tackling corruption in afghanistan: it’s now or never

8/21/2019 Tackling Corruption in Afghanistan: It’s Now or Never

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1 Center for American Progress | Tackl ing Corruption i n Afghan istan

Tackling Corruption in Afghanistan

It’s Now or Never

By Mary Beth Goodman and Trevor Sutton March 17, 2015

In March, Aghanisan Presiden Ashra Ghani and Chie Execuive Abdullah Abdullah

will make heir firs visi o he Unied Saes since assuming office under a power-sharing

agreemen reached in 2014. While he ormaion o a uniy governmen setled monhs

o poliical ension, he new coaliion aces serious challenges. O he many hreas o

Aghanisan’s long-erm securiy and economic developmen, wo sand ou as especiallypersisen and grave. Te oremos hrea is he aliban insurgency in he counry’s Souh

and Eas; he second mos pressing issue is widespread corrupion.

While hese wo challenges may seem very differen in naure, hey are in ac inimaely

conneced. Pervasive graf in he governmen has creaed deep rusraion wih he Wesern-

backed regime in Kabul and undermined he inegriy o he Aghan adminisraion.

Corrupion has criically weakened he Aghan miliary and police and impeded he

flow o ouside aid and invesmen o hose mos in need. Tese condiions have ueled

insurgency in many pars o he counry and creaed a void in delivering assisance and

providing governmenal services across Aghanisan.

Te Unied Saes and oher donors should seize on he poliical and public momenum

o comba corrupion in Aghanisan. I is essenial o accelerae plans o assis Kabul in

developing an arsenal o ools aimed a increasing accounabiliy and ransparency while

reducing corrupion and graf.

Tis issue brie surveys he key acors driving corrupion in Aghanisan and heir harmul

impac on Aghanisan’s securiy and economic developmen. I also offers a se o

recommendaions and ools or combaing corrupion ha should be prioriized by Aghan

officials and suppored by he Unied Saes and oher donors.


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Putting corruption front and center

Tis official visi by Presiden Ghani and Chie Execuive Abdullah comes a a crucial

momen or Aghanisan, as he counry seeks o peaceully conclude he firs democraic

ranser o power in is modern hisory. I also comes during a delicae period in U.S.-

Aghanisan relaions, which enered a new phase las December ollowing he ormal

end o he NAO comba mission in he counry. Te diminished U.S. and NAOmiliary presence in Aghanisan means ha he new governmenalready sruggling o

orm a cabinewill shoulder unprecedened responsibiliy or mainaining peace and

sabiliy over he coming monhs and years.

While here are many dire predicions or Aghanisan’s sabiliy and uure, he

elecion o new leadership presens a new opporuniy o prioriize effors o improve

governance, figh corrupion, and enhance accounabiliy. Boh Ghani and Abdullah

made anicorrupion effors a key componen o heir presidenial campaigns. Te

poliical will o ackle graf in Aghanisan, and he demand rom ciizens o do so, is

arguably greaer han ever beore.

Corrupion is broadly defined as he abuse o enrused auhoriyboh public and

privaeor illegiimae gain. I is an impedimen no only o economic growh and

developmen, bu also o poliical sabiliy, democracy, and susainable peace. In ragile

and conflic-riddled counries such as Aghanisan, corrupion can deeply undermine he

effeciveness and legiimacy o nascen governmen insiuions. As one acive-duy officer

recenly observed, poor governance has mean ha aliban commanders “wield boh

he carro and he sick in he minds o many Aghans.”1

Alhough corrupion in Aghanisan canno be eliminaed overnigh, i could besignificanly reduced, and even modes improvemens in public accounabiliy will

subsanially enhance he legiimacy o he new governmen. As Aghanisan seeks o

sand on is own, he naional uniy governmen canno afford o appear indifferen o

he anger many Aghans eel oward an enrenched elie widely perceived o be moivaed

more by greed han by a spiri o public service. Likewise, he rusraion o he American

public over revelaions o he massive scale o raud and wase o U.S. axpayer unds in

Aghanisan mus be considered.

An epidemic of graft

ransparency Inernaionalan organizaion ha assesses ciizens’ views o endemic

corrupionhas consisenly ranked Aghanisan as one o he op five mos corrup

counries in he world, according o is Corrupion Percepions Index.2 According o a

recen U.N. survey, hal o Aghans repored paying a bribe in 2012; ha figure was as

high as 70 percen in some areas o he counry.3 Te same survey ound ha corrupion


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was roughly ied wih insecuriy as he issue o greaes concern o Aghans, ahead o

unemploymen, sandard o living, and even governmen perormance as a general

mater.4 Consisen wih hese findings, he U.S. Agency or Inernaional Developmen

assessed in 2009 ha corrupion in Aghanisan “has become pervasive, enrenched,

sysemic, and by all accouns now unprecedened in scale and reach.”5 As recenly as

February, he U.S. Deparmen o Deense Join Chies o Saff wroe, “corrupion alienaes

key elemens o he populaion, discredis he governmen and securiy orces, underminesinernaional suppor, subvers sae uncions and rule o law, robs he sae o revenue,

