taylor.talk.paris.may.2012.as given

8/13/2019 Taylor.talk.Paris.may.2012.as Given

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Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic emanation in Greek, Arabic

and Latin.

Reflections on a recent paper by Richard Taylor

0.1 Introduction

One of the most important and most frequently occurring questions in both ancient and

modern philosophy is, of course, the following : has the world always existed, or did it come

into being at a specific moment of time ? The former was the position of Aristotle and,

following him, of most pagan philosophers down to the closing of the Platonic Academy in529AD. The latter was the view of a few renegade pagan philosophers in Antiquity

especially such Middle Platonists as Plutarch, Atticus and Galen who gave a literal

interpretation of the passages in Plato's Timaeusin which the Demiurge seems to create the

world in time and of some Christians such as John Philoponus, who were concerned to

defend the literal truth of the Biblical account of creation as narrated in theBook of Genesis.

In the controversies between Pagans and Christians at the end of Greco-Roman

Antiquity, as exemplified by the debate between Philoponus and the Neoplatonist philosopherSimplicius, these two positions were usually considered both exhaustive and mutually

exclusive1. On the one hand, one could agree with the pagans represented by Simplicius, and

maintain that the world comes into being through eternal emanation (in Greek, aei), usually

conceived as originating in the supreme principle (designated as the One, the Good, or God),

and continuing through the intermediaries of hypostasized Intellect and Soul until it reaches

the stage of Soul's insertion of forms into matter, thereby bringing about the formation of the

sensible world. Or else one could believe, with the Christians, that God created the world in

time or at a specific moment (Greekpote), including matter, out of nothing by a one-time act

of his benevolent will2. According to Philoponus at least, although this act took place at a

1 As they continued to be for Kant, in his first antinomy of pure reason ( Critique of Pure Reason,

Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, Transcendental Logic, 2nd division, Transcendental Dialectic, book two :

Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason).

2Cf. Philoponus, Against Aristotle, fr. 115 Wildberg = Simplicius, In Phys., 1141, 22 : !!"!#"$#!$%%&&!''#()!"*+(),-!!"!%'".; Hierocles, De prov., apud Photius, Bibl. cod. 251, p. 461a-23 : !!"!*/#01('2

(...) !!"!#%&3$4)'2: Proclus, Investigation of Aristotle's objections to the Timaeus, ap. Philoponus, De aet.mundi, VI, 7, p. 138, 24-25 Rabe : "516#+)47!)')1+389,.#!:&*+ ;#


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specific moment it time (pote), it was nevetheless instantaneous in the sense that various

kinds of change were held to be so in Aristotelian natural philosophy : acts of intellection and

touching, the flash of a bolt of lightning, and the freezing of water, the curdling of milk and

other phase transitions as they're known to modern science, to mention just a few of the

standard examples3.

This debate had an important impact on Islamic philosopy, with al-Kindi, the

Plotiniana Arabica, al-Ghazali and the Kalam basically adopting the broad outlines of

Philoponus' approach to the question of creation, while Farabi, Ibn Bajja, Avicenna, and

Averroes (at least in some phases of his thought) maintained different variations of the

position defended by Simplicius.

Eternal emanation or temporal creation ex nihilo : the battle lines seem to have been

drawn, and all that's left is to choose one's camp.

Very recently, however, Richard Taylor4 has argued that these two seemingly

incompatible viewpoints can be reconciled, and that both can rightly be called instances of

creation. This view has a long and exemplary pedigree, including no less an authority that

Thomas Aquinas. In what follows I will try to contribute some elements toward an evaluation

of this claim.

1.0 Taylor on creation

In his article, Taylor, following Hasker, sets forth a definition of what he calls

creation1 or Abrahamic creation (I will henceforth call it the latter). This type of creation,

opposed to Neoplatonic-style emanation (which Taylor designates as creation2), is

characterized by the following features.

1. It is ex nihilo, rather than being either a fabrication out of pre-existing material or an

outflow from God's own nature.

2. It is a free act of God, who was not obliged to create but did so out of love and

generosity.

3. God not only creates the world in the beginning, but continues to sustain it at every

moment of its existence.

3On all this, see M. Chase 2011.4R. Taylor 2012.


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Summing up this notion of Abrahamic creation, Taylor writes5that it

involves a single primary cause or First Cause originating all reality other than itself by bringing forth allex nihilo as ontologically after absolute nothingness in an action somehow including freedom, will andchoice such that there is neither external nor internal necessity compelling creation1.

What Taylor calls creation2 or emanative origination, and I will henceforth simply call

Neoplatonic emanation, is, he claims, characteristic of such Medieval Arabic works as the

Plotiniana Arabica that is, the so-called Theology of Aristotle, the Sayings of the Greek

Sage, and other such works, which are based largely on extracts from the work of Plotinus

and the Liber de Causis, based mostly on propositions from Proclus' Elements of Theology.

Here, Taylor explains, the creation or origination of reality takes place from the First Cause,

or God, without any act of will or any other intermediary, but by the very being of that Cause(Greek auti ti einai, Arabic bi-ann!yati-hi). The existence of that Cause immediately and

automatically entails, by a process of emanation, the existence of all subsequent levels of

reality. This form of creation, Taylor writes6,

... entails the negation of will, choice, the necessity of nature characteristic of things having nature orform (which is necessity2), and also external compulsion (which is necessity3).

Taylor7 thus introduces a distinction between three kinds of necessity. Proceedingfrom the lower to the higher forms, we have (Table 1) :

Necessity3, which takes place by external compulsion.

Necessity2, which indicates what follows for a thing on the basis of its nature or form.

Finally, there is

Necessity1, or transcendent necessity, in which the effect follows immediately upon

the positing of the cause.

Now Neoplatonic emanation, Taylor wants to claim, is free from necessity3 (nothingexternal can force the First Cause to create) ; and from necessity2(the first cause has no form

or nature8 that might compel it to do something), but not from necessity 1, or transcendent

5Taylor 2012, 115.

6Taylor 2012, 130.

7Taylor 2012, 130 ff.

8This seems highly questionable in the case of Plotinus, for whom the first Cause, otherwise known as the

One or the Good, may have no form, but can be, and quite often is, said to have a nature. See the numerous

attestations in Sleeman-Pollet, Lexicon Plotinianum, s.v. ?@:+9 b6, col. 1095. Already in an early Christian


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necessity. Thus, in Neoplatonic creation, the emanation of all reality follows immediately

upon the being of the First Cause qua Good. This conceptual scheme, Taylor argues,

characterises the thought of Plotinus, Proclus, the PA, the LDC, al-Farabi, and Avicenna.

Abrahamic creation, by contrast, is free from all three types of necessity.

Basing himself on no less an authority than Thomas Aquinas9, Taylor now goes on to

make what might be deemed to be his most controversial move : both Abrahamic creation and

Neoplatonic emanation can, he claims, be considered as creation tout court. Let us recall that,

according to Taylor, the main difference between Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic

emanation is that the former involves a free choice of will on God's part, and the latter does

not. In Taylor's words10:

It appears then that it is quite appropriate to consider creation to be of at least two sorts, creation2which isbased on the notion of primary causality involving necessity1 resulting from the First as the Good, andcreation1 which is also based on primary causality but adds the Abrahamic understanding that the Firstcreates without any sort of necessity, need not have created at all, and acts by will, in some understandingof that term.

