systematicity in metaphor and the use of invariant mappings - wallington-apresraam06-19feb09

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Systematicity in Metaphor and the Use of Invariant Mappings

A M WallingtonSchool of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B152TT,

UK

[email protected]

Abstract

I argue that the origin of the apparent systematicity found in families of related

metaphors lies not in ontologically rich skeletal source domain schemas with

slots that map to target domain correspondents. This suggests a rigidity I argue

is inappropriate and misses significant cross metaphor generalizations. Instead, I

will claim that metaphors utilise just a few core source-target correspondences.

Users can extend and elaborate upon these and by doing so, give the impression

of a systematic exploitation of a domain, by incorporating into the utterance any

aspect of the user’s encyclopaedic knowledge that can be linked to the core

correspondences. However, this linkage is subject to the constraint that any

conclusions then drawn about the source domain meaning must ultimately be

grounded in specific types of information that transfer invariantly between

source and target as adjuncts to the core correspondences. It is in these invariant

mappings that systematicity is to be found.

1 Introduction

In this paper, I will attempt to give an account of why metaphorical utterances

appear to abide by a principle of systematicity, that is a tendency to cluster into

families of metaphors sharing common source and target domains. For example,

metaphorical utterances pertaining to love are often viewed or described as

being about a journey, an argument is viewed as war, theories are viewed as

buildings and so on. One explanation for this systematicity is that the metaphor

families consist of a fixed and stable set of mappings or correspondences

between the linked source and target domains. For example, LOVE AS A

JOURNEY assumes correspondences between lovers and travellers, the love

relationship and a vehicle, problems in the relationship and obstacles in the

path, and so on.1 Expressions such as “We are at a crossroads in our

relationship”, and “We may have to go our separate ways” are consistent with



these correspondences. These related source-target correspondences would be

termed, if we were to adopt a cognitive linguistic approach, “conceptual

metaphors” and many hold them to be “a fixed part of our conceptual system.”

(Lakoff 1993:208).

However, I will argue that we need to reject such a static approach, in which the

correspondences involved in the individual conceptual metaphors are a fixed

part of our conceptual system. I believe there are problems both with the

assumption of a fixed and stable set of detailed correspondences and with the

proper definition of a domain and these will be discussed in sections two and

three. The main claim however of the paper is that significant generalisations

concerning what is common to metaphor are being missed.

Instead, I will argue that the production and interpretation of metaphorical

utterances must be seen as part of dynamic process that takes into account

metaphor producers’ (encyclopaedic) knowledge, the knowledge they assume

their co-locutors to have, the linguistic, social and cultural context of the

discussion and the situation in which the conversation takes place. Along with

recent work on Relevance Theory and metaphor (see Vega Moreno 2007,

Carston 2002, Sperber and Wilson 2008; see also Hobbs 1990 for similar

proposals and the work of Glucksberg and associates e.g., Glucksberg 2001) I

assume that metaphor interpretation involves (often extensive) inferencing, or

searching through knowledge associated with the source words for specific

types of information that can answer queries thrown up by the surroundingdiscourse.2 Metaphor interpretation is highly context dependent, as also noted

by Stern, 2000; Steen, 2007, Steen et al., this volume; Brouwer, this volume).

But if this is the case, then what accounts for the apparent systematicity? The

Relevance-Theoretic accounts do not give an account of systematicity and

Glucksberg and associates argue against it (e.g. McGlone, 2007). To attempt an

answer I shall first propose a metaphor for the process of metaphor use: that of a

jazz musician improvising around a theme. Importantly, there are principles and

constraints governing the process of improvisation and what I shall attempt to

do in the first part of this paper is to suggest general means, not tied to specific

conceptual metaphors, by which a very basic, central, or core mapping between

a source and target (of a similar nature to Grady’s “Primary Metaphors”, (Grady,

1997a,b)) can be extended and elaborated upon in order to allow specific types

of information to be inferred. This ability to extend and elaborate a core

mapping between a source and target -improvise around a theme- will give the



impression that there is a set of detailed mappings between different aspects of a

source domain to equally detailed target.

Another metaphor or analogy might be made with the development over time of

Chomskyan transformational generative grammar.

3

In the standard theory of the1960s, there were lots of different transformations involving construction-

specific rules detailing how a (structural) description of a source sentence, such

as an active sentence, can be (structurally) changed via a specific transformation

to become a related type of sentence, such as a passive. However, in the

following decades, it was claimed that there were structural commonalities

underlying the different constructions and transformations. Hence, an analysis

in terms of lots of different constructions and transformation was gradually

abandoned in favour of fewer, more general, principles and constraints, and by

transformations that were reduced in number firstly to two: wh-movement and

np-movement, and then to just move anything anywhere. The specific

constructions and transformations of the standard model were claimed to be

epiphenomena, derived from more basic principles.

Whatever one might think of the success or otherwise of the Chomskyan

enterprise, I will argue that a somewhat similar move is possible with the

specific conceptual metaphors and their detailed source-target correspondences.

Significant generalisations can be made by factoring out from the various

conceptual metaphors, those correspondences that have two properties. Firstly,

they are involved in transferring information in an essentially invariant or unchanging manner between source and target, i.e. without undergoing any

metaphorical transformation. For example if an enabling relationship can be

inferred as holding between an A and a B in a metaphorical utterance involving

A and B, then an enabling relationship can also be taken to hold between

whatever is being metaphorically cast or inferred as A and B. Secondly, exactly

the same types of information with the same invariant property seem to recur

across widely different conceptual metaphors; hence, the metaphor of “factoring

out” correspondences. What this “factoring out” process will leave is that which

is particular to the different conceptual metaphors: the core mapping or theme of

the preceding jazz metaphor around which we improvise by elaborating and

extending the core mapping using the type of information conveyed by the

invariant correspondences, in order to satisfy the communicative needs.

Thus, for a successful metaphor, the speaker/writer must assume that (s)he and

the hearer/reader both share knowledge of the core source-target mapping, the



types of invariant information that can accompany such mappings, the body of

knowledge that allows the relevant inferences to be made and an expectation

that the reader will make necessary inferences and utilise the core mapping.

Given these assumptions, many different metaphorical utterances will, as with

standard Conceptual Metaphor Theory, appear to be systematically related toeach other. Different utterances may exploit different inference chains in order

to convey different types of information, but since the invariant mappings

conveying the information must accompany, or act as an adjunct to, a core

source-target mapping, the entities referred to in the different utterances must all

relate to the source in the core source-target mapping. Furthermore, since the

producer of the metaphor must assume that the listener will easily draw the

correct inferences if communication is to succeed -at least for mundane, non-

poetic, discourse-, then the different entities, attributes, relations and so on that

are used to extend or elaborate on the core mapping are likely to be quite closely

and conventionally related to the source part of the core mapping.

If they are quite closely related, then they might loosely and or conveniently be

described as belonging to the same domain, but by focussing on the

identification of domains we ignore the significant generalizations that can be

found by examining the rather heterogeneous types of invariant information that

cut across traditional conceptual metaphors. These, I argue, can be empirically

investigated, at least in part, by re-examining existing conceptual metaphors,

especially where detailed (ontological) correspondences have been proposed

between source and target domains, and looking for commonalities.

This search for commonalities amongst traditional Conceptual Metaphors can

be described as a meta-analysis of existing domain to domain mappings similar

and complementary to that performed by Grady (1997a,b). Grady also

abandoned the centrality of complex domains in favour of “primary”, concept to

concept mappings. These cut across the traditional domain mappings and

interact, blend or unify with each other to motivate some, but crucially not all,

of the mappings underlying the complex domain to domain mappings. The work

reported here differs from that of Grady in that the mappings sought are

invariant ones.4

In conclusion, I wish to argue that looking for significant generalisations

concerning metaphor interpretation by aligning ontologically complex domains

may be mistaken. Instead, the correct place to look for generalisations is in the

type of information that can transfer in an invariant manner between source and



target and conversely in the type of information that is typically ignored. In

section 5, I shall re-examine from the perspective of a putative set of types of

information that partake in invariant transfers, many of the mappings motivating

Jäkel’s (1995) MENTAL ACTIVITY IS MANIPULATION conceptual

metaphor. However, I wish to do more in this paper than merely propose analternative to conceptual metaphor theory or a reorientation towards an

examination of metaphor in terms of the dimensions of similarity between

source and target.5 I would argue that there are a number of problems with the

traditional domain to domain approach which would seem to favour the

approach outlined in this paper. Thus, I shall first look at some of the problems

with using domains to circumscribe the space of possible mappings. I shall then

discuss the importance of what have been described in the ATT-Meta approach

to metaphor understanding (see Wallington et al, 2006; Barnden et al, 2004;

Barnden, 2006; Barnden, 2008) as “Map-Transcending Entities” i.e. source

domain entities, relations, attributes and so on for which it is hard if not

impossible to give a corresponding target domain interpretation, yet which play

a crucial role in allowing the interpretation of the metaphorical utterance to be

inferred.