and creaes barriers o economic growh.”6

Widespread popular resenmen o he various mujahideen warlords who governed he

counry in fiedoms ollowing he wihdrawal o he Sovie Union aciliaed he aliban’s

rise o power in he mid-1990s. Te violence o he warlords ueled his resenmen, bu

so did he graf and injusice ha characerized heir rule. Te aliban’s promise o swif

and imparial rule-o-law resonaed wih much o Aghanisan’s populaion o he ime

and coninues o resonae or some Aghans odaydespie is exreme brualiy.7

Corrupion reemerged as a poen orce in Aghan lie ollowing he U.S.-led inernaional

coaliion’s overhrow o he aliban in 2001. In he early years o he NAO mission in

Aghanisan, a wide nework o poliical elies conneced o Presiden Hamid Karzai

effecively posiioned hemselves as inermediaries beween well-inenioned Wesern

officials, donors, and ordinary Aghans.8 Te poliical elies succeeded in divering billions

o oreign aid dollars and invesmen o hemselves and heir allies, resuling in a number

o high-profile scandals. Te mos disasrous o hese was he near-collapse o he Aghan

banking sysem ollowing revelaions ha is larges insiuion, Kabul Bank, had essenially

served as a ponzi scheme or a narrow clique ied o he Karzai governmen.9

Bu he spread o corrupion has no been confined o Aghanisan’s poliical upper

echelon; i has pervaded virually every aspec o governmen operaions and he daily

exisence o ciizens. According o he 2012 U.N. survey, approximaely hal o Aghans

repored having paid a bribe o a eacher.10 Similar numbers o Aghans repored paying

bribes o cusoms officials, judges, and prosecuors, and slighly less han hal o survey

respondens repored paying off land regisry officials and provincial officers.11

Enire governmen insiuions have become enmeshed in complex paronage neworks

ha srech rom minor uncionaries o high-ranking minisers.12 Nowhere has his been

more eviden han in he realm o cusoms and border conrol. Te New York imes recenly

repored, “corrupion can no longer be described as a cancer on he sysem: I is he

sysem.”13 A recen repor by he Special Inspecor General or Aghan Reconsrucion,

or SIGAR , esimaed ha more han hal o Aghanisan’s annual cusoms revenue is

being los o graf.14


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Perhaps mos roubling, howeverrom he perspecive o Aghanisan’s pos-conflic

ransiionhas been he persisen corrupion ha has plagued he organs o governmen

direcly responsible or law and order. Te Aghan Naional Police, or ANP, have become

paricularly noorious or pernicious graf. SIGAR has repeaedly auled he Aghan

Minisry o he Inerior or ailing o properly accoun or billions o dollars allocaed or

police salaries via a U.N.-adminisered rus und.15 According o SIGAR’s mos recen

audi repor, corrup pracices wihin he minisry “could ake as much as 50 [percen] oa policeman’s salary.”16 Tis underpaymen has predicably resuled in a high incidence o

corrup soliciaions by police officers, which affecs

ordinary Aghans mos direcly. A 2012 survey by

he Asia Foundaion ound ha more han hal o

Aghans who had conac wih an ANP officer over

he previous year were orced o pay a bribe.17

Te Aghan Naional Army, while more proes-

sional han he ANP, has also sruggled wih

misallocaion o resources and high incidenceso bribe soliciaion.18 A 2013 ransparency

Inernaional survey ound ha one-fifh o Aghans

viewed he miliar y as corrup.19 By conras, he

jusice sysem may be even more revi led han he

policeboh he ransparency Inernaional and

Unied Naions surveys ound ha Aghans consider

judges he judiciary he mos corrup segmen o

heir sociey.20

FIGURE 1

Corrupt officials in Afghanistan

Percentage distribution of bribes by requesting official

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Corruption in Afghanistan: Bri bery as reported by the victims"

(2010) available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-

survey2010-Eng.pdf.

Public official

Judges

Municipal and provincial officers

Customs officers

Prosecutors

Police officers

Members of the government

Cadastre officers

Tax and revenues officers

Others

Percentage

19

14

10

9

7

6

4

4

27

FIGURE 2

Daily corruption in Afghanistan

Percentage of respondents that believe corruption is a major problem in daily life

Source: Asia Foundation, "Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People" (2014), available at http://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/

Afghanistanin2014final.pdf.

40%2006

42%

2007

47%

2008

51%

2009

53%

2010

55%

2011

56%

2012

56%

2013

56%

2014

62%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%


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Causes and effects of corruption

Te causes o corrupion in Aghanisan are numerous and complex. Decades o conflic

have severely hampered he developmen and mainenance o effecive governmen

insiuions and he civil organizaions ha monior hem. Te counry’s legislaive and

regulaory rameworks are pachwork and inconsisenly enorced, and he agencies

asked wih fighing corrupion and imposing rule o law ofen work in isolaion andconradic one anoher. Educaion levels are low; illieracy is rampan among he ANP

and ANSF.21 Civil ser vans are requenly underpaid, and hey receive litle raining.

Afer decades o war, officials use he opporuniy o public office o fill personal coffers

and channel unds o paronage neworks a he expense o public good.

