t8 b3 boston center faa employee 1 fdr- mfr- whistle blower re faa norad fighter response- sensitive...

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center FAA Employee 1 Fdr- MFR- Whistle Blower Re FAA NORAD Fighter Response- Sensitive Info Deleted 364

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ME M O R A N D U M FO R T H E R E C O RDEvent: Un solici ted phone call f romj I f orm e r controller Boston C enterType of event: Unrecorded Telephone Interview iDate: W ednesday, October 22 , 2003 ;Special Access Issues: Non e iPrepared by: Miles Kara i.Tea m N u m b e r : 8 [ /, TVLocat ion : Com m iss ion Office, G SA ;Participants - Non-Com m iss ion : None |Part icipants - Com m ission: John Azzarel lo , Miles Kaj-aBackground I

I balled the Com m ission Front Office today, October 22, 2003 andexplained to Karen H eitkotter that he had info rm at ion Iconcem ing the control of m il itaryaircraf t on 9-11. Karen called Miles Kara and passed along the unsolicited phone call.John Azzarello was in. theGSA office space and he andM iles jo intl y called] |This m em orandum is the record of that conversation, i

j He was not onduty on 9-11. Al though his knowledge of events that day is second han d, he hadconsiderable knowledge of how th e Center operated, the personalities invo lved, and therelationship with the m ilitary. By his, own words! lis a "con f irm edwhist leb lower , as he is doing today, and proud ofit."| |

| [called specifical ly because of thereported l a p ^ s e jnm obi liz ing the AirForce onthat day and because of the publicity attendant. to the CohinMssion's. Subpoena actionagainst FAA . H e concluded th e interview by stating tha t h i b "was.happy fo get out"because of the FA A penchant for . hiding records. He had told his wife that [FAA]"answers to nobody, m akes its own mles, an d i n i ts o w n m i n d / s a f e t y is nevercom prom ised . " ., ' .;, \!//..-''

9/11 Personal Privacy



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Js Major Point

Other Points DiscussedOtis Training: .Otis/Air Force/base fighter aircraft exercise regularly, at 0900 and 1300hours, local, rrvbst days. Typipally, the aircraft lift off the Cape on a southerly heading,about 190 degrees/and tjain ih Warning Area 105. Cape TRACON hahds the fighters offto Boston Center, Cape Sector, R1 8 , at 10K feet. Cape Sector, in turns hands the fightersoff to Giant Kill.er, possibly at Atlantic City. Boston Center does not control the aircraftwhile they are in the Warning area.

feaid that Area D had hot lines to HUNTRESS (90 line) and to Giant Killer . Therewas a history of jets spilling out of W 1 0 5 into the international traffic lanes and theSector wo uld "hit .the line" and "v irtually yell" to get the fighters back in to the warningarea. He recalled; on e serious incident in either W1 05 or W1 07 off of Atlan tic City "acouple of years ago" that got into the press.Qecalledi that there was once a procedure in place for supersonic flight for F\106, but he does not recall the F-15s ever train ing or flying supersonic.Hijackings;] [recalled one specific incident several years ago,perhaps 10,involv ing a Lufthansa flight that was intercepted by Otis air defense aircraft. I I

| [knew th at theonly armed defense aircraft inthe NewEngland area capableofresponding on 9 - 1 1 were at Otis. At one time there migh t have been a capabili ty atBurlington, V T and does not recall there being such a capability at Atlantic City. Furthersouth, H e though t that L ang ley had fighters that may hav e also been armed .



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Personal Privacy. . F O R O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Yacalled that there was a later mee ting in Washington, DC between the militaryA to work on procedures to use in the future. He thought tha^ \.was not sure of spell ing)

did lio.t recal l if New England Region was represented.| v. |doe$riot rec a l l anyl ive or table-top exercises concerning hijackings. He did recal lperiodic "NOPAR" (no pass to air defense) missions that involved ac tive air scrambles.T he military would task a L e a r jet to approach CONUS s imulat ing a Russian Bear(bomber) aircraft . .F.AA controllers would be aware of the aircraf t but could only respondto O t i s if Otti initiated th e call .

lought that active air scrambles occurred "5-10" t i m e s a year , but never against ahijacked aircraft (other than the Lufthansa incide nt). He did not recall any druginterdiction scrambles and thought that many scrambles involved Navy P-3 submarinehuhters..working at low,ajt i tude for long periods and then showing up unexpectedly a thigher altitude. He did not recall any scrambles against air defense targets of any sortoverhand.. \\1Aftermath and other F A A Observations

said t h a H the manager-in-charge that da y was] I who was l a terrelieved frprri d\jty for an unrelated matter. He recal ls cal l ing Later in the d a vto see ifhe\shoui:d cojhe intohold and perceiving thatj |[Staff Note: \soutofthebuilding that m o r n i n g andTerry B i g g i o was thes.enior pers on on du|y auring the cr i t ica l hours.]based on second-harid knowledge, characterized th e "rumor in the building" as all? nianagement "wannabes" getting in the road and .being asked to leave. H e

Specifically thought \thati . ' . jwas on e such person. H e inferred at this point; t| ^the secrecy and tactics" that F.AA used, routinely, iri day-day operations.\e recalled one post 9-11 session-, concerning the two hijacked aircraft. H e rememberedI I \g that after .the first impact and before th e second he was ta lk ing to theF - E pilpts from Otis ^nd| | c a m e over andsuggested thatthe|)ik>ts. be told that the a ircraf t\A.11] had hit the World Trade Center and that thefigHters migh t want to goh o m e . \y modified that statement tq say thatwhatother uggested was the pilots m i k h t . w a n t to change their course! Inamed

R n iHe recal led! la s

;; being inlArea C and not responsible for control l ing the fighters, f Staf f Note: When; intei-vJevgedl Istated, he cape of f break] jand was

'j s i t t i nsUhd [to help out --Geoff. Jhn help hereis that right reStaff askedl Iwhat position] |he!d and what his role would have beenon 9-11frvas the mi l i t a ry l iaison officer, the mili tary coordinator, butwas noton the floor that morning, he was up in his o f f i c e . In] |s opinion he had no reason to

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get involved, j Recalled tHatj Pater told a classroom fu l l of people(controllers and supervisors) that [FAA] notif ied Otis in t ime. The purpose of thatmeeting was to go over AFIO (Authorization for Intercept Order) procedures. Hecharacter ized th e meet ing a s "lots of arguments ," a nd "not much learned."N ew York Center ODAPS (Ocean Area Control)

Js primary com plaint about New York Center OD AP S is that i t had a long historyof only want ing to take c omm ercial a i rcraf t . H e speci f i cal ly recal led the mobi l izat ion forthe Gulf W ar an d working 35-40 a i r c r a f t in the Nan t uck e t area , and having greatdi f f icul ty getting ODA PS to ei ther be aware of the need f or mili ta ry cleara nce or thenecessity to help . H e said ODAP S had a reputat ion of being "difficul t to work with."They tra ck diffe rently, they have a whole set of ru les, i t is a non-radar environm ent.They do ocean control using AIRING and HF radio. They do have a radar capability inth e B e r m u d a area; th e feed is remoted to New York. Their only over ocean capabili ty inthe New England area is the Riverhead, New York radar which only goof for 200 or sonau t ical mi les .A d d e n d u m

palled back later in the day and stated that the Luf thansa hi jac king was in 1993 andthat the hijacker threat was to crash the plane into Wall Street.

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t8 b3 boston center faa employee 1 fdr- mfr- whistle blower re faa norad fighter response- sensitive...

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