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Embedded systems The old days was better, or at least more robust Mikael Wedlin, [email protected]

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Page 1: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Embedded systemsThe old days was better, or at least more robust

Mikael Wedlin, [email protected]

Page 2: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Summary

• More and more of our surroundings is controlled by

software

• Tools can get new unexpected features

• Software around us becomes only more advanced =

more complicated and komplex

• Development is not the same as more robust

• Internet of Things

• Often Wireless

• Difficult to think outside the normal use

Page 3: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

What do we see?

Demo

Page 4: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

What is security?

Confidentiality

Availability Integrity

Page 5: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

CIA vs AIC

Confidentiality

Availability Integrity

http://www.anniesinternetcafe.com

Page 6: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Healthcare

Page 7: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Healthcare

Page 8: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Another example of embedded systems

Page 9: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Are we without hope?

Page 10: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

State that "attacking" SCADA systems

- a known example!

1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline Explosion.

”While the following cannot be fully confirmed, it has been reported that during the Cold War the CIA inserted malicious code into control system software leaked to the Soviet Union. The software, which controlled pumps, turbines, and valves on a Soviet gas pipeline, was programmed to malfunction after a set interval. The malfunction caused the control system to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures beyond the failure ratings of pipeline joints and welds, eventually causing an enormous explosion.”

This has more or less been verified by V. G. & Cherkashin Feifer, Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB officer: The true story of the man who recruited Robert That Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, Basic Books, 2005.

Page 11: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Trust

Fides est bona,

sed custodia

est melior

2007 Pew Global Attitudes

Page 12: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Social trust

• QOG gives good societies

• Lack of trust provides:

• Increased transaction costs

• Increased feeling of insecurity

• Reduced use

• IT Security do not add any functionality

• IT security must be built from the beginning

Page 13: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Trivial example

Page 14: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Tailored Access Operations

Glenn Greenwald: No place to hide,

2014

Page 15: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Last Home-PC offer

Nytt HemPC-erbjudande

Frå[email protected] för Tommy Lodehed

Datum den 19 april 2006 13:16:[email protected]:

ÄmneNytt HemPC-erbjudandeHej,

nytt HemPC-erbjudande enligt nedan.

För PC:

www.dellhempc.nu/view/foi

Klicka på länken ovan så kommer du till beställningssidan.

OBS! När du beställt, skriv ut beställningsbekräftelsen samt låneavtalet (som skall skrivas under) och skicka till Tommy Lodehed på Inköp.

För Mac:

http://intranet.foi.se/upload/organisation/forskningsstod/enheter/ekonomi/inkop/HemMac-2006-FOI.pdf

Klicka på länken ovan så öppnas ett PDF-dokument.

Skriv ut och fyll i beställningen som skall skickas tillsammans med ett underskrivet låneavtal till Tommy Lodehed på Inköp.

Har du några frågor kontakta mig.

Hälsningar

Tommy

Tommy Lodehed

FOI Inköp/FOI Purchasing Office

Phone: 46 13 378117 / Fax: 46 13 378067

Email: [email protected]

www.dellhempc.nu/view/foi

Page 16: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

More of the same contract

www.dellhempc.nu/view/forsvaret

Page 17: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Login at Dell

Personnummer

UTAN bindestreck

Page 18: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

So what?

• Could there be something on a home PC that

does not should not be there?

• Do we take work home?

Page 19: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

A new quote

"So Snowden returned to the NSA, the This time as

an employee of Dell Corporation, which

collaborated with the Agency. "

Glenn Greenwald: No place to hide,

2014

Page 20: Tankar om streck - Department of Computer and Information ...simna73/teaching/REAP/HT17/FOI-2017.pdfState that "attacking" SCADA systems - a known example! 1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline

Risks with increased security?