In Aghanisan and oher counries wih ribal sysems and enrenched ehnic divisions,

srucural weaknesses inerac in complex ways wih radiional ideas abou paronage

and kinshipparicularly wih he expecaion ha hose who have influence wield i o

benefi members o heir exended nework. A recen assessmen by he Join and

Coaliion Operaional Analysis, or JCOA, deermined ha corrupion in Aghanisan was grealy exacerbaed by he U.S. governmen’s “iniial suppor o warlords, [and]

reliance on logisics conracing,” coupled wih he lack o undersanding by U.S. and

coaliion officials o he scale or naure o Aghan corrupion.22

In he immediae response o he atacks o Sepember 11, he Unied Saes uilized

exising paronage neworks and local warlords o deea he aliban and Al Qaeda.

Similarly, Presiden Karzai placed warlords in key governmen posiions when he ook

office o obain loyaly and susain poliical power.23 According o JCOA, “Once ensconced

wihin minisries and oher governmen poss, he warlords-cum-minisers ofen used

heir posiions o diver [Aghan governmen resources] o heir consiuencies,”24

andhus embedded corrupion wihin he new democraic sysem. A recen World Bank

repor observed ha expecaions o reciprocal paronage enrenched in Aghan sociey

have led o “consan atemps o inerere wih sandard meri-based appoinmen

processes by members o he governmen, he Presiden’s office, members o Parliamen,

individual commanders, and influenial poliical personaliies o all origins.”25

Tese condiions would likely produce significan levels o corrupion under any

circumsances. In Aghanisan, however, heir effecs have been amplified by wo acors

unique o counry’s roubled hisory: a massive influx o oreign assisanceofen

disribued wihou proper monioring mechanisms and which quickly exceeds he

absorpive capaciy o he Aghan governmenand a resurgen narcoics rade, which

has a warping effec on he Aghan economy ha is hard o oversae.


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Wih respec o oreign assisance, he Unied Saes alone conribued more han $73

billion in economic and miliary assisance o Aghanisan beween 2002 and 2012.26

According o he World Bank, oreign aid and spending by oreign roops accouned or

97 percen o Aghanisan’s gross domesic produc, or GDP, in 2012.27 Te World Bank

has also esimaed ha 70 percen o overall public spending in Aghanisan occurs

ouside he ormal governmen budge.28 Ye corrupion has direcly undermined he

effors o he inernaional communiyabove all, he Unied Saeso arm and rain Aghan policeman and soldiers. Las year, a SIGAR audi ound incomplee racking

inormaion or more han 200,000 weapons ha he U.S. Deparmen o Deense had

provided or he Aghan Naional Securiy Forces, or ANSF, which encompasses boh

he police and miliary orces.29

Cash flows o such a significan magniude would pose monioring challenges or even

he mos scrupulous o donors and absorpive capaciy issues or even he mos effecive

governmens. For many years, however, he Unied Saes and oher major reconsrucion

parners demonsraed litle abiliy o rackor ineres in rackinghe ulimae use o

heir unds. Securiy consrains on boh miliary and civilian officials prohibied effecivemonioring, evaluaion o projecs, and spending oversigh. As a resul, a culure o

dependence arose in which he governmen relied on subconracors o implemen and

deliver needed programs and supplies. “Compounding he problem … [o corrupion],

he inernaional communiy exercised only limied oversigh o is spending due o

poor securiy environmen. Tis was urher exacerbaed by he communiy members’

unwillingness o place condiions on he provision o heir aid,” according o JCOA.30

Even oday, oversigh o conracors, who received an esimaed $37 billion o assis in

reconsrucion effors beween 2002 and 2013, is marred by poor coordinaion and

widespread lack o compliance wih rules and sandards.31

In esimony submited onFebruary 25 o he U.S. Senae Commitee on Appropriaions, Subcommitee on he

Deparmen o Sae, Foreign Operaions, and Relaed Programs, John F. Sopko, he special

inspecor general or Aghanisan Reconsrucion, saed ha “more han $50 billion in

U.S. assisance had been provided or reconsrucion in Aghanisan since 2002 wihou

he benefi o a comprehensive ani-corrupion sraegy, and ha U.S. anicorrupion

effors had provided relaively litle assisance o some key Aghan insiuions.”32

Furhermore, pressure rom donors o spend quickly in he ace o a growing insurgency,

especially afer 2009, mean ha unds were spen firs and quesions posed laer. Such a

process led o SIGAR’s finding ha U.S. Agency or Inernaional Developmen, or USAID,

unds ended up in he hands o aliban fighers running a consrucion firm and wih

Aghan conracors beholden o provincial governors or provincial council chairman,

such as Karzai’s hal-broher Ahmed Wali Karzai.33 Local Aghans, meanwhile, heard lofy

developmen goals only o see oreign-assisance unds channeled o he very people who

conrolled he sysem.


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Time to implement and enhance support for anticorruption efforts

Wihou poliical will, no counry can effecively figh corrupion, or even win he batle

o sem corrupion in he shor erm. In Aghanisan, such poliical will was lacking

during he presidency o Hamid Karzai. I here is a silver lining o he oherwise dismal

record o he Aghan governmen on corrupion issues, i is ha he new adminisraion

has announced ha he figh agains graf is among is op prioriies.

