely related to the issue of power is the concept of repression. Some gov-ernments routinely use terrorism to keep their citizens in line. Such repressioncan sometimes be seen in the political structure of the country as leaders usesecret police forces to maintain power. Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) ruled theSoviet Union from 1924 to 1953 through terror, and Saddam Hussein ruledIraq by similar methods. Latin America has witnessed several rulers whomaintained power through repression, many times with help from the UnitedStates. Repression can also develop outside formal political structures. This iscalled extrajuridical repression. It refers to repressive groups who terrorizeothers into certain forms of behavior. Political repression is a form of terror-ism, but people seldom refer to this form of violence when defining terrorism.

extrajuridical repres-sion: Refers to a govern-ment using any illegalform of state power, in-cluding military or lawenforcement repression, toalter the behavior of itscitizens.



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Violent repression outside the norms of criminal law is sometimes used bygovernments, vigilantes, criminals, terrorists, or any group to enforce rulesthat violate criminal law. A death squad, for example, is a form of extrajuri-dical repression.

Media CoverageJournalists and television reporters frequently use the term terrorism to definepolitical violence. However, there is no consistent standard guiding them inthe application of the definition. Many times they employ the term to attractattention to a story. Terrorism, when used by the media, is relatively mean-ingless but extremely powerful. Chapter 4 will examine the impact of themedia in detail.

CrimeOn the surface it would seem that criminals and terrorists represent two dif-ferent types of violent behavior. Some analysts would agree, but confusionremains. A presidential commission on criminal justice stated that it was nec-essary to look at the motivation of a criminal act to determine whether it wasa terrorist action (Cooper, 1976). When a crime is politically motivated, thecommission says it is terrorism. The problem with this approach is that acrime is a crime no matter what motivation lies behind the action. Except intimes of conflict or governmental repression, all terrorism involves criminalactivity. Nearly thirty years after the presidential commission’s report, theFBI (2008) still files most political crimes under the heading of terrorism inits Uniform Crime Report.

ReligionIn recent years, religion has played a more significant role in the process ofterrorism. This is fully examined in Chapter 2, but for now it is important tounderstand that extreme religious beliefs provide a context for defining ter-rorism. Religious violence centers on three sources (White, 2000). First, somereligious groups feel that they must purify the world for a new epoch. Thiscan be defined as violent eschatology. Second, some groups feel that they arechosen by a higher power, which allows them to destroy other people in thecause of righteousness. This type of attitude can lead to violent intoleranceand religious war. Third, other people may become so consumed by a partic-ular cause that they create a surrogate religion and take violent action toadvance their beliefs. Ecological terrorists serve as an example of this type ofreligious terrorism.

Specific Forms of TerrorismSometimes the term terrorism is defined within a specific context. A detailedlook at weapons of mass destruction is presented later in this book under theheading of technological terrorism. Another specific form of terrorism refersto computer attacks, viruses, or destruction of an information infrastructure.This is called cyberterrorism (see Chapter 5). Finally, drug organizations fre-quently use terrorist tactics, and some terrorist organizations sell drugs to

violent eschatology:When a group believes itmust wage war to purifythe earth before the returnof a deity.



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support their political activities. Some analysts use the term narcoterrorism todescribe this type of violence (see Chapter 3). Others use terms like ecoterror-ism, nuclear terrorism, or agriterrorism. William Dyson (2004, pp. 22–40)argues that such distinctions do not represent separate forms of terrorism.Rather, they simply reflect the political focus of a particular group.

✔ Self-Check

> Why do the contexts of social definitions change?> Describe the problem with developing a definition that would remain con-

stant in changing contexts.> List and describe the contexts that surround definitions of terrorism.

A Range of DefinitionsThe myriad definitions of terrorism have an astonishing range. WalterLaqueur (1987, 1999) stands at one end of the spectrum with a simple defini-tion. He says that terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achievea political objective by targeting innocent people. He adds that attempts tomove beyond the simple definition are fruitless because the term is socontroversial. Volumes can be written on the definition of terrorism, Laqueur(1987) writes in a footnote, but they will not add one iota to our understand-ing of the topic. Laqueur promotes a simple definition because the meaning ofterrorism changes constantly as social contexts change.

But definitions hardly stop with pragmatic simplicity. Germany, theUnited Kingdom, and Spain outlawed terrorism more than a decade ago, andAmerica has examined the idea of a legal definition (Mullendore and White,1996). The beauty of legal definitions is that they give governments specificcrimes that can be used in order to take action against terrorist activities.Beyond that, they are quite useless because they account for neither the socialnor the political nature of terrorism. More important, they can be misused.Violence is the result of complex social factors that range beyond narrowlegal limitations and foreign policy restrictions. Political violence often occursduring the struggle for legitimacy. For example, American patriots fought theBritish before the U.S. government was recognized.

Legal definitions also contain internal contradictions. Under the legalguidelines of the United States, for example, some groups can be labeled as ter-rorists, whereas other groups engaged in the same activities may be described aslegitimate revolutionaries. In addition, governments friendly to the UnitedStates, such as those in Latin America, have committed some of the worst atroc-ities in the history of the world in the name of counterterrorism. Last, ironi-cally, some Latin American revolutionaries who oppose our repressive friendsespouse the rights expressed in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and theU.S. Constitution, yet we refer to them as terrorists.

Alex Schmid (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 1–38, 70–111) stands atthe other end of the spectrum as he tries to synthesize various positions in anacademic consensus definition. He concludes there is no true or correct defini-tion because terrorism is an abstract concept with no real presence. A singledefinition cannot possibly account for all the potential uses of the term. Still,

simple definition: A def-inition of terrorism thatinvolves three parts: (1)use of force, (2) againstinnocent people, (3) forpolitical purposes.

academic consensusdefinition: A complexdefinition based on thework of Alex Schmid. Itcombines common ele-ments of the definitionsused by the leading scho-lars in the field ofterrorism.



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Schmid says, leading definitions have some common elements and most defi-nitions of the term have two characteristics: (1) someone is terrorized and (2)the meaning of the term is derived from the terrorists’ targets and victims.Schmid also offers a conglomerated definition of terrorism. His empiricalanalysis finds twenty-two elements common to most definitions, and he devel-ops a definition containing thirteen of those elements. Schmid sees terrorismas a method of combat in which the victims serve as symbolic targets. Violentactors are able to produce a chronic state of fear by using violence outside therealm of normative behavior. Schmid (1992) also suggests that the definitionis closely related to the group searching for meaning. We can conclude thatacademics look for a foundation to guide research, and the media uses multi-ple definitions as it engages in a larger public debate. Governments search forlegalistic meanings to counter terrorism, and terrorists search for meanings tojustify their actions.

