Study GuideWritten by Chair

Flora Huangon behalf of the crisis team

TCGSMUN III 2014 Conference

Crisis Committee

Table Content

Meeting the Crisis Team! p.1-2Welcome Letter p.3-6 Welcome from the Chair p.3-4 Welcome from the Rapporteur p.5 Welcome from the Crisis Director p.6Position Paper s p.7Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement p.8-11 Introduction p.8 Domestic Concerns p.8-9 Government's Response p.9 International Response p.9-10 Voices Differ in Domestic Industries p.10 Vindictiveness? p.10From an economic perspective p.12Taiwan and China's trade relations p.13-19 Trade in Goods p.13 Dispute over Trade Liberalization p.14 Trade in services p.15-18 Direct Investment from China to Taiwan p.19Taiwan's Economic Challenges p.20-24Questions to Consider p.25References p.26-29Further information p.30

Meeting the crisis team!

Chairperson

Flora Huang RapporteurAngela Wu

Crisis DirectorJessica Zhao

Associate Crisis Director Phoneix Yu

1

Meeting the crisis team!

Associate Crisis Director

Sally Chuang Associate Crisis Director Kristie Chuang

Press Director Rebecca Yeh

2

Welcome from the Chair

Respected Faculty Advisors, Delegates, Observers, and all participants of TCGSMUN III,

It’s my utmost pleasure to welcome you and your delegation to the third session of TCGS Model United Nations! My name is Flora Huang, and I’m distinctively pleased to serve you as the Chairperson of this year’s crisis committee. Last year, I served as the Secretary General of TCGSMUN II 2013 Conference, and I seriously can't express my excitement of getting to reunite with all my old MUN friends this year enough!

Being a future freshman majoring in Quantitative Finance, I devoted a lot of efforts in studying this issue and writing this year's study guide. Throughout the past few months, there have been a lot of discussion and dispute over this controversial trade pact. While many regard this as a political issue, I would like to first ask delegates, for you, what is politics? Conspiracy, Machination, Ruse? Brawling in the legislature and flinging shoes?

Right now, all of us live in an era of litigation and finding someone to blame. Whenever a thing breaks out, people start to find someone to point accusing fingers at. However, these politicians didn't pass through a membrane from another reality. They come from this society. They come from the ballots in all of our hands. And we people, somehow, need to shoulder some responsibility. One of the quotes I really like from Life of Pi goes like this, "If we, citizens, do not support our artists, then we sacrifice our imagination on the altar of crude reality and we end up believing in nothing and having worthless dreams." A lot of us, while first time participating Model United Nations, said with our chin up high that we're here to become a person that put ourselves in other people's shoes. Well, did we? You may dislike, or even disdain a government official's policies, however, what if it were you? What if you were the one on the spot, facing the pressure from China and all the mounting competitors in the Asia Pacific region? What kind of policies would you carry out, and how? These are questions, that we, as MUNners, need to reflect on ourselves, and because we are MUNners, we have the unique capability to fathom people out, in the meanwhile being responsible for not keeping mum on problems.

Then, you might ask, what should I do in this committee? Simply put, DAMAGE CONTROL. At this point, a lot of decisions are already made, a lot of obstacles already emerged, and blaming on one another or finding out whose mistake it is are surely the worst solutions to take. We need to, however, face this crisis head-up and figure out the most effective and pragmatic solution to this issue. Here are some advice from the Chair:

A. Always define the parameters, and then work within the parameters that had already been established.B. Stay discreet and astute. Keep your cards close.C. Keep trying until you talk sb. off the ledge.D. Show your ambition, show you hunger, and show your scrappiness.

While considering about issues regarding Taiwan and China's relationship, there is one thing that delegates should always keep in mind, that geography and history determine the economy and politics, and politics and economics are closely interwoven. Notwithstanding it is anachronistic and unacceptable to claim territory by foolishly contending ancestral kinship and geographical proximity, it is something that all delegates need to take in your consideration when coping with the sensitive sovereignty issue between Taiwan and China.

3

Welcome from the Chair

Here are some goals of this committee,

A. deciding the future of the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement.B. designing and implementing a system of safeguard mechanisms to guarantee that select sectors and groups will be sheltered from the hypothetical storm of Chinese investment.C. providing quantifiable limits on acceptable CSSTA-inflicted impacts, clear guidelines on measurement of these impacts, and details on how the government will respond when impacts exceed stated limits.D. outlining a plan for periodic reaccessment of the safeguard mechanisms to ensure its flexibility in adapting to changing economic and political trends.E. reaching a political consensus that will allow an economic pro-growth path.

I sincerely wish all delegates to keep your focus on the economic challenge Taiwan is now facing, instead of disputing over who was the one to blame and who should be responsible for the possible damage tagging along with this trade deal. It is, indeed, a waste of energy to keep on knee-deeping in the political muck. I hope to see some more realistic and creative approaches to confronting the issue, and a solution that can combat Taiwan's long exclusion from trade agreements in Asia, which has undermined the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector.

The Chair understands that some technical terms in economic and politics may be a bit cryptic and esoteric for most delegates, therefore, I made a vocabulary list comprised of vocabularies that delegates may use to gloss and professionalize your speech and written documents. It is highly recommended that delegates make good use of these vocabularies, and the more professional your Position Paper and speeches are, the more likely you will be given the committee awards!

For most of the delegates, crisis committee might be a whole new experience, however, I guarantee this committee to be some of the best that you have ever participated in. From the student camp-out in the Legislative Yuan’s Assembly Hall, to the reaching a consensus on whether the review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) should be passed and how to formulate a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements within the current legislative session, the committee is sure to be intriguing and will truly test delegates’ problem-solving skills. All of the crises have been carefully arranged by chairs, crisis directors, and staff, in hopes of delivering the best Model UN experience. There are no better tips for crisis committee than preparing yourself with passion and innovation, and I believe that you will have a fantastic conference experience. Please feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns in the time leading up to conference, or if you just want to drop by and say hi! I look forward to seeing you all, and once again, welcome to TCGSMUN III 2014 Crisis Committee!