Boh Presiden Ghani and Chie Execuive Abdullah declared heir inenion o clean up

governmen during heir campaigns.34 In an encouraging sign, Ghani reopened an

inquiry ino embezzlemen a Kabul Bank days afer assuming office.35 Bu seting

Aghanisan on a pah oward more effecive and accounable governance will require ar

more han high-profile prosecuions. Aghan ciizens wan o see governmen officials

ake visible acions o crack down on corrupion a all levels.

Aghanisan has passed several legislaive measures aimed a ackling corrupion. For

insance, in 2008, he governmen raified he U.N. Convenion agains Corrupion, andPresiden Karzai issued a decree esablishing he High Office or Oversigh and Ani-

Corrupion, or HOO. Te office is responsible or he coordinaion and monioring he

implemenaion o Aghanisan’s anicorrupion sraegy, as well as adminisraive

procedural reorm in he counry.

Bu passing legislaion and raiying reaies only goes so ar; effors now need o ocus on

implemening hese measures and enorcing he law. Te good news is ha numerous

oher counries have grappled wih he issue o corrupion, producing an abundance o

lessons learned and bes pracices. Te naional uniy governmen should begin o

leverage he vas knowledge gleaned rom anicorrupion iniiaives in oher counries oesablish mechanisms ha can expedie effors in Aghanisan. Inernaional donors and

civil sociey organizaions should prioriize assisance and raining effors ocused on

bolsering Aghan anicorrupion effors.

However, given he vas scale o corrupion and urgen need or reorm, he mos dauning

ask may be deermining where o sar and which areas o prioriize in he shor erm.

Tis is criical or demonsraing o boh donors and Aghan ciizens ha he promise o

figh corrupion is real and no jus poliical rheoric. Te ollowing recommendaions

presened or consideraion by Aghan and U.S. officialsoffer a saring poin in he

figh agains corrupion.


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Recommendations

Send a clear signal from the top down

Poliical will is essenial o figh corrupion. Presiden Ghani and Chie Execuive

Abdullah should show he public ha hey are serious abou prioriizing effors o sem

graf and illici acs hrough public office by signing an inegriy pledge and requiring allminisers and cabine officials o sign i as well. A pledge making clear ha corrupion,

bribes, graf, and ill-goten moneary gains will no be oleraed would signal a new way

o doing business or he Aghan governmen. Such a pledge would provide symbolic

value or he ciizenry, bu i would carry even more meaning i i were ied o enorceable

provisions in Aghanisan law such as ani-bribery measures and ani-money laundering

saues. An inegriy pledge could help o resore some level o aih in he eleced

officials and begin he process o rebuilding he governmen’s repuaion. Furhermore,

op-level acion will signal o lower-level officials and civil servans ha anicorrupion

effors will be aken seriously in he naional uniy governmen.

Prioritize efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism finance

Given he vas, illici naure o rade and smuggling in Aghanisan and he huge

vulnerabiliies creaed by corrupion, as well as he weakness o he criminal jusice

sysem, Aghan officials should prioriize effors o creae an effecive sysem o comba

money laundering and errorism finance. Te Inernaional Moneary Fund, or IMF,

conduced a muual evaluaion on behal o he Financial Acion ask Force, or FAF, o

assess Aghanisan’s compliance wih inernaional norms in regulaing money launder-

ing and errorism finance.36

Te 2010 collapse o Kabul Bank should have prompedsricer regulaion o currency flow wihin he counrycerainly when money changed

hands in large quaniies. Ye he FAF repor noed ha “in spie o he vas il lici secor

and corrupion issues ha plague Aghanisan and he risks associaed wih hem, he

auhoriies were relaively unresponsive on he subjec o how his may impac he

implemenaion o he [ani-money laundering/ counering errorism finance] regime.”37

Similarly, in Ocober 2014, he Independen Join Ani-Corrupion Monioring and

Evaluaion Commitee, a collaboraive oversigh effor made up o Aghan naional and

inernaional expers, noed ha significan gaps remain in basic oversigh mechanisms,

which are criical o preven anoher banking scandal and o seek puniive seps or hose

responsible or sealing he unds. As he commitee’s laes repor noes, “sincere effor

is needed o resolve ousanding Kabul Bank issues and he change in governmen could

provide he required poliical will. o do so would demonsrae he new governmen’s

commimen o ending impuniy, ac as a deerrence, increase recoveries, and address

srucural weaknesses ha permeae public adminisraion.”38


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In a posiive sep, Presiden Ghani has reopened he invesigaion ino he Kabul Bank

scandal and sared anew atemps o recoup he nearly $1 billion in solen asses.39

Mahmoud Karzai, he broher o ormer Presiden Karzai, has been implicaed in he

scandal and is doing litle o cooperae wih he invesigaion.40 o guard agains uure

scandals, he new governmen mus prioriize legislaion o effecively criminalize

money laundering and erroris financing; o creae a legal ramework or ideniying,

racing, and reezing erroris financing; and o esablish and implemen broad proce-dures or he confiscaion o asses relaed o corrupion and money laundering. As he

FAF noed in 2011, “here was litle undersanding o he imporance o he effecive

implemenaion o he [ani-money laundering/ counering errorism finance] regime o

overall governance and he rule o law, and conversely, he criicaliy o he rule o law o

economic developmen and financial inegriy.”41 Realizing his connecion, i is essenial

ha he Aghan governmen end he impuniy ha corrup acors use o obain and

move he proceeds o heir corrupion.