A final note needs to be made for this introduction, before I discuss certain

problems with domains. By emphasising the role of inference in metaphor

interpretation it should not be assumed that I dismiss the notion of

“conventional metaphors”. Firstly, the same sequence of inferences repeated

often enough should soon become an almost automatic process, triggered uponhearing the metaphor. Secondly, a child hearing what an analyst might classify

as a metaphor may attempt a process of inferencing to derive the meaning, but it

is also possible that she makes a direct sound-meaning pairing. Thus, a final

stage in the process of conventionalisation would be if the sequence of inference

steps were replaced by a single step and the metaphor becomes lexicalised. In

short, a metaphor may become conventionalized either over the history of the

individual user or over the history of the language, with a child lexicalising

what had previously involved a sequence of conventional and automatic

inferences. Furthermore, factors influencing which metaphoric phrases become

conventionalised and which do not presumably include the type of lexical and

collocational conventions that are best explored using corpus examinations of

the type undertaken by Deignan (2005). Nonetheless, I would argue that even

with highly conventional examples, we can see evidence of the role of

inferencing and invariant transfers.



2 Domains

The overarching argument in this section is that we need to have a means of

deciding whether or not an entity is in a domain or not if the notion of a

productive, systematic mapping between a source domain and a target domain isto do any useful work.

The notion of a conceptual domain has traditionally been central to the

cognitive linguistic endeavour and what distinguishes the “Contemporary

Theory of Metaphor” from theories that look on metaphor as essentially a

lexical matter. The argument is that significant generalizations about metaphor

can be stated by assuming that related metaphors share common source and

target domains. (See Kovecses, 2002, chapter 2, for descriptions of common

source and target domains.) There may be constraints on particular

correspondences, such as Lakoff’s Invariance Principle (Lakoff 1993:207), but

essentially it is the existence of domain to domain mappings that constitutes the

productive or generative aspect of metaphor. This is because a domain is not just

a single concept, but a number of related concepts and a source-target mapping

is not between a single source concept and a single target concept, but between

a number of related concepts and a number of related target concepts.

An instance of this apparent productivity can be seen with the domain of

journeys being used to describe (the progress of) love affairs as a consequence

of the conceptual metaphor LOVE AS A JOURNEY. Lakoff (1993) lists thefollowing highly conventional phrases:

Look how far we've come. It's been a long, bumpy road. We can't turn

back now. We're at a crossroads. The relationship isn't going anywhere.

We may have to go our separate ways. We're spinning our wheels. Our

relationship is off the track. The marriage is on the rocks. We may have

to bail out of this relationship.

And a similar exercise could be done with numerous other conceptual

metaphors. Furthermore, novel variants of many conventional metaphors can be

generated by extending the conventional mappings into what Lakoff and Turner

(1989:53) describe as “unused parts of the source domain.” For example, by

virtue of the conceptual metaphor COGNIZING IS SEEING, almost anything

having to do with vision can be used to describe the process of understanding.

Thus, Grady (1997a) suggests, and I agree, that the following sentence is



perfectly understandable, although there is no conventional link involving an

“electron microscope.”

(1) You would need an electron microscope to see the point in that.

I shall return to these examples later. However, I first want to discuss a number

of related problems having to do either with the definition of a domain or with

the assumption that domains circumscribe what can be mapped in a conceptual

metaphor. The issue is important for metaphor because without an operational

definition of what constitutes a domain there must be a suspicion that with

sufficient ingenuity many different entities could be claimed as members of the

same putative domain. Such a lack of constraint and detail would considerably

weaken the assumption that it is domain to domain mappings that constitute the

generative power of metaphor in accounting for the observed systematicity.

I shall start with the question of definition, and the first problem to note is that

the term domain is highly polysemous, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain.

Thus one common usage is for domain to refer to a universe of discourse i.e.,

the set of entities -which might be reified events or relations- that are specific to

any one area of interest. Another common usage, particularly within Conceptual

Metaphor Theory, is to equate domain with Fillmore’s (1977) notion of a frame

and use domain to refer to the background (knowledge) necessary to understand

a concept. For example, terms such as buying ’ and selling are to be understood

against a commercial transaction frame. A concept is said to be profiled againsta domain (see Langacker, 1987, Lakoff, 1987).

In what follows, I shall largely confine the discussion to a view of domains as

being similar to frames rather than as a set of entities specific to an area of

interest.. And an example of an issue needing consideration is whether the

domain for one concept can itself be profiled against another domain. In a

careful study, Clausner and Croft (1999) discuss the meaning of arc and circle

from this perspective. Thus the meaning of arc (i.e., a continuous portion of a

circle) requires the notion of a circle in order for it to be understood. But

likewise, the meaning of a circle needs to be profiled against the domain of

geometric shapes and so the domain for one concept can itself be profiled

against another domain. But this now raises the question of the relation of arcs

to geometric shapes, or more generally of the relation between an upper domain,

such as a geometric shape, and a lower domain or concept, such as an arc. For

the purposes of domain to domain mappings in metaphor, does a concept belong



transitively to (all) upper domains even though the upper domains do not

directly provide the background necessary to understand the concept? If this is

the case, it makes the definition of a domain particularly inclusive and makes it

correspondingly harder to utilise the concept of a domain to circumscribe the

space of possible domain to domain mappings.

Given this problem, if we wish to keep the concept of a domain in metaphor

theory, it might be best to choose the most restrictive definition and limit a

domain to that against which a concept can be profiled. But does this apply in

practice to proposed domain to domain mappings? To give a concrete example,

one of the phrases Lakoff lists as illustrating the LOVE AS A JOURNEY

conceptual metaphor is: “It’s been a long bumpy road.” According to the

mapping Lakoff provides, “difficulties in the relationship” correspond to

“impediments to travel.” It would seem reasonable to infer impediments from

bumps, so we might ask whether specific bumps, as opposed to the more general

obstacles, are part of the domain of journeys. Now, bumps may be profiled

against the domain of roads (as well as against numerous other surface

domains), and roads may be profiled against journeys. We therefore have an

analogous case to that of the arc, circle and geometric shape. So somewhat

indirectly bumps can be linked to a domain of journeys. But does the existence

of this inferential link entail that bumps is in the domain of journeys and is it

this domain membership that allows bumpy roads to be used to talk about love

affairs via the LOVE AS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor? Or is what is

important just the fact that bumps can be inferentially linked to the notion of journey, conveying information about the lack of progress? Is the notion of a

domain something of a red herring here?

However, consideration of the bumps examples raises a more fundamental

problem. Much of the information conveyed by a metaphor does not seem to be

specific to any one domain, at least at a degree of abstraction, and conceptual

metaphor theory has always agreed that mappings should be stated at the more

abstract, superordinate, level, rather than a basic level (see Lakoff 1993:211-2).

For example, it can be inferred that bumps/obstacles prevent or disenable the

smooth running of the journey.6 But an enablement/disenablement relationship

is not restricted to the domain of journeys. For example, I would argue that in

the following sentence, which utilises the conceptual metaphor THEORIES AS

BUILDINGS, or perhaps the more general, VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS (see

Grady, 1997a,b), it can be inferred that the purpose of the buttressing is to



prevent or disenable the theory-construction from being refuted or toppling, or

conversely to enable it to stay erect.

(2) Later, Freud did locate a couple of key historical documents which

buttressed his argument .

And the notion of a general mapping is not restricted to disenablement. To give

another example, Lakoff (1993) argues that in the following song lyric the

emotion of excitement is inferred and transferred to the target.

(3) We’re riding in the fast lane on the freeway of love.

However, emotional states such as excitement are not only inferred in the

domain of journeys. Finally, we might note that in the bumpy road example,

bumps might be expected to cause physical discomfort. This physical

discomfort might itself lead to emotional discomfort, or the physical discomfort

might stand metonymically for emotional discomfort; consider for example,

“heartache”. In either case, emotional discomfort in the source corresponds to

emotional discomfort in the target. Numerous other examples will be discussed

of domain-neutral information being inferred from metaphorical utterances.

