House of Commons

Environmental Audit Committee

Sustainability in the UK Overseas Territories

Written evidence

Only those submissions written specifically for the Committee for the inquiry into Sustainability in the UK Overseas Territories and accepted as written evidence are included

List of written evidence

Page

1 UK Government 1

2 UK Overseas Territories 11

3 National Trust for the Cayman Islands 18

4 RSPB 30

5 Government of Tristan da Cunha 48

6 South Georgia Heritage Trust 50

7 Environmental Management Directorate, St Helena Government 55

8 Marine Reserves Coalition 64

9 Pew Environmental Group 71

10 UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum 81

11 Falklands Conservation 109

12 Cayman Islands Department of Environment 113

13 Turks and Caicos Islands, Dept of Environment and Maritime Affairs 117

14 Chagos Conservation Trust 120

15 British Antarctic Survey 124

16 Christine Rose-Smyth 129

17 WWF-UK 134

18 Government of Pitcairn Islands 138

19 Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management (IEEM) 141

20 Buglife 144

21 Governor of Gibraltar 152

22 Governor of Bermuda 154

23 Cayman Islands Department of Environment 157

24 Governor of Falkland Islands 160

25 Commissioner for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands 163

26 Governor of British Virgin Islands 165

27 Governor of Anguilla 168

28 Environmental Management Division St Helena 169

29 Governor of Montserrat 175

30 Governor of Cayman Islands 177

31 Governor of St Helena, Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha 180

32 Falkland Islands Government Environmental Planning Department 185

33 Anguilla Department of the Environment 189

34 Governor of Turks and Caicos Islands 193

35 UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (further evidence) 196

36 World Society for the Protection of Animals 223

37 Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Foreign & Commonwealth Office 231

38 UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (further evidence) 234

39 FCO and Defra (supplementary evidence) 273

40 BioDiplomacy 280

41 RSPB (supplementary evidence) 285

42 Edison Baird 290

43 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (further evidence) 292

44 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (further evidence) 294

Written evidence submitted by UK Government

Introduction

1. The UK Overseas Territories (UKOTs) White Paper “The Overseas Territories, Security, Success and Sustainability” published in June 2012, confirms the Government’s objective to ensure that the rich, and internationally recognised, environmental assets of the UKOTs1are cherished. The UKOTs are home to many species and environments found nowhere else in the world – including an estimated 90% of the biodiversity found within the UK and the Territories combined. This biodiversity is crucial in underpinning sustainable development across the UKOTs, as it is across the world; and is of fundamental importance to the provision of social and economic benefits across our local communities.

2. Since the publication of the White Paper, the Government has launched a new funding mechanism to support environmental protection and climate change adaptation initiatives in the UKOTs. “Darwin Plus” is jointly funded by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID), and will provide around £2m per year for UKOT initiatives. This new Fund provides a simpler and more co-ordinated source of funding, whilst maintaining the breadth of funding opportunities offered by Darwin and the previous Overseas Territories Environment Programme. Each of the three funding Departments have committed to maintain their spending commitments over the current spending review period, on natural environmental issues in the Overseas Territories.

3. In addition to the launch of this new Fund, the Government has also continued to roll out its Overseas Territories “Environmental Mainstreaming” programme, which had proved successful in the Falkland Islands and British Virgin Islands during 2011/12. Similar initiatives are underway, or in development for Anguilla, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. The aim of this programme is to support policies to ensure green growth and sustainable development, underpinning the Government’s determination to support successful economic development, including through strengthened economic planning, management of public finances, promotion of free trade and protection of vital ecosystem services and natural resources. All Territories, which wish to participate in this programme, will be given the opportunity to do so by 2014.

1 The UK Overseas Territories are: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, the Pitcairn Islands (including, Pitcairn, Henderson, and Ducie and Oeno), St Helena and St Helena Dependencies (Ascension and Tristan da Cunha), South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia (on the island of Cyprus), The Turks & Caicos Islands. 

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4. Work is ongoing to support the delivery of the ‘United Kingdom Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy’, published in 2009. The overarching objective of this strategy is ‘to enable the UK and Overseas Territory Governments to meet their international obligations for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in the Overseas Territories’. It envisages the Government working in partnership with the UKOTs to establish a set of shared values in respect of biodiversity conservation.

5. In addition to supporting on-going OTEP projects, the FCO has provided funding during this year to support a number of strategic projects in the Territories. This includes a grant to the Joint Nature Conservation Committee to develop a Falklands Islands and wider South Atlantic Information Management System (identified as a priority action from the Environmental Mainstreaming project in the Falklands) and a separate grant to begin developing a lionfish response strategy for the Caribbean region. This year the FCO is also supporting a number of projects addressing invasive species eradication, waste management, sustainable fisheries and environmental monitoring across both its inhabited and uninhabited Territories.

6. DFID through the provision of budgetary support to St Helena and Montserrat is funding two full time international environmental expert posts: Director of Environmental Management Directorate St. Helena and Special Technical Adviser on Environmental Management – DoE/Montserrat.

7. Defra and DECC Ministers and officials represent the interests of the UK and UKOTs at a number of multilateral fora including this year at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Doha, Rio+20 in Rio and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Hyderabad.

8. In the last 12 months Defra has committed funding of approximately £2.7 million to biodiversity projects in the UKOTs. The majority of this funding (£1.7m) came from the Darwin Initiative including a three-year project to develop a Biodiversity Action Plan for Ascension Island and a scoping project under the Darwin Challenge Fund to look at marine ecosystem management in Anguilla and Montserrat.

9. Defra has also committed a further £1m to other projects in the UKOTs including over £500k on rodent eradication in the South Atlantic (South Georgia and Gough Island) and environmental mainstreaming in Anguilla. These funds came from Defra’s budgets for international biodiversity and its research budget as well as the Flagship Species Fund.

10. Environmental challenges are, however, increasingly threatening the future security and safety of the Overseas Territories and in particular their biodiversity which directly supports the livelihoods of their people. The Government remains fully committed to continuing to work closely with the Governments of the Overseas

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Territories, and with non-government organisations, to ensure that these valuable natural resources are protected for the future.

The extent to which UK Government strategy on the UKOTs embodies the principles of sustainable development and appropriately trades-off environmental protection, social development and economic growth?

11. The Government Strategy towards sustainable development in the UKOTs is set out in the White Paper. Economic, social and environmental development are not mutually exclusive and the UK Government strategy looks to harness advances in one of the three strands to effect positive changes in the other two.

12. Each of the UKOTs is responsible for shaping the future of its own community through proactive management of their environmental and economic resources. The UK Government strategy is based on providing the necessary tools to enable UKOT Governments to enshrine sustainable development within their policies, and to promote the capabilities required to implement these policies. Due to their small scale and isolation, many of the UKOTs face similar challenges, providing the opportunity to share information and best practices.

13. The two environmental mainstreaming pilot projects funded by the UK Government, in the British Virgin Islands and the Falkland Islands highlight this ability to share information and best practice. The aim of these stakeholder-led projects has been to raise awareness of the value of the environment in economic growth and development, and human wellbeing, and to identify ways to integrate or ‘mainstream’ that awareness into UKOT policies, regulatory frameworks and decision-making. By taking account of the goods and services delivered by the environment, such as flood protection, prevention of coastal erosion, and mitigation of climate change impacts, UKOT Governments decisions can be more balanced and help to provide a stronger foundation for sustainable economic growth and development. This in turn can help to ensure a healthy, productive and biodiverse natural environment, whose contribution to the economy is recognised and sustainably managed. The UK Government hopes that the Overseas Territories will welcome the opportunity to engage in similar initiatives in their Territories over the next 2 years.

14. By insuring that the natural environment and the ecosystem services it provides are intrinsically valued by Territory Governments we can ensure that development and growth in the UKOTs is sustainable, green and beneficial for their inhabitants.

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How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the UKOTs?

15. The UKOTs support a diverse range of unique ecosystems and habitats, sustaining a large number of rare and threatened species. It is estimated that over 90% of the UK’s biodiversity is located in its Overseas Territories, with more priority ecosystem types (including mangrove, coral, sea-grass beds, peatlands etc) occurring in the UKOTs than in the metropolitan UK. This biodiversity underpins many of the ecosystem goods and services that provide economic and social benefits to local populations.

16. The UK Government continues to offer advice on environment, climate and renewable energy issues and we will continue to work together across Government to deliver co-ordinated support on natural environment issues with each Department leading in their respective areas of responsibility.

17. Overseas Territories Governments are responsible for environmental management in their Territory. The UK Government, however, recognises that it has an important role to play in supporting the OTs, for example through capacity building and the provision and development of the specialist skills required to ensure the protection of the local environment. This is enshrined within the Environment Charters between the UK Government and Territory Governments which are delivered through the UKOT Biodiversity Strategy.

18. Defra leads for the UK Government on developing and implementing biodiversity strategies with the UKOTs; this is outlined in the UKOT Biodiversity Strategy2. The Strategy sets out clear objectives on biodiversity and ensures co-ordination between Defra, FCO and DFID on biodiversity. Defra chairs an Overseas Territories’ Biodiversity Group (OTBG) comprising officials from Defra, the FCO, DFID, JNCC and the UK Overseas Territories Association (UKOTA), which meets quarterly to discuss progress on the UKOT Biodiversity Strategy. Following a recent request from civil society organisations3 closely engaged with some of the UKOTs4, Defra, in collaboration and consultation with the OTs and relevant NGOs, will explore the options for continued implementation of this Strategy.

19. Defra and its Agencies also represent the needs and concerns of the UKOTs at regional and international meetings, providing advice and financial support in meeting the requirements of international agreements and instruments. The UK Government has actively supported the attendance and engagement by officials

2 UK Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy (2009). Defra. http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/pb13335-uk-ot-strat-

091201.pdf 3 Falklands Conservation, RSPB, St Helena National Trust, UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum 4 Falkland Islands and St Helena 

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from UKOTs at regional and international meetings, which has led to greater understanding and integration of biodiversity related policies.

20. Funding for biodiversity projects in the UKOTs has historically come from a range of sources from formal grant schemes, such as the new ‘Darwin Plus’ scheme, through to one-off grants to fund priority issues as and when funds were available. In the current negotiation for a new LIFE Regulation, the UK has been a strong advocate for UKOTs to be able use this fund for biodiversity and other environmental projects.

How the UK Government is helping the UKOTs adapt to the impact of climate change?

21. A key long-term threat faced by the UKOTs is climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has identified the UKOTs as amongst the “most vulnerable” and “virtually certain to experience the most severe impacts” of climate change. Such impacts could include sea level rise; changes in weather patterns, more frequent extreme weather events; coral bleaching; ocean acidification; and sea temperature changes.

22. Between 2007 and 2011, DFID funded a project to enhance Capacity for Adaptation to Climate Change (ECACC) in the UK Caribbean Overseas Territories5. The main objective of the ECACC project was to support efforts by the UKOTs in the Caribbean to adapt to climate change and climate variability within the context of sustainable development. The project was implemented by the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) and helped establish National Climate Change Committees in Anguilla, British Virgin Islands (BVI), Cayman Islands (CI), Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Other outputs achieved by the project were the development and implementation of public education and outreach (PEO) programmes and the completion of Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments. Climate change policy documents were also produced for each of the 5 UKOTs.

23. In addition to HMG providing technical advice and support to the UKOTs through funding on the ground personnel and providing access to departmental reports and expertise on an ad-hoc basis, Darwin Plus funding will support projects seeking to deliver outcomes in the areas of climate change resilience, mitigation and adaption and be accessible to projects linked to green energy initiatives.

5 http://www.caribbeanclimate.bz/closed‐projects/enhancing‐capacity‐for‐adaptation‐to‐climate‐change‐ecacc‐in‐the‐uk‐caribbean‐overseas‐territories‐project.html  

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24. The Government has also recently published a Foresight Project on the International Dimensions of Climate Change6. The project looked at climate change impacts overseas which could have an impact on the UK. A section of this report considered climate change impacts on the UKOTs, which could help UKOTs prioritise further work on climate change adaptation.

Whether the recommendations in our 2008 Report, Halting biodiversity loss, on safeguarding biodiversity and practising joined-up government to further conservation have been implemented?

25. Since Halting biodiversity loss was published in 2008 the Government has undertaken a number of measures which have contributed towards achieving the recommendations made in the report.

26. The UK Government and UKOT Governments have made good progress towards valuing the natural environment in the UKOTs. In order to meet the specific needs of the individual UKOTs, baseline data and ecosystem assessments are essential for developing biodiversity policy response options. This type of work is being undertaken in the UKOTs, with support from the UK Government and its agencies. Examples of this include terrestrial and marine habitat mapping exercises (such as the Darwin Initiative supported marine mapping in St Helena; and JNCC supported marine and terrestrial mapping in Anguilla), application of a National Ecosystem Assessment approach and assessment of the economic value of environmental goods and services to UKOT economies.

27. The National Ecosystem Assessment approach, pioneered in the UK, is being extended to the UKOTs through Darwin Challenge funded projects in Anguilla and the Falklands/South Georgia. These two projects, due for completion by 2015, will provide models for the application of this form of ecosystem assessment at the appropriate scale and in a way suited to support policy development in the UKOTs. These projects also provide an opportunity for the transfer of UK skills to the UKOTs.

28. The economies of the UKOTs are highly dependent on their natural assets. Understanding the economic role and value of ecosystems, and the geographical distribution of these values, underpins most, if not all, of the actions needed to integrate the environment into decision-making. Generally, a good understanding of the value of the environment, including the elements that contribute to this value and their geographical distribution, can assist in the development of a sound economic model for the creation of a green economy. Such studies are currently in progress, or planned, for the Falkland Islands, Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands. 6 International Dimensions of Climate Change – Final Report (2011). BIS. http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/foresight/docs/international-dimensions/11-1042-international-dimensions-of-climate-change.pdf 

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29. This strategic approach provides the opportunity to link baseline biodiversity survey

work and economic analysis to policy development with integrated ecosystem assessments and policy scenarios. Inherent in this approach is the need to transfer skills to UKOT personnel wherever possible (in the use of the appropriate computer skills and economic techniques) to make them more self-reliant. At the same time opportunities are being created for mutually beneficial links to be established between UKOT organisations and UK institutions.

30. Current work in Anguilla funded by the FCO, Defra and the JNCC demonstrates the value of UKOT specific projects tailored to capacity and needs. Here, marine and terrestrial habitat mapping and the development of GIS capacity (including training UKOT personnel) forms the basis for environmental economic studies, all of which will be integrated through an National Ecosystem Assessment to assist the Anguillan Government to determine its policy options in developing a green economy.

31. The UK Government has been practising a joined up approach towards its responsibilities to the UKOTs. In the recently launched White Paper on the Overseas Territories, the UK Government committed to deliver co-ordinated support on Overseas Territory natural environment issues, and to develop with the UKOTs a strategic approach to managing their rich environmental assets. The Government also committed to maintaining its spending commitments on UKOT natural environment issues over the current spending review period.

32. Following agreement of the Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy in 2009, Defra has taken the lead in coordinating a partnership of Government Departments overseeing its implementation. This partnership comprises Defra, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID), and is supported by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC). As part of this partnership, Defra established the Overseas Territories Biodiversity Group (OTBG), comprising officials from Defra, the FCO, DFID, JNCC and the UK Overseas Territories Association (UKOTA). Chaired by Defra, the OTBG is responsible for overseeing the delivery of the Strategy.

Whether UK Government strategy on the UKOTs is consistent with the conclusions and commitments on protecting biodiversity reached at the recent United Nations Rio+20 conference?

33. The outcome document from Rio+20 ‘the Future We Want’ provided assurance to the UK Government that its strategy for protecting the vital biodiversity in the UKOTs is in line with current international consensus.

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34. Rio+20 identified that the promotion of sustainable tourism is key for many small island developing states for which tourism is the major industry. The UK Government’s strategy for achieving sustainable tourism in the UKOTs is outlined throughout the White Paper.

35. The sustainable use of oceans, seas and coastal areas through the designations of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) was also highlighted by Rio+20 as a vital cornerstone in protecting global biodiversity. The designation of MPAs is a sustainable method of ensuring that environmental protection and economic benefits are balanced for the benefit of the communities which rely on the marine biodiversity for their livelihoods. The UK government’s progress on designating MPAs in the biodiversity rich uninhabited UKOTs is outlined on page 12 of the White Paper.

36. Rio+20 advocated the application of an ecosystems approach to valuing the contribution of the natural environment to development. The UK Government strategy of providing the necessary tools and skills for Territory Governments to conduct ecosystem assessments and adopt policies which promote the valuation of the natural environment are consistent with this Rio+20 conclusion. This is also an excellent example of how the UK Government encourages the Territory Governments to make best use of an exchange of technology, information and methods of best practice to the benefit of the people of the UKOTs.

37. The UK Government has long recognised that the majority of UKOTs, as small island developing states, are unique concerning sustainable development and biodiversity protection due to their diverse biodiversity, unique vulnerabilities, size, remoteness, narrow resource and export base and exposure to climate change impacts and extreme weather. Through the UKOT Biodiversity Strategy7 the UK Government is delivering its commitments to protect the biodiversity of the Overseas Territories which underpins their sustainable development.

How weaknesses in civil society and democracy in the UKOTs impact on conservation

38. The UK Government has a vision of making government work better. We believe in sound public finances, building economic resilience and effective regulation. We want to increase efficiency and effectiveness, ensure public funds are spent wisely, and foster a fairer, more open and mobile society.

39. The UK government continues to provide support for conservation in Overseas Territories through a number of organisations who, in line with the UK strategy, advise Overseas Territories on their specific area of policy competence. Defra

7 http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/pb13335‐uk‐ot‐strat‐091201.pdf 

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provided funding for a wide range of projects to enhance research capacity in the UKOTs, and support small conservation projects identified as priorities by UKOT Governments. The Royal Botanic Gardens Kew’s Millennium Seed Bank Partnership (MSBP) has a dedicated seed conservation programme in UKOTs which comprises training in seed collection and storage techniques. JNCC has also provided project support for a wide range of conservation projects in the UKOTs. Important work strands in recent years include developing guidelines for the use of economic analysis in biodiversity; habitat mapping in the Caribbean; and marine and terrestrial invasive alien species control projects in the Caribbean and South Atlantic.

40. Conservation and the combating of environmental pressures offer opportunities for civil society and UKOT Governments to interact on environmental issues. Through utilising tools such as environmental mainstreaming it is possible to increases local engagement on environment issues as well as identify policy and knowledge gaps which highlight areas where priority action needs to be taken. However, some UKOTs lack adequate environmental legislation, which can hamper conservation. Environment is a devolved issue, but the UK Government are ready to offer advice and guidance to the UKOTs where needed.

How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine environment in the uninhabited territories

41. The UK is committed to the principle of designating Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in international waters. Specifically, we supported the call in 2010 by governments of States party to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to strive for MPA and other area-based mechanisms covering 10% of our oceans by 2020.

42. Ensuring that this CBD target is met will mean that at least 10% of coastal and marine areas are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative and well connected systems.

43. The UK is therefore striving to lead the way in the environmental management of its uninhabited UKOTs. These UKOTs cover many millions of square kilometres and we are developing a strategic approach to large-scale marine management including through the establishment of the world’s largest MPAs.

44. Through continued efforts, each of the uninhabited UKOTs (South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands, the British Indian Ocean Territory and the British Antarctic Territory) already have in place marine protection measures and are now some of the world’s most sustainable and well managed marine areas.

45. In February 2012 the Government of South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands declared a sustainable-use MPA covering over 1,000,000 km2 of the Territory’s

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maritime zone, including 20,000 km2 of no-fishing zones. This establishes the waters around South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands as one of the largest areas of sustainably managed ocean in the world. The declaration of the MPA builds upon the management measures already in place which exceed the requirements of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). As a result, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) has certified the island’s toothfish fishery, which is rated as the third highest scoring MSC-certified fishery in the world. The declaration of this MPA also contributes to the World Summit on Sustainable Development’s global commitment to establish representative networks of MPAs by 2012. The MPA will be monitored through scientific programmes and enforced through a dedicated patrol vessel.

46. The Administration of the British Indian Ocean Territory has developed a legislative framework which underpins the protection of sites and species of particular importance, and has designated special reserves. These include an area of Diego Garcia which has been designated as a Wetland of International Importance under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. This work, together with the establishment of the no-take marine protected area in 2010, has contributed to the very high levels of nature conservation achieved in the Territory and highlights the UK’s intention to ensure the on-going protection of this unique environment.

47. In the region of the British Antarctic Territory, the UK secured agreement, in 2009 at the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), to the designation of the world’s first high seas MPA. The UK Government is continuing to work within CCAMLR for additional marine protection areas in the Southern Ocean.

48. The environmental stewardship of the marine environments of the uninhabited Territories in particular is exemplary. These delicate and vital ecosystems which provide for highly biodiversity rich environments are being protected through identified measures with the intention to ensure they continue to thrive. 29 November 2012

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Written evidence submitted by the UK Overseas Territories Association 

 

1. Introduction 

The United Kingdom Overseas Territories Association (UKOTA) welcomes the Environmental 

Audit Committee’s Inquiry on this important issue. We will respond to several of the specific 

questions posed by the Committee. 

 

1.2 The Territories are home to approximately 90% of the UK’s biodiversity, including many 

species which are endemic  to  the  territories. All  the  territories depend on  these assets  in 

some way—for example, tourism or fisheries.  

 

1.3 UKOTA offer membership to all inhabited territories; the current members are Anguilla, 

Bermuda, British Virgin  Islands, Cayman  Islands, Falkland  Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, St 

Helena and Tristan da Cunha. 

 

2. The extent to which UK Government strategy on the UKOTs embodies the principles of 

sustainable  development  and  appropriately  trades‐off  environmental  protection,  social 

development and economic growth. 

 

2.1  The UK Government White Paper  (June 2012) embodies  the principles of  sustainable 

development with an explicit  focus on economy, society and the environment – the three 

pillars of sustainable development. 

 

2.2 Funding has been provided,  in particular to the Official Development Assistance (ODA) 

eligible territories through DFID to stimulate economic development. All projects are subject 

to "Climate and Environment Assessment" (CEA) process. This  is mandatory for all projects 

over £400. 

 

 

3. How  the UK Government  is  fulfilling  its  responsibilities  to protect biodiversity  in  the 

UKOTs 

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3.1  Following  the  publication  of  the  United  Kingdom  Overseas  Territories  Biodiversity 

Strategy  in December  2009,  the Overseas  Territories  Biodiversity  Strategy Group  (OTBG) 

was  set  up  to monitor  the  progress.  The  FCO,  DFID,  JNCC,  RBG  Kew,  DEFRA,  DECC  and 

UKOTA are all  represented on  this group. There  is evidence of a  significant  improvement 

with  cross HMG department  input  into biodiversity  in  the OTs  and engagement with  the 

territories.  The Strategy is being implemented by a wide range of UK Government actions, 

which have grown in scope and significance since publication of the document. 

 

3.2  The  OTBG  organised  a  workshop  in  September  2011  for  the  London  based 

Representatives of the territories on Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs). This was 

a  useful  session  but  links  into MEA  processes  need  to  be  specifically  tailored  to  the OT 

situation and capacity – this will reduce the burden of the OTs signing up to MEAs. 

 

 3.3  A  workshop  organised  by  JNCC  on  behalf  DEFRA  “Review  of  Progress  on 

Implementation of the UK OT Biodiversity Strategy” will be held on 14 March 2013. DEFRA 

will provide funding to enable participation from the OTs.  It  is  important that the views of 

the people in the territories who are involved on a day‐to‐day basis are taken into account 

in  respect  of  progress  on  the  strategy  rather  than  the  perceived  views  of  outside 

organisations. UKOTA  is also working with  JNCC  to engage  the  services of a consultant  in 

order  to  help  the  OTs  prepare  for  the  meeting  in  March  and  assist  them  to  collate 

information which can provide the basis for understanding biodiversity priorities established 

by  the OTs  themselves,  the  actions  already  taken  to  address  these priorities  and  further 

actions required. 

 

3.4 JNCC has worked with UKOTA to provide funding for two Scholarships to build capacity 

in the OTs. A student (from Bermuda) completed BSc (Hons) degree in Applied Ecology and 

Conservation  and  another  student  (from  Anguilla)  completed  a  MSc  in  Environmental 

Management – both at the University of Reading. 

 

3.5 HMG has provided support to the OTs via dedicated contact points in the relevant HMG 

departments. 

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3.6  Funding  for  projects  has  been made  available. While  there  is  never  enough  in  the 

current financial climate, UKOTA welcomed the announcement  in October 2012 of Darwin 

Plus which combines all previous HMG  funding sources. This  fund will disburse around £2 

million per year dedicated to environmental and conservation projects in the OTs. The remit 

of the new fund will be broad,  incorporating both biodiversity‐related  issues funded under 

the  Darwin  Initiative,  as  well  as  the  broader  range  of  environment  and  climate‐related 

issues funded under OTEP. The new Fund will continue to be accessible to OT Governments, 

NGOs, research institutions, the private sector and other stakeholders. 

 

3.7 OTEP dispersed £8m through more than 140 projects across the Territories. Through the 

Darwin Initiative, approximately £5.2m has been spent to date on OT projects. 

 

3.8 JNCC has closely aligned  its OT work to the Strategy and, with the exception of climate 

change, worked to address the key strategic themes identified by the Strategy. This support 

involves funding of approximately £1.4 million on a wide range of small scale projects within 

the OTs; implementing strategic projects on its own behalf and on behalf of UK Government 

departments; working  to  increase  the  capacity  of  the  OTs  through  training  and  also  by 

establish working links between the OTs and relevant UK institutions. JNCC is currently  

managing, or involved in, approximately 30 projects ranging from support for small scale OT 

specific  projects  through  to  strategic  projects managed  on  behalf  of  the  FCO  or DEFRA, 

including the environmental mainstreaming work. The environmental mainstreaming which 

started with BVI and the Falklands has now been extended to Cayman and Anguilla. 

 

3.9 UKOTA welcomes  the  support  of HMG  (DEFRA  and  FCO)  in  their  efforts  to  have  the 

Regulations for Life Plus amended to enable OTs to access this import source of funding. 

 

3.10 UKOTA  is of the view that while there has been considerable focus on the Terrestrial 

environment there has been less focus on the Marine environment. Of particular concern is 

rapid increase of lionfish in the Caribbean waters and the impact this will have on the native 

species. 

 

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4. How the UK Government is helping the OTs adapt to climate change 

 

4.1  The  key  long‐term  threat  faced  by  the  Territories  is  climate  change.  The 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has  identified  the Territories as amongst  the 

“most vulnerable” and “virtually certain to experience the most severe impacts” of climate 

change. This will mean sea level rise; changes in weather patterns, including higher intensity 

of  extreme  weather  events;  coral  bleaching;  ocean  acidification;  and  sea  temperature 

changes. Other  immediate  threats  include  land use  change; waste management;  invasive 

species; and threats to habitats from unsustainable development. 

 

4.2 A desk  study entitled  “Addressing Climate Change by Promoting  Low Carbon Climate 

Resilient  Development  in  the  UK  Overseas  Territories  “was  funded  by  DFID,  IMC  was 

contracted  in February 2012  to undertake  the  research. On  reflection  the TORs were  too 

ambitious and the quality of the data collected questionable. The project steering group, on 

which UKOTA was represented, is in the process of deciding what the next steps are. 

 

4.3  The  DFID  funded  a  project  over  a  four  year  period  which  enabled  the  Caribbean 

Territories  to  participate  in  the  regional  project  “Enhancing  Capacity  for  Adaptation  to 

Climate Change  in  the Caribbean Overseas Territories”. The  report was  largely welcomed; 

the recommendations were applicable and relevant to the needs of the territories. Some UK 

OTs produced a Climate Change strategy as a result of this, but funding was not available to 

implement the recommendations. With the current financial climate territories do not have 

the  resources  to  implement  the  recommendations of  the  strategy –  funding  from DFID  is 

restricted to the OAD eligible territories. 

 

4.4 Climate Change impacts on all OTs and access to funding is crucial (for all) if OTs are to 

implement  appropriate  Adaptation  and  Mitigating  strategies.  As  OTs  we  are  unable  to 

access  international  funding  streams  for example Global Environment Facility  (GEF). HMG 

created the £2.9 billion UK International Climate Fund (ICF) in 2011 to cover the period 2011 

– 2015 – however, OTs do not appear to be in a position to benefit from this fund. Whilst in 

theory they are eligible, none of them fall into any priority categories that govern spending 

decisions of the fund. 

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4.5 UKOTA recommends that a dedicated  fund  is set up to address Climate Change  in the 

OTs. 

 

5.  Whether  the  recommendations  in  the  2008  report  “Halting  biodiversity  loss”    on 

safeguarding  biodiversity  and  practising  joined‐up  government  to  further  conservation 

have been implemented. 

 

5.1 The Government has a clear moral and legal duty to help protect the biodiversity of the 

UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, where  it  is  the eleventh hour  for many 

species. We are extremely concerned that recommendations that we have made in the past 

that would have helped  to protect  the environment of  the Overseas Territories have been 

ignored.  The  Government  must:  adopt  a  truly  joined‐up  approach  to  environmental 

protection  the  UKOTs  and  Crown  Dependencies,  by  bringing  together  all  relevant 

departments  including the FCO, MoJ, DfID, Defra, DCMS and MoD with the governments of 

the UKOTs. 

The Overseas Territories Biodiversity Group (OTBG) has been created to provide the linkages 

suggested  in  the  recommendation. UKOTA provides  the OT  representation on  the  group. 

This  is also evident with the creation of the Darwin Plus, bringing together the funds from 

the HMG departments for environmental projects. 

 

5.2 make better use of the Inter‐Departmental Group on biodiversity  

This was superseded by the OTBG. There has been significant  increase  in the engagement 

with the OTs. Environmental contact persons were identified by the territories. 

 

5.3  to  provide more  oversight  and  support  for  the  development  and  implementation  of 

effective  environmental  protection policy  in  the UKOTs,  and  expand  the Group  to  include 

other relevant departments; 

Some OTs has received support in this area. The Environment mainstreaming projects assist 

OTs  to  incorporate  environmental  policy  into  their  strategic  planning  process.  Some OTs 

have  also  received  assistance  with  drafting  of  legislation  etc.  Assistance  has  also  been 

provided through DFID to ODA eligible OTs with TC funded personnel to provide specialist 

advice and support these areas. 

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5.4 have Defra assume joint responsibility for the UKOTs, and reflect this in future spending 

settlements;  

DEFRA  lead on  the OTBG, and  lead on  the  recently  created  ‘Darwin Plus’ project  funding 

which provides a cross HMG combined approach  to  funding biodiversity and environment 

projects in the OTs. 

 

5.6  address  the  dire  lack  of  funds  and  information  for  environmental  protection  in  the 

UKOTs. 

This has been addressed in sections 3 and 4.  

 

5.7 An ecosystem assessment should be conducted in partnership with each UKOT in order to 

provide  the  baseline  environmental  data  required  and  to  outline  the  effective  response 

options needed to halt biodiversity loss. 

 

5.8 With leadership, and a relatively small sum of money, the incredible biodiversity found in 

our  overseas  territories  can  be  safeguarded  into  the  future.  One  of  the most  important 

contributions  that  the  Government  could  make  to  slowing  the  catastrophic  global 

biodiversity  loss  currently  occurring would  be  to  accept  its  responsibilities  and  to provide 

more support for the UK Overseas Territories in this area. 

Biodiversity  protection  has  to  be  collaboration  between  OTs  and  HMG.  Funding  is  an 

important  and  vital  component  of  this  collaboration  as  are  other  areas  of  technical  and 

advisory  support.  The  short‐term  nature  of  project  funding  does  not  enable  long‐term 

sustainable planning and implementation. It is recommended that a long‐term, programme 

approach to funding is considered as an alternative.  

One size does not fit all OTs, there are many similarities but there are also many differences 

in terms of scale,  location, population etc that have significant  impacts on conservation  in 

each OT and their ability to manage all of the threats to biodiversity. 

 

6. Whether UK Government strategy on the UK OTs is consistent with the conclusions and 

commitments on protecting biodiversity  reached at  the  recent United Nations Rio + 20 

conference. 

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6.1 While  UKOTA  does  not wish  to  respond  directly  to  the  question  posed,  an  area  of 

weakness and concern to the territories  is the  lack of an established mechanism to advise 

territories  of,  and  to  solicit  their  views  prior  to  International  conferences which  discuss 

environmental issues that could impact on the territories. 

 

7. How weaknesses in civil society and governance in the UK OTs impact on conservation. 

 

7.1 UKOTA does not wish to comment on this. 

 

8.  How  the  introduction  of  “Marine  Protected  Areas”  could  safeguard  the  marine 

environment in the uninhabited territories. 

 

8.1 UKOTA does not represent the uninhabited territories and cannot, therefore, make any 

comment directly related to the question. However, we are aware that the Pew Group has 

been  in  contact  with  some  of  our  members  with  a  view  to  developing  MPAs.  Their 

representatives are currently on Tristan da Cunha having discussions. While there is value in 

investigating this, it is important that the Territory Governments are engaged to ensure the 

livelihoods of the people are not compromised. 

 

29 November 2012 

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Written evidence submitted by National Trust for the Cayman Islands 

 

Executive Summary 

• The National Trust for the Cayman Islands (“NTCI”) supports the position of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum for the increase in capacity building and funding to the UKOTS from DIFID, and The Heritage Lottery Fund.  

• NTCI also supports the call for DEFRA and the FCO to negotiate access to LIFE+ EU funding. At present, The Cayman Islands along with other UKOTS are curtailed by lack of access to such UK and EU funds. 

• In relation to the Cayman Islands specifically, the UK Government (“UKG”) devolved responsibility for the protection of the environment to the Cayman Islands Government (“CIG”).  However, UKG has failed to ensure that CIG implements sustainable development and protects the Island’s biodiversity.  

• Neither the Environmental Charter signed with the UKG in September 2001 nor other Multilateral Environmental Agreements have been implemented.  The UKG has therefore failed in its obligations to the people of the Cayman Islands and NTCI urges it to redress these issues.  

• Due to the CIG’s lack of environmental policy and conservation implementation, the NTCI has been forced to assume many of the responsibilities of the CIG. It alone has raised the necessary funds to purchase terrestrial areas of significant biodiversity for flora and fauna which has contributed to the protection of 5% of the land mass.  

• The NTCI urges the UKG to require the CIG to implement a conservation policy that includes conservation laws, development plans for the three islands, national parks and use of the environmental protection fund (“EPF”) to support conservation. 

   

  

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Introduction 

The National Trust for the Cayman Islands 

The NTCI is a membership based, non‐governmental, not for profit organization created by statute, The National Trust Law in 1987. It is the only NGO in the Cayman Islands with a mandate for terrestrial conservation. NTCI was established to preserve natural environments and places of historic significance in the Cayman Islands for present and future generations.  Environmentally significant areas owned by NTCI are protected in perpetuity when NTCI declares them inalienable pursuant to the National Trust Law (as revised). 

Responsibility for NTCI rests with the Council who are elected annually by the membership along with three CIG appointed representatives. The Chairperson and three Executive Officers are elected bi‐annually. There are nine full time staff, one part time and one full time volunteer. 

 Submissions  1. How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibility to protect biodiversity in the 

Cayman Islands  Recommendations:  

A.  The UKG should require the CIG to meet its obligations under the Environmental   Charter, the various MEA’s and its obligation to the people of the Cayman   Islands as set out in the Bill of Rights contained in the Cayman Islands   Constitution Order 2009 (“Constitution”). B.  The UKG should require the Governor to address environmental governance   issues including the passage and implementation of long stalled conservation   legislation. UKG must require the Governor to assist the UKG in discharging its   responsibilities under the EC and MEA’s. C.  The UKG should require the CIG to implement a sustainable Development Plan   for the three islands. 

 1.1 The UKG is not fulfilling its obligation to protect biodiversity in the Cayman Islands in 

that it is failing to require the CIG to adopt a sustainable Development Plan, enact proposed local conservation legislation and establish a system of protected areas to fulfill the obligations set out below.  

 (a) In September 2001, the CIG and the UKG signed an Environment Charter under 

which both governments committed to the preservation of our environment. Additionally, the Cayman Islands is party to a number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA’s), notably the Convention on Biological Diversity (the "Rio Convention" or CBD), the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (“Ramsar Convention”), the Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife 

  

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protocol to the Cartagena Convention (the "SPAW Protocol") and Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (“Bonn Convention”).   

 (b)   The Bill of Rights as contained in the Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009  

provides for the Protection of the environment [emphasis added]: ‐ Government shall, in all its decisions, have due regard to the need to foster and protect an environment that is not harmful to the health or well‐being of present and future generations, while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 

‐ To this end government should adopt reasonable legislative and other measures to protect the heritage and wildlife and the land and sea biodiversity of the Cayman Islands that—   (i) limit pollution and ecological degradation;   (ii) promote conservation and biodiversity; and   (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural   resources. 

(c)  In accordance with the Rio Convention the Department of Environment has developed a National Biodiversity Action Plan (“NBAP”) which calls for the protection of certain native species of flora and fauna and their habitats. The NBAP has not however been adopted by the CIG and is only being implemented through NTCI. 

 1.2 There is a draft Conservation Bill first proposed in 2000 which is intended to replace the 

majority of the Animals Law and has been reviewed by successive Governments for the past twelve years despite inclusion as a policy by successive political parties.  The Animals Law (2003 Revision) originally protected five sites as Animal Sanctuaries, two of which have been deregulated (both of which are on Cayman Brac) and of the remaining three, one is owned by the NTCI.   Despite calls to do so, no other suitable areas have been protected in mitigation of the deregulated areas. No terrestrial national parks have been legally established. 

 1.3 The Development Plan (“The Plan”) for Grand Cayman enacted in 1977 had no 

environmental zones. The Plan, intended to be reviewed every five years, was last reviewed but not revised in 2002 despite recommendations to include environmental overlay. There is no Development Plan for Cayman Brac and Little Cayman.   

   

  

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 2. How weaknesses in civil society and governance in the Cayman Islands impact on 

conservation;  Recommendations 

D.  The UKG should address environmental governance gaps to give primacy to environmental considerations in the Development Plan, Planning Laws, the National Roads Law, CIG conservation policies and Conservation Law. 

E. The Crown owned wetlands and forests of environmental significance on the three Islands should be vested in NTCI to ensure their continued preservation as experience shows that government designation does not offer permanent protect (viz the deregulation of two Animal Sanctuaries in Cayman Brac). 

F. The UKG should require the CIG to utilize the EPF for purchase of areas of significant biodiversity which should then be vested in the NTCI to ensure their protection in perpetuity. 

G. The UKG should require the CIG to fund adequately the work the NTCI carries out on behalf of the CIG through the EPF. 

 

2.1    Weakness in civil society and governance in the CI is severely impacting conservation as the only means of halting biodiversity loss is for the NTCI to purchase areas of significant biodiversity for protection under the National Trust Law while funds collected by the CIG for the purposes of protecting the environment are not being used for the intended purpose.   

2.2   Environmentally sensitive areas owned by the Crown, such as the George Town Ironwood Forest which is the primary habitat for the endemic Ghost Orchid Dendrophylax fawcettii, one of the 100 most endangered species in the worldi, remains unprotected.   

2.3  Whilst progress has been made by CIG in submarine conservation, very little has been done in relation to terrestrial conservation except that over the past 20 years CIG has vested certain environmentally significant sites in the NTCI.  NTCI continues to expand these protected areas and over the past 7 years alone the Trust has raised approximately CI$7million through grants and private donors for land purchase of 1093.47 acres, thereby significantly increasing the protected areas on all three islands which now stand at a total of 3,141 acres (approximately 5% of the land mass).   

 2.4  CIG has therefore been spared both the expense of land purchase, and the ongoing cost of management, for the majority of Cayman's terrestrial protected area system to date. While not yet sufficient to achieve the goals implicit in the MEAs, the NTCI has 

  

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been responsible for the majority of progress in this area over the last decade. A brief analysis of the contributions of NTCI, relevant to the MEAs, is annexed hereto as “Schedule of MEAs and NTCI Contributions”. This analysis demonstrates the substantial role that NTCI plays in the overall conservation of biodiversity in the Cayman Islands, which otherwise would fall on CIG at a considerably greater cost.   

2.5 While NTCI receives a small subvention from CIG annually (approximately CI$230,000 for the 2012/13 year), it covers less than 25% of the organization’s operating costs and does not adequately represent the cost of the services provided.  In addition, this funding is subject to budgetary constraints and has been cut by approximately 30% over the past two years. NTCI has written to His Excellency the Governor Mr. Duncan Taylor on 2nd May 2012 and again on 30th August 2012 outlining the responsibilities NTCI has taken on behalf of CIG and requesting his cooperation to obtain additional funding from the EPF (copies of these letters are enclosed), however NTCI is still awaiting an official response.  

2.6 The Environmental Protection Fund (“EPF”) was established and recorded in the Hansard as Government Motion No. 14/97 for the purposes of “...defraying expenditure incurred in protecting and preserving the environment of the Islands.”  A small fee is levied on every visitor to the islands who believes he is contributing to an environmental tax for conservation. This is a total misrepresentation by CIG.  Approximately CI$5M is collected annually in the name of the environment, however, since its inception the EPF has rarely been spent on the purposes for which it was established and at present, the fund of approximately CI$43 million, forms part of the general reserves and is used to meet CIG’s requirement for cash reserves under the Public Management and Finance Law.    

2.7 Although this memorandum deals with NTCI environmental mandate, it is important to note that NTCI is also charged with preserving sites of historic significance. NTCI currently owns and maintains 12 historic heritage sites. As NTCI has been forced to focus its efforts on protecting the biodiversity of the Islands by expanding its protected areas, it is becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill its statutory obligations.  Specifically, NTCI has been unable to fund the education programme which includes an Education Officer post and is a vital component of our environmental and historic mandate.   

 3. How the UKG is helping the Cayman Islands adapt to the impact of climate change 

Recommendations: 

H. To mitigate the impact of climate change the UKG should require the CIG to protect the Central Mangrove Wetlands (“CMW”) on Grand Cayman. 

  

  

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3.1 The UKG is not helping the Cayman Islands to adapt to the impact of climate change.  

 3.2 One of the guiding principles of mitigating the impacts of climate change is to 

conserve existing biodiversity, and as stated above this is not being done by the CIG. The CMW, approximately 8500 acres, is widely considered the ecological heart of Grand Cayman and is the largest contiguous mangrove wetland in the Caribbean.  19% of the CWR is protected under the marine conservation law, 7% owned and protected by NTCI, 9% owned by the Crown and unprotected and 75% privately owned and unprotected. These wetlands are under threat due to planned road corridors and increased development projects and the Marine Parks Law will not prevent such developments.  

   

  

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SCHEDULE OF MEA’s AND NTCI’s CONTRIBUTIONS 

Convention/Treaty & relevant commitments   NTCI Contribution  

ENVIRONMENT CHARTER CAYMAN ISLANDS Signed on Sept 2001  Objectives: 1.  Bring together government departments, representatives of local industry and commerce, environment and heritage organisations, the Governor’s office, individual environmental champions and other community representatives:   2. Ensuring the protection & restoration of key habitats and species:                 6. Implement effectively Multilateral Environmental Agreements already extended to the Cayman islands as listed herein  9. Encourage teaching within schools to promote the value of our local environment (natural and built) :         

    NTCI collaborates extensively with: ‐ Government departments: Department of Tourism, Department of Environment and Department of Environmental Health  ‐ Heritage organisations: CI National Archive and CI National Museum 

  NTCI protects and manages the following: ‐Blue Iguana species through the Blue Iguana Recovery Program and its habitat (Salina and East End Colliers Reserve) ‐Wetland and woodland bird habitats, (Governor Gore’s Bird Sanctuary, Uncle Sammy’s Pond, Central Mangrove Wetlands, Salina Reserve, Mastic Reserve, Cayman Brac Parrot Reserve, The Splitts) ‐Sea bird nesting habitats ‐ Booby Pond Nature Reserve,)  ‐Sister Island Rock Iguana species and its habitat (Little Cayman Nature Trail property, Booby Pond Nature Reserve and Preston Bay nesting site) ‐ Queen Elizabeth II Botanic Park (50% ownership) ‐ Endangered and Critically endangered flora and fauna contained on all reserves  NTCI contributes to the implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements already extended to the Cayman islands as listed herein  NTCI promotes the value of our natural and built heritage in schools by: ‐ producing environmental and historic educational material for inclusion in national school curriculum. ‐ leading 60 educational events through our Historical , Environmental and Education programmes within school system    

  

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10. Promote publications that spread public awareness of the special feature of the environment       11. Abide by the principles set out in the Rio Declaration on Environment: 

NTCI promotes the special features of the environment in the following publications: ‐ Weekly “Know your Island” articles in the national paper of record ‐ Informative articles in various publications including “What’s Hot”, “Destination Cayman”,  ‐ The Trust Times, Quarterly Newsletter to General Membership and sponsors  ‐For the purpose of conservation, NTCI owns 5% of the country’s land mass (see further details below) 

CONVENTION ON WETLANDS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE (Ramsar)  Objective: "the conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local and national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development throughout the world".   

NTCI contributes to the country’s obligations under this MEA in the following manner: ‐ NTCI owns and manages the only Ramsar designated site, Little Cayman Booby Nature Reserve. Total Acreage protected:  334 acres  ‐ Built and maintains a visitor centre on the site which is open daily and has informational signage and displays, hosts talks and bird watching groups.‐ NTCI owns and manages 765 acres in Central Mangrove Wetlands in accordance with Ramsar best practice.   ‐ NTCI owns the following fresh water ponds/pools: 3 acres at Governor Gore’s Bird Sanctuary 3.5 acres at Uncle Sammy’s Pond 17.5 acres at The Splitts Cayman Brac 

CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Rio)  Under this treaty, the UN set a target in 2002 to reduce loss of biodiversity by 2010. Objectives: 1. conservation of biological diversity; 2. sustainable use of its components; and 3. fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources          

  NTCI contributes to the country’s obligations under this MEA in the following manner:  ‐ Since 2004, NTCI has obtained and protected over 1,000 acres of environmentally significant property, thereby reducing the loss of biodiversity in the Cayman Islands.           

  

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The Cayman Islands National Biodiversity Action Plan produced in accordance with the CBD calls for the protection of key species and habitats.  

NTCI contributes to this Action Plan in the following manner: ‐ NTCI holds and protects a total of 3,141 acres of environmentally significant land in perpetuity for the people of the Cayman Islands.  This is approximately 5% of Cayman Islands total land mass.  (NB The internationally accepted standard is 12% and the Caribbean averages 11.7% per 2003 United Nations list of Protected Areas) ‐ several of the species listed in this plan are protected within the Trust Reserves including: Banana Orchid, Ghost Orchid Silver Thatch, Agave Caymanensis, Cedar, Ironwood, Broadleaf, Cayman Parrot, Bats, Vitelline Warbler, West Indian Whistling Duck, Blue Iguana, Sister Islands Rock Iguana, Little Cayman Green Anole, and Red Footed Booby. 

PROTOCOL TO THE CATAGENA CONVENTION CONCERNING SPECIFICALLY PROTECTED AREAS WILDLIFE (SPAW)  Objective: protect rare and fragile ecosystems and habitats, thereby protecting the endangered and threatened species residing therein by: 

‐ establishment and proper management of protected areas, by promoting sustainable management (and use) of species to prevent their endangerment 

 

    NTCI contributes to the country’s obligations under this MEA in the following manner:  NTCI owns, protects and manages 8 environmental reserves which serve as habitats to endangered and threatened species.  

CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY SPECIES OF WILD ANIMALS (Bonn)  Objective: to conserve terrestrial, marine and avian migratory species throughout their range. 

NTCI contributes to the country’s obligations under this MEA in the following manner:  ‐ NTCI owns, protects and manages several sites of importance to Migratory Birds such as: 

‐ Mastic Reserve ‐ Salina Reserve ‐ The Splitts ‐ Governor Gore’s Bird Sanctuary ‐ Cayman Brac Parrot Reserve ‐ Uncle Sammy’s Pond ‐ Little Cayman Booby Pond Nature Reserve 

  

 

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                                                            i According to the IUCN Species Survival Commission’s report “100 most threatened species: Are they priceless or worthless?”  published in September 2012   29 November 2012 

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 Written evidence submitted by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 

 Summary  

• Knowledge of biodiversity in the UK Overseas Territories (OTs) remains inadequate, but it is apparent that many species are under threat. 

• Improved strategy is needed. The promised Implementation Plan for the UK OTs Biodiversity Strategy could help to provide this through a prioritised, and adequately resourced workplan. 

• The UK Government does not currently have enough capacity to deal with the diverse range of environmental issues in the UK OTs. Dedicated full‐time staff are needed at Defra and DFID. 

• Although the funds available to UK OTs have increased since 2008, more resources are needed. Funds such as the Heritage Lottery Fund and the EU’s LIFE+ fund remain closed to OTs. 

• The government’s environmental mainstreaming programme should be supported and extended, and more policy support is needed. 

• Recent government commitments to exemplary management of the environment in the uninhabited OTs should be welcomed. However, improvements in management are needed in the Cyprus SBAs where illegal bird killing remains a significant issue. 

• Climate risks in the OTs do not appear to be adequately addressed at present. More information on DFID’s adaptation programme for OTs is needed. 

• There are significant gaps in environmental governance in some of the OTs, and these need to be filled in order to enable sustainable development and protection of biodiversity. 

• Marine protected areas can, if based on scientific criteria, make a significant contribution to conserving marine biodiversity in the OTs. 

 

Introduction  The RSPB is the UK partner of BirdLife International, a network of over 100 grass‐roots conservation organisations around the world.  As part of our commitment to the conservation of biodiversity worldwide, we have for over a decade, provided financial, technical and advisory support to emerging NGO partners and local governments in the UK OTs.  We have over a million members in the UK, and they are highly supportive of our work in the OTs. This support is given in many ways, including through financial contributions to appeals and for major initiatives such as our work at Henderson Island.  

Much of the RSPB’s work in the OTs assists them in meeting their commitments under the international conventions, including the Convention on Biological Diversity. Our response to this consultation covers all of the UK OTs. Our views on the specific issues raised by the Committee follow. 

 

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Specific Issues Identified by the Committee  1. How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect 

biodiversity in the UKOTs  1.1  The extent to which the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibility to protect the biodiversity 

of the Overseas Territories can be analysed against these six components: knowledge; strategy; capacity; funding; policy support; and delivery. Our assessment of each of these is set out below. 

 KNOWLEDGE  

Recommendations A. The UK Government should incorporate the outcomes of the FCO‐funded Extinction Risk 

Assessment project into its OTs Biodiversity Strategy Implementation Plan.   B. Defra’s Research Directorate should instigate a definitive priority OT Biodiversity Research 

Programme, agreed with OT Governments, research institutions and civil society.  1.2 Assessments carried out to‐date indicate that the biodiversity of the Overseas Territories 

biodiversity is under immense threat. There are a high number of threatened species in those groups of taxa that have been thoroughly assessed against the IUCN’s criteria for global threat classification (the IUCN Red List1), e.g. there are 33 globally threatened birds that occur in the Overseas Territories, more than in the whole of Continental Europe.   

1.3 On the Pitcairn Islands, for example, a total of 466 species have been recorded2. Of these, 146 have been assessed against the Red List criteria, and 41 of these are globally threatened: this is almost a third of those species assessed. Of the 15 endemic species assessed, all were found to be globally threatened. Only half of St Helena’s endemic plants, and only 2 of its 400+ endemic invertebrate species, have ever had their threat status assessed, so many of these could be on the brink of disappearing forever.3  

1.4 Many groups of taxa, especially terrestrial invertebrates, lower plants, and marine species have not been well researched or been subject to international threat classification. It is therefore impossible to make an assessment of the status of much of the biodiversity of the Territories.  

1.5 Without an improvement in knowledge, the UK Government cannot hope to be able to report accurately to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on whether or not it has made progress in meeting its 2020 target to halt biodiversity loss. 

1 See http://www.iucnredlist.org/ 2 See http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/pitcairn_island.pdf. 3 For example five endemic St Helena weevil species currently persist on just two remaining mature St Helena She Cabbage trees which survive on the island, yet since they have not been formally classified as threatened it is extremely difficult to raise funds to address their plight.

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 1.6 At present, threatened species in the UK OTs may be in danger of global extinction without 

awareness in the UK or internationally. The St. Helena Olive Tree’s (Nesiota eliptica) extinction in 2003 provides a clear example of the impact of this lack of knowledge. Other species have since been on the brink of extinction, e.g. the Bastard Gumwood (Commindendrum rotundifolium) but the concerted efforts of local conservationists and international partners (e.g. the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew) have averted an extinction crisis.  

1.7 Some biodiversity monitoring is carried out by OT Government Departments, as well as UK and OT non‐governmental organisations (NGOs) and research institutions. New endemic species are being identified and catalogued through various conservation projects, some funded by the UK government. However, the data for different taxa and different OTs is scattered and there is no central coordination or strategic overview. Without this, there can be no clear idea of where limited resources should most urgently be focussed.  

1.8 Given the lack of capacity for central coordination in the OTs, the UK Government should both facilitate the collation of existing data and improve the state of OT biodiversity knowledge if it is to be able to fulfil its responsibility to prevent further extinctions in the Territories. Defra’s Research Directorate should instigate an “OT Biodiversity Research Programme”, agreed with OT Governments, research institutions and civil society.  

1.9 an that many do not have the potential to develop local expertise in every aspect of their natural environments. To enable implementation of the suggested biodiversity research programme, access to the world‐class skills of the UK’s government‐funded institutions should be made available without the requirement for full crecovery; work in the OTs should be considered core work and there should be an internal budget at all government‐funded institutions

The small population sizes in the OTs me

ost‐

ld be 

4 for this work. Full cost‐recovery (including overhead) requirements currently limit the involvement of many UK institutions in projects, to the detriment of both OTs, and the UK. The National Environment Research Council shouinstructed to increase its role (and that of its research agencies) in promoting and supporting world class research in the OTs.  

1.10 Recently, the FCO has provided the RSPB with a small amount of funding to begin assessing extinction risk in the OTs (the “Extinction Risk Assessment project”). This will entail collating existing species list and monitoring data and identifying the priority gaps for further conservation research and action.  It will be the first collation of information and data gaps for all species across all 14 OTs and it is hoped that this process can both direct Government and civil society effort and enable more effective reporting to the CBD in 2020 on the status of the globally threatened biodiversity of the OTs.  

4 Especially the Royal Botanic Gardens Kew, the Food and Environment Research Agency, CEFAS, the British Antarctic Survey, the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology.

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STRATEGY  

Recommendation C. The OTs Biodiversity Strategy Implementation Plan must include a prioritised, and adequately 

resourced workplan with concrete milestones leading up to 2020.  1.11 In 2009, Defra published the first UK OTs Biodiversity Strategy committing itself to lead work 

with the FCO and DFID to co‐ordinate support for OT biodiversity conservation. This was a very welcome development which provided a top‐level framework for cross‐departmental working, but the Strategy contained no concrete targets or associated workplan. UK Government support has therefore remained non‐strategic, with the result that limited resources have been spread thinly and perhaps not directed to the most important priorities.  

1.12 In January 2012, Defra made the positive commitment to develop an Implementation Plan for the UK OTs Biodiversity Strategy. A meeting is scheduled for March 2013 where progress will be reviewed and future priorities discussed. To be effective, the priorities of OT Governments, communities and civil society will need to be incorporated, but the UK Government must also set out its own priorities, based on sound science.   

1.13 To enable more strategic investment in future, Defra has funded the RSPB to carry out a prioritisation of island eradications of introduced alien vertebrate species across all 14 OTs. Given the devastating impact of these species, this is to be warmly welcomed, and this model of prioritisation should be developed in other areas.  

 CAPACITY   

Recommendations D. Two full‐time dedicated Overseas Territories biodiversity policy posts should be established 

within Defra, one for the inhabited, and one for the uninhabited OTs. E. A multi‐disciplinary Overseas Territories Taskforce of staff from different parts of Defra, and 

different areas of expertise should be established to support the OTs. F. A full‐time post should be established at DFID to take lead responsibility for environment and 

climate change in the Overseas Territories.  1.14 There is a chronic lack of capacity in the UK Government to fulfil its biodiversity responsibilities 

towards the Overseas Territories. The FCO is the currently the only one of the three departments responsible for the OTs Biodiversity Strategy which has a full‐time staff member dedicated to environment and climate change issues in the OTs.   

1.15 Defra, which has had lead department responsibility for OTs biodiversity since 2009, still does not have a single staff member with full‐time OTs responsibility, nor did the Department make 

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any mention of the OTs in its most recent business plan5. Given that the OTs are home to over 90% of the threatened biodiversity for which the UK is responsible, the RSPB considers this unacceptable. Staff capacity within Defra is needed to set the strategic direction of the OTs Biodiversity Strategy, guide its implementation and ensure that international commitments are met. Effective and proactive policy support to the small and stretched Environment Departments of the OTs is also required. At present many of our Territory partners report that they feel disconnected from Defra and find it difficult to access its support and advice.   

1.16 The RSPB believes that at least two full‐time, appropriately senior staff within Defra are needed (one for the inhabited and one for the uninhabited OTs). Such roles cannot be fulfilled by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), whose role is to be an independent scientific adviser to Government. Shaping policy engagement and directing departmental support to the OTs is clearly an appropriate activity for Defra staff.   

1.17 Dedicated staff who are able to engage more proactively to build capacity in OT Governments, would be of great benefit. Such staff should work closely with the FCO, and would need the opportunity to visit the Territories themselves so as to gain first‐hand experience and knowledge of their situations.   

1.18 Recognising that there are significant staffing constraints within Defra at present, the full‐time staff should be supported by a multi‐disciplinary group of staff from different parts of Defra. Their job descriptions should contain a specific requirement to support the OTs in their area of expertise. 

 1.19 A lack of capacity also affects DFID, which is currently without a single staff member responsible 

for environment or climate change issues in the OTs, despite DFID having lead responsibility for international climate change adaptation. Whilst plans are apparently underway to recruit a new environment and climate change adviser, it is currently unclear whether this will be a full‐time post. Given DFID’s responsibility for major infrastructure projects and budgetary aid in several Territories, as well as the department’s climate change adaptation role, the RSPB believes that a full‐time staff member is essential.  

   FUNDING   

Recommendations G. The UK Government should be congratulated on the recent establishment of the Darwin Plus 

fund. 

5 http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/business-plan/10

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H. Funding should be increased for the next round of Darwin Plus from the current figure of £2 million / per year. This is one of the most cost‐effective contributions that the UK Government could make to halting biodiversity loss. 

I. All future funding rounds of Darwin Plus should be specifically linked to implementing the priorities of the UK OTs Biodiversity Strategy. 

J. The number of Overseas Territories experts on the Darwin Committee should be increased significantly. 

K. DCMS should give a policy signal that Overseas Territories are good candidates for Heritage Lottery Funding. 

L. Defra and the FCO should negotiate to enable access to the EU’s environment financing instrument, LIFE+, for all EU Overseas Countries and Territories. 

M. Defra, FCO and DFID should negotiate at Ministerial level to reinvigorate the EU BEST scheme on biodiversity and ecosystem services. 

 1.20 To‐date, UK Government funding for biodiversity conservation in the OTs has been both 

inadequate and frequently non‐strategic. An analysis in 2007 calculated that a minimum of £16 million per year for 5 years was required to meet the most urgent biodiversity priorities in the OTs.6 International environment funds such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) are closed to the Territories because of their UK (and thus developed country) status, but they are also excluded from access to UK and EU funds such as the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) and LIFE+ programme. The UK Government is thus one of the only possible sources of funding.   

1.21 In 2011/12, Defra provided funding of £2.96 million for biodiversity conservation in the UK OTs. This is a welcome improvement on the situation in 2007/08 when Defra spent just £152,379 in this area. However, it is equivalent to only £8,758 per globally threatened OT species. If increased funding is not identified, endemic OTs species for which the UK Government is responsible will certainly become extinct and the UK Government will fail to meet its international obligations.  

1.22 The October 2012 launch of the new OTs Environment and Climate Change Fund (Darwin Plus) is a positive step. The fund brings together contributions of £2 million per year from FCO, DFID and Defra. Whilst this is not ‘new money’, it will enable existing funds to be deployed in a more strategic and effective manner, and the funding call for applications has sensibly given itself the flexibility to support both small and large projects. Given the scale of the challenge and the extreme cost‐effectiveness of biodiversity spending in the OTs, increasing this amount available in this fund would represent extremely well‐targeted environmental funding. 

 1.23 In order to ensure Darwin Plus funds are used strategically, increased OT conservation expertise 

needs to be used to make funding decisions. At present, the decision‐making panel of Darwin Plus will be a sub‐committee of the Darwin Committee, with welcome additional representation 

6 The ‘Costing Biodiversity Conservation Priorities in the UK Overseas Territories’ report is available on the RSPB website at: http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/ukotfinancingcons_tcm9-158352.pdf.

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from the UK Overseas Territories Association (UKOTA). There is an absence of expertise from organisations with major cross‐cutting conservation programmes in the OTs, such as RBG Kew or the RSPB, or any OT NGOs.   

1.24 The Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) is one of the major funders of natural heritage work in the UK. Whilst legally permitted to fund conservation projects in the UK Overseas Territories, it has never done so, arguing that its policy directions from DCMS mean that it has to prioritise accessibility. In their paper detailing their role in the OTs (March 2012), DCMS said “There is no bar on Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) making [grants for work in the UKOTs] but HLF’s current policy is to treat any such applications as a low priority.”   

1.25 The previous Minister for the Overseas Territories at the FCO, Henry Bellingham MP, made numerous speeches in 2011 announcing his determination to open up this much‐needed funding source to the OTs, but appeared to meet with no success. If DCMS changed their policy directions to the HLF Trustees to allow consideration of applications from the OTs as an equal priority with UK applications, this could enable OT projects to be funded in future, and help alleviate the current funding shortfall.  

1.26 The EU’s only dedicated environmental funding stream, LIFE+, is also closed to the UK OTs at present, in contrast to the French Overseas Departments (the DOMs), which have had access since 2007. There is no constitutional impediment to opening LIFE+ funding to the OTs, but there is political resistance in Europe. Negotiations on the next LIFE+ programming period (to run from 2014‐2020) are currently underway. Opening LIFE+ to the OTs would not have any impact on the EU budget, but could bring major benefits on the ground. Defra and the FCO have been strong advocates on behalf of the OTs on this issue, but further efforts are required in the European Council if the current resistance is to be overcome. 

 1.27 The EU has recently developed a pilot funding scheme for all the Overseas Territories of Member 

States called the BEST initiative.7 This has now received two of the three years pilot funding allowed, after which it must either become a permanent programme or be discontinued. There appears to be a significant lack of enthusiasm in the European Commission for the continuation of the BEST scheme, so the UK Government will need to make strong representations in order to ensure that the recent momentum built under the pilot scheme is not lost. Three projects that will involve seven UK OTs were funded in the 2012 round of BEST.  

 

POLICY SUPPORT  

Recommendations 

7 The voluntary scheme for Biodiversity & Ecosystem Services in the European Overseas Territories (BEST) is a follow-up to the ‘Message from Reunion’. It originally aimed to establish a voluntary scheme for the protection of species and habitats, inspired by the Natura 2000 approach.

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N. The UK Government’s environmental mainstreaming reviews should be supported and extended to all OTs. 

O. A Policy Support Programme should be established, with initiatives such as secondments and twinning between OT Governments and UK Government Departments. 

 1.28 Environmental policy capacity is extremely limited on many of the UK OTs, and indeed several 

OT Government Environment Departments consist of less than five staff covering a vast array of urgent issues. Technical environmental policy support from Defra and the wider UK Government is therefore crucial in order to develop robust environmental frameworks. Whilst FCO, Defra, JNCC and DECC do now all provide a contact point or email address for OT assistance enquiries, it remains unclear what detailed assistance can actually be offered or delivered given the lack of OT‐specific staff capacity in the UK Government. Moreover, the few staff in many OT Environment Departments are frequently often inundated with pressing and responsive work, and seldom have the opportunity to identify and discuss long‐term policy support needs with the UK Government. UK Government officials meanwhile often have little detailed understanding or familiarity with the environmental policy frameworks of the OTs, largely due to not having the capacity to engage in further detail or visit an OT in person.  

 1.29 There are many policy areas where increased proactive support from the UK Government would 

be very helpful. We believe the following should be tackled in a first wave of assistance: • biosecurity and invasive species policy; • protected area designation and management; • sustainable fisheries management; and • climate change adaptation. 

A Policy Assistance Programme could take several forms, such as short‐stay secondment programmes from (or to) UK Government, assistance from legal departments of DECC, Defra, DFID, FCO, or twinning projects between OT Government Departments and UK Government Departments similar to those seen during EU enlargement between the UK and Eastern Europe. 

