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Thomas F. Carroll The George Washington University, Washington D.C.

Prepared for Delivery at the 2003 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA)

Dallas, Texas March 27-29, 2003

(May be cited or quoted, given appropriate reference)

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TALES OF COLLECTIVE EMPOWERMENT IN THE ANDES

Thomas F. Carroll1

I. Introduction – Organizational Empowerment

In 1964, in the inter-andean valley of Coroico in Bolivia the rescatadores or intermediary merchants of coffee (invariably town meztizos), had a double income: through the price differential and also by virtue of the different weights they used between buying and selling. The arroba (measure of volume), sold by the indigenous campesinos weighed 32 pounds, while the arroba sold to the wholesalers in La Paz weighed only 29 pounds. A provincial congress of the union of campesinos (sindicatos) finally discussed this issue and decided that from then on the arroba should be 25 pounds “as elsewhere in the world”. The proclamation was reinforced with a threat of a sellers’ strike. Within two months, the 25 pound arroba became the general practice in the region (Heath in Mangin 1967. 83-84)2.

This demonstration of power by a second-level campesino federation occurred almost 40 years ago. In the intervening years, the fate of poor rural people’s organizations in Andean countries fluctuated widely as a consequence of macro-political circumstances, but as the new century unfolds, there is now a potential for wider group empowerment at the supra-communal level among the highland rural indigenas, especially in Ecuador. What this current experience teaches us about empowerment strategies and organizational capacity building – concepts of new (or renewed) interest in international development circles – is the subject of this paper.

“Empowerment” is a much abused term – it often implies that people who are given crucial information not previously available to them become “empowered”, at other times when individuals are enabled to assert their identity or independence it is said that they are being empowered. We are dealing here with group, rather than individual empowerment. A recent definition ties the concept to the removal of institutional barriers, and stresses the attainment of collective influence with regard to the environment in which the group operates: “Empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Narayan 2002). Other definitions (lately by students of social capital) stress the capability of groups and networks to achieve common ends and to command

1 Professor Emeritus of Economics and Urban/Regional Planning, the George Washington University. I am grateful to Anthony Bebbington of the University of Colorado at Boulder for ideas and insights which arose in the course of our collaborative field research on Andean campesino federations over the period of 1997-2001. 2 It is significant to note that the sindicato congress imposed sanctions: if a campesino sold a “heavy arroba” he would be fined 50,000 bolivianos (about $4.20) for the first sale, and progressive higher amounts for successive sales. The person who denounced him would get 10 percent of the fine. Note that capacity to exercise “external power” by the union was underpinned by the internal capacity to decide on and apply sanctions for deviant members.

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scarce resources that could not be obtainable by the individuals acting by themselves (Montgomery and Inkeles 2000, Bebbington 1999). Empowerment, is based on “mutually beneficial collective action” according to this school of thought (Krishna and Uphoff 2002)3.

In this paper, we deal with building of the organizational capacity of poor rural

people as a form of empowerment. It is clear that the processes which enlarge the power domain of poor people are of a collective rather than individual nature: only through organizing can the institutional power holders be challenged and influence of the poor projected. This is the external dimension of organizational capacity. However, such capability is predicated on the group’s internal capacity to work together, mobilize resources, reduce conflict and engage in the solution of problems of common interest. The two dimensions are interrelated: well organized groups are more likely to have their voices heard and influential groups can prosper more through collective action.

In attempting to foster group empowerment, most of the attention has focused on

community organizations (the term community development while originally in the Latin American context meant village “modernization”, has gradually taken on the features of “conscientization” or awakening)4. Adherents of social movements and political scientists, on the other hand, concentrated on the macro-level, that is on the relationship between popular interest groups and political parties and governments (for example, Alvarez, Dañino and Escobar 1998). Between the micro and macro levels, we now have the opportunity to consider the existence of the meso-level peasant associations, operating on the territorial scale of micro-regions, intermediary administrative districts and agro-ecological zones in which the natural resource environment is the defining factor.

This paper is based on research of a number of meso-scale peasant federations in the

Andean countries, conducted between 1997 and 2001. (Bebbington and Carroll 2002, Carroll and Bebbington 2000)5. It also draws on earlier work, sponsored by ODI/ISNAR on farmer organizations and agricultural technology and by the Inter-American Foundation

3 In the social capital literature formal and informal organizations are classified as carriers of “structural” social capital, while individuals beliefs, values and attitudes belong to the so-called “cognitive” social capital dimension (Upholf 1997, 2000). 4 The earliest well-documented community development experience in Latin America was the Cornell-Vicos Project, which originated as an anthropology field station and evolved into a full scale controlled social development experiment. (Dobyns, Doughty and Lasswell 1971, Doughty 1987). When in the mid ‘40s Cornell leased the Vicos hacienda from the Peruvian government, Prof. Alan Holmberg, the Director of the project formally became the patrón of the estate serfs. He was reported to have said that the key of this strategy was not to exercise his power as patrón. The project was really a combination of technology and empowerment (an early successful combination), the culmination of which has enabled the Vicosinos through achieving higher potato yields to make a down payment toward a mortgage with which they bought ownership of their estate and unprecedented freedom from a reluctant government. In historical perspective, unfortunately the explicit power dimension disappeared from subsequent large – scale community development programs spearheaded by the ILO-led Mision Andina 1955-1964. (Breton 2001) 5 This research involved intensive case studies of 10 highland federations in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, supplemented by 5 additional cases studies previously. This case material with its qualitative and quantitative aspects was later supplemented by a complete survey of the Ecuadorean federations existing in 2001.