Let me begin my critical discussion of Taylor's theses by saying that I find his paper

exceptionally dense, profound, and stimulating, so much so that I have been wrestling with it

since I first heard an initial version of it last Fall. My initial reaction was that there is

something wrong with the final conclusion, or at least missing in the argumentation leading

up to it. I must confess, however, that the more I think about the issues involved, the less sure

I am of my position. In what follows, therefore, is by no means intended as a definitive

refutation of Taylor's position, but more as a Confessioof the doubts I have had about it, and

continue to have to some degree.

I'll group these doubts under three headings.

context, Clement of Alexandria (Strom. I, 86, 3) speaks of doing good (to agathopoein) as as it were, the nature

(phusis) of God, as it is the nature of fire to heat and of light to illuminate. Cf. Drrie-Baltes 1998, 472 n. 47.

That the First Cause lacks a nature does not even seem to be true of the Liber de Causis, which, in proposition 8

as cited by Taylor (2012, n. 36) says of the Good or First Cause that its individual nature is the Pure Good

emanating all goodnesses upon the intellect and upon the rest of the things through the mediation of the

intellect. As in Plotinus, then, it is precisely because the One is good that it creates. Taylor seems to assume that

at least as far as the Neoplatonic One is concerned, having nature is equivalent to having a form. I do not believe

that is the case.

9Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1252-56), at Book 2 d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, resp. See below.10Taylor 2012, 132.


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1. How solid are Taylor's initial axioms and definitions ? Do his categories of creation1

(Abrahamic creation) and creation2(Neoplatonic emanation) accurately designate two clearly

identifiable positions, neither neglecting any essential element nor including anything

superfluous ?

2. Subsidiary to this first question : how cut-and-dried are the positions of the various

thinkers Taylor assigns to the two camps ? I will leave aside the case of the Plotiniana

Arabicaand theLiber De Causis, assuming that Taylor, one of the world's leading experts on

both works, knows what he's talking about and has given an unimpeachable account of their

doctrines. But is it really the case, as Taylor claims with regard to creation 2or Neoplatonic-

style emanationism, that Plotinus, Proclus, Farabi and Avicenna accept the causing by the

primary cause of the existence of something after nothing11 ? With regard to Abrahamic

creation : it is really so straightforwardly clear that God's creative act, for Thomas Aquinas, is

the result of a completely free act of will ? And as far as Neoplatonic emanation is

concerned : is it quite so certain as Taylor asserts that it involves noelement of will ?

3. Finally, with regard to Taylor's conclusion, if there really is not that much of a

difference between Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic emanationism, a large chunk of the

history of philosophy, and of the Pagan-Christian debate of Late Antiquity in particular,

becomes incomprehensible. The Christian Church fathers virulently opposed the Neoplatonic

doctrine of emanation for centuries, as can be seen, for instance, in the 6th-century debate

between the Christian John Philoponus and the pagans Proclus and Simplicius in their debate

over the eternity of the world, while the pagans opposed, with equal violence, the Christian

doctrine of creation within time. Yet if these two views are really so close as to be ultimately

compatible, what was all the fuss about12?

1.2 Taylor's definitions

11Taylor 2012, 131. The key word here, is, of course, after : in what sense are we to understand it ? There

is, after all, a difference in Latin between ex nihiloandpost nihil, as Bonaventure points out (Commentary on the

Sentences, II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, II, p. 19 ff. Quaracchi), and the formulas of Catholic orthodox enshrine the

formula ex nihilo,notpost nihil.

12 Likewise, on Taylor's hypothesis it becomes hard to understand the conflict between Avicenna and

Ghazali, and between the latter and Averroes, to say nothing of the debate between Bonaventure and Aquinas

himself on the question of creation, which is inseparable from the question of the eternity of the world ; cf.Michon et al. 2004, 35 f.


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goodness manifests itself in His creation, then it seems to follow that God can never not

create, on pain of acting contrary to His essence, and this seems to rule out, or at least render

problematic, the notion of a one-shot creation in time. This, at any rate, was the conclusion

Origen drew, and it led him and many of his correligionaries to be condemned for heresy19.

Such considerations would seem to shed at least some doubt on whether the Abrahamic God

really is unconditionally free to create or to refrain from creating.

Let us re-read Taylor's summarizing statement : Abrahamic creation, he writes,

involves a single primary cause or First Cause originating all reality other than itself by bringing forth all

ex nihilo as ontologically after absolute nothingness.

At first glance, this statement seems to come close to tautology : if divine creation isex nihilo, then it cannot help but be ontologically after absolute nothingness. Surely

everything that exists is automatically ontologically after absolute nothingness, since

absolute nothingness could be defined as that beneath which nothing is ontologically. But one

suspects the addition of the term ontologically is here to rule out another possible sense in

which created reality might be later than nothingness : the temporal sense.

I do not believe, however, that what Taylor describes is in fact the standard Abrahamic

position, although it may be the standard Thomistic position. For the former, the sense in

which creation is after nothingness is not, or not merely, ontological, but temporal. It is the

Abrahamic tradition, or at least the great majority of its representatives20, that argues

relentlessly for the temporal or chronological nature of the divine act of creation, and the

Neoplatonists who argue for a version of ontologicalposterity, in the sense that for them, as

19On this, cf. M. Chase, in press ; M. Wacht 1969.

20

Excluding Thomas Aquinas, of course. Cf. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd ed. 1997,p. 429 : Though a doctrine of Creation does not as such require that the world took its beginning in or with

time, Christian theologians in general have decisively rejected the eternity of the universe. But they have

commonly held that its temporal origin is capable of being established only through revelation. This, of course,

was the position of Aquinas (Cont. Gent. 2, 38, etc.). See also First Vatican Council, Sess. 3, can. 1 : Hic solus

verus Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad

manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, qu creaturis impertitur, liberrimo consilio simul ab initio temporis

utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde

humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. The formula ab initio temporisdates back at least

to the Fourth Council of the Lateran of 1215, according to which God is creator omnium visibilium et

invisibilium, spiritalium et corporalium : qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporisutramque de nihilo

condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, no. 800). Michon et al.(2004, 353) translate ab initio temporisas au commencement du temps.


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we shall see, the world is created or generated (Greek genton) not temporally but in the sense

of causation (kat'aitian). This omission, or at least downplaying, of the temporal nature of

Abrahamic creation is, I believe, perhaps the most questionable element in Taylor's

argumentation21.

1.3 What iscreation, anyhow ? Taylor on St. Thomas

As good philosophers we ought, insofar as is possible, to define our terms at the

outset. Taylor does not fail to do so, of course : for him, the word creation primarily

translates the Arabic ibd", itself a rendering of the Latin creare. Taylor does not discuss the

Greek equivalent of creare/ibd", but I think there can be little doubt that these terms

correspond to the Greek verb gignesthai/genesthaiand to the verbal adjective genton, which

one could render either as generated or as generable, subject to generation. This will

prove to be of some importance as we proceed.