 1.30 The Environmental Mainstreaming exercises being supported by the FCO and JNCC (to date 

piloted in the British Virgin Islands and the Falkland Islands) are a welcome step in identifying environmental policy priorities and building local support for action. It is crucial that the momentum created by these exercises is not lost, and that the UK Government provides technical and financial support to ensure sufficient follow‐up. Increasing Defra officials’ capacity to proactively engage UKOT Governments on environmental policy is thus crucial. Environmental mainstreaming reviews should also be systematically extended to the rest of the OTs. 

 DELIVERY 

 Recommendations 

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P. The UK Government’s commitment to exemplary environmental management in the uninhabited OTs should be welcomed. 

Q. An integrated joint‐action plan to tackle illegal hunting in the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) should be developed. This should involve all relevant Cyprus and MoD/SBA authorities. 

R. Disaster‐preparedness should be considered for all OTs, and resourced appropriately to enable timely responses to future marine incidents. 

 1.31 The UK Government has direct responsibility for biodiversity conservation delivery in the 

uninhabited Territories and Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). With regard to the former, the commitment in the recent OTs White Paper to “oversee exemplary environmental management in the uninhabited Territories” was very welcome, and the management of these Territories is largely good. In particular, Government support for the introduced mammal (rat, mouse and reindeer) eradication programme on South Georgia is appreciated.   

1.32 However, the RSPB has significant concerns about biodiversity conservation delivery in the Cyprus SBAs (controlled by the Ministry of Defence, MOD), where illegal bird trapping is a significant problem. The situation has recently worsened considerably, and last year had the worst level of bird killing recorded for five years. Systematic monitoring by BirdLife Cyprus and the RSPB shows that, in recent years, levels of mist net use in the Dhekelia SBA have been much higher than in the areas policed by the Cyprus authorities.   

1.33 It appears that a new legal loophole could worsen the situation. The Republic of Cyprus has recently modified its hunting legislation, introducing new penalties that can ultimately lead to the loss of hunting licences. The SBA hunting law has not been modified however, so that any hunters caught trapping in the SBAs do not face the same penalties or risk losing their licence if they reoffend. There seems to be no will to change the SBA law. This loophole needs to be closed urgently as this more lenient regime is incentivising illegal hunting activity within the SBAs.  

1.34 The RSPB recommends the development of an integrated joint‐action plan to tackle illegal hunting in the SBAs. This should involve all relevant Cyprus and MOD/SBA authorities, from enforcement to the judiciary, from education authorities to the legislature. The RSPB would also like to explore other less conventional solutions with the MOD to address this problem. These could include cutting down planted acacias (which are used for trapping) to declaring and establishing part of the prime trapping areas as a bird observatory and bird‐ringing station, thereby reducing land available to trapping and aiding information gathering and enforcement.  

1.35 The stranding of the MS Oliva in 2011, and before that, of an oil rig at Tristan da Cunha has highlighted the immense risk to the wildlife of the OTs from marine incident. In the case of the Oliva, the Tristan community made an incredible effort to protect their wildlife from harm, and indeed were awarded the RSPB medal in 2012 for their work. However, it was apparent that a lack of local preparedness (in terms of equipment and training) had some negative impact on 

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wildlife. The RSPB believes that the UK government should consider preparedness for marine incidents for all of the OTs, and should provide appropriate resources locally to enable timely responses to any future incidents. 

 

2. How the UK Government is helping the UKOTs adapt to the impact of climate change 

 Recommendations S. Information should be requested on HMG’s response to the 2011 Foresight report that looked at 

climate risks in the Overseas Territories. T. An explanation should be requested on what provision is made for climate change adaptation in 

the ten Territories not covered by DFID.  2.1 Almost all of the Overseas Territories have been identified by the IPCC as amongst the “most 

vulnerable” and “virtually certain to experience the most severe ecological impacts” of climate change, including biodiversity loss, sea‐level rise, loss of infrastructure, increased extreme weather events, reductions in ecosystem services (such as crucial fisheries) and increased disease exposure.8   

2.2 The impacts of climate change on the UK Overseas Territories were not considered in the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) which was required under the Climate Change Act 2008. However, the UK Government’s 2011 report, Foresight International Dimensions of Climate Change, did provide analysis of the implications of climate change on the OTs, identifying that the UK has “not only moral, political and legal obligations to give support... but also contingent liability for disasters caused by extreme weather events... and economic collapse due to failed ecosystems”.9 The report concluded that “UK Government departments do not act proactively to address adaptation in UK Overseas Territories, leaving them vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with repercussions on the UK”.   

2.3 The economic impacts on the UK are likely to be significant, and the costs associated with adaptation measures are, in many cases, expected to be beyond the scope of these small economies. As the OTs are not eligible for financial support from UN Climate Funds due to their constitutional relationship with the UK, it falls to the UK to ensure both that adequate adaptation occurs and that it is sufficiently financed. 

 

8 See ‘Climate Change 2007 (AR4): Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’, edited by Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (2007). 9 Foresight International Dimensions of Climate Change (2011). The Government Office for Science, London. http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/international-dimensions/11-1042-international-dimensions-of-climate-change

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2.4 DFID has lead responsibility for international climate change adaptation, and did fund an adaptation project for the Caribbean Overseas Territories from 2007‐2010. It is unclear however what, if any, strategic support is currently being offered and whether this is an adequate response to the serious risks. DFID’s recent (June 2012) summary of its work in the OTs makes no mention of climate change.10 DFID’s overall business plan does have a specific target of relevance: “6.2.i Ensure that climate change risks and opportunities are identified and addressed across DFID’s country programmes and other major policy and spending areas through the implementation of Strategic Programme Reviews”,11 and DFID’s operational plan for the Overseas Territories mentions that a “strategic programme review in 2010 assessed the extent to which current OTD investments are at risk from climate change”.12  

2.5 This indicates that only the four Territories where DFID currently invests have been covered, with the remaining OTs excluded. Given DFID’s responsibility as lead department for adaptation, the significant contingent liabilities faced, and the apparent lack of an all‐Territory approach, the RSPB recommends asking the UK Government how the ten other Territories are covered. The new Darwin Plus fund can fund climate change projects, but the £2 million per year currently in the fund is far from sufficient to meet the OTs climate and biodiversity priorities. The RSPB recommends investigating the establishment of a separate funding solution for climate change adaptation in the OTs once a review has been undertaken.  

 3. Whether the recommendations in our 2008 report, Halting Biodiversity Loss, 

on safeguarding biodiversity and practising joined‐up Government to further conservation have been implemented 

 Recommendation U. All relevant UK Government Departments should feed into the development of the OTs 

Biodiversity Strategy Implementation Plan, and responsibility for delivering the various components of its workplan should be clearly assigned to each Department. 

 3.1 With regard to practising joined‐up government, progress has been made since the 2008 report. In 

2009, Defra agreed to take the departmental lead on OTs biodiversity and published the UK Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy in conjunction with the FCO and DFID. This was extremely welcome progress.   

3.2 Further progress in achieving joined‐up Government occurred in July 2011, when the National Security Council (NSC) agreed in the context of a new OTs Strategy that “each UK Government 

10 Available at: http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/ovseas-terr-dept-2011-summary.pdf 11 The climate change commitments of DFID’s Business Plan are available at: http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/business-plan/12/52 12 DFID Overseas Territories Department Operational Plan 2011 - 2015 is available at: http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/ovseas-terr-dept-2011.pdf

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Department should recognise its responsibility to engage with the territories in its area of competence and expertise”, and required each Department to publish a paper outlining how it intended to discharge its responsibilities.13   

3.3 These changes have created a much clearer structure. However, as outlined in paragraphs 1.15‐1.19, the current lack of full‐time OTs‐focused staff within Defra or DFID is an obstacle to joined‐up action, and other relevant Departments such as DCMS (responsible for natural World Heritage Sites) and MOD (responsible for the Cyprus SBAs) still appear to be on the sidelines. FCO and Defra work constructively and closely together, and the cross‐departmental nature of the Darwin Plus fund is a positive development. However, until the upcoming Implementation Plan for the Biodiversity Strategy is completed, further cohesive and strategic cross‐departmental action cannot take place.  

3.4 The other main recommendations of the EAC’s 2008 report concerned funding and information for environmental protection. As outlined above, whilst environmental funding has increased to more than £2m per year in 2012, it is still far short of the amount required. The recommendation to conduct an ecosystem assessment in partnership with each OT to provide the baseline environmental data required has not been delivered. As outlined in paragraphs 1.2‐1.10, an understanding of what species are present in what numbers and where on the OTs remains an urgent prerequisite to both halting biodiversity loss and achieving sustainable development.  

4. The extent to which UK Government strategy on the UKOTs embodies the principles of sustainable development and appropriately trades‐off environmental protection, social development and economic growth AND whether UK Government strategy on the UKOTs is consistent with the conclusions and commitments on protecting biodiversity reached at the recent United Nations Rio+20 conference 

 Recommendations 

V. The UK Government should ensure that all EU‐funded projects in the Overseas Territories are subject to comprehensive EIA and SEA, and establish a mechanism to enable wider stakeholder involvement and oversight in development spending decisions. 

W. DECC should introduce a more strategic approach of proactive support to Overseas Territories.  4.1 The RSPB believes that economic growth and social development can be achieved whilst also 

maintaining and enhancing environmental resources. We encourage the EAC to avoid the assumption that environmental protection needs to be “traded off” to achieve these other goals. 

13 The Written Ministerial Statement from the FCO outlining the NSC’s decision is available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110914/wmstext/110914m0001.htm#11091465000014

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Indeed, we believe that sustainable development can only be achieved in the presence of a healthy and functioning ecosystem, which provides the services that people rely on for life.  

4.2 Many Overseas Territories communities are especially dependent upon the natural environment for their livelihoods, e.g. the Falklands Islands and Tristan da Cunha receive over half of their revenue from their fishing industries. Achieving sustainable development is thus both of vital importance and at the same time a considerable challenge for these small island communities. Water resources are frequently limited, recycling expensive when at such low volumes, electricity is often drawn from diesel‐powered generators, and unique biodiversity may be especially vulnerable due to its extremely limited range and naivety to introduced species. Many OTs lack adequate development planning regimes to help achieve sustainable development. This means major developments can occur without the need for Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) or Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), at the expense of the environment and biodiversity.  

 4.3 It is not clear that UK Government strategy currently embodies the principles of sustainable 

development, especially given the limited knowledge of OT biodiversity and the lack of strategic overview on the part of the UK Government as to where environmental governance improvements are needed. At present there is a cross‐government official‐level working group on OTs Biodiversity, which is very welcome, but no group with a wider remit on sustainable development. Proactive input from relevant departments such as DECC appears limited.  

 4.4 The general development support provided by the European Union to the OTs is highly valued. 

The RSPB welcomes this support for the Territories, but notes that the funding processes followed by the European Development Fund (EDF) lack transparency. We are concerned that projects funded by the EDF often do not appear to be subject to EIA or SEA. This risks both undermining the natural environments on which Territory economies heavily depend, as well as causing conflict with environmental conservation projects. The UK Government should ensure that, at a minimum, all EDF‐funded projects in the OTs are subject to SEA and EIA, and establish a mechanism whereby wider stakeholder involvement and oversight in development spending decisions is enabled. 

 4.5 The Rio+20 conclusions reiterated the importance of achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets to 

halt the loss of biodiversity by 2020. Given that the OTs are home to at least 90% of the known threatened biodiversity for which the UK is responsible (and many more OT species are yet to be identified or have their conservation status assessed), the UK will not be able to meet its Rio+20 commitments without the development of a suitably ambitious and sufficiently resourced OTs Biodiversity Strategy Implementation Plan. Once that strategy is developed, Defra will also then need some full‐time staff capacity to oversee its implementation. Given that OTs biodiversity received no mention in Defra’s Business Plan, there is cause for some concern that the scale of the 

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response is not yet consistent with the ambitions declared at the Rio conference. At present further global extinctions in the OTs are considered likely. 

 4.6 The EAC’s observation in their 2008 report that providing more support to the OTs would be “one 

of the most important contributions that the Government could make to slowing catastrophic global biodiversity loss” remains true today. As the Committee said: “with leadership, and a relatively small sum of money, the incredible biodiversity found in our overseas territories can be safeguarded into the future”. It is not until the UK works to adequately protect its own biodiversity that it will be able to advocate effectively on an international stage for further action to address the global loss of biodiversity. 

 4.7 The OTs are heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports to supply their energy. In order to reduce their 

emissions and improve their long‐term energy security, investments in renewables and energy efficiency are required. DECC has lead responsibility for energy and climate change mitigation policy in the OTs, and in April 2012 published a departmental paper outlining its support to the Territories.14 This document was very light on content, containing only four pages of text. Whilst it is welcome that DECC is now more actively engaged with the OTs and has committed to ‘respond positively to further ad‐hoc requests for knowledge sharing’,15 the introduction by DECC of a more strategic programme of proactive support would be a more appropriate response to the challenge faced.  

4.8 As an example of what can be achieved, New Zealand has recently funded a £4.3 million solar project in its Territory of Tokelau, reducing dependence on diesel generation dramatically and making Tokelau the first territory able to meet all its electricity needs with solar power.16 

 

5. How weaknesses in civil society and governance in the UKOTs impact on conservation 

  

Recommendations X. The FCO and DFID should review the state of civil society in the OTs in order to identify and 

remedy barriers to sustainable growth, and to deliver its White Paper commitment to good government.  

Y. The UK Government will need to address outstanding environmental governance gaps if it is to fulfil the vision of its White Paper and ‘cherish’ the environments of the OTs.  

Z. The FCO must use its Governors to advocate for strengthened environmental governance and the passage of long‐stalled environmental legislation. 

14 Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/tackling-climate-change/international-climate-change/5028-decc-support-for-the-overseas-territories.pdf 15 Ibid. 16 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20233754.

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AA. The FCO must introduce clear safeguards to OT Governors’ roles in environmental decision‐making to reduce personal latitude and improve transparency and accountability. 

BB. The UK Government must work to swiftly complete terrestrial and marine protected area networks in all the uninhabited Territories and establish appropriate development controls where needed. We also encourage the UK Government to work with the governments of the inhabited Territories to encourage improvements in these areas. 

CC. The UK Government should extend its ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity to all of the uninhabited Territories. 

 5.1 An active civil society can play a fundamental role in conserving biodiversity, through 

supporting governments in environmental policy development, undertaking monitoring, delivering on‐the‐ground action, and through their ability to hold decision‐makers to account. Whilst several of the Territories are too small to ever sustain NGOs, others are of sufficient population size and wealth yet still lack much in the way of local civil society organisations.  

 5.2 Where they do exist, many Territory‐based NGOs rely to a significant extent on funding from 

Territory governments, so are also not able to respond objectively when consulted on issues such as development proposals because they fear budget cuts if they raise concerns. Staff at these small organisations may also not have the skills and/or sufficient time to engage effectively in policy or planning processes. Limited OT civil society capacity and high staff turnover is a key issue, and this is exacerbated by the existing project‐based funding streams for the Territories which make it difficult to develop organisations over the long term. 

 5.3 The RSPB considers that the FCO, through its Governors, should focus on creating an enabling 

environment and ensuring that technical support is available to NGOs, parastatial organisations such as National Park Trusts, as well as Territorial Governments. Governors also need to ensure that local organisations are consulted early and often on any development proposals, bearing in mind their limited capacity.   

5.4 It is clear that the FCO and Governors have the ability to support the involvement of civil society in environmental decision‐making and to promote good governance. However, in some Territories, legislation gives Governors the ability to make decisions, e.g. on development control, with no right of appeal and sometimes no local consultation. This is apposite to good and transparent governance and such legislation should be amended to avoid Governors having this sort of authority.   

5.5 DFID has particular experience in nurturing civil society, and should work on strengthening civil society in all the Territories. Opportunities for civil society to deliver services, such as the management of National Parks, should also be explored at a strategic level.   

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5.6 To get an overview of what is needed, the FCO and DFID should review the state of civil society involvement in decision‐making in the OTs in order to identify and remedy barriers to sustainable growth. This would also be a means of helping deliver the UK Government’s White Paper ambition to ensure good governance in the OTs. 

 5.7 UK‐based NGOs can provide significant resources to OT biodiversity conservation but must 

always work closely with local OT partners to achieve effective and sustainable outcomes. As well as delivering on‐the‐ground conservation projects, the RSPB has a focus on developing local NGO partners and building local conservation capacity. To do this, the RSPB shares its organisational development expertise, as well as providing direct technical and financial support to 13 OT conservation bodies.   

5.8 In some of the OTs which are too small to sustain a local NGO, the RSPB supports local Governments directly (e.g. by funding staff salaries in the Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha Conservation Departments). Our focus is to build capacity and strengthen links between the OTs as well as between the OTs and the UK. The RSPB aims to share all data collected in any OT with both Government and non‐governmental partners from that OT. Data‐sharing, consultation, partnership‐working and respect for local environmental priorities are key to effective UK civil society support.  

 5.9 Good environmental governance is a fundamental requirement for effective conservation. The 

UK Government’s recent White Paper states that “Those Territories which choose to remain British should abide by the same basic standards of good government as in the UK”.17 The standard of environmental governance in the Territories is currently deeply variable. Many OTs have only basic or incomplete legislative and policy frameworks in place to protect and conserve their threatened biodiversity, and often lack the technical capacity to improve the situation due to their small size.   

5.10 The greatest immediate environmental threat in many of the Caribbean OTs is the lack of appropriate development control regimes. There are no EIA or SEA requirements in Anguilla and Cayman so unrestricted development can destroy valuable habitats such as primary forest and mangroves. Transparent planning and development processes are also often lacking, which reduces the ability to obtain stakeholder involvement and increases the chances of corrupt practices or inappropriate developments being granted planning permission.   

5.11 Several OTs still do not have networks of protected areas in place for their important terrestrial sites, whilst the marine environments of nearly all the OTs remain largely unprotected. This includes the uninhabited OTs where HMG has direct responsibility.  

17 The 2012 Overseas Territories White Paper, ‘Security, Success & Sustainability’, is available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/publications/overseas-territories-white-paper-0612/ot-wp-0612

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5.12 Many OTs have limited capacity to strengthen their environmental frameworks, whilst in some OTs efforts to improve governance have been stalled due to lack of political will. For example, the Cayman Islands draft National Conservation Bill (2007), Anguilla’s Physical Planning Bill (2001) and Montserrat’s Conservation and Environmental Management Bill (2008) have not yet been passed into law. 

 5.13 The UK Government recognises its responsibility to help the OTs protect their environments, but 

has made no overall assessment of the presence and adequacy of current environmental policy and legislation. Given the UK Government’s new strategic priority to strengthen good government, this is urgently needed.   

5.14 The RSPB has therefore commissioned the independent Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) to assess the OTs’ biodiversity and development control frameworks in order to inform both OT Government activity and UK Government support. The report should be complete by the end of 2012, and the RSPB will submit it to the EAC as soon as it is completed. The UK Government will need to assist the OTs in addressing environmental governance gaps if it is to fulfil the vision of its White Paper and ‘cherish’ the environments of the OTs. It is anticipated that the FCO will need to provide increased legislative drafting capacity and use its Governors to advocate for strengthened environmental governance, whilst detailed technical support from and/or secondments of Defra’s policy experts will also be needed.  

 5.15 The Environment Charters are a positive aspect of the environmental frameworks of the OTs. 

These short documents set out a set of top‐level principles and environmental commitments shared between HMG and the OT governments. However, in 2012, the sense of local ownership of the Charters in many Territories appears weak, and their extremely broad scope makes them difficult to implement given limited capacity. Their effectiveness is also limited by the fact that there is little to ensure compliance (on either side).  

 5.16 The UK is yet to extend its ratification of the CBD to any of the uninhabited Territories (although 

it has been extended to four inhabited Territories). Given the scale of its ambition in this area, this is something that should be completed as soon as possible. 

 6. How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine 

environment in the uninhabited Territories  

Recommendations DD.The detailed environmental legislation and regulations required to fully establish the no‐take 

MPA in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) should be developed and passed. EE. The RSPB urges that the current South Georgia MPA is strengthened by introducing a clear 

prohibition on hydrocarbon and mineral extraction within the entire Exclusive Economic Zone 

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(EEZ) of the Territory. A comprehensive ‘no‐take’ closed area should also be established around the entire South Sandwich Islands portion of the EEZ. 

FF. In the build up to the July 2013 CCAMLR MPA meeting, the UK government should seek to expand its BAT MPA proposals using the scientific data available. 

GG. The UK Government should facilitate a process of strengthening the environmental management of the new fishery at Ascension Island and identifying and protecting the areas of highest biodiversity value in Ascension’s waters.  

HH. The UK Government must build on the outcomes of the 2012 mainstreaming review by supporting the identification and designation of a science‐based MPA network in Falkland waters before this is pre‐empted by the expansion of its rapidly growing oil industry. 

 6.1 Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) can play a very important role in safeguarding areas of 

important marine biodiversity, and the Aichi targets include a commitment to have 10% of coastal and marine areas under protected area management by 2020. As categorised by the IUCN, a diverse range of MPAs can be introduced, ranging from highly protected areas which prohibit all extractive activities, to those where some natural resource use compatible with nature conservation is seen as a principle management aim.18 The RSPB strongly recommends the use of a science‐based approach to MPA designation which takes into account both biodiversity importance and conservation threat, and supports the use of the full range of protection categories as most appropriate on a case‐by‐case basis.  

 6.2 The BIOT is home to the world’s largest coral atoll and one of the healthiest reef systems on the 

planet, and so is of international significance for its marine biodiversity. In April 2010, the UK Government declared the entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of this Territory a ‘no‐take’ Marine Protected Area and stopped issuing commercial fishing licences there. To date, this remains the largest no‐take MPA in the world. The RSPB supports the declaration of this MPA as it was declared ‘without prejudice’ to the ongoing legal process of the displaced Chagossian people. However that whilst the EEZ has been declared to be a MPA, and commercial fishing licences are no longer issued, the administration of the BIOT Government has still not passed the promised legislation to prohibit extractive activities such as commercial fishing or marine mining. At present, the MPA therefore appears to remain, in legal terms, little more than a name. The RSPB therefore recommends that the detailed environmental legislation and regulations required to protect BIOT’s seas and fully establish the MPA are developed and passed.   

 6.3 The uninhabited Territory of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) holds 

exceptional marine biodiversity, supporting albatross, penguin, seal and whale populations of global significance. The SGSSI Government allows licensed commercial fishing within the EEZ, and depends heavily on the income this generates. This fishing is conducted within a robust quota and licensing system which the RSPB uses as a case study of excellent management, and there is good enforcement capacity to detect IUU (Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported) fishing.  

18 See pages 9-10 of IUCN guidelines: https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_categoriesmpa_eng.pdf

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 6.4 The RSPB welcomed the February 2012 declaration of a large sustainable‐use MPA and ban on 

bottom‐trawling in SGSSI’s EEZ, as well as the declaration of no‐take protection in the inshore zones around the islands, as a positive first step in strengthening the conservation of this important area. Given the relatively pristine nature of SGSSI’s EEZ, and the potential catastrophic impact that a marine accident could have in this extremely remote and inhospitable environment, the RSPB also urges that the current provisions are strengthened by introducing a clear prohibition on hydrocarbon and mineral extraction within the entire EEZ. 

 6.5 A consultation on additional spatial and temporal closed areas within the overall MPA was 

conducted by the SGSSI Government in October 2012. This is an excellent opportunity to markedly enhance the Territory’s marine protection. Protected area designation should take a precautionary approach, based on scientific analysis of areas of significant importance to vulnerable species. With specific regard to SGSSI, the marine environment of the South Sandwich Islands (SSI) is one of the most pristine remaining in the Southern Ocean. Designating a no‐take zone in the entire SSI section of the EEZ would protect marine biodiversity of international significance, provide a major contribution to the Aichi MPA target, and have minimal impact on the SGSSI fishing industry (which is concentrated in South Georgia waters). As a high priority, the RSPB therefore urges that a comprehensive ‘no‐take’ closed area be established, including the entire SSI EEZ. 

 6.6 In 2009, the UK proposal for the world’s first high‐seas no‐take MPA, located south of the South 

Orkney Islands, was agreed through CCAMLR. Building on this welcome progress, the UK Government has since proposed to enhance protection in areas exposed by collapsed ice sheets around the Antarctic Peninsular, though the October 2012 meeting of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) failed to agree to this or any other MPA proposals.  However, we also note that at the moment the UK’s MPA proposal does not cover any offshore areas, or protect foraging ranges of key species such as penguins in the area. BirdLife International has identified marine Important Bird Areas (mIBAs) around the British Antarctic Territory (BAT) based on information on foraging areas for pelagic seabirds, and we recommend that in the build up to the July 2013 CCAMLR MPA meeting the UK government seeks to expand its BAT MPA proposals with this scientific data. 

 6.7 Ascension Island has no indigenous or permanent population (its inhabitants have no right of 

abode). Its marine environment is of great significance, with the island home to the second most important green turtle breeding site in the Atlantic. Since 2010, the Ascension Island Government has issued over 125 commercial long‐line fishing licences for tuna and tuna‐like species to vessels flagged in Taiwan, Korea, China, Philippines and Japan. Ascension has no MPAs at present and no stock assessments have yet been carried out. There is documented evidence that non‐target species such as the critically endangered leatherback turtle are being caught by fisheries close to the Ascension EEZ, so it is possible that bycatch may be an issue in this fishery. The RSPB has 

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already offered its assistance to the Ascension Island Government to work together to ensure this new fishery is sustainable, and recommends that the UK Government facilitates a process of strengthening sustainable fishery management and identifying and protecting the areas of highest biodiversity value in Ascension’s waters.  

 30 November 2012 

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Written evidence submitted by the Government of Tristan da Cunha Conservation Department  

 

 Introduction 

(i) Tristan Conservation Department (TCD) welcomes the Environmental Audit Committee’s Inquiry on this important issue.  

(ii) The Tristan da Cunha Islands, because of their isolation, represent some of the least disturbed temperate island systems in the world. Not only do they support the most remote human community they are also home to many endemic plant and animal species. 

(iii) Although 44% of the land area of the islands is designated as nature reserves, with Gough and Inaccessible Islands inscribed as World Heritage Sites, knowledge of the diversity of species they contain and of the threats they face remains inadequate. 

(iv) The new Tristan Conservation Department was only formed in 2009 and has a staff of four, Conservation Officer, Clerk and two Assistants. The Department has full responsibility for conservation management in the Tristan islands where there are 11 Globally Threatened bird species as well as unknown numbers of threatened plants, invertebrates and marine organisms. The workload for these four staff is very high.  

 

Summary 

• Environmental capacity is limited to address biosecurity policy and implementation 

• Access to expertise inside the DEFRA family should be given to OTs at lower cost 

• Lack of knowledge on the marine environment is a limitation to designating science‐based MPAs  

   

Specific Issues Identified by the Committee 

 

1. How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the UKOTs. 

1.1 The threat to biodiversity on Tristan da Cunha from introduced invasive species is significant. On Gough Island breeding success of the Critically Endangered Tristan Albatross averages 32% due to predation from the introduced house mice; at Nightingale mussels introduced by the grounding of the MS Oliva in 2011, potentially threaten the Tristan Rock lobster fishery on which the economy of the islands depend.   

Recommendation: 

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A. Technical expertise from Defra to support strengthening biosecurity policy and implementation, and funding for quarantine facilities are urgently needed. 

Wanless et al. 2009. From both sides: Dire demographic consequences of carnivorous mice and longlining for the Critically Endangered Tristan albatrosses on Gough Island. Biological Conservation 142 (2009) 1710‐1718. 

 

1.2 With only 262 residents, the small population size of Tristan da Cunha means that there is limited potential to develop local expertise in every aspect of the natural environment.  

Recommendation: 

B. To enable implementation of a biodiversity research programme, access to the world‐class skills of the UK's government‐funded institutions should be made available without the requirement for full cost‐recovery; work in the OTs should be considered core work and there should be an internal budget at all government‐funded institutions for this work. Full cost‐recovery (including overhead) requirements currently limit the involvement of many UK institutions in projects, to the detriment of both OTs, and the UK.  

 

1.3 The Tristan da Cunha archipelago is extremely isolated with a unique marine ecosystem characterised by few species but a large proportion of endemics.  Some studies of the shallow water marine life have been carried out but knowledge of the deeper water marine environment and its biodiversity is very limited.  Tristan’s territorial waters cover a vast area, and at present there are no MPAs.  IUU fishing is a threat to the marine environment but although there is a fisheries patrol vessel, its range is limited. The lack of knowledge of the marine environment is a fundamental limitation to designating science‐based MPAs.  

Recommendation: 

C. A significant input of resources is required to fill this knowledge gap on the marine biodiversity. However, limited expertise in the marine environment and the expense of carrying out research in deeper waters is beyond the resources of Tristan itself. 

30 November 2012 

 

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Written evidence submitted by the South Georgia Heritage Trust

Summary

• The South Georgia Heritage Trust, a charity registered in Scotland, is engaged in a project to eradicate rodents from the South Atlantic island, and UK Overseas Territory, of South Georgia. Rodents (mainly rats, but also mice), inadvertently introduced by sealing and whaling ships in the 19th and 20th centuries, do enormous damage to South Georgia’s spectacular seabird populations.

• The first phase of the project, using helicopters to spread poisoned bait, was carried out in March 2011. All the signs are that this was a complete success.

• The second stage of fieldwork will be carried out from February to May 2013.

• This is the largest such eradication project ever to have been undertaken anywhere in the world.

• The objective is to complete the project by eradicating every rodent on South Georgia by the end of 2015.

• The project is being funded entirely from voluntary donations, mainly from foundations and individuals. Just over £3.7 million of the £7.5 million required to complete the project has been raised so far.

• This is the first such project of any significance to be run by an NGO rather than by government.

• SGHT has also funded two research projects addressing issues related to the establishment of marine protected areas around South Georgia.

Introduction 1. The South Georgia Heritage Trust (SGHT) was established in 2005 as a charity registered in Scotland (Scottish Registered Charity Number SC036819). Its purpose is to preserve and protect the natural environment and historical heritage of the South Atlantic island of South Georgia, a UK Overseas Territory. More details about the Trust’s background and activities can be found on its website at www.sght.org .

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2. In connection with the Environmental Audit Committee’s current inquiry into sustainability in the Overseas Territories, the Committee may be interested to hear about SGHT’s Habitat Restoration Project, the objective of which is the complete eradication of rats and mice, both of which are invasive species, from South Georgia. A description of the project follows below. The Problem 3. Introduced inadvertently from sealing and whaling ships in the 19th and 20th centuries, rodents have thrived and done enormous damage to the island’s bird population. The spread of rats on South Georgia continues today, their progress only limited by the sea and large areas of permanent ice, especially glaciers. Scientists have now demonstrated that as a result of global climate change glaciers on South Georgia are in rapid retreat, so areas of the island once protected from rats now risk being over-run unless urgent action is taken.

Project Objectives

4. The project objectives are:

• to remove every rodent from 1,000 square kilometres (386 square miles) of infested land on South Georgia by 2015, thereby safeguarding seabirds from future attack and, in some cases, extinction

• to facilitate the return of millions of seabirds to their traditional nesting sites and thereby increase the breeding range and population size of many seabirds

• to complete the operation without any long term detriment to native wildlife.

Our vision is to return South Georgia as far as possible to the pristine state in which Captain Cook found it when he discovered the island in 1775.

Project Activities and Methodology

5. The key factor that makes eradication feasible on South Georgia is that the island’s rat population is divided into a number of discrete sub-populations, each separated by currently impassable ice barriers. The methodology employed is firmly based on successful eradication work employed elsewhere, but modified to reflect the unique circumstances of this island and this operation. An expert team, using helicopters, spread cereal-based bait at low densities over all areas harbouring rodents. The active ingredient in the pellets is brodifacoum, a second-generation anticoagulant, with 25 parts per million of toxin in each pellet. The helicopters are

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equipped with a global positioning (GPS) and tracking system to enable the pilots to maintain flight lines with a high degree of accuracy and achieve the desired even bait coverage.

6. The project requires at least three seasons of baiting activity. The first took place in March/April 2011, and we shall be returning to South Georgia for the next season of fieldwork in February – May 2013. Expected Results and Their Impact

7. The size of the area to be cleared on South Georgia makes this a project of global significance, and it has excited a great deal of interest in international environmental circles. Once completed, the Habitat Restoration Project will transform the wildlife and natural ecology of this stunning island, sweeping away two centuries of damage caused by human intervention.

8. Our objective is that South Georgia will be free of rodents by the end of 2015. The benefits will be spectacular. In the longer term the wildlife and natural ecology of the island will be transformed with the subsequent return of well over 100 million seabirds to their traditional nesting sites, making South Georgia the greatest concentration of seabirds in the world. Success of Phase 1

9. The fieldwork for the trial Phase 1 of the Habitat Restoration Project was successfully completed in March 2011 – in 28 days, half the allocated time and under our projected budget. Although this first phase of the project involved only 12% of the rat-infested land area of South Georgia, the 12,800 hectares treated already makes this the largest rodent eradication operation ever attempted anywhere in the world. All the evidence so far indicates that this part of South Georgia is now rat free for the first time in two centuries. Just weeks after Phase 1 baiting was completed, a brood of South Georgia pintail ducklings appeared at King Edward Point with their mother, the first to have been seen in the area for many years and the first in perhaps two centuries to have a good chance of survival.

10. Continuous opportunistic monitoring on the Thatcher Peninsula, and dedicated surveys of the Greene Peninsula carried out by the Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, have not revealed any sign of rodents. We are now 18 months from the completion of the Phase 1 baiting work, so we are confident that the methodology used in 2011 was broadly appropriate, and that the bait was overwhelmingly effective. This knowledge is very helpful in

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planning for Phase 2, because it is already apparent that we need not change anything dramatically from what was done last year.

Phase 2 Plans

11. Preparations to clear rodents from the rest of the island, starting in February 2013, are well underway. All members of the field team have been recruited, the British Antarctic Survey’s RRS Ernest Shackleton has been chartered, and equipment and non-perishable supplies have been sourced. All 183 tonnes of bait has been manufactured and packed. The helicopters have been made airworthy and are being transported to South Georgia via the Falkland Islands.

Monitoring and Dissemination

12. There will be a clearly defined monitoring programme with three key components:

(a) monitoring for the presence of rat sign following baiting operations (b) monitoring of effects of bait spreading on non-target species (c) monitoring the expected recovery of rat vulnerable wildlife populations.

13. Lessons learned from this project will be of special interest to other invasive species eradication projects across the world. Media interest in this project and its results is strong, providing public outreach on an international scale.

Secured Funding

14. As of today, SGHT has raised over £3.7 million, nearly 50% of the overall fundraising goal of £7.5 million (Phases 1 and 2 combined), all of it from voluntary donations to the Trust. Current funders of this project include: the Island Foundation, Garfield Weston Foundation, UK Government (DEFRA), Schroder Foundation, Binks Trust, Rufford Foundation, Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Dr Frederik Paulsen Foundation, Bell Laboratories, Lyda Hill, Forest Mars Jr., Farallan Island Foundation, Ernest Kleinwort Charitable Trust, the Salvesen Family, Healthy Planet, Bess Jahres Foundation, Gosling Foundation, Kingfisher Plc, Planeterra, and many individual visitors to South Georgia and other individual supporters. The Trust is heavily engaged in efforts to raise the remaining funds required to complete the project (nearly £4 million), a challenging prospect at any time but especially so in the current economic climate.

15. This is not only the largest rodent eradication project ever to be undertaken, it is also as far as we are aware the first to be undertaken by an NGO, and one which is moreover totally dependent

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on voluntary donations, rather than by government. (The RSPB has subsequently undertaken a project to eradicate rats from Henderson Island, which is part of the Pitcairn group in the Pacific Ocean and is also a UK Overseas Territory.)

Other projects

16. In addition to the Habitat Restoration Project, SGHT has also funded two projects related to one of the other areas of interest to the Environmental Audit Committee, marine protected areas. The first project, now completed, addressed the biodiversity of the benthic floor of the Southern Ocean. This study created 14,000 unique records representing 1,027 species of seabed life around South Georgia. The second of these projects involves research by British Antarctic Survey and Cambridge University in support of the development of marine protected areas around South Georgia, the purpose of which is to identify areas that are high in biodiversity and the focus of feeding activity by higher predators, such as albatrosses, and therefore worthy of protection.

30 November 2012.

 

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Written evidence submitted by Environmental Management Directorate, St Helena Government.  

1. Executive summary: 

Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) has developed a more‐coordinated approach to environmental management in the United Kingdom’s Overseas Territories (UKOTs) since 2008 with (Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) playing a more prominent role. The cross‐Whitehall approach appears to be extending to other HMG departments. 

One size does not fit all in the UKOTs as although there are similarities, there are a number of differences in scale, location, isolation, population etc. that have significant impacts on conservation on each UKOT. 

St Helena welcomes and has benefitted from UK government funding and technical support and this has made a significant difference for nature conservation and environmental management in general on the island. 

St Helena is host to some of the largest number of endemics (relative to UK and relative to some of the other OTs) and has one of the smallest populations. This inevitably means that the island cannot manage and address all of the threats to biodiversity with existing human and financial constraints.  

Because of the scale of St Helena (and UKOTs) there is likely to be a continued requirement for financial and technical support. The short term nature of project funding is not always the most cost‐effective or sustainable way of supporting. A longer‐term programme approach to support might be a potential alternative.  

There are a number of recommendations  in this submission that are relatively minor changes that would enhance existing activities and opportunities.   

2. Brief introduction into the submitter 

Tara Pelembe has a background in environment and nature conservation. She is currently on loan to the St Helena Government for two years from the Joint Nature Conservation Committee  (JNCC) to set up an environmental management directorate and mainstream environment on island.   

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This  submission highlights  the areas  that  the  inquiry will examine  in bold and provides a  response underneath each area.  

3. The extent to which UK Government strategy on the UKOTs embodies the principles of sustainable development and appropriately trades‐off environmental protection, social development and economic growth; 

The  UK  Government  White  Paper  2012  appears  to  embody  the  principles  of  sustainable development with  explicit  focus on  economy,  society  and  the  environment  –  the  three  pillars of sustainable development.   How, and if, this translates into reality and actual support in each of the territories will become clearer over time. 

On St Helena  

• The  Department  for  International  Development  (DFID)  has  committed  £250  million  to  the construction of an airport  to  stimulate economic  growth. This  is  linked  to  funding  to  support economic development while the airport is being built.  

• A  new  Environmental  Management  Directorate1  has  been  created  to  take  forward mainstreaming of the environment across the island. 

• The Sustainable Development Plan2 has 3 National Goals – one focussing on economic growth, the other on social development and a third on environmental management.  

Recommendation: Regular (c. 2 yearly) reports on progress (against agreed indictors)  of sustainable development in the UKOTs might be a good tool for picking up on whether UK and OT governments are delivering and whether trade‐offs are appropriate.  

Recommendation:  In 1999 when  the White Paper – Partnership and Prosperity was produced,  to ensure  the  environment  was  given  appropriate  profile  within  UK  and  OT  governments,  the Environment  Charters  were  produced.  These  had  commitments  for  both  the  UK  and  OT Governments against which progress could be monitored.  There are differences of opinions on how effective  the  Environment  Charters were  but  they  did  provide  a  basis  for  securing  support  and resources and also covered the wider environmental management, which appears to have a  lower profile than conservation, biodiversity protection and climate change. It  is therefore recommended that a charter or something similar is developed between UK and OT governments outlining in more detail the nature of agreed environmental commitments.  

4. How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the UKOTs; 

The UK Government has recently (April 2008) created an Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy 3. This  strategy provides  a  framework  for  cross Whitehall  input  into biodiversity  in  the UKOTs,  and establishes a mechanism for implementing this.  

                                                            1 http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/pages/environment.html 

2 http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/resources.php/760/sustainable‐development‐plan‐201213‐201415 

3 http://www.DEFRA.gov.uk/publications/2011/05/26/pb13335‐uk‐ot‐strategy/ 

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From an EMD perspective the main manifestations of this are 

• Funding:  the  creation of  the new Darwin plus which  combines  all previous HMG  funding sources for OT biodiversity conservation. 

• Support:  In particular the ability to write to HMG officers for advice and support around a range of areas, the invertebrate identification service that FERA (the Food and Environment Research Agency) provides, the technical and advisory support provided by Royal Botanical Gardens Kew and JNCC.  

Recommendation:  Links  into  Multilateral  environmental  agreement  processes  need  to  be specifically  tailored  to UKOT  situation  and  capacity, with  adequate  interpretation  and  time being given if meaningful input is required.  

Recommendation:  Increased  and  improved  access  to  a  wider  range  of  support  for  a  range  of environmental  areas,  that  is  available  within  relatively  short  spaces  of  time.  Currently  this  is delivered for St Helena via a call‐down contract.  

5. How the UK Government is helping the UKOTs adapt to the impact of climate change;  

The UK Meteorological Office has a memorandum of Understanding with the St Helena Government to fund the running of a recording station on the  island and provide technical training,  information and support. The data generated can provide the foundation for our work around climate change.  

JNCC has produced  a  suite of materials on  climate  change  in  the UKOTs4.  These provide  a  good foundation for climate change adaptation and mitigation policy. 

On St Helena  

• There is a target to develop a climate change (adaptation and mitigation) policy in the next year.  In the development of the policy, we are  likely to  look to UK government to tap  into expertise and advice on the policy development.  

Recommendation: Although there has been support to some general work on climate change in the UKOTs and to specific developments of climate change strategies in the Caribbean, St Helena has not really  benefitted  from  these.  St  Helena  still  requires  a  comprehensive  study  to  determine what predicted climate change impacts will be, so that we can incorporate recommended adaptation and mitigation measures into policy and planning.  

6. Whether the recommendations in our 2008 Report, Halting biodiversity loss, on safeguarding biodiversity and practising joined‐up government to further conservation have been implemented; 

This  section  outlines  each  recommendation  of  the  report  in  italic.  Underneath  each recommendation is a statement on progress of implementation from an EMD perspective.   

The Government has a clear moral and legal duty to help protect the biodiversity of the UK Overseas Territories  and  Crown  Dependencies,  where  it  is  the  eleventh  hour  for  many  species.  We  are                                                             4 http://jncc.DEFRA.gov.uk/default.aspx?page=5283 

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extremely concerned that recommendations that we have made in the past that would have helped to protect the environment of the Overseas Territories have been ignored. The Government must: 

adopt a truly  joined‐up approach to environmental protection the UKOTs and Crown Dependencies, by bringing together all relevant departments including the FCO, MoJ, DfID, DEFRA, DCMS and MoD with the governments of the UKOTs. 

The Overseas Territories Biodiversity Group has been created  to provide  the  linkages suggested  in the  recommendation. The UK Overseas Territories Association provides  the OT  representation on the group. 

make better use of the Inter‐Departmental Group on biodiversity  

Not sure of the status of this group 

to  provide  more  oversight  and  support  for  the  development  and  implementation  of  effective environmental  protection  policy  in  the  UKOTs,  and  expand  the  Group  to  include  other  relevant departments; 

On St Helena JNCC have supported the creation of an environmental management Directorate and associated  policy  and  legislation  through  secondment  of  a  staff  member  and  funding  for  data management and research. 

JNCC  and    the  St Helena Government  (SHG)  Environmental Management Directorate  (EMD)  also partner on a Darwin funded marine mapping project.  

DFID have supported this through their Technical Cooperation budget to St Helena providing funding for the following roles: 

• Director of environmental management 

• Environment Risk Advisor/Trainer 

• Terrestrial Conservation Advisor/Trainer 

• ‘Call‐down’ support for specialist technical advice 

What about JNCC/ DEFRA funding support for training courses and small projects. 

have DEFRA assume joint responsibility for the UKOTs, and reflect this in future spending settlements;  

DEFRA  lead  on  the UK Overseas  Territories  Biodiversity  group  (OTBG),  and  lead  on  the  recently created ‘Darwin Plus’ project funding which provides a cross Whitehall (DEFRA, DFID, FCO) combined approach to funding biodiversity and environment projects in the UK Overseas Territories. 

address the dire lack of funds and information for environmental protection in the UKOTs. 

Darwin  funding, and OTEP  funding – now replaced by  the new Darwin Plus  fund, provide external (HMG) streams of funding for biodiversity and environmental work on St Helena. Projects that have been funded by HMG since 2008 are outlined in Annex 1. There is also an important environmental component to the Airport. 

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An ecosystem assessment should be conducted in partnership with each UKOT in order to provide the baseline environmental data  required and  to outline  the effective  response options needed  to halt biodiversity loss. 

An  ecosystem  assessment  has  not  been  carried  out  on  St  Helena,  however  there  have  been  a number of  funded baseline data projects  including a comprehensive plant survey, and  the current (Darwin funded) marine mapping project.  

With  leadership,  and  a  relatively  small  sum  of  money,  the  incredible  biodiversity  found  in  our overseas territories can be safeguarded into the future. One of the most important contributions that the Government could make to slowing the catastrophic global biodiversity  loss currently occurring would be to accept its responsibilities and to provide more support for the UK Overseas Territories in this area. 

Recommendation: Biodiversity protection  is/has  to be a  collaboration between  the UKOT and UK governments. Funding  is an  important and vital component of this collaboration as are other areas of  technical and advisory support. OT governments,  like any government has competing priorities, and limited human and financial resources. Constraints often mean that all of the activities required to  halt  biodiversity  loss  are  not  able  to  be  implemented.  The  short  term  nature  of  project  and application driven funding does not enable long‐term and sustainable planning and implementation. It is recommended that a long‐term, programme approach to funding is considered as an alternative.  

Recommendation: OTBG needs to have a clear process for ensuring that ‘on the ground’ OT  issues are a key part of discussions.  

Recommendation: Whitehall departments  that have committed  to  inputting  into OT environment should have a named lead officer with that responsibility explicitly built into their job profile. These should  then  be  communicated  to  Overseas  Territories  governments  and  Non‐Governmental Organisations (NGOs).  

7. Whether UK Government strategy on the UKOTs is consistent with the conclusions and commitments on protecting biodiversity reached at the recent United Nations Rio+20 conference;  

• No comment on this section.  

8. How weaknesses in civil society and governance in the UKOTs impact on conservation; and 

• Civil Society on St Helena makes a significant positive  impact and contribution to conservation and environment in general.  

• The St Helena National Trust  (SHNT) works on a number of projects  (outlined above) and contributes to raising awareness and  inputting  into and questioning government decisions on the environment.   The SHNT  is however dependent on project funding and  its strength as  an  institution  can  change  as  and  when  project  cycles  start  and  finish.  One  of  their internationally recognised long‐term success stories is the Millennium Forest – an endemic plant restoration project.  

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• St  Helena  Active  Participation  in  Enterprise  (SHAPE)  is  a  social  enterprise  that  provides employment  for St Helena’s vulnerable and disabled. There  is a  focus on  ‘green’ activities and SHAPE has become the islands first paper recycler, they also use wool, recycle clothes to paper etc.   

• St Helena Nature Conservation Group (SNCG) ‐   Is a voluntary organisation that undertakes conservation  and  awareness  raising  activities  focussed  primarily  on  the  terrestrial environment 

• Other  NGO  and  Civil  Society  organisations  on  the  island  undertake  conservation  work periodically  –  these  include  New  Horizons  (the  islands  youth  organisation)  uniformed organisations like Scouts and Guides, Church and religious groups, etc. 

• In addition to providing annual funding for some NGO’s St Helena Government has recently created a community grants scheme for all civil society groups.   

• Private  Sector: A  number  of  private  sector  businesses  are moving  towards  a  ‘green’  and social consciousness. ‘Green guidelines for businesses’ are being developed and a matching accreditation system will be introduced.  

• Governance:  St Helena  is going  through a public  sector modernisation process, and  there are anticipated changes  in structure, ways of working etc. The key  is to the provision of  long term continuity  in approach to ensure  long term sustainability and support for conservation and the environment. Currently this comes through 

• Sustainable  Development  Plan5:  Effective management  of  the  environment  is  one  of  St Helena’s 3 National Goals 

• Sustainable  Economic  Development  plan6:  The  core  focus  of  economic  development  is tourism and the drive is to develop a ‘green brand’ for St Helena 

• National  Environmental  Management  Plan7:  Outlines  a  blueprint  for  environmental management for the next 10 years.  

• Land Development Control Plan8: Embeds Environmental  Impact Assessment requirements into planning and outlines boundaries for National Conservation Areas. 

                                                            5 http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/resources.php/760/sustainable‐development‐plan‐201213‐201415 

6 http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/resources.php/761/sustainable‐economic‐development‐plan‐201213‐202122 

7http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/data/files/st._helena_national_environmental_management_plan_2012_2022_final_070912.pdf 

8 http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/resources.php/770/land‐development‐control‐plan‐2012‐2022‐adopted‐revised‐plan 

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9. How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine environment in the uninhabited territories. 

This is not directly relevant to St Helena. However on St Helena we are in the process of undertaking preparatory work  to be able  to provide an evidence‐base  for  the proposed designation of  inshore Marine Protected Areas. This work is being funded through a Darwin Project (DEFRA).  

10. General conclusion HMG has developed a more‐coordinated approach to environmental management in the UKOTs since 2008 with DEFRA playing a more prominent role. The cross‐Whitehall approach appears to be extending to other HMG departments. 

One size does not fit all in the UKOTs as although there are similarities, there are a number of differences in scale, location, isolation, population etc. that have significant impacts on conservation on each OT. 

St Helena has benefits from UK government funding and technical support and this has made a significant difference for nature conservation and environmental management in general on the island. 

St Helena is host to some of the largest number of endemics (relative to UK and relative to some of the other OTs) and has one of the smallest populations. This inevitably means that the island cannot manage and address all of the threats to biodiversity with existing human and financial constraints.  

Because of the scale of St Helena (and UKOTs) there is likely to be a continued requirement for financial and technical support. The short term nature of project funding is not always the most cost‐effective or sustainable way of supporting. A longer‐term programme approach to support might be a potential alternative.  

There are a number of recommendations in this submission that are relatively minor changes that would enhance existing activities and opportunities.  

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Annex 1: HMG funded projects on St Helena since 2008: 

This section outlines the project title and the lead partner organisations.  

2008 

Overseas Territories Environment Programme  (OTEP) STH501: Supporting Critical Species Recovery and Horticultural Needs on St Helena – Agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate (ANRD) 

OTEP STH502: Heart Shaped Waterfall ‐ public access and amenities, St Helena–  St Helena National Trust (SHNT) 

Department  for  International  Development  (DFID):  Mitigation  for  the  impacts  on  the  Wirebird population on St Helena (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds ‐ RSPB, ANRD and SHNT). 

2009 

OTEP  STH601:    Illustrated  field  guides  to  the  flora of  St Helena  –  St Helena Nature Conservation Group (SNCG) 

2010 

Flagship Species Fund (FSF):  St Helena Gumwood Project SHNT 

Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC): Pheasant Tail Fern control Programme 

JNCC: Bastard Gumwood Recovery Project –  

Darwin Scoping: Laying the foundation for invertebrate conservation on St Helena – Buglife, SHNT,  

Darwin: Increasing local capacity to conserve St Helena’s threatened native biodiversity ‐  SHNT 

2011 

OTEP STH 801: Creating a mechanised recycling facility at SHAPE‐ St Helena's Active Participation in Enterprise ‐ SHAPE 

OTEP STH 803: Restoration of a functioning Bastard Gumwood population on St Helena– ANRD 

OTEP STH 805: Securing the endemic Wirebird population through invasive predator control – SHNT 

JNCC: Marine diploma: JNCC has supported 1 person to attend a Marine Biology Diploma course from June 2011 to January 2012 ‐ ANRD 

JNCC: Bastard Gumwood Recovery Project –  

2012 

Darwin: Mapping St Helena’s marine biodiversity to create a Marine Management Plan – JNCC, EMD. 

Darwin: Laying the foundations for invertebrate conservation on St Helena‐ Buglife, SHNT, EMD.   

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JNCC: JNCC has supported 1 staff member to undertake a NEBOSH Environmental Diploma course ‐ EMD 

JNCC: development of a co ‐ordinated spatial data management system, St Helena  JNCC:  Seabird monitoring  training:  JNCC  has  supported  2  staff  to  attend  seabird monitoring  and ringing training on Ascension Island ‐ EMD  

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO): Interpretation Centre for Diana’s Peak National Park.  

 

30 November 2012 

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Written evidence submitted by Marine Reserves Coalition 

 

This submission is supported by the following Marine Reserves Coalition members: 

• BLUE Marine Foundation • ClientEarth • Greenpeace UK • Marine Conservation Society • Zoological Society of London 

 

Executive summary 

• The most significant recent initiative concerning the conservation of biodiversity in the UK Overseas Territories was the designation of the Chagos Marine Reserve in April 2010. 

• Marine reserves are the most strictly protected type of marine protected area (MPA), in which all extractive and potentially damaging activities are prohibited. Marine reserves are now widely recognised as an effective and important tool in global marine conservation efforts. 

• Well managed marine reserves should be integrated into marine planning in all of the UKOTs, to ensure the protection of biodiversity and sustainable management of marine resources throughout the entirety of seas under UK jurisdiction. 

• It is widely accepted that healthy ecosystems are better placed to cope with the impacts of climate change, and effectively managed marine reserves are a mechanism by which we can achieve healthy and functional ecosystems. 

• The best‐practice approach to conserving the marine environment (including representative areas of habitat and areas of ecological/biological significance) is to protect areas before threats or damage occur (in a proactive rather than a reactive manner), in accordance with the precautionary principle and ecosystem‐based management. 

• There continues to be a lack of clarity within the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as to who holds responsibility for marine biodiversity in the UK Overseas Territories. 

Introduction 

1. The Marine Reserves Coalition (MRC) is a group of six UK‐based organisations1 dedicated to the task of protecting marine resources by the creation of highly protected marine reserves, in concert with other management strategies where appropriate. Focusing on seas under UK jurisdiction, we encourage the UK government to commit to establishing ecologically representative networks of marine reserves throughout all UK waters by 2020. We are extremely pleased that the Environmental Audit Committee (henceforth the Committee) has decided to conduct an inquiry into sustainability in the UK Overseas Territories (UKOTs). Given that over 90% of the UK’s total biodiversity is found in the UKOTs, we consider this issue to be of 

                                                            1 BLUE Marine Foundation, ClientEarth, Greenpeace UK, Marine Conservation Society, Pew Environment Group, Zoological Society of London 

  

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the utmost importance and we look forward to the Committee making robust recommendations to ensure that the UK and Territory governments are delivering accordingly.  

2. As the MRC is primarily concerned with protection of the marine environment, our comments will focus on marine conservation and marine biodiversity in the UKOTs.   

3. The biodiversity and productivity of the world’s ocean is diminishing at an alarming rate. Globally 90% of large fish species, such as sharks, tuna and swordfish, have disappeared in the last few decades2 and many marine habitats have been fundamentally altered by destructive fishing practices and other human activities3. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are an effective and key tool in the conservation of marine biodiversity.  

4. Despite commitments from the 193 countries that are Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, to protect 10% of coastal and marine areas by 2020, there has been limited implementation and ambition from the world’s governments. Currently, MPAs cover just 2.3%4 of the ocean and only a tiny fraction of these are highly protected marine reserves (or no‐take areas). 

How the UK government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the UKOTs 

5. The UK has the fifth largest marine area in the world under its jurisdiction, and as such has a responsibility and an opportunity to become a global leader in the stewardship of marine biodiversity.  

 6. The UK government’s lack of support for the conservation of biodiversity in the UKOTs was 

criticized in the Committee’s UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report5, published in January 2007 (paragraph 126‐141 and conclusions 31‐33), and again in the Committee’s Halting biodiversity loss‐ report6, published in October 2008 (paragraphs 39‐47 and conclusions 11 and 12).  

7. The criticisms contained in the 2007 report were endorsed in the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on the Overseas Territories published in June 20087, which also stated, “We conclude that given the vulnerability of Overseas Territories’ species and ecosystems, this lack of action by the government is highly negligent. The environmental funding currently being provided by the UK to the Overseas Territories appears grossly inadequate and we recommend that it should be increased.”  

8. Both the importance of the biodiversity in the UKOTs and the lack of UK government support at that time for its conservation have thus been well established and are taken in this submission as read. 

                                                             2 Myers, R., Worm, B. (2003). Rapid worldwide depletion of predatory fish communities. Nature 423:280–283 3 Peres, C.A. (2010). Overexploitation. In: N.S. Sodhi, P.R. Ehrlich, ed. 2010. Conservation biology for all. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.2. 4 The Nature Conservancy (October 2012). Policy Brief: Aichi Target 11 – Reshaping the global agenda for MPAs. http://www.nature.org/newsfeatures/pressreleases/tnc‐marine‐policy‐brief‐2012.pdf 5 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmenvaud/77/77.pdf  6 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmenvaud/743/743.pdf  7 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/147/147i.pdf  

  

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9. The most significant recent initiative concerning marine biodiversity in the UKOTs was the designation of the Chagos Marine Reserve, announced by the then Foreign Secretary, David Miliband in April 2010. At 640,000 km2, Chagos is the largest fully protected marine area in the world (detailed further in paragraph 19). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) received private funding from the Bertarelli Foundation to assist enforcement of the Chagos Marine Reserve in the first years of establishment.   

 10. Although the level of financial support provided by the UK government remains inadequate 

against the needs of the unique and often vulnerable biodiversity found in the UKOTs, we do note that this level has been maintained in the face of significant budget cuts. We refer you to the response of the Pew Environment Group to this inquiry (paragraphs 7 ‐ 14) for further detail on this point. 

Whether the recommendations in the Committee’s 2008 Report, Halting biodiversity loss, on safeguarding biodiversity and practising joined‐up government to further conservation have been implemented  

11. In the Committee’s report four recommendations were made concerning the UKOTs.  These were that the government must: 

• “Adopt a truly joined‐up approach to environmental protection the UKOTs and Crown Dependencies, by bringing together all relevant departments including the FCO, MoJ, DfID, Defra, DCMS and MoD with the governments of the UKOTs; 

• Make better use of the Inter‐Departmental Group on biodiversity to provide more oversight and support for the development and implementation of effective environmental protection policy in the UKOTs, and expand the Group to include other relevant departments; 

• Have Defra assume joint responsibility for the UKOTs, and reflect this in future spending settlements; and 

• Address the dire lack of funds and information for environmental protection in the UKOTs. An ecosystem assessment should be conducted in partnership with each UKOT in order to provide the baseline environmental data required and to outline the effective response options needed to halt biodiversity loss. (Paragraph 46).”  

12. Our comments here focus on the last two of these recommendations. In our view there is no evidence that Defra has assumed joint responsibility for the UKOTs and there continues to be a lack of clarity, even within Defra, on who holds responsibility for marine biodiversity in the UKOTs; is it the marine team or the biodiversity team? The government’s White Paper on the UKOTS, ‘Security, Success and Sustainability’8, published in June 2012, clearly states that there should be a coordinated response to natural environment issues with “each Department leading in their respective areas of responsibility” (chapter 3, page 43). Departmental expertise in marine biodiversity clearly lies with Defra, not the FCO, yet it is not at all apparent that Defra is taking the lead in this area.  

13. Whilst Defra, the FCO and the Department for International Development (DFID) have made limited, but certainly not sufficient, funds available for conservation in the UKOTS, the 

                                                            8 http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/publications/overseas‐territories‐white‐paper‐0612/ot‐wp‐0612  

  

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Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has unfortunately not helped to make National Lottery money available to the UKOTs, despite frequent requests to do so and despite having lead responsibility in the UK for a number of World Heritage Convention sites in the UKOTs.  Policy directions of the DCMS are established by The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, and therefore would appear to be entirely changeable, should they wish to assist the UKOTs9. From their lack of action, it appears clear that they have decided not to do so. To all those who care about assisting the UKOTs with the conservation of their heritage, this lack of action by the DCMS symbolizes the continuing lack of interest in government departments in assisting the Territories. 

How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine environment in the uninhabited territories 

14. The term ‘MPA’ covers a broad range of protection levels in the marine environment and is often used to describe areas that have been set up for purposes other than biodiversity conservation, such as fisheries management. This has led to over‐estimates of global MPA coverage and an inflated sense of how much of the ocean is protected. Recent guidance published by the IUCN10, aims to tackle this issue and defines a protected area as; “A clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long‐term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values. This definition will make it much harder for actions that involve exploitation, such as fisheries, to be claimed as MPAs that protect the ocean. If marine areas involve extraction and have no defined long‐term goals of conservation and ocean recovery, they are not MPAs.”   

15. Marine reserves are the most strictly protected type of MPA, in which all extractive and potentially damaging activities are prohibited. Marine reserves are now widely recognised as an effective and important tool in global marine conservation efforts and have been shown to protect vulnerable species and habitats, as well as build the ocean’s resilience to significant emerging threats such as climate change11,12  ,13. When established and managed properly, marine reserves can benefit people as well as the environment, by helping to rebuild depleted fish stocks that billions of people worldwide depend on for both income and protein14.  

16. The MRC is calling for the designation of highly protected marine reserves throughout the UKOTs, as these areas are more effective than multi‐use MPAs; a) They provide a greater benefit to ecosystem recovery than multi‐use areas15; b) Allowing certain activities to continue within protected areas often leads to a marked 

increase in those activities, affecting the natural balance of the ecosystem16;                                                             9 http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/HLFPolicyDirections2007.pdf 10 IUCN (2012). Guidelines for applying the IUCN Protected Area Management Categories to Marine Protected Areas. https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_categoriesmpa_eng.pdf  11 Halpern, B.S. (2003). The impact of marine reserves: Do reserves work and does reserve size matter? Ecological Applications 13:S117‐S137. www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/54501.pdf 12 Lester, S.E., Halpern, B.S. (2008). Biological responses in marine no‐take reserves versus partially protected areas. Marine Ecology Progress Series 367: 49‐56. www.oregonocean.info/index.php?option=com_ninjaboard&view=topic&topic=59&Itemid=106#p59 13 Gaines, S.D., White, C., Carr, M.H., Palumbi, S.R. (2010). Designing marine reserve networks for both conservation and fisheries management. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 43 (107): 18286‐18293. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0906473107 14 Mascia, M.B., Claus, A.C., Naidoo, R. (2010). Impacts of Marine Protected Areas on fishing communities. Conservation Biology 24(5):1424–1429. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20507354 15 Lester S.E., Halpern B.S. (2008). Biological responses in marine no‐take reserves versus partially protected areas. Marine Ecology Progress Series 367: 49‐56. www.naturalengland.org.uk/conservation/designated‐areas/mpa/conf2007/Session1/Gaines‐MPA2007.pdf 

  

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c) Protecting the entire reserve makes it much easier to police and manage; if anyone is seen operating fishing gear, or carrying out any other extractive activity in a reserve, they can be prosecuted; and 

d) The cost of enforcement is lower for fully protected sites than for multi‐use areas17.  

17. We welcome this inquiry’s specific examination of how the introduction of MPAs could safeguard the marine environment. However, we are disappointed the inquiry only extends to the uninhabited UKOTs. Well managed MPAs and highly protected marine reserves should be integrated into marine planning in all of the UKOTs, to ensure the protection of biodiversity and sustainable management of marine resources throughout the entirety of seas under UK jurisdiction.  

18. The two ‘uninhabited’ UKOTs; the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) both already have MPA designations in place; the highly protected Chagos Marine Reserve in the BIOT and the only partially protected ‘multi‐use’ SGSSI MPA. The government of SGSSI is currently considering proposals for further protection within the SGSSI MPA (see paragraphs 20 ‐ 21). It is our view that there is considerable scope to significantly extend the SGSSI MPA measures, giving full protection to the entire South Sandwich Islands area of the Exclusive Economic Zone, and also to sizeable areas around South Georgia.  

19. The designation of the Chagos Marine Reserve in 2010 (the campaign for which MRC member organisations played a key role in), was a milestone in marine protection, both in the UK and globally. The Chagos Marine Reserve remains today the largest highly‐protected, no‐take marine reserve in the world, covering 640,000km2. The waters around Chagos have the largest and some of the most diverse undisturbed reefs in the Indian Ocean and are home to the world’s biggest living coral structure; the Great Chagos Bank, with over 220 coral species (almost half the recorded species of the entire Indian Ocean) and more than 1,000 species of reef fish. The designation of the Chagos Marine Reserve has resulted in increased international interest and innovative scientific research being undertaken in the area.  

20. In February 2012 the government of SGSSI announced the designation of the SGSSI MPA; the largest multi‐use MPA in the world covering 1.07 million km2. Although this was a welcome announcement, the current MPA designation provides only limited protection and the area is managed primarily as a commercial fishery for toothfish, icefish and krill. The ‘multi‐use MPA’ designation meant that only 20,000km2 (just 2% of the total MPA area) was fully protected within no‐take zones, with the remaining 98% only partially protected. This is inadequate given that the marine environment of SGSSI is home to one of the most important and rich concentrations of marine wildlife on earth, with more than four million fur seals, as many as 100 million seabirds and a population of whales that is slowly recovering from the severe depletions caused by commercial whaling.   

