t3 b14 allan afghan-sudan 2 of 2 fdr- usg-org-media reports- 1st pgs for reference 917

8/14/2019 T3 B14 Allan Afghan-Sudan 2 of 2 Fdr- USG-Org-Media Reports- 1st Pgs for Reference 917

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Search - 9 Results - pakistan Page 1 of 5

Source: Legal >/ .. ./ > LosAngeles Times [[}Terms: pakistan (Edit Search)"Select for FOCUS or Deliveryn

Los Angeles Times June 20, 2004 Sunday

Copyright 2004 The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles TimesAll Rights ReservedLo s Angeles TimesJune 20, 2004 SundayHome Edition

SECTION: MAIN NEWS; Foreign Desk; Part A; Pg. 1LENGTH: 1900 wordsHEADLINE: The World;2 Allies Aided Bin Laden, Say Panel Members;Saudi Arabia and Pakistan let terrorists flourish before 9/11, apparently in return forprotection from attacks by Al Qaeda.BYLINE: Josh Meyer, Times Staff WriterDATELINE: WASHINGTONBODY:

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped set the stage for the Sept. 11 attacks by cutting dealswith the Taliban and O sa ma bin Laden that allowed his Al Qaeda terrorist network to flourish,accord ing to several senior members of the Sept. 11commission and U.S. counter-terrorismoff icials.The financial aid to the Taliban and other assistance by two of the most important allies ofthe United States in its war on terrorism date at least to 1996, and appear to have shieldedthem from Al Qaeda attacks within their own borders until long after the 2001 strikes, thosecommiss ion members and officials said in interviews."That does appear to have been the arrangement," said one senior member of thecommission staff involved in investigating those relationships.The officials said that by not cracking down on Bin Laden, Pakistan and Saudi Arabiasignificantly undermined efforts to combat terrorism worldwide, giving the Saudi exile thehaven he needed to train tens of thousands of soldiers. They believe that the governments'funding of his Taliban protectors enabled Bin Laden to withstand international pressure andexpand his operation into a global network that could carry out the Sept. 11 attacks.Saudi Arabia provided funds and equipment to the Taliban and probably directly to BinLaden, and didn't interfere with Al Qaeda's efforts to raise money, recruit and trainoperatives, and establish cells throughout the kingdom, commission and U.S. officials said.Pakistan provided even more direct assistance, its military and intelligence agencies oftencoordinating efforts with the Taliban antTATQIecia they said.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * U tfiJT

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=8aO a7adl52el577406d92558aelf52b8&docn... 6/25/2004


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UNITEDNATIONS

Security Council ^ "Distr .GENERALS/RES/1054 (1996)26 April 1996

RESOLUTION 1054 (1996)Adopted by the Security Council at its 3660th meeting,

on 26 April 1996

The Security Council,Reaffirming its resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996,Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1996

(S/1996/179) submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1044 (1996) and theconclusions contained therein,

Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of thePresident of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be broughtto justice,

Taking note that the statements of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of11 September 1995, and of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II)considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only atthe President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty,integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole,

Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not yet complied withthe requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements,

Taking note of the continued effort of the OAU Secretary-General to ensureSudan's compliance with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU,

Taking note also, with regret, that the Government of Sudan has notresponded adequately to the efforts of the OAU,

Deeply alarmed that the Government of Sudan has failed to comply with therequests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996),

96-10786 (E) 260496


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Intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan Page 1 of 3This item is availableon the Benador Associates website, atkttp://www. benadorassociates.coo]/art icle/43

Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudanby Mansoor Ijaz and Timothy CarneyWashington PostJune 30, 2002In early 1996, CIA director John Deutch convinced Secretary of-St3le Warren Clinslophel to pull U.S.diplomats out of Sudan out of fear for their safety. His anxiety was based on intelligence thatimplicated the Sudanese government. Although the embassy wasn't formally shut down, it wasvacated, and relations with Khartoum became severely strained.Soon afterward, the CIA figured out that its analysis was wrong. A key source had either embellishedor wholly fabricated information, and in early 1996 the agency scrapped more than 100 of its reportson Sudan.Did the State Department then send its diplomats back? No. The bad intelligence had taken on a lifeof its own. A sense of mistrust lingered. Moreover, the embassyhad become a political and dipomaticfootball for policymakers and activists who wanted to isolate Khartoum until it halted its bloodyj:ivilwar with the largely Christian south. To this 9ay, the embassy is mostly unstaffed.This episode is worth recounting now. Whether hunting terrorists in Afghanistan, judging the integrityof Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, mediating a dispute between India and Pakistan, orContemplating the virtue of an attack on Iraq, the Bush administration has given great weight to theontent of U.S. (and sometimes foreign) intelligence reports. As the United States wages war onterrorism and Congress re- organizes and bolsters U.S. intelligence agencies, the influence ofintelligence on foreign and military policy will only grow.But American policymakers have to be intelligent about using intelligence. The story of U.S. policy inSudan shows how bad intelligence - or good intelligence badly used -- can damage U.S. interests. InSudan, it confused us about political Islam, hurt our ability to intervene in the 47-year-old Sudanesecivil war, and in 1996 undermined our best chance ever to capture Osama bin Laden and strangle hisorganization, before he was expelled from Sudan and found his way to Afghanistan.We write from experience. One of us, Carney, a retired career diplomat, was the last U.S.ambassador to Khartoum. The other, Ijaz, an American hedge-fund manager, played an informal roleby carrying messages between Khartoum and Washington after the embassy was emptied.Perhaps the most important intelligence failure in Sudan wasn't about protecting the safety of U.S.diplomats but about understanding the political environment throughout the Muslim world. This is oneaspect of Sudan's cautionary tale: the danger of losing sight of politics while focusing on terror.During the 1990s, some committed Muslims around the worldtried to forge a political movement tobridge the gapbetween the modern world and medieval scripture. But instead of engaging thismovement, the United States lumped Islamic political groups together and viewed them all asdangerous. It clung to relationships with authoritarian regimes that felt threatened by Islamic groupsnd thus let well-organizedradicals dominate the Muslim world's reformist movement.Khartoum was an important center of Islamic political activity. Sudan's National Islamic Front, led bythe fiery, Sorbonne-educated Hassan Turabi, seized power in a 1989 coup. Turabi held annualconferences that attracted thousands of Muslim radicals to Khartoum to craft their vision for anhttp://www.benadorassociates.com/pf.php?id=43 8/27/03


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UNITEDNATIONS

Security Council Distr.GENERALS/RES/1070 (1996)*16 August 1996


on 16 August 1996

The Security Council.Recalling its resolutions 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996 and 1054 (1996) of

26 April 1996,Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 10 July 1996

(S/1996/541 and Add.l, 2 and 3),Taking note of the letters of 31 May 1996 (S/1996/402), 24 June 1996

(S/1996/464) and 2 July 1996 (S/1996/513) from the Permanent Representative ofthe Sudan,

Taking note also of the letter of 10 July 1996 (S/1996/538) from thePermanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,


Taking note that the statements of the Central Organ of the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolutionof 11 September 1995, and of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II)considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only atthe President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty,integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole,

Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not yet complied withthe requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements,

Reissued for technical reasons.