Delegates, stay valiant. Welcome. Ye who enter here.To the cut-throat world of politics.

Best,

Flora HuangChairpersonCrisis Committee | TCGSMUN III 2014 Conference

4

Welcome from Rapporteur

Dear delegates,

Hello, my name is Angela Wu. I have been participating in Model United Nations for three years, and this is my first time chairing. I participated in TCGSMUN I, CENTMUN V, 2013 Harvard MUN in Beijing, and TCGSMUN II. It is quite a pleasure to take part in the Crisis Committee this year. This will be my last MUN conference in high school. I will be majoring in Chemistry at University of South Carolina in the States. Delegates can feel free to contact me when having any problems with studying abroad.

I work as the computer supervisor in TCGS MUN. I was introduced to MUN in my first year of high school. I experienced stage fright and stayed quiet for the rest of the committee in my first MUN conference, which later on made me so regret. Therefore, I strongly recommend delegates not to be shy and try to express your thoughts. Stand up onto the stage and talk for your representing character. Both the chair and I will be encouraging all delegates to speak out your thoughts. I am looking forward to a fruitful debate.

In this year’s crisis committee, we will be discussing about the Cross Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). I would like delegates to focus on the trade agreement and the impacts on Taiwan’s economy, not on the political issues between the two parties or the two contractors. Is there a way to maximize the benefit of Taiwan, and protect the medium and small enterprises in Taiwan from being merged by the major industries? What should the government do to the agreement, whether to examine every clause or to sign another treaty?

Welcome all delegates to TCGSMUN III Crisis Committee. We are going to have a lot of debating, surprises, and most importantly a lot of fun. I am excited to see you all in June. Good luck on your preparation.

Best,

Angela WuRapportuerCrisis Committee | TCGSMUN III 2014 Conference

5

Welcome from Crisis Director

Dearest Delegates,

Welcome to the Crisis Committee in the 3rd TCGSMUN conference! My name is Jessica Zhao, a junior in ZhenHai high school, Ningbo, China. On behalf of the student academic director, I sincerely wish you all could share a wonderful memory during these days. I would appreciate all the delegates’ dedication and activation.

The CSSTA committee requires high quality role play, and the sensitivity to the proceeding of the committee. Every single action taken by delegates would result great influence in the conference. Firstly, delegates should learn about the position, or the general opinion which is held by the KMT and DPP, not only from official publications but from third parties. Delegate should do the analysis by themselves and find out what their real aim is. In a crisis committee, appropriate role play is the most important thing for every delegate. Delegates have to know about the individuality, working style, and interpersonal relationships of the character that they are playing. Everyone’s political tendency is largely identical but with minor differences. Their own characteristics affect them to have different behaviours and decision-making.

Crisis Comittee differentiate greatly with the normal UN system. It is based on the real world event which occurs under a lot of conflicts. This topic is quite close to our actual lives and more impressive than the events which have taken place in other parts of the world. The concerns for each aspect of the problem involve more short-term solutions. Delegates should concentrate more on the current situation in the committee instead of focusing on one permanent solution. Director suggests that delegates could have further research on similar social events. Delegates should attempt to debate and negotiate, and co-operate with all committee members. In a crisis committee, negotiations in various forms are more likely to occur than the normal UN system, and the director thinks it’s a quick and effective way to discuss the actions that you are going to take. Delegates could also take actions deliberately to disturb others. The explanation on specific rules would be due to the dais member before the conference. Compare to the UN system, there are fewer restrictions on delegates, which is more flexible in what you say and what you state in any form of paper. Generally, delegates should obey the basic rules of procedure, but you are given a certain freedom to make subjective statement in order to make the committee looks real. CSSTA has been on debate for a period of time, but since people always ask for the freshness public media, it started to fade out from our minds (especially in the mainland). However, it doesn’t mean that we are not connected with this incident, and it does bring influences to both nations on the two-sides. All the conflicts, demonstrations only provide us with the information on the surface. We need to put ourselves in the position of the people who are highly involved then we could see what is core of the agreement and how we should treat it.

Last but not least, I hope all of the delegates could enjoy an exciting conference. I am looking forward to our gathering in June. Are you ready? And are you aware, who you can trust, right now? Best wishes!

Best,Jessica ZhaoCrisis DirectorCrisis Committee | TCGSMUN III 2014 Conference

6

Position Papers

Position Paper

It is required that every delegate submit a succinct Position Paper relevant to your views and character’s position as well as interests. The paper will be highly evaluated and taken into consideration of delegation awards. A good Position Paper satisfies the following:

1. identifies international and regional treaties, declarations, and programs of action that are relevant to the policy of your delegation.2. proposes pragmatic solution to be taken by the committee.3. fully understands your role in the committee, whether you are a government official, student protestor, or a representative of a civic group or enterprise.

Delegates are encouraged to use the vocabulary list offered by the Committee Directors to gloss and professionalize your Position Paper.

Below are the standards of Position Papers, all submitted documents must be formatted according to these requirements,

A. Length must not exceed two pagesB. Font: 12pt CalibriC. Label your delegation name and committee name on the first page

Please do not plagiarize other articles, if used as reference, carefully mark its source, including excerpting from Committee Study Guides. Verbatim re-creation of official documents or official statements is also prohibited.

How to Submit Your Position Paper

Delegates should submit your Position Papers in only pdf formats to enhance its printing

quality. If you are using Office 2007 or 2010, you may directly save your word document as pdf files; if not, you may find several tools online such as WORDtoPDF to transform your document. Documents should be emailed to floradahuang@yahoo.com no later than June 12th. Delegates who fail to submit their Position Paper by then will not be considered when

deciding Delegation Awards. Once the Chairperson has confirmed receiving your documents, a confirmation email will be sent.