 

                                                                                                                                                                                         16 Newman, P., Lock, K., Burton, M. and Gibbs, R. (2011). Skomer Island Marine Nature Reserve report 2010. Countryside Council for Wales regional report CCW/WW/10/9. http://www.wwmc.org.uk/wp‐content/uploads/2010/11/SkomerMNR_AnnRep_2010.pdf  17 Natalie, C.B., Adams, V., Pressey, R.L. (2009). Marine protected area management costs: an analysis of options for the Coral Sea. Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies James Cook University, for the Protect Our Coral Sea Campaign. www.protectourcoralsea.org.au/media/transfer/doc/coral_sea_management_costs_report_‐_final_dec09.pdf 

 

  

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21. We welcome the recent proposals18 of the government of SGSSI for further protection within the MPA and believe that significantly greater and more meaningful protection can be achieved for relatively little ‘cost’ to the UK19. The Pew Environment Group estimates that fully protecting a large marine area in SGSSI would cost between £200,000 and £500,000 per year depending on the extent of the action taken. Furthermore, almost the entire current fishery income in SGSSI of £3‐4 million a year could be earned from a sustainable fishery zone covering no more than 20% of the area, whilst fully protecting at least 80% of the area.   

22. It is often argued that there is no (or very limited) advantage to setting up new MPAs in areas where little or no human activity currently takes place, as these areas are not deemed ‘at risk’. There are a number of reasons why we disagree with this line of thinking.  

23. Firstly, this approach of ‘do nothing until after damage has occurred’ is what, in general terms has led to the current situation of the continued loss of biodiversity on a global scale. The best‐practice approach to conserving the marine environment (including representative areas of habitat and areas of ecological/biological significance) is to protect areas before threats or damage occur (in a proactive rather than a reactive manner), in accordance with the precautionary principle and ecosystem‐based management.  

24. Secondly, experience has shown that by the time future pressures arise, protection is considerably more difficult (or even impossible) to achieve. This is due to pressure from new interests.  

25. And thirdly, there are wider implications to consider than simply the direct impacts on a specific area. As the global ocean comes under increasing threat from pollution, climate change, ocean acidification, coral bleaching, sea temperature rises and invasive species, having areas safeguarded against human activity will become ever more important. As well as protecting the biodiversity within their boundaries, marine reserves help to support the wider marine environment, and they provide us with important reference points against which to benchmark other areas of the ocean.  

26. The government’s White Paper on the UKOTS (June 2012) recognises the vulnerability of the Territories to the impacts of climate change. It is widely accepted that healthy ecosystems are better placed to cope with these impacts, and effectively managed marine reserves and MPAs are a mechanism by which we can achieve healthy and functional ecosystems.  

27. The UKOTs remain largely unknown to many UK residents. Creating MPAs and marine reserves will raise the profile of their rich and unique natural environments, leading to positive recognition by many who otherwise may not have heard of the Territories. Furthermore, it would demonstrate that the UK government takes its responsibility for the UKOTs (and their biodiversity) seriously and is committed to safeguarding these areas for future generations. 

                                                            18 South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands marine protected areas: existing protection and proposals for further protection (October 2012) http://www.sgisland.gs/download/MPA/SGSSI%20MPA%20Consultation%20Oct%202012.pdf 19 South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands marine protected areas: existing protection and proposals for further protection: A response by the Marine Reserves Coalition (November 2012)  http://www.marinereservescoalition.org/files/2012/11/MRC‐response‐GSGSSI‐MPA‐Proposals‐01.11.2012.pdf 

  

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 Recommendations 

 28. The UK government should enter a dialogue with the Overseas Territories with a view to 

establishing well‐managed, enforced and monitored networks of highly protected marine reserves throughout all waters under UK jurisdiction.  

29. The UK government should look to implementing previous recommendations to ensure there is a joined up approach to sustainability in the UKOTs throughout all government departments, with Defra and DCMS taking a more proactive lead in the conservation of marine biodiversity throughout the UKOTs. 

 30 November 2012 

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Written evidence submitted by the Pew Environment Group 

 

Executive summary 

• There have been a number of significant initiatives concerning the conservation of biodiversity in the UK Overseas Territories (UKOTs) since the Committee last looked into this issue.  These include the declaration in April 2010 of the largest fully protected marine reserve in the world in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), and programmes to remove rats from Henderson (in the Pitcairn Islands), and from South Georgia.   

• Finance for conservation in the UK Overseas Territories remains wholly inadequate, but given the savings found elsewhere in Government budgets, it is notable that the value of total support to biodiversity conservation in UKOTs has been at least maintained or possibly slightly increased. 

• Aside from BIOT, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the Falklands, there is no marine monitoring or enforcement capacity in any of the other UKOTs.  Despite this, fisheries licenses are granted in many of these areas.  This complete lack of any monitoring or enforcement invites illegal and unregulated fishing and does not represent sound governance either in terms of biodiversity conservation or of economic development. 

• The UK has a number of Territories which have no (British Indian Ocean Territory, and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands) or very small resident human populations (Pitcairn, and Tristan da Cunha).  Each of these territories also has an exceptionally large marine area, which is far less biologically degraded and over‐exploited than most other areas of the world. 

• These territories give the UK an extraordinary opportunity to take a lead in international marine conservation by creating extensive fully protected marine reserves that will ensure that the remarkable marine biodiversity of these areas persists for the future.  This would also make a significant contribution to meeting the globally agreed target of protecting 10% of the world’s coastal and marine habitats by 2020. 

Introduction 

1. The Pew Environment Group is the conservation arm of The Pew Charitable Trusts, a US based non‐governmental organisation that works globally to establish pragmatic, science‐based policies that protect our oceans, preserve our wildlands, and promote clean energy. We have offices in Australia, the UK , Belgium and the United States.  

2. Global Ocean Legacy, a project of the Pew Environment Group and its partners, aims to establish very large, fully protected marine reserves where fishing and other extractive activities are prohibited. We work with local citizens, governments and scientists around the world to protect and conserve some of the Earth’s most important and unspoiled marine environments. Since the UK has the fifth largest marine area of any country on earth (a total of 6,793,9281 km2), 

                                                            1 From the Sea Around Us project see http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/ 

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most of which is in the UK’s Overseas Territories , Global Ocean Legacy has a work programme, established in its London office, to promote better marine protection in the UKOTs.  

3. Better marine protection is essential to the conservation of marine biodiversity and to help rebuild the productivity of the oceans. Despite commitments from the 193 countries that are Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to protect 10 percent of coastal and marine areas by 2020, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, there has only been limited progress. Indeed this target, when originally established, was intended to be achieved by 2012, but to date only 3.2 percent has been partially protected and of this, less than 1 percent is fully protected in no‐take marine reserves. Unless determined action is taken by governments worldwide, this target is in danger of being missed yet again, with potentially dire consequences for ocean biodiversity.  

4. The UK Overseas Territories are very different in comparison to one another.  Some are relatively wealthy, have large populations and small marine areas, whilst others are notable because of the vast expanse of their marine areas, exceptionally rich marine biodiversity, limited commercial fishing and low (or no) local human populations. Where human populations do exist, the exploitation of fisheries is often largely confined to near‐shore areas for local use. These circumstances give the UK a comparatively easy and cost effective opportunity to make a huge contribution to the achievement of global marine protection targets and the conservation of ocean biodiversity, and present a great opportunity for the UK government to become a leader in urgently needed global efforts for ocean and biodiversity conservation.   

5. The Pew Environment Group is committed to working with the residents of the UK Overseas Territories, the UK Government, and other UK NGOs, to explore how the oceans around UK Overseas Territories could be better protected. Such protection would make a substantial contribution to global ocean biodiversity conservation and the achievement of global targets, and to raising the global recognition of these islands. In certain cases it also has great potential to contribute to their economic wellbeing through increased awareness of and interest in adventure tourism and ecotourism, and as important sites for future marine research.    

6. Since the Pew Environment Group’s work in the UKOTs is primarily concerned with conserving the marine environment, this submission will particularly focus on marine conservation in the UKOTs.  

   

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How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the UKOTs 

 7. The UK Government’s lack of support for the conservation of biodiversity in the UK Overseas 

Territories was criticized in the Committee’s Report on the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, published in January 2007 (paragraph 126‐141 and conclusions 31‐33), and again in the Committee’s thirteenth report in 2008 on Halting Biodiversity Loss (paragraphs 39‐47 and conclusions 11 and 12). The criticisms contained in the 2007 report were endorsed (paragraph 27) in the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on the Overseas Territories published in June 2008.  Both the importance of the biodiversity in the Territories and the lack of UK Government support for conservation of this biodiversity have thus been well established and are taken as given in this submission. 

 8. Since 2008, there have been a number of significant initiatives concerning the conservation of 

biodiversity in the Territories.  The most significant of these was the announcement in April 2010 by the then Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, of the creation of the world’s largest fully protected marine reserve (640,000 km2) in the British Indian Ocean Territory.   

 9. In addition, the RSPB has led a major initiative to remove rats from Henderson Island (in the 

Pitcairn Islands); the South Georgia Heritage Trust is undertaking a staged rat eradication in South Georgia; and the Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is about to remove all reindeer from South Georgia.  The removal of these introduced species is a complex and expensive undertaking to which the UK Government has contributed significant funding. 

 10. In 2011‐12, Defra spent an estimated £2,969,140 on biodiversity conservation in the British 

Overseas Territories. This included commitments under the Darwin Initiative and support for projects to address invasive non‐native species. It also included spend by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee and the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Hansard, 3 Sept 2012, Column 118W).    

11. Up to 2011, when it was suspended, the FCO and the Department for International Development (DfID) provided £1 million a year through the Overseas Territories Environment Programme (OTEP).  Whilst this had a wider remit than biodiversity conservation, in practice a significant proportion of that fund was applied to biodiversity conservation projects. 

 12. In October 2012 it was announced that OTEP and Darwin Initiative would be combined into one 

fund, The Overseas Territories Environment and Climate Fund (to be known as ‘Darwin Plus’) which will total around £2 million in the current year’s round.  Since Darwin makes up the larger part of Defra’s expenditure on overseas territories, it seems unlikely that the £2,969,140 reported by Defra as having been spent by them on biodiversity conservation in the British Overseas Territories in 2011‐12 will be increased, indeed it may possibly even decrease slightly. 

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13. It is believed that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has not financially supported any biodiversity conservation in the UKOTs and that all DfID funding for biodiversity conservation in the UKOTs is given through Darwin and is therefore accounted for in the above Defra figures.  The FCO through its support for the governments of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), contributes financially to biodiversity conservation in these Territories.  In the case of the BIOT, the FCO has received funding from the Bertarelli Foundation to assist enforcement in the first five years following creation of the marine reserve.  The costs of running the British Indian Ocean Territory are obviously in excess of this, but those would have to be met by the FCO regardless of how the area was managed.  The Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is generally financially self‐supporting, but in recent years has received support from the FCO to support its finances. 

 14. In conclusion, it appears that since 2008 the value of total support to biodiversity conservation 

has been at least maintained or possibly slightly increased.  Whilst the total level of support remains wholly inadequate against the estimated needs (estimated by RSPB in 2007 to be about £16 million a year), it is nonetheless noteworthy that maintaining this level of financial support has been achieved in the face of a significant tightening of government expenditure more generally.   

 Whether the recommendations in our 2008 Report, Halting Biodiversity Loss, on safeguarding biodiversity and practising joined‐up government to further conservation have been implemented;  

15. In the Committee’s report four recommendations were made concerning the UKOTs.  These were that the Government must: 

• adopt a truly joined‐up approach to environmental protection of the UKOTs and Crown Dependencies, by bringing together all relevant departments including the FCO, MoJ, DfID, Defra, DCMS and MoD with the governments of the UKOTs; 

• make better use of the Inter‐Departmental Group on biodiversity to provide more oversight and support for the development and implementation of effective environmental protection policy in the UKOTs, and expand the Group to include other relevant departments; 

• have Defra assume joint responsibility for the UKOTs, and reflect this in future spending settlements; and 

• address the dire lack of funds and information for environmental protection in the UKOTs. An ecosystem assessment should be conducted in partnership with each UKOT in order to provide the baseline environmental data required and to outline the effective response options needed to halt biodiversity loss. (Paragraph 46) 

16. In the preparation of the Government’s paper “The Overseas Territories – Security, Success and Sustainability” which was published in June 2012, the National Security Council in July 2011 requested each Government Department to submit information on how they could engage with 

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the Territories in each of their areas of competence and expertise.  This certainly demonstrated an interest by the Government in promoting a more joined‐up approach to policy towards the UKOTs, including on the conservation of biodiversity.  However, the responses from individual departments to this request generally failed to show much evidence of enthusiasm to change or improve their engagement with the Territories. (See paragraph 18 below for an example).  

17. There is little evidence that the Inter‐Departmental Group on Biodiversity has made any substantial contribution to forwarding biodiversity conservation in the UKOTs, nor is there any evidence that Defra has assumed joint responsibility for the UKOTs.   

18. Whilst Defra, FCO and DfID have made limited, but certainly not sufficient, funds available for conservation in the UKOTS, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has unfortunately not helped to make National Lottery money available to the UKOTs, despite frequent requests to do so and despite having lead responsibility in the UK for a number of World Heritage Convention sites in the UKOTs.  In its paper responding to the National Security Council’s request for Departments to detail how they could play a role in assisting the UK’s relations with the UKOTs, the DCMS on the subject of the National Lottery, said (The Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the United Kingdom's Overseas Territories, March 2012, page 12) “There is no bar on Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) making such grants [i.e., grants for work in the UKOTs] but HLF’s current policy is to treat any such applications as a low priority. When making decisions on funding, HLF take into account their policy directions which place an emphasis on funding the heritage of the UK for access by the people of the UK. HLF are currently considering their strategic priorities for 2013‐19 but, again, that strategic approach is decided at arms’ length from Government.”  This makes clear that HLF are guided by their “policy directions”, but it fails to make clear that these “policy directions” are in fact established by The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (see http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/HLFPolicyDirections2007.pdf) and thus would appear to be entirely changeable by DCMS, should they wish to assist the UKOTs.  In the absence of any change in policy directions, the HLF have now published their 2013‐2018 strategic framework (http://www.hlf.org.uk/aboutus/whatwedo/Documents/HLFStrategicFramework_2013to2018.pdf). No mention of UKOTs is made.  To all those who care about supporting the UKOTs with conservation of their heritage, this lack of action by DCMS symbolizes the continuing lack of interest by Government departments in assisting the Territories. 

 How weaknesses in civil society and governance in the UKOTs impact on conservation 

 19. With regard to the marine environment, the major threat comes from overfishing, which may be 

either legal or illegal.  With the exception of BIOT, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the Falklands, there is no fisheries or other marine monitoring or enforcement capacity in any of the other UKOT’s marine zones.  That means an area of 3,381,280 km2, half of 

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the UK’s total marine area, has no monitoring or enforcement whatsoever.  Yet within these areas, fishing by foreign fleets is often licenced despite the lack of any means of monitoring or control.  This lack of enforcement makes it extremely likely that illegal and/or legal but unregulated fishing is significantly damaging marine biodiversity in UK waters.  

20. Those Territories with small human populations all have high biodiversity and also lack the local means of finance to fund the conservation measures necessary to conserve these species.  Current UK Government practice is to fund conservation activities from periodic grants rather than though the provision of on‐going funding.  This means that local conservation capacity is difficult to sustain and grow since it cannot be maintained during periods when grant funding is not available.  The building of conservation skills in these Territories would be assisted by the provision of on‐going funding to support the activities of dedicated local conservation personnel. 

 How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine environment in the uninhabited territories.  

21. It is worth noting at the outset of this section that the term “Marine Protected Area” (MPA) encompasses a wide range of possible policy options from fully protected no‐take areas to areas that are protected from only a limited number of activities, whilst potentially permitting other destructive activities to continue. These “multi‐use” MPAs are often in effect resource management zones, rather than protected areas with a primary goal of biodiversity conservation, and should be recognised as such.  

22. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) guidance on MPAs issued in September 2012 says MPAs should be “A clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long‐term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values.”  In announcing this guidance, IUCN said “This definition will make it much harder for actions that involve exploitation, such as fisheries, to be claimed as MPAs that protect the ocean. If marine areas involve extraction and have no defined long‐term goals of conservation and ocean recovery, they are not MPAs.2”  

23. For many of the wealthier Territories with larger populations, the decision on whether to protect their marine waters is effectively almost entirely devolved by the UK to their own Government, with the UK only retaining oversight to ensure that all international obligations are honoured.  However for those territories with much smaller (or no) populations, the UK Government retains a much greater hand in governance, though quite correctly reflecting where possible the wishes of local inhabitants. 

                                                            2 http://www.iucn.org/?uNewsID=10904 

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 24. The UK has two territories (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and BIOT), which 

have no resident human population and two others (Pitcairn Islands and Tristan da Cunha) which have small human populations.  All of four these territories also have exceptionally large marine areas. 

TERRITORY      

Area EEZ km2  Resident human population 

BIOT  642,746  0 Tristan da Cunha  754,720  ~260 Pitcairn  836,108  ~50 South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands  1,066,000  0  Each of these territories is also of very high biodiversity importance, having exceptionally large populations of some animal species and/or numerous endemic species not found anywhere else. These territories, due to their remoteness and other factors, are also far less biologically degraded and over‐exploited than some of the more populous territories.  

25. Together the marine area of these four territories covers 3,299,574 km2.  This is almost half of the total marine area under the sovereignty of the UK (3,299,574 km2 ÷ 6,793,928km2 x 100 = 48.6%) and almost 1% of the total area of the world’s oceans (3,299,574 km2 ÷ 361,000,000 km2 x 100 = 0.91%).  

26. This is not to imply that other opportunities and needs do not exist for extensive marine protection elsewhere in UKOTs; they do, but where local populations are larger and EEZ’s are smaller, the pressures increase proportionately.  This makes the declaration of marine reserves much more difficult.   

27. In respect of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Pitcairn and Tristan da Cunha, arguments have been advanced by UK officials that there is little advantage in protecting areas in the UKOTs where there are no current risks or threats to species or communities.  Their view is that if threats to such areas were to arise in the future, then and only then is it appropriate to consider whether to implement protective measures. Such a policy wilfully leaves areas unprotected when protection is easily possible, and means that it is likely that much less will eventually be protected, since vested interests once they arrive on the scene, will actively oppose the establishment of a reserve.  Worse still, in many cases by the time the threat has been identified and action to protect the area has been taken, considerable damage may already have been done.  Our view is that the best time to take action is before the threat manifests itself and before damage occurs.  That is both easier and is the only way to be sure that species and ecosystems are effectively conserved.   

28. Located in the centre of the Indian Ocean, BIOT was declared a fully protected marine reserve in April 2010 and at 640,000 km2, is the largest such area on the planet.  It contains the world’s largest living coral atoll and has the greatest marine biodiversity by far in UK waters. It also has one of the healthiest reef systems with the cleanest waters in the world, supporting half the 

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total area of healthy reefs in the Indian Ocean. As a result, the ecosystems of BIOT have so far proven resilient to climate change and environmental disruptions. The creation of a marine reserve has resulted in a significant increase in scientific interest and work in BIOT, and has also led to the commencement of an environmental capacity building outreach project with the Chagossian community.  

29. Tristan da Cunha’s economy is based primarily on a lobster fishery that occurs around the coasts of its four islands but it also occasionally sells licences for offshore fishing for tuna and other species.  Any support for enhanced marine protection should come first and foremost from the islanders.  The seas around Tristan are an Important Bird Area and are therefore likely to be rich in biodiversity, but little is known about them and further information about the marine biodiversity of the area would be valuable.  We believe that there would be value in the establishment of a marine reserve around these islands and have established contact with the islanders to hear their views, but until further work is undertaken and until the islanders have formed a view on what they want, it is premature to advocate any particular action.  

30. The Pitcairn Islands in the South Pacific is home to around just 50 people, but has a marine EEZ of 836,108 km2, more than three times the size of the UK.   Because it is so remote and is situated in a part of the ocean which is low in nutrients, it does not have extensive fish stocks and so has to date been left almost untouched.  As a result it has one of the best preserved marine ecosystems on Earth.  However, as fisheries elsewhere become over‐exploited, even areas such as Pitcairn are likely to come under increased threat from distant water fishing fleets. Whilst it is comparatively unspoiled, Pitcairn’s marine environment is also very fragile, and any industrial fishing, were it to occur, would rapidly deplete stocks. This would damage one of the few remaining parts of the ocean still in a natural state, and would not provide sustainable income for the Pitcairn islanders.  

31. To keep Pitcairn’s marine environment in its present state, the Pitcairn islanders, working with the Pew Environment Group and National Geographic, have requested that the greater part of the area be declared a fully protected no‐take marine reserve by the Governor (who would act on the instruction of the Foreign Secretary).  A fully protected marine reserve would be a statement of intent by the UK to do everything in its power to preserve this area, which would become the largest such reserve in the world.  It would also increase international interest in and profile for Pitcairn, which is important in itself and would attract scientists who would contribute to Pitcairn’s economy and be able to study and monitor the marine environment. Enforcement would remain a priority, as it would be even if the area were not protected, but a marine reserve could perhaps help to get assistance with this.  

32. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) has no resident human population and therefore there are no local residents whose livelihoods and food security depend on maintaining a fishery.  Despite a history of over‐exploitation which even today has left an impact on populations of whales and fish, it is the most species rich ecosystem in the entire Southern Ocean and has a higher marine biodiversity than the ocean around the Galapagos Islands (which is often cited for its high biodiversity values). It is home to one of the most important concentrations of marine wildlife on earth, with more than four million fur seals, as many as 100 million seabirds and a rich population of whales that is slowly recovering from the severe 

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depletions caused by commercial whaling, particularly in the 20th century.  But many species remain depleted as a result of previous mismanagement and it may take many years for them to recover. Whilst the Government claims to have protected the entire marine area through the establishment of a protected area, this only gives partial protection and the territory is managed primarily as a commercial fishery for toothfish, icefish and krill.  

33. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the body that manages the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean, had set a target date of 2012 for the establishment of an initial network of Antarctic Marine Protected Areas.  Despite the fragility of the Southern Ocean, the importance of its wildlife, and the challenges the ocean and its biodiversity face from multiple factors, including climate change, this target is clearly going to be missed.  Of the 11 areas identified by CCAMLR as priority areas for protection based on a bioregional analysis, two ‐ South Georgia, and The South Sandwich Isles ‐ are under UK sovereignty.  The establishment of a large fully protected marine reserve in SGSSI would clearly be consistent with CCAMLR’s recommendation and would make an important contribution to meeting its conservation goals. The UK is a member of CCAMLR.  

34. Whilst the fishery in SGSSI is undoubtedly well managed relative to other fisheries, the removal of krill and other species from the ecosystem is very likely to be having a negative impact on the marine environment, which would be better conserved if it were to be given complete protection. There are very limited areas left in the world where biodiversity is so diverse and so relatively intact, but there are no people, making it possible to give full protection.  But this is one of them.  Given its teeming wildlife, which makes it a marine analogue to world‐famous parks on land such as the Serengeti or Yellowstone, we believe the case for complete protection is beyond compelling. This would not only give important recognition to the extreme significance of this area for wildlife, but would also gain world‐wide recognition for the UK’s beneficent sovereignty over these islands.  

35. To fully protect a large marine area in SGSSI would “cost” the UK very little (maybe between £200,000 and £500,000 per year depending on the boundaries), since almost the entire fishery income of £3‐4 million a year could be earned from a sustainable fishery zone covering no more than 10‐20% of the area, whilst fully protecting around at least 80% of the area.  

36. In conclusion, we believe that establishing large‐scale fully protected marine reserves in South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the Pitcairn Islands, is compelling given the high biodiversity values of their waters and the contribution this would make to achieving the global target of 10% of the oceans being protected by 2020, a target which unless large areas such as these are protected, is unlikely to be achieved.  Furthermore, we believe that establishing large‐scale marine protection in these territories would imbue them with a positive image and visibility – a global brand – which would move them from being almost unheard of backwaters, into the limelight and in a way that had many positives for the inhabitants, the UK, and indeed, through the contribution it would make to global targets, to the world as a whole. It would be 

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the largest, most visionary and most important marine conservation network managed by any country on earth.  For Tristan, and other Territories too, we recommend that the Government should enter a dialogue with islanders to determine the extent to which marine protection could enhance the seas around their islands.  

Recommendations 

37. The Government should without delay establish large scale fully protected marine reserves in Pitcairn and in South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands covering a very significant portion of their EEZs. 

38. The Government should enter a dialogue with other Territories with a view to extending marine protections within their EEZs so that further large, fully protected areas are established. 

39. The Government should establish a means of monitoring and enforcing all marine areas under UK jurisdiction, regardless of how they are managed, to ensure that UK seas are not subject to illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing. 

30 November 2012 

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Written evidence by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum

Summary The UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF) is a charity which promotes the conservation of biodiversity, ecosystem services, and their contribution, together with other aspects of natural and human heritage, to the well-being and sustainability of the UK’s Overseas Territories (UKOTs) and their local communities. UKOTCF’s some 30 member and associate organisations include leading environmental bodies in Britain, the UKOTs, and the Crown Dependencies (CDs), and much of UKOTCF’s work is in facilitating mutual assistance between these and other UKOT bodies, including government departments. In this memorandum, UKOTCF makes the following main points or recommendations, the background and rationale for which are included in the body of the memorandum: a) UKOTCF welcomes UK Government’s (HMG’s) recognition of the global importance of, and major threats to, the wildlife of UKOTs, and the need to address its conservation as a matter of urgency (para A4). b) UKOTCF recommends that, for the purposes of working towards sustainable development, strategic coordination be implemented through a working group chaired by a senior official within the FCO incorporating relevant departments and agencies, with NGOs (para B5). c) UKOTCF welcomes HMG’s new commitment to exemplary environmental management in the uninhabited UKOTs. UKOTCF recommends that this commitment be extended also to the inhabited UKOTs (para B6). d) UKOTCF recommends that HMG immediately add all uninhabited UKOTs to its ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity and other conservation conventions, and encourage and assist other territories to join its ratifications (para B7). e) UKOTCF recommends that HMG take a more environmentally responsible line in areas of UKOT issues where it has direct responsibility (para B11). f) UKOTCF recommends that the Cyprus Sovereign Base Area (SBA) Administration enforces bird protection legislation, in conjunction with the neighbouring Republic of Cyprus, whose laws those of the SBAs match (para B12). g) UKOTCF welcomes the reinstatement to approximately the level of two years ago of potential HMG funding for conservation work in UKOTs and the restoration of the eligibility of NGOs and others to apply for such funding, while having some constructive comments on the approach to be used by the newly combined fund (para C10). h) UKOTCF recommends that the UK Government increases significantly its funding for UKOT biodiversity conservation, as already recommended four years ago by two Select Committees of the House of Commons and that this not be clawed back into funding HMG’s own bodies (para C11). i) UKOTCF recommends that either the Darwin Plus grants (relating to UKOTs) have their own advisory panel, comprising mainly conservationists knowledgeable in current UKOT issues, and with experience of running projects in or for UKOTs, and of grant-programme management, or that, less satisfactorily, if the existing Darwin Advisory Committee continues to deal with UKOT grants, it be reinforced with several individuals with the attributes indicated above (para C13).

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j) UKOTCF recommends that HMG explore with NGOs who have personnel with experience of grant programme management and UKOTs the commissioning of such bodies to run small grant programmes, thereby retaining the effective small project programme without the need to call heavily on HMG personnel time (para C15). k) UKOTCF recommends that HMG takes a less arbitrarily restrictive view of the type of projects eligible for funding and takes note of what those working in UKOTs consider they need to achieve conservation (para C17). l) UKOTCF recommends that UK Government engages more with the European Union institutions in order to ensure that UKOTs are not effectively excluded from EU funding for biodiversity conservation – and that, when funding is made available, procedures are simplified (para C21). m) UKOTCF recommends that Ministers act on the importance they attach in the White Paper to the UKOTs and direct the National Lottery bodies to give at least equal priority in making grants to UKOTs as to metropolitan UK, and that more appropriate decision making systems be established with an understanding of UKOTs (para C24). n) UKOTCF recommends that UK Government re-affirms clearly its commitment to the Environment Charters which form the basis of UK and UKOTs fulfilling their international conservation obligations – for both the inhabited and uninhabited UK Overseas Territories (para C37). o) UKOTCF further recommends that fulfilling the Environment Charters be reinstated as a core role of the funding from HMG, now grouped under the Darwin Plus heading (para C38). p) UKOTCF recommends that HMG supports HM Government of Gibraltar in enforcing fisheries protection legislation, resists the Government of Spain’s support for illegal activities, and instructs the Royal Navy to support HMGOG in the consequent defence of territorial waters and their resources (para C44). q) UKOTCF recommends that HMG re-engage with the UKOTCF network and other partners to develop a real strategy, preferably shared, for conservation work in the UKOTs (para E19). r) UKOTCF recommends that UK Government Ministers instruct their officials and agencies to respond positively to the repeated invitations from UKOTCF, its member organisations and other NGOs to restore the productive communication and collaborative working that characterised conservation work for the UKOTs, until unilaterally reduced by officials over the past half-decade (para F4). s) UKOTCF recommends that HMG officials involved in decision making on UKOTs receive some basic training in environmental conservation and sustainable development, or at least have some technical advice on such matters available and pay regard to this (para G7). t) UKOTCF recommends that Ministers instruct their officials to stop blocking contacts with the body that many UKOT organisations choose to link to HMG, UKOTCF, and seek to restore the positive relationship of the 1990s and early 2000s (para G16). A. Introduction A1. The UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF or “the Forum”) is a charity which promotes the conservation of biodiversity, ecosystem services, and their contribution, together with other aspects of natural and human heritage, to the well-being and sustainability of the UK’s Overseas

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Territories (UKOTs) and their local communities. UKOTCF’s some 30 member and associate organisations include leading environmental bodies in Britain, the UKOTs, and the Crown Dependencies (CDs), and much of UKOTCF’s work is in facilitating mutual assistance between these and other UKOT bodies, including government departments. The Crown Dependencies (the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) share many conservation challenges and aspects of governance with the UKOTs, including reliance on HMG to represent their interests internationally, under international conventions, including Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and in related negotiations. UKOTCF and associated organisations have given evidence to earlier inquiries by the EAC and other select committees in relation to the fulfilment of the UK's responsibilities in respect of the UKOTs. One member organisation of UKOTCF is also an agency of the UK Government; it is therefore not party to this submission. A2. This submission is structured in relation to the questions raised in the Committee’s announcement. In order to maintain the flow of our comments, we have included most of our comments under the Committee’s second, fourth and sixth bullet points (sections C, E and G below). However, we have cross-referred in the other sections to some paragraphs in these sections. A3. The Committee’s announcement makes reference to the White Paper The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability, published by FCO in June 2012. UKOTCF analysed the aspects of this White Paper and its context which relate to the environment and published this analysis as Moving Backwards in UK Overseas Territories Conservation: Comments by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum on the UK Government’s June 2012 White Paper The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability (Cm 8374) (at http://www.ukotcf.org/pdf/Consultations/WP2012comments.pdf, with a shortened, preliminary version of this published in Forum News 40). UKOTCF subsequently analysed and published a further document, Key measures needed if the UK Government is to fulfil its main international responsibilities for biodiversity conservation in the UK’s Overseas Territories: Main recommendations of the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (at http://www.ukotcf.org/pdf/Consultations/WhitepaperResponseKeyPts05.pdf); this identified some of the main measures which UK Government needed to take to achieve the aspirations indicated in the forewords and introductions to the White Paper, in respect of the environment. These documents provided input into a workshop on environmental aspects of the White Paper, organised by UKOTCF on 2nd October 2012, the proceedings being published as Environmental Conservation and UK Government’s June 2012 White Paper The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability (Cm 8374) - Proceedings of a workshop on 2nd October 2012 at Gibraltar House, the Strand, London, organised by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (at http://www.ukotcf.org/pdf/Consultations/Workshop2012Proceedings05.pdf). These documents are very relevant to the subject of the Committee’s inquiry, and are therefore appended to this memorandum. A4. UKOTCF has long underlined the fact that, in world terms, the biodiversity of UK’s Overseas Territories is even greater than that of metropolitan Britain, in terms of endemic species, proportions of other species supported, sensitive ecosystems and threatened species. UKOTCF has expressed concern that a species, the St Helena Olive, went globally extinct on UK sovereign territory in 2003 and that other species are on the brink of global extinction. Furthermore, the natural ecosystems of many UKOTs are fundamental to the economies and livelihoods of the local human communities. These include sustainable fisheries, tourism, storm protection, water supply, medicinal plants and other raw materials, amongst others. UKOTCF welcomes HMG’s recognition of the global importance of, and major threats to, the wildlife of UKOTs, and the need to address its conservation as a matter of urgency.

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B. The extent to which UK Government strategy on the UKOTs embodies the principles of sustainable development and appropriately trades-off environmental protection, social development and economic growth B1. The Forum has a very wide remit relating to the sustainability of the UK Overseas Territories but its main involvement is through concern for the environment, and our evidence will concentrate on environmental matters. However, in relation to the specific question, UKOTCF believes that the White Paper (if that is what is meant by UK government strategy) fails to deal adequately with the need to balance the three pillars of sustainable development. Indeed, there is no specific consideration of such balance as each element is considered separately. In terms of economic growth, it is strange that only a few months after the Rio+20 meeting, where the European Union (and therefore the UK) were strongly promoting a ”green growth” agenda which was adopted in the conclusions, there is no mention of this in the White Paper. This is in line with discussions held by Forum representatives with the Governor of Montserrat in February this year, who made it very clear that any growth would be purely on economic grounds – not “green growth” and with little regard for environmental or social concerns. B2. In respect of the environment, there are strong words on this aspect within the 2012 White Paper. In his foreword, the Prime Minister says “We see an important opportunity to set world standards in our stewardship of the extraordinary natural environments we have inherited”. The relevant actions seem far less strong, and inadequate to meet this aspiration and grasp that opportunity. It is further tempered by later text which suggests that oversight of exemplary environmental management is restricted to the uninhabited territories. We would note also the wording of the introduction to the Environment chapter of the White Paper “The UK Government wishes to ensure that the rich environmental assets of the Overseas Territories, for which they are internationally recognised, are cherished.” This is an interesting form of words, particular the use of “cherish” being in the passive, and making no commitment to implementation of measures. The operational conclusion at the end of the Environment chapter speaks only of managing natural resources sustainably and putting environmental considerations at the heart of all decision-making. In respect of the latter point, we are aware that UK Government has recently started an “environmental mainstreaming” exercise in some UKOTs, but are puzzled by the duplication and why it makes no reference to the comparable work (see www.ukotcf.org/charters/charterStrat.htm), a decade earlier under the Environment Charters which derived from the 1999 White Paper. We are puzzled also as to why the new exercise has been conducted in such a closed way (see paras E6-E30, F2-F4, G6-G16). B3. UKOTCF questions also why the Environment Charters, which are so valued by local practitioners, particularly in response to policy and physical planning matters, are not mentioned in the 2012 White Paper. It has been noted by several persons that this could tend to undermine sustainable development and appropriate trade-offs (see paras C25-C38, E2-E5, E20-29). B4. Sustainable development, by its nature, has to be implemented through iterative and integrative processes, neither of which are apparent in the White Paper – nor are there clear proposals for these to be put in place. We do welcome the desire for inclusivity among government departments in meeting the aspirations of the White Paper, but that in itself does not automatically mean there is coordination. We know from experience in one territory, the Turks & Caicos Islands (TCI), that coordination has not been achieved even under direct rule by HMG (see para B8). Currently, there is in HMG an Overseas Territories Biodiversity Group, consisting of officials from DEFRA, DFID and FCO, with a secretariat from JNCC; this misses even obvious candidates for inclusion, such as the MoD and DCMS, or the Ministry of Justice responsible for the Crown Dependencies. Its terms of reference do not allow it to make decisions and it does not report to Ministers, so it is somewhat unclear as to its purpose. Discussions in June 2012 with officials from the FCO suggested that it was no longer required. The Forum has suggested that, to assist with integration and coordination, it should be replaced by a wider ranging group of departments and should be accountable to Ministers.

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B5. UKOTCF recommends that, for the purposes of working towards sustainable development, strategic coordination be implemented through a working group chaired by a senior official within the FCO incorporating relevant departments and agencies, with NGOs. B6. UKOTCF has been concerned in the past about the legal fiction that HMG was not directly responsible for the uninhabited UKOTs. Accordingly, UKOTCF welcomes UK Government’s new commitment to exemplary environmental management in the uninhabited UKOTs (but see also paras C27, E2-E5). UKOTCF recommends that this commitment be extended also to the inhabited UKOTs. B7. UKOTCF worked in the 1980s and 1990s to improve understanding of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands in UKOTs and Crown Dependencies, resulting eventually in all joining UK’s ratification. In recent years, HMG seems to have been less than helpful in encouraging its territories in joining further environmental conventions, although the Forum was asked, and agreed, to assist in a workshop on this topic in September 2011. In 2012, the Isle of Man became the first territory to be added to UK’s ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity since UK (with some other territories) joined CBD nearly 20 years earlier – and this took 18 months of delays by HMG (including many problems in communications between Departments) after the Isle of Man made the request, having met the requirements. UKOTCF recommends that HMG immediately add all uninhabited UKOTs to its ratification of CBD and other conservation conventions, and encourage and assist other territories to join its ratifications. B8. UKOTCF does not question the necessity of UK Government taking direct responsibility for governing the Turks and Caicos Islands from 2009 to November 2012. However, it notes that UK Government, in this role, has moved backwards on some aspects of sustainable development and appropriate balances in respect of environmental management. These have included: the abolition of the Conservation Fund, based on an ear-marked element of taxes on tourists and other visitors (and originally introduced by TCI Government as a condition of UK grant aid); the attempt to re-sell for built development undeveloped areas recovered after illegal sale by the previous government; the considering of deep dredging of a channel through nature protected areas, whose earlier dredging devastated some sustainable fisheries as well as the nature reserves; the encouragement of high-rise developments; and the encouragement of, and amending laws to allow, the development of a dolphinarium (or dolphin-prison). It seems that desperation over achieving income may have outweighed proper environmental considerations during the period of direct rule by UK Government. B9. It is notable also that, against much local feeling to maintain sites of biological and cultural importance, the DFID-dominated government in Montserrat is allowing – and indeed promoting – destructive development at Pipers Pond (the only remaining mangrove area on the island), Carr’s Bay Battery historical site and the historic cemetery. Other approaches retaining these features would have been quite feasible. B10. The failure of HMG and the Royal Navy to support the Government of Gibraltar in its attempts to enforce environmental protection legislation against illegal incursions of Spanish fishermen and the paramilitary Guardia Civil into British Gibraltar Territorial Waters (BGTW) in the context of actions from a neighbouring country (see paras C39-C44) are relevant here too. HMG failed also to deal in a timely manner with the Spanish government putting forward BGTW as part of its own Special Area of Conservation under the Habitats Directive, a proposal which was accepted by the European Commission, so that parts of BGTW are considered a UK SAC and the whole of BGTW are considered part of a Spanish SAC, leading to retrospective action in the European Court of Justice. B11. UKOTCF recommends that HMG take a more environmentally responsible line in areas of UKOT issues where it has direct responsibility. B12. HMG has direct responsibility, administered by the MoD, for the government of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas, but illegal hunting of migrant songbirds remains a problem, particularly in the

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Eastern SBA. UKOTCF recommends that the SBA Administration enforces bird protection legislation, in conjunction with the neighbouring Republic of Cyprus, whose laws those of the SBAs match. C. How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the UKOTs C1. HMG itself acknowledges that it has not fulfilled its responsibilities. In his introduction to the 2012 White Paper, the Foreign Secretary noted that it builds on the 1999 White Paper (which acknowledged that Britain was not meeting its obligations) and once again conceded that there are environmental obligations that are not being lived up to: “It [the 2012 White Paper] is also a strategy of re-evaluation. We have not in the past devoted enough attention to the vast and pristine environments in the lands and seas of our Territories.” The 2012 White Paper was presented as the vehicle by which this problem would be addressed; UKOTCF has strongly disputed that the 2012 White Paper will improve the situation (references at para A3). In fact, it is our position that it is a serious step backwards from the 1999 White Paper and the Environment Charters which resulted from that. UKOTCF considers that, unless a real strategy is developed to match positive wishes in Ministerial forewords and real actions are taken, there will be further losses of ecosystem services and further global extinctions on UK territory. Funding by HMG C2. The issue of funding for conservation work in the UKOTs is critically important because of the basic problem that NGOs and other bodies in the UKOTs are not eligible for most international funds, because UKOTs are considered to be British, and therefore not developing countries. The assumption is that because the UKOTs are British, Britain itself must be providing the necessary funding. For this reason, in the Environment Charters HMG committed to providing direct funding through the Environment Fund for the Overseas Territories (later replaced by the Overseas Territories Environment Programme - OTEP), promoting access to other sources of public funding and helping each Territory identify further funding partners. C3. The 2012 White Paper notes (p 13) that “The reasonable assistance needs of the Territories are a first call on the UK’s international development budget.” However, DFID’s responsibility, as its major spend, for fulfilling HMG’s target of 0.7% of GDP being spent on ODA countries tends to run counter to this, because most UKOTs do not qualify under ODA. For example, DFID’s recent adoption of the main funding of the previously DEFRA Darwin Initiative has resulted in most UKOTs effectively being excluded from the main part of the Darwin Initiative (see para E28). C4. House of Commons Select Committees have been more than clear that the level of funding which is in fact provided is “grossly inadequate” (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, June 2008). A few months later, the Environmental Audit Committee said, “One of the most important contributions that the Government could make to slowing the catastrophic global biodiversity loss currently occurring would be to accept its responsibilities and to provide more support for the UK Overseas Territories in this area.” C5. In 2005, UKOTCF (Forum News 27: 2) analysed figures from HMG showing the spending at least £460 million per year on biodiversity conservation in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but only about £1 million per year, divided between all UK Overseas Territories (and none on Crown Dependencies) – despite the Territories’ limited human populations and hence limited capacity themselves to undertake vital conservation work. This is even more vital because most of the UK’s globally important biodiversity is located in UK Overseas Territories and not in Great Britain and

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Northern Ireland. Examples of this are well known and can be found on the Forum’s web site (www.ukotcf.org). One very conservative estimate is that there are at least ten times as many endemic species in UK Overseas Territories as in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (Other measures give comparable ratios.) Using this as a factor to multiply the spending difference, it appears that UK Government values its responsibilities to global biodiversity in Great Britain and Northern Ireland about 5000 times more than it values its responsibilities to global biodiversity in its Overseas Territories. In fact, because of incomplete information in UK Overseas Territories (caused in part by the same shortage of resources), the difference is very much more. Re-analysis of this in 2012 indicated that this ratio has remained approximately the same. C6. UKOTCF has never suggested that the spending by HMG on UKOT conservation should be increased by this magnitude, but estimates of needs by both NGOs and HMG’s own agencies indicate a minimum of about a 10-fold increase in budget is needed. C7. The British Government enters international commitments, including on environmental conservation, on behalf of both itself and UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. The British Government shares responsibility for this globally important biodiversity. The same 2005 analysis showed that HMG made a major contribution to international conservation, of about £40 million per year. The ‘Government Response to Environmental Audit Committee Report: “Trade Development and Environment – the role of the FCO” (Fifth Report of Session 2006-07)’, reports that “The UK is the largest financial supporter of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).” This is commendable in one respect but contrasts with HMG’s pitiably small funding for the environment in the territories for which HMG shares direct responsibility. C8. In fact, HMG funding for conservation work in the UKOTs has increased only marginally, if at all since the EAC’s 2008 Inquiry. The new Darwin Plus fund brings together the FCO/DFID funding from OTEP (after a year’s absence of funding) and the DEFRA funding for UKOTs from the general Darwin Initiative. The funds available in the new Darwin Plus fund total only about £2 million for all Overseas Territories. (And with the new commitment to exemplary management of the uninhabited Territories, it stands to reason that the inhabited Territories are looking at a smaller share.) It seems that the amount of funding continues to be based on what Departments can spare, rather than on an assessment of the funds that would be needed actually to do the job. A strategic approach to this has been made both more complicated and easier in a sense, in that there is no longer a biodiversity strategy for the UK but each of the metropolitan devolved administrations now produce their own, with coordination through a mixture of chief scientists from the conservation agency of each of those administrations and the JNCC. However, it was noteworthy that this process initially completely missed out from the co-ordination the UK Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy; reference to this was inserted only after the agreement between the metropolitan administrations had been signed; so its status is somewhat uncertain. One possible way forward could have been to treat the Overseas Territories governments in the same way, for example, as Scotland, as a devolved responsibility, and incorporate their strategies into the overarching process. UKOTCF did suggest this at a planning meeting with JNCC, but it did not find favour. Also, because of ever more elaborate application and reporting requirements, funds are increasingly inaccessible to smaller UKOT governments and most NGOs based in the Territories with poor capacity. C9. In the early stages of OTEP, there was an expectation that the fund would not normally fund HMG’s own departments and agencies. However, this expectation has gradually been eroded. C10. UKOTCF welcomes the reinstatement to approximately the level of two years ago of potential HMG funding for conservation work in UKOTs and the restoration of the eligibility of NGOs and others to apply for such funding, while having some constructive comments (see below) on the approach to be used by the newly combined fund.

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C11. UKOTCF recommends that the UK Government increases significantly its funding for UKOT biodiversity conservation, as already recommended four years ago by two Select Committees of the House of Commons, and that this not be clawed back into funding HMG’s own bodies. C12. The recent changes mark also a further distancing of the granting process from the people doing work on the ground. The philosophy of FCO’s Environment Fund for Overseas Territories (EFOT) set up in 1999 was that FCO, the UKOTCF network and the UKOTs were a team with a shared responsibility for conservation in the UKOTs. Thus help was available from FCO or UKOTCF to prepare proposals and implement the work. With DFID joining in to create the Overseas Territories Environment Programme (OTEP), came a more formal structure, so that UKOTs became applicants and the OTEP departments just a funding body. Rather than sharing the problems and responsibility for them, the attitude was more that the territories were supplicants for UK aid. This put UKOTCF in a difficult position, as DFID/FCO would never clarify the rules as to what UKOTCF could do/not do to help applicants – usually instead taking retrospective positions. With time and changing FCO and DFID (and DEFRA & JNCC) personnel, this situation steadily became worse, with a decreasing proportion of advisory panel consisting of NGO participants and of those with experience of UKOT issues and project management. With the incorporation of grants into the Darwin Initiative, there are very few members of the advisory panel who are familiar with current UKOT issues or involved with most of the on-the-ground players in UKOT conservation – so it becomes very much a them-and-us exercise. This may be exacerbated in that the Darwin Initiative tends to have quite an academic panel, used to working in highly competitive research council situations, rather than the collaborative conservation attitude which prevailed under EFOT and, to some extent, the earlier stages of OTEP. Whilst there could be advantages in a single source of funding, this means also that an even more restricted set of people are the decision makers. UKOTCF considers that HMG and the efficacy of the deployment of public funds would benefit from a return to a system that involves fully the expertise of NGOs (and umbrella bodies like UKOTCF) working alongside officials to decide on grant funding. C13. Accordingly, UKOTCF recommends that either the Darwin Plus grants (relating to UKOTs) have their own advisory panel, comprising mainly conservationists knowledgeable in current UKOT issues, and with experience of running projects in or for UKOTs, and of grant-programme management, or that, less satisfactorily, if the existing Darwin Advisory Committee continues to deal with UKOT grants, it be reinforced with several individuals with the attributes indicated above. C14. EFOT and OTEP were small-project funds, and made possible, usually by combining with voluntary work, a great deal of highly cost-effective progress on small issues or piloting work which could beneficially be applied on a larger scale to address major conservation issues. UKOTCF has long called for a fund for such medium-sized and/or longer duration projects – as exists in Britain and many parts of the world, for species-recovery programmes, ecosystem restoration, organisational capacity development etc. This need was recognised too in HMG’s 2009 UKOTs Biodiversity Strategy. In this sense, one might be expected to welcome the fact that there is no limit on size of grants in the new Darwin Plus programme. However, such projects would be funded from the same total funding previously limited to small projects. Inevitably, this will mean fewer small projects, despite their excellent track record, and could mark the effective end of small projects. Current officials do not like small grants, because of the project handling time – and, indeed, it has become clear that JNCC, the HMG agency that still handles some small grants, does very little monitoring of the projects’ progress and accounting. In this context, whilst small projects are not excluded from Darwin Plus, subtle changes to the form (e.g. asking for financial management experience) and the preference of officials will probably lead to a move to larger project sizes. C15. UKOTCF recommends that HMG explore with NGOs who have personnel with experience of grant programme management and UKOTs the commissioning of such bodies to run small grant programmes, thereby retaining the effective small project programme without the need to call heavily on HMG personnel time.

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C16. The initial themes indicated for Darwin Plus do not specifically include capacity-building or environmental education, and specifically exclude projects on awareness-raising, communications and outreach (taking a very extreme view of a general government guidance issued 2½ years earlier by the incoming Coalition Government). This tends to imply that work on environmental education, websites, publications, workshops and conferences would not find favour. (There is some confusion here in that, in answer to a question from Mr Andrew Rosindell MP to ask what steps the Secretary of State for International Development is taking to promote environmental awareness in St Helena, the DFID Minister of State drew attention, in November 2012, to the new fund as a means of addressing this.) C17. Given that such types of work are clear needs in some situations by UKOTs, UKOTCF recommends that HMG takes a less arbitrarily restrictive view of the type of projects eligible for funding and takes note of what those working in UKOTs consider they need to achieve conservation. Funding from the European Union C18. The European Union is an obvious place to look for funding. After considerable work by UKOTCF and others, a pilot programme Preparatory Action (Voluntary scheme for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in Territories of the EU Outermost Regions and Overseas Countries and Territories)‘BEST’, was established by an initiative of the European Parliament, in collaboration with Directorate-General Environment, utilising funds from Directorate-General Development Cooperation. There have been two tranches of €2 million, the first being very controversial among many EU member states with Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) as all the lead recipients were French and sub-tropical or tropical (or two international organisations with no on-the-ground experience of OCTs). The second tranche was slightly more balanced but included funding for government agencies which UKOTCF would contend is inappropriate. The process was unbalanced in that many of the recipients were eligible for other sources of EU funds, which the UKOTs are not. The process also flagged up the lack of experience (and therefore knowledge) of dealing with European Institutions; the sheer amount of time required to fill in a supposedly simplified proposal – which included advice that applicants should use an accountant to provide the financial information needed as it was complex; and this flagged up the lack of capacity within the UKOTs, both governmental and non-governmental, to deal with such processes. C19. It had been assumed that the plan was to use the interest in funding for biodiversity projects in OCTs to persuade the European Institutions that there should be a permanent fund arising out of this preparatory action, with the current BEST (or, more correctly, Pre-BEST) results proving the need for it. Unfortunately, it was made clear at a meeting with the European Commission’s DG Environment in April 2012 that a permanent fund was not planned, that DG-ENV was not, and did not wish to be, a funding body. At the same meeting, the overseas entities of EU member states were advised to access existing EU budget-lines to fund environmental projects. This concept became known as the “virtual BEST” to follow the existing “pre-BEST”. This, however, causes major problems for the UKOTs since, aside from the still very uncertain possibility of access to the EU fund LIFE+ for the UKOTs, there are virtually no European Union funds that are accessible to them (as opposed to the Outermost Regions, those overseas entities which are parts of metropolitan member states). At present, it seems that even inclusion in LIFE+ may not be extended to OTs, but may be extended to non-EU countries in Asia! There is a need for considerable lobbying on the part of the UK Government to change this situation. This has not been a priority in the past for HMG, but we hope that policy will change and the UK Government will lobby hard for funding possibilities for Overseas Territories. Indeed, reaching agreement to open up funding lines currently not available is something hinted at in the White Paper. It was apparent that considerable work needed to be done to ensure inclusion of sustainable funding in the new EU budget agreement for 2014 onwards, but there is little evidence that HMG has tried to do so. UKOTCF would also wish to see HMG work with other states to press

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the European Commission to reduce the needless and disproportionate bureaucratic load on applications and other processes. C20. Whilst not finally agreed, the European Parliament has voted through a third tranche of funding for a pre-BEST round for 2013. The modalities for this will be agreed only once the funding has been formally approved in trialogue, but there are signs of disagreement within the Commission. Some wish to see this tranche used towards production of an ongoing sustainable process – the original intention of pre-BEST – but others seem to consider it something of a nuisance and merely wish to continue as before and fund half a dozen one-off projects. UKOTCF hopes that HMG will put its weight behind the former option (assuming the funding is agreed), and work towards a sustainable outcome. C21. UKOTCF recommends that UK Government engages more with the European Union institutions in order to ensure that UKOTs are not effectively excluded from EU funding for biodiversity conservation – and that, when funding is made available, procedures are simplified. National Lottery Funding C22. The benefits of the National Lottery are not available to the UK Overseas Territories, unlike, for example its Dutch equivalent for Dutch territories. There is no bar on the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) making grants to UK organisations which would be carried out in the UKOTs, but HLF’s current stated policy is to treat any such applications as a low priority. “When making decisions on funding, HLF take into account their policy directions, which place an emphasis on funding the heritage of the UK for access by the people of the UK.” HLF seems unaware that the UKOTs are sovereign UK territory, that their people are UK citizens and that many metropolitan UK citizens visit the UKOTs every year. The situation is exacerbated in that applications have to be made via a regional office in Britain. This places applications in direct competition with community projects in that British region, with decisions taken by regional committees with no knowledge of, or sympathy with, UKOTs. Perhaps all UKOT applications should go to one region, or a separate committee, and the relevant committee be briefed specifically on UKOT issues, and resourced for these. C23. The 2012 White Paper suggests that HLF funding is available for work in the UKOTs: “The Lottery cannot currently be played in the Territories. However, distributing bodies, which make their funding decisions independently of Government, can make grants to support good causes in the Territories to organisations based in the UK and working in the Territories.” This, as noted above, is explicitly contradicted by HLF policy, but if Ministers feel that projects in the UKOTs should be funded by HLF, we urge them to give the Lottery bodies a Direction in line with these intentions. Such action would also give some support to HMG’s suggestion that its various Departments are now more “joined-up.” C24. UKOTCF recommends that Ministers act on the importance they attach in the White Paper to the UKOTs and direct the National Lottery bodies to give at least equal priority in making grants to UKOTs as to metropolitan UK, and that more appropriate decision making systems be established with an understanding of UKOTs. The Environment Charters C25. The 1999 White Paper Partnership for Progress and Prosperity noted that the UK and its Overseas Territories have not lived up to their obligations with respect to environmental conservation, and promised to resolve that problem by negotiating Environment Charters with the Overseas Territories which would lay out responsibilities for HMG and UKOT governments, bringing in NGOs and other stakeholders. In 2001, each of the UKOTs signed a Charter, except for Gibraltar, which has

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subsequently adopted the language of the Charter in another form, the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas and British Antarctic Territory. The Charters are bilateral international agreements which were signed for the UK by Valerie Amos, the then Overseas Territories Minister, and by the head of each UKOT Government. C26. The Charters are prefaced by ten Guiding Principles, based largely on the Convention for Biological Diversity and several other Conventions to which UK and UKOTs are party. These principles are followed by the Charter Commitments, a set of mutual commitments which generally set out what each Territory Government will do and how the UK government is committed to supporting that. In essence, what the Charters do is recognise that, if care for the environment is to be devolved to the Territories themselves, the local government must be committed to best practice in its management, and HMG will in turn ensure that the Territory government has the help and resources it needs. C27. The Charters are vitally important to the UKOTs, and especially to environmental NGOs, but the UK Government has been backing away from them over the last several years. For a number of years, HMG worked with the UKOT governments and, often through UKOTCF, with NGOs in a genuine effort to meet the commitments of the Charters, providing funding through OTEP with an open application procedure, working with NGOs both in the UK and the Territories, supporting sharing of experience and expertise among the UKOTs, etc. Then about five years ago, things started to change.

• In 2008, despite promising the Environmental Audit Committee that it would “carry out a review

of the Environment Charters which have now been in place for five years” the FCO told UKOTCF (which had been asked to undertake the review of progress) that it did not have the resources to review its own performance, and, indeed, it has never carried out the review it promised to the House of Commons.

• Bi-annual meetings between HMG, the UKOTCF network, UKOT Government representatives and others to keep track of, and assist, progress in conservation were ended unilaterally by the UK Government. At first UKOTCF was told that it was just a scheduling problem, but the last meeting was held in 2008 and it was later confirmed that such meetings will not be held in future.

• Despite claiming to build on the 1999 White Paper, and having a chapter on environmental conservation, the 2012 White Paper fails to refer to the Charters even once.

• This was capped off by controversy in Bermuda about whether the Charter requirement for environmental impact assessments was binding, as the Bermuda Ombudsman asserted. In an official statement the Bermuda Minister of the Environment, Planning and Infrastructure said on 2 May 2012: “We have taken advice from both the Attorney General's office and the FCO via Government House, and conclude that the UK Environment Charter does not constitute law. It is unenforceable. Rather, the UK itself considers the Charter to be aspirational.” [emphasis added]

C28. UKOTCF agrees strongly with the Bermuda Ombudsman, Arlene Brock, that the Charters are valid and binding. (see Today’s Choices – Tomorrow’s Costs ( a systemic investigation report on the SDO process), February 10, 2012 and Special Report (Ombudsman’s comment on Government’s response) June 18, 2012, www.ombudsman.bm). C29. The general principles of international law provide that bilateral agreements between governments are binding: if they are signed in writing with specific commitments; are entered into without coercion or duress; and there is no express written provision that the signatories do not intend to be bound. Clearly the Environment Charters meet these criteria and were intended to meet them. This means they are binding, as the International Court of Justice held in its 1994 case (Qatar v Bahrain) which states that agreements between governments with specific commitments that are intended to be implemented are binding.

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C30. UKOTCF understands that international agreements of this sort are not enforceable in court. Rather they rely on the integrity and goodwill of the signatories and their desire to be perceived as responsible members of the international community. That being said, there are other such agreements about which the UK Government would be horrified if it were suggested that they can be ignored, such as the OECD Tax Information Exchange Agreements. The 2007 TIEA between Bermuda and the UK, for example, is brought into force by the exchange of letters over the signatures of Bermuda Minister of Finance and a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. Imagine Britain's reaction if Bermuda were to assert that this tax information exchange agreement is 'aspirational'.

C31. In 1992, the UK became a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity which essentially comprises a comprehensive list of actions needed to protect species and ecosystems – a list which includes every commitment in the Charters. Section 4 of the CBD imposes accountability on each signatory for processes and activities “carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Thus Britain, as a signatory, is responsible for meeting the obligations of the Convention in its UKOTs.

C32. The 1999 White Paper lists the responsibilities HMG and the UKOT governments have with regard to sound environmental management, reflecting again the elements of the CBD. It then notes: “These responsibilities already exist, but the UK and its Overseas Territories have not always addressed these issues sufficiently consistently or systematically.” It then announces the development of the Environment Charters to clarify respective roles and responsibilities. UKOTCF believes that the Charters are the means by which the UK intended to meet its international obligations under the CBD and other MEAs. C33. The Environmental Audit Committee in its 2006-7 review of the FCO said it was “necessary to assess whether both the UK Government and the governments of the UKOTs have met their respective obligations under the Environment Charters and Multilateral Environment Agreements.” They go on to describe the UK's responsibility for the UKOTs as “domestic and international environmental commitments” and to note that “failure to meet such commitments undermines the UK’s ability to influence the international community.” C34. The 2012 White Paper lists compliance with relevant multilateral environmental agreements as one of its four goals for environmental management. UKOTCF’s question is: if the Charters do not constitute the mechanism by which the UK meets its international obligations, what is that mechanism?

C35. But more importantly, most people seem to understand that the UKOTs have a variety of cultural and financial issues which affect meeting best practice in environmental management. The 1999 White Paper and the subsequent Environment Charters took a realistic look at what would be needed to enable local UKOT governments to care for their environmental resources, and developed a detailed programme of mutual commitments that would enable that to happen. Both White Papers recognise the hugely more valuable biodiversity of the UKOTs as against metropolitan UK. Why turn our backs on an established scheme that will enable effective conservation of these resources? C36. Whilst the above paragraphs have tended to emphasise Bermuda because of the wider significance of the Ombudsman’s clear analysis, the Environment Charters are valued highly in other UKOTs also. For example, in the delay of over a decade in Cayman’s legislature passing its long-proposed environmental legislation, the Environment Department uses the Charter Commitments as a document for researchers and other parties to sign up to. C37. UKOTCF recommends that UK Government re-affirms clearly its commitment to the Environment Charters which form the basis of UK and UKOTs fulfilling their international conservation obligations – for both the inhabited and uninhabited UK Overseas Territories.

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C38. UKOTCF further recommends that fulfilling the Environment Charters be reinstated as a core role of the funding from HMG, now grouped under the Darwin Plus heading. Protecting Gibraltar's territorial waters C39. This issue is currently the subject of an ongoing review, with an advisory committee to the Government of Gibraltar and a Joint Commission with Spain looking at the sustainable management of marine living resources in the waters around Gibraltar; both are chaired by UKOTCF’s Chairman. The results of that review are not yet finalised, although are expected early in 2013. Clearly there is some sensitivity in providing the EAC with detailed information now ahead of publication, but the issues can be outlined now and UKOTCF would be happy to provide further evidence on this issue, subject to the approval of the Government of Gibraltar – which is unlikely to be withheld. C40. Despite a law being passed in 1991, Gibraltar's territorial waters (BGTW) are regularly fished by Spanish vessels despite this being illegal under that law. A 1999 “understanding” agreed between the then Chief Minister of Gibraltar and the Spanish fishermen (albeit under duress) allowed for a certain number of Spanish boats to fish and the Royal Gibraltar Police (RGP) would turn a blind eye. This allowing of breaking the law was condoned by the then British government as it stopped continuation of ongoing conflict with Spain. With a new government elected in Gibraltar in late 2011, this “understanding “ was revoked, leading to further dispute and conflict, and the setting up of the Commission. There have been regular incursions by Spanish fishing boats often accompanied by paramilitary Guardia Civil boats. C41. The 2012 White Paper sets out quite clearly what Britain's responsibilities are in this situation:

P 14: “Defence and Security: the UK is committed to defend the Territories.” “International Support: the UK is responsible for the external relations of the

Territories and uses its diplomatic resources and influence to promote their interests.”

P 22: “We will continue to maintain an independent ability to defend the Territories –

including their territorial waters and airspace – from any external security threats they may face.”

“We will also ensure that the Territories are able to trade, to exploit their natural

resources… free from undue external interference.” “The Royal Navy is tasked with... upholding the sovereignty of British Gibraltar

Territorial Waters.” P 48: “economic activity, including tourism and fisheries is managed in a way that is

consistent with the long term sustainable use of the natural environment, including over-exploitation.”

P 88: “Conclusion … We are defending robustly Territories which face external threats.”

C42. Despite these definitive statements of responsibility, little action has been forthcoming from HMG. The RGP are tasked with enforcing the 1991 legislation and are therefore responsible for arresting illegal fishing boats, some few of which have been intercepted and arrested. However, the Commissioner of the RGP is (quite rightly in the Forum’s view) not prepared to send unarmed police officers in small boats against armed larger Guardia Civil boats. Further, while the Royal Navy may rely on a defence that they do not undertake fisheries protection duties (unlike elsewhere in the world) and their only concern is maintaining the integrity of sovereign waters, then that still does explain

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why armed Spanish Guardia Civil boats accompanying the Spanish boats are not tackled when they are clearly not using the waters simply for navigation purposes. There have been a number of other incidents involving Guardia Civil boats in recent months, with one arresting a Gibraltar registered boat fishing in BGTW, and in July 2012 a Guardia Civil boat fired rubber bullets at a Gibraltar registered boat within BGTW. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee looked at this issue in 1999 and many of their recommendations have not been implemented and could still apply today. C43. The Government of Gibraltar is seeking to manage its natural resources sustainably, but is being thwarted by the illegal fishing activities of Spanish boats. (In fact, if the waters were Spanish, it is likely that it would be illegal to fish there under Spanish law.) It would normally be assumed that the role of Governor and of the FCO would be to ensure the best interests of Gibraltar and its citizens – which in this case would be to put in place measures to stop this illegal activity. However, the exact opposite appears to be the case, with the UK government putting enormous pressure on the Gibraltar Government to allow this illegal fishing. The role of the Governor seems to have switched from looking after Gibraltar’s interests to that of not upsetting the Government of Spain. C44. UKOTCF recommends that HMG supports HM Government of Gibraltar in enforcing fisheries protection legislation, resists the Government of Spain’s support for illegal activities, and instructs the Royal Navy to support HMGOG in the consequent defence of territorial waters and their resources. D. How the UK Government is helping the UKOTs adapt to the impact of climate change D1. UKOTCF has currently relatively little direct involvement with climate change issues, although there has been some interaction with UNFCCC processes in a wider context than UKOTs and adaptation. Therefore, the Forum’s comment on this question will be rather brief. D2. First, this question relates only to adaptation. Given the size of the UKOTs, it is clear that any mitigation measures will be very small in relation to the overall task of reducing carbon emissions. However, in strategic terms, it is important for the UKOTs to show that attempts are being made to reduce carbon emissions and, for a number of the UKOTs, there is a very real possibility of attaining carbon neutrality. The most obvious of these is Montserrat, with its huge potential for geothermal energy generation, but many others have great potential for solar generation. Indeed, at the final round of applications for OTEP, and following UKOTCF providing some requested advice, there was a proposal from Pitcairn for funding of solar panels. This was outwith the funding availability, but certainly showed a willingness to engage. It was noteworthy that the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) attended the final OTEP assessors’ meeting, but we do not know whether they will be invited to attend the Darwin Plus equivalent. DECC should certainly be involved in any coordination process in place or to be established. We are aware that a contract has been let early in 2012 “to identify the scope and best way to deliver an appropriate climate change programme for all UKOTs and develop a business case (for) it. The business case will need to address how the territories can be best equipped to be

a) dealing with today's climate related risks and b) preparing for tomorrow's climate.”