One of the texts on which Taylor bases his claim that Abrahamic creation and

Neoplatonic emanationism can both be called creation is a text from St. Thomas'

commentary on the Sentences22. Famously, Peter Lombard had written :creare proprie est de

nihilo alquid facere23. While Thomas sometimes seems to be willing to accept this

definition24, in the text quoted by Taylor he brings in important qualifications :

21In Taylor's paper, mentions of time as a factor in either Abrahamic creation or Neoplatonic emanation are

restricted to a couple of footnotes and a brief mention at the very end of the article. At p. 131 n. 38, we read that

al-Kindi's understanding of Divine creation as willed and as creation in time separates him from the others

listed above, where the others include the PA, LDC, al-Kindi and al-Farabi. One could deduce from this, I

suppose, that in Taylor's view these last-named philosophers do notview creation as taking place in time, but

Taylor has, at least here, no more to say on the subject. At n. 39, Taylor writes that The criterion of temporal

creation indicated in the third [variety of creation mentioned by Thomas] is shared with al-Kindi, though hereAquinas considers it something known only through Christian faith. Finally, in the very last parapraph of his

article (p. 136), Taylor again points out that al-Kindi embraced not an eternal emanative creation2 but a

doctrine of temporal creation by a divine willing in accord with Islamic religious teaching . This is, unless I'm

mistaken, the only explicit acknowledgement in the entire article that Neoplatonic creation2 or emanation is

eternal, while Abrahamic creation/creation1is temporal. Yet this point is of absolutely fundamental importance,

as I shall try to show.

22Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1252-56), Book 2, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, solutio.

23Sententiae lib. II, dist. 1, c. 2, vol. 1/2 p. 330.

24 Other Thomistic definitions of creation include producere simpliciter ens and producere totum ens

subsistens, nullo praesupposito (De pot. deiIII, I, c ; In VIII Phys. 974 f.). Yet the Angelic Doctor can also

simply identify creation with emanation (hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis [S. th. I, 45,


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the notion of creation involves two things. The first is that it presupposes nothing in the thing which is

said to be created . . . creation is said to be from nothing because there is nothing which preexists creation

as uncreated. The second is that in the thing which is said to be created non-being is prior to being, not by

a priority of time or duration . . . but by a priority of nature in such a way that, if the created thing is left

to itself, non-being would result. For it has being only from the influence of a superior cause.

Taylor goes on, somewhat rashly I'm afraid, to claim25that

These two criteria [ sc. that creation presupposes not-being and that the non-being of the created thing is

not temporal but ontological - MC] are precisely those found in the account of primary causality in the

LDC derived from Proclus and common to the teachings of Plotinus, Proclus, the PA, theLDC, al-Farabi,

and Avicenna.

I'm afraid that as far Plotinus and Proclus are concerned, this statement requires a good

deal of qualification. Quite apart from the question of whether or not these Neoplatonists had

a concept of creation at all this is of course the thesis that needs to be established it seems

at first glance false that they would assent to Thomas' assertion that creation nihil

praesupponat in re quae creari dicitur. Indeed, this seems to amount to imputing to them a

doctrine of creatio ex nihilowhich neither Greek philosopher would have accepted, although,

as Endress has shown, the Arabic adapter of Proclus' Elements of Theologydoes interpolate

the doctrine into his version of Proclus' Proposition 7626.

Thomas' notion that creation presupposes nothing in the thing which is said to be

created is, however, similar to one of the seven meanings of creation distinguished by Greek

Middle- and Neoplatonists, where it is attributed to Aristotle and denied of Plato. The second

sense of creation mentioned here by Thomas here, moreover, corresponds another of the

I, c] ; ...productio universalis entis a Deo non sit motus nec mutatio, sed sit quaedam simplex emanatio [In VIII

Phys.no. 974]). Cf. Kremer 19712, 419 n. 46 ; 421.25Taylor 2012, 132.

26Cf. Endress 1973 and Chase, in press, where I also suggest that Porphyry may have accepted some variety

of the doctrine of creationex nihilo. Another interpretation may be possible, however : perhaps by his use of the

verbpraesupponatThomas may be referring to the Greek idea that the Demiurge's creation of the world in time

in the Timaeus is merely kath'hupothesin (by hypothesis) or didaskalias heneka (for the sake of instruction).

That is, as the Neoplatonists held, Plato may have meant to present eternal realities as occurring within time

after all, Plotinus informs us that this is always the function of myth like geometers describe the construction

of geometrical figures although their existence is eternal, in order to show what great benefits the world receives

from the World Soul. See, for instance, Enn. IV 8 [6] 38-42 : B #


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seven senses in which Greek exegetes of Plato explained the gegonen at Timaeus28B7f. I

therefore propose a brief return to the land of Hellas, so that we may better understand the

background of Thomas' conception.

1.4 Calvisius Taurus and Porphyry on the meanings of genton

In commenting on the Timaeus, the Middle Platonist Calvinus Taurus27of Beirut (fl. c.

145AD) distinguished four meanings of the Greek word generated (gentos).

As we can see in Table 3, these meanings include (1) what is not generated but has the

same genus as generated things ; such things are gentain the sense that an object hidden in

the center of the earth can still be said to be visible (Greek horaton), even if it will never

actually be seen. The second meaning (2) covers what is notionally but not actually

composite : things, that is, that can be analysed in thought into their component parts. The

third meaning (3) of gentos concerns what's always in the process of becoming ; that is,

according to Platonic philosophy, the whole of the sublunar world, which is subject to

constant change. Finally (4), gentos can mean what derives its being from elsewhere ; in

other words from God. In a similar sense, the moon's light may be said to be generated by the

sun, although there has never been a time when this was not the case. Note that the important

feature here is that cause and effect are simultaneous and co-eternal (Greek sunaidios).

Slightly more than a century later, the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry (c. 234-c.

310) added additional meanings of gentos(Table 4) : these include (5) : what has the logos

of generation, i.e. what can be analysed in thought28. Meaning no. (6) covers sensible objects

like houses, ships, plants and animals, which obtain their being through a process of

generation. Finally, the seventh and last meaning (7) of gentosis what begins to exist in time

after not having existed. It's this last meaning of generated that Porphyry denies is

applicable to Plato's creation story in the Timaeus29.

27Cf. W. Baltes 1976, 105-121 ; M.-L. Lakmann 1995.

28 It must be admitted that it's not terribly clear what the difference is between this meaning and Taurus'

meaning no. 2, except that Porphyry adds the crucial example of what is composed out of matter and form.

29 If one can judge from the fragments cited by Philoponus, Porphyry himself believes that constituted

(suntheton) of form and matter is the most appropriate interpretation of gentosin Plato's Timaeus ; cf. Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 440.


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It seems clear, then, that in the passage just cited, Thomas first takes up Porphyry's

definition no. 7 (What begins to exist in time, after having not existed), and then, when

discussing the second meaning of creation in the text cited above, he follows Calvisius

Taurus' meaning no. 4 : the world is created (Greek genton) in the sense that it derives its

being from elsewhere (Thomas : For it has being only from the influence of a superior

cause). According to Proclus, this sense is equivalent to being generated causally

(kat'aitian)30. This idea, originating in the interpretation of Timaeus 29E4-30A1 and

formulated by Plotinus31and then by Porphyry (see Text A below)32, amounts to claiming that

the world is not autonomous as far as its existence is concerned, but always implies a causal

principle superior to itself33. To say the word is generated kat'aitianis equivalent to saying it

has its being in becoming, as was held by a number of Middle Platonists 34, and by Plotinus

himself35. The kat'aitian interpretation is, moreover, equivalent to the interpretation of

gentonas designating that which is composite or at least analysable into its parts (Tauros'

meaning no. 2 = Porphyry's meaning no. 5), insofar as what is compound implies the

existence of a higher cause (aitia) that put it together36.

