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Targeted Support to the Philippines

Corruption-Risk Assessment for REDD+ in the Philippines & Development of REDD+ Anti-Corruption Measures

UN-REDD Programme: Targeted Support to the Philippines Corruption-Risk Assessment for REDD+ in the Philippines & Development of REDD+

Anti-Corruption Measures

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction .................................................................................................... 2

II. Methodology towards a REDD-Plus Corruption Risk Assessment Tool ............ 5

III. Challenges and Limitations .............................................................................. 8

IV. Key Findings .................................................................................................... 9

V. Prioritized List of Corruption Risks ................................................................ 27

VI. Proposed Measures ...................................................................................... 37

VII. Proposed Budget .......................................................................................... 41

VIII. Lessons Applicable To Other Countries ......................................................... 56

ANNEX 1: Expanded Methodology ....................................................................... 57

ANNEX 2: Policy and Institutional Analysis of Corruption Risks Identified ............ 61

ANNEX 3: Consolidated Results from Mindanao Workshop ................................. 69

ANNEX 4: Complete Long List of Corruption Risks ................................................ 74

ANNEX 5: High Priority Risks according to IDR Clusters ........................................ 80

ANNEX 6: Survey Form (English) .......................................................................... 85

ANNEX 7: Consolidated Copy of the Survey Results ............................................. 93

ANNEX 8: Proposed Interventions...................................................................... 112



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I. Introduction 1. It has been observed that “corruption is a significant enabler of deforestation in

developing countries.”1 Corruption has permeated forestry activities in developing countries for decades, from private companies and/or individuals offering bribes to public officials for favorable treatment, to public officials themselves demanding favors for personal gain. Historically, corruption in the forestry sector has been demonstrated to seriously compromise law enforcement and judiciary efforts, negatively affecting not only fragile forest ecosystems but also indigenous peoples and local communities.2

2. It is foreseen that REDD-Plus will likely face corruption-related roadblocks and

challenges given its fundamental ties with existing forestry practices and institutions. There is no doubt that the integrity of REDD-Plus, as a national forest management strategy, will depend on a country’s ability to identify and systematically address gaps and institutional weaknesses that breed corruption within and outside the forestry sector.

3. The literature has begun to identify and provide analysis towards understanding how

corruption can affect and arise from REDD-Plus. In the Readiness Phase, national frameworks for REDD-Plus could inherit the corrupt systems already found in the sector, or worse, “legalize” such systems.3 During this phase, “high level actors, such as political elites, institutions, powerful national and international timber companies, industrial scale agribusiness, multinational corporations, project developers and the military… may seek to influence the design of national REDD-plus frameworks, legislation and regulations in order to maximize their chances of capturing REDD-plus revenues.”4

4. In the Implementation Phase, existing petty and/or grand corruption in contexts where

REDD-Plus is implemented could work against the conservation and developmental goals of REDD-Plus schemes. Moreover, financial resources associated with REDD-Plus could create additional incentives and opportunities for corrupt activities. Such an environment could perversely attract public officials to extract rents from REDD-Plus resource flows.5

1 Bofin, P. et al, Addressing Governance and Corruption Challenges in Schemes for REDD, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center

U4 Issue 2011:1 (February 2011), p. 10, available at http://www.u4.no/publications/redd-integrity-addressing-governance-and-corruption-challenges-in-schemes-for-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-redd/, accessed 11 September 2012 2 Blundell, A. and Harwell E., Manual: An Analysis of Corruption in the Forestry Sector, Transparency International (October

2009) available at http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/Forestsectorcorruptiontoolsnov09FINAL.pdf, accessed 11 September 2012 3 Thorpe, A. and Ogle, L., Staying On Track: Tackling Corruption Risks in Climate Change, United Nations Development

Programme (January 2011), p. 32, available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/anti-corruption/staying-on-track--tackling-corruption-risks-in-climate-change.html, accessed 11 September 2012. 4 Ibid.

5 Bofin, P. et al, 13

http://www.u4.no/publications/redd-integrity-addressing-governance-and-corruption-challenges-in-schemes-for-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-redd/

http://www.u4.no/publications/redd-integrity-addressing-governance-and-corruption-challenges-in-schemes-for-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-redd/

http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/Forestsectorcorruptiontoolsnov09FINAL.pdf

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/anti-corruption/staying-on-track--tackling-corruption-risks-in-climate-change.html

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/anti-corruption/staying-on-track--tackling-corruption-risks-in-climate-change.html



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5. Nonetheless, there is an emerging view that, while not without risk, the entry of REDD-plus and related activities in developing countries present a powerful opportunity to improve forest governance practices, and this includes opportunities towards systematically addressing corruption in the sector6.

6. Moving to the Philippine setting, corruption has been attributed to both “flawed

structures in the political economy” and the lure of “economic incentives between principals and agents,” both “exacerbated by social and cultural norms.”7 Studies conducted from 2009 onwards reflect unsatisfactory ratings for the Philippines in terms of its Corruption Perceptions Index and control of corruption.8

7. It is widely posited in the context of the Philippines that the solution to curbing

corruption does not lie in additional legislation. Moratalla writes, “the Philippines does not need any more laws against corruption. If anything, what it needs is a re-examination of anti-corruption laws not only to remove duplication, but also to ensure that those existing are accepted by the populace and enforceable by the anti-corruption agencies.”9

8. Furthermore, the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific

(ANSA-EAP) notes, “while there is no dearth of laws and institutions, they may have been reduced to mere formalities. Clientelism and bureaucratic capture continue to characterize governance institutions in the country.”10

9. In the Philippine forestry sector, Mayo-Anda identified “existing and possible points of corruption problems,” listed as follows:11

Bribery, favoritism and the manipulation of land classification documents carried out by public officials regarding the issuance of Community Based Forest Management Agreements (CBFMAs) and Certificate of Stewardship Contracts (CSCs);

Extortion and bribery by officers of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), by the military and by police personnel, as part of transaction costs for activities related to the harvesting, transportation and sale of forest

6 Bofin et al, 5

7 Quimson, G. National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report of the Philippines, Transparency

International (2006) available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/Country%20Profiles/Philippines/TransparencyInternationa_NIS_philippines.pdf, accessed 11 September 2012 8 Mayo-Anda, G. Tackling Corruption for Governing REDD in the Philippines, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center U4 Issue

2011:4 (May 2011), p. 8, available at http://www.u4.no/publications/tackling-corruption-for-governing-redd-in-the-philippines/, accessed 11 September 2012 9 Moratalla, N. (1999) cited in Mayo-Anda, 8

10 Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP), Social Accountability Practice in the

Philippines: A Scoping Study (January 2010), p. 17 11

Mayo-Anda, 9, 11

http://info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/Country%20Profiles/Philippines/TransparencyInternationa_NIS_philippines.pdf

http://info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/Country%20Profiles/Philippines/TransparencyInternationa_NIS_philippines.pdf

http://www.u4.no/publications/tackling-corruption-for-governing-redd-in-the-philippines/

http://www.u4.no/publications/tackling-corruption-for-governing-redd-in-the-philippines/



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products and for the process of compliance with forestry guidelines or requirements;

Weak oversight of the forestry sector by the DENR due to corruption within the department which discourages effective forest management even in instances where there is demonstrable capacity in local government units and communities;

Current legal and institutional mechanisms provide only a weak accountability check on current and potential REDD schemes;

Court cases filed against DENR personnel alleged to have engaged in corruption are few and mostly involve mid-level rather than high ranking staff;

Rent seeking activities in natural resource management are widespread;

A complex network of individual participants that follow unwritten rules of secrecy and (mis)conduct; and

Human resources are not maximized due to the negative working environment in which individuals find themselves.

10. The Philippine National REDD-plus Strategy (PNRPS) likewise identifies corruption as an “underlying driver of deforestation and forest degradation,” with the immediate drivers being “allocation of resource use concessions and permits contrary to existing regulations and inconsistent enforcement of environmental laws.”12 11. Corruption risk assessments, economic and social impact assessments and multistakeholder consultations have been acknowledged by the UN REDD Programme as useful towards identifying and addressing corruption risks vis-a-vis national REDD- plus frameworks.13 12. To this end, the Ateneo School of Government (ASoG) is responsible for the conduct of the Corruption Risk Assessment for REDD-plus in the Philippines and Development of REDD-plus Anti-Corruption Measures Project. As part of the Philippines’ National REDD-plus Readiness Process, this project aims to produce a report that includes:

a. A prioritized list of corruption risks for REDD-plus in the Philippines, with a special focus on the Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy;

b. Proposed measures to mitigate the risks identified as most likely and most detrimental in the short, medium and long term;

c. A preliminary budget and identified responsibilities for the implementation of those measures; and

d. Lessons that may be applicable in other countries.

12

Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy Team, Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy (2010), p. 20 13

Thorpe and Ogle, 37-38



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13. Part II of this Report will detail the key activities employed in the Methodology towards the development of a Corruption Risk Assessment tool. Part III will discuss the Challenges encountered, and the Limitations necessitated as a result of these. Part IV sets out the Key Findings for each phase of the Methodology. Part V presents the final prioritized list of corruption risks for REDD-plus in the Philippines and expounds on each. Finally, proposed measures and interventions are recommended under Part VI.

II. Methodology towards a REDD-Plus Corruption Risk Assessment Tool 14. Mapping out the process involved in the identification and prioritization of REDD-Plus

corruption risks in the Philippines is necessary in order to properly understand and view the results of the project in the proper context. There were two main phases involved in the project, the first being the stocktaking and scoping of the study, and the second an analysis of the corruption risks and interventions identified during the initial phase. This section briefly goes through the project’s methodology. (See Annex 1)

Stocktaking and Scoping 15. The initial phase of the Corruption Risk Assessment project sought to identify general risks in the forestry sector in the Philippines vis-à-vis REDD-Plus, to ultimately facilitate a benchmarking of factors, risks and perceptions with regards to REDD-Plus corruption risks. 16. The initial phase of the Corruption Risk Assessment project sought to identify general

risks in the forestry sector in the Philippines vis-à-vis REDD-Plus, to ultimately facilitate a benchmarking of factors, risks and perceptions with regards to REDD-Plus corruption risks.

17. This phase began with a literature review as both guidance for the overall methodology

of the project, and as an initial basis for stocktaking and consultation. In order to produce a more well-rounded basis for further study and consultation, a focus group discussion attended by experts on REDD-Plus, governance and indigenous peoples’ affairs was held, complemented by the conduct of Key Informant Interviews (KII’s) of throughout Phase I of the project.

18. A national consultation workshop was likewise conducted to present and discuss and

build on initial findings with regard to corruption risks in the Philippine forestry sector that could apply to REDD-Plus, in accordance with the various components of the Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy (PNRPS). This was then supplemented and further defined by findings resulting from a subnational workshop conducted among



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employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources from the Visayas and Mindanao regions.

19. The conclusion of the stocktaking and scoping activities led to the conduct of a policy and institutional analysis, wherein underlying trends and gaps in policy and institutions relevant to corruption risks for REDD-Plus were identified. This analysis noted that despite numerous formal policies and institutions, and complementary efforts and initiatives by government offices in the Philippines, continuing challenges persist. Among those that must necessarily be addressed include weak enforcement of laws, a high tolerance of corruption and a need to strengthen existing institutions and collaborations. 20. The complete results of this analysis, which is contained in Annex 2 of this report, was used as a reference and partial basis for the consultation processes that took place during the second phase of the corruption risk assessment project, along with the information generated from all the activities that took place during this first phase. REDD-Plus Corruption Risk Analysis 21. The second phase of the project was primarily concerned with the orientation of corruption risks according to the PNRPS. This involved the identification of REDD- plus-specific risks and measures from among the more general forestry-related corruption risks. These REDD-plus specific risks were then analyzed and prioritized. The second phase, therefore, resulted in the determination and compilation of a prioritized list of REDD-Plus corruption risks and proposed measures. 22. At the beginning of this prioritization process, an analysis of the corruption risks and

interventions gathered through the stocktaking workshops, KII’s and focused group discussions in the first phase took place. As workshop participants were asked to rate the risks on the basis of likelihood and impact from one to five, respectively, each risk that garnered a combined score of eight to ten was preliminarily identified as “high priority.”

23. These high priority risks, as well as the interventions identified by the participants, were

then subjected to validation during the focused group discussion held on the 28th of January 2013. Approximately thirty anti-corruption practitioners from both government and non-government sector were present during this FGD, which led to a discussion on how to frame the priority risks in a manner that would be easily identifiable to those working in the anti-corruption and policy sectors. A number of categories identified in a 2007 Integrity Development Review (IDR) by the DENR were introduced and proved acceptable to the participants.



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24. To further validate the identified high priority risks, a second subnational workshop was held on the 8th of February 2013 in Tacloban City. This workshop was targeted at REDD-Plus demonstration project practitioners, as well as representatives from a number of People’s Organizations within the region, thirty-five of whom were present. 25. A survey was then administered online via SurveyMonkey.com from the 10th to the 17th

of February 2013, in order to facilitate the finalization of the prioritization of corruption risks. All previous workshop participants were invited to take part. Anticipating, however, that the participants in the second subnational workshop would be unable to respond online, given their limited internet access, hard copies of the survey were distributed during the workshop. Participants at the second subnational workshop were allowed to choose between an English and a Filipino version of the survey, in order to minimize the margin of error on the basis of a language barrier. Fifty-one people in all, the participants of the second subnational workshop included, completed the survey, among them government, non-government, peoples organizations and indigenous peoples representatives.

26. The results of the survey were presented to approximately fifty participants from the

government, donor partners, civil society, indigenous peoples and the academe during the final National Corruption Risk Assessment workshop, which took place on the 21st of February 2013. The top seven high priority risks, classified according to four IDR categories, were then analyzed and evaluated by the participants vis-à-vis the seven PNRPS components. Four breakout groups were formed, with each group being assigned specific PNRPS components, specifically (1) policy and governance, (2) MRV, (3) resource utilization and management, and (4) research and development, capacity building and sustainable financing.

27. Participants were asked to join the groups they felt were more suited to their respective

areas of expertise, and were tasked to further elaborate on each risk by identifying specific circumstances or actions that fell within the cognizance of the priority risk (eg. specific permits, exact points during the reporting process at which fraud could occur, etc.), as well as the individuals or groups that could be involved in the perpetration of each risk. They were asked to state whether each risk had, (a) as a possible enabling condition, a policy and/or capacity gap, (b) impact on the environment and/or community, and (c) the scale of each risk, whether large or small. Each “yes” for (a) and b) merited one point, while identifying each risk as “small scale” or “large scale” merited one point and two points, respectively. Participants were then tasked to identify both preventive and prosecutory interventions for each priority risk. They were allowed to simply select interventions identified during previous workshops and discussions, but could supplement these with additional measures they felt would be similarly responsive or relevant. Measures in response to these risks were then classified along the lines of short, medium and long-term interventions.



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Policy gap

Capacity gap

Environmental

impact

Community impact

scale

Measures

x x x x L

Engaging Champions 28. Upon the identification and categorization of high priority corruption risks and their respective interventions, it was then necessary to determine actions that could support the implementation of the proposed response measures. Identifying and engaging champions in both government and non-government sectors, for instance, such as individuals or groups of stakeholders through which policy reform or implementation could effectively begin or be coursed through, would raise both the effectiveness and immediacy of response measures. 29. Apart from the determination of champions, a proposed budget and set of responsibilities for the implementation or response measures were likewise identified.

III. Challenges and Limitations Before venturing further into the study, it is important that a number of challenges and limitations encountered throughout the project be stated upfront: 30. First, given that REDD-Plus in the Philippines is still within its readiness stage, it is difficult to identify precisely which corruption risks would be applicable for REDD- Plus. The PNRPS, with its components and key activities, is an excellent reference or framework through which corruption risks relevant to REDD-plus could be identified and prioritized, but further zeroing into how REDD-Plus corruption risks are applicable to certain REDD-Plus activities and phases, such as forest and tenure types, proved to be a challenge, despite the welcome suggestions of some participants. Further studies, therefore, may choose to look into these specificities. 31. Second, apart from some documented evidence on “carbon cowboys,” preliminary

findings of irregularities in the government’s reforestation efforts and in the issuance of forestry instruments and permits, documented evidence of REDD-Plus-specific corruption risks in the Philippines from which lessons and policy implications could be drawn is still limited. Engaging key government agencies such as the DENR and Ombudsman to enhance investigation and documentation efforts in this area is an important concern.



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32. Finally, there was limited time and resources to meaningfully engage identified

champions in discussions with regard to response measures and planning, hence internal estimates form a large part of the recommendations presented in the report. These internal estimates were reached through a careful consideration of factors and information that have been accumulated throughout the project process, as well as the individual expertise of members of the project team. This limitation, however, must still be acknowledged, and taken into consideration.

IV. Key Findings A. Stocktaking and Scoping 33. The stocktaking revealed that the Philippines has a relatively comprehensive legal

framework, in terms of policies, laws, regulations, and programs, on corruption. However, it is in the enforcement of these where the greatest difficulty lies.

34. Laws and policies are already in place to address specific activities such as bribery, nepotism, red tape in bureaucratic processes, graft and plunder. Additionally, regulations on the giving and receiving of gifts and use of official property and resources, as well as programs for witness protection and anonymous complaints have been institutionalized. However, serious institutional and capacity gaps with regard to enforcement and implementation represent huge challenges to the government. 35. Nonetheless, there are existing efforts in the Philippines that seek to address corruption

at the institutional and operational level. 36. The Integrity Development Review (IDR) under the Office of the Ombudsman, for instance, represents a significant innovation as a preventive measure against corruption.



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37. The Integrity Development Review looks into 10 dimensions of governance which serves as the basis for its assessment and recommended interventions. These are: 1) Leadership; 2) Code of Conduct; 3) Gifts and Benefits Policy; 4) Human Resource Management; 5) Performance Management; 6) Procurement Management; 7) Financial Management – Budgeting, Accounting and Cash Handling; 8) Whistleblowing, Internal Reporting and Investigation; 9) Corruption Risk Management and 10) Interface with External Environment.14

38. The IDR has since been a powerful platform for catalyzing comprehensive reforms

relating to anti-corruption across different government bodies, specifically the DENR, which has, in response to the IDR’s recommendations, established its Office for Internal Audit and Anti-Corruption (IAAC). Both the IDR and the IAAC have been gaining momentum under the current administration’s thrust for good governance pursuant to a Daang Matuwid or straight and narrow path.

39. Furthermore, there is an active CSO movement for anti-corruption and social

accountability in the Philippines that encompasses several sectors. These include participatory audit projects and initiatives such as CheckMySchool and Road Watch from the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific, which look into education and public works. Social Watch Philippines also implements the Alternative Budget Initiative, which looks into the national budgeting process.

