tax reform, labour supply and earnings growth - ucluctp39a/zew presentation blundell final...
TRANSCRIPT
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Tax Reform, Labour Supply and Earnings Growth
Richard Blundell University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies
Slide Presentation [Draft paper available]
Economic Policy Lecture ZEW
September 11th 2014
• Focus here on the labour market, human capital and earnings tax reforms.
• Even before the recent crisis, governments around the EU faced pressure to increase employment and earnings.
• The current recession has added to pressure on government revenues.
• Ask two general questions: • What are the key margins where might expect tax/welfare reform to
have most impact on earnings and employment growth? • How has this changed in the light of the great recession? 1. Develop an empirical foundation for tax design and reform. 2. Use the Mirrlees Review (2011) as a running example. 3. Overview of main issues and prospects with current tax systems.
Tax Reform, Labour Supply and Earnings Growth
• Current systems remain unnecessarily complicated and induce too many people not to work or to work too li5le.
• Target work incen9ves where they are most effec9ve – our simula9ons show key increase in work/earnings,
– reducing means-‐tes9ng and improving the flows into work for lower educa9on mothers and maintaining work for those aged 55+.
• Integrate overlapping benefits -‐ a single integrated benefit – Mirrlees -‐ ‘ifs’ reforms.
• Reduce disincen9ves at key margins for the educated – enhancing working life9me and the career earnings profile,
– simula9ons show significant impact on human capital.
• Align tax rates at the margin across income sources.
Summary overview...…
• In this talk I draw loosely on four of my recent ‘post-Mirrlees’ studies: – ‘Labor Supply and the Extensive Margin’; AER 2011 – ‘Empirical Evidence and Tax Reform’; JEEA 2012 – ‘Hours of Work and the Optimal Taxation of Low Income
Families’; ReStud 2012 – ... and on-going work with Antoine Bozio, Guy Laroque and
Andreas Peichl. • Additional question: To what extent do dynamic ‘longer-run’
issues change our view of earnings tax reform? • Labour Supply, Human Capital and Welfare Reform’; NBER
2013
• Overall question: How should we assemble the empirical foundations for tax policy design?
• Consider the role of evidence under five headings: 1. Key margins of adjustment to reform 2. Measurement of effective incentives 3. The importance of information and complexity 4. Evidence on the size of responses 5. Implications for policy design • Use these to build an empirically based agenda for reform
– > an efficient redesign of tax policy…. • What have we learned … so far? • Are the proposals still relevant post recession?
• There are common key points in the life-‐cycle where individuals are likely to be most responsive to effec9ve tax and welfare incen9ves – Derives from compara9ve work across UK, US, FR and DE,
– Labour market entry, parents of younger children and older workers.
• Human capital on the job is strongly complementary with formal educa9on – Pay-‐off to on the job experience and training is low for those with lower
educa9onal qualifica9ons.
• Effec9ve tax rates can be extremely high for no good reason – Interac9ons of means-‐tested programmes at the bo5om and employer/
employee taxes /contribu9ons in the middle.
• Effec9ve budget constraints are complex and oXen poorly understood – Working age parents in France face the interac9on of more than 17 different
overlapping taxes, employer contribu9ons and benefits – only 13 in UK!
• Differen9al rates on similar sources of remunera9on induce significant tax shiXing and avoidance.
• Let’s take a run through the evidence….. The five steps….
1. Key margins of adjustment to reform • A ‘descriptive’ analysis of the key aspects of observed
behaviour – not ‘causality’ just the correlations in the data, – the key facts!
• Where is it that individuals, families and firms most likely to respond? – e.g. the margins of labour market adjustment.
Key margins of adjustment Employment for men by age – FR, UK, US & GER 2007
Blundell, Bozio, Laroque and Peichl (2014)
Source: Blundell, Dias, Meghir and Shaw (2013)
1.6
1.8
22.
22.
42.
6lo
g w
age
20 30 40 50age
secondary further higher
Wage profiles by education and age – UK Women
Women’s employment - UK
Source: Blundell, Dias, Meghir and Shaw (2013)
.5.6
.7.8
.91
empl
oym
ent r
ates
20 30 40 50age
All employment
0.0
5.1
.15
.2.2
5em
ploy
men
t rat
es20 30 40 50
age
Part−time employment
secondary further higher
Wages by education and age – US Men
Notes: PSID, 1996-2010, mean log wage by age, cohort effects removed
Source: Blundell, Pistaferri and Saporta (2013)
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
High School
Drop out
Some College
Employment for men by education and age – US
Blundell, Bozio and Laroque (2011)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
Less than College College
Summary so far…key facts
• A lifetime view of employment and hours – differences accentuated at particular ages and for particular
demographic groups, – higher attachment to the labor market for higher educated,
career length matters.
