TeleologicalmortalityinPlato’sTimaeus

XiJi

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of DoctorofPhilosophyinClassics

SupervisedBy:DoctorJennyBryan

I,XiJi,confirmthattheworkpresentedinthisthesisismyown.

Whereinformationhasbeenderivedfromothersource,Iconfirm

thatthishasbeenindicatedinthethesis.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to showhowPlato attempts to bridge the gap between immortal andmortal

natureintheTimaeus.Itexploresthesimilaritiesanddissimilaritiesbetweentheconstitutionof

theimmortalexistents,i.e.thecosmicsoulandhumanimmortalsouls,andthemortalexistents,

i.e.thecosmicbodyandthehumanbodies.Intheknowledgeofthesimilarities,thatis,thesoul

andbodyarefashionedusingtheFormsandReceptacleascommoncomponents,thedistinction

between the immortal souls and mortal bodies seems not to be an absolute one. The

dissimilarities lie in that the twokinds of existents are created in differentways,which entail

thattheydifferinstructuresandmodesofmotion.Thesimilaritiesanddissimilaritiesaltogether

explainswhythe immortalsoulsandmortalbodiesappear tobeutterlydifferentexistentsbut

canbeconnectedtoandcommunicatewitheachother.Theembodimentofthecosmicsoulinthe

cosmicbodyyieldsaneverlastingcreaturesuchasthecosmositself.Whereastheembodimentof

the human immortal soul in thephysical body results in the former’s beingdisrupted and the

generationof twokindsofmortal souls, i.e. spiritedandappetitivepartsof souls.The spirited

partofsoul isdesignedasan intermediarybetweenthe immortalsoulandthebodyaswellas

betweentheimmortalsoulandtheappetitivepartofsoul.Thetripartitesoulanditsinteraction

with the mortal body reveal Demiurgic concerns for humans. Humans are endowed with

mortality intentionally for the sake of cosmic completion and perfection. The Demiurgic

compensatory arrangement, i.e. the structural affinity between the cosmos and humans and

purposefully designed bodily parts and organs, allows humans, asmortal creatures, to bridge

theirowngapwiththeeverlastingcosmosbyimitatingthelatter.

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Acknowledgements

Iwould like to extend thanks to peoplewho have so generously contributed to thework

presentedinthisthesis.

Mygreatestdebtinwritingthethesisistomydoctoralsupervisor,Dr.JennyBryan.Ithank

hernotonlyforhertremendousacademicsupportbutalsoforherpatienceandencouragement.

DuringmytimeasaPh.D.studentattheDepartmentofGreekandLatinatUCL,Ihavebeen

sofortunatetobepartofadynamiccommunityofclassicalresearchers.Iamverygratefultomy

secondarysupervisor,Dr.PeterAgocs,whohashelpedtoexaminethefirstthesischapterforme.

IalsowanttothankDr.StephenColvin,whofirstintroducedmetomydoctoralsupervisorand

hasbeenhelpfuleversince.

I would also like to acknowledge Prof. Xuefu Zhang of the Department of Philosophy at

ZhejiangUniversity,whointroducedmetoancientphilosophywhenIwasanundergraduateand

hasbeensupportiveeversince.

Finally,Imustexpressmyveryprofoundgratitudetomyparentsforprovidingmewithnot

only financial supportbutalsocontinuousencouragement throughoutmyyearsof researching

andwritingthisthesis.IcouldnothavebeenpursuingmyPh.D.degreewithoutthem.

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Contents

Abstract................................................................................................................................................1

Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................2

Contents...............................................................................................................................................3

Introduction........................................................................................................................................4

Chapter1Cosmologyandteleology...............................................................................................7Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................71.1Timaeus’cosmologyandtheTimaeus...............................................................................................81.2Αἰτίαandintentionalteleology.........................................................................................................111.3Theconceptionofdivinecraftsmanship........................................................................................171.4Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................23

Chapter2ThephysicalaccountofmortalityintheTimaeus....................................................25Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................252.1MortalityinthePhaedoandtheTimaeus.....................................................................................262.2Theconstitutionofthehumanbody................................................................................................282.3Thephysicalprocessofdeath.............................................................................................................36Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................43

Chapter3Theimmortalsoul..........................................................................................................44Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................443.1Theconstructionofcosmicsouls.......................................................................................................453.2Thecreationofindividualhumanimmortalsouls....................................................................573.3Theallotmentoftheindividualimmortalsoulsandthecauseofevils............................59Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................62

Chapter4Themortalsouls.............................................................................................................64Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................644.1Πάθημαandαἴσθησις.............................................................................................................................654.2Emotionsandthemortalpartsofsoul...........................................................................................72

4.2.1Angerandthespiritedpartofsoul........................................................................................744.2.2Theappetitivepartofsoul........................................................................................................79

Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................86

Chapter5Theteleologicalmortality.............................................................................................88Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................885.1Theinevitabilityandnecessityofmortality.................................................................................905.2Thecombinationofimmortalsoulandbody...............................................................................945.3TheDemiurgicconcernsforhumans..............................................................................................98Conclusion........................................................................................................................................................102

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................104

Bibliography...................................................................................................................................107

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Introduction

This thesis studies how, according to Timaeus’ cosmology, Plato bridges, or attempts to

bridgethegapbetweenimmortalityandmortality.Thesubjectmightstrikeoneasodd.Indeed,it

mightseemratherplain,first,thatPlatoholdsadualisticstandontherelationshipbetweensoul

andbody;1 second,thatevenifhedidintendtoreconciletheapparentlyincompatiblenatureof

immortal soul and mortal body, a prima facie reading of the Timaeus would not disprove a

dualisticinterpretation,letalonespeakinfavorofthebridge-the-gaptheory.Sincethelate19th

century,therehasinfactarevivalofinterestintheTimaeus,andPlato’sviewsoncosmologyand

psychology have drawn more and more attention of classical scholars.2 However, the topics

pertinenttoimmortalandmortalnaturesareusuallycarriedoutinisolationfromeachother.For

instance,ThomasRobinson’sPlato’sPsychologyconsistsofaprofoundstudyofTimaeus’account

ofsoul’sconstitutionandnature,butvirtually fails toprovideaclearaccountofwhat it is that

bindsanimmortalsoultoamortalbody.3

Certainly, some scholars have noticed that the Timaeus has offered a complex and

constructiveaccountof the soul-bodymatter, andPlato reveals a shiftingattitude towards the

role of body in that account. For example, Thomas Johansen, in his book Plato’s Natural

Philosophy, notes that both soul and body enjoy spatial extension and their motions in space

enables the soul-body interaction.Butmostof thework focuseson issuesof the interactionof

soul’s circular and body’s rectilinear motions, and thus lacks explanation of how, based on

Timaeus’accountofspace,anincorporealsoulwouldpossessesspatialattributesthatallowits

interaction with a physical body.4 And more generally, Johansen places the emphasis on the

dissimilarities of soul andbody rather than similarities, evenwhenhementions that soul and

body share some spatial attributes in common. An extensive treatment of how, according to

1 TheimpressionofPlato’sholdingadualisticstandontherelationshipbetweensoulandbodyowesmainlytohisremarksinthePhaedo,whereheclaimsthatthebodyisaprisonforthesoulandthelatterwouldbecomebetterwithouttheinterferencefromtheformer(66b-c,67d,82d-e).2 ForgenericexegesesoftheTimaeus,seeArcher-Hind(1988),Taylor(1928),Cornford(1937).Forcosmologicalandpsychologicalinterpretation,seeMohr(1985),Robinson(1995),Johansen(2004),Carone(2005),Vlastos(1995),Mohr&Sattler(2010),Broadie(2012).3 Cf.Robinson(1995).4 Cf.Johansen(2004)138-142.

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Timaeus’account,theimmortalsoulandmortalbodyformaunionandareabletocommunicate

witheachother,despitetheirsalientdifferenceinnature,islackingtothisday.5

LetusnowturntotheTimaeusitself.InTimaeus’tellingofthecosmicandhumancreation,

thesoul-bodyproblemoccupiesa largeand importantsection.6 Ibelievethat this iswherewe

findthatPlatobridges,oratleastattemptstobridge,thegapbetweenimmortalsoulandmortal

body.ItismyaiminthisthesistoshowthatPlatohasrevealedwhatnatureimmortalsouland

mortal body share in common that allows their communication both in the cosmos itself as a

wholeandinthehumanperson.Itisalsomygoaltoarguethatmybridge-the-gapinterpretation

will account for the possibility of human’s imitation of the cosmos, which supports the

Demiurge’s ultimate goal of cosmic completion andperfection. For, it is acknowledged that, in

Timaeus’account,Platodemonstratesalargercosmologicalframeworkthatunderpinsmanyof

hislateethicalviews.7 Thusthecosmologicalbackgroundisessentialforanunderstandingofthe

meaningof human life.Andwe can find answers abouthumanhappiness and thebestway to

achieveit inPlato’sappreciationoftherelationbetweenhumansandthecosmos.Accordingto

theTimaeus,asweshallsee,humanhappinessresidesinthegoodnessofthewholecosmosand

theDemiurge.AsIshallargue,imitationofthecosmosisthemostpracticalmethodtheDemiurge

bestowed upon humans, which is grounded by the analogous origin and nature between the

cosmos and the human race, in order that the human race can bridge the gap between the

cosmosthatisadivineandimmortalbeingandthemselvesasbeingmortalcreatures.

IwillapproachtheoverallsubjectmatterofhowPlatobridgesthegapbetweenimmortality

andmortalitybydevelopingacomprehensiveinterpretationoftheconstitutionoftheimmortal

soulandmortalbodyaswellashowthesetwoareboundtogetherandhowtheyinteractwith

eachother.Inthefirstchapter,Iwillgiveasketchofthecosmologyandteleologydemonstrated

intheTimaeussoastoprovidethecontextinwhichimmortalityandmortalityisexamined.Iwill

5 AlthoughtheconnectionandinteractionbetweenimmortalsoulandphysicalbodyreceivesrelativelylessattentioninthestudiesoftheTimaeus,thereissomegoodliteratureonit.Cf.Brennan(2012),Brisson(1997),Carone(2005),Karfík(2005),Lorenz(2012).6 Cf.Tim.27a-34bThecreationofcosmicbody;34c-37cThecreationofthecosmicsoul;41d-42dThecreationofhumanindividualimmortalsoulsandtheembodimentofreincarnationofthosesouls;42e-44dTheembodimentofimmortalsouls;44d-47dThecreationofthehumanbody;64a-69aSenseperceptionandaffection;69a-72dThecreationofthemortalsouls;72e-76eThecreationofbodilypartsandorgans;78e-79eTheprocessofrespiration;80a-81eTheprocessofmetabolism,aging,anddeath;82a-86aThenatureofsicknessandthreeclassesofdiseases;86b-87bThediseasesofthesoul;87c-90dThebalancebetweenthesoulandthebody.7 Cf.Carone(2005),Johansen(2004).