Many CSOs and NGOs have explored partnerships with relevant government offices to

disseminate and actualize the results of their studies. 40. However, many government efforts to address corruption specific to the forestry sector

have been limited and unsustained. Add to this, there are no efforts specifically targeting corruption in REDD-Plus implementation.

41. At the national level, enforcement bodies that may address corruption in the forestry

sector have been set-up but have not been fully supported. These include the National Anti-Illegal Logging Task Force (AILTF), the National Anti-Environmental Crime Task Force (NAECTF), and the Multi-sectoral Forest Protection Committees (MFPC) under the DENR. These bodies have not been able to sustain the projects and activities they commenced upon their organization. Institutional support from the DENR and law enforcement agencies are virtually intermittent.

42. The Office of the Environmental Ombudsman under the national Office of the Ombudsman was recently restored to address environment-related crimes committed by public officers and employees. A resident Ombudsman based at the

14

Integrity Development Review of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (2007)



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DENR, as well as the agency’s Assistant Secretary for Internal Audit and Anti- Corruption supports this Office. 43. But beyond these entities, there are no fully operational bodies to address corruption specific to the forestry sector, even more so for REDD-Plus and the PNRPS. 44. The stocktaking also revealed that free and prior informed consent (FPIC) and

community tenure and resource utilization—major safeguards for REDD-Plus implementation in the Philippines—are key areas of concern for corruption.

45. Implementation of FPIC and issuance of instruments for community tenure and resource utilization, such as community based forest management agreements, community resource management frameworks, community resource utilization permits and certificates of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), have been seriously hampered due to institutional constraints. The NCIP and the DENR have limited resources and capacity to effectively facilitate the lengthy processes that these involve. 46. Add to this, varying dynamics within the indigenous and local communities can render

these processes vulnerable to corruption. Local elites may monopolize decision-making and prevent meaningful community participation. Unscrupulous individuals and institutions may then capitalize on these structures and community systems for their personal gain.

47. There is global as well as national literature that describes corruption risks in the

forestry sector, as well as some relevant tools to facilitate possible interventions. However, it is only very recently that the literature has focused on REDD-Plus and the development of REDD-Plus corruption risk tools. This provides an opportunity to develop nationally appropriate REDD-Plus corruption risk tools.

48. Global literature on corruption risks has largely centered on issues such as forest governance, enforcement, market transparency, and institutional change; while national literature has tended to be sparse but heavily focused on studies on illegal logging, land conversion for plantations and large scale extractive industries, and violations of human rights in indigenous and local communities. 49. Since the inception of global discussions on REDD-Plus, organizations like the UN-REDD,

Transparency International, and the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center have produced specific studies organizing the latest thinking on corruption risks that can emanate from and impact REDD-Plus. Tools have also emerged to assist stakeholders and government identify priorities and interventions. However, it is apparent that for such tools to be truly effective towards mitigating REDD-Plus corruption risks, they must



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be context-specific. To this end, tools should be further enhanced to consider national and local circumstances.

50. The Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy (PNRPS) already recognizes corruption as a

major area of concern. 51. Policy studies on the drivers of deforestation, carbon rights, FPIC and forest policy have been conducted under the PNRPS. These have identified various areas vulnerable to corruption and proposed recommendations to address these. 52. The NMRC, as the governance mechanism for the PNRPS, is tasked to deal with corruption risks, among its other functions. However, this body is yet to be mobilized. 53. Participants of the first round of KIIs and FGDs, and at the first national workshop recommended analyzing REDD-Plus corruption risks and proposing interventions through the lens of the PNRPS. As a result, risks and interventions were specifically oriented to the 7 PNRPS components – (1) Policy; (2) Governance; (3) Resource Use, Allocation and Management; (4) Monitoring, Reporting and Verification; (5) Research and Development; (6) Capacity Building and Communication and (7) Sustainable Finance. B. REDD-Plus Corruption Risk Analysis for the PNRPS 54. DENR field operations validated the myriad ways of how corruption is pervasive in the

forestry sector and the enabling environment in which these are built. 55. As a long-standing thorn on the side of government field personnel, corruption and the

many “creative” ways it is perpetuated in the forestry sector are very well known within the ranks of DENR. DENR field operations affirmed how certain politicians consistently influence the awarding of forestry permits much to the frustration of DENR and other local government personnel. There were likewise anecdotal references nuancing common black and white perceptions of corruption, and how colleagues within the DENR and local government would conduct corrupt activities in light of poor salaries, reprisals against unfavorable decisions, or simply out of a desire to bypass or skip burdensome processes or “hassles”.

56. DENR field operations identified a long-list of corruption risks existing now that could

impact PNRPS components.



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57. This list is contained in the consolidated results from the workshop held with DENR field personnel in Mindanao, classified according to the 7 PNRPS components, are attached as “Annex 3” of this Report. 58. Provincial and Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices

(PENROs/CENROs) as well as DENR staff from the Regional Offices are aware of the many ways in which corruption occurs in the forestry sector, whether in policy making, permitting, enforcement or operations management. They likewise had ready explanations for the enabling conditions that make it possible for these corrupt practices to thrive.

59. DENR field operations also highlighted existing internal audit systems and anti-

corruption initiatives but emphasized that corruption is largely a cultural, institutional and capacity issue.

60. Among the notable efforts raised by DENR personnel both in the field and the Central

offices was the introduction of the Citizen’s Charter. This document lists the standard fees and processing times for documents and other requests. It is translated into local dialects and is conspicuously posted at all government offices to standardize fees and processes and minimize corrupt activities in the bureaucracy.

61. Nonetheless, they were in agreement that corruption in the forestry sector persisted

because of various enabling conditions, some entrenched in policy and regulations, and generally widely tolerated as accepted practice. There is certainly a palatable sense of pessimism among DENR field personnel when it comes to the culture of corruption that the agency has been associated with for several years. The boxed responses of “cultural and values re-orientation” have been deemed largely ineffective. There were, however, some positive sentiments with regard to the newly installed internal audit system of DENR, particularly towards effectively striking fear among errant officials and deterring further corrupt behavior.

62. The identified long list of risks were further processed according to the categories used

in Transparency International’s REDD Manual (2011). 63. These categories were (1) Collusion; (2) Fraud; (3) Embezzlement; (4) Bribery; (5) Abuse

of Authority; (6) Influence Peddling and (7) Extortion.15 64. Collusion refers to “an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including improperly influencing the actions of another party.”16

15

Transparency International REDD Manual (2011), adapted from UNODC (2004) 16

Ibid.



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65. Fraud refers to “any behavior designed to trick or fool another person or entity for one’s own or a third party’s benefit.”17 66. Embezzlement refers to “the conversion of money, property or valuable items by an individual who is not entitled to them but by virtue of his or her position or employment has access to them.”18 67. Bribery refers to “the act of offering and giving someone a benefit, in the form of money, services or other inducements to persuade them to do something in return.”19 68. Abuse of authority refers to “when officials use their authority to give undue preferential treatment to any group or individual, or discriminate against any group or individual for personal gain.”20 69. Influence peddling was used as an amalgamation of the categories of favoritism, cronyism and nepotism in the Transparency International REDD manual. This refers to “the favorable treatment of friends, business associates and family in the distribution of resources and positions, regardless of their objective merits.”21 70. Finally, Extortion refers to “the process of coercion where a person or institution forces

another party to pay money or other valuables in exchange for acting or failing to act.”22

71. Each of the identified risks was graded according to perceptions of their likelihood and impact. For this purpose, the following criteria were used:23

17

Ibid. 18

Ibid. 19

Ibid. 20

Ibid. 21

Ibid. 22

Ibid. 23

Blundell, A. and Harwell, E., Manual: An Analysis of Corruption in the Forestry Sector, Transparency International (October 2009), available at http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/Forestsectorcorruptiontoolsnov09FINAL.pdf, accessed 11 September 2012.



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Likelihood Impact

1 Impossible – Never happens Nil – No impact

2 Rare – Has been known to occur in other similar environments

Minor – Society not undermined

3 Unlikely – Uncommon, but does occur Moderate – If stopped, society would recover rapidly

4 Likely – Commonly occurs Major – Even if corrected, society would be compromised for some time

5 Highly Likely – Frequently occurs Catastrophic – Society undermined irreparably

72. Based on the sum of the weight for likelihood and impact, the following scale was used to arrive at an initial prioritization of the identified risks:

Priority

8-10 High Priority

5-7 Medium Priority

2-4 Low Priority

73. The results from these workshops and discussions revealed that there is already ongoing

corruption related to the implementation of the REDD-Plus Readiness Phase in the Philippines that needs to be addressed immediately.

74. Before the completion of the PNRPS, or any other standards and regulations for REDD-

Plus implementation in the Philippines, unscrupulous investors commonly labeled as “Carbon Cowboys” had already established bogus forest carbon projects among unsuspecting communities in Mindanao. This negative experience has understandably skewed many groups’ perceptions of REDD-Plus.

75. Corruption is noted to also be rampant in the implementation of the National Greening Program (NGP), the Philippine government’s wide-scale reforestation agenda. In particular, overpricing reportedly takes place in the procurement of seedlings, materials and equipment for NGP activities. Reporting of completed reforestation efforts was also allegedly tainted with fraud, particularly through the practice of “double reporting” activities and misrepresenting seedling survival rates. 76. The day-to-day operations of the concerned government agencies likewise create numerous opportunities for corrupt activities. Requests for transportation expenses and allowances are misreported to allow for higher claims. It was also noted that equipment, particularly office vehicles, were used for non-official or personal purposes.



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77. The complete long list of corruption risks, each graded as to their impact and likelihood is attached as “Annex 4” of this Report. 78. Nonetheless, there is a need to be more specific in the identification of corrupt activities

so as to be able to identify set priorities. 79. A clearer identification of the actors involved in corrupt activities is necessary. In

particular, it is necessary to pinpoint the levels of national and local government in which corrupt activities commonly occur. Correspondingly, there is also a need to identify specific activities and items, such as particular permits or tenure instruments, where corruption is most rampant. This is to ultimately identify a logical set of priorities for each of the PNRPS components and allow for champions to commit to a practical set of interventions.

80. It was strongly recommended that the classification of corruption risks for REDD-Plus

implementation in the Philippines build from the efforts under the Integrity Development Review (IDR) overseen by the Office of the Ombudsman.

81. As previously mentioned, the Integrity Development Review looks into 10 dimensions

for its Integrity Development Assessment phase. 82. For this Corruption Risk Assessment, 4 of these dimensions were deemed the most appropriate categories to classify the identified corruption risks, namely 1) Code of Conduct; 2) Performance Management, which was taken to include Service Delivery; 3) Financial Management and 4) Procurement Management.24 83. A Code of Conduct “sets out the standard of behavior” expected of officials and personnel, that “defines desirable behavior for all types of work” within the office or agency.25 84. Performance Management is based on office or agency’s mandate and “individual targets based on its respective goals.” It addresses effectivity and efficiency of units within these offices and agencies, with appropriate incentives or disincentives for behavior.26 85. Financial Management “encompasses prescribed government rules and regulations on accounting and budgeting, existing internal control systems, financial

24

For reference and guidance, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-

governance/oslo_governance_centre/analysis_and_learning/fostering_socialaccountabilityfromprincipletopractice.html 25

Ibid. 26

Ibid.



17

accountabilities, required financial reports and relevant training programs on financial management.”27 86. Procurement Management “covers the system of purchasing goods and services,” with “risk factors” such as “conflicts of interest, extortion, bribery of public officials, non-compliance with procedures and lack of information on standard prices.”28 87. To this end, there is a need to shift the discourse from “anti-corruption” to social

accountability. This entails seeing the government as partners rather than perpetrators, and engaging public participation.

88. The identified High Priority risks were further categorized according to the appropriate

IDR clusters. 89. A table of the high priority risks classified according to the appropriate IDR Clusters – Code of Conduct, Performance Management or Service Delivery, Financial Management and Procurement Management is attached as “Annex 5” of this Report. 90. To facilitate further prioritization and identification of more specific information, a

survey was developed. For accessibility, it was translated for workshop participants as well as circulated online. There are 13 major findings from the survey results.

91. A copy of the survey form in English is attached as “Annex 6” of this Report. A consolidated copy of the survey results follows as “Annex 7.” 92. The survey results were processed according to the IDR clusters. From this, the high

priority corruption risks were identified, as follows: 93. For CODE OF CONDUCT, respondents viewed as highly likely “politicians influencing

the issuance of permits to accommodate friends or as owners of business (see Figure 1.1).” They viewed this political influence as a “high impact” risk (see Figure 1.2).

27

Ibid. 28

Ibid.



18

94. Likewise, the practice of “LGUs allowing illegal permits, contracts and plans” was ranked as highly likely (Figure 1.1) with potentially “significant impact (Figure 1.2).”

Figure 1.1 – Likelihood of Risks under Code of Conduct



19

Figure 1.2 – Impact of Risks Under Code of Conduct 95. For PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT or SERVICE DELIVERY, respondents viewed as that

misuse of official resources was highly likely, as reflected in their rankings for misrepresentations with regard to travel and fieldwork, personal use of office resources and equipment and abuse of discretion in the selection of personnel to undergo training and capacity building (see Figure 2.1). However, these were all said to have little to moderate impact (see Figure 2.2).

96. The practice of “implementors of REDD-Plus activities fraudulently double reporting reforestation efforts” was viewed to be a “high impact” risk (Figure 2.2).



20

Figure 2.1 – Likelihood of Risks under Performance Management or Service Delivery

Figure 2.2 – Impact of Risks under Performance Management or Service Delivery



21

97. For PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT, respondents viewed the overpricing of equipment,

supplies and materials as “highly likely (see Figure 3.1).” In terms of impact, this practice was also ranked to be a significant to high impact risk (see Figure 3.2).

98. Collusion in the bidding and approval of contracts was also noted to have high to significant likelihood (Figure 3.1), and a potentially high impact (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.1 – Likelihood of Risks under Procurement Management



22

Figure 3.2 – Impact of Risks under Procurement Management 99. For FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, respondents viewed “Diversion of Funds” as demonstrating little likelihood (see Figure 4.1). However, they viewed it as demonstrating high impact (see Figure 4.2).



23

Figure 4.1 – Likelihood of Risk Figure

Figure 4.2 – Impact of Risks under Financial Management



24

100. Respondents attributed corrupt practices to the following reasons: 1) lack of capacity for

implementation of laws and regulations; 2) lack of capacity for enforcement of Anti-Corruption laws and regulations and punishment of corruption and 3) accepted culture or high tolerance for corruption (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 – Causes of Corruption

101. Finally, possible interventions were classified as to those that were preventive

measures, and those that involved prosecutorial action. The Respondents felt that the most effective interventions were as follows (see Figure 6.1a and 6.1b):

1) As a PREVENTIVE measure: Strengthen and standardize internal audit

system at all levels; 2) As a PROSECUTORY measure: Impose and enforce appropriate sanctions

according to applicable laws; 3) As a PREVENTIVE measure: Improve consultation process especially

before the issuance of policies;



25

4) As a PREVENTIVE measure: Massive information, education and communications campaigns on REDD-Plus at all levels, with particular focus on good governance and operations;

5) As a PREVENTIVE measure: Creation of REDD-Plus offices at the Regional and Provincial levels;

6) As a PREVENTIVE measure: Ensure independent monitoring and Third Party reporting and investigations;

7) As a PROSECUTORY measure: Strengthen the system for reward and punishment;

8) As a PREVENTIVE measure: Encourage vigilance among external sectors such as the media, intelligence offices, NGOs and CSOs and the academe in reporting malpractices; and

9) As a PROSECUTORY measure: Strengthen prosecutory practices.

Figure 6.1a – Possible Interventions—Prosecutory Practices

Establish a "one-strike"

policy, 11

Impose and enforce appropriate sanctions

according to applicable laws, 24

Strengthen the system on reward and punishment,

16

Strengthen prosecutory

processes, 14

Enact a Whistleblower Law,

7

Strengthen or establish a Witness Protection

Program, 9

Streamline prosecutory processes , 7

Speedy prosecution of

cases, 12



26

Figure 6.1b – Possible Interventions—Preventive Practices 102. These survey results were presented during the 2nd National Workshop. As a final activity, participants were asked to detail the identified high priority risks in terms of the following: 1) The PNRPS components vis-à-vis the IDR clusters; 2) The possible subject of corruption; 3) The possible perpetrators of corruption; 4) Presence or absence of gaps in terms of policies and capacities; 5) The possibility of impacts to the environment and on communities; and 6) The scale of the potential impact (whether large or small). 103. Accordingly, participants were asked to propose interventions to address these priority

corruption risks, classified according to short, medium and long-term efforts. The results from this activity are attached as “Annex 8” of this Report. 104. This allowed the CRA team to generate a list of prioritized corruption risks in a manner that builds from the PNRPS and the IDR. These are elaborated in Part V of this Report. Finally the proposed interventions for these corruption risks, classified according to short, medium and long-term efforts are discussed in Part VI.

Improve consultation process especially before

the issuance of policies, 23

Passage of interim guidelines on REDD-plus, 8

Creation of REDD-plus Office and TWG at the Regional and Provincial

level, 16

Strengthen and Standardize the

Internal Audit Service at all levels, 29

Mobilize account management teams, 6

Ensure there are avenues and

sufficient time for providing

feedback, and that feedback is responded to, 7

Implementation of Employee Rationalization

Plans to ensure that proper employees are the ones

sent to be capacitated , 8

Encourage vigilance among external sectors

in reporting malpractices (NGO, media, intelligence

offices, academe), 14

Massive information, education and

communication campaigns on REDD-plus at all levels, with

particular focus on governance and operations, 23

Values re-orientation, 10

Ensure independent monitoring/ 3rd party

reporting and investigations, 16

Harmonize reporting systems procedures

and methodologies, 6

Finalization of baseline data and standards for REDD-

plus, 7

Strict monitoring of activities (e.g. use of plantation registries),

12

Establish or strengthen a system

of rewards incentives, 9

Establish or strengthen a grievance mechanism, 9



27

V. Prioritized List of Corruption Risks 105. The various exercises facilitated by the project provided rich insight into the diverse

issues, perceptions and risks relating to corruption, REDD-Plus and the PNRPS. There is little doubt that previous experience in the Philippine forestry sector and emerging experience in the implementation of REDD-readiness activities in the country have been and will continue to be invaluable in identifying corruption risks. However, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at the top 7 risks identified, validated, and elaborated by stakeholders as high priority, considering gaps in policy and capacity, environmental and community impact, and scale. These include:

1. Politicians influencing the issuance of permits to accommodate friends or as owners

of business 2. LGUs allowing illegal permits, contracts and plans 3. Misuse of official resources 4. Fraudulent reporting 5. Overpricing 6. Collusion in bidding 7. Diversion of funds

Politicians Influencing the Issuance of Permits to Accommodate Friends or as Owners of Business

106. Influence of politicians was identified as a key corruption risk under Code of Conduct, and is applicable to all PNRPS components.