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on indigenous federations (Bebbington, Ramon et.al. 1992, Bebbington 1996, 1997). The motivation for these studies was the conviction that supra-communal rural organizations have the potential to transcend the limits of very localized forms of base organizations and to provide benefits to campesinos not available through small groups. While gaining important advantages of scale, so-called second level campesino federations can remain close and accountable to their base constituencies and avoid the frequent co-optation and corruption of national level organizations. Fox (1992, 1996) has amply demonstrated the value of regional ejido unions in Mexico. One of the most interesting underlying justifications for the ethnic-based highland federations, especially in Ecuador, was that beyond the hacienda gates, the urban commercial elites were seen as the main oppressor and affront to indigenous dignity. As this power of exploitation was based on the rural-urban region it had to be confronted by a region-based campesino organization, whose potential power today is demonstrated by the growing number of indigenous mayors and municipal counselors achieved by the mid ‘90s6.

The lessons which emerge from these studies on the appropriate strategies for

external development assistance, explicitly or implicitly concerned with organizational capacity building, have been documented in a recently published volume that contains the full text of the Ecuadorean case studies (Carroll 2002)7∗ .

II. Campesino Federations in the Andes In the Andean countries, the emergence of meso-level campesino federations is a relatively recent phenomenon and dates to the early ‘70s. These intermediate-level organizations arose mostly in connection with land reform processes, either as pre-reform struggles for land or as a consequence of post reform evolution of agrarian structures. In Mexico, the first country in Latin America to undergo a land reform, there were a number of attempts to provide the ejidos (collective communities that received land grants) with larger scale regional services, especially in marketing and input supply, but it was not until the late ‘70s when regional ejido unions were organized and the Union Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (UNORCA) an umbrella organization which included a fifth of all unions was founded in 1984. In Bolivia, the rural sindicatos, which the reform of the ‘50s superimposed on the traditional ayllu communities did have regional assemblies, but these had neither a specific territorial agenda nor their own development functions until in the 1980s. An attempt was then made to provide the political sindicatos with a regional economic counterpart in the form of the Corporaciones Agropecuarias Campesinas (CORACAS). For lack of sustained

6 Of course, there is a considerable gap between ideal and reality – the multiple weaknesses of federations, as we shall see, are self-evident and there are a number of skeptics among the intellectuals who interpret the rise and role of these organizations (Martinez 1997, Breton 2001). 7This volume “Construyendo Capacidades Colectivas” includes four monographs of indigenous federations that have received intensive capacity – building assistance over a period of 10 years.

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support and because of internal problems of this model, relatively few of CORACAS are successfully functioning at present, but other regional agroprocessing alternatives have emerged8.

In Peru, although the first regional Campesino Cooperative in the La Convencion Valley was founded as early as 19599∗ , the massive creation of territorial peasant organizations was the consequence of the Velazquista reforms of the mid ‘70s. These supposedly worker-managed enterprises were created to preserve the scale and infrastructure of the expropriated haciendas and plantations. From this failed experiment a number of cooperatively managed organizations survive, along with a number of so called multi-comunales promoted by NGOs in order to facilitate the use of technology credit and marketing services. The terror of the Sendero period and the subsequent suppression of all popular organizations by Fujimori have effectively eliminated any further rural organizing except for the militia-type rondero groups, originally created to control cattle theft but armed by the government to confront the Senderistas. While they have taken over certain aspects of local administration of justice, their political and economic role is as yet minimal (Zarzar 1991).

The true flowering of regional peasant federations has occurred in Ecuador. The

partial and incomplete land reform of the ‘70s granted resident hacienda workers small subsistence parcels, without giving them access to the best valley lands (and water rights), nor access to markets and power in the commercially dominated rural towns. The first second-level federations arose in response to these grievances, especially in heavily indigenous areas10. But in contrast with much of the Bolivian and Peruvian history, the main promotes of the federated model was no the state, but a combination of leftist urban intellectuals, liberationist priests and NGO activists, generally supported by European financial sources but also by the Inter-American Foundation and some North American Development NGOs. Once the core federations were consolidated, multilateral financing became available and the number of second-level campesino organizations multiplied. In

8 The most prominent federative model takes advantage of market niches for specialty products, such as organic coffee, chocolates or quinua. Several of these commodity-based federations in Bolivia are analyzed by Bebbington et.al. (1996) and by Healy (2001), the best known being the El Ceibo Cacao Cooperative in the Alto Beni Region. 9 This is probably the oldest surviving case of an Andean Federation. Its origin goes back to the labor conflict between coffee workers and plantation owners, and the formation of peasant unions. In 1958 eight of the newly formed unions joined together in a federation, the Federación Provincial de Campesinos de la Convencion y Lares. This organization provided the platform of the radical Trotskyite leader Hugo Blanco for his “Tierra o Muerte” movement in the Convencion Valley. The early history of these events is well documented by Craig (1969). The federation is still active today under the name of Central de Cooperativas Agrarias de la Convencion y Lares (COCLA) and was one of the intensive cases included in the current research. 10 According to the testimony of the first leaders of Jatun Ayllu Cabildo de Guamote, one of our case studies in Central Ecuador: “el Jatun Ayllu se formó para frenar los abusos de los meztizos del pueblo, de los cantineros, prestamistas y arranchadores en los mercados, para detener los abusos de los empleados de la haciendas y los curas”(V.H. Torres in Carroll 2002, p.71).

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1974 there were only 10 second-level federations; by 1993 there were 140. By 2001 a survey conducted by a World Bank-financed indigenous development project, PRODEPINE, encompassed 241 federations11. While the Ecuadorean state did not play a major role in promoting these organizations, neither did it oppose them, so there was at least a tolerant macro-political environment in which the state did not perceive them as threatening12.