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also lay some stress on the concept of the Demiurge who actually performed the creative

activities according toTimaeus’ account. InChapter2, Iwill investigate the constitutionof the

cosmicbodyandthehumanbodywithregardtothematerials,i.e.theelementalsolidsthatthe

Demiurgeusedtocomposethem.ItwillcontaindiscussionoftheFormsandtheReceptaclethat

are thecomponents in fashioningtheelementalsolids. InChapter3, Iwillbe talkingabout the

constitution of the cosmic soul and individual immortal souls of humans. Chapter 3 will

demonstratethatthedistinctionbetweenimmortalsoulandmortalbodyisnotanabsoluteone

in that the Demiurge employed the Form and the Receptacle as integral components in

constructingboththeimmortalsoulandmortalbody,andtheirdissimilarityliesonlyinthatthe

ways in which the Demiurge actually constructed them. In Chapter 4, I will look at the

constructionofthetwomortalkindsofsoul,i.e.thespiritedpartofsoulandtheappetitivepartof

soul. By redefining the concept of πάθημα and αἴσθησις, I will argue that the ingredients the

lessergodsusedtocreatethemortalsoulsalreadycontaintheparticipationoftheimmortalsoul.

In thisway, themortalkindsofsoul functionas intermediaries in thecommunicationbetween

theimmortalsoulandmortalbody.Itisnoteworthythatthespiritedandappetitivepartsofsoul

play different role in the process of communication. In Chapter 5, I will explore the teleology

operating within immortality and mortality in the cosmological context. I will show that

mortalityisinevitableandnecessaryforthecompletionandcontinuousgoodnessofthecosmos

asawhole. Forhumans,mortality isundesirableon theonehandandnecessaryon theother,

since itensures theopportunity forevery individual immortalsoul toregain itsperfectionand

purity.Iwillalsoarguethatthereisaffinityinthestructurebetweenthecosmosandthehumans.

Andsuchaffinitypromotestheimitationthatthestructuralsimilaritiesallowhumanstopractice.

Inthisway,thegapbetweenthecosmosthatisadivineandimmortalcreatureandthehuman

racethatisamortalkindofcreatureisbridgedbyhumansthemselves.

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Chapter1Cosmologyandteleology

Introduction

AccordingtoTimaeus’cosmogonicalaccount, thecreationof thehumanrace ispartof the

creationofthecosmosasawhole.Forthisreason,theinvestigationofthenatureofhumanrace

cannotbeconductedwithoutabrief introductionof itscosmological context.Furthermore, the

originofthehumanraceispresentedastheresultofdeliberateDemiurgiccreationratherthan

natural evolution. Hence, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the distinctive

mortal-immortalnatureofthehumanracerequiresnotonlyanexaminationoftheconstitution

ofthesoulandbodybutalsoanaccountoftheteleologyoperatingbehindthecreationofhuman

beings.Andthelatterinturnalsocallsfortheapprehensionofthecosmologicalcontextwithin

which the origin and nature of human beings is demonstrated. Additionally, the role the

Demiurge plays in Timaeus’ cosmological monologue is indispensable to the study of the

cosmological context. Therefore, in this first chapter, Timaeus’ cosmology, teleology, and the

conceptoftheDemiurgeareexaminedinordertocharacterizePlato’saccountofcosmiccreation.

Itaimstoprovidethecosmologicalframeworkunderwhichhuman’stwofoldnatureofmortality

and immortality are to be investigated in Chapter 2 and 3, and also the teleology operating

behindsuchatwofoldnatureinChapter4.

IfirstgiveasketchofwhattheTimaeusisaboutandexaminetherelationoftheaccountof

the origin and nature of human beings to Timaeus’ cosmology and furthermore to the whole

Timaeus. The study of that relationship will reveal that, firstly, human’smortal and immortal

nature needs to be understood in a cosmological context; and secondly, the teleologies that

operatebehindthecosmiccreationandthegenerationofthehumanraceareconsistent.Having

shownthatitis,Iwillthenscrutinizewhatweshouldmakeofthisteleologyinthecontextofthe

Timaeus. A specification of the teleology that Timaeus holds in his cosmological accountswill

show that Timaeus’ cosmological teleology is intentional rather than natural, that is,why and

howthecosmoscameintobeing,asitis,issubjecttothegoodintentionandcreativeactivitiesof

the Demiurge. Finally, I will take a look at the Demiurge who performed the calculation and

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deliberation so as to bring the cosmos into being as it is and who serves as an explanatory

principlethataccountsforthegoodnessofthecosmos.

1.1Timaeus’cosmologyandtheTimaeus

Plato’sTimaeus1 openswithSocrates’recapitulationofadiscussionfromthepreviousday,2

whichdescribedabestkindofpoliticalconstitutionandcitizenquite familiar toreadersof the

Republic.3 Today,4 Socrateswishestobeentertainedinreturnandwantstohearhowacitysuch

asthatdepictedinyesterday’s5 talkwouldfareatwarwithothercities.6 Theotherparticipants

of today’s conversation have worked out a plan for the reciprocal accounts. At Timaeus

20d7-26e1,Critiasgivesa conciseversionofhis intendedaccountaboutancientAthens, a city

fromninethousandyearsagothatsurprisinglymatchesthe idealcity7 Socrateshasportrayed,

and its wars against Atlantis.With Socrates’ approving the Athens-Atlantis story, Critias then

suggeststhatTimaeusshouldgiveacosmologicalaccountbeforehegivesafullydetailedaccount

ofthewarfarebetweenthetwocities.Critiassetsouthisplanasfollows(27a2-b6):

Allright,Socrates,whatdoyouthinkoftheplanwe’vearrangedforourguestgifttoyou?WethoughtthatbecauseTimaeusisourexpertinastronomyandhasmadeithismainbusinesstoknowthenatureoftheuniverse,heshouldspeakfirst,beginningwiththeoriginoftheworldand concluding with the nature of human beings. Then I’ll go next, once I’m in possession ofTimaeus’accountoftheoriginofhumanbeingsandyouraccountofhowsomeofthemcametohaveasuperioreducation.I’llintroducethem,asnotonlySolon’saccountbutalsohislawwouldhave it, intoour courtroomandmake themcitizensof our ancient city – as really being thoseAtheniansofoldwhomthereportofthesacredrecordshasrescuedfromobscurity–andfromthenonI’llspeakofthemasactualAtheniancitizens.8

1 Theargumentinthischapterandtheotherfollowingchaptersisalltext-based,includingtheDemiurge’sworkofcosmiccreationandtherealityoftheinterlocutors.ThatmeansIwillnotbetalkingabouttheauthenticityofthecharacterTimaeusorthedifferencebetweenahistoricalSocratesandaPlatonicfictitiousSocrates.BecausethereisnohistoricalevidenceshowingtheexistenceofTimaeusofLocri,Iwillsimplytakeitthatthetextrepresentsitsauthor,Plato’sviewpoints.FordiscussionoftheidentityofTimaeus,seeCornford(1937)2-3).FordiscussionofthetwoSocratesfigures,seeVlastos(1971),Kahn(1992),andBenson(1992).2 Cf.Tim.17c1-3and17c6-19b2.3 FortheviewthatSocrates’talkreferstotheRepublic,seeTaylor(1928)13,Johansen(2004)chapter1.Forobjection,seeCornford(1937)4-5andClay(1997)50-51.4 ForabriefintroductionofthedebateonthedramaticdateoftheTimaeus,seeZeyl(2000)xxvi-xxvii.5 Forthefrequencyoftheword‘yesterday’(χθές)intheTimaeus,seeOsborne(1996)footnote3.6 Cf.Tim.19b3-c8.7 BecauseSocratescallsthecity‘bestpossible’at17c,forconvenienceofreference,Iwillrefertoitas‘idealcity’inthefollowingdiscussion.8 Ifnotspecified,allquotationsfromtheTimaeusarefromthetranslationbyZeyl(2000).OTCgreektextoftheTimaeusisusedinthisthesis:Σκόπειδὴτὴντῶνξενίωνσοιδιάθεσιν,ὦΣώκρατες,ᾗδιέθεμεν.ἔδοξενγὰρἡμῖνΤίμαιονμέν,ἅτεὄνταἀστρονομικῶτατονἡμῶνκαὶπερὶφύσεωςτοῦπαντὸςεἰδέναιμάλισταἔργονπεποιημένον,πρῶτονλέγεινἀρχόμενονἀπὸτῆςτοῦκόσμουγενέσεως,τελεωτᾶνδὲεἰςἀνθρώπων

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From this passagewe can tell that Timaeus’ cosmology and Critias’ Athens-Atlantis story

stand together in response to Socrates’ request. Socratesmakes it clear thatwhathewants to

hearaboutisthemartialperformanceofthebestkindofcity,whichincludesthecitizens’martial

behaviour andnegotiation skills thatwould reflect positively on their education and training.9

BearingSocrates’ request inmind,his interlocutors arrangeaplanof accounts that covers the

originofthecosmos,thenatureofhumanbeings,andthecharacteristicsoftheidealcitizens,so

astofulfillSocrates’wish.Itisunderstandablethat,inorderthatthecharacteristicsoftheideal

citizensshouldbefullyillustrated,anaccountoftheoriginofhumanbeingsisbothdesirableand

suitableasapreliminarytotheaccountofhowtheidealcitizenspossessingsuchanaturewere

educated,trainedandwouldfareinwar.However,doessuchapreliminaryaccountnecessarily

havetoincludetheoriginofthecosmosasinTimaeus’cosmology?Consideringthefactthatthe

cosmoshascomeintobeingalongtimeagobeforetheexistenceofancientAthens,whatdoesthe

originofthecosmoshavetodowiththecharacteristicsoftheancientAtheniancitizensandtheir

correspondingperformanceinwar?

Before answering this question, one point worth stressing is that, at the moment when

Critiasintroducestheoverallplan,Timaeus’cosmologyisyettobedelivered,whichmeansthat,

withinthedialogue,thestructureandcontentofTimaeus’cosmologyseemstobedeterminedby

thepurposeitsetsouttoserve,nottheotherwayround.Thatistosay,Timaeus’cosmologydoes

notaimatdevelopinganaccountoftheoriginofthecosmosperse,butratherismotivatedbythe

constructionofacompletedemonstrationoftheidealcityandcitizensinactionfromtheoutset.

Thisbeing thecase, it is reasonable tosuggest that, throughCritias’ introductionof theoverall

plan,PlatoisencouraginghisreaderstounderstandthecosmologyTimaeusisabouttopresent

not only as an account of the origin of the entire cosmos but also as an account that is

fundamentally politically oriented in termsof its connection toCritias’ and Socrates’ accounts.