96-21420 (E) /.


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UNITEDNATIONS

Security Council Distr .GENERALS/RES/1044 (1996)31 January 1996


on 31 January 1996

The Security Council,Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of international

terrorism in all its forms which endanger or take innocent lives, have adeleterious effect on international relations and jeopardize the security ofStates,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on31 January 1992 (S/23500) when the Council met at the level of Heads of Stateand Government in which the members of the Council expressed their deep concernover acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for theinternational community to deal effectively with all such acts,

Recalling also the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimesagainst Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, openedfor signature at New York on 14 December 1973,

Stressing the imperative need to strengthen international cooperationbetween States in order to make and adopt practical and effective measures toprevent, combat and eliminate all forms of terrorism that affect theinternational community as a whole,

Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism,including those in which States are involved, is an essential element for themaintenance of international peace and security,


96-02172 (E)


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sudan Page 4 of 13(SFC,4/15/96,A-8)1973 Mar 2, Arab commandos, "Black September" terrorists, led by Abu Jihad executed 3 hostages in

Sudan, after Pres. Nixon refused their demands. US ambassador Cleo A. Noel, deputy George CurtisMoore and Belgian charge d'affaires Guy Bid. The operation was later reported to have been organized byYasser Arafat.(WSJ, 1/10/02, p.A12)(SC, 3/2/02)

1976 The deadly Ebola virus was 1st identified in western Sudan and the nearby region of Congo.(SFC, 1/8/02, p.A6)1978 Chevron Corp. sank oil wells north of Bentiu.(SFC, 6/13/01, p.D3)1983 Civil W ar began again in the Sudan when the People's Liberation Army renewed the battle fo r greaterautonomy from the Muslim north. The discovery of oil in the middle of the country and the imposition of shariaby th e government reignited violence.(SFC, 5/29/96, p.A8)(SFC, 1/31/98, p.A9)(SSFC, 3/25/01, p.C8)1983-1998 The civil war killed some 1.5 million people over this period.(SFC, 11/3/98, p.A10)1984 Chevron Corp. pulled out of Sudan after rebels killed 3 employees.(SFC, 6/13/01, p.D3)1984 War rekindled in the Sudan. A government official stated that: "The southerners were being used by therxist Ethiopians and by Col. Qaddafi of Libya to cause trouble fo r Sudan." Pres. Nimeiri set an edict to makeIslamic law the code of the land. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army was led by a former Sudanese armycolonel and Ph.D. in economics from Iowa St . Univ. named John Garang.(NG, May 1985, R. Caputo, p.609)1985 Apr 4, A coup in Sudan ousted pro US President Gaafar Nimeiry and replaced him with Gen. Dahab.(HN, 4/4/99)(WSJ, 12/8/99, p.A19)1985 Christian Col. John Garang and Muslim leader Sadiq el-Mahdi helped to restore democracy, but soongrew at odds.(WSJ, 3/4/97, p.Al4)1985 The people of the Nuba Mountains allied themselves with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army(SPLA) after government backed Arab militias attacked their villages.(SSFC, 1/7/01, p.Dl)1986 May 15, Francis Bok was kidnapped when Arabs from a government-armed militia swept into his villageshooting the men and cutting off their heads with swords.(WSJ, 5/23/02, p.Al)1988-1989 The war induced famine killed some 250,000 people.(SFC, 11/3/98, p .AlO)989 Jun 30, The elected coalition government was overthrown. The Umma Party and the Democratic Union

party established bases in Cairo and Eritrea and later allied with rebel groups that included the SouthernPeople's Liberation Party.(SFC, 12/29/98, p.A6)http://timelines.ws/countries/SUDAN.HTML 9/4/03


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BBC NEWS I Middle East I Timeline: Sudan Page 1 of 4

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OKOB WEflTHER

Last Updated: Monday, 3 March, 2003, 17:24 GM TQ Email this to a friend @ Printable versionTimeline: SudanA chronology of key events:1881 - Revolt against the Turco-Egyptian administration.1956 - Sudan becomes independent.1958 - General Abbud leads military coup against the civiliangovernment elected earlier in the year1962 - Civil war begins in the south,lead by the Anya Nya movement.1964 - The "October Revolution"overthrows Abbud and a nationalgovernment is established1969 - Ja'far Numayri leads the "MayRevolution" military coup.1971 - Sudanese Communist Partyleaders executed after short-lived coupKhartoum skylineagainst NumayriSouth gets autonomy1972 - Under the Addis Ababa peace agreement between thegovernment and the Anya Nya the south becomes a self-governing region.1978 - Oil discovered in Bentiu insouthern Sudan.1983 - Civil war breaks out again inthe south involving government forcesand the Sudan People's LiberationMovement (SPLM), lead by JohnGarang.Islamic law imposed1983 - President Numayri declares theintroduction of shari'ah (Islamic law).