The arguments so far against the utility of domain in metaphor theory for

anything other than superficial cataloguing have been, firstly, that having

domains does not seem to constrain possible inference chains in any natural wayand, secondly, that much of importance in the interpretation of a metaphor

seems to apply to numerous metaphors and is not profiled against any specific

domain. I now wish to consider concepts which receive a standard non-

metaphorical interpretation by being profiled against a domain and so should

clearly be thought part of the domain, yet which seem to lead to uninterpretable

metaphors when used in what appears otherwise to be a conventional and

productive source domain to target domain mapping. Thus both Grady

(1997a,b) and Clausner and Croft (1997) have discussed the conceptual

metaphor THEORIES AS BUILDINGS and noted the non-occurrence of such

metaphors as the following:

(4) That theory lacks French windows.



The concepts of windows, French or otherwise, seems to make sense in the

context of a building. If there exists a domain of buildings, windows would be a

part, yet the sentence is difficult to understand.

In Grady’s account not only does the THEORIES AS BUILDINGS conceptualmetaphor include many source domain gaps, such as French windows, but he

also notes that those aspects of the source domain that do appear productive are

not restricted to the specific target domain of theories. He concludes that what

appear to be productive are two mappings: ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL

STRUCTURE and VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS, and these are not just

restricted to talking about theories.78 Clausner and Croft, too, argue that

THEORIES AS BUILDINGS is too specific and they suggest replacing the

source domain with the more general, THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF

BUILDINGS.

However, even with very general conceptual metaphors such as MIND AS

PHYSICAL SPACE (see Barnden’s Metaphors of Mind database

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~jab/ATT-Meta/Databank/), gaps can still be found,

as sentences 5, 6 and 7 illustrate.

(5) I know he will probably do a good job but in the back of my mind I can't

help thinking about the problems he had last year. ...www.business-

english.com/backidioms/menu.php

(6) Yes, i'm young and naive, but I think theres something just on the edge

of my mind that I can't quite grasp. www.online-

literature.com/forums/showthread.php?t=19984&page=3

(7) ?The right of my mind .

Sentence 5 employs a very conventional metaphor; indeed, the example comes

from a list of idioms containing the word right . The phrase the edge of my mind

is far less conventional and an anonymous reviewer had suggested that the

phrase would not occur. Nonetheless, an internet search turned up many

examples, one of which is given as 6. However, an internet search for the right

of my mind found no examples.9 Given our knowledge of physical space this

result might appear surprising, since according to Kilgarriff’s BNC frequency

list (http://www.kilgarriff.co.uk/bnc-readme.html.), right is the most common

spatial term in the domain of physical space.



The existence of the right of the mind gap would lead Grady to conclude that

MIND AS PHYSICAL SPACE is not a primary metaphor and it may be that

further refinement can eventually come up with a set of primary metaphors for

which there exist no gaps. However an issue that bears on the nature of gaps,and which is often over-looked, is that even for entities which can be used

felicitously in a metaphorical utterance not every inference that one might make

about the entity using our normal common sense knowledge of the putative

source domain is acceptable. For example, Mussolf (2004) gives examples in

which the European Union is described as a marriage. We might assume that

such metaphors are licensed by a UNION AS MARRIAGE conceptual

metaphor. But this would be a marriage with -currently- 27 partners, which

would certainly be illegitimate in all the European Union countries. But the

illegitimacy of the European Union is presumably not an inference that the user

would expect to be drawn. Consider the utterance this policy reflects the views

of the majority. Now, a reflection inverts the image and so the utterance perhaps

ought to be taken counter-factually to mean that the policy is opposed by the

majority. But of course, it doesn’t. It is not as if it violates our common sense

knowledge of mirrors; we know that mirrors invert and even utilise the fact in

such metaphorical utterances as this is the mirror-image of what was wanted . In

short there appear to be inference gaps as well as the more normal entity gaps

What this suggests is that it might not be certain entities, such as windows or

right sides, per se that lead to illegitimate metaphors. Instead, it is the drawingof certain inferences from these entities that connect to the core correspondence.

It is these that are impossible or perverse given the context. With acceptable

entities, on the other hand, inferences, which are likely to be made by the

producer of the metaphor and followed by its interpreter, are possible. Thus, to

return to an earlier example in which the felicity of the novel phrase: You would

need an electron microscope to see the point in that was noted, we can infer,

given our knowledge of what electron microscopes are used for, and assuming a

conceptual metaphor COGNIZING IS SEEING, that the degree to which

something can be seen and hence understood is very low. A similar ease of

inferencing occurs in the case of back of the mind and, the less conventional,

edge of the mind . I will argue, following the broad lines of the ATT-Meta

approach to metaphor interpretation (see, Barnden, 2006; Barnden, 2008;

Barnden et al., 2004; Wallington et al., 2006), that for someone not at the

periphery, it can easily be inferred that peripheral areas can only be interacted

with to a very limited degree, and it is this limited interaction with, or awareness



of, the idea that represents the intended message of these sentences..

Conversely, it is unclear what inferences one could draw within the context of

THEORIES AS BUILDINGS about the relation of French windows to the rest

of the building. A similar point can be made about why an interpretation of

utterances such as it lay on the right of her mind in the context of MIND ASPHYSICAL SPACE is absent. Its absence makes sense if one tries to imagine

what inferences could be drawn from its use, and, in particular, whether the

conclusions of such inferences represent the type of information that typically

transfers in metaphor.

To conclude, although it may be possible to give precise definitions of domains,

there are reasons to doubt that the notion of domain used in discussions of

cross-domain correspondences can be given a precise enough definition to

ground the notion of source-target transfers. Furthermore, much of what is

transferred is of an abstract nature that would transcend any domain boundary.

Consequently, I take a much more open-ended approach, with potentially

anything that can be inferentially linked to a central source-target mapping

being possible to incorporate into a metaphorical utterance.10 But on the face of

it this would fail to account for the apparent systematicity unless there is some

means of controlling the possible inferences. The control cannot be exerted by

domain boundaries. The proposal I wish to advance in this paper is that the

notion of a correspondence or mapping between two ontologically complex

domains should be replaced by that of a core mapping and the assumption that

only information of a certain type typically transfers. Such information will beinferred as holding of the situation described by the metaphorical utterance if

the producer and interpreter of the utterance in its context can follow the

necessary chain of inferences to the relevant abstract information types.

3 Correspondence Approaches and Map-Transcending Entities.

The previous section argued that it is a mistake to account for systematicity by

appealing to mappings or correspondences between well-defined domains. In

this section I shall aim towards the same conclusion. However I shall do this not

by querying the nature of domains, but by pursuing one of the principle

theoretical claims of ATT-Meta theory (Barnden, 2006; Barnden, 2008; Barnden

et al., 2004, Wallington et al., 2006) and arguing that many of the entities,

relations, attributes and so on used metaphorically in an utterance to talk about a

particular target need have no actual target correspondents.



This is not the view taken by Lakoff who states that evidence for the existence

of a system of conventional conceptual metaphors includes: “Generalizations

governing inference patterns, that is, cases where a pattern of inferences from

one conceptual domain is used in another domain.” He further adds that

mappings:

project source domain inference patterns onto target domain inference

patterns. (Lakoff 1993:245, emphasis added).

In other words the pattern made by tracing out each step in the inference process

from premises to conclusion in the source are claimed to be projected onto the

target.

Given this assumption, I shall re-examine in more detail the conventional

expressions concerning the progress of a love affair that I mentioned in the

previous section, and which Lakoff claims show love conceptualized as a

journey.

Lakoff (1993:207) argues that such expressions are evidence for the LOVE-AS-

JOURNEY mapping, i.e. “a set of ontological correspondences that characterize

epistemic correspondences by mapping knowledge about journeys onto

knowledge about love.” Specifically, the following set of correspondences is

assumed:

THE LOVE-AS-JOURNEY MAPPING

The lovers correspond to travellers.

The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle.

The lovers' common goals correspond to their common destinations on

the journey.

Difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments to travel.

Unfortunately, Lakoff does not describe the reasoning process in any detail. So

let us take the expression we’re spinning our wheels and consider how we might

infer from this that the love relationship isn’t progressing as it might. Plausibly,

the following chain of inferences is entertained. If wheels are referred to, then, it

is likely that a vehicle is involved. The spinning wheels are causing the vehicle

not to move as it should. If the vehicle is not moving as it should then it is not

moving towards its destination. A further conclusion is that this lack of progress,

either literally or metaphorically causes frustration.



