t2 b15 10-14 hearing 2 of 2 fdr- questions for schlesinger deutch- steinberg 741

8/14/2019 T2 B15 10-14 Hearing 2 of 2 Fdr- Questions for Schlesinger Deutch- Steinberg 741

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. . . .>.kj4j(Jl fJLAJi'jL^^I ( J /PANEL: W arning of Transnational Threats

What is Warning?(1) W hat are the essential principles and methods that the U.S . developed during theCold War for analyzing and preparing warnings of a surprise attack?

- Did the U.S. use these principles and me thods befo re 9/11 concerningterrorism?(2) W hat does "warning" mean concerning counterterrorism?

- Is "warning" limited to instances in which the Intelligence Community knows aterrorist attack's time and place?- Doesn't "warning" also encompass when the Intelligence Community hascredible information concerning a threat, even in the absence of information on

time and place?Is warning possible when the information is vague, fragmentary and general innature?

(3) Has the threshold for warning of terrorist attacks been too low?Did recipients of warning ever experience "warning fatigue" prior to or after9/11?

(4) Ms. M cCarthy wrote in 1998 that "the likelihood of a cataclysmic warning failureis growing." Do you believe that the attacks of 9/11 were "a cataclysmic w arningfailure?"

Who is in Charge?(5) W ho was is in charge of wa rning of terrorist attacks against the U.S . prior to 9/11?

- W ho is in charge today?- W ho should be in charge in the future?

(6) What entities within the Intelligence Community should have some responsibilityfor warning of terrorist attacks?What is the division of labor among the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, theCIA's Counterterrorist Center, the National Intelligence Center, and otheragencies?

(7 ) What is the role of vulnerability assessments in warning?


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What is the Department of Homeland Security's role in warning as thedepartment identifies vulnerabilities in the U.S. homeland?

Role of the Policymaker(8) What is policymakers' role in the warning process, and what should their role be?

When the system is working properly, how should policymakers respond towarning information?Can policymakers take meaningful action on warning information in theabsence of specificity on time, place, or method of attack?

(9) What entities and mechanisms currently exist within the government to ensure thatwarning is connecting to timely and effective responses?How can these entities and mechanisms be strengthened?

(10) Are there other ways we can improve our government's ability to provide warning?Congress(11) Has Congress met its responsibility in establishing priorities, providing resources,and conducting oversight of the Intelligence Community?

- Do you recommend any changes to Congressional oversight?


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Former DCI an d Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger(1 ) Is 9/11 evidence of systemic problems with the leadership, organization,performance, or funding of the Intelligence Comm unity?

- Was 9/11 an intelligence failure?(2 ) Can the DCI fulfill his responsibilities as the President's principal advisor on

intelligence and head of the Intelligence Community if agencies responsible forimagery intelligence, signals intelligence, andcollection acquisition ca pabilities -NIMA, NSA, andNROrespectively - arepart of theDefense Department?(3 ) Having served as both the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, what in your view isthe optimal relationship between these officials?(4) The Congressional Joint Inquiry recommended the establishment of a Director of

National Intelligence. The two main elements of this proposal are that the DNIshould have enhanced authority over the Intelligence Community and that the DNIshould be separate from the CIA director.- First, should the DNIhave increased authority over NSA , NR O, andNIMA -such as the authority to execute appropriations, to reallocate funds within theIntelligence Com mu nity without the Secretary of Defense's consent, and toconsolidate and standardize intelligence personnel systems?

Second, should the DN I be separate from the CIA director?- Third, should the C IA's Directorate of Intelligence, which currently performsall-source analysis, be taken out of the CIA and become an all-source analysisagency that reports to the DNI or DCI directly - thus allowing the CIA directorto concentrate on improv ing hum an intelligence, while having another agencyconcentrate on improving analysis?

(5) What is the impact of the Intelligence Community's current organizationalstructure on the provision of intelligence to its major new customer, the Departmentof Hom eland Security?(6 ) In the past, we have divided foreign and dom estic intelligence, but global terrorism

is a transnation al threat that transcends the U.S. border. W ou ld the creation of aDirector of Nation al Intelligence close that gap?Should one official have responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligencerelated to counterterrorism?

(7 ) Do you recommend any other changes in the Intelligence Com mu nity?


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(8) Has Congress effectively established priorities, provided resources, and conductedoversight of the Intelligence Community?- How can Congress's role be improved?