COUNTRY PROFILESA GUIDE TO THE MIE

loose a countryCompiled by BBC Mo

Rebel John Garang

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/827425.stm 5/28/03


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Prendsrgast: Us Intent Is Not To Demonize Islam, But Terrorism Page 1 of 2

PRENDERGAST: US INTENT IS NOT TO DEMONIZEISLAM, BUT TERRORISMRunsPirn \ Official speaks at Institute ofPeace Sudan parley)

By Emile S. SimanUSIA Staff WriterSeptember 18, 1997

Washington "The United States' intent is not todemonize Islam, Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism,"said a National Security Council official September 17,bu t "terrorism, regional destabilization and human rightsabuses."John Prendergast, who is director of African Affairs atthe National Security Council, spoke about theimplications of the situation in the Sudan to U.S. foreignpolicy on the second day of a tw o-day conference on"Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan," which w assponsored by the Washington-based United StatesInstitute of Peace.The NSC official outlined initiatives taken by the UnitedStates governm ent on three levels to counter theKhartoum regime in Sudan, which is controlled by theNational Islamic Front.On the international level, Prendergast noted that theU.S. government, in focusing on "eradicating terrorism,"placed Sudan on the State Department's list of states thatsponsor terrorism, w hich includes four other Mideaststates Iran, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Moreover, "we aretrying to expel Sudan from the IMF, on purely economicgrounds," mainly because it is not adhering to economicreforms. W e have "intensified pressure to contain" theNIF-dominated government in Khartoum, which helabeled an "odious regime."On the regional level, the NSC official declared, theUnited States "tries to focus on supporting neighboringstates in the Horn of Africa" w hich are threatened bySudan. He noted that through w hat he called the "Front-Line States Initiative," both Uganda and Ethiopia havereceived non-lethal w eapons to defend themselves andWashington closely coordinates with the governments ofthe region. The U.S. also supports the IGAD (InterGovernmental Authority on Development) Declarationwhich calls for peace talks to settle the civil war inSudan. Another initiative is the Greater Horn of AfricaInitiative which involves a "forum on policy" on how to

http://www.usembassy-israel.org.i1/publish/peace/archives/l 997/me0918a.htm 5/28/03


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Raid on Afghanistan, Sudan: Aug.20 , 1998:Clinton's Washington Speech Page 1 of 3

DOWNLOADFREE

TARGET: TERRORISTSStatement by President ClintonThe President spoke from the White House on hisdecision to strike 'terrorist-related facilities'

[an error occurredwhile processingthis directive]Good afternoon. Today I ordered our armed forces to strike atterrorist-related facilities in Afghan istan and Sudan because of theimminent threat they presented to our national security.I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why itwas necessary.Our target was terror. Our mission was clear -- to strike at thenetwork of radical groups affiliated w ith and funded by Osama binLaden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier ofinternational terrorism in the world today.The groups associated with him come from diverse places, but sharea ha tred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and ahorrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents.They have made the United States their adversary precisely becauseof what we stand for and what we stand against.A few months ago,and again this week, bin Laden publicly vowed towage a terrorist war against America, saying -- and I quote -- "We donot differentiate between those dressed in military un iforms andcivilians. They are all targets."Their mission is murder. An d their history is bloody.In recent years, they killed American, Belgian and Pakistanipeacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the presidentof Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747sover the Pacific.They bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. They gunned downGerman tourists in Egypt. The m ost recent terrorist events are freshin our memory. Two weeks ago,12 Americans and nearly 300Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives. And another 5,000 werewounded when our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam werebombed.There is convincing information from o ur intelligence comm unity thatthe bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings.Based on this information, we have high confidence that thesebombings were planned, financed and ca rried out by the organizationbin Laden leads.America ha s battled terrorism for m any years. Where possible, we'veused law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wag e the fight. Thelong arm of American law has reached out around the world and

http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/asbombing/clintonwash.html 5/28/03


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War on Terrorism Page 1 of 4

www.a z starnet.comTHE ONLINE SERVICE OF THE ARIZONA DAILY STAR

TUCSON WEATHERVIEW FORECAST

WAR ON TERRORISMmain | anthrax | archive | human flag | in-depth | interactive map | links |message board | slide shows and interactives | smallpox | videos | Contact usDecember 3,2001

In war on terrorism, Sudan struck a blow byfleecing bin LadenBy ROBERT BLOCKThe Wall Street JournalKHARTOUM, Sudan W ith Am erican bombs dropping onAfghanistan, Ibrahim al Rufai Abu el Hassan is pleased toannounce that Khartoum Tanne ry Co. is under new management."The previous o wne r is long gone," he says with a wry smile.Curiously, Dr . Hassan, a chemical engineer, says he doesn't knowwho that owner was, except that he was a Saudi businessman whohad to leave Sudan abruptly.The man he is referring to, in all but name, is Osama bin Laden,who took up residence here in 1991 and ran the tannery as part ofa business empire that Washington says funded his terroristnetwork. In 1996, Sudan, under United States pressure, e xpelledthe then-relatively-little-known Mr. bin Laden.Five years later, many in Sudan are loath to talk about theirdealings with a man whose name many in the West have come toregard as a synonym for evil. In 1998, the United States launched amissile attack on a Sudanese Pharmaceuticals factory on the still-unproven theory that Mr. bin Laden was using his investments hereto make chemical weapons. Now, the Taliban are in retreat andWashington is promising to expand its war against terrorismbeyond Afghanistan. But there may be yet another reason forSudan's reluctance to discuss Mr. bin Laden: Its government rippedhim off for millions of dollars.In the wake of the attacks on the W orld Trade Cen ter and the

BackgroundInformationA collection ofexplanatory storiesprinted in the ArizonaDaily Star.

Muslims speak inmany voicesPlus: Origins, grow thof Islam Who are theAfghans? A look atethnic groups How theTalibanrose to power Theroots ofIslamic extremism Combat inAfghanistan's caves Afghanistan onthe world stage Jihad inAfghanistan

http://www.azstarnet.com/attack/indepth/wsi-sudanbinladen.html 5/28/03


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Order Code IB98043

Issue Brief for CongressReceived through the CR S WebSudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks,Terrorism, and U.S. Policy

Updated A pril 23, 2003

Ted DagneForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service > The Library of Congress


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Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for Democrac... Page 1 of 3ffi ^Qai lfli Mlii1^! *& INBOXINBOX Compose Folders Opt ions Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout O pen F o l d e r '

6.18MB / 476.84MB (1.30%)iNBOX: Fwd: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil w o v e i c o p y | T N S m e s s a g e to ron "T... (6 of 536) CDelete I Reply I Reply to All I Forward I Redirect I Blacklist I M e s s a g e Source I R es um e I Save as I Print Back to INBOX ^

Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2003 15:32:55 -0400From: Warren Bass #To: "" 4P

Subject: Fwd: M EI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for Democracy & Unity in Sudan" Sum mary by H eshamSallam ,,

fyi, for your sudan obsession... :)>From: "Middle East Institute" >Reply-To: >To: [email protected]>Subject: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for>Democracy & Unity in Sudan" Summary by Hesham Sallam>Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2003 14:50:25 -0400>>Middle East Institute>POLICY BRIEF>>The Prospects for Democracy & Unity in Sudan>Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil'MEI Scholar-in-Residence