It is important to point out that, in contrast with the other Andean countries, the

ethnic campesino movement in Ecuador has attained national prominence, and has most recently scored some notable political achievements. The peaceful indigenous mobilization and protest in 1990 paralyzed the country for several weeks and forced a direct dialogue between national and indigenous leaders on policy issues13. Similar nationwide protests followed in 1992, 1994 and 2000. This last one culminated in a failed coup in which Luis Macas, the leader of CONAIE, (the main national confederation of the indigenous people) made common cause with a group of disaffected middle-level army officers to form a revolutionary junta, which was quickly overthrown by the senior military establishment. Two years later in the national elections, the former military conspirators formed their own political party (Partido Sociedad Patriótica) and their leader, ex-coronel Lucio Gutiérrez was elected president, with the crucial support of the rural indigenous voters, and their party Pachakutik14. As a reward, the Gutierrez government, at the start of 2003, included three indigenous ministers (including Macas as minister of Agriculture) and a dozen or so vice-ministers and other high-level officials representing Pachakutik.

The role of the regional federations in the national indigenous movement is highly

ambiguous. While in the protest (especially in the 1990 event) the federations played the main role as a mobilizing force, and that voter turnout in behalf of indigenous candidates, continues to be a task assumed by the federations, in the matters of social and economic policies there is notable gap and difference between the national leadership and the priorities of the local-level peasant organizations. Furthermore, there is considerable political diversity among federations which fragments adhesion to the dominant line of CONAIE. We shall return to this issue later in the paper.

11 The 2201 survey included 208 second-level indigenous federations, 19 third-level organizations and 10 groups formed under the label “nacionalidades” in the foothills of the indigenous Amazonian territories. Federations of mestizo communities (mostly on the coast) were not included in this survey (Carroll 2002). 12 However, when federations engaged in the occupation of hacienda lands rather than in the usual temporary blocking of highways, the national police generally intervened at the request of the landlords. Such localized confrontations with the more politicized federations were common during the ‘80s. 13 The literature on these protests is reviewed by Carroll (1998). For a comprehensive treatment see Selverston (2001). 14 This name derives from the Inca emperor Pachacuti under whose reign the empire reached its widest extension in the 15th Century.

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III. Typology of Federations For purposes of capacity enhancement, it is necessary to disaggregate the universe of campesino federations so as to distinguish the main organizational purposes, each with different capacity requirements which, in turn, imply different assistance approaches. The common thread is that every second-level organization aims at offering services to its members (the internal dimension) and at representing the membership externally. As a simplified typology, there are four basic models:

A. Political and claim-making organizations These include the Bolivian sindicatos and those ethnic associations in Ecuador whose principal aim is to pressure for land and water rights and for ethnic recognition. These tend to be highly inclusive territorially and socially.

B. Economic-Productive organizations, we can designate as “social enterprises”15 These include production, agroprocessing and marketing organizations, generally focusing on improving the productivity and incomes of members. They tend to have an exclusive membership.

C. Common Property Management Organizations These are mainly federations of water users for irrigation (Juntas de Agua de Riego) but some are focused on the management and conservation of watersheds and fragile ecological areas. They are functionally inclusive, but exclude those in the broader territory who have no access to the resources being managed.

D. Multi-purpose Service Federations The majority of these organizations have evolved from the initial political/claim making model, by gradually taking on various service and economic functions. This type is most common in the Sierra of Ecuador. They combine the inclusive nature of their political and social components with their economic/productive activities whose participants tend to be more exclusive.

Collective action by federations has costs and benefits for members. The more political organizations impose few costs on their constituents, and their potential benefits are available to all. The main capacity domains are the quality of the leadership, the achievement of a degree of consensus on issues (and the corresponding capacity of conflict resolution) plus the ability to form political alliances.

15 A social enterprise is a business, in which the owners are the members. Generally, in a rural setting, the members also supply most of the labor force. In such an organization there are always tensions between profit and equity objectives.

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In contrast, the social enterprise model implies high costs of participation and discipline for members. The key capacity elements are in planning, management and finance as well as in the technical requirements of the business. To control “free riders" (those members who want to benefit from the joint enterprise without contributing their share of the costs) this type of federation must be able to enforce effective sanctioning mechanisms, as well as incentives for cooperative effort. In addition , the enterprise model requires flexibility and the ability to deal with unforeseen market changes. Such rigorous conditions for collective action apply also to the water user federations and to a lesser degree to the watershed associations. The major challenge of the Juntas de Agua is to gradually assume management responsibility for the operation of the irrigation system, while the watershed groups must provide incentives for investment in conservation measures and production systems such as forestry, where the benefits are delayed and accrue over a long time period16. Of the 15 case studies included in the research on Andean campesino federations two correspond to Model A (political/claim making) six to Model B (social enterprise) two belong to Model C (Juntas de Riego) and five conform to model D (mixed purpose service organizations). Because in Ecuador, with the largest concentration of second-level federations, the mixed model predominates, we shall focus for purposes of capacity enhancement on this groups of organizations17.

The following section sketches the various sources of ambiguities and tensions that characterize the existence of these multi-purpose federations, while summarizing the lessons that arise from our own case studies for future external empowerment strategies. IV. Ambiguities and Tensions Students of poor rural people’s organizations have long recognized some fundamental weaknesses that afflict the powerless and excluded in trying to improve their situation through collective organizational efforts. Over thirty years ago Landsberger and Hewitt (1970) examined the experience of campesino movements in seven Latin American countries and concluded with a list of ten basic weaknesses that affect their functioning18. A number of thoughtful critics (Erasmus 1961, Flora and Flora 1988, Tendler 1988, Brett 1993) point out the limits of and costs participation and the basic problems inherent in 16 Cross-cutting the four basic models of federations elaborated here, there are territorially specific and dispersed types, as well as those with a membership of base groups as against individual membership. 17 This choice is further justified by the recent evolution of the originally more political federations to gradually assume social and economic service functions, as more international financial aid has become available, but also because of the increased demand from the communities for livelihood-enhancing investments. 18 Landsberger and Hewitt’s list focuses on socio-political factors, as before the ‘70s very few campesino federations had economic functions. Their “weaknesses” include the disruptive effect of ideologies and parties, the manipulation/cooption of governments, the self-seeking role of elites, corrupt leadership and the exclusion of the not yet organized segments of the poor.