• Wages grow stronger and longer over the lifetime for higher educated – human capital accumulation during work is shown to be
complementary to education, – essential to explain employment and wage profiles for those
with more education.
• Other key facts include growth of high employment incomes and consequent impact on inequality.
2. Measurement of effective incentives
• Precisely how do tax policies impact on the incentives facing the key players?
• e.g. overlapping taxes, tax credits and welfare benefits. – What are the ‘true’ effective tax rates on (labor) earnings?
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
Notes: wage £6.50/hr, 2 children, no other income, £80/wk rent. Ignores council tax and rebates
Budget Constraint for Single Parent: UK 2011
$10,000
$12,000
$14,000
$16,000
$18,000
$20,000
$22,000
$24,000
$26,000
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000 $16,000 $18,000 $20,000
Net income (£/year)
Gross annual earnings
Current system
Interactions matter: Budget Constraint for Single Parent in UK
Notes: wage £6.50/hr, 2 children, no other income, £80/wk rent. Ignores council tax and rebates
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Urban Institute (NTJ, Dec 2012). Notes: Value of tax and value transfer benefits for a single parent with two children.
Universally Available Tax and Transfer Benefits in US (Single Parent with Two Children, 2008)
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
Effective Marginal Tax Rates (US Single Parent with Two Children in Colorado, 2008)
Source: Urban Institute (NTJ, Dec 2012). Notes: Value of tax and value transfer benefits for a single parent with two children.
Average EMTRs for different family types: UK 2011 40
%50
%60
%70
%80
%
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200Employer cost (£/week)
Single, no children Lone parentPartner not working, no children Partner not working, childrenPartner working, no children Partner working, children
Mirrlees Review (2011)
Average PTRs for different family types: UK 2011
Mirrlees Review (2011)
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200Employer cost (£/week)
Single, no children Lone parentPartner not working, no children Partner not working, childrenPartner working, no children Partner working, children
3. The importance of information and complexity
• How is the policy likely to be understood by the agents involved?
• For example, how ‘salient’ are the various tax and welfare benefit incentives? – ‘Take-up’ of welfare and tax credits among eligible families – ‘Bunching’ at kink points
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Variation in tax credit ‘take-up’ with value of entitlement 0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1 Pr
obab
ility
of t
ake-
up
0 50 100 150 200 WFTC entitlement (£/week, 2002 prices)
Lone parents Couples
Budget Constraint for Single Parent: UK
Mirrlees Review (2011)
Notes: wage £6.50/hr, 2 children, no other income, £80/wk rent. Ignores council tax and rebates
Bunching at Tax Kinks and the EITC One child families: US
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Saez (2010)
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Urban Institute (NTJ, Dec 2012). Notes: Value of tax and value transfer benefits for a single parent with two children.
Universally Available Tax and Transfer Benefits in US (Single Parent with Two Children, 2008)
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Saez (2010)
Bunching at Tax Kinks and the EITC One child families: US
Taxes on Higher Incomes Marginal tax rates by income level, UK
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
0% 5%
10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
$0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000 Gross income
Earned income Self employment income Dividend income
Note: assumes dividend from company paying small companies’ rate. Includes income tax, employee and self-employed NICs and corporation tax.
Bunching at the higher rate threshold, UK
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
Num
ber in each £100 bin
Distance from threshold
Composi9on of income around the higher rate tax threshold
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
-‐$1 $0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9
Total incom
e pe
r £10
0 bin (£ billion)
Distance from threshold
Interest
Property
Dividends
Other investment income Self employment
Other
Pensions
Benefits
Employment
Deductables
4. Evidence on the size of responses
• This is where the rigorous econometric analysis of structure and causality comes into play.
• Eclec9c use of two approaches: 1. Quasi-‐experimental/RCT/reduced form evalua9ons of the
impact of (historic) reforms
• robust but limited in scope.
2. A ‘structural’ es9ma9on based on a the pay-‐offs and constraints faced by individuals and families
• comprehensive in scope and allow simula9on, but fragile.
• account for life-‐cycle facts, effec9ve tax rates, and salience/s9gma.
