tackling the returning foreign fighter threat: hard or ... · the aim of this essay is twofold....

Tackling the Returning Foreign Fighter Threat: Hard or Soft Approach

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TACKLING THE RETURNING FOREIGN

FIGHTER THREAT: HARD OR SOFT

APPROACH By LTC Harris Tan Nan An

ABSTRACT

Over the past two years, the fortunes of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have turned in the Middle East. In the face of sustained ground operations and airstrikes by the United States (US) and Russian-led coalitions, the terrorist movement has ceded control of its territorial caliphate. As ISIS retreats underground, policy makers have warned of a potential surge in foreign fighters returning to their home countries. With over 1,000 Southeast Asians having joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria since 2012, the region is not immune from the threat posed by returning fighters. This essay endeavours to understand the threat posed by returning foreign fighters to Southeast Asia, and the policy responses available to governments to address this threat. It also argues that policy imbalances, that is, a predominantly ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ approach can have dangerous repercussions. Accordingly, states must be capable of fusing both approaches to manage this complex and multi-faceted issue.

Keywords: Returning Foreign Fighters; Threat of Terrorism; Ideology; Policy Responses; Hard Approach; Soft Approach

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two years, the fortunes of the so-called ISIS have turned in the Middle East. In the face of sustained ground operations and airstrikes by the US-led coalition, as well as Russian and Syrian forces, the terrorist movement has ceded control of its territorial caliphate.1 As ISIS retreats underground, policy makers have warned of a potential surge in foreign fighters returning to their home countries.2 With over 1,000 Southeast Asians having joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria since 2012, the region is not immune from the threat posed by returning fighters. The problem of Southeast Asian returnees will present serious political and security implications. Indeed, concern is high among governments in the region that some returnees may come home with the intent to commit violent acts. Singapore Defence Minister Dr Ng Eng Hen’s comments at the 12th Manama Dialogue is instructive in this respect:

Accordingly, the focus of governments and security agencies, which hitherto has primarily been on preventing

the travel of potential foreign fighters, will have to extend to addressing their return.

The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it endeavours to understand the threat posed by returning foreign

fighters to Southeast Asia. Second, it seeks to explore the policy responses available to governments to address this

threat. In so doing, the benefits and challenges of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policy approaches will be examined. The essay

argues that policy imbalances, that is, a predominantly ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ approach can have dangerous repercussions. Accordingly, states must be capable of fusing both approaches to manage this complex and multi-faceted

issue.

RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS: WHO ARE THEY?

The majority of Southeast Asian fighters who joined ISIS in the Middle East are from Indonesia and Malaysia, with a token presence from Thailand, Philippines and Singapore.4 There, many linked up with the Katibah Nusantara (KN)—ISIS’ Indonesian and Malay brigade in Syria, and regularly participated in fighting.5 It is believed that about 70 of these fighters have been killed in combat, while approximately 200 have returned.6 It is worth noting, however, that while KN was established as ISIS’ Southeast Asian wing, not all foreign fighters from the region have joined it. For instance, some Malaysians have chosen

“Paradoxically, the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria will likely worsen the threat in Southeast Asia. We expect that returning fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and a few from Singapore will likely return to continue their violent plots at home.”3


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instead to fight alongside Algerian, French and Tunisian foreign fighters. Joseph Chinyong Liow observes that a likely reason for this is rivalry and disagreement with the Indonesian leadership of KN.7

The number of returnees is expected to increase as ISIS retreats underground. Those travelling to the region will, however, not be limited to Southeast Asians. As Shashi Jayakumar notes, ‘it would be a mistake to assume that it is only Southeast Asians in Syria and Iraq who will attempt to make the journey.’8 The Philippines’ successful recapture of Marawi from the Basilan-based Abu Sayyaf Group and Maute group is significant in this respect, as it deprives the more hardened returnees, at least in the short-term, of an ISIS foothold and sanctuary.