Moreimportantly,Socrates’commentsonCritias’plan,i.e.‘acomplete(τελἐως),brilliantbanquet

ofspeeches(τῶνλὀγων),’10 indicatethatademonstrationofamobilepoliticalconstitutionthat

φύσιν.ἐμὲδὲμετὰτοῦτον,ὡςπαρὰμὲντούτουδεδεγμένονἀνθρώπουςτῷλόγῳγεγονότας,παρὰσοῦδὲπεπαιδευμένουςδιαφερόντωςαὐτῶντινας,κατὰδὲτὸνΣόλωνοςλόγοντεκαὶνόμονεἰσαγαγόντααὐτοὺςὡςεἰςδικαστὰςἡμᾶςποιῆσαιπολίταςτῆςπόλεωςτῆσδεὡςὄνταςτοὺςτότεἈθηναίους,οὕςἐμήνυσενἀφανεῖςὄνταςἡτῶνἱερῶνγραμμάτωνφήμη,τὰλοιπὰδὲὡςπερὶπολιτῶνκαὶἈθηναίωνὄντωνἤδηποιεῖσθαιτοὺςλόγους.9 Cf.Tim.19b3-c8.10 Cf.Tim.27b7-8.

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contains cosmology is to be regarded as ‘complete’. In other words, if Timaeus and Critias

provide Socrateswith adiscourseof the ideal city in actionwithout a cosmological account, it

mightbepossiblethatsuchadiscourseisnotcomplete.11 Thisisalsoaclaimthatcosmologyis

essentialtotheoveralldemonstration.Theessentialstatusofacosmologicalaccount,Ithink,lies

in the fact that Platowants the nature of human beings to be examined in the context of the

originofthecosmosasawhole.Thatis,todevelopasufficientlycomprehensiveunderstanding

of thenatureofhumanbeingsrequiresthe investigationnotonlyofwhatthenatureofhuman

beingsisbutalsoofwhyandhowthenatureofhumanbeingsbecameasitis.Andtheknowledge

of the lattercanonlybegraspedbythe inspectionof theoriginof thehumanrace,which isan

integralpartoftheoriginofthecosmosasawhole.Thatistosay,thenatureofhumanbeingsis

rooted in the origin of the cosmos and thus a cosmological account is indispensable in

understandingthecoming-into-beingofsuchanature.

According toCritias’plan, theoriginofhumanbeingsservesasaconnecting linkbetween

Timaeus’ cosmology and Critias’ Athens-Atlantis story. Timaeus’ cosmology fits in the overall

demonstration in that theoriginof thecosmosasawholecontains theoriginofhumanbeings

andthenatureofhumanbeingsneedstobeunderstoodundertheframeworkofcosmogony.And

the Athens-Atlantis story can only be presented after Timaeus’ cosmology, for the education,

training,andwarfareoftheidealcitizensshouldbepresentedinthecontextofanunderstanding

of thenatureofhumanbeings.Thereason forsuchanarrangementof speeches is thatagood

politicalconstitutionshouldbeestablishedasaimingatthebest interestof itscitizens,andthe

bestinterestofthecitizensisdecidedbytheverynatureofthemashumanbeings,whichhasits

origin intheoriginofthecosmosasawhole.Therefore, theoriginofthecosmosisnecessarily

significant for the Athens-Atlantis story in that the knowledge of cosmogony provides a

cosmologicalperspective for theunderstandingof thenatureofhumanbeings, theverynature

thatunderpinsthepoliticalstructureofagoodcitysuchasancientAthens.

11 TheTimaeusisseenaspartoftheTimaeus-Critiastrilogy,whichisinfactunsatisfactorilyincomplete.TheCritiaswasleftunfinished(breakingoffinmid-sentenceafter14Stephanuspages)andtheHermocrateswasnevercomposed(notmentionedinthepreludeintheTimaeusbutintheCritias108a-b).HereI’mnotsayingthatthedialoguewouldbecompleteaslongasitincludesTimaeus’cosmology;rathermypointisthatasintroducedintheprelude,thedemonstration(Timaeus’andCritias’)isexpectedtobecompleteandsuchcompletioncannotbefulfilledwithoutTimaeus’cosmologicalmonologue.Furthermore,ifthedialoguewereevertobecomplete,ithadtoincludeTimaeus’cosmology,butnottheotherwayround.Butthethemeofmythesisisnotaboutpoliticsafterall,soIwillnotbetalkingabouttheAtlantisstorytoldintheCritiasindetailbutrathermentionitasreferencewhereveritisnecessary.

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On thebasisof theaboveobservations,wecannowclaimthat the teleologyoperatingat

thelevelofDemiurgiccreationiscongruouswiththepoliticalorientationatthelevelofTimaeus’

cosmologicalnarration.This isbecausehumanbeingsare integral to the cosmos, and thus the

kind of goodness the cosmoswas created to strive for is also the ultimate goal forwhich the

humanracewasconstructed.Inthiscase,apoliticalconstitutionaimingatgoodnessforhuman

beingsisequallyaimingtocontributetooverallgoodness.Itfollowsthatnotonlythenatureof

humanbeingsbutalsothenatureofapoliticalconstitutionshouldbeunderstoodinthecontext

of cosmogony and cosmology, for the ends of an ideal city consist in its contribution to the

realizationofoverallcosmicgoodness.

AsIhavepointedoutattheverybeginningofthischapter,thestudyofthemortal-immortal

nature of human beings requires the understanding of both the cosmological context within

which the origin of the human race is demonstrated and the political context, i.e. theTimaeus

discourseasawhole,towhichtheaccountofhumanoriginandnatureisintegral.Nowwiththe

foregoingobservationsinplace,wecanconcludethat,firstofall,theinvestigationofthecosmic

and political teleology behind the creation of the human race is of benefit to the study of the

immortal-mortal nature of human beings. Secondly, the account of the origin and nature of

human beings may in turn, on the one hand, reflect on the teleology underlying the creative

decisionsoftheDemiurge,andontheotherhand,beindicativeofthenaturalcharacteristicsof

the ideal citizens. This is because, firstly, the cosmic teleology demonstrated in Timaeus’

cosmology iscongruouswiththepolitical teleologyunderlyinghisnarration.Andsecondly, the

origin and nature of the human race is an essential part of Timaeus’ cosmological discourse.

Bearing those conclusions in mind, I now proceed to look at the teleology illustrated in the

Timaeus that underlies the creation of the cosmos and the establishment of the political

constitution.

1.2Αἰτίαandintentionalteleology

Timaeus’ cosmology is teleological, of the sort that is called intentional teleology or

unnatural teleology,12 for, throughout his cosmogonic monologue, Timaeus has repeatedly

12 Cf.Lennox(1985).

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demonstrated that the Demiurge or the lesser gods endowed a cosmic part with this or that

attributeinorderthatsuch-and-suchacertainendshouldbemet.Τhisendisregardedasαἰτία

of the coming-into-being of that cosmic part, in a sense that the structure or property of that

cosmicpart iscomingtobeforthesakeoftheresults.13 Inthissection,Iwanttoconsiderand

distinguish the specification of the causal accounts Plato offers in Timaeus’ cosmological

monologue by making a comparison with those in the Phaedo.14 The justification for making

such a comparison between thePhaedo and theTimaeus is that the two dialogues differ from

eachotherinperspectivesandemphases,sothatthecomparisonbetweenthemwillhelpusto

discover if Plato had ever endowed the word αἰτία with a distinctive connotation under the

frameworkofcosmologicalteleology.

IntheTimaeus,Platodistinguishestwokindsofcauses,primarycauses(αἰτία)andauxiliary

causes (ξυναίτια). The primary causes are those which possess intelligence and thus fashion

whatisbeautifulandgood,andtheauxiliarycausesarethosewhich,withoutthepersuasionand

guidance of intelligence, produce only random and disorderly effects every time. 15 The

distinctionmadeintheTimaeus, I think,echoeswhatissaidinthePhaedo. InSocrates’ famous

autobiography,hedistinguishesthecause(τὸαἴτιον)fromthatwithoutwhichthecausewould

not be able to act as a cause (ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὖ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκἄνποτ᾽εἴη αἴτιον) (99b). Socrates

explainshisdistinctionbypointingoutthatitisnothisphysicalconstitution(bones,sinews,and

soon)thatiscausinghimtositintheprison;butinstead,hisbeliefthattostayinprisonismore

rightandhonorablethantoescapeandrunaway.Thelatteristhecorrectanswertothequestion

why Socrates is sitting in the prison. Here Socratesmakes a very clear statement aboutwhat

cannotbecountedascauses:whenhesaysthatthosethatcanbothserveastheexplanationof

onethingandofitsoppositeshouldnotberegardedasthecauseofthatthing,16 thatis,Socrates’

bodily constitutionofbonesand sinewswouldhavehelpedhimrunaway toMegara ifhehad

decidedagainststaying.Thisrequirementforwhatmakesasatisfactorycausalaccountbecame

cleartoSocratesashesoughtforatrueteleologicalorcausalaccountinhisstudyofthenatural

13 Cf.Furley(1996)60.14 IpersonallytaketheviewpointthattheTimaeusislaterthanthePhaedo.ForthedebateabouttheplaceoftheTimaeusintheorderofPlatonicdialogues,seeZeyl(2000)xvi-xx,Cooper(1997)xii-xviii,Owen(1965),Cherniss(1965),andBrandwood(1992).15 Cf.Tim.46e.16 Cf.Sedley(1998)121.

13

philosophers. Unfortunately, according to Socrates, these natural philosophers generally take

physicalandmaterialphenomena,sounds,air,hearingandsoon,astruecauses(ἀληθῶςαἰτίας).

The same worry is described in the Timaeus, where it is said that most people think those

phenomenathatproduceeffectslikecoldorheat,compactnessordispersal,arethetruecauses

ofallthings(46a-d).

T. K. Johansen has noticed a difference of terminology between the Phaedo and the

Timaeus.17 In the Phaedo, Socrates claims that it is absurd to call those material or physical

explanations causes (Phd. 99a). On the contrary, later in theTimaeus, Plato indeed calls those

material or physical explanations ‘co-causes’ (ξυναίτια). The reason for the terminological

change, is because in the Phaedo, before Socrates moves on to his second journey (δεὐτερον

πλοῦν),he fails to findout thetruecauses,andwithouttheattendanceofanytruecauses, it is

problematic to call those material explanations causes of anything, since they are necessary

conditionswhich serve the achievement of the true cause.Whereas, in theTimaeus, Plato has

explicitlyexplainedwhatthetruecausesare.Therefore,callingthosethatareundertheguidance

oftruecausesandassistinfulfillingthetruecauses‘co-causes’willnotprovokeanyconfusion,as

longasonebearsinmindaveryclearunderstandingofthedifferencebetweenprimarycauses

andauxiliarycauses.

Besides Johansen’splausible explanation, Iwant to add thatdifferent terminologiesmight

also be rooted in the different emphases and contexts of the Phaedo and the Timaeus. In the

Phaedo, inSocrates’ first journey,ashestudiesAnaxagoras’naturalphilosophy,hemovesfrom

expecting some satisfactory explanation through mind to becoming disappointed about

Anaxagoras’ descent to material causes (97c-98e). In fact, before he continues his reading of

Anaxagoras,Socrateshasalreadypresumedsomecriteriaforestablishingtruecauses.Allthings

are under the arrangement of Intelligence (νοῦς) (97c), and a true cause should be able to

explainwhysomethingisasitisofnecessity(ἀνάγκην)andwhyitisbetter(ἄμεινον)forittobe

so(97e).AndwhenhefindsthatAnaxagoras’causesfallbacktothemateriallevelandturnoutto

failtomeethiscriteria,Socratesdecidestoassertthattheyarenottruecausesatall:tocallthose

thingscauses is tooabsurd (99a).TheexamplegivenbySocrateshimself, thathis sitting in the

prison rather than running away is not the result of his bodily constitutionbut becauseof his17 Cf.Johansen(2008)104.