Please use the committee name and your delegation as the title of your email as well as the filename of your Position Paper (i.e., Crisis Committee _ President Ying Jeou Ma)

7

Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement

Introduction

Since his inauguration as the President of Republic of China (ROC) in 2008, President Ying-Jeou Ma has pursued a close economic integration with China, in distinction to the independence-leaning policies of former Government. One of his most significant achievements is Economic Cooperation and Framework Agreement (ECFA). Entered into force in September 12th, 2010, it negotiates and enhances the bilateral liberalization of trade in goods, services, and investment.

In June, 2013, the Service Agreement under the structure of ECFA was signed in Shanghai, with representatives from both governments, Yu-Chi Wang of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council and Zhi-Jun Zhang of China's Taiwan Affairs Office. China has agreed to a WTO-plus outcome and liberalized 80 services sectors, while Taiwan, on the other hand, liberalizes 64. Under the consent of ECFA, the two governments will further negotiate a deal on goods and disputing settlement.

Since ECFA came into effect, approved Chinese investment in Taiwan has increased from $94 million in 2010 to $328 million in 20121, and according to some estimates, Taiwan's GDP will increase by 1.7 percent and create 260,000 jobs.2 It is also sanguinely expected that it will strengthen Taiwan's position in the Asian Supply Chain, leading to a stimulation of economic growth.

However, in the meanwhile, concerns over tight economic integration with China were aroused, regarding China's remaining position of political unification. These concerns did not come from a hollow cave, on September 20th, 2013, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also former director of the mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office, claimed in a speech at Brookings that "Gradual integration of the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] through two-way interactions and cooperation will lead to ultimate unification."3

Domestic Concerns

On March 18th, 2013, hundreds of students stormed into the Legislative Yuan and barricaded inside for a month, in protest of Taiwan's signing of Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with China and the Government's circumvention on a detailed review on the trade deal. All hell broke loose when Legislator Ching-Chung Chang made a 30-second announcement on March 17th that the pact must not be debated any further, thus clearing the way of its ratification. The protestors, mostly students fearing to bear the brunt of the impact, condemned the Government for unscrupulously signing the pact without public consultation and transparency, and they voiced their concern over how economic dominance will give China an advantageous leverage on political dominance. The main demands of the protestors, as how a student protestor, Wei-Ting Chen , stated, was to retract and nullify the pact and establish a mechanism to overhaul and monitor all cross-strait deals in the future. Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) later on released a talk in support of the students defying the trade pact, " The bill should be sent back to the committee for a detailed review, and the pact should adhere to principles of equal opening, fair competition, safeguarding people's livelihood and ensure security.", he said at a press conference. Signed in June 2013, the agreement is still awaiting ratification by the parliament, but the Government was alleged by the protestors for their recklessness in using underhand and

8

Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement

undemocratic tactics to negotiate and enter it into force, thus fomented the anger of Taiwanese people. The deal is regarded as a "blatant lie" carried out unceremoniously and surreptitiously by the Government, and many fear that it will lead to an influx of Chinese businesses, which might overwhelm Taiwanese competitors and threaten basic freedoms in areas such as publishing.4 Furthermore, realistically, Taiwanese corporations that are capable of investing in China’s banking, printing and other service industries mostly are big conglomerates, not the small enterprises comprising Taiwan’s main industry. After all, such agreements clearly are welcomed by some sectors of an economy but are considered potentially harmful to other sectors.

Goverment's Response

On March 23rd, President Ying-Jeou Ma first responded directly toward recent student occupation at a press conference held in the Presidential Hall. He first questioned the decision to occupy government offices, "Is this the sort of democracy we want? Must the rule of law be sacrificed in such a manner?"5 He then reiterated the importance for enacting this deal, "The pact must be passed for the sake of Taiwan's economic future," he said, noting that Taiwan now has only seven free-trade partners, while its main export competitor, South Korea, already enjoys tariff-free treatment in more than 40 countries. "Signing free-trade agreements is an inevitable trend on which Taiwan can't afford to miss out." President Ma once again stated in his speech, urging protestors not to disseminate misinformation.6

Finance Minister Chia-Juch Chang also shared mutual concerns, saying in a press conference that the deal was too important for the island to pass up. "The Cross Strait Service Trade Agreement has a stake in the nation’s prospects. Mainland China is such a big market that if we don’t sign this agreement our competitiveness will drop. How will we join regional mechanisms in the future? Everyone had better calmly consider over [this], [we] must not be influenced by ideology," said Chang. 7

International Response

On May 16th, 2014, Taiwan's Economics Minister Chia-Juch Chang arrived in Qingdao, China, for the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial meeting, where he brought up the current issue to China's Minister of Commerce Hu-Cheng Gao. Gao raised concerns about Taiwan's draft cross-strait agreement monitoring bill, which is now under review in the Legislature, and that the draft act is seen as discriminatory and imbued with a sense of Taiwan independence.8 The speech adheres to the statement from the spokesman for China's Taiwan Affairs Office, Xiao-Guang Ma, on March 26th, urging Taiwan to continue pursuing an agreement. "Compatriots on both sides of the strait aren’t willing to see cross-strait economic cooperation be interfered with,” Ma stated.9

On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, U.S. State Department also commented on the issue on March 24th, expressing United States' hopes of carrying out the discussions on the trade pact civilly and peacefully.10 US Senator Sherrod Brown, who is a founding member of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, urged Ma to ensure a non-violent, peaceful resolution:"My thoughts are with Taiwanese students and other protesters expressing opposition to a proposed economic pact with China. The world is watching these courageous students. The message to President Ma