By adopting meanings no. 4 and 7, Thomas Aquinas is thus picking up on the tradition

of the Late Antique Neoplatonic commentators, as exemplified by Simplicius. According to

the latter in his Commentary on the Physics37, by generated (genton) Aristotle means what

previously does not exist, but later comes into existence or is generated (i.e., meaning no. 7).

30 Proclus, apud Philop., De aet. mundi, VI, 8, p. 148, 5-7 'G"D9#*H"49?-:+) "5)I,F"D)*#!)-"5),.#!+)"5)E4:7') ... E*>J"+#!)-"5)K9L%5&!'M#!)47!)')E*>'HE*H"5)N*2"O"'M!P)*+*Q"+')R)"*, #$%&'()*+),-.) ./)0.+1%+2),+%3+.4. Proclus is probably, here as often, following Porphyry,who declares in his Sentence 14 that everything generated has its the cause of its generation from something

else (IS)#!)-"5)=% T,,'2"U)*V"(*)"W9#!).:!D9J3!+).

31EnneadsII 4 [12], 5, 25 ff. ; IV 3 [27] 8, 30 ff. ; V 2 [11], 1, 5 ff. ; V 6 [24], 5, 5 ff. Cf. W. Baltes 1976,126 ff. ; Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 428.

32Ap. Philop.,De aet. mundi6, 17, p. 172, 5 ff. Rabe ; ap. Proclus,In Tim., I, 277, 10 ff. Diehl. Cf. Porphyry,

Sent. 14 ; fr. 459 Smith ; Baltes 1976, 143 ff.

33On this view, which goes back to Xenocrates' student Crantor of Soli, see Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 437 ff.

34 Philo, Plutarch, Tauros, Alcinoos, the anonymous Plationists cited by Alexander of Aphrodisias and

Philoponus. For references cf. Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 438 and notes.

35E.g., VI 7 [38] 3, 1 ff.

36 Baltes 1976, 144, who points out the Middle Platonic antecedents to this view (Albinus, Tauros,

Hippolytus).37Simpl.,In Phys., 1154, 2 ff.


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Plato, in contrast, means by generated what has its being in becoming (meaning no. 6) and

derives its being from another cause (meaning no. 4).

What follows from these considerations, then, as far as the legitimacy of the

conclusion reached by Taylor, following Thomas, is concerned, viz. that both Abrahamic

creationism and Neoplatonic emanation can legitimately be considered forms of creation ?

I think we can say that Simplicius would not have been impressed. He would have

objected against T&T that they are committing the same error, or tactical ruse, as Philoponus.

By playing on the ambiguity of the term created/genton, they are conflating two quite

different meanings of the term and claiming that these meanings are, caeteris paribus, the

same thing. In a sense, of course, they arethe same thing, or rather they are closely related.

The two meanings of genton : coming into existence after not having existed (Aristotle)

and owing its existence to a higher causal principle (Plato) do in fact bear a kind of

Wittgensteinian family resemblance, which is why they can both be designated by the same

term. But to go on to deduce from this that the two phenomena have anything substantial in

common besides their name is to commit a fallacy of equivocation. Plato and Aristotle do

*not* mean the same thing by genton, Simplicius would say, and it is *not* the same thing

for a thing (a) to exist after having not existed (Latin post nihil), and for it (b) to owe its

existence to a higher causal principle. Pagan Neoplatonists would assert (b) and deny (a) ;

orthodox Christians, such as Thomas, might very well assert both (a) and (b) conjointly.

Finally, before leaving the passage from Thomas cited and analysed by Taylor, it is

worthwhile returning to the continuation of the passage quoted above :

However, if we take a third to be required for the notion of creation so that in duration

the thing created has non-being before being so that it is said to be from nothing because it is temporally

after nothing, creation cannot be demonstrated in this way nor is this conceded by the philosophers, but is

supposed by faith.

I take it that Thomas is acknowledging here that there is a third definition of creation

in addition to the two he has just enumerated. This one insists that the sense in which created

things are after nothing is temporal, and this meaning, as Thomas acknowledges, rejected

by the philosophers. Yet this third definition, which Thomas mentions almost in passing, is

surely the standard Abrahamic position : it is the one Philoponus defended at great length,

first against Proclus, then against Aristotle, and which Simplicius in turn attempted to refute


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in his commentaries on the De Caeloand the Physics. It is also the position of Bonaventure,

against whom Thomas may well be reacting here.

Thomas' position, then, seems to amount to saying that Christian creation and

Neoplatonic emanation are compatible if we leave the question of time out of consideration.

This also seems to be Taylor's position. Whether or not such a bracketing is legitimate is,

however, quite another question38.

2. 1 Free will and necessity

We have not yet dealt with the question of free will and necessity ; yet we must, for

we recall that according to Taylor, although both Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic

emanationism are forms of creation, they are distinguished, presumably exclusively, by the

fact that Abrahamic creation is a free act of divine will, free of every kind of necessity, while

Neoplatonic emanationism involves no act of will at all, and is subject to at least one of

Taylor's three kinds of necessity.

As far as Neoplatonist creation is concerned, Taylor stresses, as we have seen, that

created reality emanates directly from the First Principle without any act of will or any other

intermediary, but by the very being of that Cause (Greek auti ti einai, Arabic bi-ann!yati-

hi) . He concludes from this that the very existence of the first cause immediately and

automatically entails, by a process of emanation, the existence of all subsequent levels of

reality.

We are on very slippery territory here, for there are clearly tensions within the

Neoplatonism itself, and especially Plotinus, as far as the question of will is concerned, so my

discussion will make even less claim here than elsewhere to be definitive. On the one hand, it

cannot be denied that creation auti ti einaiis a key element in post-Plotinian Neoplatonic

thought, not just since Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius, as Cristina D'Ancona has often

38The Taylor/Aquinas position would seem to amount to one of the doctrines identified as heretical, or at

least dangerous, by tienne Tempier and condemned in 1277 (vol. I, p. 549, no. 99 Denifle/Chatelain = 83

Mandonnet/Hissette) : Quod mundus, licet sit factus de nichilo, non tamen est factus de novo ; et quamvis de

non esse exierit in esse, tamen non esse non precessit esse duratione sed natura tantum (The world, although

created out of nothing, was nevertheless not originated ; and although it emerged from not-being to being, yetnot-being did not precede being with regard to duration, but only with regard to nature.


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argued, but since Porphyry39. Plotinus does indeed sometimes speak as if the One, the Good,

or the First lacked will40. It is just as undeniable, however, that the Neoplatonists, following

Plato himself in the Timaeus, devote a great deal of discussion to the role of the Demiurge's

will in the process of the world's creation41.

At this juncture, it is perhaps worthwile studying in detail a couple of very densely

argued pages of Taylor's paper42, which I believe are key to his entire thesis. In what follows I

will quote selections from these passages and intersperse them with my responses.

Transcendental necessity or necessity1, argues Taylor, is beyond the nature of will

where will might denote deliberation, choice, or weighing of alternatives, characteristics of

human will and action. It then does not involve a selection between alternatives.

MC : So far, so good. For Plotinus and Proclus, the One clearly does not deliberate or

hesitate. Yet all we are entitled to conclude from this, I would argue, is that if the One has a

will, it does not resemble human will, any more than human intellection resembles the

hypernosis (EnneadsVI 8, 16, 32) of the Good43. This does not, however, prove that the

One/Good/First lacks any and everykind of will.