Increase participation of civil society

Aghanisan has a nascen bu growing base o domesic civil-sociey organizaions, as

well as a plehora o inernaional civil-sociey organizaions, ha are working on behal

o Aghans. Civil sociey can serve as a wachdog or he public ineres and provide boh

ormal and inormal checks on corrup behavior and illici spending o public unds.

Given he enrenched corrupion endemic a all levels o he Aghan governmen, Aghan

leaders should consider he abiliy o boh domesic and inernaional civil-sociey

organizaions o scruinize inormaion and conribue o monioring governmen

accounabiliy an especially valuable ool.

Aghanisan should immediaely consider joining he Open Governmen Parnership, or

OGP. Founded in 2011, OGP is a mulilaeral iniiaive ounded on he premise o

collaboraion beween governmen and civil sociey o promoe ransparency, figh

corrupion, and uilize new echnologies o srenghen governance.42 OGP provides a

ramework or counry-specific acions coupled wih a supporive plaorm o leverage

experise rom oher counries and inernaional organizaions. Aghanisan would grealy

benefi rom hese peer-o-peer learning mechanisms, as well as he suppor provided by

inernaional expers. OGP has grown o 65 paricipaing counries, represening one-hird

o he world’s populaion and more han 1,000 open governmen reorm commimens. 43

OGP provides a ramework enabling hose wihin governmen, he privae secor, and civil

sociey o advance governmen accounabiliy and effeciveness. Each paricipaing counry

mus commi o joinly develop and implemen a naional acion plan in collaboraion

wih civil sociey. Aghanisan is currenly very close o meeing he requiremens or

eligibiliy in OGP and could be reviewed again based on he recenly enaced Access o

Inormaion Bill.44 Te new legislaionsigned by Presiden Ghani in December 2014

is unprecedened in Aghan hisory and will provide ciizens and journaliss wih more

ransparen access o sae insiuions.45


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Utilize technology

Hones governmen will only come abou when ordinary ciizens demand i. Aghan

ciizens wan o see change and echnology could provide a huge boos o anicorrup-

ion effors in he counry. Effors should be made o creae plaorms on social media

and hrough oher orms o echnology or anicorrupion acivism and public-privae

parnerships. Aghanisan has a cell phone peneraion rae o 71 per 100 people, andInerne service is rapidly expanding.46

In counries around he globe, ciizens are using cellphones, social media, and he Inerne

o shine a ligh on corrup acs and officials. People can anonymously repor who is

being asked o pay a bribe, abseneeism in schools and hospials, exorion by governmen

officials, ailures o deliver services, corrupion in conracing or he delivery o school

supplies or drugs, and elecion irregulariies. Websies such as Ipaidabribe.com in India

and similar effors in Kenya, Esonia, Guaemala, Columbia, and numerous oher counries

are incenivizing change and supporing governmenal effors o insill change.47

Similarly, many websies allow ciizens o repor when hey did no pay a bribe in ordero reinorce he hones effors o public servans and suppor or good governance.

Expand training on corruption to military, police, and judiciary

Tere is no quick fix o sem corrupion in Aghanisan. raining effors have been

underway by he Unied Saes and oher donors or several years and are currenly

ransiioning o Aghan-led raining. Tese Aghan effors should be expanded and

coninue o build on inernaional raining sandards. Boh Presiden Ghani and Chie

Execuive Abdullah have pledged o remove corrup ANSF officials and o promoe only based on meri.48 Tey have made a firs move in Hera by removing wo ANP officials

accused o corrupion.49 Accusaions are one hingand should be weighed careully

given heir poenial o setle oher grievancesbu Presiden Ghani and Chie Execuive

Abdullah need real, hard proo in order o prosecue corrup ANSF officials. Reviving

he Major Crimes ask Forces, he work o he Sensiive Invesigaive Uni, and he

echnical Invesigaive Uni would creae Aghan governmen offices capable o building a

legal case agains ANSF corrupion.

Corrupion diminishes he abiliy o he Aghan police and miliary o mainain law and

order and proec he Aghan people rom violen insurgency. Te U.S. governmen has

assessed ha corrupion has eroded public confidence in he miliary and police and is a

“key acor undermining developmenal progress and morale a he uni level.”50 Te

New York imes repored in February ha he governmen o Aghanisan was engaged

in “one o he mos significan corrupion invesigaions o he naional police orce in

years” in connecion wih inelligence indicaing ha police officers in Kunduz had been

collaboraing wih he aliban.51


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Similarly, rusraion wih corrupion in he ederal judicial sysem has led many Aghans

o urn o aliban cours as a as and imparial means o resolving dispuesa disurbing

echo o he condiions proceeding he aliban conques o Aghanisan in he 1990s.52

As Inegriy Wach Aghanisan observed in a recen repor, “he abiliy o any sae o

deliver jusice … [is] an imporan indicaor o is capaciy” o govern.53 On his issue,