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cooperative structures. Adherents of rational-choice concepts based on a body of empirical work conclude that cooperative success is facilitated by not only the predisposition of agents toward non-selfish behavior but by the existence of incentives, enforceable rules of conduct and credible sanctions against free riders (Wade 1987, Hechter 1990, Bardhan 1996 and especially Ostrom 1990, 1992). In the political realm, cautionary observations on the potential for popular interest groups to compete for power are also frequent (Touraine 1987, Calderon and Jelin 1987, Mainwaring 1989). For our purposes, we prefer to conceptualize the major problems of the Andean federations (and more specifically those in Ecuador) in terms of ambiguities and tensions, as they arise out our research experience. This device permits us to combine the conceptual frameworks with the empirical evidence. We present summarily eight sets of ambiguities and tensions. Four of these belong to the internal aspects of the organizations and four deal with issues of external relations. Each set of tensions will be followed by a list of lessons for appropriate external assistance approaches.

1. Ambiguity of Organizational Purposes First and foremost as a source of tension is the organization’s identity as a class-based group or as an ethnic association. In all three of our study countries, early organizational efforts by urban leftist intellectuals have led to syndicalist-type of organizations vertically integrated into national labor unions that cast the peasantry as a class. Subsequently, ethnic-based federations emerged, strongly influenced by land and territorial claims and by cultural identity issues. While most of the political-ideological influences emanated from the national or confederation levels, the second-level federations and their base communities were also pulled into these different directions, with the result that the institutional landscape is now quite diverse and overlapping. Organizations with different ideological mixtures exist side by side with differing claims, orientations and symbolisms. Power struggle among the top leadership have added to the confusion at the lower levels (Bebbington and Carroll, 2002, 239-40). However, as a recent review article on the “indian question” asserts, “class and identity struggles are actually inseparable” because both class grievances and claims for ethnic rights are born out of the same historic circumstances of exploitation and disempowerment (Otero, 2003, 249). Nevertheless, there is an identity problem in the majority of the federations which is not only rhetorical.(We shall return to this point when we discuss the external tensions of the federations.)

While multifunctionality of campesino federations has a certain logical and practical justification, the confusion over what the organization is for and what it is supposed to accomplish negatively affects its identity and performance. In the surveys of our case studies the perception of respondents (both at the executive and membership level) with respect to the purposes and priorities of their federation varied widely. In the survey of 241 federations 54% of the responses favored “development activities”, while 28% thought that “identity and representation” (the power aspects) were the priority. But when asked what aspects of their organization’s achievements they rated most highly, the percentages were reversed. The chance to receive some project aid has led to a certain opportunism to accept whatever is being offered without establishing organizational priorities, or simply to respond to various demands from the bases, without a vision of common themes.

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The insistence of some multilateral donors to condition the approval of community- targeted mini-projects on the existence of regional development plans (as in the World Bank-financed PRODEPINE) has made little impact on priority setting. These PDLs (planes de desarrollo local) are invariably prepared by consulting NGOs under short-term contract, and while the rules call for participatory processes, the finished plans are little more than a collection of basic information on resources and needs. They are neither followed up nor appropriated by the federations, after having served as a precondition for disbursements19. With the usual projectized form of financing, one of the serious functional tensions is between inclusive and exclusive projects. As we discussed earlier, productive economic projects tend to have an exclusive clientele and benefit, if not exactly the “elites”, those families with more land and other household resources. One way the exclusionary enterprise model operates is by establishing financial membership requirements, such as initial capital contributions that the base organizations have to pay in order to join the federation, as is the case with the El Ceibo cacao cooperative. Few small projects can generate non-farm income, so multi-purpose federations tend to widen indiscriminately their portfolio of activities in order to offer something of value to their memberships. Another tension is between the political as against the economic orientation of the federation itself. When political organizations engage in social and cultural projects whose benefits are widely shared, they find them hard to sustain because costs are not recovered and there are no cross subsidies from economic projects. On the other hand, the viability of social enterprises can be undermined by allowing political criteria to influence resource allocation decisions, as has occurred in several of our cases. The evidence suggests that the sustainability of the social enterprise type federations requires a degree of independence from political functions. However, even social businesses frequently need the political muscle to defend their interests and negotiate alliances to achieve macro-policy support (Bebbington and Carroll,2002, 268). 20

19 Furthermore, a number of donor agencies, such as the World Bank in the case of PRODEPINE (which is the first Bank project entirely devoted to indigenous groups) use the federations as intermediaries, first, in order to process the flow of community demands to the project unit and second, to handle the accounting and reporting requirements of the mini-projects channeled to the base groups. This is an enormous reduction of transaction costs for the agencies, who, as a result, do not have to deal directly with hundreds of base groups, but this formula narrowly circumscribes the role assigned to the federations and does not build their capacities beyond the accounting function. 20 The dairy enterpise FUNORSAL in the central Sierra of Ecuador assiduously avoided being drawn into politics. Yet, when the arrival of a mining company created a serious confrontation over natural resources, and a crisis of loss of mutual trust within the organization, the federation was unable to assume the required political negotiating role. In contrast, UNOPAC, a mixed-goal federation in northern Ecuador, with a number of productive activities, successfully mounted a defense of female employees of the powerful flower exporters over health damages from toxic chemicals and pollution of water sources (Carroll, 2002, 463-5).