9

Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement

is that when you try to jam a trade agreement through, people will resist." 11

Voices differ in domestic industries

Turning our focus back to the domestic industries, which are referred to as "standing on the peak of the impact", gave different comments on the service deal when some consider the benefit tagging along with the trade deal prodigious. "The trade pact would be a link for Taiwan’s economy to the international economy," Tsung-Sheng Liu, president of Yuanta Securities Investment Trust co., said in a phone interview. “In the short term, the public has some concern over the services trade pact, the ruling party shouldn’t railroad it. It’ll cause political instability.” 12 Vivien Hsu, spokeswoman for Fubon Financial Holdings, Taiwan's second -biggest financial provider, said failure to pass the trade pact would impede the financial industry's entry into China "because many investment regulations are tied to the pact." 13 Chang-hua Institution for Economic Research, a government think tank, stated that the agreement could add 12,000 jobs to Taiwan's service sectors, with the biggest beneficiaries being retail and storage sectors. It could also add around 0.025-0.034 percentage point to Taiwan’s gross domestic product, the think tank said. 14

Nevertheless, these comments were chastised by the public as "Grandiose Capitalism", as described to skew further economic development in favor of the wealthy at the expense of the masses. 15 The Taoyuan Federation of Trade Unions said that 16 years ago, when the government opened the island to free trade, it left "waves of Taiwan's workers laid off without redundancy and pension… This will happen again with the trade agreement today". In reality, wages in Taiwan, particular in service industries (in which 60% of Taiwan's working people are employed), have been on the decrease, by 6% in the past decade. Under the trade agreement, China's larger service businesses can enter and compete with the smaller service businesses in Taiwan, which will likely lead to the lowering of wages and worsening of conditions. 16

Vindictiveness?

Some pointed finger at the Chairman of the Legislative Yuan, Jin-Pyng Wang, for his lack of sincerity to solve the dispute. Many consider this as a vindictive action toward President Ma, due to the bad blood between the two after the so-called " Taiwan Watergate Scandal". In September, 2013, President Ying-Jeou Ma tried to expel one of his strongest political rival in the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) , Jin-Pyng Wang, the legislature's chairman, for alleged influence-peddling. However, the move not only backfired and caught him in a cleft stick but also highlighted disunity within his party. On March 19th, 2014, a day after the students stormed into the legislature, a court in Taipei ruled in Mr. Wang’s favor, allowing him to keep his party membership and thus his job. It was another embarrassment for the president, whom critics attempt to portray as an aloof patrician with an autocratic streak. 17 President Ma has been suffering from a dearth of trust from his people, and his approval ratings even nosedived to a new low of 9.2 percent, the first time the rating has dipped to single-digits, in a public opinion poll released in November, 2013, when many criticized him for his tendency toward growing authoritarianism and his hollow-rang promises. During the time of occupation, Wang called for the negotiation amongst parties, only to leave a six-time failure out of six meetings. Some queried on his inefficiency, but he responded that he had stood ready to broker a deal between the feuding lawmakers and that President Ma should listen to the people instead of seeking espousal from his supporters. The whole protest on the

10

Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement

trade deal, known as the "Sunflower Movement", finally came to a halt after 23 days when Legislative speaker Jin-pyng Wang pledged on April 6 to halt debate on the services trade pact with China until new oversight rules are passed. 18

11

From an economic perspective

Introduction

On the two sides of Taiwan strait lie two economic miracles, one as the country with the most rapid economic growth in the world, and the other creating a stunning report of GDP per capita despite its humble size and population. By 2013, China’s GDP was reported at $9.2 trillion and $3348 per capita, while Taiwan’s GDP was $481 billion – much smaller in absolute terms, but an impressive $20930 on a per capita basis given its modest population of 23 million.19

For nearly two decades, Taiwan and China have been drawn increasingly closer to one another by the same wave of globalization. In 2013, Taiwan’s total trade with China was valued at $124.4 billion (exports to China of $81.8 billion and imports of $42.6 billion).20 China is now Taiwan’s most important trade partner, representing over 21.6% of total trade, also being Taiwan’s largest export destination and second largest source of imports.21 Despite the fact that China has generally opened sectors in trade, investment, and labor to Taiwan, Taiwan has maintained a more restrictive attitude toward reciprocal flows from China due to political tensions. In fact, China’s exports to Taiwan remained relatively low during the 1990s and did not start to grow to around $5 billion annually in the years until China’s accession in 2001 to the World Trade Organization (WTO).22 After his election in 2008, President Ying-Jeou Ma indentified economic liberalization as his top priority of policies. With stepping up ad hoc negotiations, both governments have accelerated the pace of economic integration and begun to formalize quasi-official mechanisms to under grid bilateral commerce. Such an approach is being taken in the form of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that has further led to FTA-type talks.23

Trade Across the Taiwan Strait, 1992-2008, Source: Trade Potential between Mainland China and Taiwan. Xinpeng Xu and Yu Sheng. September 22, 2009. Abstract.

12

Taiwan and China's Trade Relations

Trade in Goods

Taiwan-China trade in goods has swelled over the past decades as China assumed the leading role in final assembly in regional manufacturing production networks, foremost in information and communications technology.24 Two-way trade has averaged 16 percent annually for the past decade, lifting the value of trade from $30 billion in 2000 to $105 billion in 2008, this after having roughly tripled in the preceding decade of the 1990s.25

Taiwanese exports to China by category, 1993-2009

Taiwanese imports from China by category, 2000-09

13

Taiwan and China's Trade Relations

Dispute over Trade Liberalization

In 2006, China’s WTO representatives included several pointed comments of Taiwan in the occasional Trade Policy Review.

