tamil insurgency & sri lankan army action against it

2

Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents

Ever since its independence, Sri Lanka had been mired by political and economic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. With growing ethnic nationalism from both sides, Tamil groups initially expressed their grievances through political channels, and later in the 1970s encouraged by many external and regional players, resorted to violence and terrorism. Peace overtures by Sri Lankan Government did not bear any result and armed conflict sparked on. Suicide attacks and protracted insurgency also resulted into hundreds of civilian and military casualties. Sri Lankan Armed Forces finally accomplished decisive victory in this counter insurgency campaign by end of May 2009, bringing about total subjugation of the rebels along with elimination of the terrorist leadership. It had truly been a tale of unflinching national spirit, military professionalism and resolve for sacrifices by the Sri Lankan armed forces and public alike.

Above in view, carry out analysis of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka examining its back ground, successful operations conducted by the Sri Lankan army against the terrorists. Also highlight the role played by external players in fuelling the insurgency and ‘Whole of the Government’ approach to offset such international and regional pressures. Draw pertinent lessons from the conflict to deal with such situations for any government in general and the army in particular.

THEME

3

4

Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE COMPASSIONATE,THE MOST MERCIFUL

5

Introduction

• The pearl of Indian ocean.

• Target of a ruthless insurgent

movement

• Sri Lanka fielded a series of

responses

• Episode of violence, grief and

death 6

Introduction

• The worst face of terrorism

• LTTE had evolved into a

globally prominent organization

7

Introduction

• Managed suicide killing of two

head of states

• LTTE stood strong enough to

hold its own naval fleet

8

Introduction

• May 2009, witnessed a

decisive victory by Sri Lankan

Armed Forces

• LTTE laying down their arms

and accepting defeat

• Elimination of insurgent

leadership leaving disorder

9

Aim

To present the analysis of Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka with a view to draw pertinent lessons for dealing with terrorism

10

SEQUENCE

11

Tamil Insurgency – Its Rise and SupportLT HASAN

Part – I

Past Measures for Conflict ResolutionLT TAFSEER

Part – II

Analysis & Lessons LearntLT ANEES

Part – IV

Change in StrategyLT HABIB

Part – III

Genesis of LTTE

Role of Tamil Diaspora and India

ConclusionsRole of Tamil Diaspora

and India

Conclusions

Genesis of LTTE

Contents

PART – ITAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE &

SUPPORT

12Preview

History Of Sri Lanka Is Marked By Inveterate Mutual

Fear

Sinhalese Tamil13Part - I

In The Pre Colonial Era

• Small Sinhalese Kingdoms

in the centre and South

• Tamil kingdom in the North

of the island

14Part - I

15Part - I

INDIA

SRI LANKA

Palk

Stra

itJaffna Ta

mil Nadu

Four Centuries Of Colonial Rule

Portuguese1505-1638

Dutch1658-1796

British1815-1948

16Part - I

THE TIPPING POINT IN THE CONFLICT

Sinhala Only ActRevival of

Sinhalese NationalismIsolation of Tamils

19721972Late 70s

1956

Emergence of LTTE

Three Main Steps

Emergence Of LTTE

• LTTE came into existence

in 1974

• Prabhakaran was the

founding member

18Part - I

THREE MAIN REASONS FOR SURVIVAL

• Other groups were Marxist-

Leninist

• They entered mainstream

following Indo – Lanka accord

of 1987

• LTTE systematically lobbied

for assistance from the Tamil

Diaspora

19Part - I

Organization

20Part - I

Central Governing Committee

21Part - I

Political Wing Military

Wing

International Wing

Central Governing Committee

Military Wing

Army

Navy

Air Force

Intelligence

Special Forces

Black Tigers

Political Wing

Political Wing formed the second tier of LTTE’s

organization

23Part - I

24Part - I

Propaganda WingFund Raising

Ariyana GroupArms Procurement(KP Department)