Rather, Taylor continues,

reality under necessity1involves what cannot be otherwisethan the overflowing of reality from the Firstas the Good (...) This form of origination or ibd"(creatio) then, does not allow for the possibility of astopping or denialof the emanation of reality from the First.

39See Chase 2011 ; in press ; Drrie-Baltes 1998, 472 and n. 46. Creating through being what a thing is is

characteristic of entities whose being is pure actuality (energeia).

40V 1, 6, 15-27 ; VI 9, 6, 40. With regard to the latter passage, however, Georges Leorux (1990, 57) specifiesthat ce n'est donc qu'une volont de besoin et de dsir, volont de fins particulires, qui est nie. For Leroux,

the will that can be attributed to the One, in a positive theology that provides the necessary counterpart to the

negative theology that denies it, is a will that is intransitive, i.e. that has itself as its primary object.

41The role of the will of the Demiurge is accentuated even more in Plotinus's successors that it is in Plotinus.

Porphyry and Iamblichus (ap. Proclum,In Tim., 1, 382, 18 ff. Diehl) reject the doctrine of Atticus and Plutarch

because, among other reasons, it completely eliminates the Demiurge's benevolent will ( tn agathoeid boulsin

autou to parapan anairousan).

42Taylor 2012, 129-130.

43 According to Iamblichus, De Myst. I, 12, the divine will of the Good surpasses the life of ordinary

deliberation and choice (h t'agathou theia boulsis ts proairetiks huperekhei zs), translationClarke/Dillon/Hershbell, who remark (p. 51 n. 76) on the difficulty of translating this phrase.


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MC: Cannot, does not allow, and possibility are the key terms here ; we shall

investigate their possible meanings more closely below.

After adding that the First Cause, since it lacks form, does not act through the

necessity of a nature or form44, Taylors goes on to add :

To this extent, then, it [sc. causal activity under necessity1, and hence Neoplatonic-style emanation] does

not fit under Hasker's conception of creation1, which he characterizes as common to the monotheistic

religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam [...] a free act on God's part ; he has no need to create but

has done so out of love and generosity.

M.C. A couple of remarks seem in order here. Hasker, whom Taylor is following here,

seems to be presupposing that eitherGod has a need to create orhe does so out of love and

generosity ; only in the latter case would God's act be free. Now, for Taylor, the fact that ittakes place auti ti einaiexcludes Neoplatonic emanation from this category of creation1.

This must be because he considers that such emanation is not free, or, in Hasker's

terminology, that it implies or entails a needto create on the part of the First Principle.

For Plotinus, however, there can be no question of the First Principle's having any

need to create. As perfect and self-sufficient, the One has no needs at all, not even the need

to reveal or manifest itself, and not even to create. Plotinus consistently describes the

One/Good as anendeswithout need45. Indeed, the One can be described as that which is

most without need (anendeestaton)46. And as Augustine reminds us, where there is no need,

there can be no necessity47. Perhaps, then, the dichotomy free act of creation vs. necessitated

act of creation is more complex that Hasker thought.

As far as the alleged absence of divine will in Neoplatonic emanation is concerned, for

Plotinus, God's boulsis is the cause of the eternal world48, or of the nous49. The difficult

paradox that creation occurs automatically and at the same time through the will of the First

Principle is, of course, the subject of Plotinus' EnneadVI.8, and the role of the Demiurge's

44See my objections to this claim, above n. 00.

45I 8, 2, 4 ; III 8, 11, 42 ; V 6, 4, 1 ; VI 7, 23, 8 ; VI 9, 6, 35 ; VI 8, 6, 35.

46VI 9, 6, 18

47Aug.De div. quaest. 83, quaest. 22, p. 26 Mutzenbecher : Ubi nulla indigentia, nulla necessitas : ubi nullus

defectus, nulla indigentia. Nullus autem defectus in Deo ; nulla ergo necessitas.

48II 1, 1 (40), II 1, 1, 2-4 ; II 1, 1, 34-37 ; III 8, 9, 16 ff.49VI 8, 17, 20 ff. ; VI 8, 18, 38-43.


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will as a factor in creation is stressed even more in such fifth-century pagan Neoplatonists as

Hierocles and Proclus50. For Plotinus, in a word and here one cannot avoid betraying the

subtlety and complexity of a truly profound work the will of God or the One is identical to

his substance, essence, and freedom51. The One does not exist just any old way, but as it

wills ; likewise, it produces not randomly, but as it wills52.

The role of divine will in Neoplatonic emanation can probably not be stated with more

clarity than it was by the late Matthias Baltes :

The Will of God is nothing other than the fulfillment [teleisis, one might also translate by perfection or

completion - MC] of his essence (ousia), that is, his goodness (agathots), which realizes itself

(energei) in willing (boulsis) and creation (poisis). For God is goodness that wills to communicate

itself, and does so53.

As far as the Abrahamic tradition is concerned, although God creates through a free

decision of his will, uninfluenced by any kind of necessity, he must still, like every rational

being, have a motive for his actions. Thomas' master Albertus Magnus makes this clear 54:

when something is produced not by natural necessity, but through freedom of will, the knowledge and

power of the agent do not suffice for production (...) but it is necessary that the appetitite of the will be

inclined toward the production of the thing (...) but that by which the will is inclined to action is the

goodness of the first agent ; and therefore it is proper to his goodness to educe things by creation.

For Thomas Aquinas as well, as for the Neoplatonists, it is of the nature of the Good to

communicate itself55. Ultimately, for Plotinus, God wished to produce the world precisely

50Already for Plotinus' assistant Amelius (ap. Proclus, In Tim., I, 361, 25), one of the three Demiurges acts

by will alone (boulsei monon) ; Proclus corrects him by affirming that one and the same Demiurge makes

everything through his goodness by means of his will (X#


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because he was good and was without any kind of need, and this motivation is ultimately not

terribly far removed from that adduced by Thomas56. It is true that Plotinus often says that

creation takes place by the nature of necessity57but he may be referring58by this only to the

law that all that is perfect produces an image similar to itself : natural things necessarily,

spiritual beings consciously and deliberately on the basis of purely moral necessity.

2.2 Leibniz on free will and necessity

We recall that for Richard Taylor, Abrahamic creation is free of all the three kinds of

necessity, while Neoplatonic emanation, although free from the necessity of external

compulsion (necessity3) and the necessity characteristic of things having a nature or form

(necessity2), is still subject to transcendent necessity (necessity1), in the sense that no

possibility exists of stopping or denying the emanation of reality from the First.

Klaus Kremer has an alternative discussion of necessity, which he takes from Leibniz.

For Leibniz, there is logical or metaphysical necessity in the fact that the angles of a triangle

are equal to two right angles, and this is the way God produces the world according to

Spinoza59. Unlike such absolute necessity, physical necessity, the kind by which fire warms

and ice cools, does allow its contrary. Finally, moral necessity does not eliminate freedom,

but presupposes it. It is this kind of necessity according to which the most perfect beings,

since they act in the most perfect way, must choose what is best, and wise, virtuous people

must act in accordance with their wisdom and virtue. Such necessity, although it

presupposes knowledge and will, is not opposed to freedom. If what is contrary to God's

choice implied a contradiction, then this would imply metaphysical necessity and eliminate

His freedom. In the words of Leibniz :

55Cf. Kremer 1965, 262-263, citing In DN nr. 136 ; 36 ; nnr. 213 ; 227 ; 229 ; 269 ; S. th. 1 11 1, 4 ad 1um ;

2 II 117, 6 ad 2um; I 106, 4, c. l C.G. II ; I 37 (fin.) ; III 24 ; I Sent. IV 1, 1, so. ; II 1, 4 contra ; S. th. III 1, 1, c.