“China was concerned over problems relating to the WTO nondiscrimination principle. Chinese Taipei practiced trade-restrictive policies against China in manyareas, which had limited the potential for cross-strait trade and economic cooperation. Chinese Taipei had maintained import prohibitions on 2,237 tariff lines of products from China without WTO-consistent justification. Access for China’s services providers was virtually blocked in many ways, and Chinese companies found it impossible to invest in Chinese Taipei. This was not conducive to the development of cross-strait trade and economic relations; it was not only against the interests of businesses and consumers in Chinese Taipei, but also had a negative impact on business investment in China. As a result, the economic growth of Chinese Taipei had been greatly impaired. China urged Chinese Taipei to . . . take steps to correct these trade policies and practices, which were inconsistent with WTO rules, so as to promote trade liberalization (and facilitation) across the strait. (WTO 2006, 12, paragraph 59)”

Taiwan has argued that its WTO obligations do not apply to China in the same way because China was not a WTO member when they were negotiated. (China and Taiwan negotiated accession and entered the WTO in parallel.) But WTO obligations, however arrived at, are multilateralized and applied to all members on an MFN basis, unless a specific exception is registered at accession, which Taiwan did not do. In addition to its list of prohibited imports from China and its residual restrictions on transport links, Taiwan has maintained special restrictions on Chinese investment, services, and the physical movement of people for employment and personal travel, as described below. The lack of normal government-to government contact has further frustrated a variety of commercial activities dependent on consultation and communication between regulators and overseers.

For its part, China maintains a more limited set of restrictions on Taiwanese commerce. Beijing does not impose restrictions on Taiwanese goods imports different from those applied to other WTO members. However, it has declined to issue licenses for Taiwanese services sector firms to conduct business, most notably in the financial services industry, on the grounds that such firms could not be adequately regulated due to the lack of normal regulator-to-regulator communication between governments on each side of the strait. With the advent of WTO+ FTAs between China and other economies, China now applies lower rates of import duty to goods from some other WTO members than from Taiwan. While this is neither unusual in the world today nor necessarily noncompliant with WTO obligations, it adds an element of distortion for Taiwan and has been the main argument employed by President Ma Ying-jeou’s government in making the case for a formal arrangement to achieve deeper economic integration.26

14

Taiwan and China's Trade Relations

Trade in Services

TaiwanTaiwan’s balance of payments data indicate a services trade deficit throughout 1984-2009. Services exports grew faster than imports in all these years, though starting from a very low base. Growth was highest in the late 1980s, with average annual rates at 24% for exports and 20.5% for imports. This growth has slowed over time, falling to 3.9% annually for exports and a negative number for imports in 2004-2009. As a share of total exports and imports, services exports increased from 7.5% in 1984 to 13.3% in 2009, while services imports declined from 20% of all imports to 14.8% in 2009.27

Growth of Taiwan's services exports and imports with the world (%)

Taiwan's trade in services with the world, 1984-2009

15

Taiwan and China's Trade Relations

Balance of Taiwan's services trade with the world by sector, 1984-2009

China

After its integration into regional production chains such as transport and various business services, the annual growth of services imports in China averaged 22% and services exports 24%, compared to 24% and 18% in the previous decade.28

China’s trade in services with the world, 1982-2009

16

Taiwan and China's Trade Relations

Balance of China’s services trade with the world by sector, 1991-2009

While services make up more than 70% of Taiwan’s GDP, Taiwan’s weight in Asia’s services trade, let alone in the world, is relatively low. Services trade growth by local peers was strong enough to overshadow Taiwan. China, on the other hand, already is an important market in global services trade given the overall size of the economy. In 2009, it ranked fifth in global services exports and fourth in imports, surpassed only by the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom.29 In East Asia, Japan has long led in global services exports and imports value, however, in 2011, China passed that position, representing as the third largest services imports and fourth largest services exports in the world.30 Given the size of its economy and the current growth trajectory of its services sector, China is seem as to step up as the most important market for services trade in East Asia.

17

Taiwan and China's Trade Relations

Trade in services of countries in East Asia with the world, 1982-2008

Despite a major impediment in national security concerns, Taiwan has recently picked up its pace on opening services exports to China. As of 2010, extensive Taiwan opening to inbound direct investment from China is taking place under memoranda of understanding (MOUs) signed in ad hoc cross-strait meetings since 2008. These agreements will open many Taiwanese sectors to investment from China, and address financial services in particular. Banking and the trust investment sector are in line for opening to investment from qualified Chinese institutional investors (as they have been to other foreign investors, like Standard Chartered Bank and Citibank). For example, two Chinese fund management services firms – China AMC and China International Fund Management – have completed registration procedures and are preparing to trade shares in Taiwan.31

18

Taiwan and China's Trade Relations

Direct investment from China to Taiwan

After president Ying-Jeou Ma’s election to presidency in March 2008, the whole investment picture began to change. Making good on campaign pledges to improve cross-strait economic relations, Taiwan reached agreement on expanding charter air services, triggering a wave of investment in Taiwan by China’s airlines to set up required business infrastructure. In the summer of 2008, several policies supportive of Chinese investment in Taiwan were announced. In late June, limited local currency convertibility for the new Taiwan dollar and the Chinese Yuan at Taiwan banks was announced, and in July cross-strait market access to the securities industry was widened. Additional normalization of transport links was agreed upon in fall, paving the way for additional direct investment in support of sea transport and delivery services. The biggest development came in June 2009 with an agreement to ease the process for mainland firms to set up branches and offices in Taiwan, opening 192 sectors to Chinese investors – 64 in manufacturing, 117 in services, and 11 in infrastructure. A regular cap on Chinese investors was raised from 20% to 30% of ownership.32

Approved foreign direct investment from China into Taiwan, monthly values, July 2009- January 2010

19

Taiwan's Economic Challenges

Revitalizing Comparative Advantages33

Taiwan , in recent years, have become less competitive as a place to do business. A range of factors are contributing to this such as excessive regulation of business, restrictions on FDI, insufficient investment in R&D and stagnant wages which are leading to a brain drain to competing centers of excellence such as Hong Kong and Singapore.34 Taiwan ranked 16th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report 2013, below regional competitors such as Malaysia (12th), Korea(8th), Hong Kong (2nd) and Singapore(1st). And while the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2012-13 ranks Taiwan as a respectable 13th out of 144 countries – the same ranking it has held for the last three years – policy instability, restrictive labor regulation and inefficient government bureaucracy are identifies as key problems for doing business in Taiwan.