REASONS FOR RETURNING

According to Richard Barrett of The Soufan Centre, returning foreign fighters can be categorised into four broad categories: (1) those who left after a short stay and were never particularly integrated with the ISIS; (2) those who stayed longer, but did not agree with everything that ISIS was doing; (3) those who were fully committed to ISIS, but were forced out by circumstances, including the loss of territory; and (4) those who were sent abroad to fight for the caliphate elsewhere.9 Strictly speaking, however, the latter group of individuals are ‘not so much returnees as fighters despatched to operate outside the caliphate.’10 Nonetheless, they will ‘look much the same’, and will also be the ‘most vicious and determined of the returnees.’11

This essay posits that yet another category of returnees exists—those who wanted to leave, but stayed for fear of reprisals from their fellow comrades. ISIS, after all, is known to be an organisation that not only demands full commitment from its followers, but also adopts a binary ‘us-versus-them’ worldview. Defections, therefore, are viewed as ‘acts of apostasy’, deserving of deadly reprisal.12

With ISIS’ hold over its members weakened, it is highly likely that the ranks of returning foreign fighters will include members wanting to escape an organisation they no longer feel any allegiance for.

With over 1,000 Southeast Asians

having joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria

since 2012, the region is not immune

from the threat posed by returning

fighters. While the reasons for returning may be as complex

and varied, research suggests that many returnees left due to their disillusionment with ISIS. For many, ISIS had represented ‘a perfect Islamic state which every Muslim had a duty to support and help succeed.’13 In their view, joining ISIS was an opportunity to ‘live in accordance with Sharia law and fight for a holy cause.’14 This dream of an Islamic utopia was, however, ultimately shattered by the infighting they witnessed, the brutality and atrocities committed against ordinary Sunni Muslims, and other instances of corrupt and un-Islamic behaviour.15 There were also many who found life under ISIS harsh and demanding,

and became disenchanted with the menial tasks they were given.16

PROFILE OF RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Regardless of their reasons for returning, the exposure to ISIS’ extremist ideology would have left these returning fighters with what Kumar Ramakrishna terms as a highly-tuned Manichean mindset characterised by ethnocentrism and xenophobia.17 Upon return, they would likely continue to possess totalistic constructions of ‘Islam’, as well as an ‘absolute intolerance’ for non-believers and Muslims who do not subscribe to their extreme interpretations of faith. Accordingly, while some may indeed be disillusioned with ISIS’ tactics and practices, it would be naive, and even dangerous, to assume that they have given up the ‘dream of a pure Islamic state run by rulers committed to the full implementation of the sharia.’18

Many returnees would certainly be more accustomed to blood and violence, and possess a greater tolerance for extreme action. Reportedly, at least two Malaysian ISIS fighters, including Muhammad Wanndy, the alleged mastermind of the 2016 Puchong grenade attack, have been involved in gruesome beheadings. In addition, a Singaporean, Megat Shahdan Abdul Samad was shown executing a man in an ISIS propaganda video. Almost

Weapons and other paraphernalia allegedly owned by members of the Maute group; confiscated by the Philippine Army in July 2018.

Wikipedia


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certainly, as Barrett notes, most returnees will unlikely ‘experience anything in their lives at home that matches the intensity of their experience as a member of ISIS, whether or not they were fighting on the frontline.’19 The implication is that if on return, they begin again to feel as rootless and lacking in purpose as they did before leaving, there then exists a real possibility that they will not settle back into a ‘normal life.’20 This challenge is further exacerbated by the strong sense of transnational Salafi jihadi brother that they are likely to possess, having met and trained with fellow militants from other countries. Finally, it is inevitable that some will remain committed to violent jihad.

It is perhaps useful at this juncture to highlight an often-overlooked group that will form a subset of returnees—the women and children of ISIS. While the central role of female members has been to rear children and look after the men, there have been reports of women deployed as suicide bombers. It is certainly plausible that some women may have been coerced into travelling to Syria. Most, however, may be assumed to have gone there willingly, probably for much the same reasons as the men.21 As with male foreign fighters, it is therefore likely that a

number of female returnees will present a terrorist risk.

Complicating the returnee problem is the issue of children either born or raised in the caliphate by their foreign fighter parents.22 Of particular concern are children of Malaysian and Indonesian fighters who have received education and military training at KN’s Abdullah Azzam Academy.23 They will, despite their young age, pose a security risk because of their exposure to extremist ideology, violence and weapons training. Having been immersed in a culture of violence, these children will require attention, without which the potential is high that

they will become the next generation of fighters.24

THREAT POSED BY RETURNEES

While returning fighters have as yet not added significantly to the threat of terrorism around the world, all returnees will likely pose some degree of risk. Specifically, the threat posed by returnees is three-fold.