What can be made of this pattern of inferences that allows us to conclude that

the vehicle is not moving towards its destination? Both the vehicle and the

destination have correspondents in the target domain of the love affair, namely

the love relationship itself and the lovers’ common goals. With thesecorrespondences, it might be assumed that the source domain conclusion can be

transferred to become a target domain conclusion. However, this is the transfer

of the conclusion. The conclusion would never have been reached without the

premise that something -the spinning wheels- was causing the vehicle not to

proceed. So what is the target domain correspondent of the spinning wheels,

whose presence is needed in order to allow the entire inference pattern, as

opposed to just the conclusion, to transfer between source and target? Nothing

in the list of four ontological correspondences would seem to be appropriate.

And note, furthermore, that our conclusion involves a negation: not moving

towards a target. The negation transfers to the target, but there is no formal

discussion of why this should be so and whether negation in the source always

corresponds to negation in the target.

A look at the other examples listed finds similar cases where the lack of a target

domain correspondent would prevent crucial aspects of the source domain

inference pattern from mapping to an inference pattern about the target. For

example, what is the target domain correspondent of the rocks in the utterance

our marriage is on the rocks? A similar point can be made about the location off

the tracks in our relationship is off the track . But, as before, these statementscan be easily interpreted. Both of them would seem to permit the same

conclusion that was reached about the spinning wheels, namely that the

relationship/vehicle is not progressing towards the destination and hence not

towards the lovers’ common goal, and that consequently the relationship is not

functioning as it ought. But without target domain correspondents for these

items the conclusion will not transfer if it is inference patterns that map between

source and target.

Note that it doesn’t seem quite right to assume that the spinning wheels, rocks

or lack of tracks are impediments in the sense of the third of Lakoff’s

correspondences. Whilst one might assume that the bumps in the statement it’s

been a long bumpy road are impediments and point to specific difficulties that

have occurred over the course of the relationship, there does not seem to be an

assumption with the other cases we have discussed that there are specific causes

to the relationship not progressing and hence functioning. Whatever wheels



might refer to, it is a vague and very unspecific target domain entity.

Furthermore, there is also the point made in the previous section that a

relationship described as a bumpy road suggests that there was some emotional

discomfort, an inference that would not appear to follow from the assumption

that there was an impediment.

In short, a careful study of these examples supports the view of ATT-Meta

theory that there can be entities referred to in a metaphorical utterance that need

have no correspondent or mapping in any target or literal interpretation of the

utterance. Instead, their role is in allowing certain conclusions concerning the

source to be drawn to be drawn and it is these conclusions that transfer, not

necessarily all the items that were involved in the drawing of the conclusions. 11

Another sentence often used to illustrate the LOVE AS A JOURNEY conceptual

metaphor is: We’re at a crossroads. Stating that we are at some location on a

road might be taken to imply that we are going somewhere along the road and

hence have a destination. This would correspond to a target domain common

goal . However, there is no specific correspondent given for crossroads. The

source domain inference that if one is at a crossroads, then there is a choice of

possible destinations cannot transfer to the target becoming the inference that

there alternative relationship goals, if, as is stated, inference patterns are

mapped from one domain to another.

Now a possible solution to the problem might be to assume a lacuna in thecorrespondences listed above and add a fifth correspondent that could be used to

interpret crossroads; something along the lines of alternative destinations

correspond to alternative life-goals. However, the mapping already lists as

correspondence 3, life goals corresponding to destinations. It might be thought

more parsimonious to factor out from this putative correspondence the

commonality that could be dealt with by correspondence 3. This leaves

alternatives mapping to alternatives. But, this is just the type of invariant

transfer I suggested in the introduction underlies much metaphor. If further

evidence shows that alternatives inferred in the source always map across to

become alternatives in the target regardless of which conceptual metaphor is in

play, then it would be redundant and missing a generalization to include a

specific correspondence as part of the LOVE AS A JOURNEY Conceptual

Metaphor.



I would argue that a similar factoring out can be performed with the fourth

correspondence: difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments to

travel , if it is first rephrased as: Factors that prevent the relationship from

progressing are factors that prevent the vehicle from travelling . Now, since we

have a relationship (progressing towards a goal) corresponding to a vehicle(travelling towards a destination) listed as correspondence 2 (and 3), what is

particular to the rewritten correspondence 4 is factors that prevent

corresponding to factors that prevent .

I will follow ATT-Meta theory and assume that ability, inability, enablement,

disenablement, letting and prevention (more broadly, causation) tend to map

invariantly. I will assume that an inference can be made that the journey is being

prevented from proceeding as it should. This, a reader will understand in reality

as concerning a love affair rather than a journey, because of the core mappings

of the LOVE AS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor and she will further

understand in reality that the affair isn’t progressing, because of the

disenablement adjunct to the LOVE AS A JOURNEY mapping that allows

disenablement in the source to be viewed as disenablement in the target.

In conclusion, and in agreement with the view of the ATT-Meta approach, there

often appears to be a lack of parallelism or correspondence between source and

target. Furthermore, where correspondences are stated as in Lakoff’s LOVE AS

A JOURNEY correspondences, they are often little more than rewordings of the

source terminology in order to transfer an invariant property, as with difficultiesin the relationship corresponding to impediments to travel . All this creates

problems for the assumption of domain to domain mappings, but if, instead,

what transfers are conclusions of a certain type and if the purpose of the source

entities in the utterance for which there are no correspondents is to allow

connections to be inferred with central and invariant correspondences and

append what information they enabled to be inferred to these correspondences,

then the lack of parallelism would be expected.12

4 Invariant Transfers

The two preceding sections have suggested that it is a mistake to look for the

systematicity of metaphor in correspondences between conceptual domains. In

section 2, I argued that the notion of domains is problematic, at least with

respect to circumscribing possible metaphor mappings, being both difficult to

delimit and needing to contain elements such as excitement, degree and so on,



which presumably could be inferred from numerous other unrelated

metaphorical utterances. In section 3, I criticized the claim that inference

patterns must transfer from source to target by casting doubt on the notion that

entities, relations, attributes and so on referred to in a metaphorical utterance

must have target correspondents.

So what universal types of invariant information can be inferred? It does not

seem to be the case that information of any type can be inferred, even if there is

strong contextual support for the drawing of such an inference. For example,

Hobbs (1990:59,60) noted the word elephant used metaphorically can convey

different information depending upon the context.

(8) Mary is graceful, but John is an elephant.

Patricia is small, but James is an elephant.

Susan forgets everything, but Paul is an elephant.

Jenifer is subtle, but Roger is an elephant.

However, the colour red is surely as salient an aspect of tomato or pillar-box as

clumsiness is of an elephant, yet the following metaphorical utterance doesn’t

seem to work.

(9) Mary’s pencil is blue, but John’s pencil is a tomato/pillar-box.

And consider the well known Juliet is the sun. It might be concluded that colour is not the type of information that typically accompanies a core source-target

mapping.13

I have already made some suggestions as to what types of information may

transfer invariantly, such as information concerning enablement and

disenablement, the degree to which something holds, and to emotional states.

However, I have not yet shown that the examples in which such information is

inferred are representative of a more general phenomenon. It might be the case

that the types of inference that transfer invariantly differ according to the

particular conceptual metaphor chosen. Indeed, the class of GENERIC IS

SPECIFIC metaphors (see Lakoff and Turner 1989) or Grady (1999)), such as:

LONG TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, where a

journey is a specific instance of a long term purposeful activity, constitute such

a case.14



However, the claim I wish to support in this paper is that there exists a set of

invariant mappings which have more universal application –at least by default.

In the ATT-Meta approach this set of invariant mappings have been called View-

Neutral Mapping Adjuncts (VNMAs); adjuncts because they accompany, or are

an adjunct to, traditional source-domain to target-domain mappings, and view-neutral because they can apply regardless of which metaphorical view one is

taking.15 In what follows, I shall list of a number of different types of

information which seem to get transferred between source and target by these

VNMAs. In each case, I shall also attempt briefly to motivate the particular

VNMA by giving a few examples of the invariant transfer of the type of

information being discussed using a range of what might be thought of as

different source and target domains. The list is not intended to be complete (see

Wallington and Barnden, 2006 for a fuller list with more discussion. See also

Wallington et al., 2006 and Barnden et al., 2003). In addition, since any

metaphorical utterance typically conveys a mixture of information, the

examples given do not pretend to consist of all, or even the most prominent

type, of the information being conveyed.