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Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches

• External agents should carefully assess the federation’s strengths, experiences and comparative advantages and support central or core activities of strategic importance. They should refrain from promoting too may new activities that are likely to strain the organization’s capacities and identity.

• Donors should counteract the tendency of the base communities to see their federations primarily as a source of free goods and money. “Ownership” of federations depends on value of services to members, and on the members’ willingness to contribute to the organization’s common purposes.

• Wherever possible, the political lobbying capacity of federations should be strengthened along with their technical and economic performance.

2. Tradition vs. Modernity

The second set of tensions refer to the transition from traditional type of

organizations to more modern forms. As federations are “groups of groups,” their organizational design is strongly influenced by the way their base groups have functioned. For example, frequent election of the directors has its origin in the ayllu custom of rotating leaders from a pool of trusted and experienced persons and to prevent entrenched caciquismo. As the leaders were expected to enforce land use and work discipline to ensure a collective subsistence economy, this practice, which tested and reinforced the authority of the leaders, made eminent sense. However, with the subdivision of the communal lands when most of the peasant households pursue individual strategies, this practice has lost its former justification and has become an obstacle to leadership learning. Similarly, federations have inherited the consensual decision-making of the traditional Andean communities in which every major decision had to be personally negotiated and painstakingly renegotiated with all important stakeholders. Decisions by majority vote were not acceptable, as the formalization of disagreements implies that the outvoted minority did not feel obliged to accept the majority decisions. At the same time, there was a submission to the authority of the ruling classes. The actual system is a curious coexistence of egalitarianism and oligarchy, in which control is often exercised through informal networks. 21 These contradictions were analyzed by Abraham and Platteau (2001) in a recent paper which attempted to counteract the notion that traditional communities around the world possessed a substantial amount of social capital, which could be effectively mobilized by development agencies, such as the World Bank, on behalf of the resurrected notion of “community-based-development” (Narayan 2002). They conclude that much of the traditional social capital is not available for contemporary development purposes without substantial changes. This is particularly relevant to Ecuador, where, perhaps more than elsewhere in the Andean highlands, the traditional community has given way to a

21 In one of our case studies, the federation president, a former teacher insisted that all families must send their children to the bilingual school (against the wishes of most parents) and threatened to cut off the supply of irrigation water. In another case, field research revealed that five individuals controlled all major aspects of the organization, none of whom were among those elected as directors.

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system of individualization and income differentiation in which each household pursues its own livelihood strategies. In the new market-oriented situation, while there is less reciprocal bonding, there are greater bridging type relationships, where people increasingly belong to different and overlapping groups. Another consequence of these shifting relationships is the changing role of the local elites from whom leaders are drawn. In the traditional system, the redistributive authority of the leaders was linked to experience in resolving conflicts and to their prestige as “elders.” To the extent that these elites have now achieved levels of acceptable incomes through the market, and thanks to their extra-community linkages, they no longer need the help of the others, and hence do not feel obliged to serve the common good. Or put another way, the incentives for serving in leadership positions have shifted in the direction of rent-seeking rather than reciprocity. Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches:

• Work with an increasingly heterogeneous social system by (i) reinforcing groups of sectoral interests; (ii) finding new sources of cohesion of general interest (symbolic/cultural capital, communication and information) and (iii) stress transparency of decision-making systems.

• Work simultaneously on bonding and bridging relationships • “Professionalize” staff through in-service training and exposure to the experience of

other groups. • Take advantage of inter-generational shifts by training and working with younger

potential leaders. Increase the size of the leadership pool.

3. Relations with the Bases In a federative system (“group of groups”), the problems of leader accountability are exacerbated by intra-group conflict. Conflict management is not sufficiently understood and practiced by external agents. Intergroup hostility is due in part to competition for scarce resources but also to political rivalries and ethnocentrism in which in-group of loyalty is coupled with out-group depreciation. These tensions can be controlled or reduced if (i) there are individuals who are joint members of rival groups or are trusted by both sides, and (ii) the extent that goals are shared by all groups.22 The number of base groups that make up a federation is another factor: too many groups cannot be properly attended to and can weaken adherence. This was the case with UNORCAC, one of the northern Ecuadorean federations that cover an entire canton (county) with 43 communities, while the average is closer to 20. The geographic dispersion and variability in the productive potential of base groups makes it difficult to service such a diverse membership. In the case of OJAG in the central highlands, the problem was the reverse: there were too many federations, each with limited number of base groups whose loyalty fluctuated as leadership and political allegiances shifted over time. In the first

22 These principles are supported by a wide variety of studies of organizational development, for example Weick 1969, Molina 1998 and Horton et al 2003.

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instance, the solution is decentralization, while in the second situation, it is consolidation: 12 second-level federations in that area have recently formed a regional consortium for purposes of coordinating their work., especially vis-à-vis the external aid agencies. Base-center relations are also more complicated by the proliferations of specialized groups within the federation’s orbit that are not communities or villages of neighbors or kinship groups. Sometimes, such sectoral groupings are also members of the federations, but most often they negotiate their own assistance projects with donor agencies independently from the federations. There are very few federations that have the power to insist that the agencies not bypass them in their territory. As a consequence, the geographic dispersion of external aid via small sub-projects (typical of the social fund model) has tended to de-legitimize the federations and to create more inter-group conflicts. Bringing the sectoral subgroups within the orbit of the federations, contributes to organizational cohesion and to cross-cutting types of social capital. Such a strategy also reinforces another finding of our own research: even in a large and complex organization, effectiveness is related to the existence of relatively small groups that have learned to cooperate. This is consistent with worldwide organizational experience according to which the bonds and mutually supporting relationships that have been built up among teams or relatively small subsets of members are crucial for the success of the organization as a whole (Weick 1995, MacKay and Horton 2002). Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches:

• Over time, increase the size of “core groups” in the federations, of individuals with cross-cutting ties, who are willing to assume informal and formal leadership positions. (This assumes the “socialization” of training programs, stressing the value of group advancement over individual rent-seeking).