Ø What do we need to get observed responses to match with incen9ves?
• Labour supply elas9ci9es vary in key ways by educa9on group, family type and age. No single number! – large at certain key points in the working life and for certain demographic
groups, this is where tax and welfare benefit distor9ons are important.
• Informa9on, s9gma and salience ma5er – dis9nguish large reforms that are well understood.
• Taxable income is responsive for self-‐employed and top earners – but oXen reflects tax shiXing and avoidance.
• Experience ma5ers: especially for those with above basic educa9on – and, it seems, only for those in full-‐9me employment,
– can explain ‘success’ of simpler simula9ons of reforms for low-‐wage workers.
• To match employment, hours and wages over the life-‐cycle it is key is to allow complementarity between human capital investments – between schooling and ‘on the job’ investments.
Data and Simulations for Wages by education and age – UK Women, BHPS
Source: Blundell, Dias, Meghir and Shaw (2013)
Younger Workers • Extensive margin responses are low (e≈.15) at young ages for college
educated – but much higher (≈.9) for mothers with basic educa9on & kids in 3-‐7 age range, and larger than intensive elas9ci9es which are more modest (≈.5)
– extensive/intensive elas9ci9es imply op9mal earned income tax credits,
– small human capital/experience effects for low educated so li5le progressivity but need to account for ‘take-‐up’.
Human capital effects
• Two forms of human capital – schooling and on-‐the-‐job investment – the hourly wages of those with more educa9on are higher, and grow faster and for longer into the working life -‐ formal educa9on complements experience capital,
– for educated young workers, unlikely to respond to tax incen9ves during career, rather effect career length and re9rement.
Older workers… • Elas9ci9es increase for 60+ age group for both men and women
– appear to remain higher for women at both margins,
– elas9ci9es increase as mandatory re9rement restric9ons/earnings tests are liXed and actuarial fairness introduced,
– joint re9rement ma5ers above pure incen9ves.
• Lower educated are responsive to incen9ves in disability insurance, social security and medical insurance.
• Higher educated more responsive too at these ages
– larger density of workers around the work/no-‐work margin,
– wage and wealth effects become important.
• Response elas9ci9es are sizable but do not appear to explain all the recent rises in employment at older ages (e.g. in UK and US).
Early re9rement and inac9vity by age and wealth quin9le UK: men
Note: Wealth quinMles are defined within each five-‐year age group. Source: Banks and Casanova (2003), based on sample of men from the 2002 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing.
Taxable income…for top earners • Captures addi9onal avoidance and tax shiXing responses
– the ‘elas9city’ can be expected to fall as the tax base broadens • For a given tax base we can get an idea of the Laffer rate, the
revenue maximising top rate
– 1/[1 + taxable income elas9city (e) * Pareto parameter (a)]
– ‘a’ around 1.67 and ‘e’ around .45 for UK; Mirrlees (2011).
– ‘e’ reliable?, Ignore a variety of dynamic and structural issues.
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0010
0.0100
£100,000 £150,000 £200,000 £250,000 £300,000 £350,000 £400,000 £450,000 £500,000
Prob
abili
ty d
ensi
ty (l
og s
cale
)
Pareto distribution
Actual income distribution
Some key messages emerge for reform: • First, it is important to take a‘life9me’view
– key points in the working life where tax incen9ves ma5er.
• Second, must account for interac9ons between taxes and welfare
– effec9ve tax rates depend on incen9ves in the welfare system, taxes on employers as much as in the personal tax system.
• Third, fixed costs, informa9on costs and s9gma are important
– responses at the extensive margin differ from intensive margin,
– take-‐up among eligibles is costly.
• Fourth, accoun9ng for human capital investment ma5ers
– educa9onal investments enhance human capital at work,
– incen9ves for educa9onal investments influenced by taxes.
• Finally, taxable income captures avoidance/shiXing opportuni9es.
Evidence since the financial crisis suggests • In general workers and families are ac9ng as if they expect a long-‐run
fall in rela9ve living standards
– evidence from consump9on and saving; and responses in labour supply.
• Capital investment and/or produc9vity have been slow to pick up
– employment for the young/low skilled may bounce back, but what of real wages and produc9vity?
• Appears the number of rou9ne jobs near the middle of the earnings distribu9on has declined steadily, at least in the UK and US
– more jobs are now professional or managerial.