14

intelligent decision, shows us his preference for intelligent explanations as true causes over

physical ones. Butwe still cannot confirmwhat true causes really are, because from Socrates’

preferencewecanonly learn thathe thinks truecausesmustrelate to intelligence,andrejects

theuseofmaterialorphysicalexplanationsas truecauses. I think thesignificanceofSocrates’

firstjourneyintoAnaxagoras’naturalphilosophyisnottoactuallydevelopanycausaltheorybut

rathertoruleoutbewilderingelements;thatistosay,itsrealachievementistoeliminatenatural

philosophy’s explanations from being real or true causes. And only with such a premise can

Socrates begin his second ‘sailing’, seeking for a causal account amongnon-material elements.

Thatiswhyhedoesnotcallthethingswithoutwhichacausewouldnotbeabletoactasacause

‘causes’,forheisrejectingthem.

ThecontextisutterlydifferentintheTimaeus.ThesubjectoftheTimaeusiscosmiccreation,

andforanintegratedstoryofcosmiccreationitisnotsufficientonlytopresentwhathascometo

beoutofthecausativeactivityoftheDemiurge,butacomparableexpositionofhowthingshave

come to be as such physically is also required. Thus the accounts in theTimaeus contain the

formation of immortal souls and the creation of physical things. Furthermore, fully half of

Timaeus’monologue is concernedwith the origin of the cosmos’ physical body,which clearly

showsthatthematerialaccounthasequalimportancewiththeintelligentaccount.Soitisnota

surprisethatwhenhecomestoanalyzethecausalaccountofsomething,bothitsintellectualand

materialaspectsshouldbetakenintoconsideration.

AnotherdifferencebetweenthePhaedoandtheTimaeuswithregardtothecausalaccountis

in their emphases. In the Phaedo, the specification of causes is under discussion, and the

emphasis of this discussion is on categorizing various kinds of explanations and finding out

among themwhich kind is qualified to be considered a true cause, while in the Timaeus, the

distinction of causes is straightforwardly offered without any further discussion about the

distinctionitself.Previoustothedistinction,Timaeusexplainsindetailhowtheeyespossessthe

physical power of sight (45b-46a). Immediately following his introduction of the difference

betweenprimaryandauxiliarycauses,heanalyzestheintelligentpurposeofsightastheprimary

cause.Furthermore,Timaeusremindshisaudiencethatotherbodilyfunctionshavecometobe

outofsimilarcauses:thatis,thepursuitofthegood.Inmyopinion,Timaeus’introductionofthe

distinctionofcauses isnotmerely for thesakeofmakingsuchadistinction.Despitesettingup

15

thepursuitofthegoodasthegeneralprimarycauseofeverything,aparticularbodilyorganhas

its own corresponding function, and through the assistance of suchunique functions a human

being shall enjoy his own appropriate way of pursuing the general good. That the Demiurge

endowedbodilyorganswithparticularfunctionssothattheycancontributetofulfillthegreater

goodnessshouldalsobeaccountedasatruecause.Takeeyesandearsforinstance:throughthe

function of sight and hearing,men can learn harmony from observing the orbits of stars and

listeningtopropermusic.Thateyesandearshaveparticularwaysofachievingthegoodshould

alsoberegardedastruecausesofwhythegodcreatedthehumanracewitheyesandears.Ishall

talkaboutthisinmoredetailinthefollowingdiscussion.Inbrief,inthePhaedo,Plato’saimisto

findoutwhata truecause is,whereas in theTimaeushealreadyhas theanswerandwants to

enquire further into the particular causes of a certain thing from both primary and auxiliary

perspectives.ThisiswhyitisfinetohaveauxiliarycausesintheTimaeusbutnotinthePhaedo.

As to thediscussionofprimary (or ‘true’) causes, I think theemphasizedaspects arealso

slightlydifferentwhenwecomparethePhaedoandoftheTimaeus.InthePhaedo,Socratesinhis

‘secondjourney’definesa‘truecause’asfollows:‘ifFthingsare(orbecome)FbecauseofF’—or

asmore subtly formulatedbyD.N Sedley, ‘that F things shouldbemadeFby thepresenceof

somethingwhichessentiallybringstheFormF-nesswithit’.18 I thinkthePhaedo focusesmore

onthe‘formal’aspectofcausation.Thatistosay,theproposition‘FthingsareFbecauseofF’is

based on two premises: 1) F things are or exist or have come to be already, and 2) F things

manifestthepropertiesthatqualifythemtobenamedFaftertheFormofF-ness.Forexample,

snowandfireexist,andsnowiscoldandfirehot.ThequestionthePhaedoasksiswhysnowis

coldandfireishot,buttheexistenceitselfofsnowandfireremainsoutsideitsareaofconcern.

Instead, the existence of snow and fire is taken for granted by Socrates and his companions.

Throughout the entire Phaedo, the creative agency or action is absent. This absence might

suggest that in the Phaedo there is no need to discuss the existence of things. This may be

because theobjects that thePhaedowants todiscussall existalready,and thusanydiscussion

concerningthecausesofthosethings isbasedonthefactthattheyarebeingassuch,not from

theperspective that they come to be as such fromnon-existence. On the contrary, that other

perspectiveistheveryonefromwhichtheTimaeusexpoundsitsaccountofcreation.AtTimaeus18 Cf.Sedley(1998)115.

16

28a4-6Platosaysthat‘everythingthatcomestobemustofnecessitycometobebytheagencyof

some cause (ὑπ᾽αἰτίου), for it is impossible for anything to come to bewithout a cause’. The

Timaeusfocusesonansweringthequestionwhyandhowthingscometobe:theemphasisthere

is on theprocess of creation.Taking the snowand fire example again, the causal question the

Timaeuswouldaskiswhysuchthingsassnowandfireshouldbecreatedandcometobeasthey

are.

AsIhavearguedabove,IthinkthatPlato’suniqueperspectiveoncausesintheTimaeus is

foundedontheideathattheparticulargoodsomethingbeingdesignedtopursueshouldalsobe

categorizedasaprimarycauseofthatthing.LikeImentionedinpreviousdiscussion,botheyes

and ears serve the purpose of discovering the harmony from theworld inwhichwe live and

applying it to the transformationof our ownunderstanding.Nevertheless, eyes and earswere

createddifferently.Eyesweregiventhecapacityofsight,bywhichwemightobservetheorbits

ofintelligenceintheheavens(47b).Andthenwecouldinventnumberandtheideaoftimeand

begininquiringabouttheuniverse:apursuitthat leadsuseventuallytophilosophy(47a).Ears

were assigned the capacity of hearing, by which wemight listen to logos, music, and rhythm

(47c-d). And thenwe could learnharmony from sounds and express harmony through sound,

andbysuchmeanswecouldfindanallyinsoundwhoassistsusinstablizingourowninternal

orbits(47d-e).Thisexampleofeyesandearsmaysuggestthat,fromtheperspectiveofcreation,

especiallywhenexplainingacertainthing’scomingtobe,itmaynotbesufficientmerelytosay

thatthecreationofsomethingisforthepursuitofthegood;instead,theexplanationneedstobe

specific. While the pursuit of good is no doubt the true cause of eyes, and does explain the

purposetheexistenceofeyesserves,stillitfailstogiveanexplanationwhyeyeswerecreatedas

eyes,notears,sincethesamecausecanwellexplaintheexistenceofearsandotherbodilyorgans.

Mypointisthatthepursuitofgoodisunquestionablytheprimaryandtruecause,butthatwhen

itcomestoseekingacausalaccountforaparticularthingasatisfactoryanswerneedstobemore

precise.

NowbasedontheuniqueperspectiveoftheTimaeusthatIhaveanalyzedpreviously,Iwant

to investigate what primary causes and auxiliary causes are, using the example of eyes and

eyesight. Let’s beginwith auxiliary causes. If we eliminate the creative activities of the lesser

gods from Timaeus’ description of the construction of eyes (45b-46a), the whole account

17

becomesamerecollectionofmechanicalprinciplesdescribinghowthegodstookadvantageof

diverse properties of solids to make them serve the function of sight: the properties which

explain, for example, how images are produced inmirrors or in any other reflecting surfaces

(46a-c). The explanation of images is a very good example that shows the mechanical and

automaticprocessesatworkincasesofinteractionbetweenphysicalproperties.Suchaprocess

itselflacksapurposeandhasnoessentiallydifferenteffectsontheresults.Theimagesofobject

AandobjectBproducedinamirrorareessentiallythesame,sincetheyareboththereflections

of something. Likewise, Socrates’ bodily constitution can be employed in the service both of

stayinginprisonsittingandrunningawaytoMegara.Nevertheless,itisatleastfairtoclaimthat

it is themechanicalprocessthatproducesthe imagesofobjectAandB,andthat it isSocrates’

bodily constitution that enables him to remain sitting. As Plato admits, the auxiliary causes

(ξυμμεταίτια)givetheeyesthepowerofsight(46e).Ithinktheauxiliarycausesofathingbeing

FintheTimaeusrefertothosethatatthemateriallevel,orphysically,enabletheexistenceofa

thingasFandthemanifestationofitsF-ness.Acorrespondingquestion,takingforinstancethe

exampleoftheeyes,iswhatthephysicalconstitutionofeyesmightbe,andwhatthemechanical

principle of eyesight is. According to the Timaeus, the auxiliary causes are ‘employed in the

service of the god as he does his utmost to bring to completion the character ofwhat ismost

excellent’ (56c-d).As Ihavearguedpreviously, thepursuitofgood is theprimarycause forall

thingsinageneralsense,butwhenitcomestoinquiryaboutacertainobject,thecausalaccount

shouldbe able to explainwhat specificpurpose the coming-to-beof thisobject is supposed to

fulfill inorder to achieve theultimatepurposeofmaking the cosmosas goodandexcellent as

possible.If,therefore,wearetoaskacorrespondingquestionabouttheprimarycause,takingthe

sightexampleagain,itmaybewhattheparticulargoodthateyesbringforthwasforthegodwho

createdthem.

1.3Theconceptionofdivinecraftsmanship

In the above section, I have argued that αἰτία denotes not only cosmic goodness as the

ultimate cause of and purpose for the coming-into-being of things but also the particular

explanatoryaccountofhowthingscometobeasthingswhichcouldfulfilltheirparticularroles

18

incontributingtocosmicgoodness.Andwecannoticethatthereisalwaysacreativeagency19 in

thecausalaccount.Inthissection,Iwillfocusondiscussingtheconceptofdivinecraftsmanship.

