8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 GAO Interview of FBI-DOJ Re GAO Findings on Visa Revocation 507

1/4

F B I "2.. 5Prepared by: J. McCloskeyDate Prepared: 5/23/03 Index: FBI 2.5DOC Number: 888594Job Code: 320172

Record of InterviewTitle Dept. of Justice/FBI Exit ConferencePurpose To obtain DOJ and FB I officials' views on our findingsregarding the FBI's role in the visa revocation process.Contact Method In personContact Place Dept. of JusticeContact Date M ay 21,2003Participants DOJKris Kobach, Office of the Attorney General

Laura Baxter, Office of the Deputy Attorney GeneralVickie Sloan, GAOAudit LiaisonDOJ/FBIMr. Robert E. Casey, Jr., Office of Intelligence,rnnntprtprrnrism/Counterintelligence Division

iCounterterrorism Division\Mr. Tom Ru occo , Special Assistant, Office of Intelligence,Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence DivisionGAO liaison (leaving soon)AO liaison (new)GAO/IATM r. John Brummet, Assistant DirectorMs. Kate Brentzel, AnalystM s. Judy McCloskey, Senior AnalystFor phone num bers, see attached list (included in w /p F BI 2.5as attachment I)Comments/Remarks:

W e provided the officials with a written synopsis o f our FBI-related findings. The findings arelisted below in italics, followed by the comments of DOJ/FBI officials in regular type.

State's Notification Sent to FBI and FBI Followup While State generally sent information cables to FBI to notify it of th e revocations, FBI officialscould not provide us with evidence that units in the Cou nterterrorism Division received thesecables from th e bureau's main communication center. (FBI officials said that th e agency's maincommunication center received th e notifications but could not confirm if they were thendistributed internally to appropriate investigative units at the F BI.)

Page 1 Record of Interview

8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 GAO Interview of FBI-DOJ Re GAO Findings on Visa Revocation 507

2/4

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Prepared by: J. McCloskey Index: FBI 2.5Date Prepared: 5/23/03 DOC Number: 888594Job Code:320172. in the country; thus, they did not attempt to clear, remove, or prosecute any of them. Accordingto INS and State data, at least 30 of the 240 individuals whose visas were revoked may still be inihe country. FBI officials told us that, in the past, they did not routinely attempt to locate andinvestigate individuals with revoked visas who may have entered th e United States. They did notdo so because the notification cables State sent to the FBI "were information only" did notspecify "possible terrorist"as the reason for the revocation and did not request FBI action on thecase. Moreover, State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that would indicateany urgencyin the matter.

M r. Casey and| ]had acopy of asample visa revocation cable that State sends to theFBI,which they used to highlight problems in State's revocation notices to the bureau. They told usthat the FBI did not routinely open investigations as the result ofvisa revocations on terrorismgrounds because the cable did not clearly indicate that visas had been revoked because the visaholder was a possible terrorist. In general, the cable as currentlyconstructed as an insufficientmechanism for requesting FBI action. For example, the cables were sent as "informationonly" anddid not request specific follow-up action from th e FBI. In addition, th e cable does not use theword "terrorism" in the text. It only says the visa is revoked under IN A section 212(a)(3). FBIagents wouldn't necessarily know this is the national security provision of the INA, or that212(a)(3)(B) is the terrorismprovision. Moreover, Statedid not attempt to make other contactwith the FBI that would indicate an y urgency in following up on visarevocations, for example,State never called over to ask for FBI action. Mr. Casey said that State has the obligation ofnotifying the FBI immediately and directly if it believes apossible terrorist has entered thecountry. State should includeapoint of contact for each case on the revocation cable.

Th e FBIofficials said that if the cable is uploaded into the FBI's ACS (automated cable system),then if that person is already under investigationby the FBI, th e investigator would know that th eperson had his visa revoked. However, a visa revocation cable alone would not trigger the FBI toopen an investigation for reasons stated above. Mr.Casey said that we should familiarizeourselves with th e Attorney General's guidelines for FBI investigations so that w e know what typeof FBI followup is allowed and under what circumstances. (Note: These guidelines ar e containedin w/p FBI 1.11.)

Page '2 Record of Interview

8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 GAO Interview of FBI-DOJ Re GAO Findings on Visa Revocation 507

3/4

preparedby: J. McCloskey Index: FBI 2.5Date Prepared: 5/23/03 DOCNumber: 888594Job Code: 320172In order for the FBI to take action in specific cases, State's revocation notice would have toinclude more information/evidence on why State thinks the in dividual migh t be a terrorist. Theinformation should be sent to the Coun terintelligence/Coun terterrorism Division, which wouldthen direct it to the appropriate un it within the division that wo uld determ ine whether the personhad already en tered the coun try, and, if so, whether the FBI should locate, investigate, and takeappropriate action in each case. Possible units for this followup could be either the ForeignTerrorist Tracking Task Force or the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, w ho would funnel theinformation to the local Join t Terrorism Task Forces. Mr. Casey said th at in our report, w e shouldnot specify w hich unit within the Counterintelligence/Counterterrorism Division should receive therevocation notice; instead, we should allow FBI management to make that decision.

O n March 12,2003, FBI's Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task F orce reported to Congress that it ha dcleared 76 of the 105 individuals whose visas had been revoked due to FBI delays in completingVisas Condor name checks . W e asked fo r additional information on this group of 105 individualsin February 2003. As of M ay 16, %)03, the Department of Justice had not released thisinformation to us.Mr. Casey, u ntil recently the Director of the Foreign Terrorist Trackin g Task Force, said that hehad prepared a response to our questions bu t that DOJ had not cleared the response. After theexit con ference, M s. Sloan called me to say that DO J realized the departmen t should provide theresponse to us as soon as possible. I received the response via courier at 4:05 pm that day. We 'changed some of the wording in the report draft dealing with the above two findings to account forthis new information.FBI Watchlist F B I officials in mid-May 2003 had not determined whether th e agency's watch lis t unitshadreceived any notice of visa revocations.Mr. Casey said that the FBI only has one watch list unit, rather than plural as we stated in ourfinding. The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force uses data from many agencies' watchlists; ithas no watchlist of its own.

Page 3 Record of Interview

8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 GAO Interview of FBI-DOJ Re GAO Findings on Visa Revocation 507

4/4

/11 Law Enforcement Privacy 9/11 Personal Privacy

General Accounting Office Exit Conference .Review of Visas Revoked Based on Terrorism Concerns (320172)Wednesday, May 21, 2003 @ 10:00am

Name & Position/TitleV 'C-kjffl- S\rS=>A 'j^L r C f j s l r r f A^O

I Ji/LMe/Os|&JK kW Rf*Ql - 2< f IJ d > / > ^ Dy^-t^) j* c ^ "

U^wu Ba. -W ^J L ( k - ^ j < p A v L JT-v.f- \ -/ ^Hr t^

*TUOMAS 6 - ^-UOCtOIS6 rAf-j -~ \? 5- V 3V --^

AgencyTXXT)&rfvG - f r oF & (F & iFl_$Z

w r M f c ,t o r " " O x *

P f t H1 = 1 5 1

Phone Fax E-mail