56Kremer 1965, 264, citingDe pot. DeiI 5 ad 14 um : Optima ratio, qua Deus omnia facit, est sua bonitas et

sua sapientia, quae manerent, etiam si alia vel alio modo faceret. Cf. Kremer 1987, 1029, citing S. th. I 19, 4 ad

3um : bonitas est ei ratio volendi omnia alia.

57phuses anankiIII 2, 2, 8 ff. ; III, 2, 3, 35 ; II 9, 8, 20-29 ; II 9, 8, 3.

58Kremer 1987, 1015.59Spiniza,Ethics, note to prop. 17.


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Il y a donc en Dieu une libert, exemte non seulement de la contrainte, mais encore de la ncessit. Jel'entends de la ncessit mtaphysique ; car c'est une ncessit morale, que le plus sage soit oblig dechoisir le meilleur60.

(...) c'est la bont qui porte Dieu crer, afin de se communiquer ; et cette mme bont jointe la sagesse

le porte crer le meilleur : cela comprend toute la suite, l'effect et les voyes. Elle l'y porte sans lenecessiter, car elle ne rend point impossible ce qu'elle ne fait point choisir.

Applied to Plotinus, then, Leibniz's thesis would mean that the One, as highest good,

mut communicate its goodness to other things in a way analogous to that in which a moral

person must behave morally, but this must does not mean absolute necessity or

necessitation, since there would be no contradiction in supposing that God did not choose to

communicate himself61. Plotinus' One, argues Kremer, is free in the same sense as Thomas'

God : since it is already perfect and without no need, it creates non-necessarily.

3.0 Conclusion : Porphyrian Neoplatosism on temporal vs. causal creation

Finally, since I've often stressed, throughout this presentation, that Taylor

underestimates the importance of the distinction between temporal and timeless creation, I'd

like to briefly discuss a few Neoplatonic texts to back up my claim. They all interpret Plato's

account of the Demiurge's creation in the Timaeusas occurring in a causal, not a temporalsense. The first one is explicitly attributed to Porphyry, and Matthias Baltes 62 has argued

persuasively that the others go back to him, too. In Text A, Porphyry denies that Plato gives

the world a temporal origin. In things that are causally dependent (i.e., presumably,

everything except the First Cause, and therefore including the world), existence need not

presuppose a temporally pre-existent state of nothingness ; note the direction contradiction

here with the claim of Thomas Aquinas as cited by Taylor). This is another way of asserting,

as in our texts from Augustine and Philoponus, that in the sensible world some effects co-exist eternally with their causes. In turn, this amounts to claiming that the world is generated

in a causal, not a temporal sense (kat' aitian, all' ou kata khronon).

60Leibniz, Thodice, 230.

61 Indeed, in at least one passage (Ennead IV 8 [6] 6, 1-8), Plotinus, says not that the procession of beings

cannotbe stopped, but that it ought notto be stopped (ouk edei stsai), as if it were circumscribed by jealousy.

Again, the impossibility of stopping or refraining from creation is moral, not logical or metaphysical in nature.62Baltes 1976, 163 ff.


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In Text B, taken from the same book of the City of God in which he summarizes

Porphyry'sLetter to Anebo, Augustine affirms that some Platonists interpret Plato as saying

that the creation of the world takes place not in time, but from eternity, just as an eternal foot

might leave an eternal footprint : both would exist simultaneously, and yet it would be clear

that one was a cause, the other an effect. It is thus quite possible for a cause to be co-eternal

with its effect63.

In our Text C, Philoponus, who believes God did create the world in time, explains

how God can always be good even if he does not always create. If he does not do so, it is not

because of God's unwillingness or inability, but because the very nature of creation requires it

to come into existence after not having existed. He attests the Neoplatonic image of sun

emitting light and bodies casting a shadow, an image, probably deriving from Porphyry,

intended to illustrate the simultaneity or co-eternity of cause and effect64.

This analogy also shows an important difference from Christian notions of creation, as

we see in Text D. Here, Aeneas of Gaza confirms, that the Platonists hold the world is

generated causally (genton kat'aitian). They deny, however, that the Demiurge made

(pepoiken) the world, any more that my body makes its shadow : on the contrary, as a

shadow follows upon or accompanies (sunakolouthsen) my body, so the sensible world

follows upon the Demiurge65. Here, at any rate, Abrahamic creationism and Neoplatonic

emanationism seem far apart, so much so that it does not seem licit to speak of the latter as

creation at all.

63Origen also held that God's creation was sunaidioswith him, a position that was duly anathematized. See

Chase, in press.

64This analogy of divine emanation or creation to such natural processes as the sun emitting light or bodies

casting shadows was dangerous for the Neoplatonists, in that it could tend to imply the kind of automatic andnecessary nature of emanation with which the Christians reproached them. On the Neoplatonic use of this image,

see M. Wacht 1969, 73-74. W. Theiler 1966 traces it back to Porphyry.

65Basil of Caesarea comes dangerously close to this view when he speaks (Homiliae in hexaemeron, I, 6-7)

of how the world comes into existence timelessly, together with the will of God (X7'M "\Y'2,Z:!+ "'M]!'M=3$4)D9:2)2?!:"F)*+"5)E4:7')). Yet Basil comes down hard on those who refuse to concede thatthe world was generated by Him, but came into existence as a kind of shadow of his power, as it were

automatically (^*>E*&4"+%',,'>"8)?*)"*:&.)"D):2)2%F$3!+)C/=01('2"O]!O"5)E4:7'), 'H3>#!#!)W:&*+%*$ *H"'M:2)!3_$-:*), =,, '`')!>=%':E(*:7*"W912)F7!D9*H"'MR)"**H"'7F"D9%*$2%':"W)*+). Basil's text was translated more or less word for word in Ambrose's Hexaemeron (I, 1, 5, 18),

whence it was no doubt known to Augustine.


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Our Text E, from the dialogue Ammonios by Zacharias of Mytilene, gives reasons

why God's creation cannot be co-eternal with Him : if it were, it would be equally worthy of

worship (homotimos).

Finally, our Text F, from a lost work On Providenceby the Alexandrian Neoplatonist

Hierocles, a contemporary of Proclus, is interesting in that Hierocles raises against the Middle

Platonists who gave a literal interpretation of the creation story in the Timaeusthe same, or at

least very similar, arguments that Proclus and Simplicius raised against the Christine doctrine

of creation within time. If the Demiurge, according to Timaeus42E, remains in his customary

state (en ti heautou thei kata tropon menn), then he must remain unchanging66, which rules

out any temporal act of creation, since this would imply a change or shift on his part from

non-creation to creation67. If it was better not to create, then how could could the Demiurge

shift (metabainein), as it were, into creation mode ? If it were better to create, why didn't he

create from perpetuity68?