ISIS, after all, is known to be an

organisation that not only demands

full commitment from its followers,

but also adopts a binary ‘us-versus-

them’ worldview. First, their return may contribute to the promotion of

ISIS ideology and propaganda, leading to cognitive and ideological shifts that increase the potential for inter and intra-religious conflicts.25 Increasing the susceptibility of Muslims in the region to extremist ideology is the spread of Wahhabism, which has over the years, been observed to lay the foundation for a ‘narrow and dogmatic interpretation of Islam’, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia.26 Accompanying this trend of growing conservatism is the heavy politicisation of Islam in both countries, where political leaders have increasingly taken to using religion to amplify difference and reinforce extreme interpretations of Muslim rights.27 Of concern, both trends promote exclusivism in place of pluralism and compromise, and have the effect of feeding an extremist mindset.

Second, there is the danger that returning foreign fighters will be hailed as heroes and accepted as natural leaders of militant movements in their home country.28 This would not only make their reintegration into society impossible, but the prestige gained of having lived and experienced combat as a mujahid in the caliphate would also be a powerful magnet to draw new supporters and fighters for local militant groups.29 This is a worrying prospect considering Indonesian Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu’s estimate that there are currently some 700 ISIS sympathisers in Indonesia alone.30

Third, a more dangerous consequence of their return would be the launching of terror attacks at home. Jasminder Singh makes the astute observation that these combat veterans will pose an ‘existential threat to their home countries and the wider region’ due to their battlefield experience and military know-how.31 As ISIS’ operational focus shifts beyond the Middle East, some returnees can be expected to take up the call to conduct terrorist operations in Southeast Asia. Indeed, one such attack has already been reported in Indonesia. On 25th June, 2017, Syawaluddin Pakphahan, a returnee who fought with

Photo of British Islamic militant Samantha Lewthwaite on her Wanted profile on Interpol.

Wikipedia


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the Free Syrian Army, was one of two men who attempted an attack on a police headquarters in Medan. According to the Indonesian police, Pakphahan was inspired to launch the attack following calls from ISIS to carry out attacks via the Internet.32 Additionally, should attacks be carried out in non-majority Muslim countries such as Singapore, there is the real danger that they will encourage a backlash and Islamophobia. This will ultimately play into the hands of extremist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Many returnees would certainly be more accustomed to blood and violence, and possess a greater tolerance for extreme action.

POLICY RESPONSE — HARD APPROACH

In general, government policies for dealing with returnees can be categorised into one of two approaches. The first, the ‘hard’ approach, is characterised by legislative and administrative measures that securitise and criminalise the problem at hand. Many countries, for instance, have sought to criminalise travel to foreign conflict zones, enhance prosecution powers, expand the scope of measures for extradition, as well as introduce long-term

prison sentences and preventive detention laws for terrorism-related offences.33 Additionally, Western states such as the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and Australia, which typically favour the ‘hard approach’ have adopted repressive administrative measures that include travel bans, entry bans, and citizenship revocation.34 At its extreme, ‘hard’ policies can involve the use of deadly force to prevent their return. The motivations underlying such severe policy choices is well expressed by UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson:

Preventive Detention Laws

Within Southeast Asia, elements of the ‘hard’ approach can be found within the security policies of Malaysia and Singapore. Both countries, for instance, exercise the use of restrictive and preventive detention laws against suspected terrorist and returnees. In Singapore, ISIS suspects can be held under the Internal Security Act (ISA) without trial for up to two years. Similarly,

“Quite simply, I do not believe that any terrorist, whether they come from this country or any other, should ever be allowed back into this country. We should do everything we can to destroy and eliminate that threat.”35

A summary of the procedure for preventive detention under the Internal Security Act.

Wikipedia


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Malaysia employs the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act and Prevention of Terrorism Act, which allow for preventive detention ranging from 28 days to two years.36 Reportedly, Malaysia has detained over 340 terror suspects since 2013.

As ISIS’ operational focus shifts

beyond the Middle East, some

returnees can be expected to take up

the call to conduct terrorist

operations in Southeast Asia.