CAUSATION/ABILITY/FUNCTION VNMA.

Causation, ability, function, prevention, helping and (dis) enablement

relationships between events or other entities in the source map to causation,

prevention, etc relationships between their mappees (if they have any).

A couple of examples that have utilised the invariant transfer of enablement (or disenablement) have already been discussed. Thus, in sentence 2, repeated

below, I argued that the buttressing documents enabled Freud’s arguments to

stay erect. This enabling relation between the documents and the arguments

transfers to the target as an adjunct to the core mapping between THEORIES

and BUILDINGS.

2 Later, Freud did locate a couple of key historical documents which

buttressed his argument .

Similarly, I argued that the relevance of bumps in Lakoff’s LOVE AS A

JOURNEY conceptual metaphor was that they prevented the love affair-journey

from progressing as it should.

QUALITATIVE DEGREE VNMA.



If the holding of a graded property or relationship in the source maps to the

holding of a graded property or relationship in the target, or vice versa, then the

qualitative absolute and relative degrees map over identically.

The following two sentences form a minimal pair:

(10) In the far reaches of her mind, Anne knew …..16

(11) Anne had an idea in mind.

Both sentences concern some thought or idea of Anne’s. However, sentence 10,

but not 11, seems to suggest that Anne was not engaging with the idea very

actively. See also sentences 5 and 6 discussed earlier. The respective

interpretations can be explained if the phrase the far reaches in sentence 10

allows an inference that is unavailable in sentence 11. I would claim that both

sentences make use of mappings between IDEAS and PHYSICAL OBJECTS,

MIND and PHYSICAL SPACE, and MENTAL ACTIVITY and the PHYSICAL

INTERACTION WITH SOLID OBJECTS.17 However, with sentence 10, the

fact that the idea-object is far away suggests that Anne would only be able to

interact with the idea to a very limited degree. Then, because MENTAL

ACTIVITY is viewed as PHYSICAL INTERACTION, the low degree of

physical interaction would be viewed as a low degree of mental activity if

QUALITATIVE DEGREE transfers invariantly.18

Consider now the following sentence:

(12)He’s only dimly aware of the reason for ….

I would argue that the analysis of this sentence also involves a mapping between

IDEAS and OBJECTS, but in this case involves COGNIZING AS SEEING. It

can be inferred that the viewing of the object can only be done to a limited

degree. Then, since viewing maps to cognizing, the low degree will map over as

an adjunct.

Consider now:

(13)She was not fully cognizant of the idea.

I shall assume that this rests on a mapping between a STATE (of being

cognizant or aware) and a full CONTAINER; the same mapping that underlies



idioms such as an empty vessel or empty headed. In this case the container is

full only to a partial degree and this partial degree maps over invariantly

allowing the inference that the subject’s state of cognizance or awareness is only

partial.

I will consider one more example.

(14)Now you’ve almost reached your destination: an informed and

thoughtful opinion.

This utilises the mapping between PURPOSEFUL ACTION and JOURNEYS

and between STATES, such as having an informed and thoughtful opinion and

LOCATIONS. However, the main import of the utterance is that the degree to

which the subject has an informed and thoughtful opinion is high but not

complete. This follows if we assume that the inferred near completeness of

having finished the journey and thus arriving at the destination location

corresponds to the near completeness of having the opinion.

To conclude from looking at the above examples, if the degree to which

something holds can be inferred in the source, then typically the information

conveyed by the metaphorical utterance that is relevant to the target also

concerns a degree to which something holds. Furthermore, the degree is

qualitatively the same.

(UN)CERTAINTY VNMA

The level of certainty with which situations hold in the source maps at least

roughly to level of certainty with which their mappee situations hold.

Consider the following utterances:

(15) It’s a long shot but ….

(16) It was a complete shot in the dark.

These examples rest upon the correspondence: MENTAL ACTIVITY IS

PHYSICAL INTERACTION WITH SOLID OBJECTS together with an

accompanying reification of IDEAS PROBLEMS ETC as OBJECTS. The

CAUSATION VNMA is also required to transfer the ability to manipulate the

objects. However, it can be inferred in each case that because the idea-object

was distant or there was little light to see the idea-object there will be a high



degree of uncertainty that it will be possible to interact with, i.e., hit, the idea-

object.19

To consider UNCERTAINTY at play in another domain, the following sentence,

dating from 2007, about the then future digital movement in photography wasfound using an internet search:

(17)Where are you both regarding the digital movement coming up behind

us?

The sentence is somewhat unusual because future events are often

conceptualised in the majority of languages as being in positions in front of the

temporal experiencer. Drawing upon an analysis of the future in the Aymara

language by Núñez & Sweetser (2006), I would argue that when a future event

is conceptualised as being behind the temporal experiencer, it is because she has

considerable uncertainty about the nature of the future event and how it will

impact upon her. This can be inferred if we assume core mappings between

COGNIZING and SEEING and between EVENTS and OBJECTS, plus the

inference that an event metaphorically cast as an object which is not co-located

with the temporal experiencer, is not now. If some coming event-object is

behind, then it cannot be seen and hence one only has uncertain awareness or

cognizance of it.

ALTERNATIVES VNMA20

.If a number of choices/alternatives are presented concerning a mappee or a

number of alternative instances of a mappee are available, then the alternatives

will also transfer to the target.

I have already discussed the sentence:

(18) We’re at a crossroads.

I shall assume that this can be interpreted in the context of the PURPOSEFUL

ACTIVITY AS A JOURNEY Metaphorical View. It can be inferred that if one is

at a crossroads, then alternative continuations of the journey/purposeful activity

are possible.

The interpretation of the following sentence utilises different core mappings:



(19) There’s another side to this issue.

This involves correspondences between ISSUES and PHYSICAL OBJECTS

and between MENTAL ACTIVITY and PHYSICAL INTERACTION.21 The

fact that the object can be manipulated/viewed in more than one way, as can beinferred by the claim that there are different sides, will be transferred to the

target accompanying the MENTAL ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL INTERACTION

mapping.

EVENT-SHAPE VNMA.

Aspectual features of events/situations/processes, such as whether they have a

start or end, or are intermittent, map identically to mappee events/ situations/

processes.

All episodes, including source and target, need an event-shape. By default the

event-shape of the target will be inherited from the source.22 Compare for

example:

(20) He was searching for an answer to the question.

(21) He wanted an answer to the question.

The first example denotes an activity, the second a state, and such information

concerning the event will be mapped by the EVENT-SHAPE VNMA. No

specific target correspondent is required for the searching or wanting .

MENTAL/EMOTIONAL STATES VNMA.

If some agents in the source domain map to some agents in the target domain,

then mental and emotional states of the agents map identically, except that their

objects or propositional contents (if any) are modified suitably by any mapping

relationships that apply, and provided that this modification can be done. This

VNMA also transfers any emotional state induced in the users of the metaphor

by the source domain description to the target.23

(22) Your room is a cess-pit.

This utterance plausibly relies upon the mapping STATES ARE LOCATIONS

(state of your room is a location-cess-pit). The disgust evoked by the use of the

term cess-pit is conveyed by the MENTAL/EMOTIONAL STATES VNMA.



Consider the much discussed example of the grim, unpleasant, look of

personifications of death, such as the medieval Grim Reaper . Any fear, anxiety

etc induced would be conveyed by this MENTAL/EMOTIONAL STATES

VNMA.

VALUE-JUDGMENT VNMA.

Levels of goodness, importance or other types of value assigned by the

understander to states of affairs in the source domain map identically to levels

of goodness, etc. of their mappee states of affairs, if any.

This VNMA can be very similar to and hard to tell apart from the former.

Consider the following utterance:

(23) That’s a gem of an idea.

I would argue that the only core mapping needed to understand this example is

IDEAS AS OBJECTS. In particular, there need be no correspondence associated

with the concept of gemness. Instead, it can be inferred that gems are valuable

and this VALUE-JUDGEMENT about those OBJECTS that are gems transfers

to become a VALUE-JUDGEMENT about IDEAS that are metaphorically

precious.

(24) A late medieval flowering ….

This metaphor presumably depends upon the correspondence,

DEVELOPMENT AS GROWTH (OF PLANTS). However, rather than having

a correspondence detailing all aspects of plant growth, the positive value-

judgment concerning entities that flower would be conveyed.

OTHER VNMAS .

I will briefly mention a number of other VNMAs that I will refer to in section 5.