• Help to bring sectoral sub-groups within the orbit of the federations. • Assist in the consolidation of women’s groups, as an important source of cohesion

(Molina 1998, Delpino 1991). 4. Tension Between Leaders and Technical Staff

To the extent that federations acquire technical functions, they need to have specialized staff to manage the various activities. Donors insist that specialists in charge of the various projects they finance should be included in the project budgets and be hired through competitive selection. As a result, most federations develop a dual leadership structure: one elected and serving without compensation and another salaried at more or less competitive rates. In North America and Europe, the functional duality of management in non-profit organizations, between voluntary boards and contracted staff, is clear. This is not so in most Andean federations.23 This is partly because the elected leaders are 23 The exceptions are some of the mature social enterprises that do have salaried managers and other staff paid from earnings. Even in these cases, the independence of management is often circumscribed by the interference of the elected leaders, especially in financial matters. In one well-known case, a rice milling enterprise, the interference of the political leadership on the distribution of earnings almost led to bankruptcy.

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indigenous persons, while the technical staff tends to come from urban mestizo origins. As most federations are unable to pay salaries, there is constant pressure from the leadership for compensation from donors as part of project costs. But the tensions are not limited to the compensation issue: in most multi-functional federations, the leaders are unprepared for and uninterested in the technical matters, with the result that the staff is poorly supervised and not evaluated. Also, in several cases, temporarily hired outside specialists have assumed decision-making authority that properly should be exercised by the board. Clearly, the fundamental solution to these problems is the gradual upgrading of the endogenous human resources of the organization. In the cases we studied, this process has taken about a decade of intensive assistance. It is notable that the capacity-building strategy has had a dual track: native promoters were trained through a learning-by-doing process, and a few highly motivated (usually young) professionals were placed inside the organizations for long periods. In both cases, the process involved the development of what we might call “hybrid agents”: people who were able to bridge the inside and outside environments and play the role of trusted intermediaries.24 An especially onerous heritage of traditional practice is the pressure of social obligations from relatives and friends bound in reciprocal dependency relationships to lay claim to any surplus of funds. This is a behavior not restricted to Andean indigenous customs but is widespread around the world. It has been offered as a partial explanation for the success of expatriate entrepreneurs in many cultures, as they are not as subject to these social obligations as are the native business owners (Abraham and Platteau 2001). Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches:

• The most important lesson for external agents is to achieve a gradual increase in self-financing (through payment of membership fees, quotas, service fees or through earnings from small productive enterprises).25

• Work toward a “de-coupling” of enterprise management from the federation as a whole .26

• Strengthen peer-monitoring systems that make members more aware of their mutual interdependence.

24 In one case in southern Ecuador, a civil engineer who was part of the NGO promotional team for a decade has maintained his relationship with the indigenous federation, long after his contractual obligation has ended. Ex promotores trained long ago by the Misión Andina, a United Nations community development program, continue to function within the organization without formal responsibilities, their meager compensation obtained from successive projects of different donors. 25 In one of our cases, the UNOPAC federation has succeeded to cover almost two-thirds of the annual operating costs through a collection of small productive projects, either owned by the central organization (such as a grain mill) or through a percentage of the communally-managed businesses (15% of earnings of a federation-owned plot of land, operated by four member communities through voluntary labor contributions, or mingas). 26 One example is an eco-tourism project in the UNORCAC federation, which resulted in the estabishment of an independent travel office in the nearby town of Otavalo, heavily frequented by tourists.

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5. The Changing Relations between NGOs and Federations It is paradoxical that the formerly crucial role of NGOs in nurturing campesino federations through their initial phases has now turned into a more complicated and less symbiotic reltionsihp. To the extent that second-level organizations have become more consolidated, a more critical and assertive attitude vis-à-vis NGOs has emerged. This shift has coincided with what Bebbington has called the “triple crisis of NGOs” (1998): identity, legitimacy and sustainability. Part of the estrangement can be explained by competition for dwindling international funding, but basically it is the consequence of the empowerment process itself. What we observe is that the reluctance of external donors to commit resources for long-term capacity building plus the growing attitude of the popular organizations to restirct the role of NGOs to short-term, very specific tasks, conspires to hasten the conversion of the development-oriented NGOs to consulting firms.27 In the meantime, the capacity of the professional civil society sector to serve as policy advisors and lobbyists (and support the causes of the popular/indigenous movements) has greatly declined, as virtually no domestic funding sources for such work have materialized. All this has made the oft-proposed “strategic alliance” between NGOs and popular organizations more problematic(Carroll 1992, Bebbington 1998, Howes 1999). Again, pressures on international donor agencies by their domestic constituents to show rapid, tangible results reinforce the bias against capacity building approaches. Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches:

• Donors need to commit more resources for long-term organizational capacity building. Such projects can be broken up in stages for monitoring and accounting purposes, and be packaged together with activities that yield tangible outcomes in shorter periods.28

• NGOs also need training and information exchange in organizational development. Invest in training procedures, teaching materials (case studies), and scholarships at local universities for young professionals.