In contrast, Indonesia’s current anti-terror laws do not provide for a pre-emptive approach along the lines practised in Singapore and Malaysia. Under Indonesia’s anti-terror law 15/2003, terror activities committed outside the country’s borders cannot be prosecuted back home. Its options, in terms of dealing with the returning foreign fighter threat, are thus limited. The gap in Indonesia’s laws has potentially dangerous ramifications for the rest of the region. For example, by retaining the right to hold their passports, returnees can travel to neighbouring countries to launch attacks.

The criticisms levelled by political opponents and human rights activists against the use of preventive laws usually focus on its potential for misuse by the government of the day. Yet, as the case of Pakphahan demonstrates, without ISA and the like, security agencies will only be able to act when a crime has been committed, by which time a massive loss of lives would have resulted.37 There is

therefore the case to be made that preventive detention measures do aid in directly preventing the occurrence of potential foreign fighter threats, at least in the immediate term.

Imprisonment

An approach generally favoured by the West to deal with returning foreign fighters is long-term imprisonment. In Canada and France, for instance, the act of travelling abroad to fight with the Islamist group is a crime punishable by up to 10 years of imprisonment. This approach remains largely absent in Southeast Asia, although this will change if revisions to Indonesia’s anti-terrorism laws proposed after the 2016 Jakarta attacks are accepted by the Indonesian parliament. Among the proposed changes is a maximum jail sentence of 15 years for Indonesians found guilty of taking part in paramilitary training inside or outside the country, with the aim of planning or carrying out acts of terrorism.38

Incarceration without effective rehabilitation programmes, however, is only likely to postpone the returning fighter problem. In other words, the threat posed by the returnee is delayed till he is released from prison. The Indonesian prison experience with convicted terrorists indicates that recidivism is a key problem. Many terrorist convicts, once released from prison, have been found to demonstrate an inclination to return to their old networks and re-engage in violence.39 There is no reason why returning fighters would not do likewise. Carl Ungerer explains this recidivist tendency, suggesting that unlike ordinary criminals, many terror convicts do not view incarceration as a harsh form of punishment. Instead, a life behind bars is considered to be like being in an istana uzlah, or ‘a palace of isolation’, where they can continue to dedicate their lives to religion.40

A more troubling issue is the apparent relationship between imprisonment and radicalisation. As the Indonesian prison experience again demonstrates, imprisonment carries with it real risks that an extremist prisoner will exert malign influence on his fellow inmates and prison officers.41 Neither does segregating extremists from the mainstream prison population appear to present a useful alternative. If extremists are grouped together, their views are likely to harden. As Russell Razzaque aptly puts it, they will ‘feed off each other’s notions, pushing one another’s worldviews inexorably into further extremes.’42

Poor prison management due to the lack of resources, inadequate training, or corruption can also undermine efforts to combat terrorism and extremism. For instance, the relative freedom to mingle and congregate with one another, as well as engage in ‘dakwah’ or proselytization in Indonesian prisons have enabled terrorist convicts to both expand their personal networks and recruit new members.43 Finally, it is uncertain how, if the revised

laws are approved, Indonesian courts will go about proving one’s intent of ‘planning or carrying out acts of terrorism’. Accordingly, many returnees may fail to meet the required evidentiary threshold, making the laws all but redundant.

POLICY RESPONSE – SOFT APPROACH

The second approach, also known as the ‘soft’ approach, is generally described as rehabilitation and reintegration. A key benefit of the rehabilitation approach is that it recognises that not all returning foreign fighters are the same. It accepts that while all returnees pose some form of security risk, they are at the same time a heterogeneous group comprising those committed to violent jihad, those disillusioned with ISIS, as well as those who can be regarded as ‘victims’ of terrorist recruitment, such as the children of foreign fighters.44 In her study of


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Indonesian jihadists, Julie Hwang observes that disillusionment, coupled with the realisation that violence was counter-productive, or changing priorities, have served as key drivers for successful disengagement from violence.45

It follows therefore, that rehabilitation programmes, more so than incarceration, will offer returnees a way out of terrorist networks and the circle of potential violence.46

A rehabilitative approach also recognises another important point, that is, unless returnees change their views, they will continue to pose an enduring threat to public safety and security when released.47 Worse, they may contribute to regeneration by spreading their radical ideas amongst their communities, thus increasing the pool of sympathisers and supporters.48 The ‘soft’ approach therefore stems from the understanding that to neutralise the threat that returnees pose, a rehabilitation programme is ultimately essential to change their mindsets towards rejecting violence and embracing peace.