For more details see Wallington and Barnden 2006. The NEGATION VNMA

deals with instances where a property or relationship in the source corresponds

to some property or relationship in the target. By virtue of the NEGATION

VNMA, the non-possession of the source property/relationship maps to non-

possession of the target property/relationship. For example, I have discussed

enablement and disenablement. Strictly, disenablement follows from the

NEGATION VNMA applied to the CAUSATION/ABILITY VNMA.



Another VNMA I shall refer to is RATE. Something metaphorically cast that

can be inferred to take a long time will be interpreted as taking a long time in

the context of the target.24 A final VNMA I shall mention is TIME-ORDER,

which accounts for the fact that if there is a sequence of events in the source

which map to events in the target, then the time-order of the events will be preserved.

5 Invariant Mappings and Systematicity

In the final part of this paper I shall briefly look at how the postulation of

VNMAs motivates a number of systematically related metaphorical utterances.

These utterances have been used by Jäkel (1993) to illustrate a series of sub-

metaphors and correspondences, what Jäkel calls: model-integrated components

or MICs, that group together to form the conceptual metaphor: MENTAL

ACTIVITY MANIPULATION.25 I chose Jäkel’s work because it represents a

particularly good and detailed use of conceptual metaphor theory to analyse a

large set of what appear to be systematically related metaphors. Like Jäkel, I too

shall assume as a core correspondence the link between PHYSICAL

INTERACTION, i.e. making oneself aware of the physical properties of the

object, and MENTAL ACTIVITY. I shall also assume -as does Jäkel- that ideas,

thoughts, problems and issues etc. are reified as physical objects by virtue of the

conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. I will also assume MIND AS

PHYSICAL SPACE together with the important addition that the physical space

is often conceived as relative to a homunculus or EGO representing theconscious possessor of the mind and occupying a central position in the physical

space. Since these mappings will be used in most of the examples I analyse, I

will not always explicitly mention them. Also, unless the EVENT-SHAPE plays

an important role in the analysis, I shall usually omit to mention it. There are

two final points to be made before I begin the analysis. Firstly, it is often the

case that source entities in the metaphorical utterance can be inferentially linked

to a core mapping using more than one VNMA, and so can be used to convey

more than one type of information. Indeed this economy of resources is, I would

argue, an important aspect of metaphor. Secondly, Jäkel’s illustrative examples

are presented without context, or rather the only context provided is Jäkel’s

claim that the examples illustrate particular MICs. One of ATT-Meta’s central

claims (matching that of Steen 2007 and Steen et al. this volume) is that the

context of a metaphorical utterance helps determine the nature of the queries

that the utterance is expected to answer. Thus other readings may be possible

given a more explicit context.26



Jäkel’s first model-integrated components or MIC is IDEAS ARE SOLID

OBJECTS. As noted, this is a conceptual metaphor I also recognise and it has

been used in a number of examples presented in this paper. Jäkel also argues for

its interaction with the conceptual metaphors: COMPLEXITY ISDIMENSIONALITY, DIFFICULTY IS HARDNESS, and IMPORTANCE IS

WEIGHT. These motivate in turn the following utterances:

(25) There’s another side to the question.

(26) That’s a very hard question to answer.

(27) Let’s turn to less weighty matters.

Part of the import of utterance 25 may be explained by inferring that if there is

more than one side, then the question-object may be examined from a number

of alternative perspectives, which implies it can be manipulated (or viewed) in a

number of alternative ways. If there are alternative manipulations of the

question-object, then there are alternative mental activities concerning the

question-object (or alternative understandings). This inference will transfer to

the target via the ALTERNATIVES VNMA acting as an adjunct to MENTAL

ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL INTERACTION (or possibly COGNIZING IS

SEEING).

I shall discuss utterances similar to 26 when I consider sentence 48. The

analysis of 27 may make use of a conceptual metaphor IMPORTANCE ISWEIGHT but alternatively it may rely on the common inference that heavy (and

large) objects are often important. Importance is then transferred to the target

via the VALUE-JUDGEMENT VNMA.27

Jäkel’s second MIC is UNDERSTANDING AN IDEA IS ESTABLISHING

PHYSICAL CLOSENESS. The earlier discussion of sentences 10 and 11, and

the degree to which an idea-object can be manipulated, or interacted with

physically, is relevant here. However, Jäkel subdivides this MIC into four

subMICs representing different stages in reducing the distance to the idea-

object.

The first subMIC, MIC2a is: UNDERSTANDING STARTS WITH ATTEMPTS

AT FINDING AND HUNTING IDEA-OBJECTS. This is claimed to motivate

utterances such as the following:



(28) Sally searched for an idea all day.

A plausible sequence of source domain inferences would be that Sally does not

possess the idea-object. Thus, she has no ability to manipulate it. This

information is passed to the target by the NEGATION and the CAUSATION-ABILITY-FUNCTION VNMAs. It might also be inferred that if she were

searching for an idea-object then she desires or wishes to have it. This desire or

wish would be passed to the target by the MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL

STATE VNMA. One might also note the specific event structure, which was

that of an activity involving Sally and the idea-object. This activity event

structure will transfer to the target via the EVENT-SHAPE VNMA so shaping

the aspectual properties of the target. Note that the verb search contributes to

the meaning of the utterance via its contribution to the event structure and via

the mental or emotional state it suggests. However, there is no need for a

specific target domain correspondent specifically for physically “searching for

something”. Finally a reasonable, although not definite, inference, given her

wish or desire, and the nature of the target’s event structure is that Sally

undertook some action to remedy the situation i.e. to have the ability to mentally

interact with an idea.

The inference of a wish or desire is absent from the following utterances,

although further context may suggest it, but DEGREE and ABILITY, within the

context of the core metaphor MENTAL ACTIVITY IS MANIPULATION, can

be inferred.

(29) The solution is now close at hand.

(30) Nothing was further from my mind.

(31) I think the problem is within my grasp.

These inferences are also likely to be made with the following examples, but

further conclusions can also be drawn.

(32) He took aim at the problem.

(33) Have a shot at solving the problem.

(34) It’s a long shot but ….

(35) It was a complete shot in the dark.

These examples all suggest that there is some uncertainty as to whether it will

be possible to shoot, hit or physically interact with the idea/answer-object. This



uncertainty will be transferred to the target by the UNCERTAINTY VNMA.

Thus, the existence of the UNCERTAINTY VNMA can be said to motivate the

form of these metaphorical utterances, at least partially.

Jäkel’s second subMIC, MIC 2b is: UNDERSTANDING IS SEIZING IDEA-

OBJECT FIRMLY. What this adds to the conceptual metaphor MENTAL

ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL INTERACTION is the notion that the idea-object is

manipulated firmly. Clearly if one is holding something, then one can

manipulate it, to at least some extent. However, the degree of certainty that one

will be able to continue to possess the ability to manipulate the object may be

high or low. By using the word firmly, it suggests that the ability is high. The

continuance is transferred by the EVENT-SHAPE VNMA; the

UNCERTAINTY, ABILITY and DEGREE are transferred as in the other

examples.

(36) He lost his grip and things got away from him.

(37)I’m all thumbs at algebra.

(38) It’s a slippery concept.

Consequently grip, thumbs and slippery need have no specific target

correspondents. Note that example 38 may also utilise the VALUE-

JUDGEMENT VNMA to transfer negative connotations about slippery objects.

MIC 2c is UNDERSTANDING IS PICKING UP IDEA-OBJECTS and thismotivates utterances such as the following:

(39) He’s slow/quick on the uptake.

(40) Where did you pick up such ideas?

Jäkel argues that such metaphors utilise the conceptual metaphor CONSCIOUS

IS UP. However, it might be possible instead to appeal to a default assumption

that manipulation of an object takes place when it is in an easily accessible

position, and not on the ground. Thus, there would be no need for a target

correspondent of up.

MIC 2d is UNDERSTANDING IS TAKING IDEA-OBJECTS INTO THE

MIND-CONTAINER. This assumes the conceptual metaphor MIND IS A

CONTAINER, which I assume is a special case of MIND IS PHYSICAL

SPACE: one of our central mappings between source and target.28 I have



assumed that the manipulator of idea-objects, EGO, is assumed by default to

occupy a central position in the mind-space. Thus in the following sentence a

simple inference would be that EGO, being absent from the mind-space now no

longer has the ability to physically interact with idea-objects in the mind-space.

This lack would be transferred by the NEGATION and CAUSATION-ABILITY-FUNCTION VNMAs.

(41) He’s gone out of his mind.

The following utterances allow the inference that there is a high DEGREE of

CERTAINTY that idea-objects will be able to enter the mind-space.