• Distant donors should engage local NGOs for long-term advisory and monitoring functions.29

27 This tendency can be seen most clearly in the latest generation of World Bank-financed rurual development projects, such as the recently launched PROLOCAL in Ecuador (with a loan of $25 million.) While the technical assistance of local NGOs is clearly encouraged, the Bank’s procurement rules make it very difficult to engage advisors for long-term capacity building, as each task or segment must go through competitive bidding procedures. 28 A good example is the recently completed nationwide Technical Assitance for Irrigation Project which has yielded impressive results in both physical and organizational aspects in just four years of operation. 29 The Inter-American Development Foundation, one of the very few donors unflaggingly devoted to organization-building among the poor, has maintained a contractual relationship with prominent in-country NGOs to monitor their projects. Monitors also served as advisors to IAF-supported organizations, an arrangement that worked very well over the years. For budgetary reasons, the Foundations has discontinued

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6. Relations Between Campesino Federations and Local Governments Until recently, in highland Ecuador, rural municipalities were controlled by

white/mestizo elites and the town, as market center, was the site of historic commercial exploitation and abuse of the indigenous rural population. The power holder of the lowest administrative unit, the parroquía was the state-appointed teniente politico who along with the landlords and the priest exercised the traditional triumvirate of control over the campesinos. This system of domination has chaned dramatically in recent years. Thanks largely to the political organizing of the second-level federations, a large number of municipios have elected indigenous mayors and all have now campesino councilors (consejales). And two years ago, the parroquias have, for the first time, elected their own representative juntas parroquiales. Oddly, these developments have generated conflicts that did not exist before: rivalries for political power in the regions and competition for resources, even in areas where the newly elected officies are former indigenous leaders.30 Even though the newly elected parish councils have as yet no operating budgets, there is some antagonism in areas where federations claim representation over the same territory.31 Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches:

• The functions of local decentralized government and of campesino federations, as part of civil society, are essentially complementary. Donor agencies should foster such complementarity. For example, municipalities have a comparative advantage in infrastructure construction, while federations are a natural vehicle for small productive projects for their member communities.

• Donors should encourage municipios to extend basic services to their rural areas and to promote urban-rural integration by modernizing periodic markets and attracting industries that employ non-farm labor.

these in-country services and now relies on local accountants for financial audits. With IAF funding, some of these NGO partners compiled and published excellent reports on capacity-building experiences (Bebbington, Ramon et al 1993). 30 A particularly conflictive situation developed in the canton of Cotacachi in northern Ecuador after an indigenous alcalde was elected. The Inter-American Foundation, in line with their policy of promoting multi-institutional local development, made a $350,000 grant to the cantonal federation UNORCAC, with the condition that the municipality would co-finance the program with a contribution of $236,000. Immediately, conflicts arose over the selection of communities to be benefited and over salaries to be paid to consultants. The confrontation culminated in the federation’s annual assembly in which the mayor accused the board of embezzling funds and insisted on their replacement with his own candidates. The membership rejected the mayor’s choices and elected a new set of officers from among the trusted leaders. The alcalde refused repeatedly to sign the papers specified by the IAF to authorize disbursement of the grant and the municipio’s counterpart contribution was never paid. The vision of the IAF and of other donors to advance local development was frustrated (Wright 2002). 31 In one World Bank project, PRODEPINE, regional development plans are prepared by the second-order federations, while in another, PROLOCAL, such plans are the responsibility of the juntas parroquiales.

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7. Relations with National Confederations

With the recently won prominence of the Ecuadorean indigenous movement at the national scene – especially in the aftermath of the indigenous protests (levantimientos) of the early 90s one would expect that the second-level federations would function as an important building block of the movement at the intermediate level. But curiously, this is not the case. In our studies, the upward linkages between the federations and the top levels of the indigenous confederations were very weak. Each federation functions largely as an independent entity, with only an occasional agreement in the case of electoral politics. While the federations were largely responsible for the mobilization of their rank-and-file in the major demonstrations in the capital (and in blocking key highways in the Sierra), there is remarkably little coordination in the key development policy arenas. Part of the problem is in the fragmentation of the indigenous movement: there are four different national confederations,32within which there are important differences between lowland Amazonian and highland interests. Another reason is that the national leadership is not financed by their constituencies (as in the case of labor unions) but by external funding, usually from European center-left sources. Thirdly, the ideology of the major confederation, CONAIE, is espoused by a relatively small number of indigenous intellectuals (a mixture of ethnic revivalisms and neo-marxisms) which does not resonate well at the level of regional federations, devoted to the urgent bread-and-butter issues of their constituencies and sensitive to the ethnic diversity of the base communities. Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches:

• External agents must operate with an understanding of the complicated politics of the national confederations, especially of the ethnic exclusionist positions of the CONAIE leadership.

• While ethnic resentment toward urban-based racism can be a powerful initial motivation in Sierra federations, the future effectiveness of rural organizations lies in multi-culturalism, in the alliance with non-indigenous campesinos and in bridging the rural-urban divide, where territorial autonomy is less important than overcoming low status and social exclusion.

• Promote links among federations to establish horizontal power coalitions.

8. Relations with the State

In the early phases of peasant organizing, some state agencies, during periods of liberal governments, have contributed to group capacity building, especially during the brief years of the agrarian reforms in the’70s. Subsequently, as the federative form of organization became popular, newly formed organizations sought assistance from a variety of state agencies working in both the productive and social sectors. In fact, one of the main goals of the civil society activists who helped federations to get established was to connect the fledgling federations to state agencies from whose services they were largely excluded.

32 There are sharp differences between the formerly class-based FENOCIN, the evangelical confederation FEINE, the representatives of the black communities CODAE, and the dominant CONAIE.

