taxing wealth: policy challenges and recent debates; · pdf file ·...
TRANSCRIPT
WEALTH-RELATED TAXES:
WHAT FUTURE?
Michael Keen
Sixth IMF-Japan High-Level Tax Conference For Asian Countries in Tokyo
April 7, 2015
Outline
• Context
• What types of taxes?
• Capital income and/or capital taxes?
• Differentiating across assets?
• Tax competition and EOI
Revival of Interest—?
• Marked increase in income inequality—especially at very top—and in wealth-income ratios
– Cannot “leave equity objectives to spending side”
• Recognition redistribution may not be bad for growth
• Need for revenue
Recurrent Wealth Taxes: Demise or Recovery?
• Demise
– Removal in Canada, Sweden, Australia, Pakistan… (but France, Norway, Switzerland…)
– Reflecting
• Tax competition
• “Healthy, wealthy and well-advised” manage to escape
• But some revival? Spain, Iceland
– Still (increasingly?) implicit in ‘standard of life’ checks
• Historically, a major tax base—What happened?
In the Region
• Wealth tax: – India, to be removed 2015-6 – Pakistan (removed 2001, revived 2013 only) – Thailand, subnational land tax
• Estate tax: – Philippines; – (Sri Lanka eliminated 2008)
• Inheritance/gift tax: – Bangladesh (inheritance but no gift tax) – Philippines – Thailand, proposed – Vietnam
Growth in Wealth (current exchange rates)
Source: James Davies, Rodrigo Lluberas, and Anthony Shorrocks, Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2014
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
IDN
MYS
IND
PH
L
THA
KO
R
PN
G
FJI
CH
N
SLB
LKA
TON
VU
T
KH
M
LAO
MD
V
MN
G
VN
M
NP
L
BG
D
PA
K
Wealth Gini
Disposable income Gini
= 70.7
= 37.7
8
Source: Disposable income Gini is taken from OECD; Luxembourg Income Study Database; Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC); World Bank; Eurostat. Wealth Gini data comes from Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook (2012).
Countries included: BGD=Bangladesh; BTN=Bhutan; KHM=Cambodia; CHN=China; FJI=Fiji; IND=India; IDN=Indonesia; KIR=Kiribati; KOR=Korea, Republic of; LAO=Laos; MYS=Malaysia; MDV=Maldives; MHL=Marshall Islands; MNG=Mongolia; MMR=Myanmar; NPL=Nepal; PNG=Papua New Guinea; PHL=Philippines; WSM=Samoa; SLB=Soloman Islands; LKA=Sri Lanka; THA=Thailand; TON=Tonga; VUT=Vanuatu; VNM=Vietnam; PAK=Pakistan.
Inequality in the Region
Wealth Inequality Not Especially High…
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
West
ern
Hem
isp
here
Mid
dle
East
an
d
Cen
tral A
sian
Asi
a a
nd
Paci
fic
Afr
ican
Eu
rop
ean
…But Increasing?
IDN
MYS IND
PHL
THA
KOR
PNG
FJI
CHN
SLB
LKA TON VUT
KHM
LAO MDV
MNG
VNM
NPL BGD
PAK
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
60 65 70 75 80 85 90
20
14
2010
10
Billionaires!
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
China Russia Germany India United
Kingdom
Japan United
States
(RHS)
2000 2005 2010
Recurrent Wealth Tax
• Rationale? —To address non-income benefits associated with high K? —K adds information to income/consumption/bequests?
• Gross or net? – Net closer to ability to pay, but avoidance possibilities if
some assets untaxed
• All assets or subset? – E.g. property taxes (real estate, cars..); Benefit tax aspect – Land
Others
Non-recurrent (capital levy)
• Alternative to default; but few successful examples
Non-market transfers
• Estate/accessions, and gift tax as corollary
—motive matters: unintended bequests (up to 100%) vs. warm glow (subsidy?
Market transfers
• Stamp duties, FTT
—Convenient! Stability?