^*>>Summary:>>June 25, 2003 (Washington, DC) - The Sudan peace process has recently made>signifleant progress and an end to a long devastating war seems to be near.>Yet the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, if pursued and implemented to its>tenor, would not result in the restoration of democracy, human rights and>the rule of law to the people of the Sudan.>>>Brief:>>Attributing the unprecedented progress in peace talks between the>government>of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) to the>active>U.S. involvement and the increasing concern of friendly countries, Dr.>Khalil points out that despite broad agreement between the two parties,>details of wealth and power sharing, the structure of the interim>government>and the substance of the interim constitution are yet to be worked out.>>The government's agreement to the SPLA's demand for self-determination>rules>out the possibility of Southern unilateral secession, which would not augur

ll for relations between two neighbors who share vital natural resources.-Moreover, according to international law, people of Southern Sudan are not>entitled to external-self determination, which may lead to secession. This>right to self-determination is only legally recognized in international law>within the colonial context. To that extent Machakos should be regarded as

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webm ail/imp/message.php?actionID=10 1&index=532& start=5 6/26/03


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Background Notes Archive - Africa Page 1 of 10U.S. Department of StateBackground Notes: Sudan, June1995Bureau of African Affairs

and released by the Bureau of African Affairs,^rfice of East African AffairsJune 1995Official Name: Republic of the SudanPROFILEGeographyArea: 2.5 million sq. km. (967,500 sq. mi.); almost one-third size ofcontinental .S.Cities: Capital-Khartoum. Other cities-Port Sudan, Kassala, Kosti, Juba(capital of southern region). No current accurate population statisticsavailable.Terrain: Generally flat with mountains in east and west.Climate: Desert in north to tropical in south.PeopleNationality: Noun and adjective--Sudanese (sing, and pi.).Population (1994 est.): 28 million; 25 percent urban.Annual growth rate (1993 est.): 3 percent.Ethnic groups: Arab-African, black African.Religions: Islam (official), indigenous beliefs (southern Sudan),Christianity.Languages: Arabic (official), English, tribal languages,^lucation: Years compulsory9. Attendance-50 percent. Literacy-27^jrcent.Health: Infant mortality rate099/1,000. Life expectancy52 yrs .Work force (6 million, 1982): Agriculture--78 percent. Industry andcommerce--10 percent. Government--6 percent.GovernmentType: Military dictatorship.Independence: January 1, 1956.Constitution: 1985 provisional constitution amended, now suspended.Branches: Executive authority is shared by the 12-memberRevolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the cabinet. Thechairman of the RCC is concurrently chief of state (president) andprime minister. Judicial-Supreme Court, attorney general, civil, shari'a(Islamic), special revolutionary courts, and tribal courts;investigativecommissions.Administrative subdivisions: 5 northern regions, 3 southern regions;each region, 2 or more provinces.Political parties: All political parties banned following June 30, 1989,military coup.Central government budget (1990 est.): $1.5 billion.Defense (1990 est.): 30 percent of GNP.Flag: Horizontal red, white, and black stripes with green triangle onstaff side.

G D P (1988 est.): $9 billion.G D P annual growth rate (1994 est.): -6.0percent.

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/af/sudan9506.html 7/8/03


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9-11 COMMISSION DAILY PRESS CLIPSfor September 23, 2003

***HEADLINES***1. Clinton NSC attacks Miniter (WT)2. Miniter responds (WT)3. Moroccan Calls 9-11 Conviction 'Unjust' (AP)4. Pakistan Detains 17 in Sweep At Islamic Schools in Karachi (AP)5. Musharraf Criticizes Terror War (WP)6. Probe of 2 Groups That Train Muslim Chaplains Sought (WP)7. Fifth Column II (WT)8. Antiterrorism creed (BG)9. Don't deny government useful anti-terror tools (USA Today)10. Patriot Act overreaches (USA Today)11. Patriot Act Used In 16-Year-Old Deportation Case (WP)

"*FULL TEXT***1. Clinton NSC attacks MiniterBy Roger Cressey and Gayle SmithWashington TimesAs counterterrorism and foreign policy professionals and veterans of the NSC staff in the yearsproceeding September 11, we have heard our share of misstatements and conspiracy theoriesabout terrorism. But nothing quite compares to Richard Miniter's book "Losing Bin Laden," whichincludes a number of erroneous allegations about the Clinton administration's counterterrorismrecord, many of which were then published in this newspaper. Let us address a few:First, Mr. Miniter recycles old, false Sudanese claims that the Clinton White House declinedaccess to Sudan's intelligence files on al Qaeda and that an unnamed CIA official declined anoffer from Sudan in 1996 to turn Osama bin Laden over to the United States.No one should believe these allegations by Mr. Miniter's source, Fateh Erwa a Sudaneseintelligence officer known for his penchant to deceive that there was an offer to hand bin Ladenover to the United States. Certainly, no offer was ever conveyed to any senior official inWashington. Had the Sudanese been serious about offering bin Laden to the United States, theycould have communicated such an offer to any number of senior Clinton administration officials. Itdid not happen.Mr. Miniter also claims that Sudan repeatedly tried to provide voluminous intelligence files on binLaden to the CIA, the FBI, and senior Clinton administration officials and would be "repeatedlyrebuffed through both formal and informal channels." Absurd. In fact, it was precisely the otherway around.On multiple occasions, and in venues ranging from Addis Ababa to Virginia, Washington, NewYork and Khartoum, the United States aggressively pressed the Sudanese to prove their allegedcommitment to cooperating on terrorism, bysevering their close ties with known terrorists,arresting specific individuals and providing specific intelligence information to us. Yet, despitePRESS CLIPS FOR SEPTEMBER 23, 2003 1


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Search -1 Result - "us diplomats return to sudan" Page 1 of 2Source: News & Business > News > By Individual Publication > W > The Washington Post J.:Terms: "us diplomats return to sudan" (Edit Search)

The Washington Post, September 24, 1997 * * . Copyright 1997 The Washington Post- The Washington Post