We note that three possible approaches have been suggested: 1: A truly joint HMG programme. This would mean that government departments agree on the programme itself and put their budgetary contribution towards it into a joint pot. 2: A programme that mirrors for the UKOTs the model of the International Climate Fund (ICF). Programme priorities and eligibility criteria are firmly agreed between all parties; decision-making happens in a cross-Whitehall high-level board; and implementation is taken forward by the different departments. In the case of the £2.9 billion defined as ICF spend,

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DFID is in charge of implementing £1.8 billion, DECC of implementing £ 1 billion and DEFRA £ 100 000. 3: A programme that would be better defined as “HMG umbrella strategy” and follows the HMG collaborative approach of implementing the UKOT Biodiversity Strategy. HMG departments would agree on a joint strategy for implementing climate change related activities in the territories. Delivery of the strategy would be up to each and every department, which could use their individual delivery mechanism. The commitment to the overarching strategy would help government departments to justify their spending in implementing it and give them the flexibility to bring their spending closer in line with their own objectives.

We have not seen the final conclusions of the report but, given our comments earlier about the UKOT Biodiversity Strategy (see paras C1-C17, C25-C38, E1-E29), UKOTCF would be somewhat nervous about approach 3. D3. In respect of Darwin Plus, we note that funding for climate change adaptation is included within the overall total available. UKOTCF would wish to see funding for climate change balanced against other immediate threats in the funding portfolio. Given the high profile of climate change issues, it would be easy to concentrate funding on that to the detriment of other factors causing biodiversity loss. We should also note, once again, that funding here falls into the same gap as other sources, with UKOTs being largely ineligible for international funds for climate-change adaptation, so almost any funding for adaptation in the UKOTs will realistically have to come from the UK. D4. DECC produced, in April 2012, a very useful leaflet DECC Support for the Overseas Territories in which it states “Since its formation DECC has shared with the Overseas Territories information on the development of UK negotiating positions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.” This is welcome but sharing knowledge is not the same as involvement in the negotiating process, and we are not convinced that the UK Government is sufficiently involved with the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and related processes under the UNFCCC. D5. The DECC leaflet further states that “DECC does not lead for HMG on international adaptation issues, but we will look to increase our engagement with the Overseas Territories in existing areas of collaboration, and to extend this engagement to cover knowledge sharing on renewable technology deployment.” Rather confusingly, the document ends with “DECC now provides a single point of contact for queries and requests from the Overseas Territories to in relation to energy and climate change issues.” It would be helpful if the EAC could explore this as to the lead and the relationship/coordination process. D6. DECC notes that “In recognition of the need to improve their domestic energy security and reduce green house gas emissions, the Overseas Territories have begun to request support from DECC to help them identify suitable and locally appropriate renewable energy technologies. The 2020 Renewable Energy Roadmap summarises a large body of work on how best to address the barriers to renewables implementation. Although the Department has limited resources to support knowledge sharing in this area [emphasis added], we will look to share the roadmap proactively with the Overseas Territories, including the underlying analysis. We will respond positively to further ad-hoc requests for knowledge sharing, by directing the Overseas Territories to both internal and external sources of best practice.” D7. It should be noted that Gibraltar is in an interesting position, showing in the top ten countries in the world for carbon emissions. However, these figures are based on turnover of hydrocarbons and, as Gibraltar is a major bunkering port, this skews the figures completely. D8. On adaptation specifically, we note that in many cases natural systems, for example mangroves, act as an efficient buffer to extreme events which appear to be increasing due to climate-change. The loss of these and terrestrial forest systems also remove natural carbon-holding and capturing capacity. Because of their prime coastal locations, it is these ecosystems that are being lost to development through either lack of, or poor, planning. Replacement, along with other adaptation measures is a very

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expensive process and certainly outwith the bounds of funding available under Darwin Plus as currently established. E. Whether the recommendations in our [EAC’s] 2008 Report, Halting Biodiversity Loss, on safeguarding biodiversity and practising joined-up government to further conservation have been implemented Funding E1. As noted in Section C (especially paras C1-C11, C22-C23), despite calls from both the Environmental Audit Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee in 2008 that funding for biodiversity conservation be greatly increased to meet the actual need, rather than limiting funding to what the FCO and DFID had to spare, the funding level has remained substantially the same and access to that funding has become increasingly difficult for small Territories and most NGOs (C12-C17, E20-E29, F2-F4, G8-G16). Environment Charters E2. Again, as noted in Section C (paras E2-E5), a promise made to the Environmental Audit Committee to review progress on the Environment Charters was never kept, and instead HMG began backing away from the Charters (paras E20-E29). E3. At the request of the UK Government and the UKOTs, UKOTCF collated information from all parties in 2006-7 and 2009 to monitor progress on the commitments. Bodies in the UKOTs provided a good deal of information on progress on their work on the commitments, and were generally commendably open as to the nature of this. However, despite initiating the work and keeping good records on its fulfilling the commitments until at least 2003, the UK Government felt unable to supply information on its own work in this regard at the time of these reviews. E4. When preparing supplementary evidence to address questions put to their Minister by the Committee during the Inquiry on Trade, Development and Environment: the role of the FCO, FCO officials asked UKOTCF about progress on its review on implementation of the Charters. Subsequently, the FCO Minister’s supplementary memorandum to the House of Commons EAC stated (with a slightly optimistic interpretation of UKOTCF’s estimate of the timescale): “Your Committee also asked about an assessment of the Overseas Territories Environment Charters. The UKOTCF is currently gathering information on the progress in implementing the Environment Charter Commitments for each Territory (or the equivalent for those Territories without Charters). The Forum intends to publish a progress report towards the middle of this year. The FCO will use that information, in consultation with Whitehall colleagues and the governments of the Overseas Territories, to carry out a review of the Environment Charters which have now been in place for five years.” E5. In this context, UKOTCF put a great deal of further effort into helping and encouraging UKOTs to provide information and is very pleased to note that, of the 21 entities that constitute the UKOTs and Crown Dependencies, responses were received from or on behalf of 19. In line with the Environment Charters themselves, responses were welcomed from both governmental and non-governmental bodies and, in several cases, the responses were integrated. UKOTCF did not receive information from HMG in respect of the UK Commitments in the Environment Charters, nor from those UKOTs which are directly administered by UK Government: British Indian Ocean Territory

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(which has an Environment Charter), British Antarctic Territory, and the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas (although information was received from non-governmental sources for some). A few months later, the FCO reported that, although it had no problem in principle with the indicators, HMG did not have the resources to report on the implementation of its own Commitments. Since then, it has never produced the report promised to the EAC, and, as noted in the previous section, began backing away from the Charters to the point where the FCO advised the Bermuda Government, through Bermuda's Government House, that the Charters were only 'aspirational' (see paras C25-C38). Strategic Assessment of Need E6. One of the recommendations from the EAC's 2008 Halting Biodiversity Loss Report was: “An ecosystem assessment should be conducted in partnership with each UKOT in order to provide the baseline environmental data required and to outline the effective response options needed to halt biodiversity loss.” E7. UKOTCF had started work on some aspects of this in the 1990s, in consultation with UKOTs and the support of the Darwin Initative, the results appearing first in UK Dependent Territories – A Conservation Review (1996), and later, with updating around 2000 by some UKOTs, as a web-database on UKOTCF’s web-site. Also relevant was a further analysis, The Convention on Biological Diversity and the UK Overseas Territories, a report to the WWF-UK by the UKOTCF in April 1998 (www.ukotcf.org/pdf/cdbweb.pdf). E8. With the development and signing of the Environment Charters in 2001, UKOTCF understood that such work would be taken forward within the context of these. UKOTCF, supported by FCO’s EFOT, played its part in this by facilitating, in 2002-3, the development of strategy to implement the Environment Charter in a pilot UKOT – for which Turks & Caicos volunteered. After this, St Helena secured funding from OTEP and, at its request, UKOTCF facilitated a strategy there too, in 2004-5. (Details of both of these can be found on www.ukotcf.org.) Around the same time, UKOTCF personnel visited the Falkland Islands to advise personnel there, who were approaching Environment Charter strategy development via an alternative route of biodiversity strategy and action plans. UKOTCF also helped Ascension personnel draft a simple Environment Charter implementation strategy; this was adopted informally, but lost when HMG cancelled local democracy there (see para E21). Following these mainly successful exercises, FCO and DFID lost interest in supporting such work (see paras B3, C25-C38, E20-E29) as well as in the monitoring of progress which it had initially asked UKOTCF to co-ordinate (see para C27, E2-E5). E9. Therefore, UKOTCF welcomed news that FCO, DFID and DEFRA were to collaborate on developing a biodiversity strategy for UKOTs, and had asked DEFRA’s agency, JNCC, to draft this. UKOTCF was surprised that, in contrast to all previous work in this subject area, UKOTCF was not consulted in any way nor at any stage. This seemed to demonstrate a move to rather more closed approach by HMG than in the past. It also seemed to reflect, just at the time of JNCC’s adoption of a greater role in UKOTs, a transfer of responsibility for this to personnel with less experience of this subject area. E10. The United Kingdom Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy, published in late 2009 by FCO, DFID, DEFRA and JNCC, suffers from the problem that it is not actually a strategy, but acts effectively as a memorandum of agreement between the three departments. This was recognised at a seminar on 23 September 2010, organised by UKOTCF and attended by representatives from UK Government Departments and agencies (Department of Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS), Department of Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC)), a UKOT government representative, five UKOTCF Member/Associate organisations and other partners, and UKOTCF officers and Council members (report in Forum News 37, December 2010). UKOTCF felt

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that the almost total lack of stakeholder engagement in the process of developing the Strategy had resulted in a feeling of “us and them” in the NGO community, despite the ministerial Foreword specifically noting the important role of NGOs and other stakeholders. Also, the document was not a strategy by usual standards, but more a statement of aspirations; rather than assisting in decision making, it seemed designed to constrain action. The document failed to address a number of important international obligations (e.g. various aspects of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the “wise use” provisions under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands). Environment Charters were referred to in the document, but with no specific indication of how their implementation would be advanced. There were few outputs and no outcomes in the document, and there was an absence of clear targets (e.g. achievement of “Favourable Conservation Status”, as in the UK). In many respects, the wording of the Strategy was weaker than that of earlier policy documents, including the relevant 1999 and 2006 White Papers; the second of these, for example, committed FCO to “Improve the governance, environment and security of the Overseas Territories and encourage more diversified and sustainable economic development” and “Manage the impact of new international obligations affecting the Overseas Territories” and “Promote biodiversity conservation in the Overseas Territories with support for local livelihoods and sustainable development”. Whilst noting that UKOT biodiversity issues were an important consideration across all relevant UK Government departments, the Strategy provided no indication (for example) of how the Department of Communities & Local Government might be engaged in relation to planning issues in the Territories; this continues to be a major concern in relation to environmental management. It seemed likely that even more of the work necessary to meet the aspirations of the Strategy would fall to the kinds of bodies that had been excluded from its development. If the Strategy were to be converted into a meaningful (say) Action Plan, it would be essential for all stakeholders to be engaged in this process. E11. The seminar discussions revealed that officials of UK Government departments perceived the function and value of the Strategy very differently from the NGO community. The document was seen primarily as a formal commitment by DEFRA, DFID and FCO to work together in addressing UKOT environmental issues; this represented a significant step forward, given that the previous lack of a “joined-up” approach had been heavily criticised. Officials felt that, had a more detailed document been produced, it would have been very difficult to secure cross-departmental ministerial approval, and the opportunity to secure a commitment to a more integrated approach across these three departments might have been lost. Instead, there was now a useful high-level, published document, which could be used to remind Ministers of the commitment to a cross-departmental approach, of the importance of the UKOTs, and in arguing (for example) for the continuation of OTEP. Officials indicated that the lack of NGO engagement reflected the fact that this was intended to be an inward-looking document, outlining how the UK Government was working and intended in future to work on UKOT environmental issues. E12. Officials stated that UKOTCF would be invited to the next meeting of the interdepartmental officials group, in November, where discussions would involve aspects of the forward process, although this invitation was not, in the event, forthcoming. E13. It was agreed that it was unfortunate that very different perceptions of the Strategy had clearly arisen. UKOTCF acknowledged the value of the document in providing leverage within UK Government for a joined-up approach, and for keeping UKOTs biodiversity on the political agenda, as was now being stressed by officials. However, the document itself implied (including in the ministerial Foreword) that it represented much more than this. It appeared to advance a framework for biodiversity conservation in the UKOTs, although it was clearly inadequate for this purpose, and seemed to say to other stakeholders including NGOs “this is UK Government’s solution, now you can join in”. Reflecting on the very different perceptions of the Strategy from inside and outside UK Government, a UKOT participant questioned whether these would have arisen if the twice-yearly, joint meetings between UK Government and UKOTCF (once found very valuable on both sides for “joining-up” the approaches of UK Government and the NGO community) had not been discontinued unilaterally by HMG.

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E14. At that meeting, and later in discussion with Government officials, UKOTCF offered help in developing some elements necessary to produce a more complete strategy. To further redevelop a complementary approach between HMG and NGOs, and to add strategy elements into the HMG MoU confusingly entitled “Strategy”, UKOTCF organised, on 28th June 2011, a further workshop on starting to develop UK objectives for biodiversity conservation in the UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies (report at www.ukotcf.org/pdf/fNews/BiodivWorkshop1106.pdf). UKOTCF stressed that this was not intended to replace the UK Government document which agreed the share of roles between UK government departments, but to be complementary to it. In addition, it was not intended that any draft objectives developed be prescriptive for UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. Rather, they were intended to draw on previous views from UKOTs/CDs and elsewhere, to try to identified shared features. These could then be used to guide supporting work by UK Government and other outside bodies. Without clear objectives, it would difficult for these to resource, plan and execute their efforts to support the territories. The draft objectives might be useful also for UKOTs and CDs in any revisions of their own strategies. The discussions were stimulated by example presentations from two territories. E15. The workshop made useful progress on the potential natures of strategies, particularly relating to the Environment Charters and the Aichi Targets, to which HMG had recently signed up to. However, it became clear at the workshop and afterwards that HMG officials were extremely reluctant to engage in strategic discussions even when UKOT personnel asked them to. This is difficult to reconcile with FCO’s recent comments that it wished its re-organised grant funding to take a more strategic approach. Whilst the earlier funding under EFOT and the initial years of OTEP had an underlying strategy of fulfilling the Environment Charters, the strategic objectives of the new scheme and other HMG work in this area has not been defined, or even consulted on. E16. DEFRA expressed the view at the workshop that the Aichi Targets, which UKOTCF had incorporated in their draft for discussion, are a very heavy sledgehammer with which to address UKOT conservation. However, the UK Post-2010 Biodiversity Framework (http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-6189), published in July 2012 by JNCC and DEFRA on behalf of the Four Countries’ Biodiversity Group), includes, at section 2.6 Overseas Territories: “Most UK Overseas Territories (OTs) and Crown Dependencies have Environment Charters that address biodiversity issues. The UK government’s strategy (United Kingdom Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy) aims to enable the UK and Overseas Territories governments to meet their international obligations for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in the UK OTs. The delivery of the Aichi targets in UK OTs will be supported by the UK government via the implementation of this strategy. The nature of the work to implement the strategy will be to:

i. provide advice; ii. support capacity building, evidence gathering and research; and, iii. assist Overseas Territories to access appropriate funding mechanisms.

This work will contribute to addressing most, if not all, of the Aichi targets within the Overseas Territories.” E17. However, whilst HMG’s view of the relevance of the Aichi Targets to UKOTs and CDs seems to have become more logical, this document does not take matters further, because the “Strategy” to which reference is made is the same 2009 inter-departmental agreement which lacks objectives and most other elements that would normally constitute a strategy. Despite offers of cooperation from the Forum and continued suggestions that JNCC would be producing an action plan to implement the so-called strategy, there was nothing public being produced. Further enquiries suggested that only actions relevant to DEFRA and JNCC were being generated. Ongoing discussions with DEFRA just produced an answer that it was inappropriate for the UK government to impose objectives on the UKOTs. The Forum had never suggested that to be the outcome, but what the Forum did expect were clear objectives and an action plan for HMG to use in implementing the MoU/strategy. At the last meeting the Forum had with DEFRA in September 2012, we were once again told of the inappropriateness of producing objectives but were advised that, contrary to HMG officials’ instincts and after significant

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pressure from NGOs and others, they were now minded to produce a plan. The Forum has received no further information on the possible content of this and has not been consulted. However, in respect of direct imposition of policy on UKOTs, it is patently not true that this does not happen. This is witnessed by an example from Gibraltar, where the form completed for the European Commission providing details of the Special Area of Conservation under the Habitats Directive was altered (before submission to the European Commission) by HMG’s agency, JNCC, without the Government of Gibraltar’s knowledge or approval. E18. In late 2012, HMG scheduled a 1-day meeting in March 2013 to review progress and future priorities for an implementation plan for a UKOT biodiversity strategy. Whilst UKOTCF will attempt to help this, a 3.5 year delay since the strategy and delays of 2.5 and 1.5 years since UKOTCF ran workshops to stimulate joint efforts seem to indicate some lack of priority in HMG’s view. Furthermore, the approach to the setting up of the meeting still seems to indicate a reluctance to re-engage enthusiastically with NGOs. E19. UKOTCF recommends that HMG re-engage with the UKOTCF network and other partners to develop a real strategy, preferably shared, for conservation work in the UKOTs. The decline in interest by FCO, and the role of other government departments and agencies E20. The decline in interest by FCO in UKOT conservation was perhaps first apparent in its absent-minded cancellation of the Environment Fund for Overseas Territories in 2002, only a year after HMG committed to this Fund in the 2001 Environment Charters. However, some senior staff in FCO at the time were open to reasoned argument (especially at the UKOTCF-organised conference in 2003), so that the fund was reinstated in 2003 (initially on a temporary basis, and then as OTEP). However, a more permanent decline started in 2005/6 – although it was several years before the scale and nature of this became fully apparent. E21. In 2005/6, HMG reversed its policy on Ascension in a way which had major environmental impacts (as well as on the population). In the late 1990s, the companies which used Ascension, and which were effectively allowed by HMG to run the island, had indicated that they no longer wished to do so. HMG had commissioned a study by the University of Portsmouth to look into the future constitution, resulting in March 2000 in a report. The consultants identified two options for the future of Ascension: model one “modified status quo” would result in the decline of the island. The other “public finance” option would involve a move to a more normal system of government and economy, with an elected council, the introduction of property rights, right of abode, opportunities for self-employment and investment in new business, and the opening of the airport to civilian traffic. HMG accepted the report and, in 2001, announced that it would implement the recommended “public finance” option. A first Council was elected and served its term, and a second Council elected. Until November 2005, people long resident on Ascension believed, as they had been led to believe by HMG, that they would have a right to residency, and, on this basis, a number of them had invested in local businesses. At the end of November 2005, a small group of British officials visited Ascension and the newly elected second Council, and announced that HMG had reversed its previous position, and that human rights were to be cancelled and the changes agreed and announced as definite five years earlier were not to be legislated despite their being effectively implemented already. Local representatives said that, if local residents could not invest in a place and did not have the right to stay in their home island, they were unlikely to have a commitment to the environment. The Deputy Head of FCO’s Sustainable Development Group (who was also the joint Chairman, with UKOTCF’s Chairman, of the 6-monthly joint HMG/UKOTCF network meetings) confirmed that his Group had not been consulted by the FCO colleagues reversing the policy. RSPB strongly supported UKOTCF’s concern, both bodies having heavily invested, alongside FCO, in the successful restoration of the wildlife of Ascension. FCO officials exacerbated the situation by first denying (despite the evident situation) that there had been a reversal of policy, and second by referring to citizens on Ascension as

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contract workers (reflecting the language used by HMG in the 1960s when evicting the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands). FCO had assumed that there would be no environmental implications. This attitude caused great concern amongst the NGO and UKOT representatives who profoundly disagreed with this, on the basis of direct experience. The FCO Deputy Head of Sustainable Development indicated that he fully understood the link to the environment, as he had been involved in FCO’s work in some developing countries to facilitate the concept of environmental democracy – and was clearly concerned by his colleague’s actions. UKOTCF was concerned that, despite a long and productive partnership with FCO in respect of Ascension, FCO had not consulted, or even advised, them of this plan for a fundamental change until UKOTCF had heard indirectly some weeks later, and that environmental aspects were clearly overlooked in the development of FCO’s proposed policy reversal. UKOTCF regretted the breakdown in the normally constructive communications. E22. Shortly after the Ascension controversy, FCO closed down its environmental section (then the Sustainable Development Group, previously Environment Policy Department and, before that, Environment, Science & Energy Department). This series of bodies had been responsible for working with UKOTCF to set up the twice-yearly liaison meetings and other co-operation, the Environment chapter in the 1999 White Paper, the Environment Charters, and the grant programmes EFOT and later OTEP. In 2005, the FCO dropped virtually all its environmental posts, claiming that other government departments would pick up this role for the UKOTs, but in practice little of this happened and certainly not effectively. One might imagine that, with reduced UK Governmental capacity, the government would seek to fill the gap by encouraging work by NGOs and their chosen umbrella body, UKOTCF, which had worked in partnership with government for two decades. However, the reverse was true from the middle of the first decade of the millennium. E23. With the loss of FCO’s environmental team, the HMG lead in contacts with the UKOTCF network transferred to FCO’s Overseas Territories Department (later Directorate). Whilst UKOTCF had worked well with OTD previously, alongside the environmental department links, there were changes in OTD at the same time. The normal first point of contact from mid-2006 was OTD’s Deputy Head. She appeared to take a dislike to UKOTCF, and amazed her colleagues from other HMG Departments by attending a 5-day UKOTCF-organised UKOT/Crown Dependency conservation conference in Jersey for just half a day, and speaking openly from the lectern about UKOTCF as if it were an evil foreign power. This attitude may have affected the new FCO Head of Overseas Territories, Leigh Turner; at what was supposed to be a “get-to-know” meeting in late 2006, he started by launching an attack on UKOTCF’s Chairman and Vice-Chairman over the Ascension issue of about a year earlier, before his appointment. The negative attitude seemed also to transfer to his successor as FCO Director of Overseas Territories, Colin Roberts. Whilst UKOTCF had what seemed to be a positive meeting with him in mid-2008, shortly after he took office, when he invited UKOTCF’s Chairman to drop in any time, he then refused to meet UKOTCF for nearly 4 years, until mid-2012, just before he left office. References to the ‘Big Society’ gave hope that the new Coalition Government would reverse this negative trend. In practice, however, the decline in UK Government’s interest in working with UKOTCF and its member bodies continued and possibly even accelerated. E24. UKOTCF discovered in 2012, from a document released under an unrelated application under the Freedom of Information Act, that Colin Roberts had been trying to undermine UKOTCF, while at the same time his staff were telling UKOTCF that FCO had no problem with UKOTCF – and despite the fact that UKOTCF is the body that a range of UKOT and other NGOs selected to interact for them with the UK Government and others. UKOTCF had previously experienced a very professional attitude from FCO officials and was unused to them taking (or expressing) personal dislike. It is not clear whether this personalisation of positions by senior FCO officials influenced their attitude to inter-organisational matters, but UKOTCF is concerned that this may be the case. E25. This secrecy meant that the UKOTCF network was unable to do anything about it nor address any issues UK Government officials may have had. From about 2006, when JNCC was given authority and resources to take an interest in UKOTs and Crown Dependencies, this body set up parallel systems to those long operated by UKOTCF for both NGO and official bodies, but excluded

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UKOTCF and UKOT NGOs from involvement – or even knowledge of the existence of these groups. UKOTCF considers this wasteful of public resources and disruptive to a co-operative approach. E26. The period also showed a decline in HMG funding for UKOT conservation through the effective UKOTCF network. Payments from FCO (and, to a lesser extent, DEFRA) made up most of the total from 1999/2000 to 2004/5. With the start of the joint FCO/OTEP scheme (replacing FCO’s EFOT), grants from DFID started in 2004/5. Progressively over the next 3 years, DFID became responsible for virtually all the funding from HMG to UKOTCF, as the FCO funding dwindled to nothing. Generally, the pattern of funding (until a post-2008 reduction to a low, and now zero, level) reflected the work on conservation and environmental projects for and with the UKOTs. Peaks in 1999/2000, 2002/3, 2006 and 2008/9 reflected the 3-yearly UKOTCF-organised conference-workshops for conservation practitioners in the UKOTs – highly valued by the latter as means of cost-effectively sharing expertise and skills. The last grant award from HMG to UKOTCF was in 2008/9, with the last payment in 2011/2. HMG has not awarded any grant to support UKOTCF’s conservation work in the UKOTs for over four years. E27. It may be relevant also that, from 2006, UKOTCF started giving evidence to House of Commons Select Committees, particularly Environmental Audit and Foreign Affairs, and that this evidence included constructive criticism, notably of FCO and DEFRA. UKOTCF is aware that the fact that it challenges the FCO and testifies to Parliamentary Committees honestly about funding and other problems has made it unpopular with officials. It might be said that the Forum is 'biting the hand that feeds it.' However, UKOTCF does not think that funding its work in support of conservation partners in the UKOTs should be dependent on refraining from offering constructive criticism and advocating on behalf of its network of UKOT organisations. The Forum has always said what it feels needs to be said. In other times this was taken positively by the FCO and acted upon. More recently, officials seem to take any criticism of policy as personal rather than a difference in professional opinion. When the FCO inadvertently eliminated EFOT a year after the Charters were signed (see para E20 and Moving Backwards in UK Overseas Territories Conservation: Comments by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum on the UK Government’s June 2012 White Paper The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability (Cm 8374), appended ant web-link at para A3), UKOTCF spoke out strongly, and the response of the officials of the day was to work with the Forum to establish OTEP. Indeed, previous officials had made it clear that they did not wish any funding by HMG to restrict the UKOTCF network from making constructive comments. This was not just because the then officials recognised that the UKOTCF network resources UKOT conservation by an even greater amount of voluntary effort, but because they recognised the benefit in solving challenges by sharing the issues. E28. FCO’s removal of its environmental personnel in 2006 was, according to FCO, to be followed by other government departments taking on greater roles while FCO retained the policy lead for UKOTs. There was, around that time, limited increased involvement by DFID, but its current focus on targeting 0.7% of GDP for ODA countries appears to be causing a move away from UKOTs (most of which do not qualify under ODA – see para C3). DEFRA eventually, in 2009, accepted an increased responsibility for UKOTs, but this was followed almost immediately by financial constraints neutralising most of the changes (see para C3). DEFRA’s agency, JNCC, had been allowed to increase its involvement in UKOTs and CDs from about 2007. However, with this came two problems. First, JNCC tended to duplicate existing networks and efforts and not communicate with them, rather than continuing its earlier collaborative approach before the 2007 expansion of its activities in UKOTs and CDs (see para E25). Second, DEFRA seemed to adopt a novel position that JNCC had to be its monopoly supplier both of advice and as a route for managing funding. This novel approach tended to reduce support for NGOs, because JNCC decided to limit its newly created duplicate networks to governmental bodies. In a wider sense, the success of engaging, albeit not totally effectively, other government departments and agencies in UKOTs seems to have caused the little time available for liaison to be spent within government. As a consequence, the formerly strong and effective liaison between FCO and the UKOTCF network has dwindled away, despite UKOTCF’s best efforts to retain and then restore this.

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E29. Whilst UKOTCF has great respect for some of JNCC’s specialist officers, it has real concern at some of its approaches to UKOTs and Crown Dependencies. These include: the duplication of previously existing networks but exclusion of NGOs (see paras E25, E28); the reluctance to collaborate or communicate with the UKOTCF network (see paras E9-E19); some questions over its management of projects supported by UK public funds (see Proceedings of a workshop on 2nd October 2012 – full reference at para 3); and failings in organisation of UKOT-related projects. JNCC’s handling of its UK OTs and CDs 2011 Biodiversity Snapshot Review (apparently made available in late 2012) provides an example of this. In 1999, JNCC published a review of biodiversity in the UKOTs. It had some problems of accuracy and completeness at the time (probably because of resource limitations). UKOTCF had been disappointed that JNCC had opted not to take up UKOTCF’s offer of September 2007, to work jointly with JNCC on the revision of this document. Co-operation from that early stage might have reduced some of the pressure on resources noted by JNCC later in respect of this project. In 2010, JNCC decided that the document needed updating. In June 2010, UKOTCF’s Honorary Executive Director (amongst others) was asked to (and agreed to) review the new version in the period mid-September to mid-October 2010. However, nothing more was heard from JNCC until the end of January 2011 (over four months after the documents were due) when the reviewers were told that the document would be ready by mid-February 2011. Despite all other stages taking longer, the time for reviewers had been reduced to three weeks. Again, silence followed, until early March 2011, when an email appeared saying that some drafts were now ready and others were to be supplied later. Despite this, reviewers were required to respond by the end of March – only three weeks later – when some drafts were only just appearing. This made it rather difficult to review the document as a whole. The work of the authors from individual territories was generally good, but it was clear that little guidance had been given to them from JNCC on approach – or even the type of items that should be covered. Omissions included published cross-territory analyses previously commissioned by HMG, and previously funded projects. Coverages of, for example, designated sites and Environment Charters are highly inconsistent. Some UKOTs are omitted, as also are mentions of other major sources of information. In summary, the Forum has to conclude that there are significant issues around both JNCC’s capacity and capabilities when dealing with UKOTs and in its understanding of and liaison with NGOs. F. Whether UK Government strategy on the UKOTs is consistent with the conclusions and commitments on protecting biodiversity reached at the recent United Nations Rio+20 conference F1. It is very difficult to be specific here as outcome documents of both Rio+20 and the White Paper are largely aspirational, with little concrete in the way of proposals and actions. The White Paper is mostly in line with the Rio+20 document, but the proof of the effectiveness of both will be in the outcomes. Most aspects are addressed in other sections of this memorandum. One major omission from the White Paper, as noted previously (para B1) is reference to the green growth agenda, which features highly in the Rio document but not at all in the White Paper. Interestingly it does feature in the latest JNCC business plan. F2. It is worth, however, drawing attention in particular to paragraphs 43, 44 and 53 of Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20–22 June 2012. These stress the need for broad public participation, specifically NGOs and civil society generally. Rather oddly, as we outline at paras G12-G16, the tendency of HMG in recent years has been the reverse of this – which is contrary to the text in the White Paper. From strong joint working for many years up to about seven years ago, HMG has unilaterally reduced its involvement with the network bringing together NGOs and others concerned with environmental conservation in the UKOTs, and reduced to zero its contribution to its costs, severely endangering its work.

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F3. This is despite the priority action, identified in DEFRA’s 2012 paper The Environment in the United Kingdom’s Overseas Territories: UK Government and Civil Society Support: “Continued and improved coordination, cooperation and knowledge sharing on environmental management between the UK and its Territories, and between the Territories themselves.” This was a role that UKOTCF had fulfilled for some time, but has had to reduce because of HMG’s removal of all support. F4. UKOTCF recommends that UK Government Ministers instruct their officials and agencies to respond positively to the repeated invitations from UKOTCF, its member organisations and other NGOs to restore the productive communication and collaborative working that characterised conservation work for the UKOTs, until unilaterally reduced by officials over the past half-decade. G. How weaknesses in civil society and governance in the UKOTs impact on conservation Weaknesses in governance in the UKOTs G1. The basic premise of devolving environmental conservation to the UKOT governments must be that they carry out their responsibilities in a manner which reflects best practice. That, of course, is what the Environment Charters lay out: the steps and policies which ensure a high standard of environmental conservation such as mandatory Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) before high-impact decisions are made. However, there are several aspects of political life in most UKOTs which run directly counter to the necessary high standards. G2. First is the political nature of land use and development decisions. Major development decisions are considered to be the province of Ministers, who tend to feel that they know what is best and that environmental considerations are very much secondary to what they see as economic gains. Once a Minister takes over the decision regarding a major development through a Special Development Order (SDO) or similar process, the officials and departments charged with protecting the environment are effectively gagged and, rather than being allowed to advocate for the environment, their job becomes implementing the Minister's decision. They are simply outgunned by developers who have direct access to the Minister making the decision. It should be noted that this concept of absolute Ministerial discretion is what enabled the kind of corruption we saw recently in the Turks and Caicos Islands to flourish. G3. A related point is the culture of secrecy in UKOT governments. All Cabinet decisions are made in secret and no reasons are normally given for them. And this culture of secrecy extends into many areas of government, most especially the local boards responsible for considering development applications. As an example, the Bermuda Government asserts that one reason for not requiring an EIA in Ministerial decisions regarding SDOs is that it would “'not be appropriate to mandate that Cabinet declare its deliberations over technical officer recommendations” – clearly asserting that secrecy trumps consultation. This means that decisions with huge environmental consequences are often made in secret with no public consultation. G4. This seems a bit ironic in the face of 'The Seven Principles of Public Life' laid out in the 2012 White Paper, which includes the principle “Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their actions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands.” This could not be further from the reality of several UKOT governments. G5. Another factor is that small populations of the UKOTs mean small constituencies, and often very narrow margins of victory in local elections. This makes it difficult for politicians to carry out long

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range policies which may be unpopular in the short term, like fisheries management decisions. What politician with a ten-vote majority is going to impose controls over something like spear fishing, when a significant number of his constituents will be angered by them? G6. It seems extremely concerning that HMG, when directly governing a UKOT, seems to adopt some of the same practices of secrecy, lack of consultation and lack of taking account of environmental considerations. We note this (at para B8. Above) in relation to the recent period of direct rule by HMG in the Turks & Caicos Islands and effectively in Montserrat (para B9). Such problems have been noted by several parties in respect of the UKOTs in permanent direct rule from HMG, such as British Indian Ocean Territory, as well as when HMG resumed direct rule in over Ascension, for no explicit reason (see para E21). G7. UKOTCF recommends that HMG officials involved in decision making on UKOTs receive some basic training in environmental conservation and sustainable development, or at least have some technical advice on such matters available and pay regard to this. The importance of Territory-based NGOs G8. Locally-based NGOs serve vital functions in conservation. They address weaknesses in civil society and local governments, they educate local people and they represent their concerns. They are aware of local issues and work at the grass-roots level to address them. They carry out valuable environmental programmes, at very low cost to all concerned. And when it happens that a local government makes a decision which would have severe environmental consequences, such as approving environmentally unsound tourism development, they are in practice the only force that can speak up for the importance of environmental conservation G9. This last point is really critical. The current UK Government strategy for conservation in the inhabited UKOTs relies almost entirely on the governments of the UKOTs. This assumes that the UKOT Governments are using best practice in their planning and decision-making procedures. The Environment Charters recognise the importance of this by committing the UKOT Governments to (1) making their decisions in an open and consultative manner, (2) requiring Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) before making decisions on high-impact development, and (3) requiring that a public consultation be a part of the EIA. But if a local government decides not to follow this best practice, and makes a high-impact decision without environmental assessment or public consultation, the UK Government no longer becomes involved; the only bodies who try to ensure that environmental concerns are taken into account are local NGOs. G10. A recent high-profile case in Bermuda illustrates this point clearly. In the case of Tucker’s Point, the Bermuda Government decided that it was going to grant a Special Development Order (SDO) which would allow tourism development on some of the most sensitive and environmentally valuable areas of Bermuda (including rare woodlands and caves which are habitat to numerous endemic species). Local NGOs heard rumours that this was in the pipeline and requested information from officials about it. Far from carrying out public consultation, these requests for information were either ignored or the potential SDO was outright denied until the granting of the SDO was announced as a fait accompli. Huge mobilisation of the Bermuda public, organised by local NGOs, resulted eventually in some of the most egregious elements of the SDO being modified. But, even then, there was no public consultation on the changes that were to be made. Without the NGO community, there is no one who can even try to stop a Territory government from sacrificing biodiversity to short-term economic advantage. G11. Similar examples of the key role of NGOs could be cited from other UKOTs and CDs, including: damaging built development at Beef Island, British Virgin Islands, and Anguilla; unnecessary road development in the Cayman Islands; and current activities (actually promoted by HMG) at Montserrat and Turks & Caicos (paras B8-B9).

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G12. Local NGOs and the officers of UKOTCF, a body made up of member organisations in the UKOTs and in Britain (as well as the Crown Dependencies), have long been supported by HMG and in return have contributed a great deal to the effectiveness of HMG's efforts in the UKOTs. UK officials and UKOTCF member organisations, together with UK representatives of UKOT governments, met regularly so that the UK officials could be made aware of issues of concern in the UKOTs, and the Forum (and thereby its member organisations) could be kept up to date on policies, programmes and proposals from the UK Government. Often, these meetings resulted in significant progress. One of UKOTCF’s key roles is to keep its member organisations in contact with each other and the UK Government. It does this in three ways: 1) regional working groups (Wider Caribbean Working Group, Southern Oceans Working Group, Europe Territories Working Group) meet quarterly to discuss the issues of concern to members and to share information and resources; 2) every three years since 2000 the Forum, with support from the UK Government, has held conferences at which local NGOs and governmental conservation bodies could share resources and information; and 3) through its regular newsletters and e-updates, the concerns as well as the successes of conservation in the UKOTs are disseminated. All these are supplemented by individual contacts. G13. However, over the last few years, this mutually productive partnership between the UK Government and UKOTCF member bodies has been gradually eroded by officials, without consultation, to the point of now having been phased out. We are concerned that this is part of a general movement away from support of local NGOs and towards a conservation policy which is driven by UK officials rather than being demand-led from the UKOTs. The meetings between UK officials and UKOTCF have been dropped and officials indicated very belatedly that support for the next three-yearly conference, due in 2012, would not be forthcoming. G14. There seems also to be a tendency amongst recent HMG officials that contacts and funding should be directed mainly through UKOT governments, a move away from a more mixed approach in the past. UKOTCF would like to see a return to a more balanced approach, for the reasons already outlined. G15. The way in which FCO dealt with the White Paper provides the most recent example of its break-off of communications with UKOTCF, the body which many UKOT and other NGOs choose to link with HMG. Although UKOTCF spent much effort in collating information from its network to respond to FCO’s pre-White Paper consultation, virtually none of its some 30 recommendations were taken up in the White Paper (see Moving Backwards in UK Overseas Territories Conservation: Comments by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum on the UK Government’s June 2012 White Paper The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability (Cm 8374), appended). When UKOTCF invited FCO (and other government departments and agencies) to a workshop on the White Paper, the FCO then Director of Overseas Territories (after first giving the impression that HMG would participate) replied shortly before the workshop that HMG would not participate (see Environmental Conservation and UK Government’s June 2012 White Paper The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability (Cm 8374) - Proceedings of a workshop on 2nd October 2012 at Gibraltar House, the Strand, London, organised by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum, appended). In a further letter of 10th October, the then FCO Director of Overseas Territories and the DEFRA Deputy Director of International Biodiversity and Evidence declined a meeting of UKOTCF with FCO and DEFRA Ministers, “as we have recently met with you to discuss your views on the White Paper.” This was not true. The officials appeared to be referring to two meetings in recent months on other topics. After 4 years of refusing to meet UKOTCF on anything, the then FCO Director of Overseas Territories met UKOTCF’s Chairman in June 2012 (see para E23). This was not to discuss the White Paper (except for the then FCO Director to say that UKOTCF would not like the contents) because the White Paper had not yet been published and was not available to discuss. The second meeting, in September 2012, was an invitation by DEFRA to UKOTCF officers to discuss other issues. At a late stage, DEFRA advised UKOTCF that they had invited FCO to attend also, but indicated that the agenda (which did not include the White Paper) had not changed, although HMG raised this matter in the meeting without warning UKOTCF.

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G16. UKOTCF recommends that Ministers instruct their officials to stop blocking contacts with the body that many UKOT organisations choose to link to HMG, UKOTCF, and seek to restore the positive relationship of the 1990s and early 2000s. H. How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine environment in the uninhabited territories H1. It is not clear why the question refers only to uninhabited territories, and it is not practicable to limit our comments to these. UKOTCF has long pointed out the relative neglect of several of UK’s large marine Exclusive Economic Zones and called for proper management of these, including marine protected areas as part of the suite of appropriate mechanisms. These areas are of huge importance for wildlife and ecosystem services, in some cases including sustainable fisheries. It is well recognised that effective management of both fisheries and “protected” areas depends on effective enforcement. However, this has lacked an overall HMG strategy. In fact, the presence of fisheries or other protection vessels have depended on historical accidents, rather than a strategy. The Falkland Islands and South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands acquired such vessels at least partly as a result of rebuilding following the Falklands War of 30 years ago. They are now regarded as amongst the better managed fisheries of the world. British Indian Ocean Territory managed to acquire a protection vessel from the proceeds of sale of a seized illegally fishing vessel. Other UKOTs which did not suffer such mishaps with side-benefits have not received investment for this purpose from HMG. Thus the biological riches and economic assets of Pitcairn, Ascension, and St Helena are being lost through lack of protection, and protection of Tristan da Cunha’s waters are limited to those close to the island, as the lack of a harbour limits the size of protection boat. In the case of Gibraltar, the local government’s wish to protect its no-take waters is actually being impeded by HMG’s effective encouragement of illegal fishing by boats from the neighbouring country (see paras C39-C44). H2. UKOTCF is pleased that various conservation partners are promoting the concept of marine protected areas, with some success. We leave detailed comment to these, whom we understand are submitting evidence. However, UKOTCF should note that it considers that marine protected areas should be managed on the basis of available scientific evidence, while not delaying unduly for that to be amplified. As is evident from the above, it is essential that proper management and enforcement be resourced. The generous support for this from large institutions in some current cases is noted and welcomed. The continued overall responsibility of HMG must, however, be remembered, as well as the interests and wishes of the local communities where these exist. It will be important to put in place mechanisms to ensure that the wishes of local communities continue to be respected over time, as it cannot be assumed that the overall aims of large institutions will necessarily remain aligned. H3. UKOTCF does not share the view that the whole of marine protected areas should necessarily be no-take zones, although it would be surprising if all such areas did not include large no-take zones. UKOTCF welcomes the designation of a large marine protected area by the Government of South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands (part of HMG). UKOTCF also supports the MPA at BIOT, but regrets some of the ways in which this was implemented, particularly the unwise and improper comments by the then FCO Director of Overseas Territories which indicated that the designation was a means of preventing re-settlement by Chagossians. H4. The Pitcairn Islands give a clear opportunity for a large no-take protected area. This area has no current legal large-scale fishery, although there are signs of the initial impact of illegal fisheries in part of the group. The island community has expressed its welcome for such a protected area. So the challenge reduces essentially to resourcing proper protection. This latter need relates also to Tristan da Cuhna, St Helena and Ascension, as noted above.

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H5. The Caribbean UKOTs, in common with other islands in the region, suffer many fishery problems, and require much fuller treatment than we can give here. There are several marine protected areas in some, but most lack effective no-take zones. This is unfortunate in that the benefits of no-take zones to both conservation and to fisheries in adjoining areas has been well demonstrated, for example in the neighbouring Bahamas (see article on The Bahamas National Park System, pp 46-49 in: A Sense of Direction: a conference on conservation in UK Overseas Territories and other small island communities, Bermuda 22nd-27th March 2003, www.ukotcf.org/confs/bermuda2003.). Other management in supposedly protected areas leaves much to be desired, with HMG officers apparently considering further damaging dredging in one such area in the Turks & Caicos Islands (see para B8). 30 November 2012

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Written evidence submitted by Falklands Conservation   Summary 

 The Falkland Islands Government has published its own Falkland Islands Biodiversity Strategy 2008‐18 and this is the key document that in practice guides environmental conservation work in the Islands. 

 Recently, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, through the Joint Nature Conservation Committee, facilitated work on environmental mainstreaming in the Falkland Islands, with a report produced in May 2012. The UK Government should support the Falkland Islands Government and other stakeholders in the implementation of the recommendations made in this report. 

 The UK Government should support all stakeholders in the Falkland Islands to develop a comprehensive network of Marine Protected Areas in Falklands‐controlled waters (a recommendation of the above report). 

   Another conclusion from this report is that “current levels of funding for the environment are inadequate and are not proportionate to the benefits that are provided by it.” 

 Hence Falklands Conservation, in order to carry out the work identified in the Falkland Islands Biodiversity Strategy 2008‐18: – Supports the new Darwin Plus fund designed for the Overseas Territories, but believes its overall budget     needs to be increased – Wishes to see grant‐aid from Defra to continue for specific projects in addition to the above – Wishes to see continuity of the EU BEST fund for the EU Overseas Territories – Wishes to see EU LIFE+ funding extended to EU Overseas Territories – Believes grant‐aid should be made available to support environmental education in the Overseas Territories 

 

1. Introduction to Falklands Conservation 

1.1. Falklands Conservation is an independent membership‐based charitable organisation working to safeguard and increase awareness of the spectacular wildlife occupying more than 700 islands of the Falkland Islands archipelago. We are the largest conservation NGO in the islands, where all our conservation work is undertaken, currently employing ten staff in the Falkland Islands and one in the UK. 

1.2. As a partner of BirdLife International, we take practical action, lead scientific research, provide wildlife rescue and rehabilitation services, and undertake outreach and education activities. However bird conservation is only part of our remit, our conservation activities in practice being wide‐ranging. 

1.3. Our vision is two‐fold:  a) The Falkland Islands are a mosaic of natural, restored and managed landscapes capable of sustaining the richness of biodiversity and habitats, including species of local, regional and global importance. b)  Falklands Conservation is a charity at the heart of the community. 

1.4. Our mission is:  In partnership with government, industry and the global community, Falklands Conservation will engage and empower the people of the Falkland Islands to take action with us to conserve biodiversity and manage landscapes and seascapes for the benefit of nature and people. 

1.5. Our principal activities are to:  Undertake scientific research in the wildlife and environment of the Falkland Islands and to publish the results of such research. 

Conserve the wildlife and environment of the Falkland Islands and its surrounding seas.  Educate the public in the principles and practice of nature conservation. 

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 1.6. Falklands Conservation works at all levels of the Falkland Islands Government (FIG), including with the UK Representative. We have a seat on the Environmental Planning Department’s Environment Committee, the newly established Hydrocarbon Environment Forum and the Seabird Bycatch Committee. Although Falklands Conservation is an independent charity, we do receive an annual subvention from FIG that contributes to our organisational costs in the Falkland Islands and to a number of ongoing projects. This is based on a Memorandum of Understanding with FIG in which are obligations are identified as: 

Provide independent environmental advice.  Scrutinise FIG’s environmental policies and proposals for legislation.  Provide materials and resources to support environmental education within the Islands’ schools.  Coordinate a wildlife group/s for the young people of the Islands.  Engage the local community in conservation projects, issues and activities.  Respond to small‐scale wildlife emergencies.  Support implementation of the Biodiversity Strategy and agreed outcomes from the 2011 Biodiversity Workshop. 

Curate and manage the Falkland Islands’ national herbarium and insect collections.  1.7. Falklands Conservation has engaged in many projects over the years funded by UK or FIG grant‐aid; such current projects are: 

Annual seabird monitoring [FIG Environmental Studies Budget].  Albatross demographics [FIG Environmental Studies Budget] (to support ACAP).  Southern rockhopper penguin research [OTEP].  Native plants programme [two back‐to‐back projects funded by OTEP].  Impacts of Raptors on Livestock in the Falkland Islands [Darwin Challenge & now a main Darwin project].  Survey of inshore dolphins [Darwin Challenge]  Identifying native seed mixes for habitat restoration [Darwin Challenge]  Early intervention on alien invasive plants [Defra]  Survey of the new endemic plant species of Nassauvia [Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund]  Producing a vegetation map of the Falkland Islands [Darwin Challenge]  Feasibility of mouse eradication on Steeple Jason [Darwin/RSPB]  Prioritising invasive vertebrate species for eradication [Defra/RSPB]  Developing a framework for protected areas in the Falklands [OTEP] 

 1.8. Further information about Falklands Conservation can be found on our website www.falklandsconservation.com.   FACTUAL INFORMATION  2. Conservation action  2.1. The Falkland Islands Government has published its own Falkland Islands Biodiversity Strategy 2008‐18 and this is the key document that in practice guides environmental conservation work in the Islands. Falklands Conservation was a key player in its production and this strategy is now seen as a model for the other Overseas Territories.  

2.2. Although many actions identified in the strategy are underway, it has not been possible to implement them all. Examples of important biodiversity action that is not being undertaken through lack of resources are: 

Control and eradication of invasive species [current funds not commensurate with scale of the problem]  Completion of species action plans, habitat action plans, and nature reserve plans 

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Implementation of the action identified in the above plans  Monitoring of all the nationally and internationally important species  Identification of key biodiversity sites in the marine environment 

  2.3. Falklands Conservation fully supports the conclusions reached in the Environmental Mainstreaming in the Falkland Islands: Workshop Report 21 May 2012, published by The Institute for European Environmental Policy on behalf of the FCO & JNCC. A copy has been included with this submission for reference. 

2.4. The waters around the Falklands Islands are rich in marine biodiversity, including charismatic and globally threatened seabirds and marine mammals. There are potential threats arising from hydrocarbon exploration/ commercial development, fisheries and new development/ activities inshore. Existing practice and legislation are inadequate to manage current and potential threats, to protect threatened species, sites and habitats and to establish a basic representative network of marine managed/ protected areas. 

2.5. A key recommendation of the mainstreaming document mentioned in 2.3 above is to create ”a coherent Marine Protected Area network that provides adequate protection for distinct areas of high value habitats.” Currently Falklands Conservation is pioneering a community‐based approach to protected areas on land but there is no such process currently underway for the sea. Although protected areas are not the only mechanism for achieving conservation, the Falkland Islands, uniquely amongst the developed UK Overseas Territories and all countries in its region, has neither formal Marine Protected Areas nor any marine spatial planning for developing these.  This contrasts with Argentina, for example, which now possesses a network of coastal Marine Parks and Reserves, and where they are now considering designations in pelagic waters including areas abutting/ overlapping the Falkland Islands Exclusive Economic Zone. 

3. Environmental Education 

3.1. A key role of Falklands Conservation (see 1.5 above) is to undertake environmental education for the people of the Falklands, young and old, and we are the main organisation undertaking this in the islands. Although we get some support for this through funds from Birdlife/RSPB and other donors, we do not have enough resources to employ a full‐time education officer. It should be noted that such work is ineligible for funding under the new Darwin Plus. 

4. Funding 

4.1. The Falklands are an Overseas Territory with a high biodiversity value containing, for example, globally important concentrations of southern rockhopper penguins, gentoo penguins and black‐browed albatrosses. However a small human population of only c.2,500 people means it is difficult to raise enough money from within the islands to research, survey and manage this internationally important biodiversity. 

4.2. While grant‐aid is available from the Falkland Islands government, most of the necessary conservation work can only be achieved with additional grant‐aid from the UK and Europe – see, for example, the list in paragraph1.7 above. 

4.3. The recent combining of the Overseas Territories Environment Fund (OTEP) with the Darwin Fund to create Darwin Plus means that in practice two pots of money have been converted into one, reducing the opportunity for project funding. Although we welcome Darwin Plus, the wider remit of this grant scheme beyond biodiversity is likely to increase competition for the new fund. Evidence already suggests that the Darwin Plus fund is likely to be significantly oversubscribed. Hence Falklands Conservation is concerned about our future ability to undertake essential conservation work in the Falkland Islands owing to what, in practice, could be decreasing grant aid. 

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4.4. A new source of funding to the Overseas Territories has opened up through the EU BEST fund, which is to be welcomed. However, as this fund is not guaranteed into the future, Falklands Conservation would like to see the UK Government lobby for its continuation. 

4.5. Additionally, EU LIFE+ funding is not available to the Overseas Territories. Again, we would like to see the UK Government continue to lobby for the extension of LIFE to the Overseas Territories, which might help address the funding gap identified in paragraph 11 above. 

 

5. Recommendations 

5.1. The UK Government should continue to support the Falklands Islands Government and its partners in full implementation of the Falkland Islands Biodiversity Strategy 2008‐18, through grant‐aid from Defra and also via the grant schemes outlined below. 

5.2. The UK Government should support the Falkland Islands Government in implementation of the recommendations in the report Environmental Mainstreaming in the Falkland Islands: Workshop Report 21 May 2012 (Institute for European Environmental Policy, on behalf of the FCO/JNCC). 

5.3. The UK Government should support all stakeholders in the Falkland Islands to develop a comprehensive network of Marine Protected Areas in Falklands‐controlled waters. 

5.4. Grant‐aid should be made available to support environmental education in the Overseas Territories. 

5.5. Darwin Plus is an excellent concept but intense competition for the available £2 million will mean that much essential conservation work will not be possible within the UK’s Overseas Territories (which contain a very high percentage of the UK’s biodiversity). Hence the fund should be increased. 

5.6. The UK Government should lobby for the continuation of the EU BEST fund for EU Overseas Territories. 

5.7. The UK Government should continue to lobby for EU LIFE+ to be made available to the Overseas Territories. 

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Written evidence submitted by Cayman Islands Department of Environment 

 

This  submission  is  provided  in  the  context  of  the Department  of  Environment’s  remit  as  the  agency responsible  for  the  conservation  and management  of  the  natural  environment  and  resources  of  the Cayman Islands.  The views outlined in the submission relate not only to the key issues in respect of the challenges  facing  the  natural  environment  but  also  those  which  ultimately  impact  greatest  on  the implementation  of  the  principles  of  sustainable  development,  particularly  the  integration  of environmental concerns in national decision making. 

1 General Challenges to Sustainability 

In general terms we see the main challenges as: 

1.1 Lack of a national sustainable development framework.  Achievement of sustainable development is impeded by the lack of adequate development planning and management legislation – there is no comprehensive development plan or planning policy, no comprehensive conservation legislation or environmental health regulations. This is particularly critical in the Sister Islands where there are no Development Plans and  limited planning  legislation. This  situation  is  currently being exploited on these small  islands, with a significant number of  large tracts of undeveloped  land being subdivided into  small  lots, marketed  and  sold  by  a  UK  based  investment  company  with  no  regard  to  the immediate environmental impacts associated with potential development of the land (including the speculative  clearing  of  these  sites),  as well  as  the wider  socio‐economic  considerations  and  the future infrastructure requirements to support such development.   

1.2 Climate change, energy and coastal works (seabed) policies remain in draft form and therefore have limited,  if  any,  influence  on  the  environmental management  and  development  process. Where policies exist,  they  tend  to operate  in  isolation with  little or no  integration at a national or  inter‐disciplinary  level.   There  is no strategic focus or plan for the economic development of the  Islands which  takes  account  of  the  Islands’  physical  characteristics  (size,  environmental  opportunities, assets and constraints), the indigenous population base and cultural identity. Economic planning and development decisions are largely reactive and often appear to be based on an inappropriate scale and business model.  Collection, analysis and use of reliable and relevant data and statistics needs to be greatly improved in the interests of assisting in sound economic planning. 

 1.3 Rapid population growth – the absence of a long term planning strategy and lack of comprehensive 

conservation legislation, coupled with rapid population growth, has resulted in development which is undertaken  in an ad hoc manner with  little or no regard  to preserving  the  integrity of  the  local environment.    In  addition,  there  is  no  strategic  assessment  of  the  infrastructure  requirements associated with  this  increasing population,  to  the detriment of  the environment.   This problem  is amplified  by  the  high  volume  of  cruise  tourists  that  visit Grand  Cayman  (1.5 million  visitors  per annum) and piecemeal implementation of the National Tourism Management Plan. 

 

  

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1.4 No  formal  project  appraisal/evaluation  process  (cost  benefit  analysis,  strategic  environmental assessment and environmental  impact assessment)  results  in  lack of  integration of environmental concerns  in  economic  development  and  causes  conflict  between  technical  advice  and  political decision‐making.    Enactment  of  legislation  –  such  as  the  draft  National  Conservation  Law  –  is urgently required to provide a mechanism for environmental concerns to be integrated into national plans and policies. 

 1.5 Lack of long‐term sustainable funding for environmental programmes and projects due to inability 

to access the Environmental Protection Fund. An Environmental Protection Fee, first  implemented in  1997,  is  collected  from  every  person  departing  the  Cayman  Islands  and  is  deposited  in  an Environmental  Protection  Fund within  the Government’s General  Revenue.  This  fee was  initially proposed  by  the  Department  of  Environment  as  a  means  of  securing  sustainable  revenue  for funding  the purchase of  conservation  land and  resourcing environmental projects,  vetted against appropriate conservation criteria. However, the Fund which now stands at $43 million is not readily accessible for its intended purposes, as it is forms a large proportion of the overall Government cash reserve required under local financial management legislation. There is therefore an urgent need to decouple the Fund from General Reserves so that it can serve its intended purpose. 

 1.6 The  environment  is  a  low  political  priority  which means  that  it  is  either  not  considered  or  is 

assigned a much lower weight than other factors in the decision making process.  

2. Environmental Challenges to Sustainability  The main environmental challenges are as follows:  2.1 Climate change – the Cayman Islands will need to make a concerted effort to address the impacts of 

climate change (elevated sea temperatures, ocean acidification, storms, sea level rise etc.) by taking early  steps  to adapt as well as making a  real effort  to  reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A Draft Climate Change Policy was produced under  the Enhancing  the Capacity  for Adaptation  to Climate Change Project funded by DFID. Despite three years of public consultation, Government still has not formally  considered  the  policy  and  it  remains  in  draft  form.  A  draft  National  Energy  Policy  is currently  being  reviewed  and  assessed  by  external  consultants,  whose  brief  is  to  evaluate  the economic implications of the proposed policy. Both of these policies, if properly implemented, have the potential to make significant progress towards addressing climate change issues.   

2.2 Habitat  loss  and  fragmentation  –  the  lack  of  a  proper  development  approval  and management framework, coupled with a  lack of  terrestrial protected areas,  is  resulting  in an escalating  rate of habitat  fragmentation  and  loss  on  the  three  Cayman  Islands.    This  potentially  has  grave consequences for biodiversity conservation and within a wider context, sustainable development in the territory. 

 

  

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2.3 Invasive  species  (marine  and  terrestrial)  –  dealing  with  invasive  species  is  placing  increasing pressure  on  human  and  financial  resources  for  environmental management.  On  land  the  green iguana and  select  invasive plant  species pose  the greatest  threat  to native  species.  In  the marine environment, the  lionfish  invasion which has become a regional problem within the Caribbean  is a significant  and  increasing  threat  to  local marine  resources.   A Private Members Motion,  recently approved  in  the  Legislative  Assembly,  has  committed  the  Government  to  considering  the establishment of a bounty of $5 per  lionfish with  the Environmental Protection Fund  (EPF) being used to finance this initiative. The Department of Environment is very concerned as it believes that this  is not an appropriate approach for addressing the problem of  lionfish and will simply result  in the rapid depletion of the EPF, with no tangible result. 

 2.4 Lack of a  comprehensive  solid waste management plan –  the  lack of an  integrated approach  to 

solid waste management and  legislative  framework  to  control or  reduce  the generation of waste requires urgent attention in order to address significant environmental impacts such as migration of landfill  leachate directly  into  the marine environment. Regardless of  the  lack of a  strategic waste management plan for the country, Government is currently considered relocating landfill operations to a privately owned wetland site, on  the periphery of  the Central Mangrove Wetland. A project‐specific  EIA  has  been  commissioned  for  the  site,  but  currently  Terms  of  Reference  exclude consideration  of  the  wider  issues  of  alternative  locations  and  technologies,  the  cost‐benefit  of addressing  the  countries  solid  waste  requirements  at  the  current  site  versus  the  proposed greenfield site. The lack of a strategic approach has polarized the community on this issue. 

 3. Governance for Sustainable Development 

Within  the  Cayman  Islands  good  governance  with  respect  to  sustainable  development  and  the environment is impeded by the issues outlined below. 

3.1 Lack of legislation and policies which correctly delineate technical and political decisions.  

3.2 Lack of appropriate project/plan assessment and approval processes which create inconsistencies in decision making.  

 3.3 There  is  a  lack  of  appropriate  Government  direction  and  coordination,  technical  oversight  and 

analysis  of major  economic  investment/development  plans  (e.g.  port  developments,  For  Cayman Investment Alliance, Enterprise City, Health City Cayman).   This results  in decisions being based on incomplete or  inadequate  information and environmental concerns being marginalized. Often  the environmental costs and benefits of such projects are not properly  identified and accounted for  in the overall project cycle.  

 3.4 Limited  public  access  to  key  decision making  processes  e.g.  Planning  approval,  limited  right  to 

object.  

  

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3.5 Key  decision  making  bodies  such  as  the  Central  Planning  Authority,  which  comprises  a  board predominantly  representing  the  construction  industry,  are  not  representative  of  the  community which they serve, making them inherently conflicted.  

 3.6 Large projects  involving both offshore (Cabinet’s  jurisdiction) and  land based components  (Central 

Planning Authority’s  jurisdiction)  are  not  reviewed,  assessed  and  determined  collaboratively  and comprehensively. Separate decisions are issued independently by the two bodies.  This creates the potential for applicants to achieve permission for one element (i.e. offshore or onshore) and not the other,  resulting  in an untenable  situation  for both  the applicant and  the decision‐making bodies. Consequently, poor decision making from an environmental perspective  is greatly increased as it is often  impossible  to  take  full  account  of  ecological  linkages  between  the  terrestrial  and marine environment. 

 4. Cooperation with the UK 

 4.1 Traditionally,  technical  cooperation with  the UK  in  the  area of  environmental  issues has been  in 

biodiversity/conservation management and planning. For example, collaborative projects between DOE and UK academic/conservation  institutions with associated  funding mechanisms  (e.g. Darwin, OTEP, RBG Kew, JNCC and UKOTCF).   These relationships have generally been beneficial; however, an  area of  concern  remains  the underrepresentation of  the Cayman  Islands/Territory  views with respect  to  the  UK’s  position  in  negotiations  on  international  treaties,  due  to  the  bloc  voting approach of the UK within the European Union.   

4.2 The  Department  values  the  introduction  of  the  Overseas  Territories  and  Crown  Dependencies Steering  Group meetings  (facilitated  by  the  JNCC)  as  a  coordinating mechanism  for  biodiversity issues. 

 4.3 The Cayman Islands does not fall into relevant categories that qualify them for various mechanisms 

of  international  funding  and  aid  and  subsequently  many  are  not  available  for  utilisation. Mechanisms  that are available  tend  to  focus at  the Caribbean  territories or regional  level and are not country specific. Cayman’s relatively isolated geography presents some fairly unique challenges which  would  benefit  from  country  specific  approaches.  Given  the  limited  opportunity  for  the Cayman Islands to access external funding, the introduction of the Darwin Plus funding mechanism is extremely welcome. 

 4.4 It is critical that the Cayman Islands continue to have access to UK expertise, technical support and 

resources as we continue in our endeavours to promote sustainability in all three islands. However, the Department of Environment believes that in order to realise this aspiration and achieve a more sustainable  future  for  the  Islands,  local  action  and  political  commitment  is  ultimately  what  is required. 

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Written evidence submitted by Turks and Caicos Islands’ Department of Environment and

Maritime Affairs

Summary Turks and Caicos Islands assets for effective sustainable management of natural resources include:

• An extensive Protected Areas network • Protective legislations including:

o The National Parks Ordinance o Marine Pollution Ordinance o Coastal Protection Ordinance o Fisheries Protection Ordinance o Planning Ordinance o Other Legislation

• Significant unspoiled land and wetland resources Management deficiencies include:

• Inadequate labour resources for adequate enforcement • Lack of funding for critical scientific research • Lack of funding for critical scientific monitoring, such as water quality testing • Lack of political will to implement needed reforms to current development trends

The Extent to which UK Government strategy on the UKOT’s embodies the principles of sustainable development and appropriate trade-offs, environmental protection, social development and economic growth;

1. The Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) have made great strides towards developing strategies for balancing development with sustainable management of natural resources in recent years. Environmental protections are supported by a well-developed and managed Protected Areas System, in addition to protective laws that provide for effective management of fisheries and other natural resources.