A third benefit of the ‘soft approach’ is that rehabilitated returnees can have an important positive influence to inspire other extremists to disengage from violence.49 In this respect, the Indonesian police have observed some successes in their rehabilitation of terrorist convicts. It has been reported, for example, that former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members have revised their stances on violence after meeting with Bali bomb maker Ali Imron and former JI head of Mantiqi III Nasir Abas, both of whom have been helping the police with de-radicalisation efforts in prison.50 A successful case of rehabilitation is also likely to engender an additional positive outcome for security forces. As returnees open up during the rehabilitation process, they also transform into important sources of information, particularly if they held positions of influence within ISIS networks.

Finally, rehabilitation programmes provide a pragmatic alternative to deal with vulnerable individuals who cannot be prosecuted under the criminal justice system.51 These include amongst them the children of foreign fighters, who are unlikely to be punishable by law due to their young age.

Challenges

Rehabilitation programmes are, however, extremely resource intensive. Rehabilitation is also a long-term process, which may take anywhere from a few months to years. The ideal rehabilitation model, according to Rohan Gunaratna, involves a six-pronged approach that focuses on religious, social, vocational, educational, creative and psychological issues that cause extremism.52 In other words, rehabilitation requires a whole-of-society approach involving not only the government and its security agencies,

but also Muslim leaders and clerics, and the community at large. For rehabilitation to be complete, post-release aftercare in the form of financial and moral support is also essential to ensure the individual’s reintegration into society.53 Given the significant resources required, some countries such as Egypt have chosen to discontinue their rehabilitation programmes due to the lack of government funding.54

Finally, any attempt at the rehabilitation of returnees, if they remain cognitive extremists, is likely to be very difficult. According to a former JI leader, the stock attitude among extremists is that ‘jihad is the main aim in life.’55 Consequently, rehabilitation programmes have seen their fair share of failures. In one infamous example, a project that sought to reintegrate ex-terrorist convicts by providing employment instead created the financial resources for the establishment of a new terrorist group—the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur.56 In spite of the huge resources involved, some individuals will never get rehabilitated because of their strong resistance to the programme. As a case in point, four out of the 60 individuals arrested for terrorism-related activities by the Singapore authorities from 2001 to 2013 remain in custody, while two have relapsed.57 This is despite the efforts of counsellors from the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

As ISIS reels from its defeat, its followers have one of three options. They may choose to retreat underground with ISIS as it rearms and recuperate; they may travel abroad in search of the next jihadi theatre; or they may return to their home countries.58 Some among the latter group will return disillusioned with the practices and behaviour of ISIS. Within this group, there will, however, be those who remain committed to violent jihad. They may return with the aim to resuscitate dormant networks, recruit new members, and eventually carry out attacks.59 Whatever their plans, they will certainly be equipped with some degree of military know-how, making them an existential threat to the peace and stability of their home countries and the region.

Rehabilitation programmes are,

however, extremely resource intensive.

Rehabilitation is also a long-term

process, which may take anywhere

from a few months to years.


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Accordingly, authorities in the region have assessed the issue of returning fighters to present important policy implications. Compounding the problem is the fact that some returnees will inevitably fall outside of the criminal justice system. The families of foreign fighters, particularly the children, represent just one such group. This suggests that the approach of criminalising the issue alone will not be sufficient. Some analysts have gone as far as to suggest that what returnees really need is ‘psychological care, not prison time.’60 This appears to be too simplistic an approach for the potential of returnees to engage in terror acts will be ever present until they have rejected in their minds the recourse to violence against whom they consider infidels. An overly ‘soft’ approach is therefore, unlikely to be practicable.

In spite of the huge resources

involved, some individuals will never

get rehabilitated because of their

strong resistance to the programme.