Schmid’s academic consensus definition is accepted by the United Nations.It says, “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyn-cratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—thedirect targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human vic-tims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) orselectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, andserve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication pro-cesses between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targetsare used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a targetof terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whetherintimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought” (United Nations,as cited by Jane’s, 2007). Schmid began contacting specialists in terrorism in2009 for the purpose of refining the definition.

Both sides of the definitional spectrum have been criticized. Schmid andJongman (2005, p. 3) find that one expert was wholly dissatisfied withLaqueur’s definition. This respondent to their questionnaire on definitionsstated that by not defining the subject, Laqueur wrote a book on terrorismwith no focus. Ami Pedhahzur (2004) says that although Schmid’s consensusdefinition has been used by many experts in the field, it remains too vague.They especially emphasize that the consensus definition fails to include thepsychological effects of terrorism on victims and the target audience.

There is a middle ground. Thomas Badey (2003) states that the defini-tional problem caused by terrorism must be resolved. He claims that nationsare hampered by an inability to define and criminalize terrorism, but hepoints to an alternative route. Badey looks at the U.S. State Department defi-nition of terrorism, and he concludes that although the definition is not per-fect, it divides international terrorism into functional areas. These areas canserve to guide international responses. Governments must look at the intentand motivation of terrorists, and they need to consider whether the event canbe repeated. It is important to examine the terrorists themselves to determinewhether they work with state support or if they exist outside the boundariesof government. Finally, Badey says, it is necessary to consider the effects ofterrorism. By dividing the problem into functional areas, Badey argues,



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governments can develop a pragmatic response. This is better than living withthe dilemma posed by too much simplicity or complexity.

The range of definitions demonstrates the logic of the U.S. government’sapproach to terrorism. Even though there are multiple definitions, they shrinkto insignificance when assessing threats. Words and definitions are important,but the actual threat presents the problem. When security forces assessthreats, they focus on the capabilities of particular groups posing specificthreats (Leiter, 2009). This implies that forces charged with counterterrorismneed to focus on the type of tactical threats they face, and although more ab-stract than an actual threat analysis, that they understand the changing natureof conflict in the twenty-first century.

✔ Self-Check

> What are the strengths and weaknesses of simple definitions?> How do legal definitions differ from other approaches to defining terrorism?> Does the consensus definition solve or complicate the definitional problem?> For security forces, what two things become more important than defining

the term?

Typologies of TerrorismA typology is a classification system, and there are as many typologies ofterrorism as there are definitions. Models, classification systems, and typolo-gies, however, offer an alternative to definitions, and they have several advan-tages. First, the broad scope of the problem can be presented. Terrorism iscomposed of a variety of activities, not a singly defined action. A typologycaptures the range of terrorist activities better than most definitions. Second,the scope of the problem allows the level of the problem to be introduced.Terrorism can be local, national, or international. A typology helps identifywhat kind of terrorism is to be examined. Third, when the level of terrorismis identified, the level of response can be determined. Finally, by focusing ontypes of violence and the social meanings of tactics, typologies avoid theheated debates about the meaning of terrorism.

This book is written for criminal justice students and security professionalsin law enforcement, private corporations, and the military. Therefore, terror-ism is explained from a tactical perspective, or as you will read later, from atactical typology. In addition, this text classifies types of terrorist ideologiesand geographical locations. These become typologies, or ways of looking atterrorism, for security specialists and criminal justice students.

Typologies do not solve all of the problems faced when trying to defineterrorism, and they do not solve all the definitional dilemmas. First, theprocess of terrorism is in a constant state of change. Models, taxonomies,and typologies describe only patterns among events. They are generaliza-tions that describe extremely unstable environments. Typologies mayincrease our understanding of terrorism, but each terrorist incident mustbe understood in its specific social, historical, and political circumstances(see P. Butler, 2002; Borum, 2004, pp. 20–21; Schmid and Jongman, 2005,pp. 39–59).

typology: Classificationof an issue by looking atdifferent types. Becausethis text is designed forthose studying criminaljustice and related securityfunctions, terrorism willbe examined by looking atthe different types of tac-tical behavior.



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Another weakness of typologies involves the distortion of reality. After de-veloping a model, some people, including scholars, try to fit particular forms ofterrorism into it. They alter what they see so that it will blend with their typol-ogy. This has been especially true regarding Latin America. Governments, jour-nalists, teachers, and revolutionaries developed ideological typologies for LatinAmerica and then bent reality to fit their political views. Changing events to fita pattern can completely distort reality. When this happens, researchers see onlywhat they want to see. In addition, typologies hide details. They produce pat-terns, not specifics, even when they are correctly applied (see Flemming, Stohl,and Schmid, 1988, pp. 153–195; Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 39–40).

With these strengths and weaknesses in mind, several researchers have at-tempted to approach terrorism through typologies. Some of the early typolo-gies attempted to classify terrorism by the way terrorists behaved (Hacker,1976; Post, 1984). These typologies have spawned a discussion of behavioralprofiling, a topic discussed in the next chapter. Others have focused on theuse of social or political power (Sageman, 2004, pp. 130–133, 137–173;Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 56–57). Others use typologies based oncriminal law and law enforcement (Vasilenko, 2004). Unfortunately, like thedefinitional dilemma, there are a multitude of different typologies.

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2005, pp. 39–59) have a comprehensivediscussion of typologies based in the social sciences. They find that some typolo-gies are based on individual actors who represent political states or nonstateentities. They also summarize a variety of typologies based on the distributionof political power. Other typologies seek to measure multifaceted impacts ofterrorism based on the social structures involved in terrorism and counterterror-ism, and still other typologies examine the purpose of terrorism. Despite themultiplicity of typologies, Schmid and Jongman conclude, they do not help usunderstand terrorism because they are based on different definitions. To solvethe problem, they argue that it is best to see terrorism within the context of polit-ical expression. They offer a typology based on the idea that terrorism, whetherby the state or by insurgent groups, is a method of political communication.