2. Unfortunately, the vast majority of economic growth in TCI has come at the expense of the

natural environmental, cultural and social baseline. On the island of Providenciales, the privatization and development of public lands has substantially degraded environmental and cultural resources. Relatively unchecked development practices allowed private interests to exploit natural resources and “externalize” environmental costs without restraint.

3. In 1960, Providenciales had no automobiles, paved roads or airport and a population of 518

people. The vast majority of the land area on the small, 37-square-mile island was public or “Crown” land. Ecosystems were in close to pristine condition and provided ample sustenance for all residents, human and non-human. The people were poor, but not impoverished. The quality of life was very high. Crime was virtually non-existent, and cultural values were well-defined.

4. Today, with the exception of two Protected Areas, virtually all of the land on Providenciales

has been privatized and developed for tourism, residential and industrial use. Critical upland and wetland habitats have been cleared, dredged and filled. Marine ecosystems are

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threatened by pollution and overuse. Fisheries catches are declining. The human population has exponentially increased to approximately 26,000. Illegal immigration and crime are rampant, and younger generations are adopting cultural values from nearby North America.

5. The above-mentioned benchmarks indicate that the pattern of privatization and development

of land on Providenciales is not sustainable. The TCI are the current “hot trend” in Caribbean travel destinations, with a branding of “beautiful by nature.” However tourism development on Providenciales has been anything but “beautiful by nature,” with a steady erosion of ecological values, resulting from on-going land clearance for development. Unless the prevalent development model is altered, the current ecological values that TCI enjoys on the remaining islands will be lost. Ironically, the very aspect of the Islands that attracts tourists in annually record-breaking numbers has been rapidly eroded by its own appeal, paradoxically fueled by a historic paradigm of development that views nature as a resource to be exploited for individual human profit.

How the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the UKOTs; In recent years, funding available to the Department of Environment and Maritime Affairs (DEMA) has been dramatically reduced, as budget cuts have been implemented.

6. UK has eliminated the Overseas Territories Environment Programme, merging it into the more rigid and restricted Darwin Plus programme that does not necessarily anticipate or address the needs of all of the territories.

7. UK government bodies seem to have become unaware of the role of the United Kingdom Overseas Territories Conservation forum, and have done a great disservice to all UKOTs by writing UKOTCF conference funding out of their budget.

8. UK Government’s cuts to UK conservation bodies active in UKOTs such as Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew and Zoological Society of London mean that work in UKOTs is dependent on UKOT-sourced funding, which is often sourced from UK Government due to UKOTs restricted access to international funding – which means the same funding cut from UK bodies has to be sourced by UKOTs and goes to assist those UK bodies in UKOT work, meaning there is less to spend within UKOTs themselves.

How the UK Government is helping the UKOTs adapt to the impact of climate change;

9. The UK Government is speaking the right language but practice leaves a lot to be desired. Recent developmental approval in TCI by the UK Government during Direct Rule has included some quite potentially destructive proposals. There has been little enforcement in in-filling of wetlands on low-lying islands.

10. Furthermore, the Turks and Caicos Islands currently have a monopoly supplier of electricity that produces electricity exclusively from diesel powered generators. Numerous studies have indicated that due to the excessive cost of electricity generation in TCI, solar and wind technologies are not only economically viable, but offer a less-expensive alternative for private individuals. While the Islands have abundant solar and wind resources, these renewable energies have not been tapped, and are in fact discouraged by current policy. Currently, a home owner or private individual is not allowed to generate their own electricity with renewable technologies. Additionally, there are no plans to implement progressive net metering policies that would greatly reduce the cost of electricity for the average person and have a dramatic impact on the production of greenhouse gasses in TCI.

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Whether the recommendations in our 2008 Report, Halting biodiversity loss, on safeguarding biodiversity and practising joined-up government to further conservation have been implemented;

11. These recommendations have not been implemented in TCI. The document is not circulated or referred to in any existing legislative or operational framework.

Whether UK Government strategy on the UKOTs is consistent with the conclusions and commitments on protecting biodiversity reached at the recent United Nations Rio+20 conference;

12. TCI has currently not had any active policy to implement strategies arising from that Conference.

How weaknesses in civil society and governance in the UKOTs impact on conservation; and

13. UK Government in direct Rule set a poor precedent in Conservation; it did not criticise the former administration’s quite anti-conservation stance, did not reasonably repair problems caused by that administration, and has not encouraged new administrations to become more conservation-minded, such that the environment was not mentioned in any political platform in the 2012 elections.

14. The UK Government’s Direct Rule administration’s willingness to entertain developments clearly in violation of Planning Ordinance, the Fisheries Protection Ordinance and the National Parks Ordinance and having potentially severe environmental impact has set a poor precedent for the elected government to follow. In fact, the statement that these decisions are best left to an elected government demonstrates a clear disregard for extant legislation and a government’s obligation to follow its own law.

15. The UK Government in direct rule dissolved the Conservation Fund, which was established to support conservation efforts in TCI, and absorbed it into the General Fund to cover general budget deficits. No alternative to the Conservation Fund has been established or suggested, and the loss of economic support has been detrimental to conservation efforts.

1. How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine environment in the uninhabited territories.

16. The Turks and Caicos Islands have a well-developed Marine Protected Areas network. The

limitations of this network exist as an extension of the lack of resources and funding needed for management and enforcement of the existing legislative framework.

17. While the Protected Areas network is extensive, management plans are only in place for three Protected Areas within the system. Management plans and the economic and labour resources needed to implement them are urgently needed.

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Written evidence submitted by the Chagos Conservation Trust

Summary and Recommendations

• The Chagos Marine Reserve was established in 2010 to safeguard the greatest marine biodiversity under the UK’s jurisdiction.  This Marine Protected Area (MPA), currently the world’s largest ‘no take’ marine reserve, contributes significantly to the globally agreed target under the Convention on Biological Diversity to protect 10% of the oceans by 2020, and establishes the UK as a world leader in marine conservation. 

• Since its designation, the marine reserve has seen a dramatic increase in interest and visits by scientists for monitoring and research but only careful management through a properly co‐ordinated and centrally managed programme of enhanced enforcement, scientific monitoring, and conservation projects will it be possible to show whether the ban on fishing and other activities in the reserve has been successful over time in protecting its rich biodiversity. 

• To secure this, CCT strongly recommends that:  

the BIOT Administration in the FCO enacts specific legislation and accompanying regulations for the effective enforcement of the ban on fishing and other extraction activity and for the conservation and management of the ‘no‐take’ marine reserve;  

 

the BIOT Administration should adopt an up‐to‐date management plan to guide future conservation management priorities based on the suggestions already submitted by CCT; 

 

 

the FCO and DEFRA should establish a specific, ring‐fenced budget to fund the management of this reserve in the long term; 

 

MOD should periodically deploy Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels present in the region to provide faster and more effective enforcement than is possible using the current chartered vessel (the Pacific Marlin); 

 

measures are taken to enhance surveillance by technical means, including through collaboration with the US forces based on Diego Garcia, to facilitate the detection of poachers and other illegal activity in BIOT waters; 

 

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the BIOT Administration continue to support and fund the development of Chagossian capacity in conservation already begun under the pilot project run by the Zoological Society of London (ZSL) with CCT and others; and that 

 

the FCO and the BIOT Administration make greater efforts to secure good publicity for this spectacular marine reserve, in particular through collaboration with selected wildlife film‐makers. 

Background  

1. The Chagos Conservation Trust (CCT) is a UK registered charity, established in 1992 to promote the protection and conservation of the natural environment of the Chagos Islands (British Indian Ocean Territory) and to raise awareness of environmental issues affecting the Chagos archipelago.  It seeks to do so by supporting scientific and historical research and sustainable conservation projects, often in collaboration with partner members of the Chagos Environment Network (CEN).  The CEN comprises, in addition to the CCT which acts as its secretariat, The Linnean Society of London, Pew Environment Group, The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), The Zoological Society of London (ZSL) and the Marine Conservation Society (MCS), Royal Botanic Gardens Kew, Blue Marine Foundation, and Professor Charles Sheppard of Warwick University, amongst others. 

 2. CCT promotes scientific expeditions to monitor the status of the marine and 

terrestrial environment in the Chagos; provides a channel for bringing relevant environmental problems to the Government's attention; establishes links with other groups and scientists concerned with reef and island ecology, particularly in relation to the Indian Ocean; encourages research into the history of the Chagos Archipelago, and seeks to educate and to make available the results of its work to a wider audience both directly and through its website – visit www.chagos‐trust.org. 

 3. Located in the centre of the Indian Ocean, the Chagos Archipelago, a UK Overseas 

Territory, contains the world’s largest living coral atoll, over 60,000 square km of shallow limestone reef and associated habitats, and about 300 seamounts and half a million square kilometres of deep and abyssal habitats.  It holds by far the greatest marine biodiversity under the UK’s direct control and responsibility. It also has one of the healthiest reef systems in the cleanest waters in the world, supporting half the total area of good quality reefs in the Indian Ocean. As a result, the ecosystems of the Chagos have so far proven resilient to climate change and environmental disruptions, and as such can provide unique insights for the scientific and wider community.   

 4. In March 2009, the Chagos Conservation Trust, with members of the Chagos 

Environment Network, published “The Chagos Archipelago: its Nature and the Future” proposing a large scale highly protected marine reserve be established in Chagos.   

 5. Following a public consultation during the winter of 2009‐10, the UK Government 

formally designated the Chagos Archipelago on 1 April 2010 as a strictly ‘no‐take’ marine reserve totalling more than 640,000 square kilometres (397,678 square 

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miles), currently the largest such ‘no take’ reserve in the world.  The reserve covers all the islands and the entire EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) in BIOT, save for Diego Garcia and an area of 3 nautical miles of sea around that island.  The combination of tropical islands, unspoiled coral reefs and adjacent oceanic abyss makes this marine reserve comparable in global importance to the Great Barrier Reef and the Galapagos Islands. As a fully protected marine reserve, all extractive activities, such as industrial fishing and deep sea mining, are prohibited in the Chagos. The reserve will safeguard the rich diversity of marine life found in the area and is a conservation legacy almost unrivalled in scale and significance. It will also contribute greatly to a number of globally agreed targets, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity target to protect 10% of the oceans by 2020, and undoubtedly establishes the UK as a world leader in marine conservation. 

 6. Since its designation, CCT with its CEN partners has encouraged various initiatives to 

support the BIOT Administration’s environmental management and conservation of the Chagos. Funding has been obtained to increase dramatically the number of science expeditions to BIOT for environmental monitoring and research, and to involve and train people of Chagossian descent in conservation work. A successful pilot project on the latter has already been completed by ZSL and its partners for Chagossians living in the UK (Crawley and Manchester), which we hope will be continued into future years (and extended, if possible, to Chagossian descendents living in Mauritius and the Seychelles) – see www.zsl.org/chagos.community. Major proposals have also been submitted (or are being prepared) for conservation projects to restore islands through the re‐establishment of native forest, to conduct a major botanical survey, to map and protect existing mangrove areas (which are under significant threat), and to establish a rat eradication programme on Ile Vache Marine. 

 7. Only careful management through enhanced enforcement, sustained scientific 

monitoring, and a programme of co‐ordinated and well‐targeted conservation projects will show whether the ban on fishing and other extraction activities in the marine reserve has been successful over time in protecting its spectacular biodiversity. 

 8. The BIOT Government has relied over the past years on existing fisheries and other 

legislation to manage the marine reserve.  Whilst this has been generally effective, the reserve does not have specific protective legislation.  Other countries have brought in legislation to protect their marine protected areas, which is stronger than that currently applying in BIOT. We believe that it would be desirable for the BIOT marine reserve to have its own specific (and tougher) legislation.   Furthermore, there is a BIOT management plan which pre‐dates the establishment of the marine reserve.  We believe that it would be desirable to update this to take account of the new reality of the marine reserve. A paper, requested by the BIOT Administration, making various recommendations to support a new management plan was submitted by Professor Charles Sheppard and others to the BIOT Administration several months ago (and published o the CCT website). We hope that the BIOT Administration will issue a new management plan soon. 

 9. It seems to us to be a reasonable assumption that the US uses various forms of 

surveillance to ensure the security of its base on Diego Garcia from sea‐borne and other threats, the more so because of lawless elements present in the Indian Ocean.  

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We believe that this surveillance could, if it was routinely shared with the BIOT authorities, be used to guide the UK’s enforcement efforts in the marine reserve to good effect. This would help both base security and the security of the marine reserve.  

10. There may also be other measures that the UK Government could adopt, though we recognise the financial constraints. The marine reserve is currently enforced by a contracted vessel, the Pacific Marlin.  This is an old and shallow drafted boat.  Whilst the shallow draft is invaluable for passing over the reefs close to the islands, it is much less suitable for enforcement over the deep water between the islands and the 200 mile outer limit of the marine reserve.  It is simply too slow.  The periodic involvement of RN and RFA vessels that are in the region to patrol BIOT’s deep water area, particularly if combined with satellite surveillance information, would make a considerable difference to the effectiveness and extent of enforcement in the reserve.  

11. For the long‐term sustainability of this marine reserve, we believe that the FCO, supported by DEFRA, should establish a transparent, ring‐fenced budget to fund the protection of the reserve.  

12. Evidence has shown that there is considerable interest by wildlife film makers to produce programmes on the marine reserve and the terrestrial environment in the Chagos.  We believe that it would be advantageous to the UK to get the publicity for its good custodianship of this marine environment that such programmes would bring. 

30 November 2012

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Written evidence submitted by the British Antarctic Survey

Summary: The focus of this submission conccerns the biodiversity, the marine protected areas, and the fisheries management of two Overseas Territories, namely South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) and the British Antarctic Territory (BAT). There are very brief comments on minerals. The British Antarctic Survey is a component part of the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), and this submission complements theirs. Background

1. A significant part of the South Atlantic Ocean lies within BAT and SGSSI. These OTs include areas where levels of benthic biodiversity are greater than those in the Galapagos, often cited as an example of high biodiversity. BAT and SGSSI are areas of seabird biodiversity, including globally-important populations of both albatrosses and penguins.

2. The air temperature of the Antarctic Peninsula, which is largely encapsulated within

BAT, has risen by 3o C in 50 years; this warming is greater than any other region in the Southern Hemisphere. The impacts are significant. In the last 50 years, nine major iceshelves have broken up, 87% of glaciers are in retreat contributing significantly to sea level rise, and winter sea ice extent has decreased by 10% per decade. Many animals rely on the algae under and in sea ice as a winter food source.

3. The populations of krill around South Georgia appear to have fallen by an order of

magnitude in the last three decades, and this has been attributed to major reductions in sea ice.

4. The marine animals in BAT and SGSSI have evolved over many millions of years in a near-isothermal environment. The oceans have warmed significantly in the last 50 years and this is a potential threat to the fragile ecosystems in which the animals operate.

5. A further pressure comes from the increasing acidity of the ocean, arising from the absorption of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the ocean (ocean acidification); the rising CO2 levels arise from the increased burning of fossil fuels.

6. Icebergs scour the benthic communities, and the frequency of these events appears

to be increasing as a result of the warming of the Antarctic Peninsula. The recovery time of the communities is sufficiently long that there are concerns that there may be irrevocable damage in some areas.

7. The Antarctic Treaty covers the area below 60°S latitude. It has been signed by 50 nations representing over 80% of the world population. Under the Treaty, further Conventions and Protocols have been developed to address the issues of Antarctic resources and protection of the Antarctic environment.

8. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was agreed in 1980. It aims to conserve all Antarctic marine living resources south of the polar front, the boundary between cold Antarctic seas and the warmer waters of the Atlantic, and thus includes both BAT and CCAMLR. Also of note, is the Environmental Protocol, which came into force in 1998 and establishes a framework for the comprehensive protection of Antarctica, including:

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a. A complete ban on all commercial mining; b. A mechanism to ensure that the environmental impact of all activities

undertaken in Antarctica is considered and mitigated as far as practicable;

c. Comprehensive protection of Antarctic plants and animals; d. Stringent waste management procedures; e. Prevention of marine pollution; f. A system to protect the most sensitive and scientifically important

areas of Antarctica.

9. British Antarctic Survey (BAS), in close collaboration with the Polar Regions Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ensures the requirements of the Treaty are successfully delivered.

Fisheries management

10. The Southern Ocean, and particularly the South Atlantic sector, contains one of the last under-exploited sources of marine protein, Antarctic krill. If the potential allowable catch were to be taken, it would equate to approximately 7% of current landings from marine capture fisheries reported to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.

11. Recent technological developments now enable krill to be harvested more economically, and new markets are now driving increased catches. The krill are used primarily for feeding aquaculture fish and for nutraceuticals.

12. CCAMLR, the fisheries management organisation for the Southern Ocean, regulates

the multi-national exploitation of krill. The challenge is to do this without damaging the Antarctic marine ecosystem when the impacts of fishing and climate change are both increasing. CCAMLR adopts a precautionary principles based on estimates of krill biomass.

13. BAS scientists support the UK Government in the negotiations over the fisheries

management, and carry out front-line research to understand the marine ecosystem. Conservation

14. Albatrosses are regarded by many as iconic species and thus of cultural value, but their numbers are in serious decline. One of the impacts of long line fishing is the incident mortality of birds (by-catch). Typically a long liner deploys ~10000 baited hooks during a single long line haul. This attracts birds, such as albatrosses and petrels, and over the years thousands of birds have been caught and drowned.

15. Conservationists and scientists have been working with the fishing industry to reduce the deaths. Measures include having streamers behind the fishing boats to prevent birds getting close to the hooks before they sink out of range of the birds’ diving capabilities. These measures have meant that the by-catch of birds in the South Georgia area fell from ~6000 per annum in the late 1990s to none since 2006.

16. Albatrosses are still on the decline, currently at an unsustainable rate of 4% per annum for the wandering albatrosses. Research shows that birds are breeding just as successfully as previously but the returns of birds to breed are falling. New tracking technology, developed by BAS, allows scientists to show that albatrosses often go to South American and South African waters to feed; in these locations the same by-catch mitigation measures have not been fully implemented, and young birds are particularly vulnerable to being caught on the hooks or killed by contact with the fishing warps.

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17. In 2009, CCAMLR established the South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf as its first

Marine Protected Areas (MPA), and the first such area anywhere in the world to be designated entirely within the High Seas. The agreement of this MPA was of major significance in establishing a large area for the conservation of marine biodiversity.

18. The fundamental objectives of the MPA are to :

• protect rare or vulnerable benthic and pelagic habitats • protect areas of ecosystem importance • protect trophically important pelagic prey species • protect areas important for key life cycle stages and processes for

commercially important species • promote recovery of the marine ecosystem following historical harvesting • maximise ecosystem robustness and resilience to climate variability and

change

19. There is still additional scientific evidence required to determine more robustly if the scale size of MPAs is well matched to the size at which ecosystems operate.

20. BAS scientists led the development of proposals to build the case for protection, and

provided scientific and policy advice at every stage of review and stakeholder consultation through to political implementation. BAS continues to undertake field studies to understand more completely the MPA.

21. In February 2012, the entire Maritime Zone (north of 60°S) surrounding SGSSI was

declared as a sustainably managed MPA, making it the largest such protected area in the world. BAS provided scientific advice on the initial declaration. The scientific justification for the MPA was founded on the results of an interdisciplinary suite of research, including biological studies and monitoring of land-based predators, fisheries biology and surveys, as well as physical oceanography, benthic surveys and remotely-sensed data.

22. BAS has recently completed a 2-year project to identify a range of sites to be

proposed for additional protection as “no-take zones” within the MPA. Stakeholder consultation on the implementation of these new zones has just been completed, and their future ratification will help to support the sustainable development of fisheries for Patagonian toothfish and Antarctic krill in SGSSI waters.

23. BAS scientists are also leading a proposal to implement precautionary protection for

marine habitats under ice shelves in the Antarctic Peninsula region, with the aim of providing scientific reference areas to facilitate studies of how ecosystems change following ice shelf collapse or retreat. It is hoped that this measure will be agreed by CCAMLR in 2013..

Physiological research

24. Fundamental research is being carried out at BAS to determine both the physiological and genetic responses of animals both to the long term warming of the ocean and to the impacts of ocean acidification. This is essential to allow insight into how ecosystems might evolve in the very rapidly chaning environments.

Terrestrial environment

25. The warming environment increases the threat from invasive species. There are many methods by which aliens species can reach BAT and SGSSI. In the past, there

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are been transfer of species by humans intentionally as was the case with reindeer and some plants on South Georgia, and unintentionally with rats on South Georgia. Eridication is now being undertaken.

26. There are many scientists and over 30,000 tourists visiting Antarctica every summer; many land on the Antarctic Peninsula. Most scientists and tourists take great care in cleaning clothing and materials brought to Antarctic to minimise the risk of invasion. Research during the International Polar Year demonstrated that, despite the cleaning, seeds were being transferred into the Antarctic.

Economic opportunities

27. The fisheries are a major source of income for the Government of SGSSI.

28. South Georgia and the surrounding seas are products of relatively recent geological processes with historic volcanic eruptions in the South Sandwich Islands. In contrast to most other OTs, survey data sets for resource analysis and to underpin regulation of mineral resources and sustainable development in SGSSI territory are either lacking or partial. The lack of data is a result of remote location, access difficulties and extensive ice cover on land. Potential future resource development in SGSSI may include on-shore and sea-floor minerals activity and geothermal exploitation. There is as yet inadequate data and research to underpin regulation and sustainable development in the territory.

29. Mineral resource activity in BAT is regulated by the Antarctic Act 1994 and is

restricted to scientific research under permit. Geological knowledge in BAT is highly variable; some areas are well understood with high quality data contrasting with other, less accessible areas that are poorly understood.

Future requirements

30. Much has been achieved to protect the biodiversity of the BAT and SGSSI with establishment of protected areas and through the attempts to prevent the transfer of alien species from other locations. The fishery management system has operated successfully for over 30 years but is coming under increasing pressure both through commercial exploitation and the effects of climate change.

31. There is still much to be understood about the ecosystems of BAT and SGSSI before robust predictions can be made, and this requires fundamental research at all levels from the gene to the ecosystem, and much more sophisticated modelling.

32. All the research and the successes to date have been underpinned by long term

measurements. It is essential for these to continue. Annex: The British Antarctic Survey

33. Antarctic Survey (BAS) is a component of the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC). BAS supports stations in the Antarctic and on South Georgia, five planes and two ice-strengthened ships which are used both for research and for science.

34. Within BAT, BAS operates three stations. Rothera station (67°S; 68° W) has sophisticated biological laboratory facilities incorporating a cold water marine aquarium and a diving facility. At Signy Island (60°S; 46°W), a summer only research station, penguin, seabird and seal biology, limnology and terrestrial biology are undertaken. At Halley (76°S; 27°W) the science focus is on atmospheric research from the ground to space.

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35. Within SGSSI, BAS operates two research stations, at Bird Island, South Georgia (54°S, 38°W) where the focus is on seabird and seal research, and King Edward Point, South Georgia (54°S, 36W), where applied fisheries research is carried out.

36. All these research facilities are used to support the research of BAS and the UK Universities, and frequently there are international collaborative research programmes undertaken.

4 December 2012

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Written evidence submitted by Christine Rose-Smyth  

Summary 

1. The  moral  and  legal  duty  established  under  international  conventions  and  the  Environmental Charter  is not adequately recognised  in the Cayman  Islands.   It  is not at all clear that any relevant recommendations  made  by  EAC  in  the  2008  Report,  Halting  Biodiversity  Loss  have  been implemented to create a so‐called “joined up approach”.   

2.  Extensive preparatory work is sitting on the shelf.   

3.  Definitive action to halt biodiversity loss by halting primary habitat loss is required now, principally in the form of: 

a. Adequate,  integrated  legislation for spatial planning and environmental protection ‐ a Framework for Environmental Responsibility with concrete outcomes set out for action within a defined time period complementary to the Framework for Fiscal Responsibility ‐ is required. 

b. Utilisation of the Cayman Islands Environmental Protection Fund as originally envisage in 1995. 

Introduction   

4. Christine  Rose‐Smyth  carries  out  research  on  the  Cayman  Islands  native  orchid  flora  and  is  an administrator for eBird Cayman Islands.  She is the recipient of a small 2012‐13 Overseas Territories Programme  Fund  Award1  and  is  a member  of  the  Cayman  Islands  Orchid  Society  Conservation Group, but is otherwise self‐funded.  The views expressed herein are personal and do not represent the opinions of any other group. 

Comments 

5. Comments are provided on two of the seven issues being examined:   

• Whether  the  recommendations  in  2008  Report,  Halting  Biodiversity  Loss  have  been implemented. 

•  How weakness in civil society and governance in the UKOT’s impact on conservation. 

6. The pre‐eminent threat to biodiversity in the Cayman Islands both long term and immediate, is not climate change but human  impact on primary habitat. Land conservation  lags substantially behind marine conservation.   All  three  Islands contain substantial  tracts of primary habitat.   For example: the Central Mangrove Wetland on Grand Cayman  represents 17% of  the  land area of  the  Islands;   

                                                            1 Development of Genetic Fingerprints for Endangered Endemic Orchids of the Cayman Islands; being executed in conjunction with 

RBG Kew. 

 

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the remaining Ironwood Forest  fragment in George Town  contains four important endemic plants, including  two   endemic orchid species.   The ghost orchid, Dendrophylax  fawcettii, was  featured  in the  top  25  of  endangered  species  selected  for  Priceless  or  Worthless  launched  at  the  World Conservation  Congress  in  Korea  in  September  20122.   At  present  voluntary  stewardship  or mere inaction are  the only reasons areas  like these remain relatively untouched. We have the option of ensuring protection now  versus  remediating  them  in  the  future at much higher  cost, assuming  it would even be possible.   

7. A great deal of preparatory work has been done,  much  with the assistance of some of the support programmes provided   by the UK Government, much by  local endeavour of the Department of the Environment  and  non‐governmental  organisations,  especially  the  National  Trust  for  the  Cayman Islands and also by private  individuals.   At the macro  level: a National Biodiversity Action Plan has been drafted (2009); a Conservation Law has been drafted (2002); a Green Paper: Consultation draft: Climate Change  Issues for the Cayman  Islands  ‐ Towards a Climate Change Policy has been drafted (2010),  an  Environment  and Coastal  Zone Management Report on Proposed Amendments  to  the Development  Plan  1997  has  been  drafted  (2002);  a  ‘Go  East’  –  Strategy  for  the  Sustainable Development  of  the  Eastern  Districts  of  Grand  Cayman  has  been  drafted  (2009);  new  extended Marine Parks proposals are currently in the consultation phase (2012).   This list is non‐exhaustive.   

8. Whether  the  recommendations  in  2008  Report,  Halting  Biodiversity  Loss  (RHBL)  have  been implemented. 

9. In  the RHBL you concluded  that  the UK Government must act  immediately  to protect  the equally valuable and higher risk internationally important species and habitats found in the OTs. However, in my view, all the criticisms levelled by the UKOT Conservation Forum in the RHBL continue to plague progress on natural environment issues in the Cayman Islands.  

10. The direct and indirect substantial benefits of biodiversity in the marine environment has fairly high recognition  in  the  Cayman  Islands  due  to  the  large  part  that  diving  and watersports  play  in  the Islands’  tourism product.       The  value of  terrestrial biodiversity  receives much  less  consideration. Land  is seen by an  influential constituency as only  there  to be exploited  through development.   A significant and unusual contradiction to this was the community‐based successful opposition to the routing  of  a  new  arterial  road  through  the  Ironwood  Forest  of George  Town  in  2008  and more recently a proposed port development in the district of East End.  However, a large tract of the land in East End that would have been affected by the port development has this year been stripped of its primary forest for no approved purpose.   

11. More  recent  illustrations of  the  ineffectiveness of existing planning   and environmental  legislation are: 

                                                            2https://www.zsl.org/conservation/news/the‐100‐most‐threatened‐species,997,NS.html &  

http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/44234ae6#/44234ae6/1  

 

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a. A Frank Sound development represents cumulative applications to the Planning Department for 535 acres of land for which Planning is apparently powerless to require a “planned area development” application; 

b. A proposal  for  the Duck Pond area  represents 416 acres of  land  in  the Central Mangrove Wetland. Together these amount to more than 2% of the entire Cayman Islands;  

c. At the Shetty Hospital site in East End substantial land clearance has already occurred; 

d. Preparatory work has begun at  the proposed Dart  landfill site  in Bodden Town ahead of a voluntary  EIA.   However,  the  draft  terms of  reference  are of  limited  scope  and  subject  to  criticism. A fundamental flaw is the pre‐determination of the site without public input.   

The limited ability to require Environmental Impact Assessments is either circumvented or nugatory.  

12. How weakness in civil society and governance in the UKOT’s impact on conservation. 

13. The Overseas Territories White Paper: Security, Success and Sustainability, June 2012 (White Paper) accurately  identifies  the glaring  immediate  threats  to  the pristine primary undisturbed habitats of the Cayman  Islands:   unsustainable development,  less than  ideal waste management practices and invasive species.  Of these, the unmitigated advance of random, unplanned (in the sense that there is no true national planning and development policy) development, regardless of actual need is the primary  problem.    Fees  and  the  benefit  of  short  term  economic  activity  are  the  foremost consideration  even  in  times  of  prosperity  and  more  so  in  an  economic  downturn.      Culturally powerful, also,  is a  tradition of mastery over  land.    In  its most extreme  form  this  is manifested  in absolute opposition to any proposals  for environmental protection to  the point of rejection of  full compensation at market value as a model for acquisition of land for habitat conservation. 

14.  As a result successive governments have not been able to reconcile the laissez faire tradition with a recognised need  for  integrated national planning. The Cayman  Islands desperately needs  to break this deadlock. 

15.  Page  41  of  the  White  Paper  reports  that  DEFRA  assists  in  meeting  the  requirements  of  the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS).   At page 42  it  is proposed that placing environmental consideration at the heart of decision making  is to be achieved by  a more  strategic,  co‐ordinated  approach.      This  could not  come  soon  enough  in  the Cayman  Islands.   With  respect,  the  time  for  platitudes  and  preparation  is  over  and  the  time  for action  is now.   The comments made by Dr Peter Hayes on his recent trip to Cayman are therefore welcome. 

16. I  recognise  that  the description of protection efforts at page 98 of  the White Paper as  limited by space. It is inaccurate nonetheless.  For example, it overlooks the great efforts with the marine parks system over the  last 25 years and the blue  iguana recovery programme.   More  importantly  it over emphasises  the  role of  the Botanic Park and  the bird sanctuaries as safe environments.   Both are under  threat,  the  Park  from  proposed  encircling  development  (see  paragraph  11).    The  ponds described in the White Paper are inadequately protected by the antiquated Animals Law.  

a. Animals are only protected within a 300 feet zone around the ponds.  

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b. The only such sanctuary  in Cayman Brac, Dennis Point (Salt Water) Pond was deleted from the Schedule to the Animals Law on 5 November 20123.  In 2009 the Premier of the Cayman Islands said,  in  relation  to  turning  the pond  into a marina open  to  the sea.    “[If I have to] shift road a bit, chase away a few Whistling Ducks, but so be it, that’s common law. If I had my way today … I would sign that document today and say to those gentlemen that proposed it, go ahead and get it done.”4 Mr Bush signed the Environmental Charter for the Cayman Islands in 2001. 

17. This is only one example of how conflicting goals in civil society and weakness in governance in this UKOT  impact on  conservation.   Many other  could be provided,  in addition  to  those alluded  to  in paragraph 11 above.  

Recommendations 

18. The Bill of Rights (Part 1 of the 2009 Constitution) came into effect in November 2012.  It mandates that the "government shall, in all its decisions, have due regard to the need to foster and protect an environment that is not harmful to the health or well‐being of present and future generations, while promoting  justifiable economic and social development".     The UK Government and  the CIG must ensure  that  appropriate  legislation  is  passed,  environmental  impact  assessments  are  undertaken before  approval  for major  development  is  given  and  the  public must  have  reasonable  time  for consultation.    At  minimum  the  Development  Plan  1997  (2010  Revision)  must  be  updated (incorporating the Environment and Coastal Zone Management   Report on Proposed Amendments to  the Development Plan 1997  (ECZR))     and a Conservation  law adopted  followed by  immediate integrated and effective  implementation  in conjunction with  the National Biodiversity Action Plan.    Separate  legislation  for  Little  Cayman  and  Cayman  Brac  should  be  avoided  unless  absolutely necessary. 

19. It is argued by certain land lobbyists that the Conservation Bill 2009 is unworkable even though their objections are not well‐founded5.  The Conservation Law must be finalised, passed and acted upon. A  pilot  management  agreement  programme  for  private  land  should  be  developed  to  provide illustrated  concrete  example(s).    In  the meantime  publicity  for  voluntary  adoption  of  the  ECZR recommendation for conservation of primary habitat should be promoted.    

20. Notwithstanding  the vigorous debate as  to  the  future site of  landfill services  in Grand Cayman 30 years  of  commissioning  of  reports must  end.    Little  Cayman  and  Cayman  Brac must  adopt  best practices as soon as possible as well.   

21. The Cayman  Islands Environmental Protection Fund   must be utilised as originally envisage  in 1995 by Governor Gore,  the National Trust and others6.    In 1997 an environmental protection  fee was added  to  the  tourist  tax  paid  by  all  persons  passing  through  the  international  ports,  air  and  sea (essentially  cruise  ship  traffic).      As  it  stands  the  fee  is  being  applied  contrary  to  the  legitimate 

                                                            3   http://www.caymannewsservice.com/science‐and‐nature/2012/11/06/legislators‐defeat‐environment‐animal‐law 

4    http://caymannewsservice.com/headline‐news/2009/08/31/bush‐supports‐brac‐marina  5    For example, objectors focus on the general penalty clause as if the Interpretation Law does not apply. 

6  CALPE 2000: Linking the Fragments of Paradise. Proceedings UKOTCF 2001 pp118‐119 

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expectations of those who pay it.  Proper implementation would involve forming the recommended independent oversight body, free from government interference; releasing the Fund from its role as a  budgetary  prop  for  the  Cayman  Islands  government;  applying  the  US$50  million  (and accumulating)  Fund  for  its  intended  use  of  acquisition  of  land,  including  the  Central Mangrove Wetland.    Do  not  use  Fund  monies  for  bounty  programmes  for  invasive  species  (lionfish  or otherwise).  Matching funds from the UK would have a significant impact. 

22. The Central Mangrove Wetland should be designated a Ramsar Site.   The Crown wetlands  in Little Cayman, that have not already been put under National Trust control and which already represent a significant eco‐tourism investment, should be vested in the Trust. 

23. Guarantee  funding of  the  core expenses of  the National Trust  to ensure  that  the Trust  is able  to deliver its mission without untoward government influence. 

24. To  assist  with  awareness, make  BBC  natural  world  programming  free  for  broadcast  on  a  local Cayman Islands station. 

Conclusion  

25. The failure to implement the 2008 recommendations adequately or at all, nor to address governance issues leads to the conclusion that :  

a.  The UK Government  strategy, whether  it  actually  embodies  the  principles  of  sustainable development    or  not,    does  not  appropriately  trades‐off  environmental  protection,  social development and economic growth because  it has not  taken  significant  steps beyond  the merely aspirational. b. The UK Government is not fulfilling its responsibilities to protect biodiversity in the Cayman Islands. 

26. There are abundant opportunities for the UK Government to meet its obligations to this OT. The UK and Cayman  Islands governments should as a matter of formal policy adopt the conclusions of the Bermuda Ombudsman:  "The UK Charter is more than just a statement of good intentions.   ...  our signature on the UK Environmental Charter has the force of law.  Our word must be our bond."7 

4 December 2012 

                                                            7  Today's Choices – Tomorrow's Costs, Systemic Investigation into the Process and Scope of Analysis for Special Development Orders, February 2012 and Special Report of 1 June 2012 (www.ombudsman.bm) 

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Written evidence submitted by WWF-UK

WWF is a leading global conservation organisation, employing over 5000 staff in more than 100 countries and with more than 5 million supporters across the world.

WWF has a longstanding relationship with Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, having been involved in Antarctic conservation for 35 years. Our founder, Sir Peter Scott, first visited Antarctica in 1966, following in the footsteps of his father, Capt. RF Scott RN. In 2006, we launched our Antarctic & Southern Ocean Initiative (ASOI), engaging many of our offices including the UK, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Argentina in a coordinated approach towards the management and protection of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, including the areas covered by the British Antarctic Territory and the sub-Antarctic South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. WWF works closely and constructively with the UK Government at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), both of which we attend as part of the UK national delegation.

Summary

This short submission from WWF-UK addresses just two areas under examination by the Committee’s Inquiry into sustainability in the UK Overseas Territories: (i) Adapting to the impacts of climate change, and (ii) Marine Protected Areas. It focuses on two of the largely uninhabited territories (a) ‘British Antarctic Territory’ and (b) South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

WWF recognise the UK Government as one of the champions of environmental stewardship within the Antarctic Treaty System, with a proven track record in Southern Ocean Marine Protected Areas. Furthermore, the Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands have recently designated the South Georgia maritime zone as a large scale IUCN Category VI (sustainable use) Marine Protected Area, and are working to improve the current level of protection by increasing the area set aside as ‘no take’. WWF has worked with the UK Government to highlight and raise the profile and understanding within the Antarctic Treaty System of climate change, adaptation and ecosystem resilience. We are currently undertaking a trail of a new methodology, developed for the Arctic, to identify and map areas of strategic conservation importance on the Antarctic Peninsula because they are likely to serve as sources of ecosystem resilience in a changing climate. However, significant work remains to be done by the UK Government and others to create political amongst all CCAMLR member states to establish meaningful, large scale Marine Protected Areas across the Southern Ocean, including British Antarctic Territory.

1. How the UK Government is helping UKOTs adapt to the impact of climate change

1.1 Climate Change in the Antarctic Peninsula region. The Overseas Territories – Security, Success and Sustainability (FCO, 2012) cites climate change as ‘the key, long term threat faced by the Territories’ and lists the need to address the challenges of climate change as a Priority for Action for the Uninhabited Overseas Territories, including British Antarctic Territory and South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands.

1.1.1 Warming across the Antarctic Peninsula is now well established1. Average temperatures have risen by almost 3 ͦ C, a greater rate than almost anywhere else on our planet. This has caused the thinning of glaciers, the rapid retreat of ice-shelves and the exposure of new ice-

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free terrain2. Climate change is likely to have significant implications for terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems.

1.1.2 Warming encourages the growth and spread of established plants.3 The introduction of non-native species, and corresponding competition with native species, is likely to be a major outcome of climate change within Antarctic terrestrial ecosystems3,4.

1.1.3 Antarctic penguins can be highly sensitive to climate variability and change; they are thought most likely to respond by dispersal rather than adaptation. The ice-obligate emperor and Adélie penguins are more vulnerable to warming, as their distribution will potentially shift pole-ward and contract. In particular, declining sea-ice extent will have a severe impact on emperor penguins, which generally rely on fast ice as a breeding habitat. Ice-intolerant species (e.g. gentoo penguins) may benefit as they expand their range southward15.

1.1.4 Warming of parts of the Southern Ocean surface waters could be as high as 1.5°C by 2100, although there is likely to be less warming (between 0.5 and 0.75°C) of bottom waters and other surface waters1,6. Ocean acidification as a result of increased CO2 uptake has recently been shown by British scientists to have had a detrimental effects on marine systems7, particularly on shell-building organisms including plankton species.

1.1.5 A reduction in annual mean sea-ice extent has been observed around the western Antarctic Peninsula8. Warmer waters and declining sea-ice have been associated with a decline in krill stocks of up to 80% in the southwest Atlantic9 and reduced availability of prey for higher predators 10,11,12. Changes in the extent of winter sea-ice habitat and prey availability may result in changes to the size and distribution of predator populations, or even the disappearance of some colonies.

1.1.6 Representative networks of marine and terrestrial Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) and Antarctic Specially Managed Areas (ASMAs) (designated within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting) and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) , designated by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR – see response to next section) are likely to become an increasingly important tool in mitigating the impacts of climate change, by ensuring that other pressures are minimised and thus improving the likelihood of withstanding or adapting to change. However, the timing, extent and location of climate change impacts on these ecosystems may be difficult to predict. It should remain a priority to aim for a representative network of ASPAs in line with Article 3 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, whilst ensuring that the protected area system remains dynamic and flexible, with the ability to respond to changes in the distribution and characteristics of values for protection.

1.2 Rapid Assessment of Circum-Arctic Ecosystem Resilience (RACER), and its possible application to the Antarctic Peninsula Region.

1.2.1 WWF has worked with the UK Government to highlight and raise the profile and understanding of climate change, adaptation & ecosystem resilience, and ocean acidification at ATCM and CCAMLR. In 2012, the UK delegation introduced WWF’s RACER methodology to the Antarctic Treaty Committee for Environmental Protection. RACER (www.panda.org/arctic/racer) is a new tool for identifying and mapping places of strategic conservation importance because they are, and will continue to be, sources of ecosystem resilience in a changing climate. The CEP endorsed a trial of RACER on a terrestrial area on the Antarctic Peninsula, which will take place in 2013.

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1.2.2 WWF developed RACER because current approaches to managing often vulnerable polar habitats and species are not necessarily keeping pace with accelerating climate change. RACER is a new approach which locates sources of ecological strength and durability in today’s Arctic ecosystems – known as ecosystem resilience - and tests their persistence in a climate-altered future. Focusing conservation attention on these enduring sources of resilience is important for the continued functioning of polar ecosystems.

1.2.3 As such, RACER might assist to underpin ecosystem-based management approaches for Antarctic environments in the context of climate change. The UK also introduced RACER to CCAMLR in October 2012, recommending that the Committee might remain alert to this trial in the terrestrial context, and assess whether such a trial might also be appropriate in the marine realm.

2. How the introduction of ‘Marine Protected Areas’ could safeguard the marine environment in the uninhabited territories

2.1 MPAs in the ‘British Antarctic Territory’. 2.1.1 WWF recognise that the UK Government, working with the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), are at the forefront of systematic conservation planning and marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean. 2.1.2 This was exemplified by the designation of the South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf Marine Protected Area (SOISS MPA) by CCAMLR in November 2009. The SOISS MPA, proposed by the UK, covers 94,000 km2. It was the world’s first MPA located entirely in the High Seas, and it prohibits all fishing activities. In 2010, WWF awarded BAS and CCAMLR its highest accolade – the prestigious Gift to the Earth award – in recognition of the SOISS MPA and CCAMLRs commitment to establishing a representative network of marine protected areas by 2012. 2.1.3 Despite some initial progress, however, CCAMLR failed to meet its MPA commitments this year, and much remains to be done by the UK Government, and others, to create the political will amongst all CCAMLR member states to ensure that ambitious and meaningful large scale MPAs, including marine reserves, are designated across the Southern Ocean, including the Antarctic Peninsula region, the Scotia Arc and the Weddell Sea. WWF and BAS participated in the first technical MPA planning workshops established by CCAMLR for the Antarctic Peninsula region (May 2012) and the circumpolar MPA workshop, including the Weddell Sea region (September 2012). 2.2 South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands MPA 2.2.1 In February 2012, the Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (GSGSSI) announced the designation of a Marine Protected Area covering 1.07 million km2 for the South Georgia maritime zone. WWF-UK considers this to be an important first step towards protecting one of the biodiversity 'gems' of the Southern Ocean, thereby helping to increase the resilience of the marine environment to the effects of climate change, and making a significant contribution towards CCAMLR's goal of a representative system of MPAs for the Convention Area, as well as wider global marine protection targets. 2.2.2 The provisions of the MPA management plan are set within the context of an exemplary fisheries management system which operates to an exceptionally high standard. Examples of existing good practice include minimum depth restrictions, responsive reductions in quotas, MSC certification of the South Georgia tooth-fish fishery and uniquely

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identifiable markings on hooks. In many cases, the regulations are stricter and the quotas lower than those set by CCAMLR. However, the area set aside as IUCN Category 1b 'no take’ (closed to fisheries) is 20,000km, or less than 2% of the total area. Other sub-Antarctic MPAs have included a much larger percentage area as no-take, for example the Prince Edward Islands at 38% No-take or Macquarie Island at 36% No-take. 2.2.3 It is commendable that GSGSSI have developed a number of proposals for additional and improved temporal and spatial protection measures (including closed areas) within less than 1 year of adopting the Management Plan. This includes a proposal for the seasonal closure of the krill fishery from October to April to provide temporal protection during the critical breeding period for many South Georgia species. WWF would strongly encourage the UK Government and the GSGSSI to maintain this level of commitment to continuous improvement, and to ambitiously pursue a high level of marine protection for the exceptionally biodiverse and globally important South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Such an approach might also consider taking a more wide-ranging, precautionary approach (in line with CCAMLRs precautionary principles). This is wholly appropriate given that South Georgia hosts exceptional populations of a number of species, including gentoo penguins and light-mantled sooty albatrosses (IUCN status: near-threatened); macaroni penguins, grey-headed albatross, wandering albatrosses and white chinned petrel (IUCN status: vulnerable) and black-browed albatross (IUCN status: endangered)

2.2.4 The South Georgia MPA may also serve to reduce the risk of oil pollution within the Territory’s maritime and coastal zone. The Management Plan states that a ban on the use and carriage of heavy fuels in inshore waters around SGSSI is ‘being considered’. WWF would urge GSGSSI to implement this provision as a matter of urgency, to mirror the recent ban within the adjacent Antarctic Treaty Area (south of 60 ͦ S). 2.2.5 The management plan however does not explicitly include any ban on commercial mineral resource activities (including oil and gas development) within the region. WWF recommends that the UK Government work with the GSGSSI to ensure a complete and indefinite precautionary ban on all commercial mineral resource activities within the area covered by the MPA. 11 December 2012

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Written evidence submitted by Government of Pitcairn Islands

1. Introduction The Pitcairn Islands are a group of four near-pristine small islands which can claim to be some of the most remote islands in the world. They consist of Pitcairn (the only inhabited island with a population of around 60); Henderson, a raised fossilised coral atoll which is designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site; Ducie, a coral atoll; and Oeno, a low coral atoll. All four islands in the group are recognised as Important Bird Areas (IBAs). Global Ocean Legacy, part of the PEW group, have submitted proposals to declare a Marine Reserve in the Pitcairn EEZ, covering 836,000 km2 of ocean. A National Geographic scientific expedition has declared the marine waters around Pitcairn Islands to be in a nearly unspoiled state. Pitcairn island itself is the peak of a extinct volcano with an approximate land area of 4.5 sq km and rising to a height of 347 metres above sea level. The inhabitants are mostly descendants of the mutineers of HMS Bounty and their Tahitian companions. The climate is sub tropical with rich volcanic soil and lush vegetation. Transport is by quad bike, and the island is in a mainly unspoiled condition.

Pitcairn has high volcanic steep slopes and a maximum altitude of 329m. Lying 1570km West of Easter Island, 5350km North East of New Zealand. 2. Non Government Organisations 2.1 Due to limited resources, a lack of academic experience and a vast array of challenges, the Pitcairn Islands rely heavily on the assistance and expertise of Non Government Organisations when it comes to environmental, conservation and legislative/procedure issues. 2.2 NGO’s such as UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF), The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and others provide support. We also try to share experience and lessons with other OT environmental/conservation departments by reviewing their models, policies and legislation.

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2.3 The Pitcairn Natural Resources Division is still relatively new (established in 2009) and evolving. It is therefore a priority not to re-invent the wheel but to share experiences with other OTs. 2.4 Compared to other OTs, Pitcairn’s Natural Resources Division is extremely small with a huge portfolio of responsibilities and no full-time staff. Limited Government salaries mean that the Division Manager is only paid to work 42 hours per month (the equivalent of just over 5 days a month) on leading this Government Division. In practice, many more (unpaid) hours are worked, but this is in a Territory with responsibility for over 40 globally threatened species, so much urgent work is necessarily left undone due to capacity constraints. More support is needed. 2.5 RSPB has played a major role in supporting Pitcairn’s conservation and rat eradication on Henderson Island. RSPB has provided long term support to Natural Resources Division and we will continue to work in partnership. This is a credit to RSPB. 3. Budgetary Aid/DFID 3.1 As Pitcairn is on Budgetary Aid we understand the responsibilities and accountability that lies with this. Budgetary Aid acts as a restraint on the development and implementation of certain areas within Natural Resources which can be frustrating for future development. As stated within the DFID Overseas Territories Department Operational Plan 2011-2015 the focus is on economic development and growth. 3.2 The Corporate and Programme Manager, Overseas Territories Department, DFID hasn’t visited Pitcairn, which is a disadvantage. In a recent Council meeting it was decided that a second invitation will be extended to the Corporate and Programme Manager to visit Pitcairn. The benefits of visiting Pitcairn will help the person within this role understand the logistics, infrastructure, and the daily workings of the Island without this creates a lack of knowledge first hand and reading from documents aren’t always accurate. 3.3 For the past 6 months the position of Environment, Climate & Natural Resources Adviser in DfID’s Overseas Territories Department has not been filled. Pitcairn relies on this position to provide information, advice and funding application assistance. It is disappointing that such an organisation has not filled such an important role. 4. UK Funding Streams 4.1 As a developing Division over the past 5 years we have utilised OTEP and now Darwin Plus for funding. We have received small grants from JNCC and RSPB during the Henderson Rat Eradication. 4.2 Other funding streams haven’t been utilised due to lack of knowledge, time constraints and lack of human resources and experience in drafting applications. Funding proposal timelines are often too short for small populated territories with limited resources and expertise. There is a huge and unrealistic pressure on the Pitcairn Natural Resources Division to perform at the same level as other, much larger, Environment Departments. 5. Conclusion 5.1 Pitcairn’s Natural Resources Division is an extremely small operation and must perform to the same level of competencies as other OT’s many of whom have full time government departments. This places unfair pressure on the Division Manager.

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5.2 Overseas Territories are often seen as a burden and of lesser importance by HMG. Pitcairn as an OT is not a burden; there is an opportunity for HMG to promote the OTs rich environmental wealth of endemic flora and fauna. HMG should be proud to be part of such unique culture and history. 5.3 The support received from NGO’s is invaluable to Pitcairn’s development. NGOs should be applauded for the work and support they provide to OTs and Pitcairn. It is shameful that HMG shows little interest. 13 December 2012

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Written evidence submitted by the Institute of Ecology and Environment Management

Summary

• IEEM welcomes the importance that the Government is starting to attach to the sustainable development within the UK Overseas Territories (UKOTs), especially in acknowledgement of the biodiversity that the UKOTs support.

• IEEM also recognises the UKOTs as a priority area and has recently established an Overseas Territories Special Interest Group (OT-SIG).

• The UK Government’s strategy for the UKOTs does incorporate the principles of sustainable development and discusses the need for the protection of biodiversity. Whilst the strategy identifies ways forward with regards to sustainable development, it is not clear how the UK Government intends to facilitate, generate or incentivise the relationships needed.

• In addition, more information is required as to how the UK Government will ensure that environmental factors are taken into consideration during the UKOTs development consents process.

• The IEEM OT-SIG is now building a network of partnerships across the UKOTs and their UK-based stakeholders to assist in co-ordinating, facilitating and supporting the balanced implementation of sustainable development, protection of biodiversity, climate change adaptation and the introduction of Marine Protected Areas within the UKOTs.

Introduction

1. The Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management (IEEM) aims to develop the science, technology and practice of ecology and environmental management for the benefit of people and biodiversity. As such, sustainable development is of paramount importance to its members. IEEM welcomes the importance that the Government is starting to attach to the sustainable development within the UK Overseas Territories (UKOTs), especially in acknowledgement of the biodiversity that the UKOTs support. IEEM also recognises the UKOTs as a priority area and has therefore recently established an Overseas Territories Special Interest Group (OT-SIG).

UK Government Strategy on the UKOTs

2. IEEM acknowledges the need for truly sustainable development within the inhabited UKOTs. This will allow them to grow within the international economy and meet the demands of inhabitants. The UK Government Strategy does acknowledge the key drivers for sustainable development. In light of the habitats and species present on this diverse range of territories, the UK Government must seek to do more to ensure that Territory Governments place “environmental consideration at the heart of decision-making” to balance the competing interests across the three pillars of sustainability (environmental, social and economic).

3. It still remains to be seen how the UK strategy will be translated into Territory policies, regulatory frameworks and decision-making and then implemented objectively. The UK Government needs to work more closely with the UKOTs administrations and local experts to ensure that the true ‘value’ of the

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ecological resources present is formally recognised by the Territory Governments. By working with local administrations and experts, the UK Government will achieve a true representation of how policies on paper are reflected on the ground and in the decision-making process. These working relationships needs to be facilitated (and possibly part-funded) by the UK Government in order to meet the goals of “strengthening the links between the Territories and the UK”.

4. Developments should be objectively ‘screened’ against ecological and other environmental criteria and for larger development formal assessments (such as Environmental Impact Assessments) should be undertaken to determine the true nature and extent of any potential environmental impacts. Only once this has been done, can the facets of sustainable development be reviewed and the appropriate decisions made.

5. As mentioned in the recent White Paper, UK experts not only have a lot to offer the UKOTs, but can also learn a lot from the UKOTs. In-country experts will be vital to the surveying and recording of the species and habitats present. These experts should be encouraged to pass on these skills to other inhabitants of the UKOTs. This ‘educating’ of future in-country surveyors, by current in-country surveyors and supported by others, is the only way that future developments (and the development process) will become truly sustainable.

6. The UK is a heavily developed country (unlike large portions of the UKOTs). As such, UK ecologists and land-managers are experienced in indentifying potential impacts associated with a development and proposing mitigation measures to reduce these impacts. They are also experienced in undertaking robust, repeatable surveys to establish baselines against which the effects of these predicted impacts can be measured. These skills (especially impact assessment) can be used to support in-country ecologists and decision-makers. This will ensure that all future development projects within the UKOTs acknowledge potential impacts and weigh these up against other considerations (such as those of an economic or social nature).

7. The promotion and development of relationships between the UKOTs and the UK should therefore be a key goal of the UK Government strategy. This includes raising awareness of the UKOTs within the UK, identifying relevant bodies within the UK to support the UKOTs and facilitating dialogue between these parties.

8. It is promising to see the Government discussing both the ‘protection’ and ‘management’ of ecological resources within the UKOTs. However, more information is required regarding the funding for these works and the responsibilities associated with monitoring the management measures. In addition, it would be beneficial to the UKOTs to see the ‘enhancement’ of their ecological resources.

9. Protecting the ecological integrity of the UKOTs is paramount to the sustainable development of the Territories. This involves identifying what is present, the sensitivities of the receptors, the risk these receptors face and what techniques work best at avoiding impacts on these receptors. In addition, it relies on the legal protection of the most important species and habitats. This protection needs to be monitored and enforced to ensure the protection of the most valuable and important ecosystems within the UKOTs.

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Without this formal protection it is harder to ensure that ecology factors into the decision-making process for developments.

10. The UK Government’s strategy for the UKOTs incorporates the principles of sustainable development and discusses the need for the protection of biodiversity. In addition, the White Paper provides examples of how activities such as tourism and fishing have been made sustainable with regards to ecological receptors. Whilst the strategy identifies ways forward with regards to sustainable development within the UKOTs, it is not clear how the UK Government intends to facilitate, generate or incentivise the relationships needed. In addition, more information is required as to how the UK Government will ensure that environmental factors are taken into consideration during the UKOTs development consents process. It is likely that much stricter protection of the UKOTs ecological assets will be required before they will fully feature in development decisions.

IEEM as Part of the Solution

11. It was recognised in informal discussions in November 2011 with representative of both the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF) and Joint Nature Conservation Council (JNCC) that IEEM members would be well placed to provide the UKOTs with information on best practice, governance and professional standards. Our members, through the IEEM OT-SIG, have expertise that covers not just ecological aspects, but also wider planning, EIA and sustainability considerations. These resources might be utilised in the form of the provision of electronic resources and documents, provision of visiting resources to the OTs, and through capacity building to develop appropriate skills for in-country ecologists, environmental managers and decision-makers.

12. The areas where there is most opportunity for the IEEM OT-SIG to provide input are through: • volunteers working on the ground supporting local projects; • professionals providing remote or on the ground mentoring and specialist

inputs to local initiatives; • identifying and assisting in applying for funding through a range of

mechanisms; and • capacity building and support to local government organisations,

communities, NGOs and other conservation bodies.

13. The IEEM OT-SIG is now establishing relationships with the view to building a network of partnerships across the UKOTs and their UK-based stakeholders to assist in co-ordinating, facilitating and supporting the balanced implementation of sustainable development, protection of biodiversity, climate change adaptation and the introduction of Marine Protected Areas within the UKOTs.

7 January 2013

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Written evidence submitted by Buglife 

 

1. Executive summary:  

1.1. Buglife  –  The  Invertebrate  Conservation  Trust  is  working  in  partnership  on  St  Helena  to  develop invertebrate conservation. Through this work we have been made aware of a number of failings during the construction of the new airport. These are having a large, adverse impact on the island’s ecology. 

 1.2. St Helena  is  ecologically  significant. On  Island 400  invertebrate  species  are  found nowhere  else on 

earth – surpassing the number of endemic species found in the UK and all other Overseas Territories put together.   

1.3. Plans for an airport have been confirmed and construction  is underway. The airport  is  located within Prosperous Bay Plain  in  the east of  the  island,  the  flattest area on St Helena. Prosperous Bay Plain contains a unique desert ecosystem in its Central Basin and surrounding ridges and valleys, comprising grits and dust with sheltered rock outcrops.   

1.4. Prosperous Bay Plain is the main evolutionary centre on St Helena for animals adapted to arid habitats. In the context of St Helena’s biodiversity, it is an area with an extraordinary concentration of endemic invertebrates – a globally significant  ‘biodiversity hotspot’.    It  is clear that  if  located  in  the mainland UK, Prosperous Bay Plain would be within  the very  top  tier of  the country’s most  important wildlife sites, and would be protected by a myriad of different national and international designations. 

 1.5. As part of planning process for the airport an Environmental Impact Assessment was carried out. This 

predicted a large adverse impact on the Island’s Central Basin and Prosperous Bay Plain and developed a  draft  Environmental Management  Plan  (EMP)  and  draft  Landscape  and  Ecology Mitigation  Plan (LEMP).   

1.6. The primary objectives of the LEMP were to provide compensatory habitats and landscape treatment to  reduce  and  offset  the  permanent  impacts  of  the  airport  and  its  associated  infrastructure.  This includes direct loss of habitat and the direct and indirect impacts on the landscape of the  island. The EMP makes it clear that the detailed landscape and ecological mitigation requirements would continue to be developed  in parallel  to  the design  to ensure  that any changes  to engineering works could be assessed and then avoided, mitigated or compensated.  

1.7. The detailed design of the LEMP has not run  in parallel and  is starting 16 months after construction was initiated. As a result Buglife considers there has been the avoidable loss of or serious damage to a number of areas of high ecological value and sensitivity. This  is due to requirements of the EMP not being met and/or not having detailed  information to ensure areas of high  importance are avoided or protected. This has been of particular impact when construction plans change.  

1.8. No detailed surveys have been carried out  to  identify sensitive areas and guide construction as was planned.  This  is  of  particular  issue  when  airport  engineering  plans  change,  as  they  seem  to  do frequently.  Construction  is  then  taking  place  before  the  impact  has  been  assessed, without  even thinking about how the  loss or damage may be avoided, mitigated or compensated. This  is having a serious impact on the population viability of rare species such as the endemic Mole spider.  

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1.9. There  are  on  the  ground  examples  indicating  that  airport  construction  is  not  being  adequately mitigated  and  compensated.  Avoidable  loss  of  and  damage  to  extremely  sensitive,  and  globally significant, habitat has already been caused due to environmental protection being a low priority and a  lack of forward planning. There has also been very  little monitoring and enforcement by St Helena Government  to  ensure  that  environmental  mitigation  activities  outlined  in  the  LEMP  are  being adequately delivered. In the context of the UK’s responsibility to protect the biodiversity on Overseas Territories this unique biodiversity hotspot should be of the highest priority. 

 1.10. We  strongly  recommend  that  further  information  is  sought  from  Department  for  International 

Development and the St Helena Government to clarify what steps are being taken to protect and also enhance biodiversity on St Helena. Permanent damage has already been caused and  if action  is not taken now species will become extinct. 

 2. Introduction 

2.1. Buglife – The Invertebrate Conservation Trust is the only charity in Europe devoted to the conservation of all  invertebrates, and  is passionately committed to saving the small things that run the world. The charity was established in 2002 and has a strong conservation track record, saving sites that are home to endangered species; promoting the conservation of invertebrates to the public and land managers; undertaking  research  and  surveys  essential  to planning  effective  action;  and  influencing policy  and legislation so as to benefit endangered species.  

 2.2. Buglife  strives  to  develop  international  invertebrate  conservation  by  undertaking  international 

projects.  Invertebrates are not  just  in  trouble on mainland UK,  there are  invertebrate  conservation issues across the globe, and notably in other parts of the EU and on the UK Overseas Territories. 

 2.3. Funded by the Darwin Initiative, Buglife is working in partnership with the St Helena National Trust, St 

Helena Government and  the Centre  for Ecology and Hydrology  (Edinburgh)  to develop  invertebrate conservation on St Helena and we  therefore have an  in depth understanding of  the value of  the St Helena wildlife.   

 2.4. St  Helena’s  flora  and  fauna  evolved  in  extreme  isolation,  resulting  in more  than  400  invertebrate 

species  found nowhere else on Earth. This  total surpasses  the number of endemics  found  in  the UK and  all  its  other Overseas  Territories  put  together.  For  this  reason,  St Helena  has  been  called  the ‘Galapagos of the South Atlantic’. 

 2.5. Plans for the new airport on St Helena have been approved, funded and construction is underway. We 

do not seek to stop this. However, through its work on St Helena Buglife has recently become aware of the apparent  failures  in  the delivery of  the environmental mitigation and compensation strategy  for the  airport  and  significant  changes  to  the  development  which  have  not  had  their  potential environmental  impacts  assessed.    In  our  view,  this  prevents  the UK Government  from  fulfilling  its responsibility to protect biodiversity in the UK Overseas Territories. 

 2.6. The purpose of this evidence is to raise awareness of the negative impact that the airport construction 

is having on the wildlife of St Helena which could be avoided. Going  forward we hope to encourage better quality of work from an environmental management perspective that is more transparent and engages with conservation organisations on St Helena that have detailed knowledge and expertise of the island’s ecology.  

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 3. Value of Prosperous Bay Plain 

 3.1. The airport is located within Prosperous Bay Plain in the east of the island, the flattest area on St 

Helena. Prosperous Bay Plain contains a unique desert ecosystem in its Central Basin and surrounding ridges and valleys, comprising grits and dust with sheltered rock outcrops.  

3.2. Prosperous Bay Plain is the main evolutionary centre on St Helena for animals adapted to arid habitats. In the context of St Helena’s biodiversity, it is an area with an extraordinary concentration of endemic invertebrates – a globally significant ‘biodiversity hotspot’.  As invertebrates are the principal group of endemic  animals  on  St Helena,  there  being  no  native  amphibians,  reptiles  or mammals  and  just  a single,  endemic  land  bird  still  extant,  Prosperous  Bay  Plain  is  of major  importance  to  St  Helena’s natural heritage.  

 3.3. The dusty, level floor of the Central Basin, a low lying depression within Prosperous Bay Plain, is a 

unique habitat on St Helena.  It is a miniature mature desert ecosystem, similar in character to deserts in continental Africa.  

3.4. A total of 35‐40 animal species and six genera that have been recorded on Prosperous Bay Plain occur nowhere else  in  the world. As  recently as 2003,  ten  species new  to  science were discovered  there, indicating  that  the  fauna  is  poorly  understood  and  there  are  probably  other  un‐described  species present. In addition, 51 species endemic to St Helena have been recorded from the area of Prosperous Bay Plain, though they are not restricted to it. 

 3.5. The  invertebrates found only  in the area of Prosperous Bay Plain are represented by a wide range of 

invertebrate  groups, not  just many  similar  species  in  a  single  group;  there  are  centipedes,  spiders, pseudoscorpions, mites, beetles, wasps, moths and flies: 

 • The pseudoscorpion Sphallowithius excelsus is like a miniature scorpion but without the stinging 

tail.  It lives in the dusty areas of the Central Basin. • Wolf spiders are a really special component of the Prosperous Bay Plain fauna, several species 

make burrows  in  the  soft dust,  e.g.  the Prowling wolf  spider Hogna nefasta  is  the dominant invertebrate  predator, while  the  Lurking wolf  spider  occurs  towards  the  eastern  end  of  the Central Basin, the area most at risk from the development, and is considered to be endangered and at serious risk (only eight specimens have been found to date). It has not yet been given a scientific name and has been temporarily assigned to Trochosippa sp.  