Relevant PNRPS component

Policy Gap Capacity

Gap Environmental

Impact Community

Impact Scale

1. Policy and governance

2. RUAM 3. MRV

4. Finance, R&D,

Capacity Building

✓

✓

✓

L

107. Under policy and governance, politicians’ influence was identified as being pervasive

and covers a wide range of activities, from application for and issuance of environmental clearances, business permits, all types of resource use permits (such as those for forestry, quarrying and mining, and energy) and agreements and tenure



28

instruments, to the drafting of government reports and guidelines and the passage of local legislation. Officials and personnel from the executive, legislative and judiciary were identified as being involved.

108. For resource utilization, allocation and management, politicians’ influence was identified in forest land boundary delineation where part of forest land will be included in alienable and disposable areas, in the issuance of tenure instruments, resource utilization permits, cutting permits and small scale mining permits, in non- endorsement of CBFMA and CADT applications and in the approval of government budgets. Those involved in the occurrence of this risk were local chief executives, the municipal council and congressional representatives. 109. Under MRV, this corruption risk was seen in the process of obtaining consent from

Indigenous Peoples, where undue influence can be exerted by politicians to obtain a favorable endorsement from the community. Likewise, politicians are seen to impose demands or conditions in the conduct of inventories in non-IP areas. Those involved were identified as the politicians and the IP leaders. While this may be viewed as a governance issue, attention was drawn to the activities and processes that MRV has to go through because forest areas are covered by tenure arrangements or form part of ancestral domains. Thus, any activity leading or relating to MRV will involve the process of securing consent.

110. In sustainable financing, research and capacity building, the influence of politicians was

identified in the social acceptability process, particularly in securing the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of IP groups for projects and activities within their Ancestral Domains. Both government and non-government groups were involved in perpetrating the risk, such as the LGU, NCIP, national government agencies, and civil society groups.

111. In all the PNRPS components, the influence of politicians was seen as having community

and environmental impact, which are generally large in scale. While there were gray areas in policy, the presence of politicians’ influence was viewed as a result primarily of gaps in institutional capacity, more than of policy.

LGUs allowing illegal permits, contracts and plans 112. Still under Code of Conduct, this corruption risk was identified in all PNRPS components

and was unanimously viewed as having both community and environmental impacts that are potentially large in scale. All components also attributed this corruption risk to both policy and capacity gaps. The role of LGUs and government agencies in the perpetration of this corruption risk was pointed out.

113. For policy and governance, this corruption risk was said to take place when ordinances

are passed, which contradict national laws and policies, when business permits are



29

processed or issued, and when local councils endorse development projects (e.g. biodiesel investment) without the benefit of public hearings. It was likewise identified that local leaders, management bodies and council of elders may accept bribes and may be prone to this corruption risk. Local officials like the governor, mayor and municipal council were identified as perpetrators of this risk.

114. Under resource utilization, allocation and management, the issuance of small-scale

mining permits for what are actually large-scale mining operations was identified as a concrete occurrence where LGUs have allowed illegal permits and contracts. The governor was identified as the local official responsible for allowing this illegal mining activity.

115. In the case of MRV, this corruption risk was identified when LGUs have allowed

conditions for land uses. In this case, LGUs approved of development plans or extractive projects which are inappropriate or contrary to the land use of an area, as per its classification. The persons who would be responsible here would be the private investors, officials from national government and local politicians.

Also in relation to MRV, attention was drawn to the scientific and “matter-of-fact” nature of MRV, where measurements are established, and with no room for embellishments. The possibility of committing errors on field data was also mentioned. Likewise, there was mention that the avoidance of inventory in a certain area may not be due to corruption, but also due to the long process involved in MRV and securing consent for the conduct of the inventory.

116. In financing, research and capacity building, this corruption risk was seen in the opaque approval of plans and contracts, such as the comprehensive land use plan (CLUP) and the ancestral domain sustainable development and protection plan (ADSDPP). The lack of transparency in the approval of such plans was said to enable LGUs to perpetrate corrupt practices or activities.



30


Policy Gap Capacity

Gap Environmental

Impact Community

Impact Scale


2. RUAM 3. MRV 4. Finance, R&D,

Capacity Building

✓

✓

✓

L

Misuse of official resources 117. A major corruption risk under Performance Management/Service Delivery, misuse of official resources was identified in all PNRPS components, but with varying views in terms of impact and scale. 118. Under policy and governance, database security was identified as a possible activity where this corruption risk would apply. However, impact and scale were undetermined, nor were there policy and capacity gaps indicated. 119. For resource utilization, allocation and management, this corruption risk was viewed

to take place in field activities and out of office work, more particularly, through the reduction of travel days and the use of vehicle and equipment for unofficial purposes. Personnel from the DENR and the LGU were identified as the possible perpetrators of this risk.

120. For MRV, misuse of official resources can take place when there is limited or deficient

allocation of funds for per diem during verification activities. Field visits and verification activities are critical to MRV and the inadequacy of funds would endanger MRV’s effectiveness. Government agencies concerned with MRV were identified as the ones responsible for committing this.

121. In financing, research and capacity building, the inadequacy of the allocation of

resources to ensure people’s participation has been identified, but similar to the policy and governance component, there were no gaps, impacts and scale identified.

122. In this corruption risk, the gaps, impacts and scale were identified under resource utilization, allocation and management and MRV. Under these components, the involvement of DENR and LGU personnel were pointed out.



31


Policy Gap Capacity

Gap Environmental

Impact Community

Impact Scale


2. RUAM 3. MRV 4. Finance, R&D,

Capacity Building

✓

✓

✓

L

Fraudulent reporting 123. Fraudulent reporting was identified as a major corruption risk under Performance Management and Service Delivery, of particular relevance to the PNRPS components of Policy and Governance, Resource Use Allocation and Management, and MRV.


Policy Gap Capacity Gap

Environmental Impact

Community Impact

Scale


2. RUAM 3. MRV

✓

✓

✓

L

124. For policy and governance, fraudulent reporting was described as an extremely commonplace practice in the forestry sector ranging from low-level to serious offenses. Fraudulent reporting through the lens of REDD-Plus policy and governance involves a range of activities, such as the following:

Submission of inaccurate or “inflated” accomplishment reports, especially with regards to the daily management of forestry and REDD-Plus issues

Submission of falsified documents with forged signatures

Forwarding of dummy NGOs and “ghost” projects from people’s organizations to facilitate kick-backs

Conduct of “payroll padding”, where “ghost employees” are presented as participating and providing services towards an activity but compensation is acquired by others



32

False representation of labor, number of laborers, and laborers’ wages to acquire kick-backs

Submission of false financial reports

Passing off non-consent as consent of indigenous peoples and local communities, possibly on the basis of technicalities

Submission of false technical assessments such as baselines, socio-economic assessments, results of interventions, particularly to do with forest cover and/or its regeneration as well as community benefits and distribution

Conduct of false land delineation and boundary setting for permitting purposes 125. From the view of resource use, allocation and management as well as measurement, reporting and verification, fraudulent reporting involves the following:

False or “overly lenient” baselines for carbon, biodiversity and community

Deliberately erroneous monitoring, reporting and book-keeping

Misrepresentation and false declaration of standing and planted trees and volume under reforestation efforts

Double reporting of reforestation efforts and under-reporting of reforestation failures

Recycling of transport documents and permits, facilitating double reporting of reforestation efforts and other anomalous activities inside forests

Falsification of documents where seedlings are reported as sold but not according to rightful prices, allowing for systemic overpricing

Resistance to audits 126. There was a consensus that fraudulent reporting will largely emanate from field operatives not only from the DENR (specifically, FMB, MGB, and LMB), but also local government personnel, project staff, NGOs, people’s organizations, and the private sector. 127. There was also a very strong sense that there is no policy gap with regard to manuals,

guidelines and rules for procedures for reporting in the forestry sector. Rather, the persistence of fraudulent reporting was said to indicate a huge capacity gap within the sector’s performance management system. Such a risk will emerge as a serious challenge with REDD-Plus implementation given the strict requirements of international MRV approaches and difficulties in detection.

128. Also, while cases of fraudulent reporting are at times considered as “low-level” and hence small in scale, their potential impact to the implementation of REDD-Plus is deemed significant, particularly with regard to possible cases of fraudulent reporting leading to the undervaluation of forest resources and personnel turning a blind eye to violations against the environment and community rights.



33

Overpricing 129. Overpricing was identified as a major corruption risk under Procurement Management,

applicable to all PNRPS components. It was noted that overpricing has traditionally been difficult to detect due to connivance between officials and suppliers on price fixing before even any official transaction takes place.


Policy Gap

Capacity Gap


Community Impact

Scale


2. RUAM

3. MRV 4. Finance, R&D,

Capacity Building and Communication

✓

✓

✓

L

130. Overpricing is believed to involve supplies, equipment, and infrastructure specifically for reforestation and monitoring efforts and consultants and research contracts. It was said to be achieved through the presentation of false documents that are represented to official and in order. As such, it represents a cross-cutting risk for the PNRPS. 131. Those identified as likely perpetrators of overpricing involve field personnel from the community to regional level offices under the DENR, local government, and the Bids and Awards Committees of various departments. The private sector are also believed to be capable of conniving with officials to overprice certain acquisitions and services either for personal gain of employees or for wholesale company profit. 132. No policy gap was identified, in view of several policies in place intended to curtail

overpricing, such as Republic Act 9184, which standardizes and regulates procurement processes involving the government. The gap was said to lie with the capacity of regulators to detect and verify cases of overpricing where receipts are non-existent and where the parties in question are complicit and/or keep silent out of fear of reprisals.



34

133. Overpricing has impacts on the environment and communities in that it facilitates a reduction in the materials and services certain efforts should be receiving, in turn, reducing the impact of intended investments for REDD-Plus on the ground. Due to difficulties in detection and the noted lack in checks and balances, there is a perception that overpricing can happen at seriously large scales under the PNRPS if left unchecked, with costs and risks systematically being transferred to communities in the long run. Collusion in the Bidding and Approval of Contracts 134. Related to overpricing, a major corruption risk identified under Procurement

Management for REDD-Plus is collusion in bidding processes. A key difference of this risk with overpricing is that collusion for bidding usually occurs at multiple levels. The act is not solely interested in price fixing, but is in fact a well-organized and well-planned effort by both the bidder and government officials to secure large government bids even if the acquisition or service in question is sub-par in terms of quality. Specifically, collusion is motivated by either a desire to avoid or bypass burdensome processes, or worse, to squeeze out competition, secure “padded” or inflated rates, and facilitate kick-backs under the table between the private sector and the government officials involved.


Policy Gap Capacity

Gap Environmental

Impact Community

Impact Scale


2. RUAM

3. MRV

✓

✓

✓

L

135. Across all PNRPS components, collusion in bidding was identified to involve the following activities, ranging from minor to major offenses:

Rental of facilities and vehicles, and procurement of minor services and equipment, without due bidding process to avoid bureaucratic “hassles”

Government officials allow for “monopolies” of service providers and bulk seedling suppliers out of convenience or vested interests

Use of “dummy bidders” for seedlings, equipment and plantation services to make favored bidders look competitive

Preferential treatment of favored bidders, leniency for incomplete requirements and lack of due diligence



35

Specifically, favoring research contractors who have been coaxed to manipulate research results

General non-observance of Republic Act 9184 provisions, from basic documentation to serious violations

136. Again, no policy gap was seen with regard to facilitating transparent and fair procurement processes as these are all laid out in the Republic Act 9184 and internal procedures and standards as overseen by Bids and Awards Committees. However, capacity gaps were noted with regard to the conduct of due diligence on bidders, regular monitoring, and streamlining the bidding process to avoid corruption committed out of convenience. These still hamper proper enforcement of procurement laws. And similar to overpricing, unlawful procurement may reduce the quality and quantity of acquisitions to the detriment of the REDD-Plus objectives such as sustainable forest management, reforestation and community development. Diversion of funds 137. Diversion of funds was singularly identified as the major corruption risk under financial management. And it is of interest that diversion of funds is described as a “facilitator” of corrupt activities very similar to how bribery is viewed as the "currency” for committing corrupt acts.


Policy Gap

Capacity Gap


Community Impact

Scale


2. RUAM

3. MRV

4. Finance, R&D, Capacity Building and Communication

✓

✓

✓

L

138. In this case, diversion of funds could be seen as relevant to the various PNPRS components through the following:

A portion of funds intended for REDD-Plus activities are used to purchase favors from government officials, indigenous peoples and local communities, usually in the form of gifts



36

A portion of funds intended for REDD-Plus activities are used to bribe government officials to favor certain entities and railroad permitting and bidding processes

In the absence of formalized benefit sharing schemes, financial benefits are diverted away from community development needs

Due to poor or false baselining efforts, funds are diverted to areas and activities favoring certain parties only

Due to lack of capacity, connivance or possibly intimidation, a portion of funds intended for REDD-Plus activities at the community level are spent by indigenous peoples and local communities to “pay” consultants, NGOs, government staff, or fixers to complete technical requirements for them

139. As with others, there are laws in place that avoid the improper diversion of funds. However, there was consensus that it is very difficult to differentiate what constitutes as improper and what falls under the prerogative of government officials and other entities when it comes to financial management decisions, especially at the local level. This raises the question of whether or not local government officials and stakeholders have enough capacity to make fair, balanced, and informed decisions on financial management. 140. Funds diversion was identified as a major challenge for REDD-Plus implementation in the Philippines as the country demonstrates varying levels of “readiness” and appreciation of REDD-Plus and the PNRPS. Therefore, the PNPRS needs to ensure that national and local government officials are capacitated enough to make decisions on REDD-Plus and ultimately be vanguards against moves to divert funds away from intended activities. 141. If left on its own, funds could likely be siphoned off to other activities deemed more pressing and more relevant from a point of view of political mileage—seriously impairing the ability of REDD-Plus to facilitate environmental and community impacts. Similarly, the non-government sector need to be empowered towards monitoring and promoting sound public financial management especially with regards to PNRPS related investments.



37

VI. Proposed Measures 142. The surveys and workshop groups identified a broad range of measures, both

preventive and prosecutory. These measures were further classified into short term, medium term and long term. Short term measures are those which entail one to two years of implementation, medium term involve three to five years and long term are those which require more than five years.

143. Consistent with the PNRPS principles of building on existing policies, programs and

structures, these anti-corruption measures must take off from existing initiatives. As embodied in the PNRPS, and as shown by the policy and institutional analysis, the Philippines has an existing framework on anti-corruption which includes laws, policies, guidelines and programs, but institutional deficiencies have stalled the effectiveness of implementation efforts. The proposed measures must therefore take stock of the existing framework and build upon and/or improve on the existing programs and initiatives that are most appropriate to REDD-plus engagements.

144. The PNRPS’ key governance thrust is to ensure national-level REDD-plus oversight and

management as well as engagement of local government units and other local actors in operationalizing REDD-Plus programs29. It identifies the establishment of a primary governance body called the National Multistakeholder REDD-Plus Council or NMRC as a crucial approach. The Climate Change Commission (CCC) with the support of the DENR Forest Management Bureau (FMB) is taking the lead in laying the groundwork for the organization of the NMRC.

145. As envisioned under the PNRPS, the NMRC will advise the Climate Change Commission

(CCC) on REDD-Plus concerns, facilitate stakeholder engagement, propose policy reform and provide oversight over the designated national authority. Existing efforts of the CCC on the organization of the NMRC include the drafting of an operations manual that clearly lays down the nature, role and responsibilities of the NMRC.

146. The CCC’s draft manual on the NMRC provides that the NMRC shall be a national government agency headed by the Climate Change Commission and attached to the Office of the President. It shall coordinate policies and programs among various government departments and agencies on matters involving the PNRPS and overall implementation of REDD-Plus in the country. In addition to the CCC, the NMRC is comprised by senior officials representing the DENR, NCIP, Department of Agriculture, Department of Education, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Finance, League of Province, League Municipalities, leaders from the indigenous peoples

29

PNRPS, December 2010



38

and federation of the Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), and non-government organizations involved in REDD-Plus.

147. Given the NMRC’s coordinative, facilitative, oversight, monitoring and policy-making

responsibilities, it will assume primary responsibility in carrying out the proposed measures to address the various corruption risks identified. As conceived, the NMRC shall form technical working groups, committees and organize expert panels to effectively carry out the strategies and activities provided under the PNRPS. Addressing corruption risks shall therefore form an important agenda of the NMRC.

148. One option is to continue the technical working groups (TWG) to implement the PNRPS

Components which were created by the DENR, through the Forest Management Bureau. The TWG on policy and governance can start the process of reviewing and deliberating on the recommended short term, medium term and long term measures and further refine these before these are acted upon by the NMRC. Another option is for the NMRC to organize a TWG that would focus on corruption risks and work with the Environmental Ombudsman, DENR Internal Audit and Anti-Corruption (IAAC) group, civil society groups such as the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability (ANSA) and Social Watch Philippines and academic institutions. In both options, it is important to identify champions from the government who can actively push for the adoption of the recommendations identified below.

Short Term 149. Preventive measures identified were mainly in the nature of research, training and policy and institutional support. 150. In the area of research, the following activities are recommended: (a) Baselining and mapping of corruption hotspots in REDD-Plus areas and the forestry sector and integrating this with the safeguard information system (SIS) and MRV registry; (b) Benchmarking anti-corruption efforts in the forestry sector based on their effectiveness; and (c) Evaluation of system of rewards and punishment, with the recommendations to be presented to the National Multistakeholder Redd-Plus Council (NMRC), the body mandated to govern the implementation of REDD-Plus and PNRPS.



39

151. In terms of training and capacity building, the following activities were recommended:

(a) Review of training programs and development of training modules on REDD-Plus, PNRPS, safeguards, governance and corruption;

(b) Conduct of training needs assessment among government personnel involved in REDD-Plus implementation; (c) Training members of the National Multi-stakeholder Redd-Plus Council (NMRC) and Provincial MRCs (PMRCs) who will be governing the implementation of REDD- Plus in the national and local levels, respectively; and

(d) Training of REDD-Plus practitioners, which would include governance bodies, DENR, local Ombudsman personnel, watchdogs, media and other REDD-Plus champions.