On the other hand, Taiwan is also facing increased competition from countries such as Korea in both the contract manufacturing sector and in branding and selling final goods to China and key-developed country markets such as the United States and EU.

Encouraging Foreign Investment35

Foreign investment in Taiwan remains low, particularly by Asian standards. In 2011, Taiwan’s stock of inward FDI was valued at $56.2 billion – not much up from $50.2 billion in 2006. And this compares with over $222 billion in Japan, $134 billion in South Korea and over $115 billion in Malaysia. In 2012, FDI flows into Taiwan were just over $5.5 billion compare with over $16 billion into Korea.36

There are good reasons for encouraging increased FDI into Taiwan. FDI is an important channel for introducing new technology and can also drive economic growth and employment.37 As important are the new skills foreign businesses bring, such as managerial, financial and legal skills; these are also inputs into the production of goods and therefore can benefit Taiwan’s economic broadly.

Taiwan’s desire for increased levels of inbound investment is also being driven by concerns that the large Taiwanese investment in China and elsewhere is leading to a hollowing out or deindustrialization of the economy.38 Concerns about the economic impact on Taiwan of large outward of flows of FDI are also paralleled by political concerns about the costs to Taiwan of closer economic integration with China and with the political leverage this may give China over Taiwan.

Developing Taiwan’s Services Sector 39

Taiwan’s economy has also increasingly evolved from one dependent on manufacturing to a more services-orientated economy. For instance, where as approximately 40% of Taiwan’s GDP came from industrial production in the 1980s, in 2012 that share had decreased to around 29%, while the service component rose to 69%.40 The increasing reliance of Taiwan’s economy on services is a trend that other advanced economies have followed.

20

Taiwan's Economic Challenges

However, Taiwan’s services sector remains domestically focused, comprising mainly small businesses and with low levels of productivity growth.41 This compares with other Asian Economics such as Singapore and Hong Kong which have large internationally orientated services market that generate significant levels of economic growth.

Absence From Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements

Taiwan’s history over the past decades has represented an arduous struggle for diplomatic and economic recognition. According to the Asian Development Bank, as of January 2013, ratified FTAs involving an Asian country were 109, up from 36 in 2002, with a further 148 FTAs proposed and under negotiation.42 However, Taiwan has been left absent from this proliferation of Asian FTAs, and with North Korea remaining the only two Asian countries excluded from regional economic integration. Taiwan is a party to only have signed and ratified seven FTAs to date. These are agreements with Panama(2004), Guatemala(2005), Nicaragua(2008), El Salvador(2008) ,Honduras(2008), and recently in 2013 with New Zealand and with Singapore. The five agreements signed by the former DPP government, to much disappointment, only constitutes 0.187% of Taiwan's total exports, and the two agreements signed in 2013 by the Ma Government are thought of as the economic and diplomatic benefits to Taiwan of ECFA and the easing of China’s opposition to Taiwan’s participation in other FTAs. This is a clear reflection of how political reality has affected Taiwan's foreign trade.

How the Absence Can Affect Taiwan

Under the flow of regionalism, ASEAN countries have made important progress in liberalizing trade under an ASEAN FTA. Under this FTA, since 2010 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have offered zero tariffs on 99% of trade products, with Vietnam achieving by 2015.43 ASEAN has also negotiated a number of FTAs, including with China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand have commenced negotiations towards a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Moreover, Taiwan’s current strongest economic competitor, South Korea, has inked eight FTAs covering 46 countries, including the latest one with Australia signed on April 2014, and enjoyed tariff-free from 28-nation European Union, the 10-member ASEAN, as well as the United States.

Left out, Taiwan will be harmed by these FTA’s trade diversion effect, whereby Taiwan’s exports lose out in FTA markets due to increased competition from imports from other FTA partners. A good example is that Korean exports of apparel, LCD televisions and bicycles to the EU – all goods in which Taiwan competes – will face zero tariffs to the two largest developed country, EU and the U.S., while Taiwan exports of these goods face tariffs of 12, 14 and 15 percent, respectively.44

This "trade diversion" impact can be substantiated by statistics. Two years before the Korea-ASEAN FTA took effect in June 2007, Taiwan's and Korea's annual growth rates in exports for ASEAN were 20.1% and 16.6%. Only a year after June 2007, Taiwan's growth rate plunged to 11.8% while Korea's rose to 24%.

21

Taiwan's Economic Challenges

Furthermore, when it comes to trade in intermediate parts, goods may cross borders multiple times before being assembled into a final good. As Taiwan’s economy is focused on contract manufacturing where 70% of exports are immediate goods, the impact of exclusion from these FTAs will be magnified.45

Taiwan and South Korea’s economic comparison, source: Commonwealth Magazine english.cw.com.tw

22

Taiwan's Economic Challenges

Why China

As mentioned in the front, there will be severe impact on Taiwan's economy if it remains an economic isolation to the whole Asia and the world. What worries Taiwanese enterprises more is the loss of the Chinese market to ASEAN and Korean competitors. Taiwan's trade interests in China is surely to be further eroded should the Korea-China FTA or the "ASEAN Plus Three" framework be realized. Statistics show that the "ASEAN plus three" FTA will decrease Taiwan's trade surplus by $694 million per year, and reduce its GDP by 0.836%.

Taiwan Government’s Response46

President Ying-Jeou Ma, facing the possible economic strike, pledged to reform Taiwan’s economy to be ready to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) by 2020 and in 2013 expressed Taiwan’s desire to join the TPP in 2014.47 To this end, Taiwan’s Government has started to identify its core economic challenges and is proposing policy solutions to them. For example, a government policy report titled “2012 Golden Decade National Vision” identifies the need to address economic imbalances in the economy such as too large a reliance on industry and manufacturing, the challenges and limits to an economic model that produces intermediate goods combined with a reliance on too few export markets, and the need to expand innovation.