International Secretariat

Tactics

25Part - I

“Action and inaction” was the leitmotif of LTTE’s modus operandi against SLF

Pause And Pounce

26Part - I

LTTE made use of “Outsourcing” to gain maximum benefit

Outsourcing

27Part - I

• An asymmetric strategy• Not a religious phenomenon for LTTE• Types of suicide missions

Suicide Bombing

28Part - I

• LTTE used gender manipulation to improve combat efficiency

• The women were grouped with small male teams • To ensure that the men fought for winning the

admiration

Gender Manipulation

29Part - I

• LTTE carried out

numerous high profile

assassinations

• Prime Minister Rajiv

Gandhi of India

• President Premadasa of

Sri Lanka

Political Assassinations

30Part - I

• As of 2001, Tamil Diaspora around the globe was 600,000 to 800,000 strong

• 23 to 30% of global Tamil population

Tamil Diaspora

31Part - I

• 250,000 Tamils in North America alone

• 200,000 Tamils resided in Europe

• Almost 30,000 in Australia• The Tamil Diaspora is highly

educated and occupies professional jobs

Tamil Diaspora

32Part - I

Indian involvement in the conflict was underpinned by its interest in the region

Indian Role

33

• Sri Lankan overtures towards West, caused worry• To placate the Indian Tamil population• India was not interested in Tamil independence

Reasons For Involvement

34Part - I

• 32 training camps operating all over India

Support Provided

35

INDIA

Part - I

• Indian policy makers soon realised that their policy could backfire

• India withdrew its official support after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi

Change In Indian Approach

36Part - I

INDIA

CONCLUSIONSTAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS

RISE AND SUPPORT

37Part - I

Sinhalese-Tamil Rivalry

• Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry has its roots in the history beyond the colonial rule

• Rivalry kept simmering during the colonial period and gained momentum in post independence era

38Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT

Sinhalese Nationalism

• Tamils initially pursued democratic path

• Revival of Sinhalese Nationalism


LTTE Emergence

• Astute leadership, steadfastness to Tamil nationalism and strong link with Diaspora; enabled LTTE to emerge as the leading resistance group


LTTE Organizational Structure

• LTTE developed an elaborate organizational structure

• That held them in good stead during the three decade long civil war


LTTE - Novel Tactics

• Militarily, LTTE never failed to innovate and obfuscate security forces with its novel tactics

• It gave new dimensions to suicide bombing


Tamil Diaspora

• Tamil Diaspora supported the

insurgency through all

possible legitimate and

illegitimate means

• The war can rightly be termed

as the “Diaspora funded war”


Indian Involvement

• Indian involvement in the conflict was based on self interest

• Tamils misinterpreted Indian involvement and tried to invoke the 1971 war


Indian Involvement

• Indians, were never interested in the Tamil Eelam

• Would have encouraged Tamil population in India

to raise demand for independence


Contents1. Political Response 2. Military Response3. Conclusions

PART – IIPolitical And Military

Response

Thimpu Talks

SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT

TAMIL MILITANTS

TAMIL POLITICIANS

PeaceTalks

JULY 1985 47Part - II

Fighting continued between two sides and Sri Lankan forces managed to corner LTTE in Jaffna

48Part - II

Indian Sponsored Peace Talks

• Indo-Lankan agreement at Colombo in Jul 1987

• Indian forces were never welcomed by either side

49Part - II


• Extremist JVP loathed presence of Indian forces

• LTTE started ambushing Indian Forces and

abandoned the truce

50Part - II


• Forms the basis of “Op Pawan” by IPKF

• President Premadasa demanded immediate

withdrawal of IPKF on 2nd January 1989

51Part - II


• Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw IPKF• V P Singh in December 1989, declared the policy

as utter failure

52Part - II

Eelam War II

• Newly elected government of

Chandrika Kumaratunga offer

peace talks

• Policy of military engagement

with the Tigers

• Retaking the control of Jaffna

from insurgents

53Part - II

1994 Peace Talks

• President Kumaratunga initiated peace talks in 1994

• Short lived cease fire took place but failed

54Part - II

• Lack of sincerity

• Lack of professionalism

• Lack of flexibility

Reasons

55Part - II

• Failure of 1994 talks led to

Eelam War III

• LTTE resorted to shoulder

fired anti aircraft, “Stinger

Missiles”