Huge Variation Even in OECD
0
1
2
3
4
5M
EX
ES
TC
ZE
SV
KS
VN
AU
TH
UN
DE
UTU
RN
OR
CH
LF
INP
RT
PO
LS
WE
GR
CN
LDD
NK
NZ
LIT
AIR
LE
SP
CH
EIS
LA
US
BE
LJP
NIS
RK
OR
US
ALU
XC
AN
FR
AG
BR
Rev
enue
Taxes on f inancial and capital transactionsEstate, inheritance and gif t taxesRecurrent taxes on net wealthRecurrent taxes on immovable property
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics
…incl. for Estate, Inheritance and Gift Taxes…
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8E
ST
AU
T
SW
E
TUR
PO
L
ITA
CZE
GR
C
CH
E
DE
U
PR
T
ES
P
DN
K
IRL
LUX
GB
R
NLD
FRA
BE
L
Eff
ectiv
e ta
x ra
te (p
erce
nt)
Tax
reve
nue
(per
cent
of G
DP
)
Estate, inheritance and gif t taxes (lef t scale)Ef fective tax rate (right scale)
Source: Calculations described in October 20i3 Fiscal Monitor
Are They Equivalent?
Taxing wealth at rate TK has same effect as taxing capital income at TR if
(1-TK)(1+R)= 1+(1-TR)R
which requires TR = TK(1+R)/R
—e.g. With R = 5%, TK = 1% equivalent to TR = 21%
Differences—Conceptual (1)
• If rates of return vary, a uniform TR does not imply a uniform tax on capital
– Regressive in K if richer earn systematically higher R
• A hybrid: Dutch ‘box’: Impute a return (4%) to financial asset with flat tax on that
• In principle, imputed rate could vary with capital holdings—equivalent to progressive capital tax
Differences—Conceptual (2)
• Treatment of losses
– Liability with loss zero/negative tax under tR ; remains positive under tK
A timing issue, but differing volatility and automatic stabilization properties may matter
• Distinguishing capital and labor incomes and values is an issue for both
– Except not present under comprehensive income tax
Differences—Practical (1)
• Withholding/3rd party reporting well developed for at least some forms of capital income
– May, inter alia, reduce resistance (cf. estate tax)?
• Unrealized capital gains problematic for TR…
– Though there are schemes to address this
…less so for TK if asset can be valued (though then could also tax the gain)
Differences—Practical (2)
• Non-cash asset returns—e.g. owner-occupation
– less of an issue for TK if asset can be valued, though in that case could also impute a return
• Has TR proved more robust against exemptions/special treatment than TK?
• Merits in greater familiarity with TR?
Non-Financial Assets are Important
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Afr
ica
Ad
van
ced
Mid
dle
East
,
No
rth
Afr
ica,
an
d P
akis
tan
Em
erg
ing
an
d
Develo
pin
g E
uro
pe
Em
erg
ing
an
d
Develo
pin
g A
sia
Lati
n A
meri
ca
an
d C
ari
bb
ean
Co
mm
on
wealt
h o
f
Ind
ep
en
den
t Sta
tes
Composition of Total Wealth
Financial wealth Non-financial wealth
• Scope to do more:
• Top of hierarchy of relatively growth-friendly taxes
Recurrent Taxes on Immovable Property
Source: Fiscal Monitor October 2013
Reasons to differentiate?
In terms of ability to pay, no
– Except if concerned by liquidity considerations
But possible reasons:
• Discourage some positions: e.g. debt
– But better may be to address e.g. interest deductibility
• With less than full cooperation, tax more mobile assets less heavily?
– Which would mean more use of property taxation
With Some Challenges
• Building capacity—cadastre, valuation—can be expensive and time consuming
• Keeping (relative) valuations up to date
• Retain as marginal source local government finance—benefit principle at margin?
• What role for taxes on non-residential real estate?
International Tax Competition
Much blamed for decay of taxes on capital/capital inc.
• Downward spiral in ‘source’ taxation
• Concealment: $4.5 trillion in havens (Zucman, 2013)
Exchange of information (EOI) can help enforce of residence-based taxes—and world is changing…
– EU Savings Directive, FATCA, AEOI as new global standard
…in an important and positive way