Technical Meeting on Safety Challenges for New NPP

22 – 25 June 2015

Gustavo Caruso

Special Coordination of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan

Background

IAEA response to the Fukushima accident includes:

Nuclear Safety Action Plan:

• Defines a programme of work to strengthen the global nuclear safety framework

• Covers all relevant aspects relating to nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and response, radiation protection of people and the environment, the IAEA Safety Standards and IAEA peer reviews

• IAEA Fukushima Report

NSAP Projects Overview

• More than 500 activities have been completed (~71%)

• EBP funded projects:

o Japan

o Russian Federation

o United States

• 13 Expert missions to Japan

• 2015 Final Annual Report

Safety Assessments

IAEA Peer Reviews Emergency

Preparedness and Response

National Regulatory Bodies

Operating Organizations

IAEA Safety Standards

International Legal Framework

Member States Embarking on Nuclear Power

Capacity Building Protection from Ionizing Radiation

Communication Research &

Development

NSAP Programme of work

12 Actions

Fact-Finding Mission

May 2011

Review Japan Safety Assessments NPPs Jan 2012

Expert Mission Onagawa NPP Aug 2012

Peer Review Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards Decommissioning

2nd Mission

Dec 2013

1st Mission

Apr 2013

Remediation of large contaminated area off-site Fukushima NPP

Follow-up

Oct 2013

1st Mission

Oct 2011

2011 2012 2013 2014

IAEA Action Plan

Sept 2011

Fukushima Accident Mar 2011

Japan expert mission timeline

Expert visit

Nov 2013

2015

Marine Monitoring Confidence

Building & Data Quality Assurance

Sept 2014 Nov

2014

3rd Mission

Feb 2015

Seawater

and

sediment

sample

collection

May 2015

International Expert Meetings

Reactor and Spent

Fuel Safety

March 2012

Protection Against

External Events

Sept 2012

Transparency &

Communication

June 2012

Human &

Organizational Factors

May 2013

Decommissioning

and Remediation

January 2013

Radiation

protection

February 2014

Severe accident

management

March 2014

IEM 1: IEM 2: IEM 3: IEM 4: IEM 5:

IEM 6: IEM 7: IEM 8:

Research and

Development

February 2015

IEM 9:

Assessment and Prognosis in

Response to an Emergency

April 2015

To analyse all relevant technical aspects and learn the lessons from the

Fukushima Daiichi accident and IAEA shares these lessons worldwide

Safety Assessments

IAEA Peer Reviews Emergency

Preparedness and Response

National Regulatory Bodies

Operating Organizations

IAEA Safety Standards

International Legal Framework

Member States Embarking on Nuclear Power

Capacity Building Protection from Ionizing Radiation

Communication Research &

Development

NSAP Programme of work

Action 1: Safety Assessments undertake assessments of the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power

plants in the light of lessons learned to date from the accident

• National assessments of the design and vulnerabilities of NPPs against site-specific extreme natural hazards, and measures taken to implement results of assessments

• IAEA methodology based on Safety Standards made available to Member States, and support in the improvement of capabilities

• Enhancement of transparency and effectiveness of communication

• Several meetings addressing key safety issue and producing the technical reports

NSAP Action 1 – Main activities

IEM 1 - Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (19-22 March 2012)

Over 230 experts (utilities, R&D organizations, regulatory bodies and other stakeholders) from 44 IAEA Member States and 4 international organizations.

Focus: Analyse technical aspects; understand root causes; share lessons learned from the accident.

Key Areas identified for reactor and spent fuel safety:

Defence in depth (DID)

Protection against extreme events and external hazards

Response to station blackout and loss of ultimate heat sink

Hydrogen management

Containment systems and venting

Instrumentation and control (I&C)

Safety of spent fuel pools

Research and development (R&D)

Final Report available here

IEM 1 - Conclusions

During IEM, there were a number of recurring themes:

• Place priority not only on preventing accidents, but also on mitigating them Updating and strengthening the SAMGs, training, and drills and exercise programmes to improve the overall response capability on-site and off-site.

• Need to consider the special aspects of multi-unit nuclear power plant sites improve assessment of accident propagation to other units and of the corresponding impact on emergency preparedness

• Improve plant resistance to hazards beyond the design basis Provide NPPs with a more robust and flexible capacity to respond in varied and diverse ways. (e.g. portable equipment to mitigate consequences of prolonged station blackout, prolonged loss of heat sink or combinations of both)

IEM 3 - Protection against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis in

the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (4–7 September 2012)

120 participants from 35 countries featured 42 expert

presentations including NEA-OECD.

Focus:

Share lessons learned, exchange information and identify

issues to be further investigated on:

Seismic and tsunami hazard assessment.

Special flooding issues

Uncertainties associated with hazard assessments

Approaches to establishing design values

Addressing beyond design basis events

Safety against earthquakes and tsunamis

Final Report available here

IEM 3 - Conclusions

Key areas identified need and importance of:

• Appropriate safety margins in NPP design taking natural hazards into account Need to consider beyond design basis measures and procedures

• Probabilistic assessments in evaluation of safety margins

• Deterministic seismic design basis for safe shutdown not less than 0.1g even for areas of low seismic activity, in line with IAEA safety standards

• Clear understanding of failure modes of critical SSCs is a crucial step in the calculation of the safety margins against natural hazards.

• High level of confidence in the hazard assessments for each site in order to effectively manage the risk to the NPP from natural hazards.

• Periodic re-evaluation of extreme natural hazards and NPP response

• Considering complex combinations of natural hazards and effects on multi-unit sites during siting and design phases

• Exchange of information and dissemination of results worldwide from ongoing safety assessments and plant upgrade programmes

Essential role of IAEA: Safety Standards and the IAEA peer review services.