Law enforcement typologies tend to focus on either the classification ofthe political motivation for terrorist activity or the geographical location ofthe terrorist incident. Laurence Miller (2006) summarizes these approachesas they evolved from the 1960s and 1970s. The first FBI typologies focusedon personality types. The FBI classified terrorists in terms of their leadershipcapabilities, their willingness to follow a leader, and their ideological commit-ment to a cause. Miller argues that some of these approaches are still effec-tive. The Secret Service typology, for example, is based on assessing thepractical requirements of protecting dignitaries. It casts five types of terrorists:crusaders, political terrorists, anarchists, religious fanatics, and criminals. TheSecret Service uses this typology to project what type of attack may belaunched and to organize intelligence.

✔ Self-Check

> What is a typology?> How do typologies differ from definitions?> Do typologies solve definitional problems?



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Toward a Tactical Typology of TerrorismAlthough it is not an optimistic thought, one simple assumption will help youunderstand terrorism. Humans live in a constant state of conflict. Indeed, it isimpossible to have a human social organization without conflict. Even in themost peaceful community, social organization is maintained because the con-trolling group can force people to join the organization and force members toobey the organization’s rules. The amount of force is subject to limitation, butthe ability to coerce is real. Therefore, social organizations are never truly atpeace; they are always at war. The amount and level of conflict varies, butconflict is normative.

If you accept this assumption, you will be able to understand terrorism.To illustrate this, consider a concept developed by the U.S. Army in the early1970s. After the Vietnam War, the army realized its mission was changingand it had to be prepared to fight many different styles of war. Conflict couldrange from low-level brushfire wars to nuclear devastation, and the meaningof war was nebulous at best. To clarify this situation, the U.S. Army spokeof a spectrum of conflict. The spectrum was a continuum that ranged fromlow-intensity conflict to full-scale war (Figure 1.1). This scale probably morecorrectly reflects the human condition than the belief that we can be either atwar or at peace. It also helps us understand terrorism.

State of NatureThe strongest

have completefreedom, but

the weak have none.

The Civil State is based on the premise that a democratic government can force all people to participate in the state. Complete freedom in the State of Nature is surrendered to achieve limited guaranteed freedom in the Civil State. The coercive power of the Civil State serves to guarantee limited freedom.

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Accordingly, the Civil State always experiences conflict. It is never “at peace.” The moral duty of agents of the state is to identify the type of conflict and reduce it to the lowest possible level with the least amount of force.

War

Determine the level and type of conflict.All is war.

The Civil State: Guarantees the strong and the weak limited freedom.

F IGURE 1.1 A Spectrum of Conflict

spectrum of conflict: Asystem developed by theU.S. Army to define low-intensity conflict, mid-level wars, and wars ofmass destruction. Thistext expands the definitionto include many levels ofsocial conflict far beneathtraditional definitionsof war.



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Because humans live in a perpetual state of conflict and conflict manage-ment, civil coercive power has a place on the spectrum of conflict. Even beforeconflict rises to a military level, civil authorities routinely face challenges thatmust bemet by implied or direct force. At the lowest level of organization, informalnorms and mores enforce compliance, and if they fail, stronger coercive force isapplied. In modern Western society, this may be civil or criminal law, whereas amore passive social group might use expulsion or shunning. Regardless, socialgroups always have the potential to exhibit coercive force to enforce behavior.

Terrorism is a form of violent civil disobedience, and it can be placed ona spectrum of conflict. At the most basic governmental level, the state faceslow-level challenges with ordinary crime. Challenges increase with escalationto group violence, then rioting and wider disorders, and finally terrorism. Atthis point, military options may be employed as the continuum moves to

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Noam Chomsky Examines Terrorism and MoralityNoam Chomsky (2002) approaches terrorism with two critical questions:(1) How should terrorism be defined? and (2) What is the proper responseto it? He says that the problem of defining terrorism is complex, but thereare many straightforward governmental responses. Almost all of these de-finitions cast terrorism within a moral framework; that is, terrorism be-comes a criminal act where innocents are victimized. These circumstancesrequire a government to act; yet, the response frequently evokes a paradox.Governments define terrorist acts as immoral, but they tend to respond byacting outside the bounds of morality. They justify their actions by citingthe original immoral act of a terrorist group.

Chomsky finds this approach unacceptable. The same moral frameworkthat allows a society to define an illegal act as terrorism requires that the re-sponse to terrorism be conducted within the bounds of morality. Terrorism,Chomsky says, is something “they” do to “us,” and it is never about what“we” do to “them.” Citing just-war doctrine, Chomsky says the response toterrorism cannot be terrorism. Amoral truism states that any illegal activity isimmoral no matter how a state wishes to justify its response to an event.

The definition of terrorism provides a moral constant. For example, ifan official definition states that terrorism is the use of violence againstinnocent people to change political behavior, a state is morally obligatedto live within the bounds of this definition. It cannot use violence againstinnocents to force its political will. If terrorism is a crime, the response toit must not be criminal if the response is to be morally legitimate. Thecontradiction comes, Chomsky concludes, because the United Statesoperates within a moral definition of terrorism only when its own inter-ests are served. As a result, oppression, violence, and illegal actions arerarely defined as terrorism when they are condoned by the United Statesor its allies.



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guerrilla war, low-level war, conventional war, technological war, wars ofecological destruction, and wars of obliteration.

Ethicists may correctly argue that we must always move to minimize con-flict by using the least amount of force, but morality is not the issue here.What you should be able to see from the simple model is that terrorism issimply a form of conflict among social organizations that accept conflict asnormal. There is nothing mystical about terrorism. It is simply a form of con-flict that comes between civil disorders and guerrilla warfare on the spectrum.As a form of conflict, its tactics can be modeled.

Over the past few years, I have used a typology to train military and po-lice personnel in counterterrorism (Figure 1.2). It does not solve any defini-tional problems, but police and military officers have told me that it hashelped them conceptualize their counterterrorist mission. This tactical typol-ogy may help you understand the issues involved in responding to terrorism.