• Suggests longer term earnings growth will mostly come from high-‐skilled occupa9ons, with some at the very bo5om.
• There remain the same key points where tax systems can be reformed to enhance earnings, employment and human capital.
Consump9on Growth
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
80
85
90
95
100
105
2005Q1
2005Q3
2006Q1
2006Q3
2007Q1
2007Q3
2008Q1
2008Q3
2009Q1
2009Q3
2010Q1
2010Q3
2011Q1
2011Q3
2012Q1
2012Q3
2013Q1
Private consum
pMon
(2008Q
1 = 100) EU28
Spain
Italy
United Kingdom
Non-‐ (and semi) durables; UK recessions
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Qua
rter before recession = 100
Quarters since start of recession
1980
1990
2008
Employment rate for older workers: women aged 60-64
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro area (13 countries)
Germany (un9l 1990 former territory of the FRG)
Spain
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Employment rate for older workers: men aged 65-‐69
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro area (13 countries)
Germany (un9l 1990 former territory of the FRG)
Spain
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Employment rate for older workers: men aged 60-64
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro area (13 countries)
Germany (un9l 1990 former territory of the FRG)
Spain
France
Italy
United Kingdom
For the young employment fell back.... Employment rate: men aged 25-29
60.0
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro area (13 countries)
Germany (un9l 1990 former territory of the FRG)
Spain
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Employment shares of occupation groups: UK
© Ins9tute for Fiscal Studies
Note: the discontinuities in occupation classification in 2001 and 2011 have been addressed in the following way. For the conversion of SOC 1990 to SOC 2000, we look at individuals who were surveyed in 2000Q4 and 2001Q2 and stayed with the same employer and infer the transition matrix from this group. For the conversion of SOC2010 to SOC 2000, we used the ONS two-way tabulation of the LFS 2007 Q1 sample by the major occupation groups under the two SOC systems.
Recent evidence suggests • In general workers and families are ac9ng as if they expect a long-‐run
fall in rela9ve living standards
– evidence from consump9on and saving; responses in labour supply.
• Produc9vity and capital investment have been slow to pick up
– employment for the young/low skilled may bounce back, but what of real wages and produc9vity?
• Appears the number of rou9ne jobs near the middle of the earnings distribu9on has declined steadily
– more jobs are now professional or managerial.
• Suggests longer term earnings growth will mostly come from high-‐skilled occupa9ons, with some at the very bo5om.
• There remain the same key points where tax systems can be reformed that will also enhance earnings, employment and human capital.
Prospects… • S9ll much to do in focussing on older workers in general, on return to
work for parents/mothers, and on entry into work.
• There are some poten9al big gains here,
– for example, as (higher skilled) women age in the workforce.
• Tax/welfare reforms to enhance earnings (from Mirrlees):
– refocus incen9ves towards transi9on to work, return to work for lower skilled mothers and on enhancing incen9ves among older workers.
• Human capital and ‘on the job’ wage/produc9vity complementarity
– note the poten9al importance of mismatch of entry skills in this recession.
• Produc9vity remains a key issue.
5. Some key messages emerge for reform: • First, it is important to take a‘life9me’view
– key points in the working life where tax incen9ves ma5er.
• Second, must account for interac9ons between taxes and welfare
– effec9ve tax rates depend on incen9ves in the welfare system, taxes on employers as much as in the personal tax system.
• Third, fixed costs, informa9on costs and s9gma are important
– responses at the extensive margin differ from intensive margin,
– take-‐up among eligibles is costly.
• Fourth, accoun9ng for human capital investment ma5ers
– educa9onal investments enhance human capital at work,
– incen9ves for educa9onal investments influenced by taxes.
• Finally, taxable income captures avoidance/shiXing opportuni9es.
• Current systems remain unnecessarily complicated and induce too many people not to work or to work too li5le.
• Target work incen9ves where they are most effec9ve – simula9ons in Mirrlees (2011) show key increase in work/earnings
– reducing means-‐tes9ng and improving the flows into work for lower educa9on mothers and maintaining work for those aged 55+.
• Integrate overlapping benefits -‐ a single integrated benefit – Mirrlees (2011) -‐ ‘ifs’ and ‘universal credit’ reforms.
• Reduce disincen9ves at key margins for the educated – enhancing working life9me and the career earnings profile
– simula9ons in BDMS (2013) show significant effect on human capital.
• Align tax rates at the margin across income sources
Implications for efficient redesign of tax policy