September 24, 1997, Wednesday, Final EditionSECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A27LENGTH: 40 0 wordsHEADLINE: U.S. Diplomats Return to SudanBYLINE: Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post Staff WriterBODY:The United States is sending diplomats back to Sudan, 19 months after pulling all Americanemployees out of the U.S. Embassy there for security reasons, the State Department announcedyesterday.The move does not reflect an improvement in relations with the vast African country, officialsbut instead signals the start of an upgraded diplomatic campaign to increase pressure on themilitant Islamic regime.Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright ordered the return of eight mid-level diplomats to theKhartoum embassy as "part of an intensified diplomatic effort to change the behavior of theSudanese government," a State Department official said. "W e want to ratchet up the pressure on~" Sudan to respond to the demands of the international community on terrorism, human rights andthe civil war [in southern Sudan.] This shouldn't be misinterpreted by anybody, especially theSudanese."Sudan is on the State Department's list of countries that sponsor international terrorism.Washington has long viewed the Khartoum government as an ally of Iran in promoting regionalunrest, encouraging terrorism and opposing peace between Israel and the Arabs. In Washington'sview, Khartoum is the source of trouble across east and Central Africa, most notably along itssouthern frontier where non-Muslim neighboring countries are supporting a long-runninginsurrection against the Islamic regime.In February 1996, the State Department announced it was withdrawing all U.S. personnel fromKhartoum because the Sudanese government could not guarantee their security. Diplomaticrelations were not formally severed, however, and the embassy has remained open, staffed bySudanese employees. Ambassador Timothy M. Carney ha s been living in Nairobi, Kenya, an d flyinginto Khartoum monthly to conduct official business.Carney will remain in Nairobi, but the security situation in Khartoum has improved sufficiently toallow the posting there of the eight mid-level diplomats, a State Department official said.At the same time, he said, Washington is planning to increase the amount of its "non-lethal" aid toEthiopia, Uganda and Eritrea, states backing the rebels in southern Sudan. The governments in allthree countries are in high favor with the Clinton administration, which regards them as relativelyprogressive and as useful in the effort to curb Sudanese influence.

LOAD-DATE: September 24, 1997

Source: N e w s & Business > N e w s > B y I n d i v i d u a l Pub l ica t ion > W > The Washing ton Post U Jhttp://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=c92866c30b6b3f5942af3e933dab015a&csvc=bl&cform... 10/7/03


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SUDAN

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SUDU.S. Department of the TreasuryOffice of Foreign Assets Control

What You Need To Know About U.S.SanctionsAn overview of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations Title 31 Part 538 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

INTRODUCTION -On November 3,1997, after inding ha t thepolicies an d actions of the Government of Sudan, including continuedsupport for international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and the prevalence of huma n rights violations,including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constituted anunusual and extraordinary threat to the national security an d foreign

No U.S. bank, including its foreign branches, m ay fioffshore financing for, third-country trade transactionknown to be the ultimate destination of, or the Goverpurchaser of, the goods. Arranging transactions whicSudan (for example, brokering third-country sales to

http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cache:JjCGJJrdtQ8J:www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sanctions/tllsud


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TCS: Tech Central Station - Where FreeMarkets Meet Technology Page 1 of 2

TECH CENTRAL STATION

Signs of the Times F o n t S i z e : **HB y Ke n Adelman Published 01/10/2002

Tw o important Times stories - one in the New York Times, the other in the London SundayTimes - tell us a lot about the news media and help set the record straight about theClinton administration's failed efforts to combat terrorists.The first story contains a rebuke of Fox News broadcasters for patriotism. Th e secondshows how President Clinton passed up three chances to nab Osama bin Laden before hismassive terrorist attacks against us.First up, Fox.You'd think that in our post-9/11 world, wearing a flag pin signifies nothing worse thannational unity in our fight against terrorism.But essayist Caryn James thinks otherwise. In her December 30, 2001 Ne w York Timesessay on "The Year in Television," Ms. James pointed ou t that right after September 11thcame "a round of flag-wavingand flag-wearing patriotism, in which even some networkcorrespondents wore flag pins."Before long, however, all the networks but one realized the grave error of this move. "Thatwas rightly seen as crossing a line into politics," James lectures, "and was banned byevery network and cable channel except Fox News." Then came herpunch-line - "so muchfor its ludicrous claim to political balance."Granted, I'm biased towards Fox News, no t only for giving me the opportunity to write aweekly column on their website, but also for frequent appearances on the air. But even ifMs. James wrote that about another network, I'd consider her claim rather "ludicrous."Why would wearing an American flag pin sacrifice "political balance"? Is that moreRepublican than Democratic? Surely the Democrats wouldn't admit that. Is it pro-Americanas opposed to pro-Taliban? Surely so, but Ms. James can't mean that by "politicalbalance." American patriotism, symbolized by a flag pin, doesn't compromise "politicalbalance," but instead proclaims a determination to preserve our values of freedom andtolerance.Clinton's Failure" U . S . Missed Three Chances to Seize Bin Laden" headlined England's most prestigiousand best-selling newspaper, the Sunday Times, on January 6th in the first of a three-partseries.Th e much-discussed piece began: "President Bill Clinton turned down at least three offersinvolving foreign governments to help to seize Osama Bin Laden after he was identified asa terrorist who was threatening America, according to sources inWashington and theMiddle East."Th e first offer came in the summer of 1996 when Sudanese officials were willing to handover the terrorist, then living in their country. They had done something similar when givingCarlos "The Jackal" to French authorities tw o years earlier.Yet in our case, unlike the hardheaded French, the Clinton White House let pass theSudanese offer. The very next month bin Laden struck, when "a 5,000lb truck bomb rippedapart the front of Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, SaudiArabia. The explosion killed 19 American servicemen. Bin Laden was immediatelysuspected."The other two offers came in the summer of 2000. The Clinton team handled neitherseriously. Within 14 months, bin Laden struck again, this time more spectacularly with the

http://www2.techcentralstation.com/1051/printer.jsp?CID=1051-011002B 11/3/2003


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DradgeReportArchives.com 2003 Page 1 of 4

Drudge's Special Reports DrudaeRePOrtArch8ves.com Today's DrudgeReport.com

Time Line I Recent Links and Pictures I NEW Popular Links

XXXXX DRUDGE REPORT XXXXX FRI NOV 30 2001 10:30:08 ET XXXXX*"\Q: SUDAN TRIED TO GIVE CLINTON ADMIN FILES ON BIN LADENNEW YORK VANITY FAIR HAS OBTAINED LETTERS and memorandums thatdocument approaches made by Sudanese intelligence officials and otheremissaries to members of the Clinton administration to share informationabout many of the 22 terrorists on the government's most-wanted list,including: Osama bin Laden.VANITY FAIR is set to unleash the story in January 2002 editions,publishing sources tell the DRUDGE REPORT.MORETHE MUKHABARAT, A SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, spent the early to mid-1990s amassing copious amounts of information on bin Laden and hiscohorts at a time when they were relatively unknown and their activitieslimited, author David Rose reports. From the fall of 1996 until weeksbefore the September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, theMukhabarat made repeated efforts to share its files on terrorists withthe U.S. On more than one occasion senior F.B.I, officials wanted toaccept the offers, but were apparently overruled by the StateDepartment.FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT and her assistant secretaryfor Africa, Susan Rice, declined to comment for this story.^ WORDING TO TIM CARNEY, THE LAST U.S. AMBASSADOR to Sudan, whoseposting-ended in 1997, "The fact is, they were opening the doors, and weweren't taking them up on it. The U.S. failed to reeiproeatf ?u.flnTi'9 willingness to engage us on some~~s~erious questions of terrorism. We can