IEM 5 - Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Safety in

the light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (21 – 24 May 2013)

more than 150 participants representing about 40 Member States

and four international Organizations

Focus:

Ways to improve nuclear safety culture across a range of key institutions, including operators and regulators.

Integrated approach to safety / Safety culture

Relationship between the regulator and the operating organization

Role of human and organizational factors in emergency preparedness and response Final Report

under development

IEM 5 – Conclusions

Three aspects highlighted:

• Nuclear community needs to better understand an integrated, or systemic approach to safety. Need to consider how these insights can be implemented within concept of Defence in Depth.

• Broader thinking is needed with regard to the influence of the regulator’s culture on licensees The IAEA is prepared to support Member States in this aspect with workshops and training events on safety culture self-assessments for regulatory bodies as well as forthe operating organizations.

• Severe, unexpected accidents can happen and therefore we need to be prepared for managing the unexpected One approach is to build resilient capabilities in nuclear organizations by learning not only from events and accidents, but also focussing on the more positive aspects.

IEM 7 - Severe Accident Management in the Light of the

Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (17 to 20 March 2014)

More than 200 participants, representing 48 IAEA Member States

and four international organizations

Focus:

Gather and share knowledge and experience gained in the light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident concerning severe accident management (SAM), identify lessons learned and best practices. Main areas:

Improvements to SAMGs

Equipment and Training Needs for Severe Accident Response

Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of SAM Measures

The link between On-Site and Off-Site Response

Challenges in Severe Accidents and Link with SAMGs

Final Report under

development

IEM 7 – Conclusions

• Need for robust training programs at every organization involved in SAM (operators, decision makers, regulators, and offsite responders) Taking a practical learn-by-doing approach, using realistic training aids and allow for an evaluation of their effectiveness.

• Guidance needs to reflect that responders must be able to successfully implement a knowledge based response strategy Accident management procedures are designed to be symptom based with the operator responding to symptoms without the need to diagnose the exact scenario that led to the symptoms.

• Need for regulatory requirements related to SAM Regulatory authorities should review licensee developed SAM programs and strengthen inspection and oversight activities

• Environmental qualification requirements of severe accident instrumentation (I&C) is essential Considering factors as temperature, pressure and radiological conditions under which I&C needs to function and its behaviour under extreme degradation

• Need to develop guidance for management of on-site and off-site response equipment and for testing its deployment during extreme weather conditions.

IEM 7 – Conclusions

• Need for effective communications and a common operational picture SAMGs and emergency plans need to make provisions to ensure that all response teams can have a common situational awareness in order to respond effectively.

• Organizations that may not be involved in the response to a severe accident may need to respond. All organizations (e.g. defence forces) are identified and have basic guidance on how to respond in these situations.

• Off-site plans must have provisions for expansion beyond detailed planning Ensure provisions for, if required, extend current arrangements beyond these zones.

• Risk of loss of key personnel should be reflected in Emergency plans and SAM strategies, and provisions made to ensure the resilience of the response. E.g. cross training and the need for key actions to be confirmed by more than one position.

Peer Reviews to strengthen IAEA Peer Reviews in order to maximise

the benefits to Member States

OSART – Operational Safety Review Team

IRRS – Integrated Regulatory Review Service

EPREV – Emergency Preparedness Review

DSARS – Design and Safety Assessment Review Service

SALTO – Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation

SEED – Site and External Events Design Review Service

ARTEMIS – Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and Remediation

• Following the accident and the adoption of the Action Plan, there was an increase in requests for the IAEA peer review services

• Strengthening and enhance effectiveness of existing peer reviews, while maintaining the concept of self-assessment in all safety areas

• Fukushima Module included in all IAEA peer review services

• To enhance transparency, the IAEA Secretariat provides summary information on where and when IAEA peer reviews have taken place, and to make publicly available the results of such reviews

All missions can be checked on the website of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety

NSAP Action 2 – Main Activities

• Safety Standards Review Task Force established Systematic review of Safety Standards in light of Fukushima Accident:

Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4);

Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1);

Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3);

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1); and

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2)

Review submitted to the Board of Governors in March 2015

Safety Standards to review and strengthen IAEA Safety Standards and improve their

implementation

• Review of the following Safety Guides was initiated by the Commission on Safety Standards so as to determine to whether they will also need to be revised: o Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants (for confirmation)

o External Events Excluding Earthquakes in the Design of NPPs

o Protection against Internal Fires and Explosions in the Design of NPPs

o Protection against Internal Hazards other than Fires and Explosions in the Design of NPPs

o Modifications to NPPs

o Maintenance, Surveillance and In-service Inspection in NPPs

Safety Standards

Report by the IAEA Director General:

Executive Summary;

Summary Report;

– Bold italics;

– Bold lessons and observations;

– Uses safety standards in place at the time of the accident as reference.

Technical Volumes:

Description and context of the accident;

Safety assessment;

Emergency preparedness and response;

Radiological consequences;

Post-accident recovery.

The Report of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

Approximately 180 experts from over 40 Member States and various

international bodies (including IAEA staff) were involved in the

preparation of the report.

• 45 key observations and lessons are highlighted in the report;

• The legacy of the accident will be a sharper focus on nuclear safety everywhere.

• The IAEA safety standards embody an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety.

• The IAEA peer reviews have a key in further strengthening global nuclear safety.

• The accident underlined the vital importance of effective international cooperation.

• The IAEA has reviewed its own arrangements to respond to a nuclear emergency.

• Continuous questioning and openness to learning from experience are key to safety culture and are essential for everyone involved in nuclear power. Safety must always come first.

• The report is planned to be released for the 59th IAEA General Conference in September 2015.

Final Remarks

Thank you!

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