Besides focusing on knowledge on REDD-Plus and the attendant skills needed for its implementation, these trainings should also be orientational (values and principles) in that, among others, the participants/trainees will appreciate the role of IPs and local communities in resource management and the need for transparency and participation.

152. Under the PNRPS, the capacity building component will take charge of training needs

assessments, training designs and the conduct of trainings. 153. In the area of policy and institutional support, the following have been proposed:

(a) Setting of anti-corruption clinics which can provide technical assistance to PMRCs and REDD-Plus practitioners who seek guidance in the development, assessment and monitoring of anti-corruption strategies;

(b) Pilot testing innovative anti-corruption systems and social accountability tools; (c) Establishing an effective transparent system for data sharing and third party monitoring through the development of guidelines or protocols, training of trainers and organizing a community of national and local validators. 154. Short term, prosecutory measures were focused on the organization, advanced trainings

and technical support to a community of anti-corruption practitioners, as well as active use of the remedies provided under the new Supreme Court Rules on the Prosecution of Environmental Cases, maximizing the Green/Environmental Ombudsman and providing assistance to the filing of environmental cases.



40

Medium Term 155. Medium term measures were preventive in nature and focused on consolidating key

institutions. This involves strengthening the NMRC as the primary governance body for PNRPS implementation as well as anti-corruption enforcement bodies such as the Ombudsman and Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee/Council (IACC) under the DENR. Watchdogs and media groups focusing on anti-corruption are also included in these strengthening efforts.

156. Among the measures recommended include:

(i) Human resource development planning with focus on institutions involved in REDD-Plus implementation, such as the NMRC, DENR, NCIP and Climate Change Commission; (ii) Fully integrating anti-corruption into the Safeguards Information System (SIS) and REDD-Plus Registry which would entail the development of guidelines, protocols, and monitoring and evaluation systems;

(iii) Scaling up the organization, training and support for local anti-corruption practitioners and champions; (iv) Enhancement of third party monitoring schemes or systems; and (v) Developing best practices and innovative models for anti-corruption and social accountability for REDD-Plus implementation. Long Term 157. Similar to medium term measures, the long-term measures were preventive in nature.

These shall focus on institutionalization of anti-corruption initiatives in the implementation of the PNRPS and REDD-Plus in the Philippines. Replication of successful efforts is also to be pursued.

158. Such long-term measures involve:

(i) Promotion and integration of best anti-corruption practices and models in REDD-Plus implementation; and (ii) Establishment of award/incentive schemes for the most transparent REDD-Plus project.



41

VII. Proposed Budget

Proposed Measure

Program Activities Costs Involved

Other Details TOTAL BUDGET (ballpark figures)

Short Term: Research, Training and Policy and Institutional Support for Anti-corruption for the PNRPS

RESEARCH P2,100,000

(a) baselining and mapping of corruption hotspots and integrating with SIS and MRV registry

(i)Meetings and consultations (10 meetings), (ii)Review of literature, case studies, policies and programs, (iii)Conduct of field visits (at least 10 sites) (iv) Encoding and organizing data

transportation, food and lodging, supplies and reproduction costs, communication costs, professional fees

Food for meetings – P2,000 x 10 = P20,000 Food for FGDs/ consultations (P250/pax x 20 pax x 10 consultations) --- P50,000 Transportation P10,000 x 2 professionals x 10 vists = P200,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 2 pax x 10 vists = P20,000 Reproduction costs = P20,000 Communicati

P1,000,000



42

on costs = P20,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P600,000 Contingency = P100,000

(b) benchmarking anti-corruption efforts

(i)Meetings and consultations (10 meetings), (ii)Review of literature, case studies, policies and programs, (iii)Conduct of field visits (at least 10 sites) (iv) Encoding and organizing data


Food for meetings – P2,000 x 10 = P20,000 Food for FGDs/ consultations (P250/pax x 20 pax x 10 consultations) --- P50,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professionals x 10 vists = P100,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 10 vists = P10,000 Reproduction costs = P10,000 Communication costs = P10,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P300,000 Contingency = P50,000

P 550,000



43

(c) evaluation of system of rewards and punishment

(i) FGDs and Interviews, Meetings and consultations (10 meetings), (ii)Review of system, reports, case studies (iii)Conduct of field visits (at least 10 sites)



P 550,000

TRAINING P4,710,000

(a) review of training programs and development of training modules

(i) FGDs and Interviews, Meetings and consultations (10 meetings), (ii)Review of reports and

transportation, food and lodging, supplies and reproduction costs, communicati

Food for FGDs/ consultations (P250/pax x 20 pax x 10 consultations) --- P50,000

P 520,000



44

assessments of training programs and modules

on costs, professional fees

Transportation P10,000 x 1 professionals x 10 vists = P100,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 10 vists = P10,000 Reproduction costs = P5,000 Communication costs = P5,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P300,000 Contingency = P50,000

(b) training needs assessment

(i) FGDs and Interviews, Meetings and consultations (10 meetings), (ii) Conduct of field visits (at least 10 sites)


Food for FGDs/ consultations (P250/pax x 20 pax x 10 consultations) --- P50,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professionals x 10 vists = P100,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 10 vists = P10,000 Reproduction

P 420,000



45

costs = P5,000 Communication costs = P5,000 Professional fees –(20 person days) =P200,000 Contingency = P50,000

(c) trainings of NMRC and PMRCs

(i) Preparation of training design, (ii) engagement of trainors, (iii) groundwork and arrangements for participants, venue, travel, board and lodging, (iv) conduct of training


Estimate of P20,000 (board and lodging and materials) per person for trainings (P10,000 x 30 people) = P300,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professional x 2 trainings = P20,000 Food and lodging P2500/day x 2 days x 2 trainors pax x 2 trainings= P20,000 Venue, rental of equipment and supplies= P10,000 Communication costs = P10,000 Professional

P 600,000



46

fees –(6 person days) x P10,000/day x 2 pax =P120,000 Honorarium for other resource persons (P5,000 x 4 persons) = P20,000 Contingency = P100,000

(d) trainings of REDD-Plus practitioners and champions

(i) Preparation of training design, (ii) engagement of trainors, (iii) groundwork and arrangements for participants, venue, travel, board and lodging, (iv) conduct of training


Estimate of P20,000 (board and lodging and materials) per person for trainings (P15,000 x 50 people) = P750,000 Transportation P10,000 x 2 professionals x 2 trainings = P40,000 Food and lodging P2500/day x 4 days x 2 pax x 2 trainings= P40,000 Venue, rental of equipment and supplies= P30,000 Communication costs = P10,000

P1,210,000



47

Professional fees –(10 person days) x P10,000/day x 2 pax =P200,000 Honorarium for other resource persons (P5,000 x 4 persons x 2 trainings) = P40,000 Contingency = P100,000

(e) organization, training, and technical support to a community of anti-corruption practitioners and champions

(i) Meetings (organizing and strategizing sessions), (ii) Preparation of training design, (iii) engagement of trainors, (iv) groundwork and arrangements for participants, venue, travel, board and lodging, (v) conduct of training

transportation, food and lodging, supplies and reproduction costs, trainings costs, communication costs, professional fees

Estimate of P20,000 (board and lodging and materials) per person for trainings (P15,000 x 100 people) = P1,500,000 Transportation P10,000 x 2 professionals x 2 trainings = P40,000 Food and lodging P2500/day x 4 days x 2 pax x 2 trainings= P40,000 Venue, rental of equipment and supplies= P30,000 Communicati

P1,960,000



48

on costs = P10,000 Professional fees –(10 person days) x P10,000/day x 2 pax =P200,000 Honorarium for other resource persons (P5,000 x 4 persons x 2 trainings) = P40,000 Contingency = P100,000

POLICY and INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

P2,475,000

(a) setting of anti-corruption clinics

(i) Meetings, consultations, strategy sessions (20 activities), (ii)Review of reports and assessments of existing anti-corruption programs (iii) organizing team for anti-corruption clinics in at least 3 sites (iv) engagement of anti-corruption specialists

Transportation, food during meetings, strategy sessions and consultations, professional fees for specialists, reproduction costs, communication costs

Food for meetings – P2,000 x 20 = P40,000 Food for FGDs/ consultations (P250/pax x 20 pax x 10 consultations) --- P50,000 Transportation P10,000 x 2 professionals x 5 vists = P100,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 2 pax x 5 vists =

P1,200,000



49

P10,000 Reproduction costs = P5,000 Communication costs = P5,000 Professional fees –(50 person days) =P500,000 Contingency = P50,000

(b) pilot testing innovative anti-corruption systems and social accountability tools



Food for meetings – P2,000 x 20 = P40,000 Food for FGDs/ consultations (P250/pax x 30 pax x 10 consultations) --- P75,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professionals x 10 vists = P100,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 10 vists = P10,000 Reproduction costs = P10,000 Communication costs = P10,000 Professional fees –(30

P595,000



50

person days) =P300,000 Contingency = P50,000

(c) development of guidelines or protocols, training of trainors and organizing a community of national and local validators




P680,000

MEDIUM TERM

P2,835,000

Strengthening Anti-

(a) human resource

(i) Meetings, consultations,

Transportation, food

Food for meetings,

P470,000



51

corruption and enforcement bodies: Enhancing and scaling-up existing anti-corruption initiatives of champions

development planning (NMRC, DENR, NCIP and Climate Change Commission)

planning/strategy sessions (20 activities), (ii) Competency or capacity assessment (iii) Review of reports and previous plans

during meetings, strategy sessions and consultations, professional fees for specialists, reproduction costs, communication costs

planning/strategy sessions – P2,000 x 20 = P40,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professional x 10 sessions/meetings = P100,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 10 sessions = P10,000 Reproduction costs = P10,000 Communication costs = P10,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P300,000

(b) integration of anti-corruption into the SIS and REDD-Plus Registry (development of guidelines, protocols, and monitoring and evaluation

(i) Meetings, consultations, strategy sessions (20 activities), (ii) Development of guidelines and protocols

Transportation, food during meetings, strategy sessions and consultations, workshops with REDD-plus practitiioners, professional fees for specialists,

Food for meetings – P2,000 x 20 = P40,000 Workshop with REDD-Plus practitioners - P50,000 (food, travel) Reproduction costs = P10,000 Communicati

P410,000



52

systems)

reproduction costs, communication costs

on costs = P10,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P300,000 Contingency = P50,000

(c) scaling up the organization, training and support for local anti-corruption practitioners and champions

(i) Meetings, consultations, strategy sessions (10 activities), (ii)Review of reports and assessments of existing anti-corruption programs (iii) trainings (iv) engagement of anti-corruption specialists

Transportation, food during meetings, strategy sessions and consultations, training costs, professional fees for specialists, reproduction costs, communication costs

Food for meetings – P2,000 x 10 = P20,000 Training costs (P10,000 x 2 days x 50 people = P1,000,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professionals x 10 sessions = P100,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 10 sessions = P10,000 Reproduction costs = P10,000 Communication costs = P10,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P300,000 Contingency = P50,000

P1,500,000

(d) enhancement

(i) Meetings, consultations,

Transportation, food

Food for meetings –

P455,000



53

of third party monitoring schemes or systems

strategy sessions (20 activities), (ii) Field visits (iii) Review of reports and assessments of third party monitoring schemes

during meetings, strategy sessions and consultations, professional fees for specialists, reproduction costs, communication costs

P2,000 x 20 = P40,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professional x 5 field visits vists = P50,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 5 vists = P5,000 Reproduction costs = P5,000 Communication costs = P5,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P300,000 Contingency = P50,000

(e) developing best practices and innovative models for anti-corruption and social accountability for REDD-Plus implementation

(i) Meetings, consultations, strategy sessions (20 activities), (ii)Review of reports and assessments on best practices and innovative models


Food for meetings – P2,000 x 20 = P20,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professionals x 5 field visits = P50,000 Food and lodging P500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 5 vists = P5,000 Reproduction

P435,000



54

costs = P5,000 Communication costs = P5,000 Professional fees –(30 person days) =P300,000 Contingency = P50,000

LONG-TERM P596,000

Long-Term: Institutionalizing anti-corruption with the National REDD-Plus Implementation

(a) promotion and integration of best anti-corruption practices and models in REDD-Plus implementation

(i) meetings and consultations with NMRC, PMRCs and REDD-Plus practitioners on the promotion and integration strategy and plan (ii) reviewing REDD-Plus implementation plans


Food for meetings – P2,000 x 20 = P40,000 Transportation P10,000 x 1 professional x 2 visits = P20,000 Food and lodging P1,500/day x 2 days x 1 pax x 2 vists = P6,000 Reproduction costs = P10,000 Communication costs = P10,000 Professional fee – P200,000 (20 person days)

P286,000

(b) establishment of award/incentive schemes for the most

(i) meetings and consultations to plan possible award and incentive

Transportation, food during meetings, strategy sessions and

Food for meetings – P2,000 x 20 = P40,000 Food for FGDs/

P310,000



55

transparent REDD-Plus project

schemes (ii) setting up of committee to establish criteria for the most transparent REDD-Plus project (iii) promotion of award and incentive schemes through NMRC and PMRCs

consultations, professional fees for specialists, reproduction costs, communication costs

consultations (P250/pax x 20 pax x 10 consultations) --- P50,000 Transportation Allowance for Committee members – P2,000 x 10 = P20,000 Professional fees –(20 person days) =P200,000



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VIII. LESSONS APPLICABLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES 160. Building on the Framework and Gains of a National REDD-Plus Strategy The distinct advantage of the Philippines is its development of a country-specific national REDD-Plus Strategy called the PNRPS. The partnerships between government and civil society, as well as the processes that led to the development of the PNRPS continue to shape the Philippines’ initiatives on REDD-Plus. The multisectoral working groups established to initially implement activities under the REDD-plus Readiness Phase are initial building blocks to pursue governance strategies that would give attention to corruption risks. As mentioned earlier, given that REDD-Plus in the Philippines is still within its readiness stage, it is difficult to identify precisely which corruption risks would be applicable for REDD-Plus. However, the PNRPS, with its components and key activities, is an excellent framework through which corruption risks relevant to REDD-plus could be identified and prioritized. Future studies will be guided by this framework. 161. Combining Stocktaking with Participatory Processes The corruption-risk assessment process entailed stocktaking to get a good sense of the environment as well as the corruption challenges faced by REDD-Plus in the Philippines. Participatory processes in the form of focus group discussions, workshops, group

interviews and surveys are important tools that could facilitate the identification of corruption risks, prioritization of risks and formulation of measures to address these risks.

162. Pursuing a Clearly Defined Agenda with Champions Under this project, there was limited time and resources to meaningfully engage

identified champions in discussions with regard to response measures and planning. However, with the NMRC being organized by the CCC and with existing TWGs on PNRPS implementation still existing, there are opportunities to develop an agenda that would carry out the recommended measures identified in this report.



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ANNEX 1: EXPANDED METHODOLOGY Stocktaking and Scoping

i. The initial phase of the Corruption Risk Assessment project sought to identify general risks in the forestry sector in the Philippines vis-à-vis REDD-Plus, to ultimately facilitate a benchmarking of factors, risks and perceptions with regards to REDD-Plus corruption risks.

ii. The UN-REDD Guidance on Conducting REDD+ Corruption Risks Assessments

(REDD+CRA) released by the UN-REDD Programme in 2012, and the Analysis of Corruption in the Forestry Sector manual put together by Transparency International and National Capital Advisers, LLC in 2009, were used as guidance for the overall methodology of the project, specifically the literature review and for the conduct of stocktaking activities and consultation workshops.

iii. In order to produce a well-rounded basis for further study and consultation, a focus

group discussion attended by experts on REDD-Plus, governance and indigenous peoples’ affairs was held at the Ateneo School of Government on the 18th of September 2012.

iv. The aforementioned focused group discussion was complemented by the conduct of

Key Informant Interviews (KII’s) throughout the first phase of the project. Interviewees representing indigenous peoples organizations, along with the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Atty. Gerard A. Mosquera, who was recently designated as the new Environmental Ombudsman, and Assistant Secretary Daniel M. Nicer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources’ (DENR) Administrative Reforms and Anti-Corruption Measures Division, provided particularly relevant information that allowed the project team to view certain aspects of the findings with more depth and in the specific context of the Philippines. These key informant interviews likewise complemented key findings from workshops held during this phase of the project.

v. On the 16th and 17th of October 2012, a national consultation workshop was conducted

to present and discuss the corruption risk assessment team’s initial findings, and to gather more specific data on corruption risks in the Philippine forestry sector that could apply to REDD-Plus. Feedback on the UN-REDD Guidance document on Corruption Risk Assessment, as well as the CRA team’s Philippine Corruption Risk Assessment Methodology, was also gathered and assessed.

vi. Attended by more than fifty representatives from the government, donor partners, civil

society, indigenous peoples and the academe, the first day of the workshop yielded a number of key findings. One particularly relevant message received from the



58

participants was the view that the identification of Philippine REDD-Plus corruption risks ought to be done through the lens of the Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy. This led to the restructuring of the workshop activities for the second day, in order to accommodate the identification and discussion of more specific and PNRPS-clustered corrupt practices.

vii. During the second day, workshop participants were divided into four main working

groups. Each working group was composed of member-participants representing the government, donor organizations, civil society, indigenous peoples and the academe designated by the main facilitator on the basis of their known expertise with regard to forestry, REDD-Plus, governance or anti-corruption. Groups were then assigned specific PNRPS components, under which corresponding key activities were enumerated. This served as the basis or scope of activities for which corrupt practices and actors were to be identified.

viii. On the 20th of October 2012, a subnational workshop was conducted in Davao City,

dovetailing with the Forest Management Bureau’s REDD 101 Roadshow. Approximately fifty people attended, all of them employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources from the Visayas and Mindanao regions. More definitive data on corruption risks were gathered and assessed through the lens of the PNRPS during this workshop, based on a fine-tuned workshop methodology.

ix. The conclusion of the stocktaking and scoping activities led to the conduct of a policy

and institutional analysis, wherein underlying trends and gaps in policy and institutions relevant to corruption risks for REDD-Plus were identified. This analysis noted that despite numerous formal policies and institutions, and complementary efforts and initiatives by government offices in the Philippines, continuing challenges persist. Among those that must necessarily be addressed include weak enforcement of laws, a high tolerance of corruption and a need to strengthen existing institutions and collaborations.

x. The complete results of this analysis, which is contained in Annex 2 of this report, was

used as a reference and partial basis for the consultation processes that took place during the second phase of the corruption risk assessment project, along with the information generated from all the activities that took place during this first phase.