Taiwan also has a Service Industry Development Plan that aims to increase the competitiveness of Taiwan services sector and achieve greater market access overseas. The government is establishing free economic pilot zones where a range of economic reform can be tested and, if successful, expanded to the broader economy. However, it doesn’t do enough to emphasize liberalization of Taiwan’s services sector and the impact that greater competition can have on the domestic service industry.48

Last but surely not the least, the Government has been seeking solutions to its exclusion from trade agreements in the Asia Pacific region and the sabotage of competitiveness of its sector. In his talk on July 2011, Premier Yi-Huah Jiang reiterated the importance of concluding free trade agreements (FTA) with other countries. “The R.O.C has always upheld the principle of free and open competition in world trade. As more and more countries remove tariffs and other trade barriers to allow their strongest products to be sold in other countries, those who fail to join free trade groups will be marginalized.” he said. He then cited South Korea as a model, “As our export product types are similar to South Korea’s, missing out on opportunities to sign FTAs with other countries will cost us in the future. If we fail to compete on an equal footing, our exports will dwindle, and we will definitely lose out to South Korea in the global marketplace.”

While asked about the services agreement with China, Premier Jiang emphasized, ”The protection of a few fragile industries in the short run would forfeit the competitiveness of strong industries in the long run……To win the mainland China market, Taiwan will have to change its industrial constitution through free, open competition….Whatever challenges we are faced with, we will take them head-on and do our best to overcome them.”

23

Taiwan's Economic Challenges

Although the Service Agreement is expected to foster Taiwan’s efforts to move higher in the value-added chain and pave way to further integration with other proximate nations in the region, uncertainties about Taiwan’s relations with China tempered investors’ enthusiasm, as the political risk associated with Taiwanese firms reliant on China-related income streams remained higher than in other economics.

24

Questions to Consider

From the content above, we can easily conclude that Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement is more than just a political or economic issue, which cannot be renegotiate article by article or disband in its entirely. As the Chair has mentioned in the Chair letter, this crisis committee is more than just a normal MUN committee where delegates brawl over each other. It is, however, looking forward to delegates’ cooperation on coming up with a feasible and effective way to protect the most vulnerable members of Taiwanese society, and at the same time, the economic struggle and stagnation Taiwan is trying to muddle through.

Below are the things that the Chair expects all delegates to come up with a solution to:

A. Do your character agree or disagree to sign this trade deal? If yes, then how do you ensure that the most vulnerable sectors of the economy and the members of society will not be negatively impacted? It not, what are the alternatives? Is there any other possible way to avoid us from granting China too much leverage but at the same time getting access to this biggest market in the world?

B. With economic agreements between China and most other economies in Asia altering tariff and nontariff barrier conditions, it is obvious that long-standing political resistance to economic integration with China at the hub give away to the logic and durability of China’s economic rise. How should Taiwan face this sure influence? What kind of mechanism should we establish?

C. What can we do to decrease the risks of Taiwan’s mounting dependence on China, with the absence of normalized economic integration, that can possibly erode the value of operations in Taiwan in the future?

D. How can we assure that the economic policies and plans can maintain immune to all circumstances? That is, how can we assure that these policies won’t be inherently cyclical that start and stop with election cycles, and thus maintain a cross-strait relationship that is win-win over the long term?

E. Is Taiwan ready to deepen cross-strait economic relations with China? As mentioned in the front, in the current situation, China is largely in compliance with MFN-level WTO obligations to Taiwan, while Taiwan unilaterally imposes a broad range of barriers to trade in goods and services uniquely on China. Is Taiwan ready to dismantle these barriers to normalize this economic relationship?

F. Which is more important for Taiwan, “national economic security” or “national security”? How can Taiwan filter to separate legitimate economic concerns that could undermine the island’s interests from special interests masquerading as security concerns? Also, are defensive, protectionist measures really a more effective response than proactive engagement and economic deepening?

G. Cross-strait opening, for sure, is neither a recipe nor a panacea to Taiwan’s dwindling competitiveness. It can only prevent Taiwan from the erosion of existing strengths, however, by deepening economic relations, Taiwan is merely matching what its ASEAN and other regional competitors have already done. How can Taiwan generate self-value on this playing field? How can Taiwan resolve the risks and reinvigorate its domestic business environment and incentive structure?

25

References

1 Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, "Statistics Summary Analysis", January 2010, December 2010, and December 2012. P9, Taiwan's economic opportunities and challenges and the importance of the Trans-Pacific partnership, Joshua Meltzer.

2 John F. Copper, "The Chain-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement: Politics, Not Just Economics," EAI Background Brief Npo, 548, 2010; see also " Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) Background," Mainland Affairs Council, P9, Taiwan's economic opportunities and challenges and the importance of the Trans-Pacific partnership, Joshua Meltzer.

3 Wang Yi, "Toward a New Model of Major Country Relations Between China and the United States, "speech at The Brookings Institution, September 20, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/09/20-us-china-foreign-minister-wang-yi; see also John F. Copper, "The Chain-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement: Politics, Not Just Economics," and Daniel H. Rosen and Zhi Wang, "Deepening China-Taiwan Relations through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement," Policy Brief 10-16, June 2010, p. 2.

4 http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21599807-students-occupy-taiwans-legislature-protest-against-free-trade-pact-china-manning ; Manning the trade barriers, Students occupy Taiwan’s legislature in protest against a free-trade pact with China; March 29th, 2014

5http://time.com/35142/taiwan-protests-over-tisa-reveal-china-fears/TIME WORLD TAIWANThe ‘Battle of Taipei’ Shows Just How Wary of China Young Taiwanese AreEmily Rauhala / Beijing @emilyrauhala March 24, 2014

6http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303725404579456731907714984Taiwan Police Evict Protesters From Cabinet Building ; President Ma Ying-jeou Again Rejects Demands, Written by Jenny Hsu, March 24th, 2013

7http://minzhuzhongguo.org/ArtShow.aspx?AID=39226Voice of America 3/19/2014 Taiwan Protesters Occupy Legislature Over China Trade Pact

8http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201405180019.aspxChina urged to fix problems linked to cross-strait trade talks 2014/05/18 21:34:37

9http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/criticism-and-rare-words-of-support-as-china-watches-taiwan-protests/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0Criticism, and Rare Words of Support, as China Watches Taiwan Protests By AUSTIN RAMZY, New York Times

10Culpan, Tim (25 March 2014). "Taiwan’s President to Meet Protesters Who Seized Legislature". Bloomberg. Retrieved 27 March 2014.