• A  further  un‐described  and  rare  species  of  restricted  range,  recently  christened  the  ‘Mole spider’, is also endemic to Prosperous Bay Plain. It is possibly the only large spider in the world to live rather like a mole, exclusively in subterranean tunnels which it digs itself.  

• Endemic weevils  are  very  species  rich  on  Prosperous  Bay  Plain, with  Xestophasis  xerophilus being found only there and associated with the native Samphire plant. 

• The  tachinid  fly  Atlantomyia  nitida  is  probably  a  parasite  of  the  endemic  grasshoppers  but appears to be very rare. 

 3.6. It is clear that if located in the mainland UK, Prosperous Bay Plain would be within the very top tier of 

the country’s most important wildlife sites, and would be protected by a myriad of different national and  international designations. Permission to develop such a site  in the UK would be very unlikely to be granted.  

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 4. Impact of airport construction  4.1. The  airport  development  is predicted  to  take  around  163 hectares of  the  Prosperous Bay  Plain.  In 

addition to this 8.11 hectares of the Central Basin will be lost to the airport development area.   4.2. The  St  Helena  Airport  Environmental  Statement  (2008)  concluded  that  the  desert  habitats  of 

Prosperous  Bay  Plain  were  of  Very  High  Value  for  their  ecological  interest  and  of  International Importance. A Large Adverse  impact was predicted  for the desert ecosystems of PBP and  its Central Basin.  

 4.3. To mitigate and compensate the acknowledged Large Adverse environmental impact of the airport, a 

draft Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and draft Landscape and Ecology Mitigation Plan (LEMP) were  produced.  The  documents  were  part  of  the  St  Helena  Airport  Environmental  Statement published  in 2007 and which subsequently supported the application for development permission  in 2008.  

 

4.4. Within  these  documents  the  St  Helena  Government  (SHG)  and  Department  for  International Development  (DfID)  state  that  they  will  to  seek  the  highest  possible  standards  of  environmental management  during  construction  and  operation  of  the  [airport]  works1.  It  also  states  that  the Environmental Management  Plan will  remain  in  draft  form  to  the  start  of  construction2  and  that changes, both significant and minor, will be incorporated into the Environmental Management Plan as it develops. 

 

4.5. The primary objectives of the LEMP were to provide compensatory habitats and landscape treatment to  reduce  and  offset  the  impacts  of  the  airport  and  its  associated  infrastructure.  This  includes permanent direct loss of habitat and the direct and indirect impacts on the landscape resource of the islands. The EMP makes  it  clear  that  the detailed  landscape and ecological mitigation  requirements would continue to be developed  in parallel to the design to ensure that any changes to engineering works could be assessed and avoided, mitigated or compensated.  

 

4.6. The draft LEMP set out the range of activities considered necessary to establish the means to provide compensatory  habitat  and  landscape  treatment.  Principle  activities  included:  pre‐construction  site preparation, plant production management,  germplasm  collection, plant production,  landscape  and ecology mitigation planting, alien plant control & maintenance and long term management. 

 4.7. The  LEMP  first  initiated  in  September  2008  was  scaled  back  significantly  and  then  halted, 

understandably, following the pause and then cessation of negotiations for air access. This work was limited  to a one‐year programme, which collected a very  small amount of  seed  to  start building up plant stocks  for compensatory habitat. No direct mitigation  for  the permanent or  temporary  loss of habitat was undertaken.   

 

1 Department for International Development and St Helena Government (2007) St Helena Airport and Supporting Infrastructure Environmental Management Plan ‐ Stage 1 Draft Report page 1 http://www.sainthelenaaccess.com/application/  2 Department for International Development and St Helena Government (2007) St Helena Airport and Supporting Infrastructure Environmental Management Plan ‐ Stage 1 Draft Report para 1.3.1 http://www.sainthelenaaccess.com/application/  

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4.8. In  June  2010  the  Rt  Honourable  Andrew Mitchell MP,  then  International  Development  Secretary, confirmed the UK Government’s willingness to fund an airport for St Helena subject to conditions. In 2011  there  were  engineering  modifications  and  an  Environmental  Statement  Addendum  was produced reviewing past work and addressing some of the engineering revisions. 

 4.9. In  a written Ministerial  Statement  to  Parliament  on  3rd November  2011  it was  confirmed  that  the 

conditions had been met and the design, build and operate contract awarded to Basil Read (Pty) Ltd.   4.10. In March 2012 DfID initiated the search to appoint a supplier to provide ecology mitigation services to 

the  Government  of  St  Helena  to  deliver  LEMP  (www.government‐online.net/ecology‐mitigation‐st‐helena/).  

 4.11. A year later in March 2013 the Airport Project board that governs the Airport Project gave approval for 

the LEMP of £870,000  to be managed by  the St Helena Government Air Access Office  (AA).  It  is not clear how this sum is to be allocated, if it is enough to mitigate and compensate a major development with a large adverse impact or what will happen if further compensation work is needed once the fund has been allocated.  

 

4.12. The St Helena Airport update  issue no 28 (26th March 2013) stated that detailed design and planning for  the  LEMP has begun. As of May 2013  airport  construction works have been underway over 16 months.  

 4.13. Due  to  the detailed design of  the  LEMP  starting 16 months after  construction was  initiated Buglife 

considers  there  has  been  the  avoidable  loss  of  or  serious  damage  to  a  number  of  areas  of  high ecological  value  and  sensitivity.  This  is due  to  requirements of  the  EMP not  being met  and/or not having detailed  information  to ensure areas of high  importance are avoided or protected. This has been of particular impact when construction plans change. For example:  

i. Advanced  pre‐construction works  that  formed  part  of  the mitigation  requirements  of  the project are not underway and this will  impact on ecologically sensitive habitats and species as  well  as  the  quality  of  environmental management  of  the  development.  For  example, ecologically  sensitive  areas  of  habitats  and  species,  including  and most  importantly,  the unique Central Basin  area of  Prosperous Bay  Plain has not been  adequately protected by physical barriers or signage to prevent damage or additional disturbance (by works or access) during construction. Fencing of the Central Basin was  identified as a key method of  limiting the damage to this area prior to the construction.  

 ii. The  baseline  surveys  carried  out  as  part  of  the  original  EIA  do  not  provide  an  accurate 

baseline data set to work from. It was intended that more detailed surveys would be carried out prior to construction to  inform development. As a result  it  is not possible to accurately assess  the  impact  of  construction  or  to  guide  construction works  and mitigation  plans  to avoid unnecessary environmental damage.  

   We  are  aware  that  in  some  areas  detailed  habitat  and  invertebrate  surveys  have  been 

carried out, but  the  report  and  its  findings  are not  in public domain despite  a number of requests  for  the  information over  the  last nine months. Even more alarming  is  that one of 

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the  areas  identified  as  of  high  value was  destroyed  shortly  after  it was  pointed  out.  This demonstrates the lack of transparency in the construction process. 

     Surveys appear to be either not undertaken at all or commissioned  late  in the construction 

process, which imposes limited options for avoidance, reduction, mitigation or compensation of impacts.  

 iii. The endemic Mole spider has been previously recorded in the Central Basin but no surveys of 

the  size or health of  the population have been  conducted  that we are aware of.  It  is also known on one site near the Airport Contractor's construction camp at Bradley's and on the southern ridge of the Central Basin3.   On  the  southern  ridge, the  one  population was  expected  to  be  directly  impacted  by  the construction and  one  to  be  lost  entirely  to  the  runway.  Airport  engineering  plans  have changed  and  the  construction  footprint  has  now  resulted  in  the  additional  loss  of  the majority  of habitat  across  the  southern  ridge.  This  could  impinge  on  the  viability  of  the population, particularly as no attempt has been made to mitigate this loss. It may have been possible  to  translocate  the population had  further assessment of  the  impacts been carried out  in  advance.  Remaining  areas  of  habitat may  be  at  risk  of  additional  disturbance  and damage as there are no physical protective measures in place.   The  population  at  Bradley’s  Camp  is  now  likely  to  be  destroyed  to  create  a  triangulation station for the airport. It is not clear why this area of habitat has been selected when there are similar habitats unoccupied by the spiders, including the area temporarily being used to house septic tanks, all around this area. Unfortunately, the story of the mole spider  is  likely to  be  indicative  of  how  other  less  charismatic  species,  concentrated  around  the  Airport Development Area, are being affected by the development.  

 iv. The recently constructed access road from Rupert’s Bay has resulted in the creation of a spoil 

slip slope covering the original vegetation that is highly prone to erosion. The vegetation lost contained  Samphire which was  important  for  a  number  of  species  only  recorded  in  that particular area.  If  there had been  further  refinement of  the EMP  this  interest would have been identified and its loss may have been avoided.   

v. Part  of  the  mitigation  strategy  was  to  restore  areas  under  temporary  use  and  create compensatory  habitat  for  permanent  habitat  loss  using  native  species. Without  detailed baseline  surveys  it  is  not  possible  to  accurately  assess  the  quantity  and  types  of compensatory habitat required. As the surface of the majority of the construction area has now been scraped, this task has been rendered impossible. 

 vi. Some areas of compensatory habitat may need to be stocked with native species from areas 

to be lost to development. These would be propagated primarily through seed collection and then cultivated. The delay  in  the start of  the LEMP means  that  important plant areas have already been destroyed, severely compromising this aspect of compensation.  

 

3 Department for International Development and St Helena Government (2007) St Helena Airport Environmental Statement Vol 4 Appendix 9.1 Terrestrial Ecology and Nature Conservation ‐ Detailed Assessments page 14 http://www.sainthelenaaccess.com/application/  

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vii. In  this  arid  and  sensitive  environment  dust  levels  arising  from  the  development  are unavoidable but controlling them is an important and required component of the mitigation measures. We are concerned about dust levels and the need to protect ecologically sensitive habitats adjacent to the development. The  impacts of dust on the habitats and species are not fully understood and need to be monitored in order to allow action if levels rise too high. Heavy coatings of dust are  likely to have a serious effect, particularly on annual plants and sensitive  lichen  species, which  form major  food  sources  for  the  invertebrates of  the Plain. The Environmental Statement  indicates  that barriers will be used as needed but none are evident at this point in time. 

 4.14. These  examples  indicate  that  the  airport  construction  is  not  being  adequately  mitigated  and 

compensated. Avoidable  loss of and damage  to extremely  sensitive, and globally  significant, habitat has already been caused due to environmental protection being a  low priority and a  lack of forward planning. There has also been  very  little monitoring and enforcement by  St Helena Government  to ensure that environmental mitigation activities outlined  in the LEMP are being adequately delivered. In the context of the UK’s responsibility to protect the biodiversity on Overseas Territories this unique biodiversity hotspot should be of the highest priority. 

 5. Recommendations for Committee 

 5.1. As mentioned above, going forward we would like to see a more transparent way of working secured. 

Buglife and the on island conservation organisations are able to give specialist ecological advice on the wildlife of St Helena. As the construction  is moving at such pace action needs to be taken quickly to ensure that further habitat is not destroyed or damaged needlessly.  

 5.2. Buglife recommends that further  information  is sought from DfID to establish the on  Island situation 

and ensure that environmental protection is high on the St Helena Government agenda. This needs to be demonstrated on the ground through sensitive construction. We suggest the following information is obtained from DfID to help understand the situation: 

• What  is the  timetable  for  the revised LEMP and what  impact on St Helena’s biodiversity will there be by not having this in place from the start of construction?  

• Will the revised LEMP review the level of mitigation and compensation required to offset the additional environmental impact? What will the procedure be if mitigation and compensation exceeds the budget set by DfID? 

• When  engineering  and  design  plans  have  changed  is  construction  being  realised  after environmental  assessment  has  been  carried  out?  If  so,  when  will  the  survey  and  impact assessment information be in the public domain? The current absence of detail is contributing to the lack of transparency around the project.   

• What monitoring and auditing  is being carried out to ensure that mitigation measures are  in place and working?   

• What  process  is  used  to weigh  up  the  costs  of  impact  on  the  environment  (e.g. potential extinction  of a  very  rare  endemic  species)  relative  to  the  financial  savings  gained  by  a particular change to the construction design? 

• To what extent has DfID devolved environmental management and oversight of  the airport construction  project  to  the  St Helena Government? We  have  concerns  that  environmental protection  is  being  and will  continue  to  be  compromised  as  St Helena Government  is  also required to deliver the airport to time and to budget. This is a clear conflict of interest.  

 

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 13 May 2013 

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Written evidence submitted by the Governor of Gibraltar, Adrian Johns

Thank you for your letter of 25 March about the Environment Audit Committee’s Sustainability in the Overseas Territories Inquiry. Before addressing your questions I thought I would it might be helpful to you if I were to set out some of the context in which I am replying.

Under Gibraltar’s current 2006 Constitution, the Governor remains responsible for external affairs, defence, internal security and for certain functions in relation to appointments to public office while HM Government of Gibraltar (HMGoG) has responsibility for all areas not specifically assigned to him in the Constitution. This includes environmental management.

Of the Overseas Territories, Gibraltar holds the unique position of being within the European Union by virtue of Article 355(3) of the TFEU. This provides much of the framework for Gibraltar’s environmental law and practice. While the UK Government is ultimately responsible under the Treaty for the implementation of EU law in Gibraltar, EU measures are in practice implemented within Gibraltar by means of legislation enacted by Gibraltar’s Parliament. The Governor has no formal role in either Cabinet meetings or within Parliament, although all primary legislation comes to him for Assent. The Governor may withhold Assent in certain narrowly defined circumstances. In transposing the wide range of EU directives and regulations in the environmental sphere, HMGoG enjoys a healthy relationship with Defra and DECC from the initial proposal stage through to implementation. HMGoG is up-to-date in the transposition of post-Lisbon EU directives into domestic law.

What role do you have in regards to the environment in your territory, both in terms of overall strategy and on particular developments/projects in the territory?

As set out above, environmental management including sustainability is a responsibility devolved to HMGoG.

How much of a priority is the environment and sustainable development to the government of the territory? How do you engage with the territory’s government on these issues? Are there any particular examples of where developments/projects have proceeded which would damage the environment, and what if any input did you make in such cases?

The priority attached to the environment is a question more appropriately addressed to HMGoG given their devolved responsibility. I can however inform you that the present government’s manifesto does sets out their proposed environmental policies including a carbon neutral Gibraltar, an environmental impact assessment for all policies, examination of possibilities on bunkering at sea and land based storage, power generation/alternative energy, renewable energy funding and regulation of fishing. HMGoG hosted a Thinking Green conference and trade fair in October 2012 which profiled many of their policies. The speakers included former US Vice President Al Gore and Juan Verde, then International Co-Chair of President Obama’s re-election campaign.

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The Environment Minister, the Hon Dr John Cortes, comes from a strong environmental background, is a Chartered Environmentalist and a member of the Institute of Ecology & Environmental Management. He received an MBE in 2003 for services to Ecology and the Environment.

What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in your territory? Is there any draft environmental legislation that has stalled? Have you declined previously to enact any environmental legislation and what were the reasons behind that decision(s)?

Again a devolved area of responsibility but I am not aware of any stalled legislation. As mentioned, all necessary legislation to comply with EU law has been enacted.

What is the nature and frequency of your contact with UK government departments and UK Ministers on environmental or economic development issues in the territory?

HMGoG enjoy a healthy working relationship with Defra and DECC both on EU work and also relating to the extension of international conventions to Gibraltar. Minister Cortes called on Defra and DECC Ministers in April 2012 during a visit to the UK.

What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory Government to account for their environmental practices?

Again this is a matter more appropriately addressed to HMGoG. I can however inform the Committee that it is an HMGoG policy to consider every decision against its potential environmental impact. The Development & Planning Commission (DPC) also considers the potential environmental impact of all new projects. The DPC is chaired by the (independent) Town Planner and commission members include the Environment Minister and Gibraltar NGO the Environmental Safety Group.

Gibraltar also has a Public Services Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is an independent authority, whose functions are to investigate complaints received from the general public about acts of maladministration undertaken by HMGoG and certain public bodies and contractors. This could potentially include environmental malpractice.

Given your role in regards to standards in public office, on what environmental grounds would you seek to remove territory government officials from office?

Through his general responsibility for ensuring good government, the Governor has responsibility for some public appointments including some senior civil servants. This question is however hypothetical and is more appropriately addressed to HMGoG.

I hope that the information above helps your inquiry. In my role as Governor, I of course keep in touch with HMGoG on a broad range of issues including the environment and I ensure that the UK Government is aware of the views of HMGoG including on EU issues relating to the environment and vice versa.

19 April 2013

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Written evidence submitted by the Governor of Bermuda, George Fergusson.

Thank you for your email to me, along with the Governors of other Overseas Territories, enclosing a questionnaire about the role of Governors in dealing with environmental matters. I am attaching the questionnaire completed in respect of Bermuda.

You will see from the responses that Governors’ constitutional roles vary considerably across the Territories. In the case of Bermuda, the Governor’s formal constitutional role is limited to matters of national security, police, defence and international relations, together with a role in some important appointments, some of which, like that of the Ombudsman, can become involved in environmental matters. But for the most part responsibility for environmental matters is devolved to the elected Government. As a result, some of the answers to the questionnaire end up being more a matter for the Government of Bermuda than for the Governor. I have answered the questions as fully as I can, nonetheless, and hope they are of use to the Committee.

Bermuda is one of the most advanced Overseas Territories. Its constitution was adopted in 1968 and was designed to be a stepping stone towards independence. Unlike other Overseas Territories the Governor has no role in Cabinet or Legislative Assembly proceedings. He has the same special responsibilities (external affairs, defence, including armed forces, internal security and the police) but must work in collaboration with the relevant Minister to accomplish his goals. As the Governor does not sit in Cabinet he is kept informed of policies outside of his responsibility through Cabinet Papers, and is provided a copy of all papers which are presented to Cabinet. He also receives a copy of the minutes of Cabinet meetings following each meeting.

1. What role do you have in regards to the environment in your territory, both in terms of overall strategy and on particular developments/projects in the territory?

The Governor only has direct involvement in environmental projects if it is something which the UK Government is involved in, for example by a potential implication for international obligations and conventions, or if there is a project which cuts across his special responsibilities as set out in the constitution. Environment is a devolved responsibility of the Government of Bermuda. As such the Governor does not have any involvement in the development of overarching strategies for the environment. If there is an environmental project which involves international obligations Government House uses its excellent relationships with the Bermuda Department for Environment, the Minister and Permanent Secretary, to discuss the project or development and to help provide guidance and assistance. The cooperation has worked very well with projects such as the Sargasso Sea initiative being very much discussed between Government House and the Bermuda Department for Environment. The Governor also has an informal role through asking questions and making suggestions.

2. How much of a priority is the environment and sustainable development to the government of the territory?

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The Government of Bermuda sees the protection of its natural environment as very important but this question is primarily a matter for the Bermuda Government itself. There are many Acts which protect the environment and promote sustainable development, including:

Protected Species Act 2003

Endangered Animals and Plants Act 2006

Water resources Act 1975

Clean Air Act 1991

Bermuda National Parks Act 1986

The Department for Conservation Services works to monitor and protect the environment. The Government of Bermuda signed up to be part of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and were asked to take part in the second. They have agreed in principle.

(a) Are there any particular examples of where developments/projects have proceeded which would damage the environment, and what if any input did you make in such cases?

The Governor appoints a number of senior officials within the Civil Service who work to oversee the work of government. One of these appointees, the Ombudsman, has investigated Special Development Orders (SDOs) in Bermuda for compliance with the UK Environment Charter. A copy of the special report, which was in some respects critical, can be found at www.ombudsman.bm. Bermuda signed up to the Charter in 2001 but has not followed it invariably in relation to large developments on the Island. As mentioned previously, when the Cabinet papers are seen in Government House it is possible for the Governor to raise an issue or offer help on a planned project. But we have no power to intervene unless it crosses one of the Governors special responsibilities.

3. What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in your territory?

(a) Is there any draft legislation that has stalled?

We are not informed of draft legislation and its progress. This query would be better raised with the Government of Bermuda. Draft legislation is taken to the Cabinet before it is put forward to the House of Assembly.

(b) Have you declined previously to enact any environmental legislation and what were the reasons behind that decision(s)?

As far as we are aware the Governor of Bermuda has never refused to enact any Environmental Legislation. It is not in his power to do so unless it would breach the UK's international obligations.

4. What is the nature and frequency of your contact with UK government departments and UK Ministers on environmental or economic development issues in the territory?

When necessary we interact with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) on matters pertaining to the environment in the

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Territory. Ministers from Defra attended the Joint Ministerial Council hosted by the FCO which was attended by representatives from OT Governments. They were able to talk to the Territories and Governors about the environment and climate change. Most recently we have had contact with them over the Sargasso Sea initiative being put forward by the Government of Bermuda and the Sargasso Sea Alliance. Defra have been very involved and provided representation at international conferences and fora for the project. We have also begun work on an environmental mainstreaming project. This FCO-funded project which is managed by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee has been successfully piloted in the British Virgin Islands and the Falkland Islands. It aims to encourage elected representatives, civil servants and the private sector to consider environmental impact in decision-making across the board.

5. What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory Government to account for their environmental practices?

See comments on the role of the Ombudsman under question 2a. Bermuda MPs can and do raise issues in the House of Assembly: there is an active civil society with a range of environmental organizations; and the media is active on environmental matters.

6. Given your role in regards to standards in public office, on what environmental grounds would you seek to remove territory government officials from office?

The Governor only appoints a small number of senior officials and has no role in appointing any other civil servants. The dismissal of any government official would be resolved through normal disciplinary procedures and the Government of Bermuda would be best placed to answer this question.

The Governor's Office and the Office of the Deputy Governor in Bermuda help support environmental projects where they can. Bermuda has recently benefitted from funding through the Darwin Plus Initiative and in the past has been a recipient of funding through the Overseas Territories Environment Programme. Government House keeps in touch with many environmental organisations and projects, providing support either through use of the House for events or through patronage at events. We continue to look for other ways to help environmental projects.

18 April 2013

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Written evidence submitted by Gina Ebanks-Petrie, Director, Department of Environment, Cayman Islands

What particular aspects of environmental support/admin/funding from the UK Government is welcomed?

We particularly welcome the opportunity to access technical and scientific expertise in UK government environment departments and NGO’s on an ‘as needed’ basis. It is therefore important that we are able to identify individuals within Defra, DECC, FCO, UK CITES Management and Scientific Authorities etc to whom we can directly address questions. This is not always easy. We tend to have fewer communications issues with JNCC, Kew, etc. Any funding is appreciated and welcomed.

What environmental support/admin/funding is not welcomed?

Generally we welcome any support and funding that is offered. However, there are times when a request for assistance or involvement in projects materialises when either the project is not relevant to priorities in the territory or the timing is not convenient due to a lack of available resources. This can sometimes be counterproductive.

Would the Governor taking a closer interest in environmental protection be appropriate?

While political will to tackle environmental issues remains low it would be useful for the Governor to maintain an oversight role from the perspective of good governance.

What more should the UK Government be doing to support environmental protection in the overseas territories?

With the responsibility for the environment being a matter that has been constitutionally delegated to an elected Minister, the UK’s role in this regard is arguably limited to the provision of funding and technical support and/or expertise. However, we also believe it would be helpful for HMG to require regular reporting from UKOT Ministers of Environment on key environmental issues, perhaps by making the environment a regular/standing agenda item on the annual Ministerial Council meetings. We also think it would be useful for HMG to encourage and assist UKOTs to develop relevant biodiversity and sustainable development indicators which can be reported against.

Does the 2012 White Paper, which sets out the UK Government’s strategy, meet your expectations?

Not really - for a strategy level document we found the paper lacking in specifics and detail.

To what extent is the UK Government discharging its international responsibilities concerning the environment and biodiversity?

We find this difficult to answer. If the question can be asked differently we will attempt a response.

Do UK government departments work effectively together on overseas territory issues?

There is room for improvement.

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Would you welcome stronger support from any UK departments in particular?

At the moment we would welcome stronger support from DECC on issues relating to Climate Change.

The UK Government has consolidated its environmental protection funding for the overseas territories into the ‘Darwin Plus’ Fund. Is this a positive development and is the Fund big enough to support the work that is needed?

Generally we welcome the launch of the Darwin Plus Fund in that its remit is wide enough to cover almost any issue that would be a priority in our territory. However, as we understand it, work in the UKOTS is now outside the remit of the regular Darwin Initiative funding which means that there is a real potential that the environmental agenda in the territories will be set by the funding needs of UK and/or international NGO’s and agencies, as opposed to being driven by realities and needs on the ground in the individual territories.

Do your environmental departments have enough staff and the technical expertise you need?

Generally speaking we are well resourced and there is a high retention of qualified, local personnel (currently there are 31 fulltime staff operating on the three islands, 90% of which are qualified Caymanians). However, we have recently lost funding for four research posts and three conservation (enforcement) officer posts so are feeling the impact of these losses on a daily basis. Our scientific and technical personnel also do not possess all of the skills and expertise that may need to be applied to particular problems so we very much rely on collaboration with UK and other academic institutions and government agencies.

What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in the territory?

The Draft National Conservation Law, updated Marine Parks regulations, and regulations for the protection of Nassau grouper remain in draft form. Two national policies are also still in draft form – National Climate Change Policy and National Energy Policy. The Endangered Species Trade and Transport Law has been passed by the Legislative Assembly but has not yet been implemented. Also of note is the fact that the physical Development Plan for Grand Cayman is seriously out of date (the current plan is dated 1997), despite there being a legal requirement for it to be reviewed and revised every five years.

Is there a role for the UK Government to ensure that this legislation is enacted?

Perhaps through the reporting requirements mentioned earlier.

What estimates have the territory’s government made of the value of natural resources and ecosystem services to the economy of the territory?

None. However, the DoE is about to embark on a prioritisation exercise for economic assessment of ecosystem services through JNCC funding.

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What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory government to account for their environmental practices?

There is FOI legislation but without the National Conservation Law and a legal requirement to consult on the environmental impacts of decision, plans and policies (and no legislated process for EIAs) then the opportunities for scrutiny are very limited.

18 April 2013

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Written evidence submitted by Nigel Haywood, Governor of the Falkland Islands

What role do you have in regards to the environment in your territory, both in terms of overall strategy and on particular developments/projects in the territory?

The Governor sees agendas and minutes of the Environmental Committee but does not typically attend the meetings. The Governor can feed his views to this committee through formal letters or informal conversation with committee members.

The Governor’s position in Executive Council enables oversight of all environmental policy/strategy within the Islands. The Governor has the authority to request Environmental Impact Assessments.

Environmental Mainstreaming Project oversight – The Governor has a place on the Project Oversight Group and attends meetings and contributes to this forum.

How much of a priority is the environment and sustainable development to the government of the territory?

The Environment is one of 11 priority areas identified in the Islands Plan, which aims to ensure the conservation of the Islands’ environmental heritage and biodiversity and seeks to enhance environmental protection.

The Islands developed a Biodiversity Strategy in 2008, supported by a detailed environmental baseline assessment (State of the Environment Report) which was reviewed in 2012.

The Falkland Islands Government (FIG) has signed up to a number of international agreements in its own right. FIG has committed to achieving the objectives of:

• The Kyoto Protocol • Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) • Ramsar Convention • Conservation of Migratory Species of Animals • Conservation of Albatross & Petrels (ACAP)

The Islands have been leaders in the development of wind power. The Islands’ six wind turbines provide 40% of Stanley’s electricity. Extensive investments have been made in providing wind power to settlements and individual farms in rural areas – to the extent that most now have 24hr power and with a commensurate reduction in the use of diesel fuels. FIG has recently concluded negotiations with the Ministry of Defence to construct additional turbines to provide power to the Mount Pleasant Complex, further reducing the use of fossil fuels on the Islands.

Environmental funding is low in the context of the overall FIG budget. Total annual funding of c£200,000 (less than 1% of FIG annual budget) includes funding for Falklands Conservation (£70k) and an Environmental Studies Budget (£60k).

The recently formed Environmental Mainstreaming Group is a Forum to further encourage and support ‘greening’ of government and industry.

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In 2012 FIG announced the creation of the South Atlantic Environmental Research Institute, along with seedcorn funding to develop the institute over a three year period. The Institute has a high level of political support and is successfully engaging with partners from other OTs, in the UK and the rest of the world.

Reflecting the high priority attached to the environment in the Islands, FIG recently announced that hydrocarbon developments would be required to undertake a detailed ‘Environmental Case’ in support of any proposals put forward. This is a significant step and will enable the Islands to be at the forefront of environmental management of a new hydrocarbons sector. The Government is also actively reviewing its safety and emergency management processes and procedures, which will include environmental protection.

How do you engage with the territory’s government on these issues?

I engage with FIG regularly at a number of levels – through weekly meetings with Members of the Legislative Assembly, weekly meetings with the Chief Executive and Attorney General, and others as appropriate. More formally, I chair the monthly Executive Council. Environmental issues feature as appropriate in these discussions.

Are there any particular examples of where developments/projects have proceeded which would damage the environment, and what if any input did you make in such cases?

There are no specific examples. However planning and EIA legislation is dated, and is a concern as oil exploration progresses. The gap has been identified by FIG and plans are in place to address it.

What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in your territory? Is there any draft environmental legislation that has stalled? Have you declined previously to enact any environmental legislation and what were the reasons behind that decision(s)?

The terrestrial Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) legislation is still in draft, and has not yet been subject to public consultation due to a lack of capacity in FIG (both in Environmental Planning and in Attorney General’s Chambers). I have not declined to enact any environmental legislation.

What is the nature and frequency of your contact with UK government departments and UK Ministers on environmental or economic development issues in the territory?

Such issues are discussed formally at the annual Overseas Territories Joint Ministerial Council, attended by Overseas Territories leaders, UK Ministers and Governors. Otherwise, contact is through Overseas Territories Directorate in the FCO as and when necessary.

What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory Government to account for their environmental practices?

The Committee system within FIG is transparent and allows the public and NGOs to attend and the Environmental Committee has lay members. All committees are open for the press and public to attend. Agendas and papers are available for public scrutiny three days in advance of each meeting.

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The JNCC Environmental Mainstreaming Project is attempting to encourage ‘green’ business and overcome what is perceived to be generally poor environmental practices in much of the private sector (and to some extent within Government).

Falklands Conservation provide independent scrutiny to FIG on environmental issues (though are largely funded by FIG).

Given your role in regards to standards in public office, on what environmental grounds would you seek to remove territory government officials from office?

It is difficult to answer such a hypothetical question. Discipline and removal of public officers is covered by s85 of the Constitution, and the Management Code which it describes. There are no explicit environmental grounds for removal set out in either document.

18April 2013

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Written evidence submitted by Nigel Haywood, Commissioner for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands

The territory of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands has no resident population. It is managed by an appointed Government (GSGSSI), based in Stanley in the Falkland Islands. Oversight of the Government comes through the Polar Regions Department in the Overseas Territories Directorate of the FCO, but day-to-day management of the Territory, including environmental issues, rests with GSGSSI.

The Commissioner has overall responsibility for the management of the Territory and of the GSGSSI team, which has four full-time staff (including an Environment Officer) based in Stanley and three Government Officers, who work on rotation on South Georgia. There is a strong environmental element to the small Government team, with four of the seven full-time staff having a PhD in biological or environmental science.

Environmental issues are a high priority in all of GSGSSI’s work. South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands are home to an incredible abundance and diversity of both marine and terrestrial wildlife, including globally significant populations of seabirds and marine mammals. The presence of such diverse and abundant wildlife means that environmental protection is at the heart of all activities in the territory. Fisheries, which provide the main source of income to the territory, are amongst the best managed and most highly regulated in the world and this has been recognised by MSC certification of the Patagonian toothfish and mackerel icefish fisheries as well as part of the krill fishery. We continually strive to improve our fisheries management and have been pioneers in introducing environmentally sensitive fishing practices. Tourism is also carefully managed and monitored, with a limited number of sites accessible to visitors.

GSGSSI supported the establishment of the South Atlantic Environmental Research Institute (SAERI). The Chief Executive is a board member. GSGSSI provides some financial support, and has used its offices to establish a PhD studentship. We plan to use SAERI more extensively for logistical and coordination work as its capacities develop.

Legislation

Developing robust legislation is essential to underpin sound environmental management. In 2010 we enacted the Wildlife and Protected Areas Ordinance, which gives full protection to the native wildlife of the territory. It also enables the declaration of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and Specially Protected Areas. In February 2012 the Marine Protected Areas was enacted, creating a large (1 million km 2) sustainable use MPA, which will shortly be strengthened by additional protection.

Further legislation will be developed in the course of the next two years. Whilst particular focus will be on administration of justice, other areas of environmental legislation (notably marine pollution and terrestrial Specially Protected Areas) will be addressed. Legislation is drafted by the Attorney General’s Chambers in the Falkland Islands. Lack of capacity is an issue, and we are considering farming drafting out to the UK.

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Funding and support from the UK Government

Links to UK Government departments are particularly important as a small team cannot have suitable expertise in all areas. In SGSSI we are fortunate to be able to call on expertise at the British Antarctic Survey, who have a long history of scientific research on and around South Georgia. GSGSSI staff are in regular contact with the Polar Regions Department in the FCO and links with DEFRA are facilitated through a JNCC point of contact, Anton Wolfaardt, who is based in Stanley. This post is part-funded by the South Atlantic OTs and partly by DEFRA. Dr Wolfaardt was originally appointed as co-ordinator for activities in the South Atlantic territories in support of the Agreement on Albatross and Petrels (ACAP), but has since taken on a broader role. Unfortunately he will be leaving post later this year, though we hope that his post will be retained.

The establishment of Darwin Plus is a step forward in that it combines funds previously available under OTEP and Darwin, however there is a considerable amount of high priority environmental work that is not funded. For example, in South Georgia an eradication of introduced reindeer is being funded from GSGSSI reserves, whilst a rodent eradication is being undertaken by a charitable trust (South Georgia Heritage Trust, SGHT). In the case of the reindeer eradication an application to Darwin was rejected. DEFRA have provided some funds towards the rat eradication and we understand the SGHT have recently secured some Darwin Plus funding to support the eradication of mice.

Further financial support from the UK Government would be of great benefit to SGSSI, priority areas include work on marine and terrestrial biodiversity to underpin our desire to see the Convention on Biological Diversity extended to the territory; work on invasive mammals and plants, including monitoring the recovery of the native wildlife after eradications; and work in support of our commitments to the ACAP.

Value of Natural Resources and Ecosystem Services

No formal assessment has been undertaken of the value of natural resources and ecosystem services, although in collaboration with United Nations Environment Programme-World Conservation Monitoring Centre and funded by the Darwin Challenge fund, such an assessment is currently underway. However, in a place like South Georgia, where environmental considerations are central to all activities, outcomes of such analyses may not be particularly applicable.

Accountability

The GSGSSI team are accountable to the Commissioner and to the Overseas Territories Directorate in the FCO. GSGSSI organises an annual stakeholder meeting at which environmental issues are openly discussed. Any major projects are subject to expert and stakeholder review to ensure best practice is adopted.

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Written evidence submitted by Boyd McCleary, Governor of the British Virgin Islands

What role do you have in regards to the environment in your territory, both in terms of overall strategy and on particular developments/projects in the territory?

The environment is a devolved responsibility. Overall strategy and policy decisions on particular developments/projects are therefore matters for the Territory government. My main role within environmental decision-making is to promote good governance i.e. to ensure that proper procedures are followed which are in line with international best practice.

As Governor of the Territory, I chair meetings of Cabinet. In this capacity, I am involved in any environmental matters that come to Cabinet. My office liaises between the Territory Government and UK government departments to ensure that any requests from the Territory Government for technical assistance are passed on.

How much of a priority is the environment and sustainable development to the government of the territory?

This question would be better directed towards the bodies within the Territory Government with responsibility for environmental matters, currently:

• Environment - Ministry of Natural Resources and Labour; • Energy - Ministry of Communications and Works • Waste Management - Ministry of Health and Social Development • Development - Town and Country Planning, Premier's Office.

The Virgin Islands Constitution enshrines the commitment of the government to protect the environment. Section 29 of Chapter Two says -

‘Every person has the right to an environment that is generally not harmful to his or her health or well-being and to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through such laws as may be enacted by the Legislature including laws to -

• prevent pollution and ecological degradation; • promote conservation; and • secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting

justifiable economic and social development.’

How do you engage with the territory's government on these issues? Are there any particular examples of where developments/projects have proceeded which would damage the environment, and what if any input did you make in such cases?

In line with the principles outlined in the 2012 Overseas Territories White Paper, we are able to put the British Virgin Islands Government in touch with UK Government Departments who can supply expertise, technical support and sometimes funding.

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In addition to the Darwin Plus Fund which is administered by DEFRA, and open to all Overseas Territories, my office has a modest delegated project fund which we use to support projects by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Labour and Non-Governmental Organisations.

BVI has also participated in the pilot for an environmental mainstreaming project. This FCO-funded project aims to encourage elected representatives, civil servants and the private sector to consider environmental impact in decision-making across the board.

The BVI is co-hosting the Caribbean Challenge Initiative Summit in May which will see Caribbean political leaders and company CEOs come together to make significant environmental commitments - such as protecting 20% of near-shore coastal environment by 2020. My office is offering support where requested and I will attend. My office actively engages with BVI Government led initiatives. These include an annual clean up of coastal areas, Earth Day activities and supporting Environment Month.

My office also acts as a conduit between the Territory Government and the UK Government on international conventions relating to the environment.

What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in your territory? Is there any draft environmental legislation that has stalled? Have you declined previously to enact any environmental legislation and what were the reasons behind that decision(s)?

Comprehensive environmental legislation entitled the "Environmental Management and Conservation of Biodiversity Bill" was drafted in 2008 and is currently under review by the Territory Government.

What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory Government to account for their environmental practices?

The National Parks Act 2006 is one of the major pieces of conservation legislation. It allows for areas to be designated as, for example, nature reserves, wilderness areas or national parks. It makes it possible to restrict activities and access to terrestrial and marine areas. It also makes provision for voluntary conservation agreements with landowners. Science-based criteria form the basis for designations.

The Physical Planning Act 2004 sets out a development assessment regime, including restricting development, designating protection areas, controlling activities and access, and requiring EIA for certain activities (there are no SEA requirements). The Act provides for public participation and consultation on development and has mechanisms for enforcement and non-compliance, but it does not provide a comprehensive regime.

The Fisheries Act (1999) and Regulations (2003) makes provision for the promotion, management and conservation of fisheries resources. It allows for the designation of marine and fisheries protected areas and for measure to be taken to prevent, reduce and control pollution of fishery waters and the marine environment.

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Also in April 2012, the British Virgin Islands signed the Protocols for Effective Financial Management (PEFM) and they were incorporated into law in October 2012. Section 11 of the PEFM says that for capital projects with a lifetime value above 5% of forecast annual recurrent revenue and funded from recurrent surplus or conventional borrowing:

‘independent expert advice such as (but not limited to) accounting, legal, financial, economic and environmental advice will be sought from parties outside the public sector.’

What is the nature and frequency of your contact with UK government departments and UK Ministers on environmental or economic development issues in the territory?

Environment and development issues are discussed formally at the annual Overseas Territories’ Joint Ministerial Council (JMC). This takes place in December in London each year and is attended by UK Ministers, Governors and Overseas Territories’ leaders. Governors also meet UK Ministers twice a year (i) prior to the JMC and (ii) during the week of the FCO’s annual meeting of senior civil servants the FCO Leadership Conference. We have been engaging with DFID in relation to the Caribbean Challenge Initiative Summit referred to above.

Given your role in regards to standards in public office, on what environmental grounds would you seek to remove territory government officials from office?

This is a hypothetical question, but I would follow the normal disciplinary procedures set out in the Constitution, relevant legislation and General Orders for the Public Service.

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Written evidence submitted by the Governor of Anguilla, Alistair Harrison

Thank you for your letter of 25 March 2013. I set out my answers to your questions below, but many of them are for the elected Government of Anguilla (GoA) to answer more fully. I have therefore forwarded your letter to the Minister for the Environment Hon. Jerome Roberts and his colleagues. I understand that you have also written separately to the Government of Anguilla (GoA).

Turning to your questions in order:

- As in most of the Overseas Territories, the environment is a devolved matter for the GoA. My role is limited to that on all devolved matters: I act as the Chair of Executive Council (EXCO, effectively the cabinet) and can therefore influence discussion to some extent. But decisions are taken by the four elected Ministers. However, in addition to the work we do with the Darwin Initiative and other strategic funds, my Office has some small devolved project funds that we use to assist Anguilla in capacity building and other support including environmental work. Examples are the support we have given to opening a Centre for Vocational and Technical Education, an outreach initiative with the National Trust “youth with nature” and a sports ground water capture and filtration system. Anguilla also recently participated in the environmental mainstreaming initiative which was funded by Defra (and managed by JNCC). The initiative aims to encourage elected representatives, civil servants and the private sector to consider environmental impact in decision-making across the board. The Governor’s office played a key role in working with JNCC to ensure local buy-in to this initiative -and I opened and closed the 3-day workshop.

- The priority placed on environment and sustainable development is a matter for the GoA. My input is limited to my chairing EXCO as noted above and where practicable helping to share UK best practice and expertise.

- Legislation pending is also a matter for the GoA, who bring legislation to the House of Assembly. My input is as above and I have never declined to assent to environmental legislation. Nor, as far as I am aware, have any of my predecessors.

- I attend the annual meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council (JMC) which brings together the Governors and elected governments of all the OTs in London each autumn, and associated meetings involving all Governors. There are usually further meetings involving Governors in London in the late Spring. Defra is represented at the JMC at Ministerial level, and officials attend relevant parts of the other meetings.

- All projects, including those with potential environmental impact, are subject to local planning laws. In the case of the marine environment, for example, a decision by the Minister for the Environment can be appealed to the full EXCO (as has happened on two occasions recently – you have received a letter dated 16 April from one of the appellants in the most recent appeal).

- This is a hypothetical question, but I would follow the normal disciplinary procedures if necessary.

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Written evidence submitted by the Governor of Montserrat, Adrian Davis

1. Thank you for your letter of 25 March.

2. Environment conservation and protection is a devolved responsibility on which the Government of Montserrat (GOM) takes the lead. Environmental issues and the need for legislation etc. would generally be decided in Cabinet and I chair discussions in Cabinet.

3. The Governor’s office has provided £10,000 to help with the establishment of an environmental programme by Coral Cay Conservation http://www.coralcay.org/expedition-locations/montserrat/. There is also an on-going project on preserving the mountain chicken funded by the Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust http://www.durrell.org/animals/amphibians/mountain-chicken/

Under the Darwin Initiative, a project was completed to designate the Centre Hills as a national park. Like other Overseas Territories, Montserrat is eligible to apply for project funding from the Darwin Plus Challenge Fund.

4. The issue of how much priority is given to the environment is a question that should be addressed to the Government of Montserrat. I engage as necessary via my chairmanship of the Cabinet. I would simply note that the implementation of a Strategic Growth Programme (SGP), which is being agreed with DFID, is Montserrat’s highest priority. This consists of the development of geo-thermal energy, improved access by air and sea, the construction of a port and breakwater and the re-installation of a fibre optic cable. Discussions are ongoing between the UK and Montserrat Governments about how the SGP will be funded. Project design has fully taken on board the need to conduct environmental impact appraisals and to ensure adequate public consultation as required by existing legislation.

5. On environmental legislation, the Conservation and Environmental Management Bill remains in draft form. The latest draft of the Bill was submitted to the Ministry of Housing, Agriculture, Lands and the Environment (MAHLE) on April 2, 2013 for review and distribution to the relevant stakeholders. Once the draft Bill is deemed satisfactory, the next step will be submission to Cabinet. There is currently no stalled draft environmental legislation. Additionally, there is no record of any environmental legislation for which enactment has been declined.

6. The SGP is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding which was signed by DFID Ministers and the GOM on 1 May 2012. The MOU specifies that an appropriate legal and institutional framework for environmental management should be in place. This includes GoM enacting the Conservation and Environmental Management Bill. GoM is in the process of recruiting an Environment Officer for MAHLE which will be financed from DFID technical cooperation funds.

7. The primary existing legislation governing environmental matters is the Forestry, Wildlife, National Parks and Protected Areas Act (Cap. 12.03), which provides for the administration, conservation and proper use of forests, the protection and management of wildlife, the establishment

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and maintenance of national parks and protected areas and for connected matters. The Endangered Animals and Plants Act (Cap. 12.01), Beach Protection Act (Cap. 12.04) and the Turtles Act (Cap. 12.06), to a lesser extent address environmental matters.

8. Our main contact with UK Government Departments other than the FCO is with DFID. All DFID projects (which form the bulk of GoM development projects) are subject to climate and environment appraisal prior to completed design and implementation. For example DFID are financing the development and rehabilitation of the hospital on the existing site rather than expecting GoM to develop a new site. As mentioned above, the exploitation of geothermal energy exploration will hopefully improve Montserrat’s economy and fiscal position but also to reduce or remove GoM dependence on fossil fuels. The DFID contribution to the island is considerable. They expect to spend around £36 million in Montserrat in 2013/14.

9. Environment and development issues are also formally discussed at the annual Overseas Territories’ Joint Ministerial Council (JMC). This takes place in November/December in London each year and is attended by UK Ministers, Governors and the leaders of the Overseas Territories. Governors also meet UK Ministers twice a year (i) prior to the JMC and (ii) during the week of the FCO’s annual meeting of senior civil servants.

10. In respect of the scrutiny mechanisms in place by virtue of the legislation set out above, the MAHLE is best equipped to provide a more comprehensive response. As mentioned, there is a standard requirement for EIAs for major project proposals. Ultimately recourse to the courts can be pursued. Under the new Montserrat constitution a Complaints Commission has been established which provides another avenue for citizens to make their concerns known. If representations are made to me, I will pursue issues with the relevant officials if I consider it appropriate.

11. The final bullet point is entirely hypothetical. Proposals to remove any public officials need to follow established procedures as set out in the Public Administration Act and in the general orders covering the roles and conduct of public servants.

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Written evidence submitted by the Governor of the Cayman Islands, Duncan Taylor 

 

Thank you for your letter dated 25 March 2013 in which you asked for information about how UK government departments support Overseas Territories’ governments on environmental matters. 

What role do you have in regards to the environment in your territory, both in terms of overall strategy and on particular developments/projects in the territory? 

As you rightly state, environment is a devolved responsibility. Overall strategy and policy decisions on particular developments/projects are therefore matters for the local government. My main role within environmental decision‐making is to promote good governance i.e. to ensure that proper procedures are followed which are in line with international best practice. My office liaises between the Cayman Islands Government and UK government departments to ensure that any requests for technical assistance are passed on.  

How much of a priority is the environment and sustainable development to the government of the territory? 

This question would be better directed towards the bodies within the Cayman Islands Government with responsibility for environmental matters, currently: 

• Environment ‐ Ministry of Health, Environment, Youth, Sports and Culture; • Energy and Waste Management ‐ Ministry of Finance, District Administration, Works, Lands 

and Agriculture; • Development ‐ Ministry of Tourism and Development. 

You may be aware that a general election will be held in the Cayman Islands on 22 May. The allocation of responsibilities/portfolios may change with the formation of a new government.  

How do you engage with the territory's government on these issues? Are there any particular examples of where developments/projects have proceeded which would damage the environment, and what if any input did you make in such cases? 

In line with the principles outlined in the 2012 Overseas Territories White Paper, we are able to put the Cayman Islands Government in touch with UK Government Departments who can supply expertise, technical support and sometimes funding. In addition to the Darwin Plus Fund, which is administered by DEFRA and open to all the Overseas Territories, my office also has a modest delegated project fund which we use to support projects by the Department of Environment (DoE) and Non‐Governmental Organisations. 

Projects which we have supported since 2011 include: 

• A DoE lionfish study. The study analysed the population and feeding habits of this invasive species; 

• Funding attendance at regional conservation workshops for National Trust representatives; • A study by a private individual and the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew seeking to develop 

genetic fingerprints for endangered endemic orchids; 

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• Purchase of an Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler for the Central Caribbean Marine Institute on Little Cayman. 

We have also begun work on an environmental mainstreaming project. This FCO funded project which is managed by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee, has been successfully piloted in the British Virgin Islands and the Falkland Islands. It aims to encourage elected representatives, civil servants and the private sector to consider environmental impact in decision‐making across the board. 

What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in your territory? Is there any draft environmental legislation that has stalled? Have you declined previously to enact any environmental legislation and what were the reasons behind that decision(s)? 

The most important piece of legislation which remains in draft form is the National Conservation Law. There is currently no requirement in the Cayman Islands for environmental impact to be taken into account when making decisions on development projects. This comprehensive draft law would rectify this, requiring environmental impact assessments to be carried out and public consultation to be conducted. It would also create a list of endangered species to be protected and put restrictions on land use in some areas. Despite having first been drafted a decade ago and despite extensive public consultation, this Bill has not yet been taken to the Legislative Assembly. It was included in the Throne Speech setting out the Government's legislative proposals for the years 2010 and 2012 but was not brought forward. 

 There is also a draft Climate Change Policy. This is the result in part of a DfID sponsored project. Again, there has been much public consultation, but no bill has been taken to the Legislative Assembly yet. 

The Endangered Species (Trade and Transport) Law (2004) has been enacted by the Legislative Assembly, but it has not yet been put into effect by the Cabinet of the Cayman Islands Government. The Law would bring the Cayman Islands into compliance with CITES. The Cayman Islands currently rely on CITES legislation dating from 1976, and some species newly included under CITES e.g. black coral, are not included in the older legislation. 

What is the nature and frequency of your contact with UK government departments and UK Ministers on environmental or economic development issues in the territory? 

Environment and development issues are discussed formally at the annual Overseas Territories’ Joint Ministerial Council (GMC). This takes place in December in London each year and is attended by UK Ministers, Governors and Overseas Territories' leaders. Governors also meet UK Ministers twice a year (i) prior to the JMC and (li) during the week of the FCO's annual meeting of senior civil servants the Leadership Conference.  

What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory Government to account for their environmental practices? 

In November 2012, part 1 of the 2009 Cayman Islands Constitution ‐ the Bill of Rights – came into force. Unlike many countries' Bills of Rights, it contains a section on the environment. Section 18 Protection of the Environment states: 

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(1) Government shall, in all its decisions, have due regard to the need to foster and protect an environment that is not harmful to the health 01' well‐being of present and future generations, while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 

(2) To this end government should adopt reasonable legislative and other measures to protect the heritage and wildlife and the land and sea biodiversity of the Cayman Islands that  

(a) Limit pollution and ecological degradation; 

(b) Promote conservation and biodiversity and 

(c) Secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources. 

Also in November 2012, the Cayman Islands enshrined the Framework for Fiscal Responsibility (FFR) into law. Section 20 of the FFR requires that for any development projects with a value above CI$10m (approximately £8m) or projects which are Public Private Partnerships: 

... the Cayman Islands Government will retain independent accounting, legal, financial, economic, environmental, and other technical advice as appropriate to ensure value for money. 

However, the National Conservation Law, which would become the main scrutiny mechanism, has not yet been passed into law. 

Given your role in regards to standards in public office, on what environmental grounds would you seek to remove territory government officials from office? 

The dismissal of any government official would be resolved through normal disciplinary procedures as set out in the Public Service Management Law. 

I understand that you and another member from your Committee will be visiting the Cayman Islands in June. I look forward to meeting you and to discussing these issues with you. 

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Written evidence submitted by Governor of St Helena, Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha, Mark Capes

Background note:

Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) has developed a more-coordinated approach to environmental management in the United Kingdom’s Overseas Territories (UK OTs) since 2008 with the Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) playing a more prominent role. The cross-Whitehall approach appears to be extending to other departments of HMG in keeping with the principles of the Overseas Territories White Paper.

Although there are similarities among the UK OTs, there are significant differences in scale, location, isolation, climate, population and wealth, which means that when addressing conservation issues in the OTs, one size does not fit all.

St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha welcome and have benefitted from UK government funding and technical support and this has made a significant difference for nature conservation and environmental management in general on the islands.

To successfully address the threats to biodiversity, St Helena in particular will continue to rely on the UK for financial and technical support for some years but the short term nature of project funding is not always the most cost-effective or sustainable way of supporting environmental work. A longer-term programme approach to support would probably deliver efficiencies and better value for money.

Questions for the Governor

(1) What role do you have in regards to the environment in your territory, both in terms of overall strategy and on particular developments/projects in the territory?

I am Governor of three territories: St Helena, Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha.

St. Helena Government (SHG) has a Natural Resources, Environment and Development Committee, chaired by an Elected Member of Legislative Council; it has political oversight of the environment portfolio within Government. The Governor in Council makes higher level strategic decisions drawing on advice and recommendations from the Environment Committee and other stakeholders. Since the establishment of our Environmental Management Directorate, we have:

• Included ‘effective management of the environment’ in St. Helena’s Sustainable Development Plan as one of our 3 national goals reflecting the 3 pillars of sustainable development.

• Created our National Environmental Management Plan • Designated 23 National Conservation Areas in our land development control plan • Added environmental law to our legislation calendar (this law is currently being drafted) • Created a solid waste management strategy for the island • Agreed that tax incentives for importing ‘green’ materials will be considered this year. • Signed off a solid waste management capital project • Formalised the species action plan for the critically endangered Wirebird

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• All Executive Council (Cabinet) memos require a statement on the environmental impact of the decisions being put to Council. This statement is reviewed by our Environmental Management Directorate and taken into account when decisions are made.

Through my office I make financial contributions to work on the environment through the Overseas Territories Programme Fund (OTPF) and ‘Darwin Plus’ funded by the FCO, DfID and DEFRA. Some recent contributions were:

o St. Helena Active Participation in Enterprise (SHAPE):: Darwin Plus 99,200 pounds for a paper and card recycling unit

o St Helena National Trust: OTPF 10,000 pounds for ‘Heritage Building Skills’ training o EMD: OTPF 4.940 pounds to erect an information hut in the Peaks National Park o St Helena Conservation Group: Darwin Plus 8,650 pounds to fund a rare plant census

SHG’s recurrent budget provides core funding to:

• The Environmental Management Directorate, to provide strategic oversight of the environment.

• Health and Social Welfare Directorate to run the waste collection service • SHAPE a social enterprise focussing on employment for disabled people, a key focus of which

involves recycling paper and cardboard products. • The St. Helena National Trust, a non-governmental organisation focussed on protection and

conservation of the natural and built environment • The museum of St. Helena

On Ascension Island, I chair the Ascension Island Council, which provides me with advice on all issues impacting the Island, including on the environment. I also have overall oversight of the Ascension Island Government, though day-today running is vested by me in the Administrator of Ascension Island. The Ascension Island Government funds a Conservation Department and an Environmental Management team. A review of the structure of these teams, with the aim of developing one, efficient structure with oversight of conservation, waste management and climate change issues under one senior official reporting to the island’s Administrator, has started. These teams preserve and protect the island’s conservation and biodiversity including endemic plants and animals, provide solid waste management and provide oversight of and support for scientific research on the island.

The Conservation Department has received significant projected funding from the Darwin Fund and OTEP. The Administrator has also used funds devolved to him by me to provide smaller support, most recently to promote biodiversity awareness on Green Mountain.

On Tristan da Cunha, the Administrator, appointed by the Governor, is President of the Island Council, which has oversight of environmental issues. Council has a Conservation Committee where policies are formulated and environmental issues discussed.

There is a conservation department that manages conservation and environmental issues. The Administrator is line manager of the head of conservation, has regular contact with the department

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and regularly visits and reviews their projects. He also keeps in close contact with major environmental stake holders e.g. RSPB.

(2) How much of a priority is the environment and sustainable development to the government of the territory? How do you engage with the territory’s government on these issues? Are there any particular examples of where developments/projects have proceeded which would damage the environment, and what if any input did you make in such cases?

Conservation of the environment is of vital importance to the government of St Helena, not least because it is a key part of St Helena’s attraction for tourists. As mentioned above in (1) the environment is one of our 3 National Goals and is supported by a National Environmental Management Plan.

There is a rigorous Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process in place, so the requirement for an EIA is identified for developments through a recently modernised planning application process. Not aware of any development projects that have not been properly managed from an environmental perspective.

The same priority on these issues is given by the Ascension Government. While a formal EIA process is not yet in place, environmental impacts are part of the process in the development of projects and legislation.

As the Tristan archipelago includes two world heritage sites (Gough and Inaccessible) and is an important home to millions of sea birds and endemic species, the Tristan Government takes its bio diversity responsibilities seriously. This was highlighted in 2011 when a bulk carrier went aground and sank off Nightingale Island. The Island’s response to this environmental disaster illustrated just how vital the Tristan Government considers the environment, despite the extreme lack of resources and capacity on the island. The community’s response was recognised with the award of the 2012 RSPB Medal.

(3) What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in your territory? Is there any draft environmental legislation that has stalled? Have you declined previously to enact any environmental legislation and what were the reasons behind that decision(s)?

St Helena has recently reviewed all of its environmental legislation and is in the process of drafting a new environment law to update and address any gaps. When drafting work is complete the new law will follow the same process as any other law required to be enacted on island. I have not declined to enact any environmental legislation.

On Ascension, the Island Council is considering a draft Ordinance on Marine Protection. This will allow the Administrator, on the Council’s advice, to bring in protection measures for particular marine species. I have not declined to enact any legislation relating to Ascension.

Tristan’s conservation legislation was updated in 2006. There are no outstanding or stalled ordinances in the pipeline.

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(4) What is the nature and frequency of your contact with UK government departments and UK Ministers on environmental or economic development issues in the territory?

As Governor I Chair Executive Council (Cabinet) and so have oversight of every major policy decision taken by government that has an environmental impact. On some environmental issues I may consult with the FCO or other UK government departments. For example, in looking to develop a sustainable fishing industry we have had close and detailed consultations with UK officials to ensure that any fishing activity is well regulated and managed to ensure compliance with UK and international best practice. Last year I held a video conference with DEFRA Minister Richard Benyon to mark the launch of SHG’s new Environment Management Directorate. There was also input from DEFRA at the annual Joint Ministerial Council for Overseas Territories held in London last November. We work closely with DfID in particular on managing the environmental aspects of the airport construction project on St Helena.

The same applies for Ascension Island except day-to-day interaction with UK Government Departments is managed by the Administrator.

On Tristan the Administrator keeps in contact with the FCO and DfID on both economic development and environmental issues but with officials, not ministers. Tristan is in receipt of JNCC, OTEP, Darwin and RSPB funding.

(5) What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory Government to account for their environmental practices?

The Natural Resources, Environment and Development Committee (see 1, above) has political oversight of our environmental issues, which are also closely monitored by NGOs such as the St Helena National Trust and the Heritage Society. Development legislation and regulations apply strict environmental controls to planning and development permission.

On Ascension, political oversight is provided by the Island Council.

On Tristan conservation legislation and Council oversight of environmental and conservation issues ensures that Tristan’s environmental responsibilities are scrutinised. The conservation department itself plays an important part to ensure compliance. A fairly recent example was when some wooden containers were brought in from Cape Town for a major project. The department was quick to alert government that the wood was not properly treated and suggested steps to mitigate against the impact of invasive beetles.

Tristan has a bio diversity action plan to cover the period 2011-2015, which spells out the responsibilities of individual departments and individuals.

All visitors to Gough, Inaccessible and Nightingale must comply with landing regulations. All landings at the outer islands must be accompanied by environmental/conservation officers.

(6) Given your role in regards to standards in public office, on what environmental grounds would you seek to remove territory government officials from office?

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Any dismissal from the public service would be guided by the employment rules covering the actions of public servants.

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Written evidence submitted by Nick Rendell, Environmental Officer, Environmental Planning Department, Falkland Islands Government.

Thank you for your letter of 25th March 2013 requesting information relating to sustainability in the Falkland Islands. I have put together a response to the specific questions you supplied which has been copied to members of the Environmental Committee – the statutory committee administered by the FIG Environmental Planning Dept and is responsible for overseeing environmental management in the Falkland Islands.

What particular aspects of environmental support/admin/funding from the UK Government is welcomed? What environmental support/admin/funding is not welcomed? Would the Governor taking a closer interest in environmental protection be appropriate?

Funding

UK Government funding is vital to running conservation programmes in the Falkland Islands. The Falkland Islands Government has made it clear in the past that external funding is necessary to implement the Falkland Islands Biodiversity Strategy 2008-18. We currently require roughly £300K per year (2008 figures, so this figure is higher in real terms now) to undertake conservation-based research and environmental management to fully implement the Biodiversity Strategy. Of this around £200K is provided by FIG, to Falklands Conservation (the main conservation NGO in the Islands) and FIG Environmental Planning Dept. The remainder is down to external funding. There are very few environmental funding streams available to us. Those available funding streams we have accessed are Darwin Initiative funds (now Darwin Plus only), EU BEST and EDF funding and historically OTEP. Project application success has varied, and has led to ad hoc delivery of conservation programmes and research.

Long-term funding is required to support capacity building, retaining locally-based individuals in conservation and environmentally related positions to retain knowledge and integrate conservation efforts into the community.

Support and Admin

JNCC offer useful support and admin to facilitate small scale training as well as securing larger one off funding support. This is very much appreciated and is the main contact the Environmental Planning Dept has with UK Government Departments. I am not aware of the FI NGO groups having relationships with any UK Government Departments.

Governor’s role

There is a subtlety regarding perceptions of recommendations on environmental action being placed by UK institutions on the Falkland Islands. FI led priorities stemming from the Biodiversity Strategy and FI Islands Plan should be identified and pursued by the Governor where appropriate.

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What more should the UK Government be doing to support environmental protection in the overseas territories. Does the 2012 White Paper, which sets out the UK Government’s strategy, meet your expectations?

There should be a commitment from UK Government to better support the OTs through enhanced long-term project funding, given that the vast majority of UK biodiversity is held in the Overseas Territories. The 2012 white paper sets out this commitment in principle but does not detail an adequate funding strategy.

To what extent is the UK Government discharging its international responsibilities concerning the environment and biodiversity?

The Environment is one of 11 priority areas identified in the Falkland Islands ‘Islands Plan’, which aims to ensure the conservation of the Islands environmental heritage and biodiversity; and seeks to enhance environmental protection.

The Falkland Islands developed a Biodiversity Strategy in 2008 (supported by a detailed environmental baseline assessment (State of the Environment Report) which was reviewed in 2011.

The Falkland Islands Government has signed up to a number of international agreements in its own right. FIG has committed to achieving the objectives of:

– The Kyoto Protocol

– Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)

– Ramsar Convention

– Conservation of Migratory Species of Animals

– Conservation of Albatross & Petrels (ACAP)

The Islands have been first movers amongst OCTs in the development of wind power. The Islands six wind turbines provide 40% of Stanley’s electricity and extensive investments have been made in providing wind power to settlements and individual farms in rural areas – to the extent that most now have 24hr power and with a commensurate reduction in the use of diesel fuels. FIG has recently concluded negotiations with the Ministry of Defence to construct additional turbines to provide power to the Mount Pleasant Complex, further reducing the use of fossil fuels on the Islands.

Environmental funding is low in the context of the overall FIG budget. Total annual funding of c£200,000 (less than 1% of FIG annual budget) includes funding for Falklands Conservation (£70k) and an Environmental Studies Budget (£60k).

The recently formed Environmental Mainstreaming Group is a Forum to further encourage and support ‘greening’ of government and industry.

In 2012 FIG announced the creation of the South Atlantic Environmental Research Institute, along with seedcorn funding to develop the institute over a three year period. The Institute has a high level

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of political support and is successfully engaging with partners from other OTs, in the UK and the rest of the world.

Reflecting the high priority attached to the environment in the Islands, FIG recently announced that hydrocarbon developments would be required to undertake a detailed ‘Environmental Case’ in support of any proposals put forward. This is a significant step and will enable the Islands to be at the forefront of environmental management of a new hydrocarbons sector. The Government is also actively reviewing its safety and emergency management processes and procedures, which will include environmental protection.

There is a relatively small amount of funding available for environmental work in the OTs. Two million pounds per year from UK Government compared to hundreds of million available to UK mainland projects.

Do UK government departments work effectively together on overseas territory issues? Would you welcome stronger support from any UK departments in particular?

I do not understand the UK Government Department structures well enough to comment in detail. There seems to be very poor connectivity between UK departments and down to OTs. JNCC are a very useful contact who are very supportive and could give access to UK Government depts.

The UK Government has consolidated its environmental protection funding for the overseas territories into the ‘Darwin Plus’ Fund. Is this a positive development and is the Fund big enough to support the work that is needed?

The Darwin Plus Fund is positive, but at £2 million between 14 territories, this is still not enough funding. The removal of eligibility of non-ODA eligible OTs from Darwin’s main round is a backward step.