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This was especially true in bilingual education, insurance, social security and public health. But as a consequence of structural adjustment and privatization, the state gradually withdrew its supporting role to the poor, the number and coverage of government programs to which federations could be linked has dramatically diminished. As a result, there are neither ongoing financial support programs for poor campesinos, nor pro-poor national policies which would consititute a favorable macro environment for the developmental role of the federations. This fundamental macro problem is beyond the capability of most donor agencies, except for the multilateral banks that are in positions to negotate policy conditionalities, as a result of their substantial financial leverage. Lessons for Capacity-building Approaches:

• In comparison with the other Andean countries, it is remarkable that the Ecuadorean macro environment has been sufficiently open to permit the indigenous federation network to develop, and confront power holders at the meso-level. However, for the full flowering of these fedrations, a more actively supporting macro framework is required. 33

• To a great extent, national policy shifts depend on the success of the indigenous/campesino national leadership, as discussed in the previous set of tensions. But donors can use their influence to negotiate commitments for continued resource flows from permanent national budgets (both in terms of social subsidies and of development credits) to insure sustainability of the federations once their rural development projects end.34

• A crucial ingredient in this area is to increase the capacity of the federation leaders to formulate realistic policy proposals, which could be pursued with the help of coalitions and alliances.

V. Conclusions 1. With all the inherent obstacles to successful organizing by poor campesinos, there is evidence that, with sensitive outside assistance, indigenous federations in the Andes can be created and sustained. Such meso-level, or second-order federations have a great potential for both political and economic empowerment. 2. The evidence comes from case studies gathered in the course of field research in 1997-2001. Capacity building was accomplished through the patient and steady efforts of national development NGOs with long-term financing from mostly European donor 33 One example is the case of water policy. Even if further land reforms are politically unlikely, access to irrigation water is an absolutely key policy issue. It is estimated that the redistribution of water rights would result in a 40% increase in agricultural productivity (Wiens 1994). 34 When this was written in March of 2003, it remained to be seen to what extent the new government’s reformist electoral promises would be actually implemented. As in the case of the new Brazilian president, former labor leader Lula, Lucio Gutierrez has been obliged to sign on to IMF restrictions on fiscal policies. But with key ministries in the hands of indigenous leaders and sympathizers (Manuel Chiriboga, a prominent rural sociologist, has just been named vice minister of agriculture), there is a unique opportunity for positive changes.

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agencies. External strategies were less influenced by preconceived designs and more by pragmatic learning in the course of action. In order to expand the scope of these cases (“tales”) for wider application, changes in the policies of the large development agencies and of the governments themselves are required. In Ecuador, paradoxically, while the rise in the political importance of the indigenous national organization (CONAIE) has been aided significantly by the regional federations, there is a serious disconnect between the developmental applications of the bases and the ideology of the top leadership. 3. In spite of the aid agencies’ professed interest in institution-building and sustainability, most development assistance does not contribute to the building of the organizational capacity of membership-based groups and in a number of instances, such assistance has actually weakened existing poor people’s organizations. Yet the latest generation of rural development projects of the World Bank that for the first time explicitly aims at group empowerment make the application of large-scale capacity building approaches possible. 4. One of the most important lessons from the case studies is the disaggregation of federation models, ranging from those pursuing mainly political goals to more productive- economic types of organizations. Forms of federations that either do not require high costs of cooperation/participation from their members or where the relatively high costs of discipline are compensated by high collecive benefits are the most viable models of wide replicability. However, most federations are of the mixed-goal type, in which political, cultural, and economic purposes are pursued simultaneously, with a consequent ambiguity of organizational identity. Strategies for mixed goal federations need to involve prioritization of core activities, combination of projects of “exclusive” benefits with those of more inclusive impact and intensive efforts at upgrading the human resources at all levels. 5. Capacity-building approaches for poor people’s membership organizations differ substantially from those taught and practiced for business enterprises and for government institutions (Howes 1999). Principles of community-development are valid (Leverack 2001), but have to be adjusted for second-level or supra-communal federations, which are essentially “groups of groups” and therefore are more complex social structures, with differing conditions for bonding, bridging and linking relationships. Development agencies must understand the “institutional landscape” of any given territory, not only to detect the best opportunities for organizational interventions but also to become aware of the many conflicts and rivalries in which groups are embedded. 6. The context for indigenous highland organizations in the Andes is of general transition from tradition to modernity. This implies not only market-oriented individualization and differentiation but the weakening of the traditional kin-based social capital that inhered in the reciprocities and consensual discipline of a subsistence-based community system of social reproduction. In such a transition, new motivations for solidarity and collective action are called for. One of the most successful adaptations can be observed in the case studies of irrigation associations (Juntas de Riego) that, with the help of external promoters, have learned to shift from bureaucratic administration to self-management (Perreault et al 1998). Yet, the life of most campesino federations is

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characterized by constant ambiguities and tensions as the old solidarities dissolve, yet much of their organizational infrastructure (such as the frequent rotation of leaders) remains. Issues of class/ethnicity, authoritarianism/democracy, autonomy/dependency or the widening circuits of trust/distrust are joined by tensions based on the need to connect to other agencies operating at the regional level, among them NGOs and decentralized government units. The greatest region-wide development opportunities lie in expanding the role of the municipios to strengthen rural-urban links and create non-farm employment. 7. To navigate through these complications requires a high degree of tolerance for ambiguity and often an acceptance of seemingly contradictory positions. It is not so much the issue of resolving the tensions, but learning to live with them. Perhaps one of the key strategy lessons is to help federations to acquire their own sources of income to pay for their recurrent costs and to provide some endogenous compensation for their leaders and core professionals. It is a precondition to professionalization and to resource development, as reliance on external sources for salaries is unsustainable. The other key lesson is the gradual acquisition of a “critical consciousness” or “strategic vision” by the federation leadership, in dealing with their internal constituency, and with their external environment. This also means the ability for networking with other federations and creating horizontal power coalitions. There is some cautious optimism that in Ecuador the constant erosion of resource flows to the campesino sector and the absence of policy support for rural membership organizations can be reversed. 8. There is no evidence that the federation model can be transferred to an urban setting. Supra-communal urban groups in the Andean cities have failed to take hold. Therefore, now is the last chance to do something about capacity building of indigenous campesino organizations before the accelerated urban migration erases their identity both as peasants and as indigenas..

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