• Hit two Sri Lankan planes

flying over Jaffna

Eelam War III

56Part - II

Operation Jayasikurui

Operation terminated in 1999 without meeting all its objectives

57Part - II

13 MAY 1997

Norwegian Sponsored Peace Talks

CEASE FIRE AGGREEMENT

SRI LANKANGOVERNMENT

LTTE 58Part - II

• LTTE’s exclusion from reconstruction talks

• Tamil people were not receiving the full economic

benefits of peace

• Tamil held areas are not as peaceful

Critical Issues

59Part - II

• Mahindra Rajapakse offered to hold unconditional peace talks in 2005

• LTTE instead announced refresh war effort

Parliamentary Elections – 2005

60Part - II

Peace Dialogue

Peace talks started from 28-29 Oct 2006 but the peace talks broke down

62Part - II

Eelam War IV

• Resolved not to hold talks

• Pursue the military option

• Leadership is not interested in

a peaceful coexistence

• In 2006 fighting officially

resumed after a cease fire

63Part - II

Eelam War IV

• Continued fighting led to territorial gains

• Operation is termed as Eelam War IV

• Changed Sri Lankan strategy started to pay

dividends

64Part - II

CONCLUSIONSPOLITICAL AND

MILITARY RESPONSE

65

Failure Of Peace Negotiations

Attributed to LTTE’s belief that they could achieve political goals through violence and intimidation

66Part – II Political and Military Response

Lacked Sincerity Of Purpose

Both came to the negotiations table only because of either external pressure or to achieve some short-term gains


Display Flexibility

• To reach a compromise solution• Agenda should widen as the negotiations proceed

to maintain confidence in the process


Role Of IPKF

• IPKF failed to bring peace in Sri Lanka

• LTTE considered the agreement has deflected

their goal to establish independent Tamil State


Role Civil Society

• Crucial for any settlement to ethnic conflicts• People’s voice was weak in Sri Lanka• Be informed of the broad contours of the talks• Broad-basing of negotiations will weaken

manipulation


Change In Strategy

• Paid the dividends in the form of complete eradication of LTTE leadership

• Army this time focused on elimination of LTTE leadership instead


Change in Political Thinking

Change in Military Strategy

Conclusions

2

Part

3

Part

1

Part

PART – IIICHANGE IN STRATEGY

Past Political Strategy

• Mounting pressure by the International community• Straight forward military strategy could not be

formulated• Insufficient provision of equipment and logistics• Lack of international and regional interagency and

security cooperation

74Part – III

Past Political Strategy

• Weak agencies to develop frontline intelligence

• Lack of political commitment

75Part – III

THE NEW STRATEGY 76

Nuanced Political Approach

• LTTE invited to negotiation table • LTTE’s unwillingness to implement peace

accords• International community tried to force the

government• Resisted all such external pressures

77Part – III

Model Of Fighting Terrorism

“Given the political will, the military can crush terrorism”

78Part – III

Model Of Fighting Terrorism

• Unwavering political will• Disregard for biased international opinion • No negotiations with forces of terror• Improved flow of conflict information• Absence of political intervention • Complete operational freedom• Accent on young commanders• Kept the regional countries in the loop

79Part – III

Proactive Foreign Policy

• To gain support of international community• To create awareness in support of official stance• Complete support from China, Russia and Pakistan• Keeping United States, India and Europe neutral

80Part – III

Change In Military Strategy

81Part – III


• Unconventional war, in a conventional mode

82Part – III


• Transform the national security doctrine, training and weaponry

83Part – III


CONVENTIONAL

GUERILLA

TRANSFORMATION

84Part – III

85Part – III

NAVAL Strategy

Air Strategy

86Part – III

• Continuous raids on identified LTTE fortifications and nerve centers

• Sri Lankan Air force did well to counter LTTE air threat

Land Forces Strategy

• Focused on destroying terrorists instead of capturing the territory

87Part – III

Operational Level

• Focused on supporting huge logistic demands for tactical level operations

88Part – III

Tactical Level

• Shifted from large scale operations to small scale platoon and section level operations