The three parallel lines in the model in Figure 1.2 symbolize three differ-ent measures that roughly correlate with each other. The first measure showsthe level of activity. It is fairly simple to grasp: incidents on the low end equallow activity, whereas the high end represents increasing rates of violence. Thesecond line represents the type of activity. The line itself indicates the size ofthe terrorist group. On the extreme left, directly correlated with low activityon the activity continuum, is a single individual. Size increases as youmove to the right. This brings the first rule of thumb. In terrorism the level

Level ofTerroristActivity

Type ofActivity

Type ofResponse

Serial activityfor economicor psychologicalgratification

Small groupswithout foreignsupport

Large groupswithout foreignsupport

Gangs Small groupswith foreignsupport

Large groupswith foreignsupport

Oriented to lawenforcement

Law enforcementaugmented withmilitary force

Oriented to military

Guerrilla*warfare

Rioting, disruption,civil disorders*

Political ActivityCriminal ActivityLow High

Organized crime

Organized crimesupporting terrorism

Force multipliers allow any type of terrorist activity to operate at a higher level. Force multipliers include media, technology, transnational support, or religion.

*Indicates activities that are categorized more as violence than terrorism.

F IGURE 1.2 A Tactical Typology of Terrorism



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of activity is generally correlated with the size of the group. Generally, thelarger the group, the greater its potential for terrorist violence. This is trueunless a group’s force is strengthened by enhancing its striking power. This isa tactical concept known as a force multiplier (see Chapter 5).

Notice that the second line is divided by a nebulous border separatingcriminal and political terrorism. This border is intentionally open because ter-rorists are free to move between the criminal and political boundaries. Theopenness is designed to illustrate the movement of political violence. Somecriminal groups can become so large that they may act like terrorist groups.Small terrorist groups can become so focused on crime that they becomenothing more than criminal gangs. Examples of these types of groups appearunderneath the line.

The final spectrum illustrates the type of response. Most criminal terror-ism and a good share of political terrorism is a law enforcement responsibil-ity. This means that when nonpolice units assist police agencies as part of asecurity force, they must think as the police do. For example, deadly force isalways the last alternative in police operations. Additionally, legal proceduresand an emphasis on individual rights guide each phase of a law enforcementresponse and investigation. The courts may allow certain amounts of latitudein procedures, such as internment in Northern Ireland, in the interest of pub-lic safety.

As you move across the spectrum, however, response actions become moremilitaristic. Although deadly force remains the final option, law enforcementpersonnel must think of themselves as a team, much as the military does. Team-work, however, does not imply an ability to operate outside legal norms.Despite the necessity to develop certain military tactics or employ the directhelp of the military, democracies cannot and should not tolerate activities out-side the law. For example, police and military units of some countries haveformed secret death squads, claiming terrorists have become too strong. If legalnorms are violated, security forces can become little more than terroriststhemselves.

This is one of the reasons for controversy in America’s battle with terror-ism. The government has defended tactics such as detaining suspects withouttrial, turning suspects over to countries where torture is used, using so-calledaggressive interrogation techniques, and maintaining secret prisons. The gov-ernment argues that the situation is so critical that these extra measures arenecessary. Critics claim that the government is acting outside the law (seeTennet, 2007).

The tactical typology illustrates two important aspects of counterterror-ism. First, it shows that terrorism is primarily a problem for law enforcementand the justice system. It is augmented by intelligence activities and militaryforce, and sometimes, such as in Afghanistan, military forces must take thelead. Even then, however, they work to bring stability and capture those whoact outside the law. Second, terrorists have acted outside the law. The FourthAmendment of the U.S. Constitution allows the government to use the amountof force necessary to stop terrorist violence. The same amendment, however,does not allow the government to violate the law (see Sageman, 2004;Scheuer, 2006).



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✔Self-Check

> What is a tactical typology?> How does a tactical typology differ from a definition?> Why might law enforcement, military, and intelligence personnel want a

tactical typology?

Defining the “War on Terrorism”

In the past few years some officials in the United States have defined terror-ism by rhetorically declaring war on it. Shortly after the attacks of September11, 2001, President George W. Bush addressed the nation, stating that Americaand its allies were in a war with terrorism. Despite the Constitution havingno provision for declaring war on a concept, federal and local bureaucraciesembraced the metaphor of war for combating terrorism, and the Americanmilitary even used an acronym for it: GWOT, the Global War on Terrorism.More recently, President Barack Obama has redefined America’s approach toterrorism as a criminal justice problem where military force is used to aug-ment legal power (Kimery, 2009).

Many people accept the idea of a war on terrorism, even though the termterrorism remains undefined. Thomas Friedman (2004), a columnist for theNew York Times, believes that the United States is at war with terrorism.Friedman calls the fighting after September 11 democracy’s third great strug-gle against totalitarianism in the past one hundred years. The first cameagainst the Nazis (1939–1945), and the next struggle involved the Westagainst the East during the cold war (1945–1991). Today’s enemy, Friedmansays, is militant groups who hate America more than they love life.

Stephen Blank (2003) of the U.S. Army War College also accepts the meta-phor of war. Like Friedman, he believes that this new war differs from conflictsof the past. Blank contends that America’s best weapon is to assist legitimategovernments faced with armed insurgencies. Terrorism is caused by differentradical groups driven by localized economic, social, and political pressures.They can be countered, Blank says, “by providing military assistance to legiti-mate governments and pressuring repressive governments to reform.”

Ariel Cohen (2003) also believes the United States is in a war with terror-ism. Examining central Asia, Cohen believes that the United States must proj-ect military power in the face of terrorist threats. He argues that it isnecessary to position military forces in central Asia so that they may be usedin Afghanistan and elsewhere. He warns, however, that American militaryforces should not associate with repressive governments (see Another Perspec-tive: State Repression). Fiona Hill (2003) of the Brookings Institution agrees.To conduct the war on terrorism, she says, it is necessary to identify militantgroups and select the proper tactics that will destroy them. Cohen and Hillsee no problem with a war on terrorism as long as political leaders under-stand that the war will require innovative weapons.

Michael Howard (2002) has not been so quick to join the bandwagon.He believes that terrorism is an emergency situation best handled by intelli-gence and law enforcement services. Military forces may be used, but theyserve as reinforcements for law enforcement or as special operations units for



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intelligence organizations. Counterterrorist work is sometimes a matter forcriminal courts and is at other times best left to ruthless secret actions ofintelligence units. Counterterrorism involves tedious investigations and infor-mation-gathering operations. When counterterrorism is called a war, itevokes images of battles, sophisticated weapons, and lightning strikes againsta well-defined enemy. This is not the nature of terrorism, nor does it indicatethe methods used to combat it.