Aswecansee, inTimaeus’ cosmologicalmonologue,heoffersadiscourseofhowadivine

craftsman or the Demiurge (ὁ δημιουργός) created the cosmos by endowing the pre-cosmic

chaoswithgoodnessandorder.He transformed thepre-cosmicdisorder intomaterials for the

constructionof corporealentities, that is, thewholecosmicbody towhichan immortal cosmic

soul, constructedby theDemiurgehimself,wasbound.Thuscame intobeing thecosmosasan

eternal livingcreature.AndtheDemiurgealsocreatedthecelestialstarsandthe lessergodsto

whomhethengavethetaskofcreatingthehumanraceandothermortalcreaturestohousethe

individual immortal souls he himself constructed. Readers since Plato’s own time have been

arguing whether the concept of a divine craftsman is indispensable in Timaeus’ cosmological

framework.Somescholarssuggestedthat theDemiurgecanbeequatedwithotherelements in

Timaeus’ cosmology,20 since some of the terminologies employed by Timaeus to portray the

Demiurge’s creative actions, for example, that the Demiurge used a mixing bowl (ἐπὶ τὸν

πρότερονκρατῆρα)tocreatetheimmortalsouls,21 ifreadliterally,whichwouldentailthatthe

Demiurgeusedabowlasthecontainertocreatethecosmicsoul,wouldonlyproduceabsurdities,

whereasametaphoricalreadingcanexplainawaysuchabsurdities.Thushowfararewetotake

theconceptionthatthecosmoswascreatedbytheDemiurgeseriously?Wastherereallyadivine

craftsman at all, the onewho brought the cosmos into being a certain numbers of years ago,

along with time itself? Or is the Demiurge merely a metaphorical figure Timaeus employs to

serveapedagogicalpurpose22 so thatreadersmightunderstandmoreeasily thecausalroleof

Intelligenceinthecosmosthathasexistedalwaysandwillexistforaninfinitetimespan?

The exposition of the concept of the Demiurge brings about the investigation of another

controversialissue,thatis,whetherthecosmoswascreatedchronologicallyashavingatemporal19 Timaeushasusedthesingular‘god’indescribingthecreationofthecosmicbody(27a-34b),cosmicsoul(34c-37c),andindividualimmortalsouls(41a-b).Andhehasmadeitreallyclearin41a-dthattheagencywhocreatedthehumanbodywasthelessergods.However,heusesindiscriminatelythesingular‘god’andplural‘gods’asthecreator/creatorsofthehumanbody.Cf.singular46e,71a,74d;plural47c,75b,77a.Cf.Gerson(1990),pp268,note87.20 FortheviewthattheDemiurgeisreducibletooneoftheotherelementsinTimaeus’cosmology,seeArcher-Hind(1888)38-40,tothecosmicsoul;Cornford(1937)37-38,totheReason;Perl(1998);foranargumentthattheDemiurgerepresentsnomorethananimpersonalintelligentcausation,seeCarone(2005)chapter2.FortheargumentsfortheDemiurge’sirreducibility,seeRobinson(1993),Broadie(2012)chapter1. 21 Cf.Tim.41d4.22 Cf.Aristotle,OntheHeavens279b32-280a1.

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beginning.23 That the cosmos has a genetic origin is significant for the conception of divine

craftsmanshipinthat,asSedleyconcludes,theformerservesasanindispensablepremiseforthe

latter.24 Sedley takes Timaeus’ words at 28c2-3 as specific to the coming-into-being of the

cosmosand infers from it that thecosmoshavingabeginning is the sufficient conditionof the

cosmoshavingacraftsman.Andwhetherornottheformerisalsoanecessaryconditionofthe

latter,thesameconclusioncanbereached.IagreewithSedley’sinterpretation.Andadditionally,

I want to lay some emphasis on the intentional perspective of the teleology illustrated by

Timaeus. In my view, Timaeus’ words at 28c2-3 cannot be read alone but belong to his

comprehensive reasoning from 28a4 to 29a6. And themain point Timaeus tries to convey in

those lines isnotmerelythatthecosmoshavingageneticoriginentails itshavingacraftsman,

but more importantly that a beautiful cosmos such as ours coming into being at a temporal

beginning entails that the well-intentioned Demiurge implanted goodness and order to the

pre-cosmic chaos modelling after the Forms.25 I shall elaborate my point in the following

discussion.Forthesakeofclarity,IquoteTimaeus’wordsat28a4-29a6infull.

Noweverythingthatcomestobemustofnecessitycometobebytheagencyofsomecause,foritisimpossibleforanythingtocometobewithoutacause.Sowheneverthecraftsmanlooksatwhatisalwayschangelessand,usingathingofthatkindashismodel,reproducesitsformandcharacter,then,ofnecessity,allthathesocompletesisbeautiful.Butwerehetolookatathingthathasbeenbegotten,hisworkwilllackbeauty.Nowastothewholeheaven,orworldorder–let’sjustcallitbywhatevernameismostacceptableinagivencontext–thereisaquestionweneed to consider first. This is the sort of questionone shouldbeginwith in inquiring into anysubject.Hasitalwaysbeen?Wastherenooriginfromwhichitcametobe?Ordiditcometobeandtakeitsstartfromsomeorigin?Ithascometobe.Foritisbothvisibleandtangibleandithasabody–andallthingsofthatkindareperceptible.And,aswehaveshown,perceptiblethingsaregraspedbyopinion,which involvessenseperception.Assuch, theyare things thatcometobe,things that are begotten. Further,wemaintain that, necessarily, thatwhich comes to bemustcometobebytheagencyofsomecause.Nowtofindthemakerandfatherofthisuniverseishardenough, andeven if I succeeded, todeclarehim toeveryone is impossible.And sowemust gobackandraisethisquestionabouttheuniverse:whichofthetwomodelsdidthemakerusewhenhefashionedit?Wasittheonethatdoesnotchangeandstaysthesame,ortheonethathascometobe?Well,ifthisworldofoursisbeautifulanditscraftsmangood,thenclearlyhelookedattheeternalmodel.Butifwhatit’sblasphemoustoevensayisthecase,thenhelookedatonethathas

23 ForadiscussionofNeoplatonicexegesesofcosmogony,seePhillips(1997).Foradiscussionofdifficultiesraisedbyaliteralchronologicalreading,seeDillon(1997)andTarán(1972).24 Cf.Sedley(2007)105-106.25 Inthischapter,IwillnotbetalkingaboutthenatureoftheFormsperse,butonlytheparadigmaticfunctionoftheFormsinTimaeus’cosmology.FordiscussionofthenatureoftheFormsintheTimaeusparticularly,seeOstenfeld(1997)andFerber(1997).

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cometobe.Nowsurelyit’scleartoallthat itwastheeternalmodelhelookedat, for,ofallthethingsthathavecometobe,ourworldisthemostbeautiful,andofcausesthecraftsmanisthemostexcellent.26

FromthispassagewecanseethatTimaeus’argumentisasfollows.Firstofall,hecomesup

with a generic reasoning27 about the cause of things that come to be (28a4-b2), that is,

everythingthatcomestobemusthaveacause,andthosewhosecauseisacraftsmanlookingat

the changeless model and reproducing them are of necessity beautiful, otherwise not.28 This

servesasaparadigmforthelaterargumentofthespecificcaseofcosmiccreation.

Asforthecosmos,therearetwostatementsTimaeustakesasself-evidentfactsthatheuses

asthepremisesofhisreasoning.Oneisthatthecosmosisvisible,tangible,andhasabody,and

thus isperceptible (28b7-c1).Theother is that the cosmoswithinwhichheandhis audiences

live is the most beautiful (29a5), which is a plain fact to Timaeus. From the first statement

Timaeusinfersthatthecosmoshasanoriginfromwhichitcametobe(28b7,28c2-3),basedon

thedistinctionhemakesbetweenbeingandbecomingandtheirrespectivemethodsofcognition

at27d6-28a4.Thatistosay,thingsthatcometobearegraspedbyopinion,andthedevelopment

of opinions involves sense perception (28a2-3), whichmeans that things that come to be are

perceptible.Nowsincethecosmos isperceptible, itmustbelongtothingsthatcometobe,and

thushascometobehavingacause.Atthispoint,wecannotyetclaimthatthecosmoscametobe

26 πᾶνδὲαὖτὸγιγνόμενονὑπ΄αἰτίουτινὸςἐξἀνάγκηςγίγνεσθαι·παντὶγὰρἀδύνατονχωρὶςαἰτίουγένεσινσχεῖν.ὅτουμὲνοὖνἂνὁδημιουργὸςπρὸςτὸκατὰταὐτὰἔχονβλέπωνἀεί͵τοιούτῳτινὶπροσχρώμενοςπαραδείγματι͵τὴνἰδέανκαὶδύναμιναὐτοῦἀπεργάζηται͵καλὸνἐξἀνάγκηςοὕτωςἀποτελεῖσθαιπᾶν·οὗδ΄ἂνεἰςγεγονός͵γεννητῷπαραδείγματιπροσχρώμενος͵οὐκαλόν.ὁδὴπᾶςοὐρανὸςἢκόσμοςἢκαὶἄλλοὅτιποτὲὀνομαζόμενοςμάλιστ΄ἂνδέχοιτο͵τοῦθ΄ἡμῖνὠνομάσθω-σκεπτέονδ΄οὖνπερὶαὐτοῦπρῶτον͵ὅπερὑπόκειταιπερὶπαντὸςἐνἀρχῇδεῖνσκοπεῖν͵πότερονἦνἀεί͵γενέσεωςἀρχὴνἔχωνοὐδεμίαν͵ἢγέγονεν͵ἀπ΄ἀρχῆςτινοςἀρξάμενος.γέγονεν·ὁρατὸςγὰρἁπτόςτέἐστινκαὶσῶμαἔχων͵πάνταδὲτὰτοιαῦτααἰσθητά͵τὰδ΄αἰσθητά͵δόξῃπεριληπτὰμετ΄αἰσθήσεως͵γιγνόμενακαὶγεννητὰἐφάνη.τῷδ΄αὖγενομένῳφαμὲνὑπ΄αἰτίουτινὸςἀνάγκηνεἶναιγενέσθαι.τὸνμὲνοὖνποιητὴνκαὶπατέρατοῦδετοῦπαντὸςεὑρεῖντεἔργονκαὶεὑρόνταεἰςπάνταςἀδύνατονλέγειν·τόδεδ΄οὖνπάλινἐπισκεπτέονπερὶαὐτοῦ͵πρὸςπότεροντῶνπαραδειγμάτωνὁτεκταινόμενοςαὐτὸνἀπηργάζετο͵πότερονπρὸςτὸκατὰταὐτὰκαὶὡσαύτωςἔχονἢπρὸςτὸγεγονός.εἰμὲνδὴκαλόςἐστινὅδεὁκόσμοςὅτεδημιουργὸςἀγαθός͵δῆλονὡςπρὸςτὸἀίδιονἔβλεπεν·εἰδὲὃμηδ΄εἰπεῖντινιθέμις͵πρὸςγεγονός.παντὶδὴσαφὲςὅτιπρὸςτὸἀίδιον·ὁμὲνγὰρκάλλιστοςτῶνγεγονότων͵ὁδ΄ἄριστοςτῶναἰτίων.οὕτωδὴγεγενημένοςπρὸςτὸλόγῳκαὶφρονήσειπεριληπτὸνκαὶκατὰταὐτὰἔχονδεδημιούργηται·27 Iholdtheviewthatwhenὁδημιουργόςandπαράδειγμαarefirstintroducedhereat28a4-b2,thedistinctionbetweenacraftsman’susingachangelessandageneratedparadigmistobeagenericconsiderationwithnospecificreferencetotheDemiurge,thecosmiccreator.Cf.Dillon(1997)28andBroadie(2012)27-28.28 Onanuanceofthereadingof28a4-b2thatwhetherthecauseofthings’coming-into-beingreferstoacraftsmanexclusively,IconsultandagreewithJohansen’sinterpretation.Cf.Johansen(2004)70-71.Whenandonlywhenthecosmosexhaustivelycontainsallthosecometobecanthecauseofthingscomingtobeandacraftsman(theDemiurge)exclusivelyrefertoeachother.HoweveratthetimewhenTimaeusismakingthisgenericreasoning,theargumentofthecosmosbeingtheexhaustiveAllisyettobedeveloped.Fortheviewthatthecosmos’beingtheAllisanunspokenpremisethroughouttheTimaeus,seeBroadie(2012)8.