REDD-Plus Corruption Risk Analysis

xi. The second phase of the project was primarily concerned with the orientation of corruption risks according to the PNRPS. This involved the identification of REDD-plus-specific risks and measures from among the more general forestry-related corruption risks. These REDD-plus specific risks were then analyzed and prioritized. The second



59

phase, therefore, resulted in the determination and compilation of a prioritized list of REDD-Plus corruption risks and proposed measures.

xii. At the beginning of this prioritization process, an analysis of the corruption risks and

interventions gathered through the stocktaking workshops, KII’s and focused group discussions in the first phase took place. As workshop participants were asked to rate the risks on the basis of likelihood and impact from one to five, respectively, each risk that garnered a combined score of eight to ten was preliminarily identified as “high priority.”

xiii. These high priority risks, as well as the interventions identified by the participants, were

then subjected to validation during the focused group discussion held on the 28th of January 2013. Approximately thirty anti-corruption practitioners from both government and non-government sector were present during this FGD, which led to a discussion on how to frame the priority risks in a manner that would be easily identifiable to those working in the anti-corruption and policy sectors. A number of categories identified in a 2007 Integrity Development Review (IDR) by the DENR were introduced and proved acceptable to the participants.

xiv. To further validate the identified high priority risks, a second subnational workshop was

held on the 8th of February 2013 in Tacloban City. This workshop was targeted at REDD-Plus demonstration project practitioners, as well as representatives from a number of People’s Organizations within the region, thirty-five of whom were present.

xv. A survey was then administered online via SurveyMonkey.com from the 10th to the 17th

of February 2013, in order to facilitate the finalization of the prioritization of corruption risks. All previous workshop participants were invited to take part. Anticipating, however, that the participants in the second subnational workshop would be unable to respond online, given their limited internet access, hard copies of the survey were distributed during the workshop. Participants at the second subnational workshop were allowed to choose between an English and a Filipino version of the survey, in order to minimize the margin of error on the basis of a language barrier. Fifty-one people in all, the participants of the second subnational workshop included, completed the survey, among them government, non-government, peoples organizations and indigenous peoples representatives.

xvi. The results of the survey were presented to approximately fifty participants from the

government, donor partners, civil society, indigenous peoples and the academe during the final National Corruption Risk Assessment workshop, which took place on the 21st of February 2013. The top seven high priority risks, classified according to four IDR categories, were then analyzed and evaluated by the participants vis-à-vis the seven PNRPS components. Four breakout groups were formed, with each group being assigned specific PNRPS components, specifically (1) policy and governance, (2) MRV, (3)



60

resource utilization and management, and (4) research and development, capacity building and sustainable financing.

xvii. Participants were asked to join the groups they felt were more suited to their respective

areas of expertise, and were tasked to further elaborate on each risk by identifying specific circumstances or actions that fell within the cognizance of the priority risk (eg. specific permits, exact points during the reporting process at which fraud could occur, etc.), as well as the individuals or groups that could be involved in the perpetration of each risk. They were asked to state whether each risk had, (a) as a possible enabling condition, a policy and/or capacity gap, (b) impact on the environment and/or community, and (c) the scale of each risk, whether large or small. Each “yes” for (a) and b) merited one point, while identifying each risk as “small scale” or “large scale” merited one point and two points, respectively. Participants were then tasked to identify both preventive and prosecutory interventions for each priority risk. They were allowed to simply select interventions identified during previous workshops and discussions, but could supplement these with additional measures they felt would be similarly responsive or relevant. Measures in response to these risks were then classified along the lines of short, medium and long-term interventions.

Policy gap

Capacity gap

Environmental

impact

Community impact

scale

Measures

x x x x L

Engaging Champions

xviii. Upon the identification and categorization of high priority corruption risks and their respective interventions, it was then necessary to determine actions that could support the implementation of the proposed response measures. Identifying and engaging champions in both government and non-government sectors, for instance, such as individuals or groups of stakeholders through which policy reform or implementation could effectively begin or be coursed through, would raise both the effectiveness and immediacy of response measures.

xix. Apart from the determination of champions, a proposed budget and set of

responsibilities for the implementation or response measures were likewise identified.



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ANNEX 2: Policy and Institutional Analysis of Corruption Risks Identified Policies and institutions (see Table 1) can either support or hinder efforts to address corruption. Formal institutions can provide the structure for cooperation and community involvement in combatting corruption, and policies can establish the needed framework for such institutions. On the other hand, the absence or weakness of institutions and policies can contribute to the existence of corruption. In this context, a policy and institutional analysis in relation to the corruption risks identified is useful in highlighting complementarities, conflicts, overlaps and gaps in the institutional arrangements and organizations which support or hinder effective anti-corruption at various levels of government and within the community. The process can assist in identifying what is needed to support anti-corruption efforts, such as new regulations, new organizations and enforcement mechanisms. Table 1. Policies and institutions30

FORMAL INFORMAL

Creation/ Origin

Written legislation, administrative regulations, court decisions

Oral tradition, customs & indigenous belief systems which may not be recognized by the State

Enforcement Require exogenous enforcement by a third party organization, e.g. courts

Endogenously through mutual agreement, or by relations of power and authority between or among social actors involved

Policies and Institutions vis-à-vis Corruption Risks Identified The corrupt activities identified in the previous section are all covered under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which is a compilation of laws defining and penalizing crimes committed by public officers (Title VII, RPC). These crimes or offenses include direct bribery (Article 210); indirect bribery (Article 211); qualified bribery (Article 211-A); corruption of public officials (Article 212); frauds against the public treasury (Article 213); and malversation of public funds or property (Article 217). The Revised Penal Code forms part of the country’s legal and policy framework on anti-corruption, which also acts as a framework for transparency and accountability. The key provisions of the Revised Penal Code include the following: (i) 1987 Philippine Constitution The Constitution establishes the accountability of public officers by stating that “a public office is a public trust” and that “Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives” (Section 1, Article XI). It is also noteworthy that the Constitution provides that “the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel” (Section 15, Article XI). It further provides that the highest ranking public officials, namely, the President, Vice-President, members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for bribery and graft and corruption.

30

Adopted as reference from the CBCRM Handbook on Institutional Analysis PowerPoint presentation.



62

(ii) Key Statutes/Laws and Executive Policies31 Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960) is one, if not the most, significant anti-corruption law in the Philippines. This law specifies 11 types of corrupt practices of any public officer, and provides the corresponding penalties of imprisonment (between 6-15 years), perpetual disqualification from public office and confiscation or forfeiture of unexplained wealth in favor of the government. The law requires every public officer to file every two years detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, and includes submission of Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) every other year. Besides these enumerated acts, the law penalizes other acts or practices which may lead to the commission of graft and corruption, as well as those which do not necessarily result in damage or injury to the government (for example, merely persuading, inducing or influencing a public officer to violate the law). Private individuals can be penalized under this law, not only in cases where there is a proven conspiracy, but also when they induce a public official or employee to commit any of the prohibited acts. RA 1379 (Law on Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth) authorizes the forfeiture in favor of the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his or her salary as such public official or employee and his or her other lawful income and the income from his or her legitimately acquired property. Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) reiterates the provisions embodied in Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and gives the President the power to institute proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials and employees. This Administrative Code provides for 30 disciplinary grounds against any officer or employee of the civil service. The cases may be administrative in character, but it can serve as a monitoring scheme on bureaucratic malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.32 RA No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees of 1989) promotes a high standard of ethics among public officials and employees by requiring all government personnel to make an accurate statement of assets and liabilities and disclose net worth and financial connections. This law also requires new public officials to divest ownership in any private enterprise within 30 days from assumption of office to avoid conflict of interest. Other prohibited acts and transactions provided under this law are analogous to those enumerated under RA 3019. RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA No. 7055 (An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy over the Military) creates two avenues for trying erring members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other members subject to military laws. Ordinary courts take cognizance of crimes penalized by the Revised Penal Code and other special penal

31

Please refer to the compendium of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. 32

Cabarios, F. Corruption Control in the Criminal Justice System in the Philippines available at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No76/No76_19PA_Cabarios.pdf.

http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No76/No76_19PA_Cabarios.pdf



63

laws and local government ordinances while military courts take cognizance of service-oriented crimes only. RA No. 7080 (Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) penalizes any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth of at least seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000), through a combination of series of event criminal acts. Such public officer shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. RA No. 8249 (Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) classifies the Sandiganbayan as a special court and places it on the same level as the Court of Appeals. Other Related Laws RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) identifies the nature, powers, authority and responsibilities of local government officials. It also provides for processes that ensure people’s participation. Section 60 of the law provides for acts that can be committed by local officials, and this includes breaches of their mandates and other laws. RA 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001) defines and penalizes money laundering. RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) redefines procedures in government purchasing, and has enhanced transparency, competitiveness and public accountability in government procurement. RA 9485 (Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007) provides for a Citizen’s Charter which refers to the service standards of all government agencies in the form of information billboards, which are required to be posted at the main entrance of offices or at the most conspicuous place, and in the form of published materials written either in English, Filipino, or in the local dialect, that detail:

(a) The procedure to obtain a particular service; (b) The person/s responsible for each step; (c) The maximum time to conclude the process; (d) The document/s to be presented by the customer, if necessary; (e) The amount of fees, if necessary; and (f) The procedure for filing complaints. (Section 6, RA 9485)

During Martial Law, the following decrees were passed: 1. Presidential Decree No. 46 declares it unlawful for government personnel to receive gifts and for private persons to give gifts on any occasion including Christmas, regardless of whether the gift is for past or future favors. It also prohibits entertaining public officials and their relatives. 2. Presidential Decree No. 677 requires public officials to submit annually the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. 3. Presidential Decree No. 749 grants immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery charges if they testify against the public officials or private persons guilty of those offenses. (iii) Creation of Anti-Corruption Bodies Constitutional bodies were established to effectively implement the provisions on public accountability



64

and deal with graft and corruption. To ensure the independence of these bodies, the Constitution grants them fiscal authority and their actions are appealable only to the Supreme Court. Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) The Office of the Ombudsman plays a key role as “people’s watchdog” by investigating and acting on complaints filed against public officials and employees. The Office consists of the Ombudsman and his deputies (an overall Deputy Ombudsman, a Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, one Deputy Ombudsman each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao), and have the following key functions:

1. oversee the general and specific performance of official functions so that laws are properly administered;

2. ensure the steady and efficient delivery of public services; 3. initiate the refinement of public procedures and practices; and 4. impose administrative sanctions on erring government officials and employees, and prosecute

them for penal violations.

Civil Service Commission (CSC) As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC is mandated to establish a career service and promote moral, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It is also mandated to strengthen the merit and rewards system, human resource development, and public accountability, and has jurisdiction over administrative cases including graft and corruption brought before it on appeal. Commission on Audit (COA) As the watchdog of the government’s financial operations, the COA is empowered to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property under the custody of government agencies and instrumentalities. Its mandate includes the promulgation of accounting and auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and properties. Sandiganbayan As the country’s anti-graft court, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Its mandate includes taking charge of maintaining morality, integrity and efficiency in the public service. Other anti-corruption bodies established by the government include the following: Department of Justice (DOJ) The DOJ conducts preliminary investigations on complaints of a criminal nature against public officials that are filed with the Department, subject to the approval of the OMB if the offense investigated was committed by the public official in relation to his office. It also prosecutes these cases if the public officials involved belong to ranks lower than salary grade 27. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) The NBI and PNP conduct fact-finding investigations on graft cases. These law enforcement agencies conduct entrapment operations, issue subpoena and serve warrants of arrest issued by the courts.



65

Successful entrapment operations result in the arrest and filing of criminal complaint in courts against the perpetrators. NBI and PNP personnel involved in the conduct of investigations also serve as witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the case by the Ombudsman. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) The PCGG was created primarily to recover, and prosecute those who have, ill-gotten wealth. Its responsibilities include the adoption of safeguards to ensure that corruption shall not be repeated and the institution of measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption. Presidential Commission against Graft and Corruption, and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) Created by virtue of Executive Order 151 under then President Fidel Ramos, this Commission was tasked to investigate graft and corruption cases in the executive department. Its jurisdiction over corruption cases covers crimes involving:

1. appointees with rank of or higher than Assistant Regional Director; 2. at least one million pesos; 3. an offense that may threaten grievous harm to national interest; and 4. cases specifically assigned by the President.

Under the Arroyo Administration, another (though similar) commission was created by EO 12 in 2001- the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Several executive orders were issued supposedly to strengthen and refine the mandate of the PAGC. Its adjudicatory powers were further delineated in 2007 by EO 670-A, and its composition was amended by EO 699. Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council This council is tasked to coordinate the government’s anti-corruption efforts. It is composed of the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service Commission, the Ombudsman, the Department of Justice, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Presidential Commission against Graft and Corruption. Complementary Policies, Government Programs and Initiatives Anti-corruption has always been part of the rhetoric of every administration. Thus, other laws and policies were promulgated and programs were developed to combat corruption and establish accountability. During the first Arroyo administration, the Government Procurement Act (RA 9184) was passed to redefine procedures in government purchasing, and has enhanced transparency, competitiveness and public accountability in government procurement. One important change in the system is the establishment of the Government Electronic Procurement System or E-Procurement System. This serves as the primary source of information in all government procurement. As of June 2004, some 7,173 suppliers and 2,522 agencies, including government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs) and LGUs have registered with the System. It has resulted in increased competition among suppliers and contractors. It has also generated competitive prices and reduced procurement processing time. All these have resulted in at least 30 percent savings in the cost of government procurement. To strengthen public financial accountability, the new government accounting system (NGAS) was implemented. The NGAS aims to (a) simplify government accounting; (b) conform to international



66

accounting standards; and (c) generate periodic and relevant financial statements for better performance monitoring. The NGAS intends to address the undue complexity of the old system, which inhibits full compliance with reporting requirements, inaccurate reflection of the full cost of agency operations, which affects management decision-making and the inability of the system to allow benchmarking of costs with the private sector.33 The New Aquino Administration approved in early 2012 its Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan (GGACP) and is continuing to map out its country action plan to address key open governance and transparency issues. The plan designates government officials to focus on several major result areas, one of which is the Cabinet Cluster on Good Governance and Anti-Corruption (GGAC). The GGAC will focus on institutionalizing “open, transparent, accountable and participatory governance.” According to President Aquino, “Our administration defines accountability in two ways: as a commitment to uphold the highest ethical standards in government, and as an obligation to achieve measurable performance targets and outcomes.”34 The Aquino Administration’s GGAC Plan was developed in tandem with the domestic Open Government Partnership (OGP) process with input from civil society networks, business associations, and donor partners over the past six months, and includes the following strategic objectives - to curb corruption; to improve the delivery of public services and to enhance the business and economic environment. Three pillars of open governance—transparency, accountability, and participation—form the basis for the Plan, with each pillar encompassing action-oriented programs and representing a commitment to the Open Government Partnership (OGP) at all levels of government. An initial success has been a directive by President Aquino to the government’s cabinet ministers to pass the Freedom of Information Act, which has languished in the Congress for over a decade.35 On the level of the DENR, anti-corruption efforts were more explicit since 2003 under the leadership of former DENR secretary Elisa Gozun. The DENR has an Integrity Development Action Plan (IDAP) which had three strategies – Prevention, Education and Deterrence. This program was developed following a 2004 anti-corruption workshop organized by the Office of the President and the then Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. The DENR’s anti-corruption strategy had the following components (Figure 1):

1. Integrity Development Action Plan 2. Citizen’s Charter 3. Code of Conduct 4. Moral Recovery Action Plan

Figure 1. DENR’s Anti-Corruption Strategy36

33

NEDA. Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 2004-2010 (2004), p. 250. 34

Open Government Partnership. The Philippine Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan: A Roadmap for Implementing Good Governance Measures. Available at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/philippine-good-governance-and-anti-corruption-plan-roadmap-implementing-good-governance-measures 35

Ibid. 36

Based on DENR Asst. Secretary Daniel Nicer’s PowerPoint Presentation on DENR’s Integrity and Anti-Corruption Program (2011).

http://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/philippine-good-governance-and-anti-corruption-plan-roadmap-implementing-good-governance-measures

http://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/philippine-good-governance-and-anti-corruption-plan-roadmap-implementing-good-governance-measures



67

It is worth noting that Partnerships between civil society, media groups and government have resulted in several initiatives against corruption. Foremost among these efforts is the Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project37 (Pera Natin ‘to!), which consisted of over 100 unique reports, investigations, commentaries and backgrounders produced on transparency and accountability issues, plus 29 blogs and 46 project news reports. In addition, this project resulted in, among others:

more than 390 journalists, activists and citizens trained on budget and financial issues;

22 training workshops held across the country and 9 public roundtables;

four local pilot citizens’ watchdog and accountability groups set up and formally linking with the Department of Interior and Local Government at the latter’s request; and

dedicated educational and interactive website set up to build understanding and engagement in transparency and accountability issues.

Continuing Challenges The Arroyo Administration’s Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), particularly Chapter 21, admits that progress in anticorruption efforts was still slow, considering falling ranking of the Philippines in terms of perception of corruption. The MTPDP identified “several issues which need to be addressed in managing the fight against corruption, such as:

1. weak enforcement of anticorruption laws; 2. need to reinvigorate the anticorruption agencies and improve their coordination; 3. low social awareness and high tolerance for corruption; 4. need to institutionalize government-civil society-business collaboration; and 5. need to strengthen integrity and accountability in government-business transactions.

There is a need to strengthen earlier efforts against corruption and build a track record of success. The Aquino Government recognizes that the passage of a Freedom of Information (FOI) Act alone will not improve access to information. The administration’s GGAC Plan includes the pursuit of other initiatives to enable meaningful freedom of information, and this includes technologies that will automate the processing and public disclosure of data.

37

Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project, http://www.transparencyreporting.net.

http://www.transparencyreporting.net/



68

The DENR, the Ombudsman38 and other key institutions that deal with corruption suffer from institutional deficiencies, such as the lack of personnel and funding to actively sustain the implementation of their integrity programs. These anti-corruption laws and integrity initiatives need to be disseminated effectively to vulnerable communities and sectors. There are no clear programs focused on anti-corruption and involving vulnerable communities. The “Pera Natin ‘To” needs to be replicated in the local level, with priority given to the most vulnerable communities. Specific, localized strategies in REDD-Plus demonstration sites can be developed taking into account the lessons from such initiatives.