In conclusion, then, I have to say that I disagree with Taylor's assertion that both

Christian creation and Neoplatonic emanation and usefully and legitimately be called

creation. Creation, as it is usually understood in the Abrahamic world, is usually understood

as ex nihilo and temporal. For the Neoplatonists in contrast, as for virtually the entire

millenium-long Greek philosophical tradition, ex nihilo nihilfit, and emanation neither takes

place within time nor does it begin from a temporal starting-point. Finally, the role Taylor and

many others assign to divine will in creation as a specific difference between Abrahamic

creation and Neoplatonic emanation is a bit of a red herring. It is doubtful that God's will is

entirely free for thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, and it is false that will plays no role in

Neoplatonic emanation. It does indeed seem paradoxical to maintain, as does Plotinus, that

the First Principle creates both by free will and by its own being or essence. In fact, however,

as long as we recall that we are not talking about the same kindof will in the case of the First

as in the case of human beings, this paradox can be understood : for in the case of the One or

the Good, will and being are simply identical69.

66 For this doctrine in Plotinus, cf. Kremer 19712 4-5, with references n. 18. Only the soul is altered as it

creates.

67Drrie-Baltes 1998, 470 ; Baltes 1996.

68Cf., with Drrie-Baltes ad loc., Augustine, Conf. 11, 10, 12, probably following Porphyry.69Drrie-Baltes 1998, 472 n. 46.


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Tables

Table 1 : Taylor on types of necessity

Type of necessity characteristics applicability to

Abrahamic creation

applicability to

Neoplatonicemanation

3 external compulsion no no

2 necessity of nature,

characteristic of

things that possess a

nature or form

no no

1 transcendent ; effectfollows necessarily

upon positing ofcause

no yes

Table 2: Athanasius on the generation of the Son and the creation of the world

Type of creation relation to God'sessence

relation to God's will relation to time

poima(world) outside divine

essence

dependent in time

gennma(Son) idion ts ousias

gennma/ex autou

phusei gennmemon

not dependent eternal

Table 3

Calvinus Taurus apud Philoponum aet. mundi, p. 145, 13-147, 25 Rabe on the

meanings of genton :

Meanings of gentos examples

1. what was not generated, but

belongs to same genus as generated things

body in center of the earth (visible,

but will never actually be seen)


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2. what is composite by virtue of a

thought experiment, even if not composite in

actuality

middle note of the musical scale from

the highest and the lowest, flowers, animals

3. what is always in a process of

becoming

sublunar elements

4. what derives its being from

elsewhere (viz., from God)

moon derives its light from the sun

(although there's never been a time when it

did not do so)

Table 4

Porphyry apud Philoponum aet. mundi, VI, 8, p. 148, 7 ff. Rabe on the meanings of

gentos :

meanings of gentos examples

5. That which has the logos of

generation

(= Taurus meaning 2?)

words, syllables (decomposable into

letters) ; geometrical figures (rectilinear

figures decomposable into triangles),

compounds of matter and form

6. What receives its being through

generation and becoming

house, ship, plant, animal (snap of

fingers, flash of lightning : come into

existence without any process of generation)

7. What begins to exist in time, after

having not existed

most familiar meaning, but Plato

didn't apply it to the world


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Chase, Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic emanation

in Greek, Arabic and Latin.

Texts

Text A

Porphyry ap. Sharastani p. 492 = t. II,

p. 357-358 Jolivet-Monnot

Porphyry, fr. 459, p. 529-351 Smith70.

wa yadaa anna allaai yubkc an

AflAden min al-qawl bi-budefal-Alam ghayr

gabcbqAl fcrisAla ilAAnAbAne: wa-ammAmA

faraqa bihi AflAden71 indakum min annahu

yahau li-l-Alam ibtidA zamAniyyan72 fa-

dawAkAaiba. wa-aalika anna AflAden laysa

(yarA) anna li-l-Alam ibtidA zamAniyyan

lakinna ibtidA alAjiha al-alla, wa yazamu

anna alla kawnihi ibtidAuhi73, wa-qad raa

anna al-mutawahhim alayhi fcqawlihi anna

al-Alam maileq wa-innahu badafa lA min

jay, wa-innahu iaraja min lA nikAm ilA

nikAm fa-qad aida wa lalida, wa-aAlika

annahu lAyagabbu dAimAn, anna kull adam

And he claimed that the statement

attributed to Plato concerning the world's

coming into being is not correct. He said in

his letter to Anebo76 : what separates Plato

from you, viz. that he gives the world a

temporal beginning, is a mendacious

assertion. This is because Plato did not think

that the world has a temporal origination77,

but an origination with regard to a cause ;

and he claimed that the cause of its existence

is its origination78. He was of the opinion that

whoever had the illusion that his view was

that the world was created and that it had

come into being ex nihilo, and that it had

70I have considerably modified the translation by Wasserstein (in Smith, Porphyrius Fragmenta), in the light

of the alternative versions by Jolivet-Monnot (Livre des religions et des sectes, trad. avec introd. et notes par

Daniel Gimaret, Jean Jolivet et Guy Monnot, 2. vols., Leuven : Peeters Paris : Unesco, 1986-1993 [Collection

Unesco d'oeuvres reprsentatives. Srie arabe, vol.1]) (J/L) and by Gabrieli (in A. R. Sodano, ed., Porphyrii in

Platonis Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta, Napoli 1964) (G).

71 Ce dont on accuse Platon chez vous (J/L), quanto a ci di cui presso di voi si a torto accusato

Platone (G)

72 commencement temporel (J/L).

73 la cause de son existence est son commencement (J/L), e che la causa del suo nascere debbaconsiderarsi come suo principio (G)


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aqdamu min al-wujed fc-mA alla wujedihi

jay Aiar layrihi74 wa lA kull se nikAm

aqdam min al-nikAm wa-innamA yanc

AflAden anna al-iAliq akhara al-Alam min al-

adam ilA-l-wujed, wajada75 innahu lam

yakun min /493/ aAtihi lakinna sabab

wujedihi min al-iAliq.

emerged from disorder into order79 - such a

person has erred and been deluded. That is

because it is not always true that all non-

existence precedes existence in that which

has the cause of its existence in something

else80; nor is all lack of order prior to order.

But by saying that the creator revealed the

world from non-existence into existence,

Plato merely meant that it does not exist by

itself, but the cause of its existence is from

the creator.

Text B

74 il n'est pas vrai toujours que toute sorte de non-tre prcde l'existence en ce qui a sa cause en une autre

chose que lui (J/L).

75 s'il est patent que... (J/L) ; Platone col dire che il Creatore trasse il mondo dal non essere all'essere

volle solo intendere che il suo essere non fu di per s stesso (G). The latter is the interpretation I have followed.

76 Sodano believed this reference was incorrect, and that the quotation in fact comes from Porphyry's

Commentary on the Timaeus. Yet there seems to be no good reason to doubt mahrastAnc's express testimony. TheLetter to Anebowas well known in the Arabic-speaking world, as it was to Augustine, who gives an account of it

in civ. Dei10, 11.

77For the translation of ibtid"by origination I follow Zimmermann 1986, 198, who remarks on the term's

frequency in the Theology of Aristotle. Cf. also al-Kindi, Epistle on the quantity of Aristotle's books, p. 410 f.