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byacraftsman.This isbecause, inhisgenericreasoning,Timaeusdoesnotsaythateverything

thatcomestobemustcometobebyacause,wherethiscauseisnecessarilyacraftsmandoing

such and such. Rather, he only says thatwhen the cause is a craftsman doing such and such,

thingswould come to be accordingly. Thereforewhat Timaeus has confirmed so far ismerely

that thecosmoshasageneticcauserather than that thecosmoshasacraftsmanas itsgenetic

cause.

OnepointworthstressingisthatthesignificanceofTimaeus’genericreasoningat28a4-b2

is thatheemphasizes therelationshipbetween thecraftsmanshipand theoutcome in thecase

wherethecauseisacraftsman.Thatis,firstofall,onlywhenthecraftsmanlooksatthekindof

model that is always changeless can the product he reproduces turn out to be beautiful. By

contrast,ifthecraftsmanchoosesthekindofmodelthatbelongstotherealmofcomingtobe,the

outcomewouldnecessarilyturnouttobelackinginbeauty.Thepointhereisthatthecraftsman

gets to choose between two alternatives,whichmeans the intention of the craftsmanmatters.

Secondly, the craftsman also has to reproduce the form and character (28a8) of themodel he

looksatsothatwhathecreateswouldresemblethemodelandbecomebeautiful.Thismeansthe

calculationanddeliberationofthecraftsmanmattersduringthecreation.Inaword,when,and

only when, a craftsman chooses the changeless model to look at and reproduce its form and

characterinhisproductcantheoutcometurnouttobebeautiful.

NowsincethecosmoswithinwhichTimaeusandhisaudienceliveisthemostbeautiful,the

coming-into-beingofthecosmosmustthenbetheresultoftheDemiurge’screatingitlookingat

theeternallychangelessmodel(29a6-b1).29 WhattheDemiurgeconfrontedbeforehiscreation

was the pre-cosmic chaos, which was in discordant and disorderly motion (30a4-5). But the

Demiurgewantedeverythingtobegoodandnothingtobebadso faraspossible (30a2-3),sohe

chose to implant order in the pre-cosmic disorder. In other words, it is because of the good

intention of the Demiurge that he chose what is eternally changeless as the model for the

creation of the cosmos. And it was through careful calculation that the Demiurge decided to

createthecosmosasalivingcreaturewithintelligence(30b1-6).

29 Thisargumentationisvalidonlywheneverythingcomingtobebythehandofacraftsmanlookingatthechangelessmodelisthesufficientandnecessaryconditionofitcomingtobeasbeautiful.However,Timaeus’reasoningat28a6-b1onlyconfirmsthattheformeristhesufficientconditionofthelatterandisimplicitaboutwhetherornotitisalsoanecessarycondition.

22

From this argument, we can claim that the cosmos’ having a generic origin is indeed

requiredfortheconceptionofadivinecraftsmanship.Andthroughfurtherinspection,Ipointout

thatthecoming-into-beingofthecosmosasthemostbeautifullivingcreatureistheresultofthe

Demiurge’s good intention of hoping everything to be as good as possible and his creative

activities accordingly. In short, Timaeus’ teleology is intentional, in a sense that the goodness

throughout the cosmic creation and within the cosmos itself as a whole is endowed by the

intention of the Demiurge. And the concept of the Demiurge itself is granted by the cosmos’

havingatemporalbeginning.ThuswecansaythattheDemiurgicteleologydemandsatemporal

beginning,inotherwords,thecosmos’havingatemporalbeginningisneededinordertoground

the teleological structure of the cosmos, in which a good Demiurge aiming for goodness is

essential.

Yetanobjectionarisesfromtheveryideathatthecosmoshasatemporalbeginning.Thatis,

if time came to be along with the cosmos and before the cosmos came to be there was the

pre-cosmic chaos, then it seems that the pre-cosmic chaos existed at a time before time. By

showing that the timecreatedby theDemiurgecanbeunderstoodasmeasurable time,Vlastos

hasplausiblyexplainedawaythisincompatibility.30 ItisworthaddingtoVlastos’viewpointthat

thecreationoftimeitselfisindicativeoftheDemiurge’screativedecision.For,ontheonehand,

timecameintobeingasanearthlymovingimageoftheeternalnatureofthechangelessmodel

theDemiurgelookedat(37d5).Ontheotherhand,timewasmadeaccordingtonumber(37d6),

which was bestowed by the Demiurge upon pre-cosmic matter (53b4-5) in order to replace

disorder with order. Therefore, the creation of time exemplifies the Demiurge’s intention of

makingthecosmosresembletheeternalmodelascloselyaspossible(37d2).

The good intention of theDemiurge is challenged byTarán.31 He askswhy theDemiurge

wouldallowtheexistenceofthepre-cosmos,andwhy,iftimeisassociatedwithnumbermarked

by celestial motions, the Demiurge imposed order on pre-cosmic disorderly motions at that

specificpointof theirmotive succession?Whynot another ‘time’ so that time couldbegin five

minutes earlier or later. I shall use an analogy to answer this question. Imagine drawing a

coordinate invoidspace.Afterdrawingthecoordinate, there isapoint inthisspacewhich isa

30 Cf.Vlastos(1939)and(1964).31 Cf.Tarán(1972)381.

23

starting point (0, 0, 0) and every position in this space is then defined accordingly. Tarán’s

question,ifappliedinthiscoordinateanalogy,islikethis:whydidn’twechoosethepoint(2,2,2)

tobethestartingpoint(0,0,0)?Andtheanswersimplyisbecausetherewasnopoint(2,2,2)or

anyotherpointatallinthisspacebecausenopositionwasdifferentiatedbeforethecoordinate

cameintobeing.Likewise,therecouldnotbeanotherpointoftimethatwasfiveminutesearlier

thanthebeginningoftimebeforetherewasabeginningoftimeasbeingareference.Andthisis

the very reason why the cosmos’ having a temporal beginning is so significant, because it

necessitatesthecausalroleoftheDemiurgewhointroducedorderandbeautytothepre-cosmos,

whichisinturnessentialtotheteleologicalframeworkofTimaeus’cosmology.

1.4Conclusion

Inthischapter,IhavelookedatthecosmologicalbackgroundtheTimaeusshowsfromthe

perspectives of cosmology, teleology, and the concept of the Demiurge. First of all, from the

cosmological perspective, I have argued that since the creation of human race is part of the

creation of the cosmos as a whole, the study of human’s twofold nature of mortality and

immortality must be undertaken in its cosmic context. In other words, when it comes to the

discussionoftheconstitutionofhuman’sbodyandsoulandtheinteractionbetweenthosetwoin

Chapter2and3,therelationshipbetweenthecreationofhumanraceandthatofthecosmosasa

whole will necessarily be taken into consideration. Furthermore, I have also argued that the

teleologyoperatingbehindthecreationofhumanraceisconsistentwiththatbehindthecreation

ofthecosmosasawhole.Sowecanclaimthatthecreationofthehumanraceisessentiallyinthe

serviceof thecosmicgoodness.Forthisreason,whenitcomestoChapter4’sdiscussionof the

teleologyofthecreationofhumanracewithregardtoPlato’saccountofhuman’stwofoldnature

ofmortality and immortality and his attempt at bridging the gap between those two natures,

cosmic goodness as the ultimate creative purpose ought to be considered as an indispensable

contextualelement.

Secondly,IhavealsodemonstratedTimaeus’distinctivecausalaccount.Timaeus’teleology

is intentional andDemiurgic, in a sense that all the cosmic creation is to serve thepurpose of

cosmicgoodnessandperfection.AndasalientfeatureaboutTimaeus’teleologyisthat,notonly

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isthecausewhysomethingcomesintobeingimportant,butthecreativeprocessofhowitcomes

intobeinginordertofulfillitscauseofbeingcreatedisalsosignificant.Itisbecausethecreative

process of something reveals the particular good it is designed to contribute to the overall

goodness.Bearingthis inmind,Chapter2and3willexplorehowtheDemiurgebestowedboth

mortalandimmortalnatureuponthehumanrace,andChapter4will investigatetheparticular

goodwithwhichthehumanracehasbeenendowedbypossessingsuchatwofoldnature.

Thirdly, Ihaveargued that theDemiurgeplaysan indispensable role inTimaeus’account,

foritguaranteesthattheresultofcosmiccreationisgoodandperfect.Onethingtobestressedis

thatIhavenotandwillnotdiscusswhattheDemiurgeis.Sofar,Ihaveconfinedmyargumentto

thatthereisandneedstobeaDemiurgicelementinTimaeus’cosmiccreation,because,onthe

onehand,intentionalteleologycallsforapremisesuchastheDemiurge,andontheotherhand,

thatthecosmoshasagenericoriginisasufficientconditionofthecosmoshavingacraftsman.In

Chapter2and3,thediscussionofthematerialsemployedtobethecomponentofhumans’body

and soul will also involve and further explore the necessity of the Demiurge in Timaeus’

cosmology.

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Chapter2ThephysicalaccountofmortalityintheTimaeus

Introduction

ThemainquestionoftheoverallthesisishowPlatocollapsesthedistancebetweenhuman’s

mortalandimmortalnature.Toanswerthisquestion,itrequirestheinvestigationofnotonlythe

natureofmortalitybutalso thatof immortality, and the relationshipbetween the twoaswell.

Thischapterwillcontributetoansweringthemainquestionbylookingathuman’smortalnature.