Do your environmental departments have enough staff and the technical expertise you need?

No. One full time staff member within FIG working on the environment. A subvention of £70K to Falklands Conservation helps support 3 positions. Support for more permanent positions should be a responsibility of FIG.

We do have access to outside expert advice on many subjects from JNCC and RGB Kew which is helpful. Low staffing means we rarely have time to draw on sources of external advice fully.

What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in the territory? Is there a role for the UK Government to ensure that this legislation is enacted?

Notable is draft terrestrial Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) legislation. This is in draft form and not yet consulted on due to general lack of capacity in FIG, both for relevant departments to comment and for Attorney General’s Chambers to progress.

What estimates have the territory’s government made of the value of natural resources and ecosystem services to the economy of the territory?

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Very crude estimates on primary economy areas (fisheries, agriculture and some aspects of tourism). Currently a FCO and JNCC-funded pilot project assessing ecosystem services in the Falklands which may lead to a National Ecosystem Assessment exercise. So some progress in this area. Support for this work is mixed at all levels.

What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory government to account for their environmental practices?

The committee system within FIG committees is generally transparent and allows public and NGOs to see what is planned and taking place and to advise and comment.

Environmental Mainstreaming Project is attempting to better ‘green’ business, as there is a poor approach to environmental thinking in government department s and much of the private sector.

Falklands Conservation provide independent scrutiny to FIG on environmental issues. Even with links to Birdlife International, FC are fully occupied implementing their own research and conservation priorities and do not have sufficient resources to undertake this as well as they might.

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Written evidence submitted by Mr Karim V D Hodge, Director, Environment: Anguilla Department of Environment

What particular aspects of environmental support/admin/funding from the UK Government is welcomed?

Support funding and technical assistance is welcomed and will be for the foreseeable future, until the required skills and the means to continue the development of such are retained locally.

Support is needed for some infrastructure, and continued research into areas of the environment from which Anguilla can have appropriate environmental management that can lead to a sustainable economy. Potential research areas include but not limited to biotechnology, habitat restoration, protected areas management (terrestrial and marine) integrated coastal management, climate change adaptation and mitigation (specifically renewable energy), waste management, fisheries development and management, agriculture improvement and development etc. The development of a Sustainable National Development Plan (for the next 20-25 years) along with a robust but realistic economic strategy is needed to provide vision, purpose and measurable targets. Therefore, environmental research will play a pivotal role in the development of both the plan and strategy. This will require commitment of capital investment and continued technical and financial support beyond the original investment to ensure sustainability. Perhaps the UK Department Commerce, Investment and Trade (UKDCIT) can assists in various ways other than monetary, for example, network current innovators, potential investors and legitimate business initiatives. OT’s must be a part of the UKDCIT’s mandate. In order for the abovementioned to be achieved, the appropriate and affordable legal and institutional changes that can effectively and efficiently manage such actual realities on the ground must be implemented.

The Department of Environment (DOE) Anguilla has championed and implemented some relevant supportive policy documents related to the environment that should be integrated into both the National Development Plan and Economic Strategy. This can also be further facilitated by the UK Government extending their existing funding arrangements to the OT’s, specifically along the Environment and Natural Resources theme. For example UN-FAO, GEF, UNDP and UNEP granting schemes.

What environmental support/admin/funding is not welcomed?

Initiatives and collaborations of external parties (i.e. NGO’s, Universities and Research Agencies) are often welcomed. However, the projects that are not national priorities or supportive of national policy although supported by the UK Government or any other donor agencies, should not be considered.

This form of support should be innovative and have comprehensive national government support if the end products are to be useful. The UK HMG needs to rethink whether the support for projects by external parties are synonymous with national policy aligned with current medium term strategies, critically making national impact or contrarily, are they only really addressing academic and scientific purpose.

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These projects should have national support by local government at the highest level so that they can be appropriately be integrated into national plans, programmes and Ministries mandates.

Would the Governor taking a closer interest in environmental protection be appropriate?

It is strongly believed that the Governor should take a closer interest in environmental management and biodiversity conservation, especially where the UK has international obligations.

In the past, the Governor’s intervention (even if subtle) has influenced positive strides for instance, the sea turtle moratorium; legislation- BHCA, TESA EPA ANT and more.

Having the Governor take a more pronounced stance on the environment will enable the environment to be seriously considered at the highest levels whereby in some instances crucial environmentally related matters are not thoroughly disseminated and thought of prior to a final decision being made.

What more should the UK Government be doing to support environmental protection in the overseas territories?

As highlighted by a number of UK and international reports, it is clear that the United Kingdom Overseas Territories (UKOTs) and Crown Dependencies (CDs) represent the majority of the UKs biodiversity and environmental assets globally.

The UK should develop with OT’s and CD’s input two documents for which annual reporting will be required at the UK OT/CD Consultative Council Meetings. These two documents can be as follows; A UKOT/CD Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan and A UKOT Environmental Management Strategy and Action Plan. These two documents should mirror the process, concept, content, and design layout of the St. Georges Declaration of Principles for Environmental Sustainability in the OECS (In which Anguilla, BVI and Montserrat holds membership) as well as the reporting template for the same. The UKOT/CD Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan online should be along the format and layout, with the ACHI Targets of the Convention of Biological Diversity being the main goals, but design with OTs realities.

DEFRA and its many units specialised or not, needs to have OT’s as part of their mandate, work plan or programme. These services can range from technical attachments, training, advice and offer direct services in marine, terrestrial, pollution, air quality, pesticides, biodiversity, etc. Other relevant UK Environment agencies should also provide similar services.

Does the 2012 White Paper, which sets out the UK Government’s strategy, meet your expectations?

The White Paper meets my expectations. However, the HMG needs to execute more meaningful and clear action to illustrate to OT Governments that they are serious about the environment and biodiversity. The development of a UKOT (individual OT’s) agreed UKOTs Environmental Management Strategy with a component to allow annual reporting at the UKOT Consultative Council Meeting in paramount, for transparency. It needs a general document addressing environmental management and biodiversity in the OTs which can consequently form the basis for developing

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national environmental management strategies. This means there will be a similar strategy for all OTs and specific targets to be developed given the various OT environmental contexts.

To what extent is the UK Government discharging its international responsibilities concerning the environment and biodiversity?

Through the JNCC/DEFRA, FCO, DFID and FERA, the UK Government has been ensuring that some of its international obligations concerning biodiversity conservation and environmental management are discharged. The Biodiversity Strategy developed by DEFRA, JNCC, FCO and DFID is an excellent start. A revision of this document is needed and could take the approach used by OTs, Anguilla, Montserrat and BVI in developing their National Environmental Management Strategy. The UK Government needs to ensure that the local legislation is in place prior to extending international conventions. It is also important that the UK Government examine the practicality of the Convention in that OT.

Do UK government departments work effectively together on overseas territory issues?

There is room for improvement or rather widening the involvement of other agencies which should and must have an input on overseas territories. There is obviously great cohesion between DEFRA, DFID, JNCC and the FCO. However, there has to be a larger role for the involvement of DECC, given that the biodiversity and the environment on which the UK holds in high esteem is under threat from climate change realities. Also, the role of the DMSC is also needed where heritage issues are of utmost importance.

Would you welcome stronger support from any UK departments in particular?

Stronger support is required especially from DMSC with regard to Culture/World Heritage and DECC to ensure that OTs become part of their mandate and work plan programme annually and that OTs are streamlined across the units of Energy and Climate Change of the Agency. DFID, DEFRA, JNCC and FCO have been excellent partners in ensuring that the environment and development is supported especially the element of livelihoods and sustainability. However, the relationship between the OTs, DEFRA, JNCC, FCO and DFID can be strengthened.

The UK Government has consolidated its environmental protection funding for the overseas territories into the ‘Darwin Plus’ Fund.

Is this a positive development and is the Fund big enough to support the work that is needed? While it is a positive development, the fund is not large enough to make a medium-term (Short term 1-2 years, Medium term 3-5 years) meaningful impact as is needed to ensure continued sustainable ecosystem functioning in OT’s given the challenges of trade, development and climate invariabilities. As a condition of granting support under the fund, OT governments (Finance Ministries) should be made to support in writing that they will ensure sustainability through providing the adequate financial commitment.

Do your environmental departments have enough staff and the technical expertise you need?

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Anguilla is not in a unique position, like all OTs we need additional hands to effectively carry out the work that needs to be done. Additional skill sets, equipment and resources need to be added, however the realities of the local economy do not allow for this to occur normally. Alternatives, such as attachments with other agencies in the UK or other OTs to build technical skill sets must be explored and are needed.

What pieces of environmental protection legislation remain in draft form in the territory?

Draft Bill for the Environmental Protection Act and its regulations (2008), The Regulations for the Biodiversity Heritage Conservation Act and the Bill for the Physical Planning Act and its regulations 2005.

Is there a role for the UK Government to ensure that this legislation is enacted?

Yes there is a role. The portfolio for biodiversity and environmental management should remain with the OT governments, however, where there are international obligations the Governor and HM Government should ensure that the proper environmental and biodiversity legislation are implemented within each OT.

What estimates have the territory’s government made of the value of natural resources and ecosystem services to the economy of the territory?

The Department of Environment has embarked on the first stage (Scoping exercise) of conducting a National Ecosystem Assessment which involves an economic valuation, scoping exercise and study. On completion of this stage a full proposal will be developed to actually conduct Anguilla’s first National Ecosystem Assessment for any UK OT, which will have significant lessons learnt.

What scrutiny mechanisms are in place in your territory to hold the territory government to account for their environmental practices?

The scrutiny mechanisms exist in the draft legislation mentioned above, hence at present, the level of meaningful scrutiny is non-existent. This does not mean that a stand-alone piece of legislation that would assist in scrutiny and holding OT governments accountable is not needed.

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Further written evidence submitted by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum

Introduction This document supplements the original written submission from the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF) in November 2012 and the oral evidence given to the Committee on 17th April 2013. It arises from points in the oral evidence where UKOTCF offered to provide supplementary evidence and other points where relevant information has become available. These points are addressed in the sequence that they arose in the session on 17th April. To minimise confusion in cross-referencing, we label the sections by letters following on from those used in our original written evidence. The sections in this supplement address: I. Environment Charters

J. Reluctance of some parties to give evidence to EAC K. Problems in HMG governance in respect of UK Overseas Territories L. Gibraltar fisheries and marine conservation M. Necessary qualities for effective Governors N. Some further aspects on funding O. Raising awareness in Britain of the importance of its Overseas Territories P. Some reasons for UK taxpayers to support environmental conservation in UK Overseas

Territories

If the Committee requires further clarification, then we would of course be happy to assist with such. I. Environment Charters I1. The reasoned and clear reports by the Ombudsman for Bermuda on the legally binding nature of Environment Charters have featured in our written and oral evidence. The Ombudsman for Bermuda issued a further report on this topic to the Bermuda Parliament on 17th May. The full report (Diligent Development - Getting it Right) is available at http://www.ombudsman.bm/systemic_reports.html. It is subtitled: Update on Legal Status of UK Environment Charter. Some key extracts from these reports are:

Last year, when I tabled Today's Choices - Tomorrow's Costs ("TC-TC') regarding the Special Development Order process, I made a finding that the Civil Service had erred at law by not recognizing that Bermuda's signature on the 2001 UK Environment Charter is a legal commitment. In a press release dated 2 May 2012, the then Minister challenged the legality of my investigation of the procedure leading up to and informing decisions to grant SDOs. He also called into question my conclusion that the Charter sets out legal obligations: ‘We have taken advice from both the Attorney General's office and the FCO via Government House, and conclude that the UK Environment Charter does not constitute law. It is unenforceable. Rather, the UK itself considers the Charter to be "aspirational".’ In June, I responded with a brief Special Report ("5.16 Report") that demonstrated that the Privy Council agreed with the distinction I made between a decision and the procedure leading up to it. Therefore, as Ombudsman I was within the law to investigate the SDO procedure.

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My S.16 Report also clarified and provided additional evidence that the Charter is a legal agreement. This included:

• a decision of the International Court of Justice about what constitutes a legal agreement between two governments; • the rationale for the Charter set out in the 1999 White Paper; • contemporaneous statements of both the UK and Bermudian Governments regarding their intentions that the Charter commitments are to be implemented; and • subsequent evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee of the UK House of Commons by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) affirming the commitments of the Charter.

Since then, I have received additional information, including the only judicial decision to date about the legal effect of the Charter. Accordingly, it is important and appropriate that the Legislature and public be informed about this. This report pulls together in one document the evidence already presented in TC-TC and the S.16 Report, along with an overview of the legal landscape. Bermuda's approach to development of its scarce land resources is at a turning point. For the sake of our children and grandchildren, it is time that Bermuda puts its words into action. The correct legal approach is clear and now is the time to act. With every decision made with blindfolds on, we fall further behind and do a disservice to our island and our future generations. We can do what is right today, or we can wait years for our courts, after costly litigation, to force us to do the right thing. The choice is ours. The choice is now. Is Bermuda legally obliged to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments ("EIA") - with a robust public consultation component - prior to approving developments that are major or likely to have significant adverse environmental effects? Yes. By signing the UK Environment Charter in 2001 Bermuda legally bound itself to conduct EIAs before approving major projects. Bermuda's obligations are further confirmed and reinforced by:

1. other commitments made in the UK Environment Charter and Rio Declaration; 2. responsibilities imposed by the Convention on Biological Diversity; 3. the common law doctrine of legitimate expectation; 4. recent case law; and 5. international best practices.

From a practical perspective, Bermuda is obliged to conduct an EIA prior to approval in principle for development proposals that are either "major" or "likely to have significant adverse effect on the environment". I undertook, on the public's behalf, a comprehensive investigation of the scope and quality of information analyzed and recommendations made by civil servants for the Tucker's Point SDO [Special Development Order]. My independent investigation confirmed that the current SDO process is inadequate: an EIA, coupled with a proper process for public consultation, was required to lift the conservation protection and to approve the SDO. One purpose of an EIA is to identify risks, ways to mitigate risks, and alternatives to development proposals (such as site or design). Another purpose of an EIA is to ensure transparent public consultation, disclosure and input. The government is bound to follow the nearly universal EIA process as a result of the following:

• commitments made when it signed the UK Environment Charter; • common law doctrine of legitimate expectation; and • international best practices.

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The mandatory language and structure of the Charter is clear: it creates legally binding commitments. According to one of the drafters, the words were chosen carefully to designate the future obligations we were undertaking at the time. The Charter commitments are explicit and detailed. We, like other countries subject to identical Charters, must stick to our word. Having signed the Charter, Bermuda has an undisputed obligation to conduct EIAs prior to approving major developments or those likely to have significant adverse environmental effects. Implementation of the commitment to ensure EIAs does not require domestic legislation or government expenditure. In 1992, the UK signed the Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"), an international legally binding treaty, which sets out responsibilities to conserve biological diversity and to ensure sustainable use of species and habitats. In ratifying the CBD, the UK assumed legal (as well as a moral) responsibility for its Overseas Territories ("OT") with respect to biological diversity. For Bermuda, the responsibilities under the CBD remain with the UK. The primary method by which the UK fulfils its own responsibilities under the CBD with respect to OTs is by way of the Environmental Charters. The UK cannot unilaterally extend its multilateral environmental responsibilities to the OTs. The 1999 White Paper signalled that – as priority actions – the UK must (and the OTs were encouraged to) undertake certain responsibilities. Section 8.15 of that White Paper stated: These responsibilities already exist, but the UK and its Overseas Territories have not always addressed these issues sufficiently consistently or systematically. Examples include damage to coral reefs and the effects of introduced species on native species and habitats. We intend bringing together the responsibilities, common objectives and cooperative approaches of the UK Government, Overseas Territory governments, the private sector, NGOs and local communities by drafting and agreeing an Environment Charter with the Overseas Territories. The Charter will clarify the roles and responsibilities of these stakeholders, set out in a shared vision which also takes account of the wide variety of circumstances and local resources in each territory. The exact form of the Charter and variations between territories will be determined in consultation with them. In 2007, the FCO reaffirmed the commitments of the Charter in evidence before the Environmental Audit Committee of the UK House of Commons. The FCO asserted that the Charter is the basis to work with Overseas Territories' governments on implementation. The responsibility for doing so is a cross-UK government responsibility of the FCO, Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and Department for International Development. As recently as January 2012, in a policy document, "The Environment in the United Kingdom's Overseas Territories: UK Government and Civil Society Support", DEFRA defined the Charter as a "formal individual agreement, listing commitments to develop and implement sound environmental management practices in the OTs". Based on the common law doctrine of legitimate expectations, the Government of Bermuda can be legally held by the courts to perform actions that it promised to do. Legitimate expectations arise when the government makes it known that it will follow a specific course of action, including conduct set out in treaties. Government can depart from the expected course of action only where it has given proper notice and has given those affected an opportunity to be heard.

Once a legitimate expectation has been established, which is the case here, the onus shifts to the government to identify an overriding public interest to justify going back on its

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commitment. The onus therefore is on government, to follow what is literally, and legally, a legitimate expectation. EIAS must be comprehensive, involve full disclosure, be done at the earliest possible time (but can be required at a later stage), involve proper public consultation, and provide adequate time. The source of the obligation to require an EIA can be legitimate expectations resulting from statements of government officials in recognition of the need to account for residents' concerns and wishes. A recent case from the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court is directly on point with the issues facing Bermuda: Webster et al v. Attorney General (Anguilla) and Dolphin Discovery. In that case, the Court reviewed the adequacy of EIAs and public consultation based on commitments under the UK Environment Charter for the construction of a Dolphinarium and shopping complex. The Court found that the Charter (singly or taken together with the government's environmental strategy and action plan) established a policy and therefore created a legitimate expectation that the public would be consulted. To some degree, Bermuda has acknowledged (but as discretionary only) its obligations arising from the UK Environmental Charter. Our Department of Planning issued Guidance Note 106 which explains the importance of EIAs and when they are required. GN 106 recites the Rio Declaration requirement for EIAs and sets out a comprehensive list of the purposes of EIAs. These purposes include:

• to incorporate environmental information in development decision-making; • to examine alternative and superior options; • to identify positive and negative environmental impacts; • to recommend mitigation measures; and • to allow for full and early consultation with stakeholders.

The current SDO process fails to meet these purposes. In addition, it does not recognize our current legal obligations or modern planning standards, nor does it provide for adequate public consultation. With no EIA, decisions are being made in the dark - Ministers and the Legislature do not have reliable and independent information and the public is not given the opportunity to be heard. Not only is there a lack of full environmental understanding, but there is also a lack of financial understanding and the true effect that the development proposals will have on our island. A combination of SDO conditions based on an ill-informed process and a hazy mishmash of studies are nowhere near the equivalent of a proper EIA. To suggest otherwise not only does a disservice to the people of Bermuda but also raises red flags as to the reasons why a universally accepted process is not being used in Bermuda for the development of our scarce land resources. By having an EIA process, our government would be in the position to mute suspicions that information is deliberately being withheld and that the grant of SDOs benefits the interests of a few rather than Bermuda as a whole. It would also ultimately secure inter-generational justice through the principles and practices of sustainable development. To continue forward without the legally necessary due process of a proper EIA, without considering the impact, is like walking ahead blind without guidance - the legal equivalent of walking into barbed wire in the dark. Except here, the damage, once built: cannot be undone - we just cannot put the lava back in without being burned. In the Throne Speech of 8 February 2013, the Government stated: The Government will build upon an earlier legislative amendment that ensured that Special Development Orders would be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny by implementing a protocol that is clearly articulated,

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tronsparent and fair. This protocol will guide the request for, consideration of and grant of SDOs. No environmental expert consulted has been able to suggest what possible protocol Bermuda could create that would be better than an EIA. Most countries of the world, with the exception of a few countries such as Syria and Iran, require EIA for major developments. Does Bermuda really want to be in the company of these countries? Do we want to strike out on our own, defy the judgments of the highest courts, and ignore global best practices? It is time for Bermuda to be realistic, join the 21st Century, and keep our promises. EIAs must be done prior to approval of major developments and all development proposals that may cause significant adverse impact on our fragile environment. The absence of EIAs is like producing a cookbook devoid of recipes. In Save Guano Cay, the Privy Council adopted the statement of the President of the Court of Appeal: "The ecology of the Bahamas is said to be 'fragile' and possible deaths of those [coral] reefs due to 'global warming' coupled with environmental degradation may result from indiscriminate development of the islands, it is quite understandable that thinking persons would be concerned to protect, as far as humanly possible, their environment, not only for themselves, but also for their descendants who may have to inhabit these islands in the future." All persons in Bermuda who have a stake in the well-being of the island that we leave for our children and grandchildren must be similarly concerned. In conclusion, as Ombudsman, I am obliged to follow my own governing statute, the Ombudsman Act 2004. Section 2(1) of that Act obliges me to point out government "maladministration", which is defined to include "inefficient, bad or improper administration and ... includes ... administrative action that was ... contrary to law ... based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact or irrelevant grounds ... related to the application of arbitrary or unreasonable procedures." I would be derelict in my duty if I did not point out that our word must be our bond - not just because it is the law but also because it is the right thing to do - for now and for tomorrow.'

I2. UKOTCF notes that the procedure of agreement and relevant wording of Environment Charters signed with other UKOTs is similar to that between Bermuda and UK, and there is no reason why those Charters are any less binding than Bermuda’s. J. Reluctance of some parties to give evidence to EAC J1. During the oral session, RSPB mentioned that they know of at least one overseas territory NGO that wrote evidence for this Committee but then decided it would be wiser not to submit it as it was too fearful of local repercussions. UKOTCF can add that it knows of bodies from at least four UKOTs that similarly decided that they would not risk giving evidence, because of potential reprisals. It is difficult to appreciate in Britain how, in these small communities, there is little de facto freedom of speech. J2. In this context, we must commend Dr Nikki Chapman and Mr Bryan Naqqi Manco for their courage in giving evidence and their organisations for allowing this. Subsequent to the giving of this evidence in March 2013, Mr Manco has been attacked in an anonymous article in the online newspaper TCI News Now (http://www.tcinewsnow.com/headline-Environmentalist-takes-on-local-authorities-6004.html), subsequently quoted widely. The article mixes partial reporting of the Committee’s proceedings with personal information about Mr Manco. Much of this information was not previously in the public domain (and has presumably been unlawfully released by someone with

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access to personnel files of a previous employment), and even more of it is erroneous. We understand that Mr Manco has written to correct some of the material but TCI News Now has not published a correction or apology for publishing erroneous personal information. It seems that some other local publications are also launching personal attacks, as has at least one contractor for TCI Government (see paras K27-28). J3. This sort of unaccountable personal attack inhibits individuals from giving evidence on future occasions and their organisations from allowing them to. In this case, the Turks & Caicos Islands Department of Environment and Maritime Affairs and its overseeing Ministry of Environment and Home Affairs commendably authorised Mr Manco to give fair and balanced evidence including both successes and remaining challenges concerning environmentally related matters in TCI. It is unlikely that, with this experience, if the Committee were seeking witnesses now, any UKOT organisations or individuals would feel safe enough to give evidence. J4. This situation recalls the experience of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in its 2007-8 inquiry on Overseas Territories. Its recommendations included:

13. We are concerned that witnesses from Overseas Territories cannot at present be guaranteed protection against legal action or even intimidation or other abuse arising as a consequence of their giving evidence to select committee inquiries in the UK. We recommend that the Government should introduce legislation to extend the Witnesses (Public Inquiries) Protection Act 1892 to Overseas Territories, or as an alternative, that it should urgently require Overseas Territories to introduce equivalent legislation as a matter of good governance.

J5. Recommendation 17, relating specifically to the Turks and Caicos Islands, included:

In such an environment, people will be afraid to publicly come forward with evidence. We conclude that the UK Government must find a way to assure people that a formal process with safeguards is underway and therefore recommend that it announces a Commission of Inquiry, with full protection for witnesses.

J6. This recommendation led to a Commission of Inquiry and eventually a 3-year period of direct UK rule of TCI, from 2009 to 2012. It seems that the opportunity to change the culture of fear in deploying free speech has effectively been missed despite that 3-year period of British direct rule. K. Problems in HMG governance in respect of UK Overseas Territories K1. As we noted in written and oral evidence, the problems in conservation legislation and enforcement seem also to be a problem in some cases when HMG is in direct control of a territory or certain aspects. This was evident also in the session with officials from UKOTs. We undertook to update our written evidence on this matter. K2. Some proposed legislation in the Turks & Caicos Islands to implement international conventions was put on the back-burner by the interim FCO direct administration. Laws proposed after a major review in Montserrat seem to have been delayed for financial reasons, and local views in respect of planning appear to be overridden, while HMG is in charge of funding. There appear to be problems in St Helena - which are particularly concerning while major developments proceed. ST HELENA

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K3. HMG has a strong influence on the governing of St Helena, including the management of the environment. This is for two main reasons. First, the island depends on direct budgetary support from HMG. Second, the Air Access project is also HMG funded. These impact on almost every aspect of life in St Helena. The Air Access Project K4. This is not just about building an airport. What also matters for long-term sustainability are the related construction and land use activities to develop the infrastructure for - and make sure that Saints benefit from - the projected influx of visitors, who will be very different from those arriving after a long sea voyage. The operation of air services involves also contracts with carriers, importation of different types of goods and the related quarantine/ biosafety considerations on an isolated island which is highly vulnerable to invasive species. A related issue is how sea freight will affect the island's economy and family budgets after the subsidy for the RMS St Helena is withdrawn. K5. There are two current environmental issues. The first is that changes to the configuration of the site made since the project was agreed have not been accompanied by sufficient attention to further adjustments to mitigation measures where there are unavoidable impacts on habitats of important flora and fauna. Catch-up work being done by the St Helena National Trust and by Buglife under a Darwin Initiative project may help, but it is a pity that the contractors did not seek specialist advice when starting to amend their plans. The recent milestone of 1 million cubic metres of fill at Dry Gut being reached while design changes are still not finalised show that the contractors and their government supervisors could surely have made it clear much earlier that work to supplement the original EIA should be undertaken. K6. The second point is more general: that the Landscape and Ecology Mitigation Programme (LEMP) was to have been developed in parallel with completion of the original Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and refining design details. The initial deployment of the LEMP funding should have started at the start of the construction project, whereas it has only recently (see issue 28 of St Helena Airport News) got to the design and planning stage. (The LEMP funding of £870,000 is a rather niggardly sum for a project of this size in an area of known global ecological importance and sensitivity. Prosperous Bay Plain is widely recognised to be an evolutionary hotspot.) K7. Both these features indicate that the powers that be on St Helena (essentially DFID and FCO) appear to have forgotten the discussions with conservationists at the start of the proposals. Then, various conservation bodies, including UKOTCF, indicated that, were the development on an area of similar significance in Britain (not that there are any), they would object. However, they recognised that, both for economic sustainability and, through that, conservation of a non-pristine environment, an airport was probably necessary - and there was no real choice as to where to put it. Accordingly, they agreed that they would not oppose it provided that environmental impact was minimised. It would seem that the last part of this agreement has been forgotten or otherwise disregarded. Budgetary Support and Freedom of Information K8. The second issue is that, on most aspects of life in St Helena, departments in London are in the driving seat. There are consultations and serious annual budgetary negotiations between DFID/ FCO and locally elected councillors. However, the bottom line is that HMG calls the shots and that the Governor is appointed to a position where his authority is buttressed by legislation that remains colonial in nature. That is not surprising, since it is HMG which ultimately carries all the contingent risks associated with governing the territory. K9. That is why it is especially important that decisions are reached as openly as possible; and, in a period of huge change, that civil society on the island is as fully engaged as possible in these changes. As environmentalists, UKOTCF and our associates, including those in St Helena, are keenly aware

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that good environmental management and good access to information go together. The principles have been widely appreciated in many international agreements to which the UK is a party; and they are reflected in the Guiding Principles and the specific Commitments from both HMG and the St Helena Government of the 2001 St Helena Environment Charter. K10. How to apply these principles is another matter. On 12 January 2005, the St Helena Executive Council advised the Governor that the UK Freedom of Information Act was not suitable to local circumstances and should not apply to St Helena; but that consultation should be initiated over providing a suitable framework to apply the principles of Freedom of Information in St Helena. The Attorney General undertook to co-ordinate the consultation process. However, since then there has not been any sign of draft legislation being prepared. The demands on legal drafting skills in relation to St Helena are considerable, but this is an area where it is right for St Helena to be able to draw on FCO support, possibly through its Good Governance Fund. K11. We believe that FoI legislation appropriate to St Helena's circumstances is urgently needed and will have long-term benefits both for the Air Access project and for the development of greater participation in the island's democratic life. TURKS & CAICOS ISLANDS K12. In the Turks and Caicos, the direct British Government rule for three years effectively abandoned the line previously promoted by HMG, for all the territories, of taking a long-term environmentally sustainable view in favour of short-term financial considerations, despite the resulting threat to the environment. At the request of local partners, UKOTCF raised some of these issues with FCO. In the following paragraphs, we list the issues raised with FCO and the responses received. Conservation issues in FCO’s direct governing of Turks & Caicos Islands (TCI) K13. A role which UKOTCF has always undertaken for its partners in territories is to raise issues of concern for them with FCO in London, especially when they appeal to us to do this, usually when they feel their voice is not being heard in territory. For many years UKOTCF was able to do this quite informally, through regular contact with FCO and, in many cases, such interventions helped achieve a satisfactory solution. UKOTCF is encouraged that, with the appointment of a new FCO Director Overseas Territories, correspondence about such issues has recommenced, and thanks his staff for taking the time to engage in this way, and for following matters up with Governors and others. As we express the concerns of mainly (but not solely) civil society in territories, we are inevitably not always going to be able to agree with one another. However, re-establishing a dialogue is a welcome step in conducting meaningful discussions, and it is important to be able to disagree on some points whilst keeping an open communication channel. K14. UKOTCF has had for over 15 years, and still has, a very strong involvement in conservation issues in TCI. It has assisted both governmental bodies and local NGOs on many projects and issues and, at local request, led some of these. Local partners have drawn to UKOTCF’s attention several major issues relating to FCO’s period of direct rule of TCI from 2009 to November 2012, especially the latter part of that; they consider that these have set conservation in TCI back by many years. These are certainly having major negative impacts on TCI’s environment, and on HMG’s reputation there and elsewhere. However, some of them could still be corrected or alleviated. K15. These are not criticisms of the taking of FCO’s decision to take direct control. However, the implementation of this in the recent case is contrasted with the earlier one. Twice in some 20 years, UK Government has had to take back direct responsibility for governing TCI. In the early 1990s, the then FCO direct government fulfilled the requests of local people by implementing protected area

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legislation and designating some such areas, as well as helping establish a non-governmental conservation body. A decade later, UK Government agreed with UKOTs the Environment Charters. These, and other UK Government actions, encouraged UKOT Governments and other stakeholders not simply to focus on short-term financial gain, but to look at sustainability and to protect the environment – because of its intrinsic importance, the ecosystem services that it provides, and the potential for long-term sustainable economic development, notably high-value, low-intensity tourism. What is concerning is that the recent direct FCO Government of TCI seems to have acted precisely in the opposite direction to FCO’s previous advice to UKOTs. This has both damaged and – unless there are changes – will continue to damage TCI’s environment, and has provided a bad example, undermining the Environment Charter process in other UKOTs also. K16. UKOTCF cannot simply ignore matters raised with it by responsible local partners, but equally is anxious to give FCO the chance to comment. For this reason, UKOTCF tried to raise the matters initially with the TCI Governor, and then followed up through FCO at the kind invitation of the new Director Overseas Territories. We hoped that, on at least some issues, the FCO’s responses would enable us to convey a message of attempts by the disputants to find mutually agreeable approaches. We are still looking for this, despite the Governor’s understandably defensive statements. Nevertheless, UKOTCF is pleased that the Governor has now commented on the environmental issues raised by our local partner organisations, as his previous comment to UKOTCF that these matters were being used by political interests rather than being of environmental importance indicated that, because he perceived that there were political pressures, the environmental issues were somehow lessened. K17. The particular points drawn by local partners to UKOTCF’s attention include the following (with responses by FCO and follow-up by UKOTCF added). 1. Caves near Providenciales Airport K18. The Remipede crustacean species Micropacter yagerae is the only member of its genus and of its family, Micropacteridae. It is known only from the caves by the international airport at Providenciales, TCI. These caves are important also for other wildlife. Plans have been approved to expand the airport car-park by destroying these caves. No Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has been done, thereby breaching the Environment Charter and UK’s international commitments. Local bodies had thought the caves were relatively safe due to private ownership; however, it turns out the government had arranged compulsory purchase of the area. The Planning Board ignored the request of the Director of the Environment not to hold its meeting while she was out of the country, and apparently wrongly advised members that the Environment Department (DEMA) did not object. The airport re-design could easily be modified to avoid expanding the car-park into this area, there being much space beyond (west of) the terminal buildings, but the airport authority did not draw the attention of the designer to the importance of the caves. The airport authority has since made unsupported statements that the work will not affect the caves. All the preparatory work for this, including compulsory purchase and the failure to undertake an EIA, was done under direct UK rule. The work, if it proceeds, could lead to the global extinction of a species, genus and family – and this could readily be prevented by relatively minor redesign, which could even be cheaper to implement. This unnecessary destruction of caves could still be stopped. K19. FCO responded: I understand from the Governor's office that the caves highlighted in your note as being under threat from the airport expansion actually lie outside the parcel of land that will be used for this development. This has been confirmed by an independent [a] surveyor’s report that was submitted to the Governor's Office by the CEO of the TCI Airport Authority. I know that this issue was of particular concern to you and hopefully this reassurance will be welcome news to you and other environmental stakeholders in TCI.

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K20. UKOTCF replied: It seems that the information supplied to the Governor and yourselves is somewhat incomplete - as, indeed was reflected in TCI evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee yesterday [19 March 2013]. I am advised that the situation is that the entrance to the cave lies outside the parcel of land that is now proposed for this development, but the situation of the caves themselves is far from clear. The caves spread widely from these entrances. No-one can say that the development will not impact the caves, although impacting seems likely. The reason that no-one can say this is that TCI Government (in breach of the Environment Charter) failed to require an adequate Environmental Impact Assessment from the developer. The purpose of EIAs is to avoid getting into such unsatisfactory situations where the impact of a development cannot be predicted. Because of this failure, conservationists in TCI are now attempting to enlist skilled volunteers to undertake rapidly the difficult task of mapping the underground and underwater caves. Such last-minute emergency efforts should not be necessary when environmental governance in a territory follows best practice. K21. I am advised too that workers who undertook the recent expansion of the apron at the airport informed local conservationists that a bulldozer broke through to an underground cave during that work. However, the airport authorities apparently did not report this to the planning or environmental authorities. In addition to environmental considerations, questions of contingent liability to TCI and HMG could readily arise. K22. We trust that, in line with the final sentence of your email, no work will start on the currently proposed phase of the airport development until completion of the cave surveys, and that it will not proceed unless the environmental bodies can confirm that the proposed construction work, servicing and operation will not be damaging to the biodiversity, given its international importance. K23. FCO responded: our Governor's Office has followed up with the TCIAA who have provided the below information. K24. On the allegation of a bulldozer breaking through into a cave, the TCIAA have advised that this did not happen. In addition, they have informed us that there are currently no bulldozers on the site and that the caves are located on privately-held land that is not within the parameters of the airport development. K25. Secondly, on the issue of whether an Environmental Impact Assessment was carried out: DEMA’s predecessor, the Department of Environment and Coastal Resources ([D]ECR), carried out a survey of the site at the request of the TCIAA. A walk-round of the site was conducted and, following this, plants considered of interest were removed for replanting. The DECR’s findings were submitted to the relevant planning authorities and full planning permission was duly granted. It was actually during this survey that the caves were initially discovered. K26. UKOTCF replied: Thank you for following up in respect of the airport in your later email. However, we do have to suggest that the Governor be slightly more questioning of statements by the TCI Airport Authority. Their comment that the “walk-round” discovered the caves is demonstrably untrue. The caves and their importance have been well known for years. For example, UKOTCF personnel were escorted to the cave by a senior TCI government official (not in the environment department) in 2008. The caves had already been studied by TCI and US researchers, and some of the results, including the description of a new species (in a new genus, in a new family), published in the scientific literature. Any competent environmental impact assessment would have discovered this information, related it to the proposed development, and examined non-damaging options. It is to make such alternatives in a cost-effective way that is one purpose of EIAs. Another is to protect the positions of developer, authority and others. It is unfortunate that the Governor, as then government, chose to breach the Environment Charter, of which he indicates he was well aware, by not requiring an EIA. A walk-round does not constitute an EIA. K27. On 10 &11 May 2013, UKOTCF received an unsolicited email (and a correction to it) from the architect to the TCI Airport Authority:

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Dear Dr. Pienkowski, We write as the architects for the expansion of the existing air terminal. The purpose in writing is to set out the record of events leading up to the construction start a few weeks ago. We have become aware of various communications concerning the cave in relation to the air terminal works. Some of the information conveyed to you and others borders, and I use the word reluctantly, on the hysterical. I do hope that the following helps not only to set the record straight, but also to reassure the relevant parties that the correct procedures have been followed. The time line is as follows: 1. Submission of Detailed Planning and Building Permit application: 2 November 2012. 2. Meeting with Planning Board to discuss the proposals: 19 Dec. 2012. 3. DPP granted: 20 Feb. 2013, following clarifications that plot 14 was not part of the airport property. Torrin Surveys, a government registered surveyor, certified the latter. 4. Site meeting with deputy director of DEMA and Dr. Salamanca. Attempts were made to delay this meeting but the deputy director was instructed to proceed with the meeting. 5. Minutes of site meeting issued by DEMA on 13 March 2013. On the same date Dr. Salamanca forwarded a copy of the flora and fauna report relating to the car park site. 6. 30 day notice issued to DEMA of intention to clear the car park: 14 March 2013. Notice expired on 13 April 2013. 7. Items 5 and 6, above, issued to Planning on 14 March 2013.8 8. Building Permit granted: 15 March 2013. 9. The contractor met with DEMA prior to actually starting the excavations for the new car park - to make 100% sure that there were no outstanding issues. The caves are located some 320ft. from the nearest point of the new car park – and a similar dimension to the cliff face of plot 14. It is not understood why DEMA are so concerned about the cutting into this cliff face. It was formed in 1999, when the current terminal was constructed. It may be that nutrient run-off, combined with weathering of the soft limestone, gives the impression that this is an older face. In the event, this cliff face is staying as existing. As a keen amateur student of the papers by Dr. Iliffe, I read the paper ‘Micropacteridae, a new family of Remipedia (Crustacea) from the Turks and Caicos Islands. Stefan Koenemanna,, Thomas M. Iliffe, Joris L. van der Ham. 2005’, and noted that ‘The cave cave consists of a crescent-shaped fissure extending along the base of a larger sinkhole. A narrow ravine-like passage extends down for 20m to a tidal, anchialine pool in total darkness with a maximum depth of 14 m.’ It would appear that the cave may extend about 15m in a horizontal dimension. In an extract from a message to me from Prof. Iliffe, he refers to the small size of the cave: “ Hi Rolf I am quite concerned as to the fate of this cave since I have heard that an extension of the airport parking lot may threaten it. Although it is quite a small cave, it contains the only known site in the world where this particular type of remipede is found. Several other species of cave adapted fauna also inhabit this cave.” Sincerely,

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Tom Iliffe Prof. Thomas M. Iliffe Department of Marine Biology Texas A&M University at Galveston I was able to re-assure him that the works did not threaten the cave. In the paper cited above, there are references to other diving expeditions to the cave – for example,, ‘Yager, J., Schram, F.R., 1986. Lasionectes entrichoma, n. gen.,n. sp. (Crustacea, Remipedia) from anchialine caves in the Turks and Caicos, B.W.I. Proc. Biol. Soc. Wash.99, 65–70.’ My reason for mentioning this is that it indicates a long period of knowledge concerning the cave. It beggars belief that no steps appear to have been taken in all these long years to safeguard this unique habitat. Considering an extreme scenario, there seems to be nothing stopping the cave from being destroyed tomorrow. An appalling situation, which surely DEMA could put right immediately, under existing legislation. TCIAA are very interested in the cave and I understand would welcome publicity for travellers – to the extent (if that can be achieved without damage) – and encouraging visits. I also noted a reference to the excavation and filling in of a 'cave' during the runway extension work. A small hole – too small to allow a person to pass through - was found on 10 November 2010. This was photographed by the consulting engineers. It has nothing to do with any cave. The Islands are replete with such holes and a typical residential site of, say, half an acre might have around a dozen of them. If larger, as sink holes, they are preserved because they often contain trees. Otherwise, they are simply bulldozed if in the way of new houses/buildings or driveways. TCI does have some serious environmental issues. Take the coral reefs for example: whilst reefs are extremely robust and have survived millions of years under extreme conditions and damage, there are issues of pollution in the TCI that appear to have received little attention. Reef recovery can exhibit remarkable characteristics, including for example, even mechanical damage (such as in the Florida Keys). In the TCI, however, little attention appears to have been given to a much more serious cause – pollution. Turtle Cove Marina, for example, exhibits characteristics of sewage effluent from boats, despite stringent regulations. During high season this pollution is highly visible to the naked eye and outflow to the reefs ensures a steady supply of poisons – from which coral reefs have little chance of recovery until it is stopped. On a final note: I do think when listening to witnesses concerning the TCI, it is important to check their background. A typical example are the presentations made on 18 March 2013 to the Environmental Audit Committee. The report by ‘TCI News Now’ of 22 April 2013 makes sad reading. Possibly also worthy of note is the fact that there seem to have been many instances where design firms have made application for and were granted permission to dredge and establish canals without proper if any hydrological studies or credible EIAs . Considering the potential impact of global warming, dividing the islands into roughly smaller islands would have serious consequences, from an environmental and hydrological stand point. Much work needs to be focused on this. One may only speculate why this is not a focus of the environmentalist.

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Regards, Rolf Rothermel

K28. UKOTCF replied on 12 May 2013:

Dear Mr Rothermel

Thank you for taking the trouble to write to UKOTCF about the expansion of the airport car park and concerns about the airport cave and its wildlife, including a unique species, genus and family of remipedes, found nowhere else in the world. I do not know how much background you have been given about the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF), but let me explain first that we are a non-Governmental not-for-profit organisation, and a federation of members and associate organisations and other stakeholders from both Britain and the UK Overseas Territories (UKOTs). The UKOTCF network is not opposed to built developments and has, indeed, worked in partnership with developers. It is, however, concerned that proper processes are followed. A key role we play, on behalf of our partners is to raise concerns which they have expressed to us. It is in this role that we raised concerns about some aspects of the expansion of the airport. In this particular case, UKOTCF was undertaking its role of bringing matters raised by our network partners to the attention of UK Government, because of its shared responsibility for environmental matters in the UKOTs generally, and its specific direct responsibility in the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI). I am surprised by your use of the word “hysterical.” I am not aware of any information that we have received or passed on that in any sense could reasonably be described in this way. Thank you also for your time-line. There is no reference in this to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and I understand that none was undertaken. This failure puts the TCI Government (for part of the time until recently under direct UK Government control) at variance with the Environment Charter in not requiring this of a developer. The Environment Charters, signed by UK and UKOT Governments in 2001 agreed certain commitments. The Ombudsman for Bermuda has determined that the Environment Charters are legally binding agreements, of similar standing to the anti-money-laundering agreements. Amongst the Commitments of the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands relevant in the present case are that it will: 3. Ensure that environmental considerations are integrated within social and economic planning processes... 4. Ensure that environmental and environmental health impact assessments are undertaken before approving major projects and while developing our growth management strategy. 5. Commit to open and consultative decision-making on developments and plans which may affect the environment; ensure that environmental impact assessments include consultation with stakeholders. 11. Abide by the principles set out in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and work towards meeting International Development Targets on the environment.

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The 1992 Rio Declaration set targets (reaffirmed and further endorsed in both subsequent environment and development summits in 2002 and 2012) for safeguarding biodiversity and preventing loss, so the threat of loss of an endemic family is particularly pertinent here. As I am sure you are aware, the purpose of having independent, thorough, and open EIAs prior to development work is to preclude just the sort of situation currently on the ground regarding the airport extension, by highlighting issues and reaching solutions before ground works begin, as well as protecting all the participants. Regardless of the commitments made by TCI Government, I am surprised that, as a responsible professional, you did not yourself insist on an independent EIA being undertaken, both as normal practice throughout the world and to protect your own position. Indeed, I see that you have promoted such an approach in at least one publication in the past. UKOTCF has, not unexpectedly, sought information as to whether an Environmental Impact Assessment was conducted for the airport development, and whether the designers and architects were made aware of the environmental sensitivities of this area. UKOTCF is pleased that you personally have acquainted yourself with Dr Illiffe’s research work, and that of others. However, especially in the absence of an EIA, the basis of your re-assurance to Professor Iliffe is unclear. It may be related to some confusion in your email between the cave system and the entrance to the cave. This may also be the basis of your references to plot 14 and to 320 ft. The statements are invalid because of the lack of a proper EIA. Whilst the initially explored cave and the entrance to it are in plot 14, the cave system extends to unknown distances in all directions. This is typical of limestone areas, and you yourself allude to this. The fact that Prof. Illiffe cites the cave as small does not negate the need for a thorough survey of the true extent of the cave, and whether excavation works nearby will affect it. After all, the remipede is a very small animal, and can obviously navigate tiny passages which people cannot access. Even more importantly, the water systems which could be impacted at some distance could be the same system as at the cave entrance. At present, in the absence of a proper EAI, the extent of the cave’s tunnels and chambers is not known, and if this basic information is not available, then it is not possible to state that the airport extension works will not affect the caves. There appears to be a similar misunderstanding on your part as to the concern about the cliff face. This is not about the face itself but the fact that pushing it further back could impact the unsurveyed cave system. The fact that it has already been cut into is not relevant to this concern. There have been previous efforts by concerned local people to raise awareness that the airport caves were in need of protection. UKOTCF was made aware of such concerns in 2008. Any competent independent EIA would have made this information available to you and the others concerned with this development. Your plan could then have made use of some of the large area available instead of unnecessarily risking this important system and endangering the only place in the world supporting the species, genus and family mentioned. Thank you for the information on the discovery of a hole during the runway extension. I am interested in your distinction between a “hole” and a “cave”; what definitions are you using in this classification, and what is the relevance of whether or not a person can pass through? As any caver could advise, the width of passages in cave systems is hugely variable. Assertions that they are not linked are worthless without proper survey. You are correct in noting that TCI does have some serious environmental issues, such as the coral reefs and marine pollution. However, your assumption that UKOTCF and others have not addressed these is quite wrong. UKOTCF, on behalf of its partners, has raised concerns

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about these, for over 15 years, and recently drew attention to at least six others in TCI (as well as others in other UKOTs). The serious problems caused by the dredging of Leeward Channel in 2007-08, without any hydrological studies or EIAs, have been publicised by many concerned TCI persons. In fact, a consortium of local stakeholders took legal action, and stopped this illegal dredging. However, each case of potentially environmentally damaging actions has to be highlighted as an issue, and because in the past some environmentally damaging actions were not able to be challenged does not provide an argument against challenging current and future potentially environmentally damaging actions. We think that there is little value in your implicit argument that, if others have damaged the environment, TCIAA has the right to do so as well. We thank you for taking the time to send this communication, but must also express disquiet at your citing of the article in TCI News Now about the evidence given by a TCI representative to the UK Parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee’s Inquiry into Environmental Sustainability in the UK Overseas Territories. We are concerned that this article was written anonymously, inaccurately reported the evidence given to the committee, and contained irrelevant and erroneous personal information on the witness. It seems that this could only have been obtained improperly from a previous employer. The “newspaper” concerned did not check facts with the person they were attacking and has not published the corrections he supplied. I advise you that your case is not supported by citing such scurrilous sources. I would prefer to place confidence in the fact that the witness is held in high regard in TCI and internationally, as one of the most knowledgeable ecologists on the TCI environment. Last month, he was the recipient of a prestigious international award from a UK Government agency in honour of the quality of his conservation work in TCI and commitment to the environment. If you have not yet done so, you could benefit from watching the video of the oral evidence session (on UK Parliament website).

2. Dolphinaria K29. For reasons which are not readily understood, the Governor, late during the period of his direct rule, changed TCI law to allow the keeping of marine mammals in captivity, thereby enabling establishment of dolphinaria. This runs counter to widespread modern practice and to HMG’s previous attitude towards dolphinaria in UKOTs. There was little local support for the change, and much local opposition. As a consequence, there is a current proposal for a dolphinarium on Providenciales (by Jamaican interests) and apparently another on Grand Turk (by US interests). There are strong local objections to these on both animal-welfare and environmental grounds. The Governor commented that the decision is no longer his (which is technically correct, but his previous personal actions made the proposed developments possible). He commented also that the objections received are on animal-welfare, rather than environmental, grounds. We can only suppose that he has been misinformed, as some environmental objections that had been made have since been copied to us. K30. FCO responded: the Governor amended the regulations in order to allow marine mammals to be kept in captivity with a licence. This was not contrary to UK policy on the Overseas Territory because the issue is a matter for the elected governments of the Territories, not for HMG (there are dolphinariums for example on Cayman). A balance had to be made between those demanding the interim administration allow a decision on the proposal before the elections and those wanting it definitely stopped before the elections. Amendment to the regulation meant that the application could be considered under the planning process by the elected Government of TCI. It is also not the case that there is little local support for this change. All objections, whether environmental or on the basis of animal-welfare, should be raised in the normal way through the TCIG’s planning application process.

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K31. UKOTCF replied: With regard to the Governor’s comments, we note that research commissioned by the UK Government in the 1980s meant that not even the very well funded dolphinaria in UK could meet the environmental and welfare standards necessary, and all such facilities have been closed down. HMG has since discouraged the introduction of dolphinaria in UKOTs, although – as you point out – it is a local decision. This makes it all the more surprising that the Governor, while in direct control of TCI, chose personally to change the previously existing law which made the keeping of marine mammals illegal, rather than leaving this to the elected Government – and without consultation, in breach of the Environment Charter. K32. UKOTCF notes also the evidence on this topic (and others) given to EAC on 19 March 2013 by Bryan Naqqi Manco, of TCI Department of Environment and Maritime Affairs. 3. Deep dredging K33. A few years ago, during the corrupt previous administration, deep dredging was allowed through a channel in a protected area, causing severe damage to the coral reefs and a commercial conch farm, and severe erosion and destruction of a popular nature trail on a nearby island nature reserve. The development was of dubious legality and was to provide access to a similarly dubious mega-yacht port which went into bankruptcy with only one yacht ever using it. Ownership of the facility has now passed into a company seemingly run by a British legislator, and consideration is being given to further deep dredging, despite the partial recovery from the earlier devastation. It appears that again, in breach of the Environment Charters and UK’s international commitments, there is no EIA, and the development was encouraged by the FCO direct government. The applications for planning permission were made in October 2012, during the direct UK administration, but (in common with TCI procedurally flawed practice) were not posted at the site (and then on posts requiring boat access) until January 2013, with the deadline for objection being indicated on the posts as in November 2012 – over 2 months before the notices were posted. K34. FCO responded: there has been no encouragement for the dredging application by the Interim Administration or the UK Government; indeed neither has been involved in it in any way. An application for planning permission to dredge in order to maintain an existing channel has been made in the normal way and is being considered under the TCIG’s planning process. K35. UKOTCF notes that it is slightly puzzling that the Governor’s office indicates that it has not been involved in any way, since the process started during the period of direct UK rule by that office. It is not clear either why that office did not enforce proper process. 4. Joe Grant’s Cay K36. Through work of the civil recovery team and the Special Investigation and Prosecution Team, land at Joe Grant’s Cay has been recovered after illegal sale by the previous government. Bizarrely, the direct FCO government put this unspoilt area up for sale for built development, rather than turning it into a nature reserve. An overseas benefactor would be prepared to fund the nature management of this and other areas if TCI Government would set it aside as a nature reserve, it already being the basis of considerable low-intensity, high-value nature tourism – which would be lost by built development. K37. FCO responded: Joe Grant Cay was recovered by the civil recovery team (not the SIPT). However, 200 acres of Joe Grant Cay were not recovered because it was subject to a charge to, and is thus effectively owned by, a bank. The bank is entitled to sell the land to get its money and the land is now for sale. The only way the Interim Administration or Elected Government could stop this is by spending three million dollars to buy the land from the bank. The Interim Government did not have money to do so. It is the decision of the Elected Government whether it wants to do so.

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K38. UKOTCF notes that it is unclear why a bank is allowed to benefit from its acquisition of what was effectively stolen property. 5. High-rise developments K39. In contrast to previous policies, the direct FCO government has encouraged high-rise developments. K40. FCO responded: the Interim Administration has not encouraged high rise development. The Interim Administration did say it would take no decision on a proposal for a 28 storey development and would leave this to be handled by the Elected Government. K41. UKOTCF notes the evidence to EAC on 19 March 2013 by Bryan Naqqi Manco, of TCI Department of Environment and Maritime Affairs. It is not clear why the UK Interim Direct Government allowed the developers to pursue the loaded questions in the so-called consultation exercises. 6. The Conservation Fund K42. The direct FCO Government abolished the Conservation Fund. This was a rare example of a popular tax, based on an ear-marked element of taxes on tourists and other visitors. It was originally introduced by TCI Government over a decade ago as a condition of UK grant-aid. Whilst there was some mis-use of the fund during the period of the corrupt government, the basic concept was sound, and widely applauded in other countries and territories. Clearly, some changes would be necessary with the switch to VAT, but the different methods of tax-collection do not present an insuperable problem. K43. FCO: Conservation Fund: this was not a popular tax. Rather it was a hypothecation of part of Accommodation Tax. As part of the rationalisation of public finances, which the Interim Administration undertook, a number of “funds” were abolished, many of which (like the Conservation Fund) either had no real money or were badly run, or both. It is down to the Government – either Interim Administration or Elected Government – how much money they want to spend on conservation and allocate it properly during the budget process. The existence of all sorts of funds was simply unhelpful and led to bad government. The view of the Governor and CFO is that the ‘basic concept’ is not sound. K44. UKOTCF notes the unexplained reversal of HMG policy from requiring TCI Government to introduce the Conservation Fund, based on a publicly announced hypothecated increase in accommodation tax, to a cancellation of this while HMG was in direct control of TCI. UKOTCF notes also that, whilst there was much discussion before the introduction of the Conservation Fund and its supporting tax, there was effectively none before the cancellation of the Fund by two unelected officials. There was some prior consultation by the Direct Interim Government’s tourism advisory commission – but this was on the indicated basis that it was envisaged that the Conservation Fund and its tax base would continue. This constitutes yet another breach of the Environment Charter by HMG while running TCI’s Government. The importance of the Conservation Fund was summarised eloquently for EAC on 19 March 2013 by Bryan Naqqi Manco, of TCI Department of Environment and Maritime Affairs. The tax on accommodation for tourists was increased from 10% to 11%, explicitly to contribute the extra one percentage-point to the Conservation Fund. The accommodation tax has recently been increased to 12%, so it even more unclear why the contribution to the Conservation Fund has been cancelled (and not subject to as prominent consultation and announcement as its introduction).

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7. Lack of briefing on the Environment Charter commitments by HMG of its TCI officials K45. It seems that officers sent from UK to run TCI during direct government were not briefed by FCO about the existence or content of the Environment Charter, in place as an agreement between UK and TCI Governments. This may account for some of the problems. However, the omission is difficult to account for. In 2002-3, TCI had been the pilot UKOT to develop (in line with the first Commitment of the Charter) a strategy for Charter implementation. And, in 2009, just before direct rule, UKOTCF produced the second review of progress in implementation of the Charters in all UKOTs. This was a major element of the UKOT conservation conference in Cayman that year, supported by HMG and in which FCO, DFID and DEFRA officials and a DEFRA minister participated. It was not an obscure topic! K46. FCO responded: Environment Charter: It would be helpful to know on what basis you feel that officers sent from UK to run TCI during direct government were not briefed on the existence or content of the Environment Charter? The Governor’s Office in TCI is well aware of the Charter and the principles set out within it. K47. UKOTCF replied: One of the conversations about the lack of awareness of the Environment Charter amongst the Governor’s staff took place in the Governor’s office in his presence, and he did not comment when his personnel indicated both that they had not seen the Environment Charter before and how useful it would have been had they done so. L. Gibraltar fisheries and marine conservation L1. When UKOTCF representatives gave oral evidence to the EAC, we had anticipated that the Report dealing with fisheries, and wider issues, would have been available; this unfortunately was not the case. This followed from UKOTCF’s written evidence in which we made reference to the work being undertaken on marine living resources around Gibraltar. That being the case, we were somewhat limited in what could be said to the Committee. This work has now been largely completed and the report “The Management of Marine Living Resources in the Waters around Gibraltar” was published on 4th June. It can be downloaded from the Gibraltar Department of the Environment website www.gibraltar.gov.gi/images/stories/PDF/environment/Management_of_marine_living_resources_in_the_waters_around_Gibraltar.pdf and is also available in hard copy from their offices. It was accompanied by a Ministerial Statement in the Parliament in Gibraltar www.gibraltar.gov.gi/images/stories/PDF/pressoffice/pressreleases/2013/376-2013.pdf which can also be downloaded. We would suggest that the Report is taken as additional evidence for the EAC enquiry. Given the recent publication date, it has not been possible to gauge with any accuracy any responses to the findings and recommendations of the report save those from the Government of Gibraltar, which are positive and leading to uptake of at least some of the recommendations in new Regulations. L2. The authors of the report attempted to provide a technical report with a sound basis in science. However, as the Report points out, it is extremely difficult to separate management considerations based on science from the political considerations which often overlay any decision making process. That being the case, and given that it was impossible not to encounter wider policy, organisational and political processes (by and large not involving Spain) in the preparation of the Report, such additional information was collated and further information on these elements has been provided to the Government of Gibraltar in a separate form. It is clear, that while the Report provides significant background on fisheries and other environmental matters to enable management decisions to be made it will, on its own, not provide the solution to the overall problem, which lies in the territorial/sovereignty dispute with Spain coupled with the very difficult socio-economic issues

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pertaining in Spain. The latter is not of Gibraltar’s making. Indeed the neighbouring Spanish inhabitants would be considerably worse off without inter alia the employment opportunities in Gibraltar; and the responsibility for sovereignty and territorial waters resides entirely with HMG as they relate to foreign affairs and defence matters. L3. Legislation already exists in Gibraltar – the Nature Protection Act 1991 – to regulate activities adversely affecting the marine environment including those relating to fisheries. It is this legislation that prohibits the activities of Spanish boats in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters (BGTW) and for which enforcement has been found lacking – an issue we raised in our oral evidence. In 1999 when the Foreign Affairs Select Committee considered issues pertaining to Gibraltar, the then UK Government was of the opinion that a so-called “Understanding” derived by the then Government of Gibraltar which allowed for the Royal Gibraltar Police (RGP) to “turn a blind eye” to infractions by Spanish fishing boats was an effective solution. So effective in fact that the Minister at the time desired the Government of Gibraltar to repeal the Nature Protection Act so that Spanish boats could fish in BGTW. This does seem a rather bizarre way to interpret making of good law and its enforcement. In practical terms, enforcement is the major issue here. Spanish boats are encouraged by Spanish Ministers and the local governments in Andalusia to enter BGTW as they regard them as Spanish – thus promoting incursions by Spanish fishing boats. This is reinforced by armed Guardia Civil boats accompanying the fishing boats in what is clearly an infraction of BGTW and the sovereignty of Gibraltar – matters which it should be reinforced are the responsibility of HMG rather than the Government of Gibraltar. There have been some suggestions made by HMG that it is difficult to know whether a boat from the Guardia Civil is undertaking right of navigation under international maritime law when in BGTW rather than breaching sovereignty by undertaking activities in BGTW. This is somewhat disingenuous. If a Guardia Civil boat is circling Spanish fishing boats within BGTW in an attempt to keep (unarmed and considerably smaller) RGP boats away, it is fairly obviously not undertaking innocent right of passage. It is at the least very unusual for Royal Navy vessels to intercede. The explanation usually given is that the Royal Navy does not have a role in fisheries protection duties and only deals with breaches of sovereignty but in these cases does not regard these activities as such a breach. L4. Following the oral evidence given by UKOTCF to the EAC a number of Parliamentary Questions were asked apparently, at least in part, to follow up on that evidence. They were: -

Gibraltar Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he has any plans to extend the UK's claim to a territorial water surrounding Gibraltar from three to 12 nautical miles. [156092] Mr Lidington: We have no plans at present to extend British Gibraltar Territorial Waters to 12 nautical miles but we retain the option to do so, as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Jim Dobbin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many incursions into British Gibraltar territorial waters there have been over the last six months. [156133] Mr Lidington: There have been 176 unlawful incursions into British Gibraltar Territorial Waters by Spanish state vessels in the period from 1 November 2012 to 30 April 2013. Jim Dobbin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps he has taken to deter illegal incursions into British Gibraltar territorial waters by Spanish Civil Guard boats. [156134] 20 May 2013 : Column 511W Mr Lidington: The Royal Navy challenges Guardia Civil vessels whenever they make unlawful incursions into British Gibraltar Territorial Waters (BGTW). We also make formal diplomatic protests to the Spanish Government about all such incursions. We will continue to

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do all that is necessary to uphold British sovereignty over BGTW. Jim Dobbin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many times the Spanish Ambassador has been summoned to the Foreign Office over the last 12 months in respect of Spanish incursions into British Gibraltar territorial waters. [156135] Mr Lidington: The Spanish ambassador has been publicly summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office once in the last 12 months in respect of unlawful incursions into British Gibraltar Territorial Waters by Spanish state vessels. Jim Dobbin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps he is taking to ensure that Spain complies with its obligation under the Cordoba Agreements. [156136] Mr Lidington: As part of regular diplomatic engagement, the UK Government continues to encourage Spain to comply with its commitments under the 2006 Cordoba Agreement, which represented a significant step forward in co-operation between the UK, Spain and Gibraltar. The UK Government continues to recognise the value of dialogue and supports a return to a trilateral process in which Gibraltar is actively involved. We make this position clear to the Spanish Government whenever it is appropriate to do so. We have also ensured that the European Commission is aware of the UK position. Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether the Chief Minister of Gibraltar has been put under pressure by his Department to allow Spanish fishermen to fish illegally in British Gibraltar territorial waters; and what assessment he has made of the recent evidence from Dr Tydeman to the Environmental Audit Committee on 17 April 2013 alleging that such pressure has been applied. [156142] Mr Lidington: My Department has regular discussions with the Government of Gibraltar and has supported their efforts to find a solution to the fishing dispute, encouraging all parties to show restraint and cooperate with the Government of Gibraltar. The UK Government has a single policy on Gibraltar, which is agreed across Whitehall Departments including the Ministry of Defence and discussed with the Governor. I will write to the Chair of the Environmental Audit Committee about the Gibraltar related-issues raised in the oral evidence that the Committee has taken from Dr Tydeman.

L5. We would note the following in respect of the answers provided:

a) It is our understanding that the Chief Minister of Gibraltar has formally requested of HMG an extension to the limit of territorial seas from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles in December 2012. We do not know the official response to that request but it is clear from the Parliamentary answer that it has been declined. The request by the Chief Minister accords with a recommendation in the Report that the territorial limits should be expanded to 12 nm on scientific grounds.

b) On the question of incursions, the figure quoted in the parliamentary answer (which could be an underestimate and does not provide information on the number of boats for each incursion) shows that the chances of an incursion on any given day between 1 November 2012 and 30 April 2013 were 97%, in other words virtually every day.

c) Mr Dobbin asked what steps are being taken to deter Guardia Civil boats. The answer did not address this but what actions are taken at the time

d) The Minister’s response to this question on actions is slightly misleading as the word “challenges” could be interpreted as some form of direct action by the RN, when in fact all that happens is a standard radio message is sent asking the Guardia Civil boats to leave BGTW. It would useful to know on how many occasions the RN intercepted Guardia Civil boats on such occasions. Also, given the 176 illegal incursions by Spanish fishing boats in the time period quoted, what actions were taken by the RN on those occasions if not accompanied by Guardia Civil boats?

e) It is our understanding that the Spanish Ambassador was called into the Foreign Office not in respect of incursions by Guardia Civil boats but after one of the two recent

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occasions when a Spanish naval boat was patrolling within BGTW and clearly not undertaking innocent right of passage.