Since Howard wrote, other reflections about the use of war as a meta-phor have emerged. Some legal scholars believe that when terrorism is con-ceived wholly within a militaristic framework, issues like the rule of law aremarginalized (Duffy, 2005). Other scholars argue that the language of warhas been used to manipulate public response and increase anxiety (Jackson,2005). While not questioning the metaphor directly, Alfred McCoy (2006,pp. 218–219) argues that utilizing paramilitary methods from the intelligencecommunity is detrimental to the effectiveness of antiterrorist operations. Hebelieves that proven interrogation techniques within acceptable Western legalnorms are crucial to controlling terrorism. Another argument deals withWestern values and their relationship with human rights. When antiterroristoperations are militarized, basic human rights are ignored. Torture, crueltreatment, limitless detention, and continuous monitoring become the logicof controlling enemy combatants. Such people, like terrorists in general, aresomething less than human, and they do not have the right to rejoin anytype of human society (Suskind, 2008, pp. 225–228, and Martinez, 2008).

Erik Ringmar (2009) fears the logic of dehumanization in the war meta-phor. He argues that throughout its history, the United States has fought twotypes of wars. The first involves “civilized” wars against other nations thatgenerally fight within the same rules as America. The other involves smallwars against “savages.” America has a history of being ruthless in these typesof conflicts, utterly destroying both its enemies and its way of life. The Bush

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

State RepressionEdward Herman (1983) says terrorism should be defined in terms of staterepression. During the cold war the United States supported several LatinAmerican dictatorships because the dictatorships were anticommunist.These governments, with some of the worst human rights records in his-tory, routinely jailed, tortured, and executed political opponents. TheUnited States not only ignored the repression but funded the activities andtrained the repressive military and police forces. When the amount of hu-man suffering from these dictatorships is compared to violence caused ininsurgent terrorism, the pain caused by modern terrorism shrinks to insig-nificance. The “real terror network,” Herman argues, is found in repressivegovernment. University of Virginia sociologist Donald Black (2004) sum-marizes the paradox evident in Herman’s earlier work. Counterterrorism,he says, is more violent than terrorism.



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Administration conceived of counterterrorism within the context of the “sav-age” war. It allowed the United States to “get tough” with terrorists andavoid the limitations of “civilized” warfare. The Obama Administrationrevamped the approach, but Ringmar fears this is only temporary. In theAmerican way of war, he says, frontiersmen willing to kill “savages” seem todominate the political response to conflict.

On Christmas Day 2009 a suicide bomber unsuccessfully tried to blowup a Northwest airliner just before it landed in Detroit. Passengers subduedthe suspect, and the FBI took him into custody. As required by law beforequestioning a suspect while in law enforcement custody, the FBI advised thesuspect of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. In the days following theincident, former Vice President Richard Cheney and a host of Republicanslambasted the Obama Administration for being soft on terrorism. Their argu-ment was that the U.S. Constitution did not apply to terrorists. This disputebecomes an illustration of Ringmar’s thesis. Will the United States followRingmar’s interpretation of history and revert to utter destruction of“savages” with the metaphor of war? Ironically, many American militarythinkers do not believe that this is the correct move. They argue that it is nei-ther necessary to define terrorism or to use the war on terrorism metaphor.They believe that it is time to change the American way of war.

✔ Self-Check

> Why would the government declare war on terrorism?> Why do some analysts have problems with referring to counterterrorism as

a war?> In what other ways might the war on terrorism be described?

Rethinking ConflictThe rules of conflict have been changing since World War II, and homeland se-curity is taking place within a changing tactical environment. David Rapoport(1988) believes that the world has witnessed four primary waves of terrorismthat overlapped and changed with the currents of history. Bruce Hoffman(2006, pp. 43–60) refers to the changes as phases and believes that the worldhas experienced anticolonial, ideological, and religious terrorism. Brian Jenkins(2006) speaks of the types of wars America will face on a spectrum of conflictranging from small, short counterterrorist operations to major military con-flicts. Wesley Clark (2001) speaks of the need to confront social disorder in dys-functional states, and Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor (2006) believe thatthe rise of the Iraqi insurgency is due to the American failure to understand andfollow the changing tactical nature of conflict, especially the need for nation-building operations. Thomas Ricks (2006) supports their conclusions.

Networks and Law EnforcementHomeland security is taking place within a new set of rules, or rule set (seeBarnett, 2004). Although nations can pose a security threat, the current majorthreat for the United States comes from terrorist networks. Yet homeland



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security is more than counterterrorism. It involves responding to disasters, man-aging health crises, maintaining order at special events, and protecting federalofficials, including the President. Since this text focuses on terrorism, the discus-sion of homeland security will be limited to the prevention of terrorist attacks.

Most terrorism experts have argued for nearly fifty years that counterter-rorism was primarily an affair for law enforcement, not the military (seeCooper, 1978; Wilkinson, 1974; Wardlaw, 1982; Jenkins, 1983; Sageman,2004; Scheuer, 2006). Law enforcement still has a major role in stopping inter-national networks that wage modern conflict, but the times have made it neces-sary to discuss the nature of modern conflict, warfare, and warfare’s relation toterrorism.

The primary job of law enforcement in preventing terrorism is to stopcriminal activity within networks. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) believe thatfive factors must be in place for networks to operate. These factors identifynodes where the network can be disrupted: technology, social support, narra-tive, organizational structure, and tactical doctrine. Networks may be able tooperate without all five factors, but they are not as effective. Technology, atraditional force multiplier for terrorist groups, is crucial. It allows a smallgroup to operate on more sophisticated levels. Social support is also crucial.Groups must effectively maintain internal and external social relations. Thisbuilds trust and identity. Narrative is myth; it provides a story, the raison d’e-tre. The story must be accepted by the group, but outsiders must also em-brace the narrative if the group is to operate in society. Organizations haveabandoned the old hierarchy that defined terrorist groups in the post–WorldWar II era. Groups range from simple chains to hubs to all-channel networks.There is no leadership structure. Finally, the tactical doctrine involves aswarm. Whether a demonstration in Seattle or a wave of suicide attacks, thegroup assembles, conducts operations, and disperses.