Sinceitisobviousthattheimmortalnatureisattributedtothesoul1 andthemortalnaturetothe

body due to the soul’s being indissoluble and the body’s being the very opposite,2 then, to

developanaccountofmortality is to lookat thephysical aspectof ahumanbeing, that is, the

humanbodyanditsdissolubility.Furthermore,asIhavearguedinthefirstchapter,thecreation

ofthehumanraceisanessentialpartofthecreationofthecosmosasawhole,whichmeansthat

the investigation of the physicality of human body should not be conducted without the

consideration of its cosmological context. So, in short, this chapter aims to explore themortal

natureofhumanrace fromthephysicalperspectiveof thebody.The investigation involvesthe

humanbody’sconstitution,exploringhowthemortalnatureisbestowedtothehumanrace,and

itsdecomposition,explaininghowthemortalnaturemanifestsitselfinahumanbeing.

As to the manifestation of mortality, it is commonly known that the mortal nature is

manifestedasthedeathofahumanbeing.Anddeath,bydefinition(thedefinitionaccordingto

Timaeus’descriptionat81b4-e5),isnothingotherthantheseparationofthesoulfromthebody.

That is tosay, tounderstandhumanmortality thoroughlyalsocalls for the investigationof the

soul’sdeparturefromthebody,whichinturnisgroundedintheexaminationoftherelationship

betweenthesoulandthebody.Thus,beforethematterofimmortality,thatis,theconstitutionof

the soul, is covered in Chapter 3, in this chapter, I will confine my interpretation to matters

relatingonlytothephysicalaspectoftheprocessofdeath,andleavethediscussionofhowthe

1 Inthischapter,Ispeakofthesoulindistinctively(withoutanyspecificreferencetoeithertheimmortalpartofsoulorthetripartitesoulasawhole)onlyforthesakeofexplanatorypurpose.ThetripartitenatureofthesoulillustratedinTimaeus’cosmologyshallbediscussedinChapter3and4.2 Cf.Tim.41b7-d3.

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immortalsoulinteractswiththemortalbodyinthefollowingchapter.

Ishallstartwithabriefdiscussionregardingthenecessityofhavingadetailedandlengthy

accountofmortality inTimaeus’narration,bycomparingPlato’s shiftingattitudes towards the

bodyofhumansinthePhaedoandTimaeus’cosmology.Ithenapproachthematterofmortality

fromtwoperspectives.Firstly,Ishallexaminetheconstitutionofthehumanbody,intermsofthe

natureofthematerialsoutofwhichandthemannerinwhichthehumanbodywasconstructed

asdissoluble.Sincethematerialsusedtoconstructthehumanbodyarethesameasthoseofthe

cosmic body, that is, the four elemental solids, the investigation will turn to demonstrate the

constitutionoftheelementalsolidssoastoshowhow,atthemicro-level,mortalityisbestowed

tothehumanbodyattheverybeginning.Secondly,Iinvestigatethephysicalprocessofdeathso

astoseehowtheembodimentanddepartureofthesoulrelatestotheinevitabledissolubilityof

thehumanbodyandthesubsequentdeath.

2.1MortalityinthePhaedoandtheTimaeus

InthePhaedo,apartfromdefiningdeathasthebody’scomingtobeseparatedbyitselfapart

from the soul and the soul’s coming tobe separatedby itself apart from thebody (64c), Plato

offersnofurtherdetailsabouthowsuchseparationofthesoulandthebodyhappensandwhyit

happens.ForSocratesinthePhaedo,3 thebodyisratheraconcern,foritmightverylikelybring

contaminationtothesoulandisanobstacleforthesoulinlearningthetruth.4 Heencourageshis

audiencetodisdainthebodyandrefrainfromassociatingthemselveswithit,becausethebodyis

merely a disposable container for the soul. However, years, or perhaps decades later, in the

Timaeus,Platomakesaveryexplicitexplanationofthephysicalconstitutionofthebody5 aswell

aswhat happens before the dying process finally reaches the pointwhere the soul leaves the

body(81b4-e5).Then,whydoestheproblemofmortalitysuddenlybecomeworthdiscussingin

theTimaeus?Thequestion,Isuggest,canbeansweredfromtwoperspectives,thatis,firstly,from

theperspectivethatconcernsthecosmologicalcontextwithinwhichthedescriptionofthebody

3 Fordiscussionaboutthehistoricalvs.PlatonicSocrates,seeChapter1,footnote1.4 Cf.Phd.65b-67a.5 Cf.Tim.42e8-a4and44d3-45b2,asummaryofthelessergods’constructingthehumanbody;45b2-c2,theconstructionoftheeyes;70a7-72d3,theconstructionofsomebodilyorgansthathousethemortalpartsofsoul;72e1-81e5,theconstructionoftherestofthebody,suchasthebowel,themarrow,bones,flesh,sinew,etc.andtheprocessofrespirationandmetabolism,ageinganddeath.

27

and death is offered, and secondly, from the perspective that concerns the explanation of

mortality in its own right. The Phaedo’s entire discussion emphasizesmatters concerning the

soul.Hence,it lookslikethepurposeoftalkingaboutdeathisonlytointroducethekeysubject

matter,i.e.theimmortalityofthesoulanditsreincarnation,alongwiththeproblemofthepurity

ofthesoulassociatedwithit. Inthiscase,mattersconcerningthebodyordeathbythemselves

are irrelevant and thus Plato is in no need of analyzing them in their own right. In contrast,

Timaeus’ monologue is a discourse of cosmogony and cosmology and is thus composed of

accountsconcerningthecomingtobeofvariousentities,amongwhichthecreationofthehuman

raceisoneoftheindispensableparts.Thatistosay,itisratherreasonablethatTimaeusincludes

atlengthinhisdemonstrationtheconstructionofthehumanbody,alongwithitsbirth,growth,

and decay, for the creation of the human race is necessary for the completed creation of the

cosmosasawhole.6 Furthermore,asIhavepointedoutinChapter1,todevelopcomprehensive

understandingofthehumanrace,itcallsforinvestigationsnotonlyofitsimmortalfeaturesbut

alsoof itsmortal ones.Thismeansaphysical accountofmortality isnecessary for theoverall

Timaeus.

ItisnoticeablethatSocrates’attitudeofcontempttowardsthehumanbodycouldappearto

discourageinterestinresearchonthebody.AndTimaeusalsoclaimsthatthesoulfeelspleasure

whenit fliesawayfromthebody(81d7-e1).Socrates’attitudeandTimaeus’assertiontogether

promptthefollowingquestion:ifthebodyisofleastimportanceanditwouldbeabetterthing

for thesoul tobe free fromtheconnectionto thebody,whywouldtheDemiurge,whowanted

everythingtobegoodandnothingtobebadifpossible(30a2-3),havethesoulembodiedinthe

firstplace?IsitpossiblethatthisisanexemplificationofthelimitationoftheDemiurge’screative

powerwhenhedealtwiththepre-cosmicchaos?Orisitindicativeofthepossibilitythatthebody

isinfactofsomeusetothesoulafterall?Butifitis,whywasthehumanracecreatedsuchthat

thesoulwouldeventually flyaway fromthebodyand leave it todecompose?Thosequestions

cannotbeansweredwithout theknowledgeof theconstitutionof thebody, theconstitutionof

the soul (with reference to the elaboration in Chapter 3), and the connection and the

disconnectionbetweenthesoulandthebody.Inaword,inordertounderstandcomprehensively

for what reasons the Demiurge endowed the human race with mortality, it is necessary to6 Cf.Tim.41b7-c2.

28

developaphysicalaccountofmortality.

Nevertheless, fromtheaboveargument,wecanseethat,althoughTimaeusdoesnotclaim

thatthebodyisassignificantasthesoultoahumanbeing,itisatleastreasonabletosuggestthat

Platohaschangedhisviewthatthebodyisnothingbutahindrancetothesoul.Thismeansthat

the body might be of benefit to an embodied soul at some point, and might be able to

communicate with the soul and thus provides either help or harm to the soul. In conclusion,

Plato’s shifting attitude towards the mortal nature of human race in the Timaeus might be

indicativethathedoesnotdeclarefortheideathatthereisanutterlyunbridgeablegapbetween

thebodyandsoul,notatleastinTimaeus’cosmologicalcontext.

2.2Theconstitutionofthehumanbody

At the commandof theDemiurge,7 the lesser gods took over the task of constructing the

bodyofhumanbeings.Thematerialstheyusedtocreatethehumanbodywereborrowedfrom

thecosmicbody,thatis,theelementarysolidsoffire,water,air,andearth,whichthelessergods

intended to pay back at the very beginning.8 This means that thematerials out of which the

human bodywas constructed are the very samematerials out of which the cosmic bodywas

created.Consequently,thepropertiesthatareattributedtothecosmicmaterialscanequallybe

ascribedtothematerialsofthehumanbody.Thisbeingthecase,itisreasonabletosuggestthat

thephysicalprinciplesoperatingbehindthecosmicbodyare, toacertaindegree,applicable to

thehumanbody.ThissuggestionfindssupportingevidenceinthefactthatTimaeusemploysthe

inter-transformation of the four kinds of elementary solids as the most basic explanatory

principle not only to demonstrate various cosmic phenomena but also to account for the

construction and functions of different bodily organs and parts, along with their respective

physical processes. 9 That the explanation of the elementary solids and their

inter-transformation is applied consistently throughout Timaeus’ cosmological account is

understandable,foreverythingthatpossessesaphysicalbodyisintegraltothecosmicbodyand

7 Cf.Tim.41a-d.8 Cf.Tim.42e-43a.9 Cf.Tim.61e-63e,theperceptionofhot,cold,hard,soft,light,andheavy,alongwiththeconceptofdownandup;64a-65b,thenatureofpleasureandpain;77c-78e,veinsandirrigationinbody;78e-79e,respiration;80a-81e,metabolism,ageing,anddeath;82a-86a,diseases.

29

thusisnecessarilysubjectto,attheelementallevel,theverysamephysicalprinciplesoperating

behindthecosmicbody.Forthisreason,itisjustifiabletosuggestthattoexaminethematerials

of the human body is to examine the materials of cosmic body, that is, the four kinds of

elementarysolids.

AccordingtoTimaeus’demonstrationat53c-55c,thefourkindsofelementalsolids,i.e.fire,

water, air, and earth, can be further separated intomore basic constituent parts, that is, two

kinds of triangles. Thismeans, the triangles are the originating principles of the four kinds of

elemental solids, and thus the ultimate constituentmaterials of the cosmic and human bodies

alike. Considering the complexity of the issue of the elemental triangles and solids, I shall not

offer a full and thorough discussion of the coming-into-being and nature of the elemental

triangles and solids. But instead, I shall confine my investigation to matters that provide

necessarybackgroundknowledgetotheexaminationofthephysicalaccountofbodilymortality,

that is, thedestructibility, themateriality,andthestructureof thetrianglesandfourelemental

solids.IwillexplaininthefollowingdiscussionwhyItakethosemattersasmostimportantand

essentialtotheunderstandingofmortality.