he aliban appears o have a beter record o perormance han he naional governmen

in he eyes o many Aghans.54

Improve transparency in procurement and extractives sector

Aghanisan’s vas mineral wealh is esimaed a nearly $1 rillion and remains largely

unexploied.55 Te ew mining operaions ha do exis have been predicably ained

wih allegaions o widespread irregulariy and influence peddling.56 Governmen

oversigh o mineral resource exracion is palry o nonexisen, and a new mining law

hreaens o exacerbae his siuaion.57 Wih he suppor o he World Bank and oher

donors, however, Aghanisan is paricipaing in he Exracives Indusry ransparencyIniiaive, which provides a ramework or monioring o he secor in collaboraion wih

he privae secor and civil sociey.58

Several groupsincluding Global Winess, a leading inernaional nongovernmenal

organizaion acive in his areahave conduced addiional research and analysis on

how o avoid he so-called resource curse, curb corrupion, and improve oversigh in

Aghanisan.59 While he vas mineral and oil wealh in Aghanisan may provide an

economic lieline or growh and developmen, he more likely scenario is ha mining

will urher exacerbae corrupion. Presiden Ghani has recognized he need o prioriize

reorms in he mining secor and has promised a paien approach, bu significan supporis needed rom donors.60

Unil effecive oversigh and legislaive measures are esablished o ensure an open

endering processes and ransparency or conracing and supply chains, Aghanisan’s

bes proecion agains urher corrupion in he secor is o leave he minerals in he

ground and preserve is mineral wealh or he uure. In he near erm, he Unied Saes

and oher donors mus prioriize capaciy building and echnical assisance o he

Minisry o Mines, as well as o Aghan parliamenarians wih oversigh o he exracives

secor, o ensure ha uure endering o projecs and legislaion regulaing he mining

secor conains effecive oversigh mechanisms.

Implemenaion o he open conracing iniiaive may be an effecive ool o prioriize

in he shor erm. Governmens rouinely sign rillions o dollars worh o conracs or

services and inrasrucure projecs, bu rarely do governmen officials or ciizens know

wha a paricular conraced company is responsible or delivering. Aghanisan is no

differen and would benefi rom increasing disclosure and paricipaion in all sages o

public conracing, as well as rom open conracing effors ha zero in on endering,

perormance, and conrac implemenaion.


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Identify ways the United States and international community can assist

anticorruption efforts

Te Unied Saes and he inernaional donor communiy should encourage and

suppor Aghanisan in is effors o effecively ake on he challenge o corrupion while

mainaining realisic expecaions abou he likely pace o progress. I is criically

imporan ha leadership o he figh agains corrupion remains firmly in he Aghangovernmen’s hands, wih srong suppor rom inernaional parners. Effors are needed

creae a high-level and public dialogue on corrupion and he coninuaion o echnical

assisance and capaciy building is essenial. However, he inernaional communiy

could beter coordinae assisance o ensure ha all needs are addressed and ha

muliple donors are no providing repeiive, or even conradicory, advice on measures

o be aken in he figh agains corrupion.

Te Unied Saes and he inernaional communiy could also revoluionize effors

aimed a enhancing Aghan governmenal ransparency and accounabiliy by ensuring

ha all conracs wih he governmen a naional and subnaional levels are publiclyavailable. Injecing ransparency ino Aghanisan’s own programs could yield aser

resuls and greaer benefis. For example, disclosure o bid requess and conrac awards

and o audied financial accouns, in parallel wih he similar acions underaken by he

Aghan governmen, would allow or beter accounabiliy and oversigh. Effors by he

Unied Saes and he inernaional communiy o ensure such ransparency would have

posiive demonsraive effec and place an emphasis on good governance.

Conclusion

As recenly as January 2015, SIGAR assered ha he Unied Saes “lacks a comprehensive

ani-corrupion sraegy” or Aghanisan.61 Given he vas amoun o oreign assisance

and resources ha he Unied Saes devoes o Aghanisan, his mus change. Te

Unied Saes needs o prioriize effors o suppor Aghanisan’s anicorrupion capaciy

and o assis wih developing accounabiliy mechanisms or he governmen. Mos

imporanly, U.S. officials should suppor he developmen and implemenaion o a

comprehensive Aghan anicorrupion sraegy. Effors o sem corrupion in he counry

will only be successul when he poliical leaders in Aghanisan demand change and

lead such change.

Corrupion is a grave hrea o he viabiliy o he Aghan sae and o U.S. policy objecives

in Aghanisan. Corrupion deprives he Aghan people o he benefis o air and effecive

governance a he mos basic level, which in urn diminishes he legiimacy o he sae

and he loyaly i commands among he general populaion. Te ime o urn he ide

and se Aghanisan on a beter pah o good governance is now. I anoher Aghan

adminisraion ails o ackle he problem o corrupion, here may never be anoher

opporuniy o do so.


13/14


Mary Beh Goodman is a Senior Fellow a he Cener for American Progress and a Senior

Advisor o he Enough Projec. She previously served as he direcor for inernaional econom-

ics a he Whie House and as a diploma for he U.S. Deparmen of Sae. revor Suton is a

graduae of Yale Law School and a former fellow in he Office of he Secreary of Defense. He

is currenly a consulan o he Unied Naions.