It is important to note that networks have changed the tactical structure ofconflict, but the principles of conflict remain the same. Targeting has shiftedfrom military forces to societal structures. Civilians, symbols, and physical andtechnological infrastructures become the targets of attack in a war beyond tradi-tional definitions. The manner and style of fighting have changed (for example,guerrilla movements and terrorism enhanced by technological weapons), butthe principles of war that applied to Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great, andGeorge Patton are applicable today (for example, see Keegan, 1993, pp. 386–392). Whether a small eclectic terrorist cell or an armored division, combatantsmust structure units for operations and effectively communicate with one an-other. They must move matériel, seize and maintain the initiative, mass at theenemy’s weak point, and psychologically convince the enemy that there is nopoint in fighting (Jenkins, 2006, pp. 111–143). Military ventures led by fightersfrom Scipio Africanus to David Petraeus require shock action and exploitationto achieve victory. The rule set has changed, not the nature of war.

In the new rule set, one social network opposes another. Although net-works share information, agencies do not change their roles. Police depart-ments should not become military or secret intelligence organizations. Lawenforcement has three primary responsibilities—duties that existed longbefore 9/11. These responsibilities include (1) maintaining public safety,

rule set: A term usedby Thomas Barnett todescribe the socio-legalnorms governing warduring any given period inhistory. Wars are wagedwithin cultural norms.Since the 1991 collapse ofthe Soviet Union, Barnettbelieves we have entered anew rule set that includessubnational conflict.



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(2) collecting criminal intelligence, and (3) sharing information in a legalmanner. None of these activities requires extraconstitutional authority, andthey do not imply that police tactics should be militarized. Most importantly,there is no need for special paramilitary law enforcement units beyond thoseneeded for high-risk response. In fact, closer relations with local communitiesenhance the national defense role of policing, whereas militarization, whichinevitably builds barriers between the police and the public, actually detractsfrom law enforcement’s ability to protect a community and serve the nation(Murray, 2005; see also Carter, 2004).

Blurring War and PeaceJust below the surface of jurisprudence, the practice of terrorism has blurredthe distinction between war and peace. Before the time of growing terrorism,Americans thought they knew the meaning of conflict. War was an extensionof politics fought within the legal framework of the U.S. Constitution. Quitesimply, the U.S. Constitution states that only Congress has the power todeclare war and that only Congress decides whether America is in a state ofwar or peace. However, the anticolonial struggles after World War II; theVietnam War; and the battles in Somalia, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq con-fused the issue. American troops fought limited wars in peacetime.

The situation grew more complex as violence spread at home andabroad. Civil agencies faced standoffs with militant groups; a U.S. citizenbombed the federal building in Oklahoma City; two teenagers went on ashooting spree at their high school in Colorado; the World Trade Centertowers were destroyed and the Pentagon attacked on September 11, 2001; astudent went on a killing rampage at Virginia Tech; jihadists allegedly plottedan attack on Fort Dix and JFK International Airport; a self-radicalized soldierwent on a shooting spree in Ford Hood; and a jihadist tried to shoot down anairliner on Christmas Day. Clearly, the law enforcement and public serviceworkers involved were not soldiers, but they were being called to restore or-der during military-style attacks. Even civilian law enforcement officers endedthe attack at Fort Hood. The FBI was empowered to seize suspects beyondterritorial limits, and military forces joined them in the hunt. When suspectswere identified, prosecutors issued arrest warrants; and, when suspects werecaught, they went to trial in U.S. courts. Terrorism is changing the nature ofconflict. Law enforcement agencies, courts, and corrections joined in the bat-tle, even though they are not constitutionally associated with military power.

Networks and Classical Theories of ConflictThe American concept of conflict has been deeply influenced by the Prussiangeneral and military philosopherCarl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), who beganstudying conflict during the nationalistic wars against Napoleon (1795–1815).Joining the Prussian Army as a twelve-year-old drummer boy to fight againstFrance, he came to believe that the French Revolution created a new type ofwar, and he began to study war as a philosophical problem (1984 [1831]; forcritiques see Liddell Hart, 1967; Craig, 1968; Howard, 1988; Hanson, 2000).

Carl von Clausewitz:(1780–1831) A Prussianfield marshal and philos-opher of war. His bookOn War helped to shapemilitary doctrine in thetwentieth century.



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The strength of the French, Clausewitz reasoned, came from their abilityto place the nation in arms, that is, to rally the people to the belief that all ci-tizens of a nation are potential soldiers or supporters of the military. To de-feat the French, Germany had to become a nation in arms, unite under ademocracy, and employ its own citizen soldiers. The proof of victory wouldcome when Germany’s political will could be imposed on France. Clausewitzjoined a group of reformers and tried to modernize the Prussian Army. ThePrussians were destroyed, however, in 1806 after the Battle of Jena-Auerstädt, and Clausewitz was carried off to Paris in captivity. He beganwriting, formulating a philosophy of national war.

Clausewitz’s notions (see Another Perspective: Clausewitz and War in theWestern Tradition) were derived from his study of history, especially theThirty Years’ War (1618–1648) and the campaigns of Frederick the Great(1740–1786). They were also influenced by his experiences after joining theRussian Army in 1812 to fight Napoleon and the German War of Liberation(1813–1814). Clausewitz’s ideas were published in a book posthumously byhis wife Maria the year after he died. On War is a philosophical treatise onthe nature of total, nationalistic wars. It has also been one of the most influ-ential works on military force in the twentieth century. Clausewitz’s under-standing of the nation in arms clearly renders the meaning of war, but itmay not help Americans who desire to bring terrorists to justice.

Victor Hanson (2000) criticizes Clausewitz’s idea of a single decisive con-flict and the Western way of battle, claiming the West is consumed with theway war was fought in ancient Greece. According to this line of thought, thepurpose of military action is to seek a decisive engagement, and Clausewitz’sphilosophical treatise emphasizes this point. Terrorism, however, is designedto produce the opposite effect, seeking to avoid direct confrontation withforce. In addition, since the emergence of professional, modern warfare inthe West after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the purpose of war has beento impose political will on the defeated party. American law enforcementdoes not seek a decisive battle with enemy forces, and its purpose can neverbe the imposition of political will. The goals of terrorism are to create panicand cause social systems to break. These goals mean that criminal justice andother civilian agencies will be involved in combating terrorism. America isneither at war nor at peace, and another paradigm may be more helpful.

Nearly 2,000 years ago a Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, produced a trea-tise on the paradoxes of war (Giles, 2000). Rather than conceiving of timeswhen a political realm is either at war or at peace, Sun Tzu saw war and peaceas two sides of the same coin. War and politics were psychological forces heldtogether by the belief in power. In Sun Tzu’s philosophical structure, the highestform of military leadership comes in breaking the enemy’s resistance withoutfighting. Those leaders must be able to control their anger and project power.When military leadership is strong, the state will be strong and have less needto act. If the state appears to be weak, it is vulnerable despite its strength (seeAnother Perspective: Sun Tzu and the Logic of Terrorism).