Consequently the broadness or openness of the mind needs no target equivalent.

(42)Keep an open mind.

(43) Her parents were broadminded.

We now turn to a new model-integrated component, MIC 3: WITHIN THE

MENTAL WORKSHOP, IDEA-OBJECTS ARE STOWED AWAY

ACCORDING TO URGENCY. Jäkel assumes that the following utterance

utilises Johnson’s (1987) conceptual metaphor, IMPORTANCE IS

CENTRALITY.

(44) She put the idea to the back of her mind.

This metaphor can be analysed in a similar manner to the far reaches example,

i.e. sentence 10, that I examined in section 4, and which involved a low degree

of ability. Over and above this analysis, the time course and event-shape of the

idea-object being in the centre and then being put at the back will be transferred

by the TIME COURSE AND EVENT-SHAPE VNMAs.

MIC 4 is THINKING IS WORKING ON PROBLEM-OBJECTS WITH THE

MIND-TOOL. As with MIC 2, Jäkel also divides this into four subMICs. I shall

not examine them in detail here, nor list them all, but see Wallington and

Barnden (2006). However, I shall comment on a few of the metaphorical

utterances that motivate this MIC. Jäkel assumes the conceptual metaphor:

INTELLIGENCE IS SHARPNESS OF THE MIND-TOOL and this motivates

utterances such as the following:

45. He has a razor wit.29



46. The intrigues of the court had sharpened her wits.

47. He used extensive reading to hone his intellect.

However, let us use instead the familiar metaphor ANALYSING IS CUTTING.

I can then assume a source domain inference that the degree to which one cancut something, and hence analyse it, is high if the tool is sharp. This will be

conveyed by the DEGREE VNMA

A somewhat similar analysis can be given to utterances such as:

48. This is a hard nut to crack

But in this case the idea-object or nut is being profiled rather than the cutting or

cracking implement.

The following utterances about the MIND-TOOL can be analysed as allowing

the inference that the MIND-TOOL is not functioning properly:

49. He flies off the handle quite easily.

50. Her mind was not on it

This lack of function will be conveyed by the CAUSATION-ABILITY-

FUNCTION VNMA.

Jäkel uses the following utterance to motivate his MIC 4d, SOLVING A

PROBLEM IS TAKING THE SOLUTION-CONTENTS OUT OF THE

PROBLEM-CONTAINER.

51. We dredged up a load of sordid facts about her.

The notion of facts-object being brought to a position where they can be easily

operated upon or interacted with is similar to many other examples I have

analysed. However, note the negative value-judgment conveyed by the word

dredge. I shall assume this is conveyed to the target by the VALUE-

JUDGMENT VNMA.

MIC 5 is FORMING IDEAS IS SHAPING RAW MATERIALS. This differs

from other examples in that the idea-object is produced or manufactured rather



than being a pre-existing object. Consequently most of the examples involve the

EVENT STRUCTURE VNMA.

52. He produces new ideas at an astonishing rate.

This example may also involve the RATE VNMA, although arguably the

astonishing rate applies to the outcome the source-target mapping and is not

part of the inference process involved in interpreting what is meant by

producing new ideas.

MIC 6 is JUDGING DIVERSE ARGUMENTS IS WEIGHING UP IDEA-

OBJECTS. In the discussion of MIC 1, I suggested that the inference can be

made that heavy things are important and that the importance would be

conveyed via the VALUE-JUDGEMENT VNMA. The examples Jäkel discuss

here also involve the ALTERNATIVES and DEGREE VNMAs. All else that is

required is a conceptual metaphor involving a mapping between

CONSIDERING SOMETHING and WEIGHING IT, which is just a special

case of ANALYSING IS MEASURING.

53. He weighed the alternatives in his mind.

54. The scale just tipped in favour of my voting yes.

Under this analysis, scales or weights need no target domain correspondents.

Jäkel’s seventh MIC is THE VALUABLES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE KEPT IN

THE MEMORY STORE FOR FURTHER USE. He assumes that this involves a

conceptual metaphor, IDEAS AND KNOWLEDGE ARE VALUABLES, which

motivates utterances such as:

55. Treasure something up in one’s memory.

But all that is required is the conceptual metaphor IDEAS AS OBJECTS and

MIND AS PHYSICAL SPACE, which have been assumed throughout this

section, plus the VALUE-JUDGMENT VNMA to convey the value that might

be inferred from being told that an object is to be treasured. See the discussion

of example 23 in Section 4.



Jäekel divides this MIC into two subMICs in which memorising is putting

objects into the memory store and remembering is bringing the objects back.

These motivate examples such as:

56. You must commit them to memory.57. Can’t you bring this to mind?

Assuming IDEAS AS OBJECTS, MIND AS PHYSICAL SPACE and MENTAL

ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL INTERACTION, together with the assumption of

EGO, or a homunculus representing the conscious possessor of the mind, in the

centre of the mind-space, then all that is required to analyse these examples are

the TIME-ORDER and EVENT-SHAPE VNMAs.

Jäekel’s final MIC is MIC 8: ABANDONING IDEAS IS DUMPING

DISCARDED OBJECTS AND EMPTY ISSUE-CONTAINERS AT THE END

OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS. This covers such examples as the

following:

58. You’ll have to let go of your belief in Santa Claus.

This example can be analysed by assuming that after the event of letting go,

EGO will only have a low DEGREE of ABILITY to manipulate the belief-

object.

6 Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that contemporary metaphor theory has paid too

much attention to describing the nature of putative domains used in source-

target mappings and the objects, such as buttresses, windows, crossroads and so

on, that might or nor might not be found in these domains and not enough

attention to describing and cataloguing the types of information that seem to be

used in metaphor. I suggested an alternative to explaining the systematicity

found in metaphor in terms of these ontologically complex, circumscribed,

source domains that map to specific target domains by proposing a means

whereby core metaphor mappings can be extended and elaborated. I argued that

what is required is just the interaction of a few core source-concept to target-

concept correspondences, together with the assumption that anything that can be

inferentially linked to the source concepts, given the context, is a possible

candidate for use in a metaphorical utterance by the speaker. However, this



candidature is subject to the constraint that the speaker must assume that the

hearer will draw the correct inferences and, most importantly, that the

information so inferred belongs to one of the types of information that can

transfer invariantly between source and target as an adjunct of the core

mappings. Following the ATT-Meta approach, I put forward a set of VNMAsthat characterise the types of information that appear to map in an invariant

manner. It must be stressed that determining the set of VNMAs is an empirical

exercise, which requires careful examination of a wide range of metaphorical

utterances in order to factor out common invariant properties.

The claim made in this paper, however, consists of more than that there is an

alternative means of explaining the systematicity found in metaphor. I argued

that there is no operational means of defining source domains that could

usefully be used to delimit the set of possible metaphors and I noted that much

of what is transferred would not normally be characterised as belonging to just

one particular source domain. I also noted that many of the entities, relations,

attributes, and so on in particular metaphorical utterances do not have any

correspondents in the target. Thus I would claim that there are empirical

problems with domain to domain mapping approaches. In general, it is not

entities that are important, or even how different entities relate or are structured,

but rather the types of conclusion that can be drawn from their use.

It could be argued that the proposal is more of a shift in emphasis in doing

metaphor research. Others have noted the importance of invariance in metaphor.Indeed a traditional claim is that metaphor involves searching for a similarity

between the source and the target, although ATT-Meta’s assumption that

correspondents need not be required for many source entities argues against too

superficial a similarity. This lack of source-target parallelism also argues against

the claim that metaphor is a type of analogy or is strongly related to analogy

(see Gentner et al., 1988). If we turn to specific approaches to metaphor and

analogy, further differences from the approach presented here can be found.

Thus, approaches based on Structure Mapping Theory (Gentner 1983) argue that

systematic relations and the entities involved in them will transfer between

source and target, whilst one-place relations such as attributes will not. Such an

approach may well account for the CAUSATION-ABILITY-FUNCTION

VNMA. However, I also assume that VALUE-JUDGMENT attributes that

pertain to something will also transfer by default, as will DEGREES.



The importance of invariant information has also been discussed within the

context of Cognitive Linguistics. Thus, Lakoff has formulated an Invariance

Principle that acts as a constraint on source-target mappings (Lakoff, 1993:207).

Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is the

image schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with

the inherent structure of the target domain.