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NewsMax.com: Inside Cover Story Page 1 of 4

N e w s M a x . c o mAmerica's News Page CUC.une 30, 2003 FREE OFFER:: AnnCoulter's Treason* Home Late-Night Jokes Archives Cartoons News Alerts U.S. News Links PriorityGrams> Int'l News Links MoneyNews Contact Us NewsMax Store Classifieds Get Your Site List*

With Carl Limbacher and NewsMax.com StaffFor the story behind th e story...Tuesday, JUly 2, 2002 11:12 p.m. EDT

U.S. Ambassador to SudanConfirms Clinton Snubbed BinLaden DealProtect Your

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Former Ambassador to the Sudan TimCarney confirmed Tuesday night thatthe Clinton administration refused anoffer from the Sudanese government tohand over terrorist mastermind Osamabin Laden in the late 1990s -directly contradicting former Clintonadministration officials who haveattacked the story as baseless."In fact, what was offered [by theSudanese] was to expel bin Laden toSaudi Arabia, and the Saudis, becausehe was such a hot potato, simplyrefused to handle him," Carney toldFox News Channel's Alan Colmes."Then, as I understand it, there wasan offer to send him to us," Carneyrecalled. The Clinton administrationrebuffed the overture because, Carneysaid, "we did not have an indictment[against bin Laden] at the time."Carney's account corroborates theclaims of Pakistani-Americanfreelance diplomat Mansour Ijaz, whohas maintained for months that the

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The Brookings Institution Page 1 of 1

Sc J 1 0 I . A H SJune 5, 2003HomeNews & Events Scholars by Name Scholars by ResearchTopic Scholars by ProgramResearch TopicsProgramsPublicationsBookstoreExecutive Education 5 jAboutBrookings

Bropklngs > Schojars

Susan E. RiceSenior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Governance StudiesThe Stephen and Barbara Friedman Endowed FellowExpertiseWar on terrorism, foreign assistance, failed states,post-conflict reconstruction, development issues,humanitarian intervention, international peacekeepingand conflict resolution, national security policymaking,UN affairs and multilateral diplomacy, AfricanaffairsCurrent ProjectsTransnational security threats and the security implications ofglobalization; Corporate social responsibility investingEducationPh.D. (1990), M.Phil. (1988), Oxford University; B.A., StanfordUniversity, 1986BackgroundCurrent Positions: Independent speaker, management and policyconsultant Previous Positions: Assistant Secretary of State for AfricanAffairs (1997-2001); Special Assistant to the President ana seniorDirector for African Affairs, the National Security Council, the WhiteHouse (1995-1997); Director for International Organizations andPeacekeeping, National Security Council (1993-1995); ManagementConsultant, McKinseyand Company (1991-1993)PublicationsArticles:

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AdvancedRecent VAnalysisCommon Stop theFood Flgr Th e Loot!Nuclear FDo We D< Training IPolicy Bi The NewStrategy:States The NewStrategyEvents The IraqDoes theA b o u t theWranglini

The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States," PolicyBrief #116 (February 2003)"The New National Security Strategyand Preemption," Policy Brief#113, with James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon (January 2003)"Managing Allies and Adversaries:A Critique of U.S. National SecurityPolicy," University of Delaware International Speakers Series (11 /19/02)Back toTop I Research |Bookstore | Executive Education ISearch |About Brookings IHomeThe Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, WashingtonD C 20036(202) 797-6000 Fax (202) 797-6004 E-mail Brookings

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Personal Privacyhttp://www.brookings.edu/scholars/srice.htm 6/5/03


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Page 1 of4

S c o t t A l l a nF r o m : T h e C r e s c e n t P a rtnersh i p s [[email protected]]S e n t : Sunday, March 28, 20047:14 AMS u b j e c t : I J A Z o n t h e C l i n t o n I n t e l l i g e n c e R e c o r d i n N R O ( 4 )

LONDON Sunday, March 28, 2004Dear Friends & Colleagues,In light of the past week's events surrounding the release of Richard Clarke's newbook, the controversy it generated on intelligence failures and the 9-11Commission's hearings on the subject, I thought it might be of interest for you tosee once again an article I wrote about a year ago in which the very same topicswere discussed at length.Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor IjazNROContributorApril 28, 2003, 8:45 a.m.

The Clinton Intel RecordDeeper failures revealed.By Mansoor IjazThe unearthing of documents directly linking Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to SaddamHussein this weekend may have hermetically sealed the Bush administration's case that dismantlingIraq's Baathist enterprise was in part necessary to undo terrorism's dynamic duo.But closing that casemay reopen a Pandora's box for ex-Clinton administration officials who still believe their policyprescriptions protected U.S.national interests against the growing threat of terrorism during the pastdecade.The London Telegraph^ weekend revelations raise deeply disturbing questions about the extent andmagnitude to which President Clinton, his national-security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, andsenior terrorism and State Department officials including Assistant Secretary of State fo r East Africa,Susan Rice politicized intelligence data, relied on and even circulated fabricated evidence in makingcritical national-security decisions, and presided over a string of intelligence failures during the monthsleading up to the 1998 U.S.embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

4/2/2004


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Scott AllanFrom: The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 9:34 AMSubject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Inquiry in NRO (4)

LONDON Wednesday, March 24, 2004Dear Friends & Colleagues,I've offered some areas of inquiry the 9-11 Commissioners might want to considerfor the witnesses appearing today in front of the Committee. These seven areas ofquestioning appeared in an op-ed for National Review Online yesterday.Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor IjazH R O Contributor '" , . .

March 23, 2004, 8:55 a.m.