Guidi-Walzer, who translate the term by creare dal nulla. Lizzini 2009 prefers far iniziare. Compare the

Latin factum esse de novo, above, n. 00

78 By this phrase, Porphyry may have meant something analogous to Augustine's non esse hoc videlicet

temporis, sed substitutionis initium (see text B) : in the Timaeus, Plato depicts not a temporal origin for the

world, but the origin of its hypostasis/substitutio : that is, its concrete existence. On this meaning of hypostasis,

cf. Chase 2009-2010.79 A reference to Timaeus 30A, where Plato depicts the Demiurge's imposition of order on the disorderly

motion of the khra. In Porphyry's preserved comments on this passage, Porphyry denies that what appears to be

described as preceding and subsequent stages in Demiurge's creative activity can be understood as temporal :

this is merely a pedagogical tactic on Plato's part to enhance the clarity of the exposition. As Baltes comments

(1976, 152) : Es folgt daraus nichts fr ein reales Frher oder Spter im Schpfungs-geschehen : alles ist

vielmehr immer zusammen.

80In things that are causally dependent (i.e., presumably, everything except the First Cause), existence need

notpresuppose a temporally pre-existent state of nothingness. This is another way of asserting, as in our texts

from Augustine and Philoponus, that in the sensible world some effects co-exist eternally with their causes. In

turn, this amounts to claiming that the world is generated in a causal, not a temporal sense (kat' aitian, all' oukata khronon).


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Aug., civ. dei 10, 31.

Cur ergo non potius divinitati

credimus de his rebus, quas humano ingenio

pervestigare non possumus, quae animam

quoque ipsam non Deo coaeternam81, sed

creatam dicit esse, quae non erat ? Ut enim

hoc Platonici nollent credere, hanc utique

causam idoneam sibi videbantur adferre,

quia, nisi quod semper ante fuisset,

sempiternum deinceps esse non posset ;

quamquam et de mundo et de his, quos in

mundo deos a Deos factos scribit Plato,

apertissime dicat eos esse coepisse et habere

initium82, finem tamen non habituros, sed per

conditoris potentissimam voluntatem in

aeternum mansuros esse perhibeat83. Verum

id quo modo intellegant invenerunt, non esse

hoc videlicet temporis, sed substitutionis

initium84. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex

aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper

Why, then, should we not rather

believe the divinity about these things which

we cannot investigate with human ingenuity,

that divinity which tells us the soul itself is

not co-eternal with God, but that it was

created after having not existed ? In order for

the Platonists to refuse to believe this, they

thought they adduced this adequate cause :

unless something has always existed

previously, it cannot be perpetual

subsequently. However, Plato openly says

both of the world and of what he writes as

the gods in the world made by God, that they

began to exist and have a beginning, but by

the most powerful will of the creator he

testifies they will remain for eternity. Yet

they found a way to understand this, i.e. that

this is not a beginning of time, but of

subsistence85. Just as, they say, if a foot was

81sunaidios.

82Plato, Timaeus28B7 ff.

83Ibid., 41B 2.

84 A difficult phrase. Some translations : Combs : Les platoniciens, il est vrai, ont leur manire de

comprendre : il s'agit videmment, disent-ils, non pas d'un commencement d'un temps, mais d'un

commencement d'un tre sous-jacent un autre . Madec : Les platoniciens, il est vrai, ont leur manire de

comprendre : il s'agit videmment, disent-ils, non pas d'un commencement temporel, mais d'un commencement

constitutif . Allerdings haben sie einen Weg gefunden, wie sie das Gesagte verstehen : damit sei natrlich

nicht ein Anfang der Zeit gemeint (initium temporis = arkh khronik), sondern das Prinzip der Existenz (initium

substitutionis = arkh hupostases.

85Cf. Augustine, civ. dei XI 4, I, p. 515, 18-24 Hoffmann (quoted by J. Ppin 1964, 90-91 n. 6) : Qui autem

a deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis volunt habere sed suae creationis initium, ut modo

quodam vix intellegibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, unde sibi deum videntur velut a fortuita

temeritate defendere, ne subito illi venisse credatur in mentem, quod numquam ante venisset, facere mundum, etaccidisse illi novam voluntatem, cum in nullo sit omnino mutabilis.


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27

ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium

a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec

alterum altero prius esset : sic, inquiunt, et

mundus atque in illo dii creati et semper

fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit, et tamen

facti sunt.

in dust from eternity, a footprint would

always be under it86, yet no one would doubt

that the footprint was made by someone

treading, so, they say, both the world and the

gods created within it always existed, since

He who made them always exists, and yet

they were made.

Text C

Philop.,De aet mundi, 4, p. 13, 12 ff.

Rabe

1n. ^*> T,,D9. !V X &!59 =#*&49,

=#*&O16'H1!>9%!$>'H1!)59'H1.%'"!

C##()!"*+ X ?&4)'9, K9 X :'?49 ?-:+

I,F"D), E*>1+=#*&5)=?*+$'@7!&*

'p"!=:&.)!+*)"W91-7+'2$-

(5)

#+EW9 *H"'M E*"-#'$'M7!)

12)F7!D9, =,,


28/33

28

?@:+)'HEJ3!+

(...) B9#'p"!

(25)

"'Mo,('2"5?89'p"!"'M?D"59

X v,+'9 'p"! %$4"!$49 C:"+) 'p&

G:"!$'9 E*>"


29/33

29

"'H75):87*, =,, 'HE%!%'(-E!)*H"Z),

=,, CE!()-"'@"z:2)-E','@&-:!).

(kat'aitian), as my body is the cause of my

shadow87, but it did not make the latter, but

the latter followed from the former.

Text E

Zacharias Mytilenaeus Rhet.,

Ammonius sive De mundi opificio disputatio,

ed. M. Minniti Colonna, Zacaria Scolastico.

Ammonio. Introduzione, testo critico,

traduzione, commentario. Naples, 1973, sect.

2, 508 ff. = p. 105 Boissonade

{|}~. V :2)*s1+') "O &!O

"5) E4:7') !P)*+ ?Z:'7!), J:"*+ %'2

%F)"D9 E*"F #! "'M"' E*> X74"+7'9

*H"O. ' "( ) #.)'+"' %$59 =:.Y!+*)

7![u'), !V "5) %!$+#!#$*77.)') E*>

X$*"5) E*> %"5) E*> :87* J3')"*

L,+E5) C9 "*H"5) 14/-9 E*> "+7W9 "\

=%!$+,Z%"z E*> ='$F"z E*> =)D"F"z

%*:8)=)*#F#D7!)?@:!+;

Christian: If we are to say that the

world is co-eternal with God, it will

necessarily, in that respect, be somehow

equal in value to Him. [And what could be

more impious], than if we were to raise what

is circumscribed, visible, tangible, and

possesses a material body to the same degree

of glory and honor as the uncircumscribed,

invisible nature which is above all natures ?

Text F

Hierocles, De prov., apud Photius,

Bibl. cod. 251, p. 461a-23

^*> 7S,,') ) !Q- "W9 =,-&!(*9

=?!:"_9, !V %$59 "O C)1!![ "W9 L,+EW9

And it would be even farther from the

truth if, in addition to making him needy of

87Bonaventure (loc. cit.) uses the same image of God's production of creatures as the body's projection of ashadow, once again on the presupposition of the eternity of matter.


30/33

30

C)!$#!(*9E*>=%5 3$4)'2 "+)59E':7![)

$/*"', q%!$'HEC7.)!+)*H"5)C)"O

*L"'M &!+88. V #


31/33

31

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