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Former DCI and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch(1) Is 9/11 evidence of systemic problems w ith the leadership, organization,performance, or funding of the Intelligence Com mu nity,

- Was 9/11 an intelligence failure?(2) Can the DCI fulfill his responsibilities as the President's principal advisor onintelligence and head of the Intelligence Com mu nity if agencies responsible forimagery intelligence, signals intelligence, andcollection acquisition capabilities -NIMA, NSA, andNROrespectively - arepart of the Defense Department?(3) Having been the DC I and the Depu ty Secretary of Defense, what is the optimalrelationship between the DC I and the Secretary and Deputy Secretaries of Defense?(4) The Congressional Joint Inquiry recommended the establishment of a Director ofNational Intelligence. The two main elements of this proposal are that the DNIshould have enhanced authority over the Intelligence Com mu nity and that the DNIshould be separate from the CIA director.

- First, should the DNIhave increased authority over NSA, NRO, andNIMA -such as the autho rity to execute app ropriations, to reallocate funds within theIntelligence Community without the Secretary of Defense's consent, and toconsolidate and standardize intelligence personnel systems?Second, should the DNI be separate from the CIA director?

- Third, should the CIA 's Directora te of Intelligence, which currently perform sall-source analysis, be taken out of the CIA and becom e an all-source analysisagency that reports to the DNI or DCIdirectly - thus allowing the CIA directorto concentrate on improving human intelligence, while having another agencyconcentrate on improving analysis?^

(5) What is the impact of the Intelligence Community's current organizationalstructure on the provision of intelligence to its major ne w customer, the Departmentof Hom eland Security?(6) hi the past, we have divided foreign and domestic intelligence, but global terrorism

is a transnational threat that transcends the U.S. border. W ould the creation of aDirector of National Intelligence close that gap?Should one official have responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligencerelated to counterterrorism?

(7 ) Do you recommend an y other changes in the Intelligence Com mu nity?


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(8) Has Congress effectively established priorities, provided resources, and conductedoversight of the Intelligence Community?- How can Congress's role be improved?


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Questions for Former Deputy National Security Advisor Jam es Steinberg(1) Given that you endorse the creation of a DNI, what specific authorities should aDNI have vis-a-vis the Defense and the Homeland Security Departments - such as:- the authority to execute appropriations,to reallocate funds within the Intelligence Community without a cabinet

secretary's consent, and- to consolidate an d standardize intelligence personnel systems?(2) You also argue that the U.S. needs a single individual w ith responsibility andaccountability for all counterterrorism information, both foreign an d domestic.

What would this mean for entities within the Homeland Security Departmentsuch as the Secret Service, the Customs Service, legacy-INS, and the CoastGuard?- What would this mean for the FBI?

(3) You endorse the creation of a domestic security agency and note that placing theagency in the Department of Homeland Security would connect the agency to otherhomeland security functions, while having the agency report to the DNI wouldmake the agency independent from policy agencies.Given that yo u call for a single official over all intelligence activities related tocounterterrorism, shouldn't the agency report to the DNI?

- W ouldn't having the agency report to the DN I facilitate transnationalintelligence collection and analysis?(4 ) You call for the handling of information to be decentralized and modeled on a"network approach," and you also advocate greater cen tralization of authoritywithin the Intelligence Comm unity and more broadly.

- Is there a conflict between decentralization of information an d centralization ofauthority?(5 ) You argue that effective counterterrorism requires dramatic organizational changean d recalibrating the balance between security and inform ation-sharing . How ever,th e U.S. faces not just terrorism but also traditional state actors.

- W ould the changes you advocate increase our counterterrorism effectivenesswhile decreasing our Intelligence Community's capability vis-a-vis stateactors?


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(6) In 1947, President T ruman opted for a decentralized rather than a consolidatedIntelligence Com munity for fear of creating an American Gestapo.Do you believe that there are risks to civil liberties from the manner oforganizing U.S. intelligence capab ilities, such as having one person in charge?Does the nature of the terrorist and WM D threat outweigh such risks?

(7) You suggest a number of changes in the architecture of the IntelligenceCom munity, the FBI, and the Executive Office of the President in order to meet thechallenges o f the terrorist threat.- Which of your recomm endations do you consider to be essential?- Can essential reforms be achieved without creating a DNI?

t2 b15 10-14 hearing 2 of 2 fdr- questions for schlesinger deutch- steinberg 741

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