A Dick Clarke Top SevenQuestions for commissioners.Richard Clarke, the former White House counterterrorism czar in four successive administrations,testifies in front of the 9/11 Com m issiononWednesday. But what should have been a serious inquiryinto how a loosely knit gang of Islamic fanatics could rise to become one of history's most lethal andeffective global terrorist organizations now promises to become a political spectacle.At the height of the presidential campaign season, Clarke has made irresponsible and untrue allegationsthat the Bush White House was indifferent to the threat posed by al Qaeda in the months leading up tothe 9/11 attacks. Whether his charges are the result of a momentary lapse injudgment in an otherwisedistinguished civil-service career, or the hallmark of personal ego and greed in trying to sell a bookwhile settling scores with a Bush White House that demoted him, the 9/11 commissioners cannot bedeterred in their task to find out the truth about what happened on his watch to America'scounterterrorism efforts.Th e 9/11 commissioners have a thankless job of asking tough questions that nobody wants to ask. Therewill be a broad set of questions asked Tuesday and Wednesday of the various witnesses who appear. Butwhen Clarke goes under oath, there will be a need to get down to specifics because the devil of

4/2/2004


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Scott AllanFrom: The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 11:35 AMSubject: IJAZ on Richard Clarke in The Washington Times (4)

NEW YORK Tuesday, March 23, 2004Dear Friends & Colleagues,Mr. Ijaz asked that I send his op-ed piece on the recent controversy generated byRichard Clarke's new book and hopes you will find it of interest. He asked that Isend his best regards to each of you.Sincerely, M. Wassil

Tuesday, March 23, 2004

washing ontimes.com

POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE TO WHAT END?by Mansoor IjazRichard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism czar for Presidents Bill Clinton andGeorge W. Bush, testifies tomorrow before the commission investigating the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. He is well-qualified to do so because fewindividuals over the last decade, inside or outside government, better understood the Islamicextremism threat in all its dimensions.But rather than deliver a factual recounting and analysis of the intelligence failures andpolitically charged antiterrorism policies that plagued his years as coordinator forcounterterrorism operations, he has chosen to characterize the Bush White House asindifferent to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network prior to the September11 attacks without consideration for the failures on his watch during the Clinton years. This isinaccurate and adds nothing to our understanding of how distant terrorists could plan and carryout such daring and effective attacks.Mr. Clarke's premise that Bush national security officials neither understood nor cared to knowanything about al Qaeda is simply untrue. I know because on multiple occasions from June

4/2/2004


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S c o t t A l l a nThe Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]Monday, March 22, 2004 1:48 PMGov (NSC) Hadley, Stephen J.Gov (NSC) Lineberry, Laura; Gov (NSC) McCormack,SeanIJAZ manuscript on RICHARD CLARKE

Importance: High

LONDON Monday, March 22, 2004Dear Steve,I thought you should have an advance copy of this piece on RichardClarke's statements which will appear in a prominent Washingtonnewspaper tomorrow morning. This storm too shall pass...All best, Mansoor

LONDONRichard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism czar for Presidents Bill Clinton

and George W. Bush, testifies today before the commission investigating the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. He is well-qualified to do so becausefew individuals over the last decade, inside or outside government, better understood theIslamic extremism threat in all its dimensions.

But rather than deliver a factual recounting and analysis of the intelligenceand politically charged antiterrorism policies that plagued his years as

oordinator for counterterrorism operations, he has chosen to characterize the Bush WhiteHouse as indifferent to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network prior tothe September 11 attacks without consideration for the failures on his watch during theClinton years. This is inaccurate and adds nothing to our understanding of how distantterrorists could plan and carry out such daring and effective attacks.

Mr. Clarke's premise that Bush national security officials neither understood norcared to know anything about al Qaeda is simply untrue. I know because on multipleoccasions from June until late August 2001, I personally briefed Stephen J. Hadley, deputynational security adviser to President Bush, and members of his South Asia, Near East andEast Africa staff at the National Security Council on precisely what had gone wrong duringthe Clinton years to unearth the extent of the dangers posed by al Qaeda. Some of thebriefings were in the presence of former members of the Clinton administration's nationalsecurity team to ensure complete transparency.

Far from being disinterested, the Bush White House was eager to avoid making the samemistakes of the previous administration and wanted creative new inputs for how to combatal Qaeda's growing threat. Mr. Clarke's role figured in two key areas of the debriefings -Sudan's offer to share terrorism data on al Qaeda and bin Laden in 1997, and a seriouseffort by senior members of the Abu Dhabi royal family to gain bin Laden's extraditionfrom Afghanistan in early 2000.

* Fall 1997: Sudan's offer is accepted by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,then rejected by Mr. Clarke and Clinton National Security Adviser Samuel "Sandy" Berger.

Sudan's president, Omar Hasan El Bashir, made an unconditional offer ofcounterterrorism assistance to the vice chairman of the September 11 Commission, then Rep.Lee Hamilton, Indiana Democrat, through my hands on April 19, 1997. Five months later onSept. 28, 1997, after an exhaustive interagency review at the entrenched bureaucracy levelof the U.S. government, Mrs. Albright announced the U.S. would send a high-leveldiplomatic team back to Khartoum to pressure its Islamic government to stop harboring Arabterrorists and to review Sudan data on terrorist groups operating from there.^ As the re-engagement policy took shape, Susan E. Rice, incoming assistant secretary

E state for East Africa, went to Mr. Clarke, made her anti-Sudan case and asked him tojointly approach Mr. Berger about the wisdom of Mrs. Albright's decision. Together, theyrecommended its reversal. The decision was overturned on Oct. 1, 1997. Without Mr.Clarke's consent, Mr. Berger is unlikely to have gone along with such an earlyconfrontation with the first woman to hold the highest post at Foggy Bottom.


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Renaissance Connection Page 1 of 10

www.rcnetwork.neBY DAVID ROSE

VANITY FAIRRepinted from Vanity Fair (New York) January 2002, No. 497, pp.50-56

An updated picture of Osama bin Ladenwith fellow terrorists Ayman al-Zawahiri left,an d Muhammad Atef.