38

USAID/Philippines. Enhanced Governance through Anticorruption Efforts in the Philippines. Available at: http://philippines.usaid.gov/programs/democracy-governance/enhanced-governance-anticorruption-efforts-philippines.

http://philippines.usaid.gov/programs/democracy-governance/enhanced-governance-anticorruption-efforts-philippines



69

ANNEX 3: Consolidated Results from Mindanao Workshop

Corruption Risk Clusters

Policy Governance RUAM MRV R&D CB Finance

Collusion or Complicity [Sabwatan]

Collusion between government agencies and project proponents to circumvent requirements and required processes (eg. FPIC) Government agencies interpret vague and/or weak policies to receive commissions or benefit friends

Government agencies unwilling to monitor and investigate forestry projects for possible violations Negotiators for IP communities and LGUs for co-production agreements are biased to favor one party Government agencies and local officials withhold IP and local community participation in local natural resource management bodies when opposition is raised

Deception as regards field work (eg. number of days, preparation of surveys, field based investigation for FPIC, TEV claims) Private parties bribe local officials and government agencies to circumvent licensing requirements (eg. for forest land use permits; to issue private titles over forest land) Condoning forestry crimes (eg. out of pity), up to the highest level

LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans Diversion of funds Dummy NGOs/POs, misrepresentation of NGOs/POs (eg. to meet MRV needs and requirements) Manipulation of economic studies to favor specific commodities for private gain (through political pressure and complex methodologies)

Interpretation of the law favors vested interest Selection of sites for demonstration activities Government officials manipulate information to allow project proponents to circumvent processes in the issuance of permits (eg. issuance of ECC)

Bidding or approval of contracts Legitimizing the selection of certain demonstration sites



70

Fraud [Panlilinlang]

Local politicians and LGU officials bribe government auditors to misrepresent government income and expenditures

Deception as regards field work (eg. number of days, preparation of surveys, field based investigation for FPIC, TEV claims) Misinformation of survey results Recycling of documents (eg. one-time transport permits become multiple-use permits)

Deliberate misinterpretation of data to favor LGUs or investors Fraudulent resource inventories and performance reporting, including survival rates of reforestation efforts Double reporting of reforestation efforts Dummy NGOs/POs, misrepresentation of NGOs/POs (eg. to meet MRV needs and requirements) Substandard seedlings reported as standard to meet deadlines Recycling of documents (eg. one-time transport permits

Government officials manipulate information to allow project proponents to circumvent processes in the issuance of permits (eg. issuance of ECC)

Misleading claims on carbon rights



71

become multiple-use permits) Bribes provided to manipulate economic studies to favor specific commodities for private gain

Embezzlement [Tongpats; Pagnanakaw]

Politicians influence issuance of permits (eg. business, land use, resource extraction) to receive commissions Government agencies interpret vague and/or weak policies to receive commissions

Payroll-padding - ghost employees/laborers for enrichment of certain officials Overpricing of survey equipment, supplies, materials (eg. seedlings) to benefit private interests

Overpricing and underpricing of seedlings

Potential benefits to be derived from REDD-Plus activities appropriated by local politicians

Bribery [Panunuhol]

Local politicians and LGU officials bribe government auditors to misrepresent government income and expenditures

Project proponents bribe local officials and IP communities to secure favorable consent

Private parties bribe local officials and government agencies to circumvent licensing requirements (eg. for forest land use permits; to issue private titles over forest land)

POs and LGUs provide bribes to favor them in plans Recycling of documents (eg. one-time transport permits become multiple-use permits)

Interpretation of the law favors vested interest To get the approval of necessary documents by officers-in-charge



72

Recycling of documents (eg. one-time transport permits become multiple-use permits)

False measurement and inspection of reforestation efforts, types of seedlings used LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans Manipulation of economic studies to favor specific commodities for private gain

Abuse of Authority [Abuso ng kapangyarihan]

Politicians influence issuance of permits (eg. business, land use, resource extraction) as owners of businesses Pressure and interference in policy-making and implementation of ordinances

Government agencies and local officials withhold IP and local community participation in local natural resource management bodies when opposition is raised

Personal use of vehicles and office equipment

LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans Diversion of funds

Interpretation of the law favors vested interest Selection of sites for demonstration activities Government officials manipulate information to allow project proponents to circumvent processes in the issuance of permits (eg. issuance of ECC)

Improper selection of personnel to be sent for trainings (local and international travel)

Officer in charge decides on whom the projects will be awarded to Legitimizing the selection of certain demonstration sites Potential benefits to be derived from REDD-Plus activities appropriated by local politicians

Influence-peddling Politicians Paying lobby- Hiring of relatives Interpretation of Legitimizing the



73

[“Padrino”] influence issuance of permits (eg. business, land use, resource extraction) to accommodate friends Government agencies interpret vague and/or weak policies to benefit friends

groups or having close friends or padrinos lobby for approval of policies that benefit vested interests

for field activities

the law favors vested interest Selection of sites for demonstration activities Government officials manipulate information to allow project proponents to circumvent processes in the issuance of permits (eg. issuance of ECC)

selection of certain demonstration sites

Extortion [Pangingikil]

Asking for large sums of money to facilitate the approval of land titles

To get the approval of necessary documents by officers-in-charge

* Malversation of public funds, misappropriation



74

ANNEX 4: Complete Long List of Corruption Risks

Key Activities Enabling Conditions Corruption Risks [Means and Players]

Likelihood Impact Interventions Needed

Enabling Policies and Governance Enabling Policies

Establish national legislation on REDD-Plus

Engage CCC with the PNRPS

Address potential jurisdictional conflicts and/or overlaps

Clarify legal carbon ownership and tenure up front

Establish quantifiable national forestry emissions reduction targets

Develop a “menu” of legal options for REDD-Plus at the national and local levels

Establish institutional mechanisms

Review forestry sector definitions

Develop a long-term policy on Payment for Ecosystems Services (PES)


Ensure REDD-Plus social and environmental safeguards

Policies are inconsistent, weak, vague, contain numerous loopholes and are frequently amended.

Insufficient information dissemination on policies prior to implementation.

Policy makers have vested interests

Lengthy processes for the issuance of licenses and permits/ Red Tape

“Turfing” among and between government agencies

1. Interference of CSOs (i.e. Task Force Mapalad) that affects land conversion and negotiations with the DENR (form of Collusion)

2. Politicians influence the issuance of permits to accommodate friends, receive commissions or as owners of businesses

3. Manipulation, Pressure and Interference of Politicians (particularly at the LGU) in policy making and implementation (particularly for ordinances)

4. Negotiators for IP communities and LGUs for co-production agreements are biased to favor one party (Abuse of Authority)

5. Collusion between government agencies and investigating parties to circumvent requirements and required processes) (i.e.

4

5

5

3

4

3

4

4

3

3

Conduct consultations with stakeholders before the issuance of policies

Policymaking should not be rushed. Policy makers should be qualified in terms of expertise, experience and capacities.

Impose sanctions according to applicable laws (RA 3019, RA 6713)

Identify and demarcate all Ancestral Domains

Strengthen internal audit systems to deter corruption



75

Governance

Conduct broad consultations and meaningful engagement

Integrate REDD-Plus in sectoral plans

Establish equitable benefit-sharing schemes

Create a national REDD-Plus policy advocacy community

Establish national and subnational REDD-Plus coordinating agencies

between the FBI investigator and the NCIP)

6. Paying lobby groups, or having close friend or padrinos lobby for the approval of policies that benefit vested interests

7. Government agencies interpret vague or weak policies to accommodate friends or receive commissions

4

4

3

3

Resource Use, Allocation and Management Complete the delineation of

permanent forest lines

Define and delineate the protection and production forests within forestlands

Secure land tenure

Secure carbon tenure

Improve management of protection and production forests for REDD-Plus

Extend protected areas network

Enhance carbon stocks through forest restoration, regeneration and reforestation

Provide appropriate support to tenure holders to ensure improved forest management and to

Lack of moral value on the use of resources (money/time) vis-à-vis attainment of targets on FLBD

Poverty

Decadence of morality

Ignorance of the law

Personal interest over and above public interest

Strong political intervention

Manipulation of data in delineation and inventory

Inability of all CBFM POs to secure necessary paper requirements to conduct business like BIR, CDA, SEC, etc.

1) Payroll padding (ghost laborers)

2) Fraud a) Hiring of relatives

(nepotism) b) Travel allotted for 15 days

is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity

c) Personal use of vehicle not in relation to the work

d) Overpricing of survey equipment, supplies and materials

e) Overpricing of farm inputs/tools purchased for CBFM POs use

f) Using the receipt of a registered PO to facilitate purchases of farm inputs/tools of

3

3

5

3

4

3

3

3

3

5

5

4

5

4

Strengthen monitoring thru 3rd party

Mobilize account management team

Close supervision and monitoring

Encourage vigilance among external sectors in reporting malpractices (media, intelligence offices, NGO, academe)

Strengthen the system on reward and punishment

Massive IEC on REDD-Plus at all levels

Capacity building on all levels

Speedy audit report



76

decrease pressures on natural forests

Provide incentives for early REDD-Plus

Integrate population growth and in-migration into forest management

Weak enforcement/ regulatory activity to control illegal activities of forest squatters

Poverty/insurgency

Unstable policy on tenure/utilization

unregistered PO g) Cost of seedlings in the

contract is P12 but the actual cost given to PO is less than the contract cost

h) TEV claims of personnel doing NGP activity is not actually claimed based on the payroll signed by the claimant

i) Asking big amount of money from land claimant for approval of land title

3) Misinformation of survey results/map

4) Rampant/uncontrollable charcoal making in PA

3

3

3

2

4

5

5

3

2

4

Research on values

Strengthen human values

Research and Development Develop a comprehensive

R&D Program on REDD-Plus

Analyze drivers of deforestation and forest degradation

Identify conservation interventions

Enable resource valuation

Review policy to inform alignment and reforms

Establish pilot/demonstration projects on REDD-Plus

Determine realistic and appropriate benefit-sharing schemes

Policy gaps/conflicts in jurisdiction or authority

Political influence

REDD-Plus guidelines not yet in place

Many experts or R&D consulting firms

1) Collusion: Interpretation of the law favors vested interest

2) Bribery and extortion in the approval of necessary documents by officers in charge

3) Corruption risks in selection of sites for demonstration activities

5

3

5

4

4

Inclusion of REDD-Plus to the SFEM Bill

Passage of interim guidelines on REDD-Plus

Ensure there are avenues and sufficient time for providing feedback, and that this feedback is responded to



77

Identify strategies to harmonize REDD-Plus and community practices

Develop and communicate REDD-Plus baselines

Information dissemination and knowledge management of R&D

Measurable, Reportable and Verifiable (MRV) Conditions Utilize appropriate MRV

tools

Assess capacities and technologies to remotely measure changes in forest cover

Improve capacity to monitor emissions factors

Calculate emissions reference levels

Create business-as-usual and REDD-Plus projections

Assume a phased approach to carbon MRV

Establish socioeconomic and environmental impact assessments

Establish financial review procedures

Ambiguous/manipulated systems and procedures

Unclear processes, methodologies

Political interventions on policy formulation for personal gain

Overlapping policies

Old and damaged instruments

Election season

“Deep connivance” between DENR-LGU-POs)

1) Inaccurate/ fraudulent reporting a) Deliberate

misinterpretation of data to favor LGUs or investors

b) Fraudulent resource inventories and performance reporting, including survival rates of reforestation efforts

c) Double reporting of reforestation efforts

d) Bribery (eg. PO and LGUs provides bribes to favor them in plans)

e) To meet deadlines, substandard seedlings for reforestation reported as standard

2) Recycling of documents (eg. One-time transport permits become multiple use)

3) Bribery/”Tongpats”: Commission culture a) Overpricing/underpricing of

5

3

5

3

4

4

[Inaccurate/fraudulent reporting]

Independent monitoring / 3rd party reporting and investigations

Harmonize reporting systems procedures and methodologies

Values re-orientation

Strict monitoring (eg. use of plantation registries, registries in general)

Strengthen and standardize the Internal Audit Service at all levels

One-strike policy



78

seedlings b) False measurement and

inspection of reforestation efforts, types of seedlings used

c) LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans

d) Diversion of funds

4) Dummy NGOs/misrepresentation of NGOs/POs (eg. To meet MRV needs and requirements)

5) Manipulation of economic studies to favor specific commodities for private gain a) Through bribery and

political pressure, and complex methodologies

4

2

3

3


Promote REDD-Plus through information, education and communications activities (IEC)

Establish a REDD-Plus Continuing Education Mechanism

Enhance REDD-Plus learning exchanges

Strengthen REDD-Plus implementing mechanisms and

Inadequate REDD-Plus documents

1) Fraud: Misleading claims on carbon rights

2) Abuse of discretion in the selection of personnel to be sent for trainings (sp. travels abroad)

a) Improper selection of person to be capacitated

4

4

4

5

Implementation of RAT Plan

Develop criteria to select participants (maybe agreed to by MNRC?)



79

structures through organizational development, institutional strengthening and collaboration

Sustain government and non-government cooperation

Sustainable Financing

Capitalize on existing resources to initiate REDD-Plus readiness

Seek immediate donor funding for REDD-Plus readiness

Seek diverse long-term funding mechanisms

Ensure resilience within REDD-Plus

Pursue equitable and reasonable benefit-sharing among stakeholders

Explore fund management arrangements

Numerous project proposals/funded projects engaging in REDD-Plus

1) Collusion in the bidding or approval of contracts

2) Abuse of discretion with regard to whom the projects will be awarded

3) Favoritism in the selection of sites

5

4

5

3

3

3

Finalization of baseline data and standards for REDD-Plus

Creation of REDD-Plus Office of TWG at the Regional/Provincial level



80

ANNEX 5: High Priority Risks according to IDR Clusters

PNRPS COMPONENT CORRUPTION RISK (according to IDR Categories) LIKELIHOOD IMPACT TOTAL

Enabling Policies and Governance Code of Conduct

4

5

5

4

4

3

4

3

4

4

3

3

3

3

7

9

9

7

7

6

7

Enabling Policies

Establish national legislation on REDD-Plus

Engage CCC with the PNRPS

Address potential jurisdictional conflicts and/or overlaps

Clarify legal carbon ownership and tenure up front

Establish quantifiable national forestry emissions reduction targets

Develop a “menu” of legal options for REDD-Plus at the national and local levels


Review forestry sector definitions

Develop a long-term policy on Payment for Ecosystems Services (PES)


Ensure REDD-Plus social and environmental safeguards

Governance

Interference of CSOs (i.e. Task Force Mapalad) that affects land conversion and negotiations with the DENR (form of Collusion)

Politicians influence the issuance of permits to accommodate friends, receive commissions or as owners of businesses

Manipulation, Pressure and Interference of Politicians (particularly at the LGU) in policy making and implementation (particularly for ordinances)

Paying lobby groups, or having close friend or padrinos lobby for the approval of policies that benefit vested interests

Government agencies interpret vague or weak policies to accommodate friends or receive commissions

Performance Management/Service Delivery

Negotiators for IP communities and LGUs for co-production agreements are biased to favor one party (Abuse of Authority)

Collusion between government agencies and investigating parties to circumvent requirements and required processes) (i.e. between the FBI investigator and the NCIP)

Procurement Management



81

Conduct broad consultations and meaningful engagement

Integrate REDD-Plus in sectoral plans

Establish equitable benefit-sharing schemes

Create a national REDD-Plus policy advocacy community

Establish national and subnational REDD-Plus coordinating agencies

Financial Management

Resource Use, Allocation and Management

Code of Conduct

5

3 3

3 3

3

3

5

5 3

5 4

5

5

10

8 6

8 7

8

8

Complete the delineation of permanent forest lines

Define and delineate the protection and production forests within forestlands

Secure land tenure

Secure carbon tenure

Improve management of protection and production forests for REDD-Plus

Extend protected areas network

Enhance carbon stocks through forest restoration, regeneration and reforestation

Provide appropriate support to tenure holders to ensure improved forest management and to decrease pressures on natural forests

Provide incentives for early REDD-Plus

Integrate population growth and in-migration into forest management


Travel allotted for 15 days is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity

Personal use of vehicle not in relation to the work

TEV claims of personnel doing NGP activity is not actually claimed based on the payroll signed by the claimant

Misinformation of survey results/map


Overpricing of survey equipment, supplies and materials

Overpricing of farm inputs/tools purchased for CBFM POs use

Using the receipt of a registered PO to facilitate purchases of farm inputs/tools of unregistered PO

Cost of seedlings in the contract is P12 but the actual cost given to PO is less than the contract cost

Rampant/uncontrollable charcoal making in PA Financial Management

Payroll padding (ghost laborers)



82

Hiring of relatives (nepotism) 3 3

3 3

6 6

Research and Development Code of Conduct 5

3

4

4

9

7

Develop a comprehensive R&D Program on REDD-Plus

Analyze drivers of deforestation and forest degradation

Identify conservation interventions

Enable resource valuation

Review policy to inform alignment and reforms

Establish pilot/demonstration projects on REDD-Plus

Determine realistic and appropriate benefit-sharing schemes

Identify strategies to harmonize REDD-Plus and community practices

Develop and communicate REDD-Plus baselines

Information dissemination and knowledge management of R&D

Interpretation of the law favors vested interests


Bribery and extortion in the approval of necessary documents by officers in charge

Corruption risks in selection of sites for demonstration activities ((NB Ensure there are avenues and sufficient time for providing feedback, and that this feedback is responded to)



MRV Conditions Code of Conduct

Deliberate misinterpretation of data to favor LGUs or investors (under Inaccurate/ Fraudulent reporting)39

LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans (under Bribery/”Tongpats”: Commission culture)40

39 Inaccurate/Fraudulent reporting was given a collective score of 5 for likelihood, and 3 for impact 40 Bribery, “Tongpats”, Commission culture was given a collective score of 5 for likelihood and 3 for impact



83

Manipulation of economic studies to favor specific commodities for private gain (Through bribery and political pressure, and complex methodologies)

2

3

4

3

4

3

5

7

7


Fraudulent resource inventories and performance reporting, including survival rates of reforestation efforts (under Inaccurate/ Fraudulent reporting)

Double reporting of reforestation efforts (under Inaccurate/ Fraudulent reporting)

Bribery (eg. PO and LGUs provides bribes to favor them in plans) (under Inaccurate/ Fraudulent reporting)

Recycling of documents (eg. One-time transport permits become multiple use)

False measurement and inspection of reforestation efforts, types of seedlings used (under Bribery/”Tongpats”: Commission culture)

Dummy NGOs/misrepresentation of NGOs/POs (eg. To meet MRV needs and requirements)


To meet deadlines, substandard seedlings for reforestation reported as standard (under Inaccurate/ Fraudulent reporting)

Overpricing/underpricing of seedlings (under Bribery/”Tongpats”: Commission culture)


Diversion of funds (under Bribery/”Tongpats”: Commission culture)


Code of Conduct



84

Promote REDD-Plus through information, education and communications activities (IEC)

Establish a REDD-Plus Continuing Education Mechanism

Enhance REDD-Plus learning exchanges

Strengthen REDD-Plus implementing mechanisms and structures through organizational development, institutional strengthening and collaboration

Sustain government and non-government cooperation

Fraud: Misleading claims on carbon rights

4

4

4

5

8

9


Abuse of discretion in the selection of personnel to be sent for trainings (sp. travels abroad) -- Improper selection of person to be capacitated



Sustainable Financing Code of Conduct

Capitalize on existing resources to initiate REDD-Plus readiness

Seek immediate donor funding for REDD-Plus readiness

Seek diverse long-term funding mechanisms

Ensure resilience within REDD-Plus

Pursue equitable and reasonable benefit-sharing among stakeholders

Explore fund management arrangements

Abuse of discretion with regard to whom the projects will be awarded

5

4

4

3

9

7 Performance Management/Service Delivery

Collusion in the bidding or approval of contracts

Corruption risks in selection of sites for demonstration activities ((NB Ensure there are avenues and sufficient time for providing feedback, and that this feedback is responded to)





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ANNEX 6: Survey Form (English) ON-LINE SURVEY Good day! The Forest Management Bureau (FMB), together with the Ateneo School of Government (ASoG), and with support of the UN-REDD Programme, is currently conducting a Corruption Risk Assessment of REDD-Plus and the Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy (PNRPS). This project hopes to make a contribution to national efforts to reduce corruption risks in REDD-Plus programs and projects by establishing a dialogue to identify corruption risks and facilitate discussion towards appropriate actions and measures to reduce corruption risks in the implementation of the Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy. The PNRPS refers to a comprehensive document that describes, among others, the seven strategies to ensure the effective implementation of REDD-Plus in the Philippines. This survey is being undertaken to elicit responses from stakeholders who are – or will likely be – involved in the implementation of the PNRPS. The survey will not take more than fifteen minutes to accomplish, and its results will go a long way in aiding existing efforts to build good governance for effective REDD-Plus implementation in the Philippines. Thank you for your cooperation!