89Part – III

Tactical Level

• Multi pronged attacks to paralyze Tamil resistance

90Part – III

Morale Of Troops

• Good training• Effective casualty evacuation plans

91Part – III

Brief Account Of Operations

• Military offensive commenced in February 2007 which continued up to March 2009 and finally concluded in May 2009

• LTTE command structure completely destroyed

92Part – III

Brief Account Of Operations

93Part – III

94Part – III

xx53

55

xx57

58xx

59

TFTF

TF

TF

February 2007

95Part – III

xx53

55

xx57

58

xx59

TFTF

TF

TF

February 2007

August2008

96Part – III

xx53

55

xx59

TFTF

TF

TF

February 2007

August2008

xx58

November2008

97Part – III

xx53

55

xx59

TFTF

TF

TF

February 2007

August2008 xx

58November

2008

January2009

98Part – III

February 2007

August2008

November2008

January2009

March2009

CONCLUSIONSCHANGE IN STRATEGY

99Part – III

Unwavering Political Will

100Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY

Foreign Policy

• Undeterred by international pressure• Continued with its policy• Limiting the diplomatic damage through astute

diplomacy


Warfare Transformation

• Embarked upon a transformation process from conventional to irregular warfare

• Under the dynamic leadership of the Army Chief General Fonseka


Warfare Transformation

• Multipronged, unconventional in nature• Based on sub unit level actions instead of large scale

conventional assaults


Personal Supervision

• Personally supervised operations • Maintained touch with field commanders• Appointed young commander to infuse enthusiasm


Role Of Navy

• By choking LTTE’s lifeline through sea


Role Of Air Force

• Precision strikes against insurgents and by destroying elements of LTTE


ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT AND LESSONS LEARNT

PART IV

Contents• Political Aspects Military Aspects

Causes Of Sri Lankan Success

• Two decades in the conflict• Neither side was strong enough to overcome the

other

108Part – IV

MOB TACTICS

INTELLIGENCE

YOUNG COMMANDERS

Causes Of Sri Lankan Success

• Change in strategy came three years ago

109Part – IV

Political Aspects

• To defeat terrorism, all political forces must develop consensus

110Part – IV

Strong And Proactive Foreign Policy

FOREIGN POLICY

111Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS

CONSISTENCY

Consistency In Handling The Conflict

1974

1983

1987

1993

1994

1997

2009


No Ceasefire/ Peace Agreements

Refit

Regroup

Re-Arm

Re-Supply


Curtail External Support


Economic Aspects

115

GDP

FDI

EXPORTS

CONSUMER

Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS

Military Aspects

116Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

Clear Objectives


Adaptable Tactical Plans


Secrecy In Operational Planning


Choose Men To Bring Effects


Intelligence Gathering


Coordinated Joint Operations


SUSTAINED MILITARY BUILDUP


LESSONS

Political Lessons

125Part – IV

National And Political Will

126Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

Proactive/ Clear Foreign Policy

FOREIGN POLICY


Concessions Will Not Defeat Terrorism

128

Re-fit

Re-group

Rearm

Resupply

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

Curtail Foreign Support


Regional Cooperation On Security/ Intelligence


Media Handling


Border Control


ENHANCEMENT OF LEAS ANTI TERRORISM CAPACITY

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 133

Modernization Of Intelligence Agencies


Strategy For Stability After War


MILITARY LESSONS

136Part – IV

Clear Aim And Objectives

137Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

Doctrine For LIC

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 138

Establishing Special Warfare Center


Procurement Of Weapons And Equipment


Employment Of Special Operations Force


Logistic Buildup


Destroying Safe Havens Of Terrorists


Isolating The Insurgents


Identifying And Targeting Insurgent Leadership


CONCLUSION

tamil insurgency & sri lankan army action against it

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