Terrorism is based on Sun Tzu’s relation of strength to weakness. Inmodern military parlance this is called asymmetry. Asymmetry simply meanscompeting forces are out of balance; that is, a weak force fights a much

On War: One of the mostinfluential philosophicalworks on the practice ofwarfare. Written by Carlvon Clausewitz and pub-lished posthumously byhis wife Maria, it remainsstandard reading for mili-tary officers in the Amer-icas, Europe, and Asia.

Sun Tzu: A Chinese phi-losopher of war who madelittle distinction betweenwar and peace. Subtle ex-pressions of power thatdefeat the enemy are betterthan war or fighting.Many counterterrorismanalysts believe that SunTzu’s ancient approach toconflict is applicable forfighting modern terrorism.

asymmetry: A term usedin guerrilla warfare andterrorism to describe howa small, weak force fightsa stronger power. Asym-metrical wars are foughtbetween sides that aregrossly unequal. The lesspowerful side does notfight the more powerfulside under the conven-tional rules of war becauseit cannot win by usingthese tactics. The weakerside uses unconventionalmethods of fighting.



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stronger power. A good analogy is a single angry hornet attacking a hiker inthe woods. The hornet can sting the hiker and, if it is lucky, cause the hikerto panic or maybe induce a fatal allergic reaction. If the hiker stays calm,however, a single swat ends the attack. The odds are in the hiker’s favor. Ter-rorists are much like the hornet with two exceptions: They tend to be true-believing fanatics who sacrifice lives—not an angry insect acting in defenseof itself or its territory—and they are willing to attack, violating social con-ventions and societal norms. Hornets attack the same way, following theirnatural instincts, but terrorists fight outside the rules.

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Sun Tzu and the Logic of TerrorismCompare the selected paraphrases below of Sun Tzu with those of Clause-witz. Which statements are more applicable to conventional battles withfront lines and uniformed soldiers? Which statements are more applicableto guerrilla warfare and terrorism?

If you know yourself and your enemy, you will be successful. If youknow yourself but you do not know your enemy, you will fail many times.If you know neither yourself nor your enemy, you will never succeed.

The worst way to take a town is to lay siege. The best way is to makethe inhabitants believe they are beaten.

A military leader who projects strength can settle a dispute withoutlosing a soldier.

The best leader subdues the enemy’s troops without fighting.Reduce the enemy by creating problems, making trouble, and making

them rush to any given point.

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Clausewitz and War in the Western TraditionClausewitz made several points about war, including the following:

A nation is either at war or at peace.

The purpose of diplomacy is to impose your will on your enemy.

When diplomacy has failed, war may result.

War must unite the will and resources of the nation.

War is to be waged with maximum violence to destroy the enemy’s will tofight.

Battle results from a mutual decision to fight.

All resources should be aimed at the main point (Schwerpunkt) of the battleto decisively defeat the enemy.

War plans should be aimed at the total defeat of the enemy.



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The reason terrorists fight outside the norms of society is revealed bythe imbalance of power. The major powers hold all the cards in internationaltrade, legal authority, and military power. It does no good to strike them inthe open, but they are vulnerable when attacked outside the norms of standardinternational relations. The lesson is as old as terrorism: If you can’t kill theirsoldiers, kill their civilians. The purpose of terrorism is to give the impressionthat powerful economic, military, and political forces cannot protect ordinarypeople going about their daily routines. Terrorists do not seek an open battle;rather, they want to show that the norms of civil society cannot protect thepopulation of the superior force. Enemy forces prepared for combat are toostrong; but, police stations, off-duty military personnel, and schoolchildrenmake tempting targets.

Obviously, military forces must cope with this change, but criminal jus-tice agencies become involved in homeland security precisely because terror-ists fight outside the rules. They commit virtually every type of crimeimaginable when preparing an attack. If they wore uniforms, struck militarytargets, and fought within recognized international conventions, they wouldnot be terrorists (Crenshaw, 1983, pp. 14–32).

Of course, they will never fight by conventional means because terroristslack the military strength and political appeal to engage in such activities.This means they will fight in the shadows committing crimes as they do so.Since all aspects of terrorism eventually involve criminal activity, the criminaljustice system will be involved in confronting terrorism. It is a new role, but theworld is fighting by a new rule set. Instead of a frontline engagement involvingan enemy army, law enforcement agencies will be forced into a long-term con-frontation with criminal networks, and encounters will take place within theconfines of criminal law. When military forces are used in the struggle, theirrules of engagement will limit the use of deadly force. Law enforcement depart-ments, military forces, and intelligence agencies will play complementary rolesin struggles against terrorism.

Pearl Harbor and 9/11: Two Different WorldsDecember 7, 1941, is known as “a date which will live in infamy”; September11, 2001, is certainly a day that is burned into the hearts and minds ofAmericans. Both events held surprises. For example, both Pearl Harbor andthe suicide strikes on September 11 revealed that America was vulnerable toattack. Both events occurred with no formal declaration of war, and bothinvolved civilian casualties. Pearl Harbor and September 11 also shook thesoul of the United States.

Despite these similarities, September 11 differs significantly from PearlHarbor. The purpose of the Japanese surprise attack was to destroy U.S. mili-tary capabilities in the Pacific. Japanese governmental and military officialsknew the United States would go to war as soon as the surviving Zerosreturned to their carriers. Their purpose was to temporarily destroy America’scapacity to wage war, achieve political objectives with military might, andnegotiate a truce from a position of strength. By contrast, the September 11attacks were designed for drama. They were a tragedy performed on a



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subnational—not international—level in order to create an aura of fear bymurdering thousands of people. The terrorists had no intention of negotiatingfrom a position of strength, and failure was out of the question because theybelieved they had a divine mandate to destroy an evil enemy. The Japanesefought a political struggle, but in the minds of the September 11 hijackersthey were fighting a cosmic war under the power of God (Lichtblau, 2001;Juergensmeyer, 2000, pp. 143–155).