Endnotes

1 Drew Shepler, “Jim Gourley, wanna know why we lost inAfghanistan?”Foreign Policy , February 11, 2015, available athttps://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/11/jim-gourley-wanna-know-why-we-lost-in-afghanistan-failure-on-human-terrain/ .

2 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index2014” (2014), available at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2014_cpibrochure_en?e=2496456/10375881; Transparency International, “CorruptionPerceptions Index 2013” (2013), available at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/cpi2013_brochure_single_pages?e=2496456/5813913; TransparencyInternational, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012” (2012),available at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/

docs/cpi_2012_report?e=2496456/2010281.

3 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, “Corruption in Afghanistan:Recent patterns and trends” (2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf .

4 Ibid.

5 U.S. Agency for International Development, Assessment ofCorruption in Afghanistan (2009), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO248.pdf .

6 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “OperationalizingCounter/Anti-Corruption Study” (2014), available at http://nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Schools/NIPCONS/nipcons-institutions/CIPS/Download%20Section/JCOA%20CAC%20Final%20Report_U.pdf .

7 Chatham House, “No Shortcut to Stability” (2010), available

at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chatham-house/public/Research/Asia/1210pr_afghanjustice.pdf.

8 Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption ThreatensGlobal Security (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015).

9 Matthew Rosenberg, “Trail of Fraud and Vengeance Leads toBank Convictions,” The New York Times, March 5, 2013,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/world/asia/afghanistan-convicts-21-in-kabul-bank-scandal.html?pagewanted=all; Adam Ellick and Dexter Filkins,“Political Ties Shielded Bank in Afghanistan,”The New YorkTimes, September 7, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/world/asia/08kabul.html?pagewanted=all;Matthew Rosenberg, “Audit Says Kabul Bank Began as ‘PonziScheme,’” The New York Times, November 26, 2012, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/kabul-bank-audit-details-extent-of-fraud.html.

10 U.N.Office on Drugs and Crime, “Corruption in Afghanistan:Recent patterns and trends” (2012), http://www.unodc.org/

documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf .

11 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2014 A Survey of theAfghan People” (2014), available at http://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2014final.pdf.

12 U.S. Agency for International Development, Assessment ofCorruption in Afghanistan.

13 Declan Walsh, “At Afghan Border, Graft Is Part of the Bargain,The New York Times, November 11, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/in-afghanistan-customs-system-corruption-is-part-of-the-bargain.html.

14 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,“Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes,but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a SustainableSource of Income for Afghanistan” (2014), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-14-47-AR.pdf .

15 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,“Quarterly Report to the United States Congress” (2015),available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-01-30qr.pdf .

16 Ibid.

17 Yama Torabi, “The Growing Challenge of Corruption in

Afghanistan” (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2012),available at https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/FNLcorruptionchapterOccasionalPaperJuly30.pdf .

18 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress TowardSecurity and Stability in Afghanistan ( 2013), available athttp://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf .

19 Transparency International “Global Corruption Barometer2013” (2013), available at http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report.

20 Ibid; U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, “Corruption inAfghanistan: Recent patterns and trends.”

21 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,“Afghan National Security Forces: Despite ReportedSuccesses, Concerns Remain about Literacy ProgramResults, Contract O versight, Transition, and Sustainment”

(2014), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/sigar_14-30-ar.pdf.

22 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “OperationalizingCounter/Anti-Corruption Study.”

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 The World Bank, “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan”(2009), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1237085035526/5919769-1249254211329/VCAsSummaryReportFinalJuly172009.pdf .

26 Find The Best, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants to Afghanistan,”available at http://us-foreign-aid.findthebest.com/l/196/Afghanistan#key%20facts&s=4fLKCr (last accessed February2015); Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan’s DonorDependence,” GAO-11-948R, Report to the Chairman, Senate

Committee on Armed Services, Committee on ForeignRelations, House Committee on Armed Services, Committeeon Foreign Affairs, Senate and House of Representatives,September 2011.

27 The New York Times, “Afghanistan’s Economic Challenges,”July 20, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/opinion/afghanistans-economic-challenges.html.

28 The World Bank, “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan” (2009),available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1237085035526/5919769-1249254211329/VCAsSummaryReportFinalJuly172009.pdf .

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29 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,“Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed toImprove Weapons Accountability” (2014), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-14-84-AR.pdf.

30 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “OperationalizingCounter/Anti-Corruption Study.”

31 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,“High-Risk List” (2014), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/High-Risk_List.pdf .

32 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,

“Improving the Effectiveness of U.S. Reconstruction Effortsin Afghanistan by Enhancing Oversight and Addressing KeyAreas of High Risk” (2015), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-15-36-TY.pdf#page=9.

33 Dan Murphy, “US auditor finds taxpayer money flowing to Taliban, Al Qaeda - but Army refuses to act,” The ChristianScience Monitor, July 30, 2013, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2013/0730/US-auditor-finds-taxpayer-money-flowing-to-Taliban-Al-Qaeda-but-Army-refuses-to-act; Dexter Filkins, “ConvoyGuards in Afghanistan Face an I nquiry,” The New York Times,June 6, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/world/asia/07convoys.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;David Francis, “Millions in Tax Dollars End Up in TalibanHands,” The Fiscal Times, April 12, 2013, available at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/04/12/Millions-in- Tax-Dollars-End-Up-in-Taliban-Hands.