1. Personal Information (please check whatever is applicable) Gender: ___________ Female ____________ Male Age: ______20 to 35 _____ 36 to 50 ______ 51 to 65 _______ above 65 Work/Occupation: _______ Government ______ Business Sector _____ International Institutions/Groups _______ Non-Government Organization _____ Indigenous Peoples’ Organization ______ Non-Indigenous Peoples’ Organization Are you, or do you consider yourself, a practitioner on anti-corruption? _____ Yes _____ No (If you answered YES, please answer additional questions in the last portion of this survey.)

2. In what areas of forestry work is corruption most pervasive? Rank from 1 to 6 according

to pervasiveness, with 1 being the most pervasive and 6 being the least pervasive. ______ Enforcement ______ Reforestation



86

______ Titling and Tenure ______ Securing Community Consent ______ Permitting ______ Others: ___________________________________________________________

3. In your experience, can you identify the most serious corrupt practices that lead to deforestation and forest degradation in the following:

a. Enforcement (eg. Bribery of forest officers by illegal loggers)

b. Reforestation (eg. Overpricing of seedlings)

c. Titling and tenure

d. Securing community consent

e. Permitting

f. Others

4. According to initial research and consultations on potential corruption risks that could impact the implementation of the Philippine National REDD-Plus Strategy, the following) corrupt activities have been identified as most relevant to REDD-Plus for the Philippines.

a. Assign a LIKELIHOOD score to the following corrupt activities.

1 - no likelihood 2 – little likelihood 3 – moderate likelihood 4 – significant likelihood 5 – high likelihood

Code of Conduct ______ Politicians influence the issuance of permits to accommodate friends,

receive commissions or as owners of businesses. ______ Manipulation, pressure and interference of politicians (particularly at the

LGU) in policy-making and implementation (particularly for ordinances). ______ Interpretation of the law favors vested interests ______ Misleading or fraudulent claims on carbon rights ______ Abuse of discretion with regard to whom the projects will be awarded ______ LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans Implementors of REDD-Plus activities offer bribes to overlook fraudulent

reporting on reforestation and similar forest-related activities



87

Performance Management/Service Delivery Travel allotted for 15 days is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity ______ Personal use of vehicle/s and other equipment not in relation to the

work Implementors of REDD-Plus activities fraudulently double report

reforestation efforts Implementation of REDD-Plus activities produce fraudulent resource

inventories and performance reporting, including survival rates of reforestation efforts

_______ Manipulation of carbon and non-carbon reporting ________Favoritism in the resolution of grievances and conflicts involving REDD-

Plus programs and projects ________ Abuse of discretion in the selection of personnel to be sent for trainings (sp. travels abroad) -- Improper selection of person to be capacitated Financial Management ________ Diversion of funds

Procurement Management ______ Overpricing of equipment, supplies and materials (including survey

materials, seedlings, and other equipment) ______ Collusion (of politicians, investors and REDD-plus implementors) in the bidding or approval of contracts

______ Using the receipt of a registered PO to facilitate purchases of farm

inputs/tools of unregistered PO

Others: ___________________________________________________________

b. Among the following actors, rank which are most LIKELY to commit corrupt activities in relation to REDD-Plus. 1 - no likelihood 2 – little likelihood 3 – moderate likelihood 4 – significant likelihood 5 – high likelihood ______ National government personnel ______ Local government personnel ______ Politicians (Senators, Congressmen, Local Officials) ______ Law enforcement officials/Police



88

______ People’s Organizations ______ Indigenous Peoples Groups ______ Non-Government Organizations ______ Private Sector ______ Others: ___________________________________________________________ Cite specific actors:

c. Assign an IMPACT score to the following corrupt activities. The impact can be

economic (for example loss of revenues for local and indigenous communities), social (for example undermined trust, weakened governance), or environmental (for example loss of efficiency in reducing emissions, loss of biodiversity) – please specify or elaborate on the actions in the space provided.

1 - no impact 2 - little impact 3 - moderate impact 4 - significant impact 5 - high impact




reporting on reforestation and similar forest-related activities Performance Management/Service Delivery Travel allotted for 15 days is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity ______ Personal use of vehicle/s and other equipment not in relation to the


reforestation efforts



89

Implementation of REDD-Plus activities produce fraudulent resource inventories and performance reporting, including survival rates of reforestation efforts

_______ Manipulation of carbon and non-carbon reporting _______Favoritism in the resolution of grievances and conflicts involving REDD-




______ Using the receipt of a registered PO to facilitate purchases of farm

inputs/tools of unregistered PO ______ Others: ___________________________________________________________

5. Why do you think these corrupt practices happen frequently? Please CHECK the top 3.

______ Weak policy (i.e. defectiveness, absence of or inappropriateness of laws or policies)

______ Lack of capacity for implementation of laws and regulations to prevent and control corruption ______Lack of capacity for enforcement and punishment of corruption ______ Lack of funding for implementation of laws and regulations to prevent and

control corruption ______ Lack of funding for enforcement and punishment of corruption ______ Accepted culture (there is tolerance or acceptance of corruption) ______Lack of awareness of what constitutes a corrupt action ______Lack of available information to allow proper monitoring ______Absence or lack of effective protection for whistleblowers ______ Others: ___________________________________________________________

6. Based on your answers in questions 4 a and b, what do you feel is the most critical corrupt activity government efforts should focus on? Please check no more than 3.



90




reporting on reforestation and similar forest-related activities Performance Management/Service Delivery Travel allotted for 15 days is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity ______ Personal use of vehicle/s and other equipment not in relation to the


reforestation efforts Implementation of REDD-Plus activities produce fraudulent resource

inventories and performance reporting, including survival rates of reforestation efforts

_______ Manipulation of carbon and non-carbon reporting ________Favoritism in the resolution of grievances and conflicts involving REDD-




______ Using the receipt of a registered PO to facilitate purchases of farm inputs/tools of unregistered PO

______ Others: ___________________________________________________________



91

7. Which 5 interventions among the following would be most effective in preventing corruption?

Preventive Interventions _____Improve consultation process especially before the issuance of policies _____Passage of interim guidelines on REDD‐Plus _____Creation of REDD‐Plus Office and TWG at the Regional/Provincial level _____Strengthen and standardize the Internal Audit Service at all levels to

ensure speedy and actionable audit processes _____Mobilize account management teams _____Ensure there are avenues and sufficient time for providing feedback, and

that feedback is responded to _____Implementation of Employee Rationalization Plan to ensure that the

proper employees are the ones sent to be capacitated _____Encourage vigilance among external sectors in reporting malpractices

(media, intelligence offices, NGO, academe) _____ Massive information, education and communication campaigns on REDD-

Plus at all levels, with particular focus on good governance and operations _____ Values re-orientation _____Ensure independent monitoring/3rd party reporting and investigations _____ Harmonize reporting systems procedures and methodologies _____Finalization of baseline data and standards for REDD‐Plus

Strict monitoring of activities (e.g. use of plantation registries) _____ Establish or strengthen a system of rewards and incentives _____ Establish or strengthen a grievance mechanism Prosecutory Interventions

Establish a “one-strike policy” Impose and enforce appropriate sanctions according to applicable laws

(RA 3019, RA 6713) _____ Strengthen the system on reward and punishment _____ Strengthen prosecutory processes _____ Enact a Whistleblower Law _____ Strengthen or establish a Witness Protection Program _____ Streamline prosecutory processes _____ Speedy prosecution of cases

8. Can you suggest other interventions that have not been mentioned? Please try to be as

specific as possible in suggesting who should do what towards what projected result. ___________________________________________________________________________



92

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION PRACTITIONERS 1. In the Philippines, are you aware of any effective laws, policies, programs and/or

institutions that reduce the likelihood and impact of corrupt activities with that will affect REDD-Plus in the Philippines?

______ Yes ______ No

a. If YES, which among these laws, policies or programs do you think are the most relevant? Please check five (5). ______ Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (Republic Act 3019) ______ Law on Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth (Republic Act 1379) ______ Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees

of 1989 (Republic Act 6713) ______ Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act 6770) ______ Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder (Republic Act 7080) ______ Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (Republic Act 9160) ______ Government Procurement Act (Republic Act 9184) ______ Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007 (Republic Act 9485) ______ Presidential Decree 46 (declaring it unlawful for government personnel

to receive gifts and for private persons to give gifts on any occasion including Christmas, regardless of whether the gift is for past or future favors. It also prohibits entertaining public officials and their relatives)

______ Presidential Decree 749 (granting immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery charges if they testify against the public officials or private persons guilty of those offenses)

______ Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan (GGACP) of 2012 ____________ Others: ________________________________________

b. If YES, which among these institutions do you think are the most relevant?

Please check five (5). ______ Office of the Ombudsman ______ Civil Service Commission ______ Commission on Audit ______ Sandiganbayan ______ Department of Justice ______ National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police ______ Presidential Commission on Good Government ______ Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption and the

Presidential Anti-Graft Commission ______ Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council



93

ANNEX 7: Consolidated Copy of the Survey Results

REDD-Plus Corruption Risk Assessment in the Philippines

1. Gender

Answer Options Response Percent Response Count

Female 47.1% 24

Male 52.9% 27

answered question 51

skipped question 0

2. Age


20 to 35 14.0% 7

36 to 50 42.0% 21

51 to 65 38.0% 19

above 65 6.0% 3


skipped question 1

3. Work/Occupation


Government 51.0% 26

Business Sector 7.8% 4

International Institutions/Groups

13.7% 7

Non-Government Organization

21.6% 11

Indigenous Peoples’ Organization

5.9% 3


skipped question 0



94

4. Are you, or do you consider yourself, a practitioner on anti-corruption?


Yes 78.4% 40

No 21.6% 11


skipped question 0

5. In the Philippines, are you aware of any effective laws, policies, programs and/or institutions that reduce the likelihood and impact of corrupt activities with that will affect REDD-Plus in the Philippines?


Yes 79.5% 31

No 20.5% 8


skipped question 12

6. Which among these laws, policies or programs do you think are the most relevant? Please check five (5)


Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (Republic Act 3019)

80.6% 25

Law on Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth (Republic Act 1379)

16.1% 5

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees of 1989 (Republic Act 6713)

74.2% 23

Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act 6770)

67.7% 21

Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder (Republic Act 7080)

29.0% 9

Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (Republic Act

25.8% 8



95

9160)

Government Procurement Act (Republic Act 9184)

58.1% 18

Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007 (Republic Act 9485)

29.0% 9

Presidential Decree 46 (declaring it unlawful for government personnel to receive gifts and for private persons to give gifts on any occasion including Christmas, regardless of whether the gift is for past or future favors. It also prohibits entertaining public officials and their relatives)

38.7% 12

Presidential Decree 749 (granting immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery charges if they testify against the public officials or private persons guilty of those offenses)

12.9% 4

Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan (GGACP) of 2012

32.3% 10

Other (please specify) 0


skipped question 20



96

7. Which among these institutions do you think are the most relevant? Please check five (5)

Answer Options Response Percent

Response Count

Office of the Ombudsman 92.3% 24

Civil Service Commission 69.2% 18

Commission on Audit 92.3% 24

Sandiganbayan 42.3% 11

Department of Justice 53.8% 14

National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police

46.2% 12

Presidential Commission on Good Government 11.5% 3

Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission

50.0% 13

Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council 38.5% 10


skipped question 25

8. In what areas of forestry work is corruption most pervasive? Rank from 1 to 5 according to pervasiveness, with 1 being the most pervasive and 5 being the least pervasive.

Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 Rating

Average Response Count

Enforcement 11 11 2 7 7 3.32 38

Reforestation 9 9 6 9 5 3.21 38

Titling and Tenure 4 6 13 11 3 2.92 37

Securing Community Consent 2 4 5 6 20 1.97 37

Permitting 12 9 12 3 2 3.68 38

Other (please specify) 5


skipped question 11



97

Number Other (please specify) Categories

1 pag iinspeksyon sa mga iba't ibang uri ng mga proyekto

2 pag may report mga illegal hinde maakyat sa taas

3 illegal logging, charcoal making

4 Inspection for survey validation of project

5 PO's

9. In your experience, can you identify the most serious corrupt practices that lead to deforestation and forest degradation in the following:


Enforcement (eg. Bribery of forest officers by illegal loggers)

81.1% 30

Reforestation (eg. Overpricing of seedlings)

73.0% 27

Titling and tenure 67.6% 25

Securing community consent 56.8% 21

Permitting 67.6% 25

Others 27.0% 10


skipped question 14



98

Number Enforcement (eg. Bribery of forest officers by illegal

loggers)

Reforestation (eg. Overpricing of

seedlings)

Titling and tenure Securing community consent

Permitting Others

1 ang mga forest officers mismo ang pumupunta sa area na pinagpuputulan ng kahoy at doon na magkakaroon ng transaksyon at pinapalusot ang mga kahoy

May mga taong nasa mga agency ng gobyerno na humihingi ng proyekto sa reforestation project at hindi tama ang social mobilization na binibigay

2 pag may report na illegal fish fund wa;ang malinaw sa amin isp P.O. nag babantay ng environmentprotecta walng action supa sa PO ang opesina sa amin esip CBFMA holder, sana mabigyan naman pansin ang bawat PO kung mayron report mga PO case pronttainer ng mga illegal activities ng

3 ilegal kaingin, ilegal mining

4 Hindin mahigpit ang DENR sa batas tungkol pag- illegal ex. cutting trees

5 hindi mahigoit ang batas sa pagkakaingin



99

6 (jog) paglolko sa PUMD especially from one project to other project

7 ang reforestation maging ng ugali

8 Intervention of politicians and influence from higher boss within the office

Procurement of planting materials and bidding

using power of politicians to acquire the consent of comm

no approval of permits without giving/asking monetary values to secure that permit

9 Connivance of forest officers

Awarding of contracts to friends

Bribery exist entitling just so titles be given, Sometimes because close relationship say relatives of head of office or close friends

In my observation and experience there's no or less corruption

people asking for a permit sometimes if not always give bribe to forest officers

10 underpricing slow process

11 seedling production

12 over pricing of seedling matagal ang pag hintay ng permit lalo na ang paggawa ng mapa proposed BCFM area at mapa ng agro foresetry

13 pnp officers / law enforcement agency

titles issued at timberland double issuing of titles by DENR's DAR

14 Delay of issuance of permit

15 political intervention, connivance with illegal loggers ang other law enforcers

untruthful reporting of area planted vis-avis actual plantation target, inadequate monitoring of refo activities in site

some tenured areas are awarded in consideration of vested interest of politicians

delayed/uncooperative community NGus until their request as bargain is also granted

some permits were issued intentionally giving favor change to recycle or re-use more than what was granted

inspection or verification of private tree plantation purportedly done for consideration



100

16 "palusot system" illegal loggers tend to bribe law enforcement officers in order not to have illegal forest products seized

Innaccurate are planted yet paid in full(e.g. target is 100 hectares yet the contractor only accomplished 50 hectares but paid in full

issuance of tenurial instrument only to close friends in exchange of some amount

Bribe the concerned personnel to get his/her consent

Some employee asks an amount to facilitate the processing of their permit

17 minimal budget especially in the hauling of confiscated forest products

acceptance of low quality seedlings and bloated quantity ( # of seedling in short vs the quantity based on the contract)

awarding of tenurial instrument (CBFMA) even if the requirement is lacking

Bribing LGU (Barangay, municipal) in setting the required clearance

awarding a permit evein if there is no trees (ex. Private tree plantation)

In the private tree plantation because issued it appears that there number of trees but in reality not enough trees in the area

18 Rampant in the locality, some military personnel were even aprrehended being the business

Not prevalent, as the CENRO in locality is strict in implementing the NGPprogram of the gov't

As to my observation based on cases of multiple titling and issuances of permitsor leases there are unfiled cases

19 complacency and connivance of forest officers by illegal loggers

packagingof title with considerable amount of money from the applicant

Red tape

20 ang mga forest officers mismo ang pumunta sa area ng pinagpuputulan ng kahoy at doon na nagkakaroon ng transaction

may mga taong nasa agency ng gobyerno(denr) na humihinging 12% sa refo, proj, at insakto ang social mobilization na binibigay sa mga tenures na area cbfm

packaging ang ginagawa from surveying to titling

Bago mabigyan ng permit may padulas muna hangang for every bo/rt ay may share and permitter

21 political intervention, lack of manpower

none none none red tape none



101

22 Release of confiscated lumber if there is money, Connivance of forest officer with illegal loggers

Dummy of DENR personnel in contracting the seedling production, asking certain percentage of the total budget of seedling production to private organizations

asking money from the applicant before the title be released, Fake Title

asking money from the person before the permit is approved

travel of personnel tat home, number of travel time is very long yet it can be accomplished in shorter duration

23 formation of company sponsored indigenous peoples organizations to guarantee favorable FPIC

24 bribery at checkpoints, no reforestation at all, over reporting of achievements, people's organizations are not paid justly, procurement of seedlings questionable

illegal titling in forest lands; lack resources for ground survey hence overlapping with forest

bribery and manipulations even violence to get consent; unclear project impacts( not so informed on the impacts)

prone to patronage politics, lack of monitoring to see violations

25 Bribery Non-performance Bribery Influence peddling Bribery

26 Bribery to forest officers especially on check points

Political interventions in awarding contracts to supposed/intended beneficiaries of the NGP Program

Collecting fees that do not conform with the government policies

Political interventions Connivance of government employees with applicant therefore securing/asking payments of services

Political interventions play a lot in all government transactions

27 ommission in reports or under-reporting of commission of crimes

overestimation of number of seedlings and other planting inputs

conversion of public lands into AD titled lands

bribery of community stakeholders in favor of getting consent

fixers abound who can bypass the legal procedures to get official permits

bribery of highly placed local officials

28 bribery of forest officers

overpricing dont know bribery forging, bribery



102

29 frequent very frqquent also in the course of the NGP

dont know no experience very frequent source of corruption

30 collusion of enforcement officers (forest officers, PNP, military) with illegal loggers

overpricing of seedlings; Community organizations/assn. used as dummy contractors in seedling production

inaccurate data and information that leads to the conversion of forestlands into A&D

bribery to community members to give their consent on mining projects

bribery to facilitate the processing of application for permits

31 bribery NA NA NA NA NA

32 same as example same as example interpretation of policies in support of certain sectors or actors

"purchasing" community consent

bribery in issuance of permits

n/a

33 bribery of officials and forest officers

overpricing of seedlings bribery of those incharge of titling

forming a PO to secure the consent

bribery

34 bribery anomalous procurement

fixers political interference fixers

35 bribery to look the other way

overstating actual number of seedlings planted

dubious titling or awarding of tenure

bribing chieftain to secure consent even without community consultation

bribery to obtain a permit

36 Briber; Head officers Overpricing of seedlings, allocating seedlings to other personal purposes

Land grabbing; Awarding of land titles to the wrong person;

False promises; Non-participatory

Bribery

37 none none DENR employee demanding bribe from the applicant in exchange for the processing and issuance of land title

none none



103

10. Code of Conduct

Answer Options no likelihood little likelihood moderate likelihood

significant likelihood

high likelihood Rating

Average Response

Count

Politicians influence the issuance of permits to accommodate friends, receive commissions or as owners of businesses.