11Wang, Chris (25 March 2014). "Politicians, civic groups lash out over crackdown". Taipei Times. Retrieved 25 March 2014.

12http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-21/taiwan-protests-escalate-amid-demand-for-china-deals-oversight.htmlTaiwan Protests Escalate Amid Demand for China Deals Oversight, By Tim Culpan Mar 21, 2014 4:49 PM

13http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB300014240527023037254045794567319077

26

References

14984Taiwan Leader Rejects Student Demand ; By JENNY HSU Updated March 23, 2014

14http://www.uscnpm.org/2014/03/31/thousands-protest-taiwans-trade-pact-with-china/Thousands Protest Taiwan’s Trade Pact With China , By Jenny W. Hsu, March 30, 2014 in The Wall Street Journal

15http://www.socialistalternative.org/2014/03/26/taiwan-ma-government-rocked-mass-protests-occupation-parliament/Published On March 26, 2014 | By Sally Tang Mei-ching and Vincent Kolo | World Events

16http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/25/taiwans-protesters-democracy-china-taiwan-straitTaiwan's protesters are fighting for the very democracy of the island - A trade deal struck with China threatens economic as well as political dominance from across the Taiwan Strait, Written by Hsiao-Hung Pai, theguardian.com, Tuesday 25 March 2014 22.00 GMT

17http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21599807-students-occupy-taiwans-legislature-protest-against-free-trade-pact-china-manningManning the trade barriers, Students occupy Taiwan’s legislature in protest against a free-trade pact with China , Mar 29th 2014 | TAIPEI | From the print edition

18http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-10/taiwan-students-to-end-24-day-occupation-of-legislature-today.htmlTaiwan Students End 24-Day Occupation Over China Trade Deal, By Justina Lee and Tim Culpan , Apr 11, 2014 12:13 AM GMT+0800

19 China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P5

20http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/fsci/

21Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p2 ; statistics from http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/fsci/

22China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P7

23 China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P6

24China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P6

25China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P10

27

References

26China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P19-20

27China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P20-21

28China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P23

29China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P24-25 ; See the WTO’s annual report on trade services via the Chung Hua Institution of Economicn Research. http://taiwan.wtocenter.org.tw/WTOissueindex.asp?id=18 (accessed on September 15, 2010).

30See statistics from WTO http://stat.wto.org/ServiceProfile/WSDBServicePFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN%2cTW%2cHK%2cJP%2cKR

31China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P26 ; Jingying Ma, “Finance Industry Is Not Included in the Second Round of ECFA Negotiation”, Caing News, March 31, 2010. http://finance.caing.com/2010-03-31/100130861.html (accessed on September 15, 2010).

32China-Taiwan Economic Relations, © Peterson Institute for International Economics | www.piie.com , P38-39 ; “Regulations on Investment Permission for Mainland Investors”, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, June 30, 2009. Earlier drafts intended to raise the percentage to 50 percent. Available at: http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_external/ctlr?PRO= LawsLoad&id=64.

33Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p4 ; An-Chi Tung and Henry Wan, Jr, “Chinese Electronics Export; Taiwanese Contract Manufacturing – The Win-Win Outcome along the Evolving Global Value Chain,” The World Economy (2013), p. 839.

34Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p4 ; American Chamber of Commerce Taipei, “2013 Taiwan White Paper,” p. 5, June 2013, Vol. 43, Issue 6.

35Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p5 ; Victor Zitian Chen, Ming-Sung Kapo and Anthony Kuo, “Inward FDI in Taiwan and its policy context,” in Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, March 22 2012, p. 2.

36Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p5 ; American Chamber of Commerce Taipei, 2013 “Taiwan White Paper,” p. 5.

37Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p5 ; OECD. 2002. “Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs.”

28

References

38Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p5 ; Haddad, Mona. 2007. “Trade Integration In East Asia : The Role Of China And Production Networks,” World Bank, ISSN: 1813-9450.

39Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p6

40Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p6; Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan.

41Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p6; Donghyun Park and Kwanho Shin, “The Services Sector in Asia: Is It an Engine of Growth?” Institute for International Economics, October 2012.

42Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p11; Asian Development Bank, “Asian Economic Integration Monitory March 2013,” p. 50.

43Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p11; “Trade patterns and global value chains in East Asia: From trade in goods to trade in tasks,” p. 41.

44Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p11

45Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p12; Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Matalone and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Vertical Production Networks in Multinational Firms,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4) 2005, p. 664-78.

46Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p13

47Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p13 ; Taiwan Today, “President Ma prioritizes trade negotiations,” July 23, 2013, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=193827&ctNode=421

48Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ; Joshua Meltzer ; p13

29

Further information

Though plenty of information has been offered in this study guide, it is strongly encouraged for delegates to some extra topic research on your own, whether a better background knowledge of your charactor role or the committee issue at large.

Please remember to submit your Position Paper to the Chair no later than June 12th.The instructions of submitting your Position Paper can be found in the front.

You may find further information on the following websites,

TCGSMUN III Crisis Committee Official Website

TCGSMUN III Official Website

TCGS Model United Nations Official Facebook Fan Page

Keep updated to the conference!

Contact information

Chairperson Flora Huang

Facebook

Instagram

Email

Kik: floradahuang Line/Skype: flora_huang_ille

Rapporteur Angela Wu

Facebook

Email

Line: angelawu1126

Feel free to contact us if any question regarding the issue or the committee at large!

30