Are the trianglesdestructibleornot?Thisquestionnaturally followson thedescriptionat

Timaeus 81d ‘they themselves (the triangles) are easily divided by those entering from

without’,10 which seems to imply that the triangles can be further broken up and thus are

destructible. If they are, this might seem to lead to an inconsistency in the account. This is

because,Timaeus’ account (53c-54b) is not specificwhether ornot triangles canbe rebornor

replenished.Sothetriangleswerepresumablyperishableandtherewerenonew-borntriagnles,

thenthesumofthetrianglesandsolidswouldgetsmallerandsmallerastheresultoftheirbeing

destroyed by other triangles and solids, and given a long enough period of time, all triangles

would eventuallyperish.At last,without any triangles and solids left, thephysical bodyof the

cosmos would perish as well. This is however obviously inconsistent with the assumption,

expressed atTimaeus 36e,11 that the cosmos as awhole is imperishable. In that case, that the

trianglesaredestructibledisagreeswiththefactthatthecosmosisaneverlastingcreatureunless

ofcoursethetrianglesaresomehowtoberebornorreplenishedtocompensateforearlierlosses.

10 αὐτὰδὲὑπὸτῶνἔξωθενἐπεισιόντωνεὐπετῶςδιαιρεῖται11 …itinitiatedadivinebeginningofunceasing,intelligentlifeforalltime.

30

Anotherproblemraisedbythepossibilitythatthetrianglesaredestructibleistobefoundinthe

phrase ‘theoriginatingprinciple (ἀρχἠν)of fireandof theotherbodies’ (53d),which I take to

imply that the triangles are indestructiblewith reference to some similar usages of thisword

ἀρχή elsewhere in Timaeus and Phaedrus. At Phaedrus 245d, Socrates says that an ἀρχή is

somethingthat iswithoutcomingtobefromanythingelse, it isthusnecessarily indestructible,

forotherwise themortal thingswhichcome tobe from itwouldeventuallycease tocome into

existence. And in the Timaeus, when using ἀρχή in just this sense, Plato uses it to indicate

indestructible entities, such as the model the cosmos comes to be after (28b), the God who

created the cosmos (29e), the subjugation of Necessity towise persuasion (48a), and so on.12

Therefore, ‘theoriginatingprinciple’ in53dcanbemeantinthesamewayandimpliesthatthe

triangles are indestructible, since there is nothing to show that ἀρχή in 53d is being used

differentlyfromtheothercitedcontext.But, is itpossiblethatPlatocouldreallybemakingthe

opposite implication in the Timaeus? Or is there any interpretation that might reconcile our

readingof53dand81d?

R. J. Hankinson’s interpretaion of ἀρχή in the Phaedrus will be useful here.13 Hankinson

offersasolutiontotheproblemthatanἀρχήitselfmaypossiblycometobefromanothersource.

Hesuggests ifweunderstandtheἀρχήasstrictlyspeakingtheἀρχήofsomepropertyorsome

particularthing,thenaslongasthepropertyorthingexists,thisἀρχήwillbetheultimatecause

foritsexistence,beyondwhichthereisnoothersource.Thisdefinitionsatisfiesthedescription

in the Phaedrus. And, if, in the meantime, we see this ἀρχή not strictly but as something

individualinitself,thentheἀρχήcanindeedcometobefromanothersource.Hereisananalogy

tohelpunderstandHankinson’ssuggestion.Ifwedrawastraightlineextendingfromapointona

coordinatemap, thispoint thencanbe regardedas theἀρχήof this linebecause itdefines the

startingpointforthisline,andaslongaswehavethisline,thispointwillalwaysbethestartfor

itandwillnotvanish.Andastothepointitself,itcomestobefromourrandomchoiceofposition

onthecoordinatemap.

12 Tim.48b,thefourelementalsolidsinthesensethatthey’vebeenmistakentobetheἀρχή;48c,originorultimatesourceofallthings.TheGreekwordἀρχήappearsintheTimaeus28times,including28b(3times),29e,48a,48b(4times),48c(twice),and53d(twice).Andat42eand79c,ἀρχήindicatesthesoulparticularly,whileat17b,20a,21d,24b,24b,36e,44a,48d(3times),48e,55e,57d,69a,69b,73b,73c,79c,80b,89c,90e,itsimplymeansthebeginning.13 Cf.Hankinson(1988)98-101.

31

Thus, when Plato presumes the triangles to be the ἀρχή of elemental solids, I think he

probablymeansthatthetrianglesareindestructibleonlyinalimitedsense,thatis,aslongasa

solid exists, its triangles are indestructible. In otherwords, ifwe imagine the triangles, in the

strictsense,astheἀρχήoftheelementalsolids,aslongastheelementalsolidsexist,thetriangles

willbetheultimatesourcefortheirexistence,beyondwhichthereisnoothersource.Inthiscase,

thetrianglesareindestructible,andwecanonlyanalyzeasolidintotriangles,regardlessofthe

possibilitythattheremightbesomemoreultimatecomponent(Tim.53d).Butinthemeantime,

ifwelookatthetrianglesfromtheperspectiveoftheirownindividualexistenceratherthanas

theoriginatingprincipleofelementalsolids, itwilldonoharmtothepriorinterpretationifwe

admit that the triangles themselvesarecreatedandcanpossiblybedestroyed. In thisway,we

eliminatetheproblemofpotentialinconsistencyintheTimaeus,thatis,itisnotcontradictoryto

thinkof the trianglesas theἀρχήof theelemental solidsandas tobedestructibleat thesame

time.Thatthetrianglesareindestructibleonlyinalimitedsense,i.e.intermsofbeingtheἀρχήof

elemental solids, is not a strong claim in thatwe are still confrontedwith thematter that the

triangles, being seen on their own, are indeed perishable. This entails that the cosmoswould

maintaineternalexistenceifonlythetrianglescouldberebornorrepleanished.Iwilldealwith

thatmatterbyexaminingthematerialityofthetriangleswithregardtohowthetrianglescameto

beinthefirstplace.

The reason why I think the triangles’ materiality worth discussing is because, as I have

arguedabove,thetrianglesarethebasiccomponentsofthehumanbody,henceitisthetriangles’

materialitythatdeterminesthematerialityofthehumanbody.Since,theinvestigationofhumans’

mortalityreliesonthestudyof thephysicalityofhumanbody, it is thenalsoreasonabletosay

thattheunderstandingofthephysicalaspectofhumans’mortalnatureisgroundedinthatofthe

triangles’materiality.Furthermore,thematerialityofthetrianglesdeterminesthematerialityof

themarrow,whichisthemediumthatbindsthesoultothebody(73b-c).Ourunderstandingof

the triangles’materialitywill thereforeaffect the futurediscussionofhowthesoul isboundto

themarrow,whosenature,particularlyasitimpactsontheproblemofthebody’decomposition,

istobeunderstoodinthelightofhowweunderstandthetriangles’materiality.

Many interpretations canbe sustained in thedebateabout thematerialityof the triangles

32

andthusithasbeenexaminedfromvariousperspectives.14 ItwillbecomeadigressionifItryto

coveralltheperspectivesexistingliteraturehasdemonstrated.Butfromthepointofviewofmy

overall argument, it is necessary to state my position on this issue to the extent that such a

statementcanat leasthelptosolvethetwoproblemsraisedattheendofthediscussionofthe

triangles’ destructibility, and provides a coherent background to the understanding of the

triangles’nature,andhowthey fit intoourdiscussionofhumanmortality.Furthermore,as the

trianglesarealsothematerialsofthecosmicbody,adiscussionofthematerialityofthetriangles

willprepareusforaninvestigationintotherelationshipbwteenhumanbeingsandthecosmos

andtheteleologyoperatingbehindthehumanrace’sbeingcreatedasbothmortalandimmortal.

InthecontextoftheTimaeus,whatdoesitmeantosaythatsomethingismaterial?Before

exploringtheanswertothatquestion,amorefundamentalproblemneedstobedealtwith,that

is,isitevenapproporiatetoemploytheconceptofmaterialityinintepretingTimaeus’cosmology?

For, Timaeus’ discourse does not involve the concept of materiality by itself. Instead, Plato

merelyclaimsthatthefourelementalsolidshavebodilyform(Tim.53c),andthatthecosmosasa

whole is visible and tangible andhas abody, inotherwords, perceptible (Tim. 28b-c).Andhe

attributesthosefeaturestothingthatcomestobesoastodistinguishitfromthosewhichalways

is. ‘Materiality’, I think, ismerelyaterminterpretersemploytodenotethosefeatures,sowhen

weemploythisterminthediscussionrelatedtotheTimaeusweshouldrefertoitascautiouslyin

arestrictedsenseasthecosmologicalcontextallows.Furthermore,itisworthemphasizingthat

itisnotthesametosaythattheelementalsolidsarematerialandthatahumanbodyismaterial.

Aswecansee,at61e-63eand65c-68d,Platoelucidatestheprincipleofsenseperceptionusing

the explanation of triangles and solids. Fromhis expositionwe can learn that sensation is the

resultofthemovementofinteractionofelementalsolids.Thismeansthatasinglesolidsdoesnot

possesseitherthenatureofbeingperceptibleorthecapacityofperceivingontheonehandandit

is themovementofmany trianglesandsolids thatenables theactof senseperceptionand the

attributeofbeingperceptibleontheother.15 Thisbeingthecase,wecanconcludethatwhenwe

say that elemental solids, the human body, and the cosmos aswhole are allmaterial things it

meansthattheyallpossessbodilyforms.Andthenatureofbeingperceptiblecanbeseenasthe

14 ForvariousinterpretationsofwhatthetrianglesaresinceAntiquity,seeMiller(2003)173-179. 15 Foranelaborateargumentonthemechanicalprinciplesofperceivingandbeingperceptible,seeChapter4,4.1Πάθημαandαἴσθησις.

33

movements of elemental solids on amicro levelmanifesting themselves in human and cosmic

bodyonamacro level.Then,bearing inmind that thecomponentsofhumanbodyandcosmic

bodyariseinthesamesource,thatanythingthat ismadeoutofthesamesourceasthehuman

bodycaninteractwiththebody,andthuscanbecountedasvisible,tangible,andhasabody,in

otherwords,perceptible.

Sofar,Ihavearguedthattheelementalsolidsbeingmaterialmeanstheyhavebodilyforms,

and human body is also material since it is composed of elemental solids. And due to the

movementof the interactionofelementalsolids,humanbodythenpossessessenseperception,

and thus the nature of being visible, tangible, and perceptible embodies themateriality of the

elemental solids on a macro level. Now that we have defined materiality in Timaeus’

cosmologicalcontext, itseemstobe inappropriate tosay that the trianglesarematerial in that

sense,sincePlatodoesnotmentionwhetherornotthetrianglesthemselvespossessbodilyform

(53c).Thisbeingthecase,weareconfrontedwithaquestion:isitpossibleforTimaeusthatthe

basis, i.e. the triangles, ofmaterial existence, i.e. the four elemental solids, humans, etc. is not

themselvesexactlymaterial?Inotherwords,isitpossiblethat,intheTimaeus,Platoistryingto

blur the boudary line betweenmaterial and non-material existence by constructing elemental

solids that has depth out of the triangles? For Plato does not confirm that the triangles

constituting the elemental solids are two-dimensional existence but