4 5 2 11 17 2.18 39

Manipulation, pressure and interference of politicians (particularly at the LGU) in policy-making and implementation (particularly for ordinances).

4 1 10 12 11 2.34 38

Interpretation of the law favors vested interests

2 7 13 6 10 2.61 38

Misleading or fraudulent claims on carbon rights

4 10 10 6 6 3.00 36

Abuse of discretion with regard to whom the projects will be awarded

4 8 9 13 3 2.92 37

LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans

4 4 12 6 13 2.49 39

Implementors of REDD-Plus activities offer bribes to overlook fraudulent reporting on reforestation and similar forest-related activities

6 3 5 6 4 3.04 24


skipped question 10



104

11. Performance Management/Service Delivery




Average Response

Count

Travel allotted for 15 days is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity

3 2 8 7 8 2.46 28

Personal use of vehicle/s and other equipment not in relation to the work

5 5 10 10 6 2.81 36

Implementors of REDD-Plus activities fraudulently double report reforestation efforts

5 7 6 3 4 3.24 25


5 7 5 4 5 3.12 26

Manipulation of carbon and non-carbon reporting

8 9 10 5 5 3.27 37

Favoritism in the resolution of grievances and conflicts involving REDD-Plus programs and projects

4 12 11 8 2 3.22 37


4 7 8 10 8 2.70 37


skipped question 12



105

12. Financial Management




Average Response

Count

Diversion of funds 4 9 7 8 8 2.81 36


skipped question 15

13. Procurement Management




Average Response

Count

Overpricing of equipment, supplies and materials (including survey materials, seedlings, and other equipment)

5 7 6 10 10 2.66 38

Collusion (of politicians, investors and REDD-plus implementors) in the bidding or approval of contracts

3 5 8 13 6 2.60 35


2 11 9 7 6 2.89 35


skipped question 13

14. Are there any other corrupt activities not listed above that are relevant to REDD-Plus for the Philippines?

Answer Options

Response Count

6

answered question 6 skipped question 45

Number Response Text



106

15. Code of Conduct

Answer Options no

impact little

impact moderate

impact significant

impact high

impact Rating

Average Response

Count


4 7 5 8 16 2.38 40

Please specify/elaborate on the action (optional) 2


3 5 9 10 13 2.38 40


Interpretation of the law favors vested interests 4 7 10 10 9 2.68 40


Misleading or fraudulent claims on carbon rights 6 6 9 11 8 2.78 40


Abuse of discretion with regard to whom the projects will be awarded 4 4 9 14 8 2.54 39


LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans 4 6 6 12 11 2.49 39


Implementors of REDD-Plus activities offer bribes to overlook fraudulent reporting on reforestation and similar forest-related activities

5 3 3 6 6 2.78 23



skipped question 11

1 PO did not receive money in seedling production 2 Influence peddling

3 none

4 Using the name of community associations as dummy contractors of reforestation/REDD plus projects

5 none

6 none in mind



107

16. Performance Management/Service Delivery

Answer Options no

impact little

impact moderate

impact significant

impact high

impact Rating

Average Response

Count

Travel allotted for 15 days is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity 4 6 7 6 8 2.74 31

Personal use of vehicle/s and other equipment not in relation to the work 3 10 9 7 8 2.81 37

Implementors of REDD-Plus activities fraudulently double report reforestation efforts

5 5 0 4 11 2.56 25


6 6 2 5 10 2.76 29

Manipulation of carbon and non-carbon reporting 7 9 5 6 10 2.92 37

Favoritism in the resolution of grievances and conflicts involving REDD-Plus programs and projects

4 8 10 9 5 2.92 36


5 7 12 6 6 2.97 36



skipped question 13

17. Financial Management

Answer Options no

impact little

impact moderate

impact significant

impact high

impact Rating

Average Response

Count

Diversion of funds 6 9 2 5 15 2.62 37


skipped question 14



108

18. Procurement Management

Answer Options no

impact little

impact moderate

impact significant

impact high

impact Rating

Average Response

Count

Overpricing of equipment, supplies and materials (including survey materials, seedlings, and other equipment)

2 7 4 10 14 2.27 37

Collusion (of politicians, investors and REDD-plus implementors) in the bidding or approval of contracts

3 6 9 7 12 2.49 37


3 14 5 8 7 2.95 37



skipped question 13

19. Aside from the aforementioned corrupt activities, are the any other activities you want to add? Please specify or elaborate on the action/s.

Answer Options Response Count

4

answered question 4

skipped question 47

20. Why do you think these corrupt practices happen frequently? Please check the TOP three (3).

Answer Options Response Percent

Response Count

Weak policy (i.e. defectiveness, absence of or inappropriateness of laws or policies)

31.8% 14

Lack of capacity for implementation of laws and regulations to prevent and control corruption

56.8% 25

Lack of capacity for enforcement and punishment of corruption 45.5% 20 Lack of funding for implementation of laws and regulations to prevent and control corruption

31.8% 14

Lack of funding for enforcement and punishment of corruption 29.5% 13 Accepted culture (there is tolerance or acceptance of corruption)

38.6% 17

Lack of awareness of what constitutes a corrupt action 15.9% 7 Lack of available information to allow proper monitoring 20.5% 9 Absence or lack of effective protection for whistleblowers 34.1% 15 Others (please specify) 6




109

21. What do you feel is the most critical corrupt activity government efforts should focus on? Please check no more than 3.



62.8% 27


46.5% 20

Interpretation of the law favors vested interests 32.6% 14 Misleading or fraudulent claims on carbon rights 18.6% 8 Abuse of discretion with regard to whom the projects will be awarded 39.5% 17 LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans 60.5% 26 Implementors of REDD-Plus activities offer bribes to overlook fraudulent reporting on reforestation and similar forest-related activities

14.0% 6

Travel allotted for 15 days is actually completed in 5 days’ survey activity 23.3% 10 Personal use of vehicle/s and other equipment not in relation to the work 39.5% 17 Implementors of REDD-Plus activities fraudulently double report reforestation efforts 11.6% 5 Implementation of REDD-Plus activities produce fraudulent resource inventories and performance reporting, including survival rates of reforestation efforts

25.6% 11

Manipulation of carbon and non-carbon reporting 25.6% 11 Favoritism in the resolution of grievances and conflicts involving REDD-Plus programs and projects 44.2% 19 Abuse of discretion in the selection of personnel to be sent for trainings (sp. travels abroad) -- Improper selection of person to be capacitated

44.2% 19

Diversion of funds 32.6% 14 Overpricing of equipment, supplies and materials (including survey materials, seedlings, and other equipment)

34.9% 15

Collusion (of politicians, investors and REDD-plus implementors) in the bidding or approval of contracts 27.9% 12 Using the receipt of a registered PO to facilitate purchases of farm inputs/tools of unregistered PO 20.9% 9 Other (please specify) 2




110

22. Which 5 interventions among the following would be most effective in preventing corruption?


Preventive Interventions: Improve consultation process especially before the issuance of policies 53.5% 23 Preventive Interventions: Passage of interim guidelines on REDD‐Plus 18.6% 8 Preventive Interventions: Creation of REDD‐Plus Office and TWG at the Regional/Provincial level 37.2% 16 Preventive Interventions: Strengthen and standardize the Internal Audit Service at all levels to ensure speedy and actionable audit processes

67.4% 29

Preventive Interventions: Mobilize account management teams 14.0% 6 Preventive Interventions: Ensure there are avenues and sufficient time for providing feedback, and that feedback is responded to

16.3% 7

Preventive Interventions: Implementation of Employee Rationalization Plan to ensure that the proper employees are the ones sent to be capacitated

18.6% 8

Preventive Interventions: Encourage vigilance among external sectors in reporting malpractices (media, intelligence offices, NGO, academe)

32.6% 14

Preventive Interventions: Massive information, education and communication campaigns on REDD-Plus at all levels, with particular focus on good governance and operations

53.5% 23

Preventive Interventions: Values re-orientation 23.3% 10 Preventive Interventions: Ensure independent monitoring/3rd party reporting and investigations 37.2% 16 Preventive Interventions: Harmonize reporting systems procedures and methodologies 14.0% 6 Preventive Interventions: Finalization of baseline data and standards for REDD‐Plus 16.3% 7 Preventive Interventions: Strict monitoring of activities (e.g. use of plantation registries) 27.9% 12 Preventive Interventions: Establish or strengthen a system of rewards and incentives 20.9% 9 Preventive Interventions: Establish or strengthen a grievance mechanism 20.9% 9 Prosecutory Interventions: Establish a “one-strike policy” 25.6% 11 Prosecutory Interventions: Impose and enforce appropriate sanctions according to applicable laws (RA 3019, RA 6713) 55.8% 24 Prosecutory Interventions: Strengthen the system on reward and punishment 37.2% 16 Prosecutory Interventions: Strengthen prosecutory processes 32.6% 14 Prosecutory Interventions: Enact a Whistleblower Law 16.3% 7 Prosecutory Interventions: Strengthen or establish a Witness Protection Program 20.9% 9 Prosecutory Interventions: Streamline prosecutory processes 16.3% 7 Prosecutory Interventions: Speedy prosecution of cases 27.9% 12




111

23. Can you suggest other interventions that have not been mentioned? Please try to be as specific as possible in suggesting who should do what towards what projected result.

Answer Options Response Count

7

answered question 7

skipped question 44

Number Response Text

1 to penalized under aged from theft of forest product of national resources

2 -

3 Ensure that there is a judiciary office and prosecution panel in areas where there are no such service nearby

4 Ensure a clear and equitable benefit sharing scheme among players

5 none 6 none 7 Development of an effective Monitoring and Evaluation tool of implementing agencies



112

ANNEX 8: Proposed Interventions

MRV/INVENTORY WHAT WHO POLICY

GAP CAPACIT

Y GAP ENVI

IMPACT CMTY

IMPACT SCALE RESULTS INTERVENTIONS

PREVENTIVE PROSECUTORY

Code of Conduct

Politicians influence the issuance of

permits

Undue influence in obtaining

consent of IPS

IP leaders/com

munity leaders

x x x x L 6 National level coordination

Administrative case for

grave misconduct;

File complaint

for VRA 6713; File complaint VRA 3019

Demands/conditions in order to

alllow inventory process (non-IP

areas)

Politicians

LGUs allow illegal

permits, contracts and

plans

Conditions for land use

Private investors/ national

government agencies/

local politicians

X x x x L 6


Misuse of official

resources

Verification (tipid sa expense per-

diem)

Concerned government

agencies x x x L 5



113

Fraudulent Reporting

No. of trees, species, carbon from baseline to implementation Community

level RTD, CENRO, PENRO

x x x x L 6

Ensure independent

monitoring/3rd party

monitoring; Ensure vigilance among external

sector in reporting

malpractices; Massive IEC

campaign at all levels

Fraudulent

reports (financial and performance)

Leakage/additionality (REDDABLE or

not)


Overpricing

Overpricing of equipments for

monitoring BAC and pre-

BAC x x x x L 6

Overpriced consultants

Collusion in bidding or

approval of contracts

Non observance of provisions of RA

9184

BAC and pre-BAC

x x x L 5


Diversion of Funds



114

SUSTAINABLE FINANCE, R&D; CAPACITY BUILDING AND

COMMUNICATION

WHAT WHO POLICY

GAP CAPACIT

Y GAP ENVI

IMPACT CMTY

IMPACT SCALE RESULTS

INTERVENTIONS


Code of Conduct

Politicians influence the issuance of

permits

social acceptability

(esp FPIC) cuts across

Local communities

/ LGUs/NCIP/

other NGAs/CSOs/

Pos

x x x 2 5

IEC on forest use laws for local communities (short term)

Training and capacity building of

communities on their rights (short

term)

LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts

and plans

Approval of plans and

contracts not transparent

(CLUP, ADSDPP)

LGUs x x x x 2 6

Training and IEC on technical matters for govt officials

Appreciation and awareness on IP

rights, transparency and

participation

Performance Management/

Service Delivery

Misuse of official resources

Resources alloted for people's

participation are not

enough/inadequate




115


Overpricing

Overpricing of supplies & materials, equipment

and infrastructure;

BAC, suppliers

x x x 2 5

Overpriced researcg contracts

Collusion in bidding or

approval of contracts

Favoring research

contractors who will give

preferred data (biased)

LGUs, NGAs, senate (EIA

process)


Diversion of Funds

Lack of funds for community empowerment

LGUs, IP communities

, local communities

x x x x 2 6

Data sharing for transparency

Enforce sanctions or pernalties

according to applicable laws (short

term/continue efforts)

Absence of benefit

sharing for carbon credits

Local communities, NGAs, LGUs and private

sector

x x x x 2 6

LEGEND Sustainable

Finance

Capacity Building

R&D



116

Governance/Policy WHAT WHO POLICY

GAP CAPACITY GAP

ENVI IMPACT

CMTY IMPACT

SCALE RESULTS INTERVENTIONS


Code of Conduct

Politicians influence the issuance of permits

Mining/ Quarrying permits within protected areas

Military, judges, barangay officials, mayor, governor congressman, senator, politicians and LGU heads

Gray areas and internal procedures

x x x L 5

Assistance in evidence collection; Strict enforcement of laws; Streamlining and automatic approval of govt permits after lapse; Greater transparency in bidding, procurement, licensing and permitting; Enorcement of ARTA law

Maximize green courts, Writ of Kalikasan and Green Ombudsman; Assistance in the filng of charges and complaints

Permit to operate and certificate of non-coverage

FPIC

Energy coal permit

Overruling of accurate report

Carbon rights agreement

Crafting of policy guidelines

Private sector bribes has corrupting effect

CBFMA and ITPLA

Hydro project

SEP clearance

ECC



117

Forest products gathering

Tenurial instruments and permits

Business permits

Tree cutting permit

LGUs promulgate ordinances contradicting national law (circumventing)

SLUP, SAPA/SUP, FLAGT

LGUs allow illegal permits, contracts and plans

Local leaders, mgt bodies,counci of elders may accept bribes/be prone to corruption influence

Mayor, Governor, SB

Especially admin issuances

x x x L 6

Assistance in evidence collection; Consistency in national and local policies; Clear procedures (manuals in issuance of licesnses, permits, etc); IEC; Institutionalize multi stakeholder consultation and MS bodies especially in poicy making,

Maximize green courts, Writ of Kalikasan and Green Ombudsman

LGU acceptance through SB resolution adopting bio-diesel investment without public hearing;

LGUs promulgate ordinances contradicting national law (circumventing)

Business permits



118

etc; Harmonization of local, subnational and national plans; Strengthen due diligence and supervisory role of SBs

Performance

Management/Service Delivery

Misuse of official resources

Database security


False signatories

LMB, BIR, rank and file officials, LGU, project staff, NGOS, NGAs, private sector, MGB regional office, CENRO (boundary)

Existing manuals and procedures

Lack in capable monitoring personnel

x x S 4

3rd party monitoring & review (PO, NGO); Institutionalize external audit and public access to information; Values formation/transformative education; Whistleblower/witness protection program, rewards for witness; Legal

Serious implementation of administrative section

False consent (misleading)

Financial reports

Accomplishment reports

Technical assessment (savety, envi study, baseline, forest cover)

Delineation and boundaries

Resource inventory

Ghost employees, dummy NGOs and ghost PO projects;

Laborers'



119

wages/salary prosecution of guilty parties to set an example; Assistance in evidence collection


Overpricing

Materials (polyurethane bags)

Mayor, BAC, end users, service providers and suppliers; contractors, rank&file

RA 9184

No check and balance

Reduces quality/ quantity of services

Community carries cost

S 4

Seedlings, equipments, vehicles

Payroll padding

Services (consultancy)

Catering

Collusion in bidding or approval of contracts

Rental of facilities

BAC (negotiated bids); congressman; senator

Procurement watchdog; Law enforcement manual for anti-corrupt practices; Streamlining of procedures in the issuance of permits and contracts

Blacklisting

Procurement entity manipulation

Seedling contracts monopolized

Payroll padding


Diversion of Funds

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