The goal of the 9/11 terrorists was not one of conventional military strat-egy. Their purpose was to create so much fear that Western institutionswould change their behavior. There was no grand offensive to follow the at-tacks and no notion of a rational, negotiated peace. The terrorists who tar-geted the United States wanted the West to believe that mass murder canhappen at any time. In the words of Thomas Barnett (2004, pp. 18–34), theterrorists of September 11 were playing by a new set of rules. They were at-tacking globalization whereas America was defending state power.

If Barnett is correct, the September 11 attacks and the subsequent worldof international terrorism have ushered in a new style of conflict. Jihadists arenot attacking state power; they are attacking the idea of Western—particularlyAmerican—culture. Their war is with a global system that they fear and hate,and they resist being included in an economic arrangement they resent. Thislogic is applicable not only to jihadists. When the ideology of domestic terror-ists is examined, similar types of concerns emerge. Modern terrorism is aimedat the infrastructure of everyday life and the symbols that define that structure(see Homer-Dixon, 2002; Stevenson, 2003).

✔ Self-Check

> How does World War II differ from the “war on terrorism”?> Why is it necessary to counter networks with networks?> How does terrorism apply to Clausewitz? to Sun Tzu?> How does the attack on Pearl Harbor differ from the hijackings of Septem-

ber 11?

Critical Engagement: Definitions and the FutureApart from policy ramifications and academic debates, the definition of ter-rorism is important for the future. The world may be experiencing a radicalchange in the way nations conceive of the idea of war, and this will impactcriminal justice systems, international relations, notions of international sov-ereignty, and the use of military force. David Bell (2007) illustrates this in awork entitled The First Total War.

Bell argues that total war came with the 1789 French Revolution becauseEuropeans dominated international understandings of the nature of conflict andtheir notions about war changed with the end of the French monarchy. Hebelieves that the age of Catholic and Protestant religious wars, from the earlysixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century, ushered a new para-digm into European politics. Religious wars were too destructive, but politicalwars had their purposes in the everyday practice of European politics. In thenew paradigm, war was limited to specific political objectives. The purpose of



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war was to maintain the dominant political system, and to shift power withinthe system. In the rare instances when nations sought to eliminate other coun-tries, such as Maria Theresa’s policy against Frederick the Great in the SevenYears’War (1756–1763), the political goals were to maintain social and politicalsystems, not to replace them with another set of values.

The key to understanding this type of war, Bell believes, was two-fold: itwas normal and limited. Nobles left courtly life to engage in the adventures ofwar. They were a part of society, not apart from it. Far from professional,they were expected to be poets, dandies, and wits. Although lower classes suf-fered more under this system, nobles, peasants, and the middle classes identi-fied with their counterparts in enemy countries. Peace was abnormal becauseit interfered with the natural political competition among various nationalinterests. This limited paradigm did not threaten the political or social struc-ture of Europeans or their empires. Bell says this changed in 1789.

The French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon brought a new mindset.The change came for a number of reasons. A movement toward religious andintellectual pacifism began to assume that peace was normal and that warwas an aberration. Shifting political and social structures in France trans-formed the distribution of political and economic power. Some social groups,such as loyalist French peasants in the Vendee region of revolutionary France,felt their existence was threatened. They sought to destroy revolutionaryforces, and revolutionary generals responded in kind with massacre and mur-der. Ironically, since people came to believe that war was abnormal, militaryforce was to be employed with maximum violence to eradicate the enemythat caused war. Even though technology remained relatively constant, thenew paradigm radicalized the nature of war. It was aimed at the eliminationof an enemy and the enemy’s political and social structure. It was waged tobuild national character with heroic self-sacrifice. In Bell’s interpretation, thisevolved into total war.

If Bell is correct, his thesis may well be important for understanding thedefinition of terrorism and the future. Bell maintains that war changed from1789 to 1815, and that we are experiencing a similar change today. We areconfused, however, because we face changing conflict within the frameworkof total war. Victor Davis Hanson (2000) and Thomas Barnett (2005 and2006) use different evidence, but come to a similar conclusion. Unlike theshift during the French Revolution, technological changes imply that the totalwar can destroy a significant portion of the planet or even alter human exis-tence. In addition, technology makes terrorism possible. (See Donald Black’sexplanation of social geometry in Chapter 2.)

Consider these issues in terms of future developments:

● If war and conflict are normal, should policies be aimed at eliminatingterrorism or controlling it?

● Is terrorism a single concept, or does it change with the political andsocial circumstances of each cause?

● If the nature of war is changing, what factors support the interpretationof terrorism as a military problem? What factors suggest that it is aproblem for law enforcement and criminal procedures?



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SUMMARY● The term terrorism is pejorative because it evokes a variety of politically

charged responses. The way terrorism is defined often has life or deathconsequences.

● Terrorism is defined within social and political contexts. This is the pri-mary reason that no single definition of terrorism will ever be successful.

● In terms of contextual definitions, the meaning of terrorism is influencedby history, conflict, political power, political repression, mass media,crime, and the specific form that terrorism takes.

● Myriad definitions cover a wide spectrum of varying meanings. Someanalysts opt for complicated approaches, such as Schmid’s academicconsensus definition, whereas others, like Laqueur, choose simplicity.

● Some scholars turn to typologies in an effort to solve the definitionaldilemma. Typologies are often based on behavior, activities, ideologicalorientation, or political and social classification.

● Although it does not solve debates about definitions or typologies, a tac-tical typology of terrorism helps to explain the problems faced by secu-rity forces.

● Clausewitz viewed war as a rational political process between states. SunTzu viewed war as a psychological process at many different levels. Thedifference between the ideas of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu can be illustratedby comparing Pearl Harbor with September 11. The former was a mili-tary attack rationally designed to obtain a political objective. The latterwas a psychological attack designed to create an aura of fear.

● The nature of conflict is changing because entire cultures fear for theirexistence. When threatened in this manner, they do not respondrationally.

KEY TERMS

social construct (p. 4)

selective terrorism(p. 5)

Nidal Malik Hasan(p. 6)

pejorative term (p. 6)

social context (p. 7)

extrajuridicalrepression (p. 9)

violent eschatology(p. 10)

simple definition (p. 11)

academic consensusdefinition (p. 11)

typology (p. 13)

spectrum of conflict(p. 15)

rule set (p. 22)

Carl von Clausewitz(p. 23)

On War (p. 24)

Sun Tzu (p. 24)

asymmetry (p. 24)



terrorism and homeland security, 7th ed

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