As with Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory, this seems to emphasise the role

of structure over the type of information that is transferred invariantly. But even

more importantly, note that the structure is image schematic structure (i.e.

imagistic or what can be experienced by the senses). If the source and target

domains are structured by image schemata, then one would expect to find

similarities between the source and target. And, in this sense, obstacles to a

journey might reflect a basic journey image schema. However, whilst thisapproach may explain the use of ‘bumps’ in metaphors about journeys,

EMOTIONAL STATES such as excitement or misery are not imagistic; nor are

VALUE-JUDGMENTS; and nor would I contend is much that is conveyed by

metaphor.

Perhaps the closest approach to that given here is that of Carbonell (1982) who

presents an invariance hierarchy of relations that are preserved under

metaphoric/analogical transfer. However, I make no claim that the VNMAs are

ordered in terms of a hierarchy of application.

It is worth emphasising that VNMAs appear to be rather a heterogeneous set.

What they all do is “afford” the participants in a discourse the means of

describing what might at the time of the discourse, and for whatever reason, be

difficult to state using more domain specific language. There is no obvious

means of reducing them to some more general principle. Indeed, we could

speculate that the different VNMAs have little to do with metaphor as such. One

might suppose, for example, that VALUE-JUDGMENTS, such as X is good to

eat or Y is dangerous represent a very basic categorisation principle. Similarly,

recognising the EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL STATE of an individual; having

a ‘theory of mind’ is a fundamental cognitive ability, and assuming CAUSAL

links between entities is if anything over exploited and seen as relating events

where no such relation exists. Thus looking for further VNMAs, analysing

metaphors in terms of VNMAs and looking for motivation for the VNMAs that



have been proposed represents a considerable research endeavour that has

barely been started.

Acknowledgements

This work is located within the ATT-Meta approach to metaphor interpretation

and ATT-Meta’s influence together with that of my colleagues with whom I

have worked on ATT-Meta: John Barnden; Mark Lee; Sheila Glasbey and

Rodrigo Agerri, permeates this work including in many places where

acknowledgements should have been given, but haven’t. This work has been

supported by current and past grants: EP/C538943/1 and GR/M64208, from the

Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.

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1 I shall follow the convention of capitalising source-target mappings and continue the process both when the mappings are

from concept to concept, rather than domain to domain and also for types of information that are mapped in an unchanging

or invariant manner between source and target.2 But unlike Relevance Theory where the interpretation of a metaphorical utterance is broadened or narrowed until its

relevance to the discourse is able to ground the inference process, I will argue that what grounds the inference process is

whether information of a specific type that is relevant to the discourse can be inferred.

3 This analogy implies no commitment to Chomskyan linguistics. The importance of constructions has recently received a

great deal of support from linguists working in a number of different theoretical approaches(e.g. Goldberg 2006, Sag et al.

2003).4 I also make no assumptions concerning the embodiedness of the concepts involved.

5 Using the term conceptual metaphor theory overlooks the fact that there have been major changes and advances in thetheory over the years. See Lakoff (2008).

. See Barnden 2008 for a discussion of some of the problems such a view of domain would pose for metaphor theory.

6 According to the online edition of the OED, the meaning of “disenable” is: To render unable or incapable; to disable: the

reverse of enable.

7 A phrase motivated by ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE that is not about theories might be: “the fabric of

society”. A phrase motivated by VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS that is not about theories might be: “This situation will not

stand”.

8 For reasons such as these, Grady abandons the notion of a domain for what he calls “primary metaphors” and assumes

instead concept to concept mappings, relying on a somewhat sketchy notion of the unification and/or blending of primary

metaphors to account for metaphorical systems such as THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS.

9 Examples were found in which “off” had been misspelled as “of” and the words occur within the larger phrase “I have notlost the birth-right of my mind” in Act 3, scene 1 of John Dryden’s play Aureng Zebe.

10 Note that to define a domain as any entities, relations, attributes and so on that can be inferentially linked to a core

element leads to a circularity.

11 In ATT-Meta theory, entities that are not directly part of a mapping, either a pre-existing mapping such as the

correspondences in the LOVE AS A JOURNEY mapping, or a mapping that needs to be created on the fly, are termed

“Map-Transcending Entities” or MTEs. One of the principle theoretical claims made by ATT-Meta is that very little source

to target mapping needs to be done on the fly.12 We might go further than stating that unmapped source entities allow inferences to be made to stating that they initiate

the inference process. In the ATT-Meta system this is enshrined in the principle of “Transfer-Warranting by Unmapped

Structure” (see Wallington et al 2006, Barnden and Lee 2001).

13 The accompaniment ought to be emphasised here. I am not claiming that a colour cannot be the target of image

metaphors. An added complexity is that the presence or absence of a determiner seems to make a difference. “John’s is

pillar-box” seems marginally more acceptable to me.14 The importance and widespread use of GENERIC AS SPECIFIC metaphors is often overlooked, the GENERIC AS

SPECIFIC being disguised by the terminology used to describe the source and the target. Thus, Grady decomposedTHEORIES AS BUILDINGS into PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT and ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL

STRUCTURE. But “persisting” is a close synonym of “remaining” and a “structure” is a type of “organization.”

Consequently, the two metaphors could be reworded as: PERSISTING IS PERSISTING IN AN ERECT STATE and

ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL ORGANIZATION. If this is done, the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC structure is brought out.

15 The term COMMAs (Conceptual Metaphor Mapping Adjuncts) was used instead of VNMAs in Wallington et al., 2006.

16 This sentence and the ensuing discussion is related to an ATT-Meta example, see for example, Barnden 2008.

17 This is essentially Jäkel’s (1995) MIND AS A WORKSHOP metaphor.

18 There s an alternative, but very similar analysis of these sentences and that involves replacing the MENTAL ACTIVITY

AS PHYSICAL INTERACTION (WITH AN OBJECT) mapping with COGNISING AS SEEING (AN OBJECT), and

inferring from the phrase “the far reaches” that the idea-object can barely be seen. In fact, we might collapse the twodifferent mappings into the more general MENTAL ACTIVITY AS INTERACTION WITH AN OBJECT THROUGH THE

SENSES, with the former involving the sense f touch and the latter, the sense of vision. This, of course suggests that the

senses of hearing, smell, and taste can also be used to describe mental activity. I will not pursue the idea further here.

19 Note the existence of the DEGREE VNMA at work as well.

20 This VNMA frequently operates in conjunction with the Mental and Emotional States VNMA, to be discussed shortly,

allowing the inference of a choice.

21 Or possibly COGNIZING AS SEEING; it is often difficult to determine whether the tactile or visual senses are being

utilised.22 Glaseby (2003, 2007) argues that with idioms that take the form of fake resultatives, such as “She painted the town red,”

the event shape of the literal interpretation is telic: it is an accomplishment and has an end point, with the town painted red.

However, the event shape of the idiomatic interpretation is that of an activity. Thus, one can say “they painted the town red



for a few hours” only under the idiom interpretation. In short the event shape does not appear to transfer invariantly.

23 I assume that mental and emotional states are frequently combined and interconnected, making it difficult to talk of pure

mental or emotional states. It may even be the case that there is a cline between mental and emotional states of mind.24 As with the DEGREE VNMA, RATE must be interpreted qualitatively rather than in terms of some absolute rate, for

example as: slow, fast or at a medium rate, and inferred using everyday, common sense, knowledge about the

metaphorically cast object. For example, the following sentence was found via an internet search: “Evolution occurred at a

glacial pace” (www.straight.com/print/118354). It can be inferred that glaciers move extremely slowly and this very low

degree is what is transferred to the rate of change of evolution. But of course, glaciers move at many times the order of

magnitude quicker than evolution proceeds.25 This is broadly the same as the core metaphor I have called MENTAL ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL INTERACTION.

26 It should be noted that space permits consideration of only a selection of his examples and I shall usually discuss onlysome of the inferences that may be drawn, but see Wallington and Barnden (2006) for a fuller analysis.

27 In fact Grady (1997a) motivates the IMPORTANCE IS WEIGHT primary metaphor by just this type of inference.

28 See Barnden’s Metaphors of Mind database http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~jab/ATT-Meta/Databank/) for discussion of the

relation between MIND AS A CONTAINER and MIND AS PHYSICAL SPACE.

29 An anonymous reviewer has questioned “razor wit”. The following is from an internet search: Sexual perversity in

Donegal. With whiskey, suicide and razor wit , the Dublin Theatre Festival is in fine form.

www.bookrags.com/highbeam/art-sexual-perversity-in-donegal-with-19991013-hb

systematicity in metaphor and the use of invariant mappings - wallington-apresraam06-19feb09

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