34 Cameron Dodd, “The Insider Who Says He Can Change

Afghanistan,” Global Journalist , June 12, 2014, available athttp://globaljournalist.org/2014/06/insider-says-can-change-afghanistan/; Ali Latifi, “Q&A: Afghan candidateAshraf Ghani Ahmadzai,” Aljazeera , October 6, 2013,available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/qa-afghan-candidate-ashraf-ghani-ahmadzai-201310611725757232.html.

35 Azam Ahmed and Declan Walsh, “New Afghan Leader,Putting Focus on Graft, Revives Bank Fraud Inquir y,” The NewYork Times, October 1, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/world/asia/afghanistan-president-corruption-investigation.html.

36 International Monetary Fund, “Islamic Republic ofAfghanistan: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-MoneyLaundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism”(2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11317.pdf .

37 Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and

Evaluation Committee, “Unfinished Business: The Follow-UpReport on Kabul Bank” (2014), available at http://www.mec.af/files/2014_10_02_Kabul_Bank_Follow-Up_Report.pdf .

38 Ibid.

39 Hamid Shalizi, “Judge toughens jail terms in Kabul Bankscandal, freezes Karzai brother’s assets,” Reuters , November11, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/11/us-afghanistan-bank-idUSKCN0IV1X020141111.

40 Ibid.

41 International Monetary Fund, “Islamic Republic ofAfghanistan: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-MoneyLaundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism.”

42 Open Government Partnership, “Four-Year Strategy” (2014),available at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/attachments/OGP%204-year%20Strategy%20

FINAL%20ONLINE.pdf.

43 Open Government Partnership, “What is the OpenGovernment Partnership?” available at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about (last accessed March 2015).

44 Open Government Partnership, “2014 OGP EligibilityCriteria,” available at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/open-government-partnership/2014/11/27/2014-ogp-eligibility-criteria (last accessed March 2015).

45 The Danish Institute for Human Rights, “New Afghan lawgrants access to information” (2014), available at http://www.humanrights.dk/news/new-afghan-law-grants-access-information.

46 The World Bank, “Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100people),” available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2 (last accessed February 2015); U.S. Agency forInternational Development, “Connecting to Opportunity: ASurvey of Afghan Women’s Access to Mobile Technology”(2013), available at http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/survey_afghan_women_mobile.pdf ; JavidHamdard, “The State of Telecommunications and Internet inAfghanistan- Six Years Later” (Washington: U.S. Agency forInternational Development, 2012), available at http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/The%20State%20of%20Telecoms%20and%20Internet%20%20in%20Afghanistan%20(2006-2012)%20Low-Res.pdf .

47 I Paid a Bribe, “India,” available at http://www.ipaidabribe.com/#gsc.tab=0 (last accessed March 2015); StephanieStrom, “Web Sites Shine Light on Petty Briber y Worldwide,”The New York Times, March 6, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/web-sites-shine-light-on-petty-bribery-worldwide.html?_r=0.

48 Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,“Inaugural Speech by Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as thePresident of Afghanistan,” Press release, September 29,2014, available at http://president.gov.af/en/news/36954;Pajhwok Afghan News, “Ahmadzai for merit-based ANApromotions,” October 15, 2014, available at http://www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/2014/10/15/ahmadzai-merit-based-ana-promotions.

49 Margherita Stancati, “Afghan President Launches Effort toOverhaul Local Government,”The Wall Street Journal,January 5, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/

afghan-president-launches-effort-to-overhaul-local-government-1420513669.

50 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,“Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of AfghanSecurity Force Assessments” (2010), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2010-06-29audit-10-11.pdf .

51 Joseph Goldstein, “Police Force in Afghanistan Is Studied for Ties to the Taliban,”The New York Times, February 8, 2015,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/world/asia/police-force-in-afghanistan-is-studied-for-ties-to-taliban.html.

52 Azam Ahmed, “Taliban Justice Gains Favor as Official AfghanCourts Fail,” The New York Times, January 31, 2015, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/taliban-justice-gains-favor-as-official-afghan-courts-fail.html?_r=0.

53 Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “Shadow Justice: How the Taliban run their judiciary?” (2013), available at http://www.

baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/Integrity%20Watch%20Shadow%20Justice%20Dec.%202012.pdf .

54 Ibid.

55 Javed Noorami, “Afghanistan’s Emerging Mining Oligarchy”(USIP, 2015) available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR358-Afghanistan-s-Emerging-Mining-Oligarchy.pdf .

56 Ibid.

57 Global Witness, “Gaps in new Afghan mining law pose athreat to stability,” August 19, 2014, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/gaps-new-afghan-mining-law-pose-threat-stability.

58 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “Afghanistan,”available at https://eiti.org/Afghanistan (last accessedFebruary 2015).

59 Global Witness, “Building for the Long-Term: Avoiding theResource Curse in Afghanistan” (2014), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/LONG-TERM_BUILDING_Report.pdf .

60 “Afghan President sets out his mining agenda,” ExtractiveIndustries Transparency Initiative, December 4, 2014,available at https://eiti.org/news/afghan-president-sets-out-his-mining-agenda.

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tackling corruption in afghanistan: it’s now or never

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