As a case in point, four out of the 60

individuals arrested for terrorism-

related activities by the Singapore

authorities from 2001 to 2013

remain in custody, while two have

relapsed. The logical conclusion is that a multi-faceted

approach combining elements of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policy responses is necessary. In the short term, preventive detention laws, when used prudently, provide the best means to prevent the threats posed by returning foreign fighters from actualising. Where such laws are absent, as in the case of Indonesia, the criminal justice system and

imprisonment offer the next best solution. For the former to be effective, however, strong laws are first needed. In other words, the act of travelling overseas to train with, or fight for, any organisation needs to be criminalised. The

prison system will also have to be strengthened with specially trained personnel, as well as with strict controls on visits, communications and donations. With proposals to establish special high security prisons for leading Indonesian jihadists, particular effort must also be taken to segregate returnees who are amongst them cognitive radicals from the cognitive extremists, in order to prevent their further radicalisation.61

Both forms of ‘hard’ approaches must be complemented by rehabilitation programmes. The policy question is whether the aim of such programmes should be de-radicalisation, or disengagement from violence. Simple disengagement, where the individual chooses to cease participation in acts of violence, almost certainly seems to be a more realistic and achievable goal.62 This is particularly so in Indonesia where the scale of the returning fighter problem looms much larger. This is, however, unlikely to be a sufficient policy objective in multi-racial societies such as Singapore and Malaysia. After all, an individual may disengage without completely de-radicalising. In other words, he continues to be a ‘cognitive extremist’ who holds on to intolerant, uncompromising views of religion—views he is likely to promote to those willing to listen. As an extremist, his core beliefs on the legitimacy of violence do not change, and there is little telling when he may act on them.63 Additionally, there is the case to be made that Singapore and Malaysia, which have well-established prevention and rehabilitation mechanisms in place, are in stronger position to adopt a more stringent approach towards de-radicalisation.

In closing, the returning foreign fighter problem is a

complex issue that demands a multi-faceted response. Also essential is political will on the part of governments in the region, without which, well thought out laws and programmes cannot be effective.

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Neumann, Peter. “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors.” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 18 September 2015, available at http://icsr.info/2015/09/icsr-report-narratives-islamic-state-defectors/

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ENDNOTES

1. Rohan Gunaratna, “Annual Treat Assessment,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 2017), p. 2.

2. Alastair Reed and Johanna Pohl, “Tackling the Surge of Returning Foreign Fighters,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 14 July 2017, available at https://icct.nl/publication/tackling-the-surge-of-returning-foreign-fighters/.

3. Chong Zi Liang, “Coalition against ISIS Warn of Threat Posed by Returning Fighters at Manama Dialogue,” The Straits Times, 10 December 2016, available at http://www.straitstimes.com/world/coalition-against-isis-warn-of-threat-posed-by-returning-fighters-at-manama-dialogue

4. Jasminder Singh, “Danger of Southeast Asian Jihadi Returnees: Need for an ASEAN-wide Policy,” RSIS Commentary, No. 7 (January 2016), p.1

5. Shashi Jayakumar, “The Islamic State Looks East: The Growing Threat in Southeast Asia,” CTC Sentinel, No. 10, Vol. 2 (February 2017), p. 29.

6. Singh, “Danger of Southeast Asian Jihadi Returnees,” p. 1.

7. Joseph Chinyong Liow, “ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing Terrorism in Southeast Asia and the Threat to the Homeland,” Brookings, 27 April 2016, available at https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/isis-in-the-pacific-assessing-terrorism-in-southeast-asia-and-the-threat-to-the-homeland/.

8. Jayakumar, “The Islamic State Looks East,” p. 30.


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9. Richard Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees,” The Soufan Center (October 2017), pp. 18-19.

10. Ibid., p. 21.

11. Ibid.

12. Peter Neumann, “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors”, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 18 September 2015, available at http://icsr.info/2015/09/icsr-report-narratives-islamic-state-defectors/.

13. Ibid., p. 9.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 10-11.


17. Kumar Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean Mindset (Singapore: Springer, 2015), pp. 15-16.

18. Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate,” p. 19.

19. Ibid., p. 15.

20. Ibid

21. Ibid., p. 23.

22. Lorenzo Vidino, “How Real is the Threat of Returning ISIS Fighters,” BBC News, 23 Oct 2017, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41679377.

23. Kumar Ramakrishna, “Understanding Youth Radicalisation in the Age of ISIS: A Psychosocial Analysis,” E-International Relations, 11 February 2016, available at http://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/11/understanding-youth-radicalization-in-the-age-of-isis-a-psychosocial-analysis/.

24. Ibid., pp. 2-4.


26. Kumar Ramakrishna, “Reflections of a Reformed Jihadist, The Story of Wan Min Wan Mat,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 31, No. 3 (December 2016), p. 513.

27. Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum,” Brookings, 21 April 2015, available at https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/malaysias-isis-conundrum/.


29. Ibid.

30. Ryamizard Ryacudu, “Finding Common Ground on Regional Security” (speech, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2017, Singapore, 4 June 2017).

31. Ibid.

32. Amy Chew, “Indonesia Still Debating Legal Loophole allowing Terror Suspects to Go Free,” CNA, 10 August 2017, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/indonesia-still-debating-legal-loophole-allowing-terror-suspects-9107744.

33. Charles Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalisation or Rehabilitation,” Brookings (August 2015), p. 4.

34. Berenice Boutin, “Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search of Limits and Safeguards,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Dec 2016), p. 3.


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35. Jessica Elgot, “British ISIS Fighters should be Hunted Down and Killed, Says Defence Secretary,” The Guardian, 8 December 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/07/british-isis-fighters-should-be-hunted-down-and-killed-says-defence-secretary-gavin-williamson

36. Sumisha Naidu, “Surge in Malaysia’s Islamic State-linked Arrests; Official Explains Anti-Terror Strategy,” CNA, 19 October 2017, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/surge-in-malaysia-s-islamic-state-linked-arrests-official-9324112.

37. Bilveer Singh, “Prevention of Terrorism: Relevance of POTA in Malaysia,” RSIS Commentary, No. 75 (31 March 2015), p. 2.

38. Naidu, “Surge in Malaysia’s Islamic State-linked Arrests.”

39. Carl Ungerer, “Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian Prison Experience,” ASPI-RSIS Joint Report, No. 40 (May 2011), p. 2.

40. Ibid., p. 13.

41. Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate,” p. 27.

42. Russell Razzaque, Human Being to Human Bomb: Inside the Mind of a Terrorist (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2008), p. 100.

43. Ungerer, “Jihadists in Jail,” pp. 12-13.

44. Reed, and Pohl, “Tackling the Surge of Returning Foreign Fighters.”

45. Julie Chernov Hwang, “The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists: Understanding the Pathways,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2017), pp. 279 & 291.

46. Eva Entenmann, Liesbeth van der Heide, Daan Weggemans, and Jessica Dorsey, “Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Dec 2015), p. 12.

47. Rohan Gunaratna, “Global Terrorist Rehabilitation and Community Engagement Programmes: The State of the Art” (presentation, International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation and Community Resilience, Singapore, 12-13 March 2013).

48. Ibid.

49. Entenmann et al., “Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters?”, p. 12.

50. Ungerer, “Jihadists in Jail,” pp. 15-16.

51. Entenmann et al., “Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters?”, p. 12.

52. Nurfilzah Rohaidi, “Exclusive: Can Singapore Really Rehabilitate Terrorists?” GovInsider, 5 April 2017, available at https://govinsider.asia/security/singapore-terrorist-rehabilitation-rohan-gunaratna/.

53. Gunaratna, “Global Terrorist Rehabilitation and Community Engagement Programmes.”

54. Ibid.

55. Ramakrishna, “Reflections of a Reformed Jihadist,” p. 509.

56. Navhat Nuraniyah, “Returning Indonesian Fighters from Syria and Iraq: Learning from the Past,” RSIS Commentary, No. 35 (17 February 2015), p. 3.

57. Rohaidi, “Exclusive: Can Singapore Really Rehabilitate Terrorists?”

58. Colin Clarke, and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Where Do ISIS Fighters Go when the Caliphate Falls?” The Atlantic, 6 March 2017, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/isis-foreign-fighter-jihad-syria-iraq/518313/

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Bilveer Singh, “Revising Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Laws,” RSIS Commentary, No. 57 (March 2016), p. 2.


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LTC Harris Tan Nan An is an Infantry Officer by vocation and is currently serving as a Branch Head in MINDEF. He graduated from the National University of Singapore (NUS) with a Bachelors of Arts (BA) in History in 2008 and from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) with a Masters of Strategic Studies in 2018. LTC Tan also attended the 48th Command and Staff College Course in 2017 and was awarded the Top Graduate for the Army Faculty.

62. Ungerer, “Jihadists in Jail,” p. 18.

63. Hwang, “The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists,” p. 279.

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