THE OSAMA FILESBY DAVID ROSEIn a squat, red-brick building next to Khartoum's presidentialpalace, the agents who serve the Mukhabarat, Sudan'sintelligence division, keep their secrets in pale manila files."Those guys know what they're doing," says a retired long-time C.I.A. Africa specialist. "They tend to be thorough. Their

stuff is pretty reliable." And sometimes very important.Sudan's Mukhabarat spent the early to mid-1990s amassingcopious intelligence on Osama bin Laden and his leadingcohorts at the heart of the al-Qaeda terrorist network-whenthey were still little known, and their activities were relativelylimited. Some of the files at Mukhabarat headquarters identifyindividuals who played central roles in the suicide bombingsof the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August> 1998; others chart the backgrounds and movements of al-Qaeda operatives who are said to be linked directly to theatrocities of September 11.In the wake of those attacks, President Bush and the F.B.I, issued a list of the world's 22 mostwanted terrorists. Sudan has kept files on many of them for years.From the autumn of 1996 until just weeks before the 2001 attacks, the Sudanese governmentmade numerous efforts to share this information with the United States all of which wererebuffed. On several occasions, senior agents at the F.B.I, wished to accept these offers, butwere apparently overruled by President Clinton's secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, and hiassistant secretary fc^Ajrjc^,_Sjjgn_R[ce, both of whom would no t comment for this story afterepeated requests for interviews. Vanity Fair has obtained letters and secret memorandums thdocument these approaches. They were made directly to the State Department and the F.B.I.,and also via a series of well-connected U.S. citizens who tried to warn America that theSudanese offers were serious and significant.By definition, September 11 was an intelligence failure. As the C.I.A. man puts It, We didn't knit was going to happen." Some of the reasons for that failure were structural, systemic: theshortage of Arabic-speaking agents, the inability of C.I.A. officers to go underground inAfghanistan.This one was more specific. CE Had U.S. agencies examined the AF Mukhabarat files when tl

http://www.rcnetwork.net/include/_tellafriend.php?iscript=yes&preview=760&criteria=id,bo... 5/28/03


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Scott AllanFrom: The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 8:58 AMSubject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Hearings in NRO (4)

L O N D O N Thursday, April 15, 2004Dear Friends & Colleagues,Please find below some thoughts on the 9-11 Commission's hearings over the pastmonth, and a key area of inquiry I believe the commissioners have not yet lookedat.Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor I j a zN R O ContributorApril 15. 2004, 8:32 a.m.

Politicized IntelligenceThe 9-11 Commission's Achilles Heel.By Mansoor IjazThe independent 9/11 Commission investigating the intelligence failures that preceded the September11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States has not done enough to shed light in its hearings duringthe past month on the most critical problems facing America's system of predicting and protectingagainst external threats. The commission's blue-ribbon panel seems unable perhaps even unwilling to ask tough questions about how good intelligence was politicized, how bad intelligence was used tomake worse policy, and howpolicymakers' egos andpersonal career agendas interfered with thedevelopment of prudent national-security strategies todeal withthe growing threat of militant Islam'sterrorist front.Analyzing these areas can reveal more about how the 9/11 attacks became possible than any assessmentof which committee or working groupmet when, and who did or did not attend, or how high a "wall"wasbuilt tomake sure the American judicial system functioned properly. The Clinton administrationsstormy relations with Sudan illustrate the gaping holes in the commissions important work withdistressing clarity.

5/7/2004


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SURVIVORS'RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL I alert doc!207 Page 1 of 5

RightsHome I About Us I Alerts & SRI News I Contact Us I Education i How You Can Help I Daily Headlines I Links ! Employment Opportunities

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Alien Tort Claims Act Alert-May 13, 2003

Khartoum and terrorism: the viewfrom inside the NSC New DiversionaryScheme to shift blame on US gov. andlegitimize Sudan gov.Gayle Smith was special assistant to the president for African affairs at theNational Security Council under President Clinton. Los Angeles Times

Ho w to Address the MassacresPerpetrated in Algeria's Civil Conflict

- May 12, 2003

Traff icking in Persons: Latin Americaand the Caribbean

-May 12, 2003

SRI Press Release: Survivors' RightsInternational Praises the FirstIndictments of the Special Court fo rSierra Leone

-M ar . 11,2003

Cote d'lvoire: Update

SRI Background Alert: Liberia

Open letter to Kofi Annan and toAfrican and western heads of stateand government: We demand thedeployment of an international policeforce throughout Ivory Coast to protectthe whole civilian population.

Burundi Press Release-N ov . 21, 2002

Th e Great Lakes Region of CentralAfrica

Sr i Lanka: Post-Conflict Alert

"Terrorism? Sudan Gave Us No Help"By GAYLE SMITHDecember 7 2001One of the mistakes all too frequently made by the outside w orld is to assume thatbecause the regime in Sud an is bad it is incapable of fooling the good guys.

The regime, however, has been anything but ineffective. Quite the contrary, it isfrequently brilliant, always clever and too often successfully m anipulative. Its mostsuccessful ploy has been to turn on its head the adage "actions speak louder thanwords."

"We stand for peace," the government says. According to Khartou m, thegovernment wants nothing more than to end the civil war that has killed more than2 million civilians and turned southern Sudan into a permanent, destitute reliefcenter. What Sudanese officials fail to mention is that they overthrew an electedgovernment in 1989 just hours before it was to sign a peace agreement. "We areno t terrorists," they say. What they fail to mention is that they invited Osama binLaden no t only to live in Sudan but to establish a financial architecture there. W hatthey fail to mention is that they created terrorist training camps and deployedsoldiers against their neighbors and Western targets. What they fail to m ention isthat they harbored terrorists involved in an assassination attempt against EgyptianPresident Hosni M ubarak, the bombin g of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenyain 1998 and a thwarted plot to bomb the United Nations.

The only definitive step Khartoum ever took against terrorism asking Bin Ladento leave the country in 1996came about not out of a desire to thwart Bin Laden'sintentions bu t because Sudan wanted tu u v o l U fmtliu1 sanctions. .The Sud anese government appears to still hope th at words speak louder thanactions. Now the story is that the Sudanese government ha d massive intelligencefiles on the Al Qaeda network that it wanted to give to the U.S. over the four yearsbeginning in 1996 and that the State Department refused to take them, thusdenying th e U.S. imp ortant information . This is as inaccurate as it is illogical.

Regroupment Efforts in Burundi Th e facts are these: On countless occasions, the Sudanese governmenteager to

http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/alerts/alert_docl207.mv 5/28/03


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Scott AllanFrom: The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 8:58 AMSubject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Hearings in NRO (4)

L O N D O N Thursday, April 15, 2004Dear Friends & Colleagues,Please find below some thoughts on the 9-11 Commission's hearings over the pastmonth, and a key area of inquiry I believe the commissioners have not yet lookedat.Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor IjazNRQ ContributorApril 15. 2004, 8:32 a.m. ~7l< /*,4*

t3 b14 allan afghan-sudan 2 of 2 fdr- usg-org-media reports- 1st pgs for reference 917

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