UKOTCF very much welcomes the statement that HMG supports the Government of Gibraltar and encouraging all parties to show restraint and cooperate with the Government of Gibraltar. UKOTCF looks forward to seeing the practical implementation of such aspirations. As with other sections, if this supplementary evidence is insufficient or requires further clarification then we would of course be happy to assist with such. M. Necessary qualities for effective Governors M1. The Committee asked what we think should be included in the specifications for governors, and we indicated that we would amplify in writing our initial brief thoughts. M2. One previous governor described his job at the time as being ‘to fulfil the constitutional and representational duties of Governor, paying due regard to the interests and needs of both the territory and the UK Government.’ His duties and responsibilities, with the approx proportion of time spent on each, were: Presiding Officer of Cabinet 17% Supervision of Ministries and [non-political] Portfolios; day-to-day government business 18% Head of Public Service 15% Reserved Powers (external affairs, internal security, police, drugs etc) 20% Community and representational activities 25% Leadership and management of Governor's Office 5% M3. The role and responsibilities of a Governor, and certainly the time spent on different aspects of them, will considerably depend on the extent of constitutional devolution to the elected local Overseas Territory Government or other officials. And each UKOT will present a variety of challenges at different times. However, the following personal qualities would all always be virtually essential: - self-reliance - resilience - strategic perspective - sound judgment - adaptability - empathy - ability, when necessary, to focus with palpable enthusiasm on the relatively trivial and/or ephemeral, never mind how many more important and/or urgent issues are lurking in the background - teamwork skills and ability to influence - communication skills (oral and written) - leadership - resource management skills (staff and financial)

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- the calibre to demonstrate by actions, as well as words, support for the territory, its environment and people, without undermining HMG policies or priorities - ability to seek good briefings on key issues (not necessarily just from official sources) and utilize them - striving to act as if one would need to live the rest of one’s life in the territory (even though one will be there for only a few years) – with the consequences of one’s actions on the territory and UK - enthusiasm to support aspects, such as environmental conservation, of long-term benefit to the territory but liable to be subordinated to short-term interests (a former governor has noted that even the minister with responsibility for the environment had other responsibilities – including commerce and tourism – where short-term political, financial/budgetary and economic interests repeatedly tended to override; so that, although responsibility for environmental conservation was essentially devolved to the local government, the governor’s was often the only voice in Cabinet prepared to question the environmental wisdom of a particular policy or decision) - an appreciation for the people of the territories and for different cultures - knowing one's way around the Whitehall machine and how to oil it - overall, honesty, integrity and readiness to be held to a higher standard, with a conscience about the environment and a general appreciation for different cultures. M4. Fundamentally, it is essential that any Governor be able to take an independent and dispassionate strategic view of his territory's economic, social and environmental interests and to represent that as necessary (even where constitutionally it is strictly not his business), not only to his elected government and the local public but also to the responsible authorities (not just FCO) in Whitehall and to members of the UK parliament. M5. Conversely, the following undesirable qualities are to be avoided. - Unwillingness to ask for help in areas where he/she is inexperienced (e.g. auditing the budgets of government departments run by locally elected politicians; planning and environmental impact legislation) - Enjoying being treated with deference (developing an inflated sense of entitlement and self-importance) - Having a spouse or partner who tries to steer the job. This is a tricky point to express in politically acceptable terms, but it has undoubtedly been a significant factor with several unsuccessful past Governors. If there is a spouse or partner, this is a factor to be considered. Equally, supportive spouses, often with their own distinctive skills and experience to contribute both in support of the Governor and of local civil society and UKOT government organisations, have been a major factor with several outstandingly successful Governors/Administrators. - Having a tendency to ride personal hobby-horses, since this easily leads to unbalanced priorities, forfeiting local respect and frustrating staff in the Governor's office - A weakness for extramarital sexual proclivities or alcohol. A Governor has a right to a private life, but should avoid overly amorous or excessively drink-influenced behaviour and inappropriate language in public situations. Sadly, this is not invariably the case.

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- A readiness to change, or not resist change to, laws with no regard for the island/territory, leaving the territory (and UK) to clean up after his/her departure. M6. Relevant past experience is highly desirable. This could include roles such as: - a desk-officer or more senior FCO post in relation to UKOTs; - experience (in FCO, other departments or relevant outside bodies) in relevant specialist contexts, such as environment, legal, security/intelligence, support to Ministers and senior official committees; - experience as an Ambassador or High Commissioner (although a Governor, unlike a normal Head of Mission, has no resident EU, NATO or other peers with whom privately and urgently to discuss matters when crisis or disaster strikes). M7. In the absence now of a Colonial Service, an appropriate mix of experience in the FCO is likely to be a good background for a Governor, not least because it is important that a Governor has enough experience of in-fighting within the FCO to be able to deal with the problems of liaising via inexperienced desk officers and sometimes being bullied or ignored by an unsympathetic Director or acting Director of Overseas Territories (and the equivalents in DfID for territories where it likes to call the shots). However, one should not consider this as the only background. There have been outstanding Governors who came from non-FCO backgrounds, as well as some Governors and Administrators with FCO backgrounds who have proved disastrous. M8. Although a posting as Governor is sometimes appropriate for a senior FCO officer approaching retirement, it should never be a place to park someone who is known to be "difficult" to place (“I don't want X to be Ambassador in any country that I'm dealing with from London!”). One problem in the senior management of FCO, and consequently of understanding at top policy level, is that direct experience of UKOTs is extremely rare. It seems that some appointments of younger governors in recent years may have been intended to overcome this; the governors might have gone on to top posts in their later appointments. However, these attempts do not so far seem to have achieved this end. The Governor’s role is so different from most FCO posts that it may be quite difficult for even a successful younger Governor to get back into the mainstream after leaving his/her UKOT. Indeed, there are some signs that doing the job well may have to cut across FCO norms so much that it then becomes less likely that such persons will reach top levels in FCO. M9. Nevertheless, the personal qualities outlined in the earlier part of this section are key. N. Some further aspects on funding N1. As noted in earlier evidence, the different funding mechanisms by FCO, DFID and DEFRA have been combined in a new programme “Darwin Plus.” In our oral evidence, we mentioned that we do have some reservations about Darwin Plus, and noted the further move away from the constructive shared-responsibility approach that used to dominate the funding approach by HMG. N2. In our earlier written evidence, we expressed concern also that funding was moving away from small projects (especially important for NGOs), despite their excellent track record. We now have further information which indicates that this concern was justified. The following tabulation shows the number of grants in a range of size-classes awarded for environmental projects from 2004 to 2013. The grants from 2004 to 2011 were by the FCO/DFID Overseas Territories Environment Programme (OTEP). (Data are not available for the 2005 round.) There was no invitation for bids for a round in 2012. 2013 was the first round of awards by Darwin Plus. Grants Number of grants awarded in the size ranges (£k): awarded in: <25 25-75 75-125 125-175 175-225 >225

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2004 7 4 6 1 0 12006 5 8 1 0 0 02007 6 22 4 0 0 02008 3 3 5 0 0 02009 2 7 6 0 0 02010 1 7 3 2 1 02011 2 7 2 4 1 12012 0 0 0 0 0 02013 2 2 5 2 3 5

N3. It is evident that there has been a decline over the years in grants of <£25k & £25k-75k, with very few being made by Darwin Plus. N4. During the course of providing oral evidence, there were some questions in relation to financing biodiversity conservation and in particular the EU BEST initiative. We would like to go into a little more detail than was possible during the EAC meeting. There has been, and still appears to be, some confusion over BEST. Its origins lie in discussions between UKOTCF and its partner umbrella organisations in the Netherlands and France (linked as “Bioverseas”) with the European Commission about consideration of a voluntary scheme in the OCTs (Overseas Countries and Territories, including UKOTs) to match the system of Natura 2000 and related processes within the EU. This idea was later taken up by the Commission at a conference in Reunion in 2008 and subsequently promoted within the European Parliament by Maurice Ponga MEP and colleagues. N5. This led to the release of an initial tranche of €2 million from the EDF for allocation by DG Environment for a preliminary exercise, which was called BEST. This had the intention of showing the need for such funding on a permanent and larger scale. Since then there has been a second tranche and a call has been made for a third tranche with a deadline of 9th September 2013. This, however, is not an open call for proposals as were the first two but through an open call for tender with 2 LOTs aiming at 1 or 2 service contracts for 4 years on "Measures towards sustaining the BEST Preparatory Action to promote the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem services in EU Outermost Regions and Overseas Countries and Territories". This has the stated aim of covering all ORs (Outermost Regions, i.e. remote parts of the Member State, rather than Territories) and OCTs with a need for partnerships, collaboration, solidarity and clever networking; synergy and complementarity with on-going initiatives. N6. Much of the confusion is in what purpose lies behind the funding which has been exacerbated by imprecise language from the European Commission, the personnel of which persistently referred to BEST as an active process when in fact it was a preliminary exercise (a sort of pre-BEST) to promote the establishment of BEST. Sadly, both tranches of funding, aside from that to IUCN to promote the need for BEST, were allocated to one-off projects and not to those that would provide sustainable outcomes. Also the first tranche was the subject of much criticism when all the awards relevant to specific territories were allocated to proposals led by French outermost regions or OCTs – in what the European Commission described as a fair and balanced outcome (and two other projects led by international bodies with no on-the-ground involvement). Many, including UK interests most certainly did not see it as “fair and balanced”. It should be noted also that several of those projects funded were in territories eligible for other EU funds to which UKOTs are not. A review of the outcomes showed some ongoing issues and a very fundamental difference in the way BEST was considered within DG Environment. The main issues were: -

Despite this supposedly being a simplified application procedure, it took a huge amount of time to prepare and ended up with an application which, in paper form, was the size of a London telephone directory

It was clear that those territories that dealt with the Commission on a regular basis had far

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greater knowledge of the processes and procedures in form-filling and making applications. By and large the outermost regions also had considerably great capacity than others especially including the UKOTs

There was, and continues to be, a lack of transparency in the decision making process on BEST applications, decisions being apparently made in-house by officials with little knowledge of OCTs.

Although these early tranches were initially perceived to be precursors to a much larger and bigger funded process, it became clear that DG Environment personnel were not interested in running such a scheme as they did not consider themselves fund managers. Instead, they promoted the idea of BEST as being some sort of coordinating mechanism for existing funds, such as Regional funds. This means that pre-BEST would become converted into a virtual BEST. As UKOTCF has pointed out to the Commission, this would be of no use to the UKOTs as they are not eligible for such funds

N7. This put more pressure on proposals, also apparently resisted within the Commission, to expand LIFE + funding to encompass the OCTs. While this would be worthwhile as any additional funding for environmental projects in the UKOTs would be welcome, it should not take the place of a BEST equivalent. Also, as it would be open to competition from countries much nearer to home, it would be unlikely to provide very significant funding. Current proposals would provide 0.3% of the EU budget while NGOs have proposed that 1% is required as a minimum. Further, the proposals place new restrictions on elements available to applicants, further limiting their usefulness. N8. We would like to draw attention also to the differences in scale with respect to funding. As regards financial support for biodiversity conservation, ORs are eligible to receive funding within the overall EU financing framework established to support conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity within the Community. During the current funding period (2007–2013), a number of Community funds, including the EU funds for rural and regional development, (e.g. the European Structural Funds (European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF)), the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Fisheries Fund (EFF)) provide possibilities to support the protection of biodiversity. The implementation of the EU policy on cohesion and regional development is supported by a number of Community funds, namely the EU Structural funds (i.e., the ERDF and the ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. Among other things, these funds also provide possibilities for financing initiatives and projects aimed at implementing the EU Biodiversity Action Plan, including the Natura 2000 Network. In addition, the ORs are entitled also to receive funding from the LIFE+ fund that specifically supports environmental and nature conservation projects within the EU. As for the OCTs, funding for biodiversity conservation can be provided as a part of the general EU framework for development cooperation (EDF) and financial assistance to these countries. The current EDF funding period covers years 2008–2013 and provides an overall budget of EUR 22,682 million. Of this, EUR 286 million is earmarked for cooperation with the OCTs. Under the 11th EDF, OCTs have a budget of €343.4 million. This is allocated against a plan which can have only one sectoral priority and that is rarely the environment. The Outermost Regions will receive €7.8 billion in Community investment over the period 2007-2013 with €4.5bn coming from the European Regional Development Fund. Clearly, not all of this is available for environmental projects but the amount does show the scale of differences in what is available, by comparison to the OCTs (including the UKOTs). In the proposed budget for 2014-2020, €0.9 billion has been allocated from the structural funds for outermost regions. By contrast, the amount available for BEST has been 3 tranches of €2million with the future not looking optimistic. Also by contrast is the allocation of ERDF funds of €3.37 million in 2011 to ‘Redevelopment of Capelinhos Lighthouse – Interpretation Centre’ project, which aimed to develop the site as an historical, environmental and sustainable tourist attraction. N9. It is worth recalling also the difficulties and costs of securing grants from even those EU budgets available to UKOTs. Many UKOT partners need help in making the complex applications. For example, UKOTCF (at the request of territories and FCO) co-ordinated an application for the current MPASSE project on Management of Protected Areas to Support Sustainable Economies (MPASSE).

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This part-supports work in the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and the Turks & Caicos Islands on conservation and interpretation. This took 7 years of unpaid work by UKOTCF while the European Commission considered the application, appointed consultants to help in that assessment (but did not penalise these for making mistakes which caused major problems and unnecessary costs to the applicants), and finally issued contracts. A further error by the Commission reduced the grants available to the territory partners and especially UKOTCF. The Commission also noted that its own procedures were so complex that it insisted on diverting much of the original budget to employ further consultants to deal with these (in addition to the administrative work covered by UKOTCF and the territory partners). The costs of the administrative consultant (not including the costs of at least 3 other consultants employed by the Commission in respect of this relatively small project) proved to be more than the grant for conservation work by each of the partners. O. Raising awareness in Britain of the importance of its Overseas

Territories O1. All UKOTs are different, but one can use a common framework, citing individual UKOTs, when seeking to spread awareness of the territories within the UK. UKOTCF has experience of this in working with different territories, for example in its conferences and regional working groups, as well as in facilitating strategy development. O2. If the Ministry of Education were interested in being joined-up, it would be possible to include Overseas Territories in the National Curriculum – not to pack this further, but to use, for example, in biodiversity issues, as well as in human social diversity aspects. P. Some reasons for UK taxpayers to support environmental

conservation in UK Overseas Territories P1. In the oral session on 17th April, we supplied some reasons why National Lottery funds should be available in practice, as well as in law, to work in support of conservation in UK Overseas Territories, but lack of time prevented our giving further reasons why UK taxpayers should support environmental conservation in these distant places. We committed to supplying supplementary evidence on this point. P2. It is very important to note that the UK territories are not eligible for international aid (as they would be if they were independent). The international community assumes that UK supports its citizens in its sovereign territory – as do other nations (such as Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the USA) with territories. For the same reason, the UKOTs cannot even access Global Environment Facility funds, to which UK taxpayers contribute in a major way. Why should UK taxpayers pay less to conservation in its own Overseas Territories than, say, to Indonesia? P3. UK taxpayers already support DfID’s work in developing countries – why should UK citizens in UKOTs miss out? P4. Are we a United Kingdom or not? A former colleague from the Outer Hebrides, who has worked in conservation in her islands, in England, and in UK Overseas Territories has said: “We in the Outer Hebrides know that we are subsidised in the Scottish and UK budgets, and you guys don’t seem to mind because of what we contribute to conservation etc. Why is it so different if the UK citizens live in UK islands a bit further away?”

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P5. It is not really the case that UKOT people make no contribution to UK taxes. As they are British citizens, it is not surprising that, at any one time, substantial proportions of UKOT people are living and working in UK, paying taxes and contributing in other ways. Whilst the proportion is low from some territories, for others it reaches about 40% of the total population. P6. As noted earlier, UKOTs are effectively excluded from grants from the National Lottery – unlike the Dutch territories, which receive grants from the Dutch Postcode Lotterij. P7. By far the greatest biodiversity for which UK is responsible globally is in the Overseas Territories. UK answers internationally for its territories. It has accepted responsibility for this biodiversity. As this Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee have previously recognised, it is beyond the financial capacity of the small communities in the territories to cover the relevant costs. It would be ridiculous to expect the 42 Pitcairn Islanders to provide the resources and human skills for the management of the Henderson Island World Heritage Site; similarly for the 250 Tristan Islanders to be expected to fund the Gough and Inaccessible WHS, containing possibly the world's most important seabird colonies. The same point applies, in varying degrees, to other UKOTs. P8. The economies of many UKOTs depend on their special environments – fishing, tourism, storm protection, etc. So, if UK supports sustainable development and conservation, this assists the UKOTs to become less reliant on central UK support – their economies can become stronger through establishing sustainable fisheries, increased sustainable ecotourism (a growing and high-value component of the tourist industry), and more resilience to severe weather damage, so decreasing the amount needing to be spent on e.g. after-hurricane recovery. P9. The heritages of the UKOTs are closely intertwined with Britain’s heritage. Just a few of many examples are: Explorers from Cook to Shackleton and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands; The East Indies trade & Napoleon (as well as architecture) on St Helena; Shakespeare’s The Tempest and Bermuda; The Bounty and Pitcairn; Gibraltar’s long military and naval history for Britain; Pirates, Loyalists, and 100 years ago the best salt in the world, in the Turks & Caicos Islands; Plantations to pop music recording in Montserrat. 8 June 2013

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Written evidenced submitted by the World Society for the protection of

Animals (WSPA)

Background For centuries turtle meat was consumed in the Caribbean region as part of the local diet. However over time attitudes towards turtles and their meat have shifted in the region, due in part to the green turtles’ status as an endangered animal, and subsequent international legislation which seeks to protect it. However, instead of moving away from turtle meat consumption, a farm was founded in 1968, in the Cayman Islands which sought to meet the demand for turtle meat. This facility still remains today and is known as the Cayman Turtle Farm (CTF). Whilst some may view a farm of this sort as a solution to the conservation crisis by providing legitimate source of meat for those who wish to consume it, the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA) argues that the existence of this facility could actually artificially stimulate demand. WSPA would maintain that the same arguments that are applied to the sale of rhino and ivory, which is said to increase demand for these types of products (where previously this type of demand may not have existed), can also be applied to the sale of turtle meat. Whereas the demand for this meat has diminished within other populations, a legal source of turtle meat in Cayman means this demand has remained on this British Overseas Territory. Furthermore the sale of turtle meat to tourists via restaurants on the island could be artificially inflating the numbers of turtles slaughtered per year and as a result enable the Farm to claim that there is a demand for this meat. Hypothetically it could also be possible that the existence of a facility which sells turtle meat at a cost which is higher than most other forms of meat on the island stimulates a demand for this sort of meat, and in turn an increase in poaching activities, amongst populations which are unable to afford these high prices. The CTF was also recently broken into with a quantity of turtle meat stolen; there is obviously a police investigation currently underway but it would seem evident that the vast quantities of an expensive meat were too irresistible for thieves. 1 The fragile biodiversity of the Cayman Islands is also affected by the presence of the CTF, and WSPA has exposed shocking instances of mistreatment of the turtles in their care, as well as a lack of understanding surrounding the welfare needs of these animals. WSPA has proposed to both to the CTF and the Cayman Islands Government (CIG) that a gradual transition away from turtle meat production is needed – into a rehabilitation and release facility for turtles. This has been done before; a sea turtle farm in the Réunion Islands known as Ferme Corail, made the transition away from a farm and in 2006 reopened as ‘Kélonia: The Observatory of Marine Turtles’. This facility now operates as a rehabilitation and release facility, and a descaling education exercise was conducted which reduced demand for turtle meat so that now no turtles are slaughtered for human consumption. Sadly the CTF and the CIG still remain unwilling to discuss the option of a gradual transition with WSPA. Biodiversity The existence of the CTF threatens the unique biodiversity of Cayman in a number of ways. Firstly the CTF facility does not comply with the legal requirements to carry permits for water discharge. The waste water from over 9,500 turtles is pumped out from the facility directly into the sea. This includes waste water, normal water, food and even particulate matter such as soil and dust.

1 Cayman News Service, 2013, http://www.caymannewsservice.com/crime/2013/06/24/thieves-steal-turtle-meat

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Whilst the Cayman Water Board has required the CTF to reduce the amount of effluent it discharges, and to obtain the necessary permits – in 2012 – they had not yet done so. It is believed that this waste water has an impact on the delicate biodiversity of the marine environment on the side of the island where the CTF is located. A report in 2008 from then-Complaints Commissioner John Epp revealed “It is argued that effluent ... may have interfered with the attractiveness to the water tourism industry of Cayman’s well-known surrounding reefs and contributed to the reduction in the production of beach sand,”. 2 The report also cited anecdotal observations by the Cayman Islands' Department of Environment of a stunting of coral growth in the immediate area surrounding the facility, although it said no recent environmental study had been done to quantify the effects of the effluent discharge.3 WSPA has also seen photographic evidence which suggests that the coral reef around the Farm outflow pipes has died, and WSPA does not believe the CTF currently mitigates the effect that this pollution has on the delicate marine environment. Year of release Number of turtles released

2012 150 – this was after (and thought to be in response to) WSPA’s launch of the ‘Stop Sea Turtle Farming’ campaign

2011 61

2010 22

2009 30

2008 0

2007 20

There is also concern surrounding disease and genetic pollution from turtles released into the wild. Since the Farm’s inception they have released over 31,000 turtles (although can only account for the whereabouts of approximately 13 of these animals now), although in recent years this number has drastically declined, as can be seen in the table below; When the Farm was first established the method of breeding turtles in captivity for release, or ‘headstarting’ was considered appropriate and necessary to help increase turtle numbers in the wild. This method involves maintaining individuals in captivity until they have reached a size which it is believed will make them less subject to predation. However, thinking has moved on, and experts maintain that this is no longer the method of choice. Instead better protection for nesting turtles, their eggs, and properly resourced anti-poaching initiatives are believed to have better results. It is also argued that headstarting can cause aberrant behaviour and movement patterns which compromise the complex migratory movements of sea turtles in their sub-adult years. In addition, there are serious concerns regarding the potential introduction of disease and parasites from these captive bred animals into wild populations.

2 CayCompass, June 2012 http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2012/06/20/Turtle-Farm--monitors--discharge/ 3 CayCompass, June 2012 http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2012/06/20/Turtle-Farm--monitors--discharge/

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It remains unclear as to whether a thorough and robust quarantine procedure has been in place for those turtles selected for release which would screen for disease and genetic abnormalities. In a recent ‘Independent Assessment’ conducted by researchers appointed by the CTF it was concluded that ‘although no evidence of deleterious effects have been documented in wild turtles, we recommend that, in future, all animals released into the wild receive a veterinary certificate of health’4. This clearly suggests that up until this point such checks and certificates were not in place. It is known that many different types of disease are present at CTF, and are spread from turtle to turtle. These include; grey patch disease, chlamdiosis, fibropapillomatosis and lung-eye-trachea disease. If inadequate screening of diseased turtles meant that individuals with these conditions were exposed to the wild population, disease could have been spread. However, as the CTF does not appear to monitor the turtles it releases it is unclear what effect may have resulted from this sort of release. The impacts of genetic pollution, which refers to releasing turtles from unknown and/or different genetic stocks into wild populations, are also a major concern. WSPA has found evidence of turtles in the care of the CTF which had genetic deformities, including missing eyes and deformed skeletons. Via a Freedom of Information (FOI) request WSPA has also learned that the number of turtles which are breeding and producing viable eggs is very limited, which could suggest that in-breeding of some sort is occurring at the CTF. The figures below show the number of breeding turtles over the last ten years. It is worth bearing in mind that CTF is currently home to over 9,500 which would have been produced over time, solely as a result of the turtles detailed below. Year Wild caught turtles producing

eggs Captive bred turtles producing offspring

2002 0 0

2003 4 1

2004 5 2

2005 6 5

2006 9 9

2007 4 8

2008 3 9

2009 7 27

2010 9 10

2011 8 25

2012 12 31

The CTF is also home to the world’s most endangered turtle, the Kemp’s Ridley. The facility collaborated with the Mexican Government and the US National Marine Fisheries Laboratory, and in 1968 they were given 177 of these turtles. Today the CTF have 27 Kemp’s Ridley turtles remaining in their care, and they have never released any of these turtles into the wild. Ineffective record- 4 Cayman Turtle Farm, January 2013, http://www.turtle.ky/mediareleaseinspectionfindings

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keeping by the CTF means that they cannot be sure of the numbers which were shipped abroad; however, it is likely to have been in the region of 10 individuals. Although it is believed that these turtles were donated to the CTF in order to establish a breeding programme for them, breeding ceased in the mid-nineties, however, before this time the Farm managed to breed 3049 hatchlings, It is extremely concerning to think that a breeding programme which produced 3049 hatchlings, from approximately 167 turtles (minus the 10 shipped abroad), has ended up with just 27 turtles surviving in their care. Worldwide it is estimated that there is a total female nesting population of just 1,000 Kemp’s Ridley turtles5, and so whilst it is unlikely that all of these turtles in the care of the CTF were female, it is possible to compare the number in the wild versus the numbers donated to the CTF and the number which remain to infer the extremely detrimental cost of allowing these animals to remain at this facility. This collaboration project between governments and the CTF could have resulted in a significant increase in the total number of Kemp’s Ridley turtle in the world today, which would have aided biodiversity in the Caribbean and South American region. Yet actually this project has had seemingly no positive impact on biodiversity whatsoever. Consumption of turtle meat Whilst the CTF may claim that they need to meet the local demand for turtle meat which otherwise would be satisfied by individuals poaching turtles from the wild, the actual demand for turtle meat among the local Caymanian population appears to be unknown. Via a FOI request WSPA has ascertained data on the number of turtles slaughtered for meat over the last five years. The number of turtles sold for consumption in 2011 (762) is less than half that sold in 2007 (1632). Via the media, WSPA has also learnt that the figure for turtles sold for meat in 2012 was over 9006. These figures strongly suggest that there has been a significant decline in the number of turtles consumed over the last 6 years, which could suggest that local demand for this meat is also declining. Even this slight increase from 2011 to 2012 of around 140 does not show that demand is anywhere near the levels seen in 2007. It appears that the UK Government is unwilling to tackle what is perceived to be a cultural issue – this is despite their willingness to tackle other culturally sensitive concerns such as rhino horn, ivory, shark-finning and whaling. The Environment Minister Richard Benyon MP upholds a ban on shark finning in British waters; this prevents sharks dying a painful death at sea after the removal of their fins. The demand for shark fins is fuelled by the desire by some to eat shark fin soup, whilst others maintain that the fins have medicinal purposes. Whilst Ministers feel able to comment on the cultural issues surrounding shark finning, the same cannot be said for the consumption of turtle meat. In a recent communication to WSPA, dated 14th March 2013, Richard Benyon MP said “The Cayman Turtle Farm is… the responsibility of the Cayman Islands Government (CIG). The fundamental issue of whether the Farm should continue to farm turtles for their meat is one for the CIG to consider.” Whilst there is no doubt that the consumption of turtle meat is a cultural issue, there is concern that the slaughter figures do not provide a clear picture as to what quantity is actually consumed by local people, as opposed to tourists who eat it as a 'cultural dish' or something exotic to try when on holiday. In 2012 WSPA commissioned an independent poll of 400 people who went to the CTF as part of a cruise ship tour to the island. Out of these 400 people, 21% claimed to have consumed turtle meat whilst on holiday. This clearly demonstrates that this meat is being eaten by a group of people for whom it should not be intended. 5 National Geographic, http://animals.nationalgeographic.co.uk/animals/reptiles/kemps-ridley-sea-turtle 6 CayCompass February 2013 www.caymannewsservice.com/science-and-nature/2013/02/12/900-turtles-killed-meat-2012-ctf-reveals

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Turtle meat is clearly on sale in restaurants around the island which are primarily aimed at tourists. For example the Paradise Bar and Grill7 is situated next to the area of the port where cruise ship passengers alight onto the island, and they sell dishes made from green turtle meat sourced from the CTF. Selling turtle meat to tourists is effectively a subsidisation mechanism for the CTF. This entirely artificially created market for turtle meat helps perpetuate the Farm’s existence and even keeps afloat what appears to be a diminishing demand for the meat amongst Caymanians. The artificial stimulation of demand for turtle meat can also be compared to the artificial demand for goods made from other endangered animals including rhino horn and elephant ivory. The UK Government have stated previously that they would call for ‘future sales of legally sourced ivory - designed to undermine the illegal ivory market - to be stopped unless it can be clearly shown that such sales reduce poaching levels.’8 WSPA understands that despite the Farm’s existence poaching still continues in the Cayman Islands, and this could perhaps be because people are encouraged to eat turtle meat, but are unable to afford the prices charged by CTF. The fact is that the CTF perpetuates a demand for turtle meat in the Cayman Islands, when in fact the pragmatic solution would be to find ways in which that demand as a whole could be diminished over time. In the same way that any legal trade in ivory creates a demand that supply cannot fulfil, the only ultimate solution is to find ways in which that demand ceases altogether. WSPA would like to see the CTF and CIG commit to undertaking research into the true local demand for turtle meat and commit to meet only this – whilst introducing initiates to reduce the demand for meat over time. An initial first step which can easily be made is for the CTF to cease selling the meat to restaurants, especially those which cater primarily for the tourist market – and instead only supply to local people who truly do demand access to the meat source. This would allow for the true demand for meat to be established fairly quickly. Economics Every known attempt to farm sea turtles commercially has failed on economic grounds. The CTF is no exception: its meat production is not profitable, and the tourist facing facility has never been able to compensate for this. Historically, there might have been one or two years when a profit can claim to have been made, but ultimately the CTF has declared itself bankrupt on two separate occasions, long before the large tourist development, known as Boatswain’s Beach was created. This required the CIG to step in and run the facility as a Government owned company. A historical timeline of the CTF and its economic issues can be seen below; CTF Timeline: 1968 – Mariculture Ltd. was established 1975 – Mariculture Ltd. went bankrupt and was put into receivership. 1975 – Mariculture Ltd (receivership) was purchased by German investors who renamed it the

Cayman Turtle Farm. Conditions were placed on this sale which meant that the Cayman Islands Government held a 2.5% stake in the company.

1979 – CITES changed the interpretation of its exemption of “bred in captivity” animals. This excluded the first generation of turtles born in captivity and occurred just as the Farm announced that its captive breeding program had successfully produced its first generation of turtles.

1982 – The new Cayman Turtle Farm owners gave up trying to farm turtles and brought numbers to a minimum with the intention of closing the facility.

1983 – The Cayman Islands Government purchased the Farm for US$1.5 million; the previous owners had invested over ten times this amount.

7 http://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/ShowUserReviews-g147366-d1046148-r156549307-Paradise_Bar_Grill-George_Town_Grand_Cayman_Cayman_Islands.html 8 DEFRA, 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/benyon-calls-for-firm-action-against-archaic-trade-in-rhino-horn

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By the end of the current fiscal year the CTF is set to have received a total of just over $30 million in ‘equity injections’ since mid-2010. The CTF auditors, KPMG have noted that the massive amount of Government funding required to sustain operations is of “growing concern”9. Whilst the CTF might claim that their total cost of sales-to-revenue ratio has improved in 2012 and progress is being made because the borrowings, once totalling around US$54 million, have been reduced to CI$24 million in the 2011/12 fiscal year10 - it is difficult to see how the CTF can ever turn a profit or even break even when they are farming an animal which is so completely unsuitable for this purpose. Under the FOI Act the CTF have stated that they have received the following amounts in funding from the CIG, as well as the following amounts in debt servicing, over the last five years; Year Total funding in CI$ Debt servicing in CI$

2006 - 7 5,824,104 3,578,464

2007 - 8 8,451,967 5,966,465

2008 - 9 10,554,818 5,867,789

2009 - 10 9,555,610 6,021,498

2010 - 11 9,852,569 6,102,434

The CIG have also just submitted their budget (which was discussed and agreed with the UK Government this month) which states that for the period between July and October of this year they will be spending CI$2,500,000 on the Cayman Turtle Farm.

That’s more than:

Emergency Fire Services - CI$1,797,019 Public Education Programmes - CI$84,828 Cayman Airways Limited - CI$1,700,000 Children and Youth Services (CAYS) Foundation - CI$726,000 Care of the Indigent, Elderly and Disabled Persons - CI$440,173 Ambulance Services - CI$743,375 School Health Services - CI$637,925 Environmental Services and Research - CI$877,394

In order to understand why the CTF is unable to make a profit, it is important to look past the debt incurred and instead look at the underlying reasons that have caused the CTF to go bankrupt twice, and remain financially supported by the CIG. Sea turtles simply are not biologically appropriate for commercial farming. These are wild animals, unsuitable for domestication for farming purposes. They take years to reach a size where they are suitable for slaughter, prefer to live in solitary conditions in the wild unless mating, require a food source which is not available to farmed animals meaning that a synthetic replacement, not produced in the Cayman Islands has to be sourced. Furthermore keeping mortality rates down is both technically challenging and extremely expensive. It is not only WSPA which upholds this position, CITES officials state that sea turtle farms “are very expensive, require advanced technical knowledge, and are, to date, of unproved economic viability.”11 9 CayCompass, April 2013 http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2013/04/02/Report---Turtle-Farm--gets-$30M-over-three-years/ 10 CayCompass, April 2013 http://www.compasscayman.com/story.aspx?id=120091 11 CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/hbt/bg/ranch_breed.shtml

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It has been suggested that the CTF managers may be holding out hope that international CITES legislation will eventually be altered to allow for international trade in green sea turtles. They may believe that this would open up international markets and provide a new source of revenue as turtles could be traded between countries. But the reality is if this change were ever to occur it would take decades before a decision was made. In the meantime the CTF would need to remain operational and would continue to function at unsustainable levels of debt. It is not only the cost of producing turtle meat which is of concern when considering the CTF’s business model. This model is currently based on the assumption that the CTF will ‘break even’ if it can double the number of tourists per year. The Current CTF Manager, Tim Adam has said “...when the Turtle Farm was expanded in the early part of last decade, the business model called for the construction of a cruise dock at the public beach”12. To just “break even” at the CTF Tim Adam estimates the facility would have to draw twice the number of visitors it draws now per year – 460,000 people – or about one quarter of the Cayman’ Island's yearly total visitors, counting both cruise ship and stay-over tourists.13 The only way for this to happen is via the introduction of a potential and controversial new dock for cruise liners - something which is far from certain, and so should not be relied upon in terms of business projections. This would also have serious consequences for biodiversity in the region as it would require the destruction of coral reefs to double the number of polluting cruise vessels which could dock on the island. The Cayman Islands needs a new facility which takes the actuality of the current situation into account and builds a business model around realistic projected growth of tourism. A new rehabilitation and research facility would not be reliant upon a dock of this sort, or on the doubling of visitor numbers, and so would be starting at a much more realistic number when it came to economic stability. Animal Welfare WSPA conducted an investigation into the animal welfare failings of the CTF over a year ago. Details of what the investigators found are detailed in WSPA’s publication entitled ‘The Cayman Turtle Farm; A case for change’. However, since this report was publicised and its findings presented to the CTF and CIG very little has changed for the 9,500 turtles in the care of the CTF. In fact in some cases the situation has worsened. In July of last year, staff negligence resulted in the death of 299 turtles at the CTF.14 Under the FOI Act WSPA has received images which show the number of turtles which died, as well as the conditions they endured before their death. It is worth remembering that in 2011 the CTF released into the wild 150 turtles, yet managed to accidentally kill 300. The death of these animals is shocking, as it is likely these animals suffered before they died. Further documentation obtained via the FOI Act showed that the CTF believed these animals died from heat exhaustion as a result of a lack of water. As a result of the WSPA campaign the CTF commission an ‘Independent Investigation’ of their own facilities, the results of which were published in January 2013.15 Despite WSPA having reservations about the impartiality of this report, the investigators did find that "a notable proportion of animals had quite severe skin lesions that included deep ulceration to the shoulder, forelimbs, head and hind limbs." The investigators also noted that "although there are processes in place to address existing lesions and on-going mortality, they need to be intensified, enhanced and their efficacy 12 CayCompass, April 2013 http://compasscayman.com/caycompass/2013/04/09/Farm-finances-not-getting-better/ 13 CayCompass, April 2013 http://compasscayman.com/caycompass/2013/04/09/Farm-finances-not-getting-better/ 14 Wildlife Extra, 2012, http://www.wildlifeextra.com/go/news/cayman-turtle-farm.html#cr 15 Cayman Turtle Farm, 2013, http://www.turtle.ky/mediareleaseinspectionfindings

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assessed". The panel also noted that, “based on visual examination of body profile, a notable proportion of animals appeared moderately emaciated.” In response to this report, the current CTF Manager Tim Adam said "recent experimental pre-clinical trials conducted by Dr. Carlos E. Crocker (St. Matthew’s University School of Veterinary Medicine) and Dr Walter Mustin of CTF have enabled the Cayman Turtle Farm to develop effective medication protocols for the treatment of skin lesions and, as a result, the Farm has subsequently expanded and intensified these treatments to include the aggressive treatment of all affected turtles in its care". 16 However, what is sadly missing from this explanation is an understanding of what causes the lesions on turtles in the first place, and that is that sea turtles are not suitable for farming. CTF should not be keeping 299 solitary animals in a shallow cramped tank, as it is clear that lesions could, and currently do, result from this. A solution for change WSPA proposes that a transition away from meat production and towards a rehabilitation and release facility is necessary. This would allow for the current levels of debt to be properly managed because the main focus of the facility would no longer be the costly production of turtles for meat. By gradually downscaling meat production at the CTF an end would be in sight to the annual bailout required in order to ensure that turtle meat can be consumed by perhaps only a small proportion of Caymanians. WSPA suggests that this transition process should be phased over several years, during which time the current staff employed at the CTF could be re-trained, to ensure that jobs for current staff remain. A transition of this sort could also significantly benefit the territories natural biodiversity, waste water would no longer be pumped into the sea in such large amounts, and turtle releases would cease which could prevent the spread of diseases from farmed turtles to wild populations. A properly conducted transition, which could be funded by sources including DEFRA’s Darwin Plus Initiative, would result in a positive change for the Caymanian taxpayer, the UK Government and the 9500 turtles in the care of the CTF. 2 July 2013

16 Cayman Turtle Farm, 2013, http://www.turtle.ky/mediareleaseinspectionfindings

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Letter from Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I am writing on behalf of the UK Government to respond on the Gibraltar issues raised in the oral evidence taken by the Committee from Dr Chris Tydeman, Chair of the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF) in April and in UKOTCF’s supplementary written evidence in June. In his oral evidence Dr Tydeman commented on the UK Government’s position on enforcement of the Gibraltar Nature Protection Act 1991 within British Gibraltar Territorial Waters (BGTW). However, under the Gibraltar Costitution the UK Government is responsible for external affairs, defence and internal security, while HM Government of Gibraltar (HMGoG) is responsible for all other matters, including the management of the marine environment and the Nature Protection Act. The UK Government respects the Constitution and supports the rule of law. We have neither urged HMGoG to abolish the Nature Protection Act nor put HMGoG under pressure to allow Spanish fishermen to fish illegally within BGTW. Instead, we have supported HMGoG’s efforts to find a solution to the dispute with Spanish fishermen, encouraging all parties to show restraint and cooperate with HMGoG. We believe that dialogue and cooperation offers the best chance of ensuring respect for the law and enabling environmental protection. Illegal fishing by Spanish vessels within BGTW has posed problems since the passage of the Nature Protection Act but the issue has become a major source of friction since March 2012 when HMGoG ended an informal agreement with the fishermen, made in 1999, which had allowed limited fishing despite the provisions of the Act. The offending fishermen have received support from vessels of the Spanish Guardia Civil, which make unlawful incursions into BGTW with the aim of preventing the Royal Gibraltar Police from enforcing the law. Other unlawful Guardia Civil incursions into BGTW have also increased significantly. This is utterly unacceptable and contrary to international law, specifically the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We have protested in strong terms to Spain, including summoning the Spanish Ambassador in London to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 15 November 2012 – the first EU Ambassador to be summoned for many years. The summoning of the Ambassador was a response to two particularly serious incursions; one by a naval vessel and one by a Customs vessel. However, the summoning was in the context of the repeated protests that we had previously made to the Spanish Government about incursions, the vast majority of which concerned Guardia Civil vessels. The Prime Minister and I protested to the Spanish Prime Minister and the Spanish Minister for the European Union respectively following an incident on 23 June 2013 in BGTW. In the course of an unlawful incursion by a Guardia Civil vessel, a Guardia Civil officer is reported to have discharged non-lethal shots from a firearm while in pursuit of a Gibraltarian jet ski. In his oral evidence Dr Tydeman claimed that the Nature Protection Act was not being enforced effectively because the Royal Navy is not tasked with fisheries protection. However, in accordance with the Constitutional division of responsibilities, it is the Royal Gibraltar Police and not the Royal Navy that is tasked with enforcement of Gibraltar law,

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including the Nature Protection Act. The main tasks of the Royal Navy Gibraltar Squadron (RNGS) are to protect visiting warships and to uphold British sovereignty within BGTW1. As the Committee will be aware, there is a long-standing difference of position between the UK and Spain in relation to sovereignty over Gibraltar’s waters. We are confident of British sovereignty over BGTW, since under international law territorial waters flow from sovereignty over the land. Yet for many decades there have been unlawful incursions into BGTW by vessels of the Spanish State. Although such behaviour is a challenge to British sovereignty, it has not posed a threat to it. Incursions cannot change international law. The Royal Navy upholds British sovereignty by challenging all unlawful incursions by State vessels by means of radio warnings, issued either by RNGS vessels or by units ashore in Gibraltar, and through close monitoring until the offending vessels leave BGTW. In his oral evidence Dr Tydeman questioned statements that I purportedly made in the House on 16 October 2012 about Royal Navy activity in Gibraltar. I believe that he may have been referring to the debate of 15 October on an Urgent Question tabled by Jim Dobbin MP(HC 15 Oct 2012 : Column 24), as I did not speak about Gibraltar in the House on 16 October. In that debate I said that the Royal Navy challenges Guardia Civil and other Spanish State vessels whenever they make unlawful maritime incursions into British Gibraltar Territorial Waters. I can confirm that the Royal Navy has continued to carry out this task of upholding sovereignty throughout the fishing dispute and has issued warnings to all Guardia Civil vessels which have attempted to support illegal fishing. Private vessels, such as those that fish illegally within BGTW, are not State vessels and their activities are not included in the 176 unlawful incursions by State vessels to which I referred in my Written Answer of 20 May 2013 and which UKOTCF quote in their written evidence (HC: 20 May 2013: Column 510W). The policing of private vessels is a matter for the Royal Gibraltar Police. British Forces Gibraltar (BFG) closely monitor movements of Spanish State vessels within BGTW and determine whether they are lawful according to the rules on innocent passage, as defined in UNCLOS. Many of the passages through BGTW by Spanish State vessels constitute lawful “innocent passage”, as defined in UNCLOS. However, whenever BFG assess that a movement is a violation of the right of innocent passage they categorise it as an unlawful incursion. They then issue appropriate warning(s) to the vessel(s) concerned and we protest to the Spanish Government on diplomatic channels. In their written evidence UKOTCF refer to “suggestions” from the UK Government that it is difficult to determine whether a Guardia Civil vessel is violating British sovereignty. It is unclear to which UK Government statements this refers. We have always been clear that British sovereignty is violated when:

- A Spanish State vessel attempts to exercise jurisdiction in BGTW, for example by interfering with the jurisdiction of the Royal Gibraltar Police.

                                                            1 British Gibraltar Territorial Waters have a limit of three nautical miles from the land except where the median line between British and Spanish territory is less than 3 nautical miles.   

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- A Spanish State vessel passes through BGTW without attempting to exercise jurisdiction, but her passage is neither continuous nor expeditious and is therefore in contravention of UNCLOS Article 19 governing the right of innocent passage.

The UK Government is clear that unlawful incursions by vessels of the Spanish State are an unacceptable violation of British sovereignty and contrary to international law, specifically the provisions of UNCLOS. We maintain diplomatic pressure on the Spanish Government to stop this behaviour. We remain fully committed to upholding British sovereignty over Gibraltar and BGTW, in accordance with the wishes of the people of Gibraltar, and we rule out no options in doing so. However, our differences with Spain on Gibraltar issues should be resolved by political and legal means rather than by naval confrontation. I believe that an escalation on the waters would be likely to heighten tensions and make it more difficult for HMGoG to find a solution to the fishing issue, and for progress to be made with Gibraltar and Spain on other Gibraltar-related issues.

I hope that this clarification of the UK Government’s position is of assistance to the Committee. I would be happy to provide further information if the Committee would like me to do so. 1 July 2013

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Further written evidence submitted by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum

Introduction This document supplements the original written submission from the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF) in November 2012, the oral evidence given to the Committee on 17th April 2013, and the supplementary written evidence of June 2013. It updates some earlier material and arises also from points in the written evidence recently made available by the Committee and the oral evidence session on 9th July. To minimise confusion in cross-referencing, we label the sections by letters following on from those used in our earlier written evidence. The sections in this supplement address: (Letter Q is omitted to avoid confusion with references to questions and answers in oral

evidence.) R. HMG’s shared responsibility for environmental conservation in UK Overseas Territories

Environment Charters S. Problems in HMG governance in respect of UK Overseas Territories (continued from

Section K) T. Gibraltar fisheries and marine conservation (continued from Section L) U Final remarks

If the Committee requires further clarification, then we would of course be happy to. R. HMG’s shared responsibility for environmental conservation in UK Overseas Territories R1. UKOTCF is concerned that the written evidence from some UKOT Governors, which appeared on the Parliament web-site in July, seemed to ignore HMG’s responsibilities for UKOTs in respect of international multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and in some aspects of good governance generally. Whilst there is limited recognition of HMG’s shared responsibility in respect of Gibraltar by virtue of the latter’s inclusion in the EU, the shared responsibility for all the UKOTs under various MEAs is omitted. (However, the Gibraltar Governor’s submission implied that, because fisheries came under environmental legislation, they were not the Governor’s responsibility.) Noting that the evidence submitted by most Governors seemed to be based on a common template (from which they varied in different degrees), one presumes that this omission of mention of HMG’s shared responsibilities reflects a view of HMG. This was reinforced by the Committee’s questioning at the oral session on 9th July 2013. At this, Ministers and officials seemed to want to play down HMG’s shared responsibilities in this area but were at a loss as to how to find a justification of this change of position in the face of the points made on the basis of law and HMG’s international commitments. R2. UKOTCF has previously noted the greater readiness of HMG to engage with the UKOT Governments in respect of its shared responsibilities for financial regulation, by distinct contrast with its shared responsibilities for environmental protection. In particular, UKOTCF noted the clarity with which this came through in the oral session with Ministers, who made clear their lack of engagement with environmental issues, especially compared with financial ones. This is despite both the fine words in the 2012 White Paper, and the conclusions in the detailed analyses by the Bermuda Ombudsman that the Environment Charters signed between HMG and UKOT Governments are of the same standing as the anti-money-laundering agreements. (It is notable also that, whilst the Environment Charters remain easily accessible on UKOTCF’s web-site

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(www.ukotcf.org), they are not available on HMG’s new minimalist web-site although they can be accessed by the determined on the old, rather better FCO website, archived by the National Archives website.) R3. We recommend that the Committee reinforce the conclusion that HMG shares with UKOT governments the responsibility for environmental protection in the UKOTs. R4. UKOTCF presumes that the failure to mention the Environment Charters in the Governors’ evidence (the only exception is where the Bermuda Governor refers to the work of the independent Bermuda Ombudsman) and their playing down by Ministers in the oral section results from a deliberate effort to downplay the importance of the Charters and also the commitments by both HMG and the territories , embodied in paragraph 11 of the Charters, to “Abide by the principles set out in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and work towards meeting International Development Targets on the environment”. The authority of the Charters derives from the texts not being determined unilaterally by HMG but being the result of careful negotiations with each of the territories. The format of the Charters thus recognizes the shared but differentiated responsibilities in respect of the environment of both HMG and the governments of the territories. UKOTCF is pleased, however, to note that the Joint Communiqué of the December 2012 Joint Ministerial Council (JMC), to which HMG referred in oral evidence, did reconfirm the commitment to the Environment Charters, and agreed to work together on the priority action “to continue to implement Environment Charters, and to work towards the full implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements where these have been extended to the Territories”. R5. We note that the HMG evidence on 9th July, as well as reiterating the commitment to the Environment Charters, mentioned carrying some matters forward through its “mainstreaming”1 exercise. UKOTCF welcomes progress here. It notes that mainstreaming is effectively provided for in the Charters through the commitment to “Ensure that environmental considerations are integrated within social and economic planning processes.” Furthermore, the cross-sectoral development of strategies to implement the Charters that UKOTCF facilitated in several territories included all the elements of the current mainstreaming and some additional ones. The UKOTCF-facilitated exercises were designed as open processes, and the current “mainstreaming” exercises might benefit from a more transparent approach. R6. UKOTCF is concerned that the positive commitments and shared responsibilities, under international commitments, for conservation underlined in the Environment Charters, to which Ministers indicated they remain committed and wish to treat as priorities, appear to be undermined by other Ministerial comments within a couple of weeks of giving evidence to the Committee (Written Answers 18 July 2013):

Matthew Offord (Hendon, Conservative): To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs what steps his Department is taking to ensure that all Overseas Territories entrench the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals into their respective legislation. Richard Benyon (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Natural Environment and Fisheries), Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Newbury, Conservative): UK practice is that treaties are only extended to Overseas Territories if the territories request extension. Environment is an issue devolved to Territory Governments and it is for each Overseas Territory to decide how to deliver any obligations arising from Multilateral Environmental Agreements that have been extended to it.

1 Note that, in an attempt to improve the quality of drafting in Whitehall, a DFID Minister, in a widely reported minute of June 2012, included “mainstreaming” as one of the terms not to be used.

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If an Overseas Territory considers the Convention on Migratory Species to be of relevance, we will work with that Territory to extend the Convention to it. Matthew Offord (Hendon, Conservative): To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs what steps his Department takes if a UK Overseas Territory is in contravention of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals. Richard Benyon (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Natural Environment and Fisheries), Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Newbury, Conservative): Environment is an issue devolved to Territory Governments. Where the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals has been extended to a UK Overseas Territory it is the responsibility of that Territory to decide how to deliver any obligations arising from it. If requested we will work with the Territories to which the Convention has been extended to help them meet their obligations.

R7. This seems to be an abnegation of responsibility, in the same ways as were previously criticised by the Environmental Audit Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee in their 2008 Inquiries, as well as HMG’s international commitments. Indeed, several of the HMG responses to the Committee in the 9th July session seemed to be aimed at separating responsibility for the environment (delegated to UKOT governments) from responsibility for international treaties (HMG). This ignores the fundamental point that environmental responsibilities bear on both HMG and the territories. Indeed, it was to address this reality that HMG developed the Environment Charters. The attempt flies in the face also of British Overseas Territories Law (Hendry & Dickson, 2011), quoted by Dr Offord in the 9th July session – which makes clear that HMG “is responsible for compliance by the Overseas Territories with obligations arising under international law, whether deriving from customary, international law or from applicable treaties.” On 9 July, Mr Benyon accepted that point in respect of CITES, and also in Dr Offord’s example of water pollution; so it is of concern – and puzzling – that he rejected it in respect of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species barely a week later in Parliamentary Answers on 18th July. (The information at paras G1-G5 and oral evidence Q57-Q60 on 17th April are also relevant here.) R8. Even if HMG accepts its shared responsibility to environmental conservation in the UKOTs (to which UKOTCF believes HMG has committed itself under international agreements and the Environment Charters), the enthusiasm of officials and the extent to which UK government departments are prepared to initiate an active dialogue over how they can help – see all the UK commitments under the Charters – will have a great bearing on how well HMG and the territories can together realise the vision of “the natural environment managed to the highest international standards.” We have already mentioned UKOTCF’s work in facilitating complete sign up by UKOTs and Crown Dependencies to the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and HMG’s general support for this. Now, HMG’s approach has clearly moved from proactive to reactive, with DEFRA noting that, if a territory asked, HMG would help. The recent record is that help is given reluctantly. Last year, the Isle of Man finally managed to get itself added to UK’s ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 18 months after it formally requested HMG to do this at a time when the Isle had met all requirements. This was achieved almost totally due to the commitment and persistence of Isle of Man environmental officials, rather than enthusiastic support from HMG (see para B7 of our earlier evidence). No other UKOT or Crown Dependency has managed this since the inclusion of several territories by UK at the time of original ratification some 20 years ago. As we have indicated earlier, UKOTCF recommends that HMG move without delay to add the uninhabited UKOTs to its ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and encourage the remaining inhabited territories to join also. R9. UKOTCF welcomes the fact that, since the July session and after several years of waiting, the Government of Anguilla has asked HMG to add Anguilla to UK’s ratification of the

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Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). UKOTCF trusts that HMG will progress this speedily. We hope also that the last remaining UKOT not included in CITES, the Turks and Caicos Islands, is also added soon, especially as TCI has much of the domestic legislation in place. Only one UKOT, Anguilla, remains out of the UK’s ratification of the Convention on Migratory Species, and we encourage its joining. R10. Discussions at the Committee’s session on 9th July included consideration of the UN’s Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, when HMG indicated that this Convention applies only within Europe. The treaty itself (at depository’s web-site: http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf) makes clear that states within Europe have the right to join but others may join with the approval of a Meeting of the Parties. Some non-European states have already done so. The Meetings of the Parties have indicated that other parties are welcome. R11. However, a further point has emerged. It is normal, in signing or ratifying a treaty, for a nation-state which has separate territories within its sovereignty to indicate either which territories are included or which are excluded. Indeed, Article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (to which the UK is a Party) provides that “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.” In a “Memorandum on Application” the FCO, on its web-site (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130104161243/http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/treaties/uk-overseas-territories/memorandum-application), explains that, the term ‘entire territory’ includes the UK Overseas Territories unless expressly excluded by a declaration upon ratification. HMG has certainly done that for other treaties. R12. However, UK did not qualify its ratification of the Aarhus Convention (except for a declaration about the meaning of Article 1 and the preamble). No geographical declaration was made at the time of ratification or later (http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=27&lang=en#EndDec). In the case of their ratifications: Denmark excluded Faeroes and Greenland; Netherlands limited coverage to its European Territory; and France excluded three of its Territoires Outre-Mer, but not the other TOMs or any Departments Outre-Mer. The Aarhus Convention does not require explicit extension, and is consequently applicable to all UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies by virtue of its ratification by the UK on 23 February 2005, which made no geographical reservation. R13. Therefore, the Aarhus Convention applies to all UKOTs and Crown Dependencies. This is also the view of the Depository; the UN considers that the UKOTs are within the Aarhus Convention (see, for example, the map of included areas: http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/AarhusMap.html. This has a category of “Overseas territories excluded by countries’ declarations”, including for example Greenland. In contrast, the UKOTs are included in the Convention, as exemplified by the Falkland Islands, the only one of them physically large enough to show on this small-scale world map. The dates of signing and ratification are confirmed as those of UK.) R14. This means that the Minister may have inadvertently misled the Committee, and the House when answering Dr Offord’s question (2 July 2013: Column 591W):

Dr Offord: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which British Overseas Territories have ratified the Aarhus Convention to Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. [162338]

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Mark Simmonds: The UK's ratification of the Convention, which was deposited with the UN on 23 February 2005, does not currently extend to any of the UK Overseas Territories.

R15. It seems that HMG may have overlooked consulting the UKOTs when it, possibly inadvertently, included them in its ratification of the Aarhus Convention. R16. In this context especially, it is unfortunate that HMG has given no practical support to assist any UKOT to implement freedom of information provisions – as admitted by the Minister, with commendable openness, on 9th July. We welcome the comment by the FCO Director of Overseas Territories that this freedom of information measure could be promoted more actively. R17. The Committee might like to recommend that HMG take positive steps to encourage and assist UKOTs to implement freedom of information measures – not just because it would minimise the effects of the rather confusing situation that HMG has got itself into with the UN and the UKOTs – but because (as acknowledged by Mr Simmonds) it would be the responsible thing to do in terms of both UK’s international obligations and to meet its commitments under the Environment Charter agreements signed between HMG and the UKOTs. A keen interest in Freedom of Information has been expressed in several territories, notably in the recent Legislative Council Elections in St Helena (see paras S18-S19 below) R18. UKOTCF finds it difficult to reconcile the priority that the White Paper and HMG’s evidence to your Committee claim to give to environmental conservation with the lack of effective action and the side-lining – or even omission – of UKOTs in their policies. By agreement between Government Departments and in public statements, DEFRA leads for HMG on biodiversity of UKOTs. As repeated by Ministers to the Committee, it is generally accepted that over 90% of the global biodiversity for which UK is responsible is found in (and depends on) the UKOTs, rather than on Great Britain & Northern Ireland. Yet, UKOTs are not mentioned once in DEFRA’s business plan. The Minister noted in evidence that the business plan is an over-arching strategic document. It remains remarkable that such a document should make no mention of any commitment to support 90% of the global biodiversity for which UK is responsible – a key role in terms of UK’s international reputation at the forefront of environmental biological sciences and conservation. R19. In addressing this point and Dr Offord’s question as to where to find DEFRA’s objectives for the UKOTs, Mr Benyon referred to the Natural Environment White Paper (June 2011). However, this includes only one mention of the UKOTs. The paragraph, in its entirety, says:

5.11 We will also continue to give priority to the UK Overseas Territories (OTs) Biodiversity Strategy, through a co-ordinated approach across government that is led by the National Security Council. The Government will continue its engagement with the OTs in their efforts to conserve their biodiversity through programmes such as the Flagship Species Fund and one-off initiatives such as the £200,000 contribution towards a project to eradicate rodents on Henderson Island in the Pitcairn Group. Moreover, the Darwin Initiative is also making a significant difference to wildlife in our OTs. An additional £1.5 million has already been invested in Darwin projects in the three years from 2010, and this sum will increase further as a result of the new Darwin funding referred to above.

At the time, UKOTCF wrote to the Secretary of State at DEFRA to seek clarity as to the respective roles in relation to UKOTs biodiversity of the National Security Council, DEFRA, FCO and other departments. The response by Mr Benyon suggested that we had “misunderstood” the wording “led by” with the reference to the National Security Council. This was a little odd, as our letter had asked the question about this, rather than made a statement about it R20. In the same letter, the Minister responded to our query regarding the National Ecosystems Assessment (2011) raised in this DEFRA White Paper but which did not appear to address the

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UKOTs and about which we sought clarification and offered possible collaboration. Furthermore, none of the many distinguished participants listed as involved in producing this (expert panel members, user group, client group) include UKOT bodies or those with direct experience of UKOTs. We were referred to a 2007 document produced by JNCC (Valuing the Environment in Small Islands - An Environmental Economics Toolkit (2007) van Beukering, P., Brander, L., Tompkins, E. and McKenzie, E.) which, although of some relevance, did not relate to the new initiative. R21. Similarly indicative of the de facto low priority HMG assigns to this area is the fact that the one DEFRA post which has UKOTs as about one-third of its responsibilities has only just been filled, after half a year vacant. UKOTCF looks would be delighted to work with that officer, but notes that she faces a formidable challenge working in the context of such a lack of enthusiasm and continuity. We note that when the EAC decided to learn something on the ground about the UKOTs, it felt constrained to make a visit to only one territory and by just two members of the committee. That means, however, that the committee has more recent experience of the UKOTs than do DEFRA ministers or officials. There are good stories to be told about biodiversity in the UKOTs, many with part-funding from HMG. However, when the then DEFRA Secretary of State spoke at a meeting of the CBD of HMG’s support for the rat eradication programme on Henderson Island, she identified the island only as being in “the Pacific”, with no mention that the Henderson Island World Heritage Site is part of the Pitcairn Islands, a UKOT. It is as if ministers are afraid of acknowledging internationally that that there are Overseas Territories that are happy to be British. R22. NGOs in Britain and the UKOTs, and others in the UKOTs, find it surprising that there is not at least one full-time post in DEFRA dedicated to UKOTs biodiversity (over 90% of the global biodiversity for which HMG is responsible) – and other NGOs have called for more. DEFRA’s suggestion, during the 9 July session, that the occupant of a post in DEFRA dedicated to lead on the UKOTs might have not enough to do (“be left twiddling their thumbs”) has no basis in past experience. UKOTCF is concerned that DEFRA senior management responsible for this area could so badly underestimate the capacity needed, and the essential nature of a lead person at an appropriately senior level. Even the previous holder of the part-time UKOT post in DEFRA repeatedly noted that he did not have the time to meet all requests, and the notorious one-stop shop for UKOT environmental enquiries to HMG set up by DEFRA in 2009 never actually functioned (see also Q69 in oral evidence 17th April). The confusion over lines of communication on environmental matters between UKOT governments and HMG was evident from the HMG’s evidence on 9th July. UKOTCF does concur with Mr Simmonds’ stressing of the importance of UKOTs exchanging expertise between each other and co-operating on initiatives. This is a cost-effective approach that UKOTCF pioneered and developed, with some FCO support – which has unfortunately been discontinued. R23. For comparison in relation to personnel levels, UKOTCF itself (a small charity, rather than a fully resourced government department) has working on UKOT environment issues: one half-time paid person, two full-time unpaid volunteers (including one who, when he left UK Government service some years ago, was at about the current grade of a current DEFRA Deputy Director) and at least another 2.5 full-time equivalent unpaid skilled volunteers. This total of 5 FT-equivalents does not include the personnel employed by UKOTCF’s member and associate organisations in Britain (which would probably about double the number of FT-equivalents to at least 10), nor those in our member and associates organisations in the territories. Our colleagues in RSPB have already indicated that that they have 3 dedicated UKOT staff, and can call on the time of others. Even with all these personnel resources, the NGOs also cannot cope with all the reasonable requests from UKOT NGOs and government departments on environmental matters centred on biodiversity. If the reason for the lack of a full-time UKOT post in DEFRA is really the risk of the incumbent twiddling their thumbs, we invite DEFRA to grant UKOTCF the equivalent funds to two-thirds of a Principal-level post; we guarantee that our personnel funded by that grant will be kept busy and will achieve real conservation progress.

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R24. The real reason for DEFRA’s failure in this area appears to be lack of interest, of focus and of willingness to work with relevant partners. (Q71-72 of oral evidence 17th April also refer.) UKOTCF has met the current DEFRA Deputy Director, International Biodiversity, Ecosystems and Evidence only once, on 10 September 2012, shortly after he took up post. UKOTCF had been invited by a DEFRA officer to a meeting to discuss a specific issue, and this was later combined with an introduction to the new Deputy Director. Unfortunately, DEFRA had forgotten both that they had called the meeting and its purpose. This became apparent only when the Deputy Director started the meeting by asking what UKOTCF had called the meeting for. This was despite the fact that, when UKOTCF had noted a few days before that DEFRA had invited also FCO to attend (even though the original subject was purely a DEFRA matter), UKOTCF had enquired whether there had been a change to the agenda, DEFRA had replied in the negative. As a consequence of this confusion, the meeting did not go well. Recognising that all sorts of problems could have resulted in DEFRA’s error, UKOTCF’s Chairman wrote in friendly style to the Deputy Director on 11 September 2012, suggesting that it might be helpful to start again. No reply has yet been received, 11 months later. R25. On a point of detail, one point of DEFRA’s evidence on 9th July, noted that two members of JNCC staff were on secondment to UKOTs. We understand that the arrangement is that one JNCC staff member is on secondment to St Helena for two years, and that the consequent gap in JNCC’s staffing is being partly filled by a secondment of 9 months from Bermuda to JNCC (as correctly noted by Mr Benyon). In relation to Mr Benyon’s comment that JNCC does not develop policy, it is difficult to reconcile this with the fact that junior staff at JNCC prepared the DEFRA/FCO/DFID document United Kingdom Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy. Furthermore, it would seem that DEFRA has instructed JNCC to review and revise that document, with both NGOs and UKOT governments expressing concern during the one consultative meeting (in March 2013) at JNCC’s failure to involve them and at the lack of transparency of the process. R26. UKOTCF notes that a substantive answer to Dr Offord’s question “in regard to Defra what assessment of environmental sustainability has the Department made of the Overseas Territories?” was not provided (unless DEFRA has since written to the Committee on that point). (Paras E6 onward of our earlier evidence are also relevant.) R27. UKOTCF notes that, in his comments following this question, the Minister referred to the new Darwin Plus initiative. UKOTCF has noted previously (paras C12-C17; N1-N3; oral evidence 17th April Q77) its major concern at all HMG grant support for UKOTs being pulled together under the Darwin Initiative. Whilst the Darwin Initiative has provided some excellent approaches for grants for work in foreign countries (where HMG has no responsibility other than as a good world player), it is not an appropriate model for UKOTs, where HMG has a shared responsibility. The Darwin Initiative decisions are not linked to strategy and are reactive, rather than living in a framework of shared priorities. UKOTCF has attempted to raise these points with HMG on several occasions but Departments have not been prepared to engage. Our concern is that Whitehall departments appear to regard devolving to an independent scientific committee such funding as they are prepared to provide for projects in the territories as the primary way in which they need to support good management of the natural environment in the territories. As the list of UK commitments in the Environment Charters show, that is far from being the case. Many of the issues we have highlighted in our earlier submission and in Section S (below) show that the obstacles to good environmental governance often have to do with defects in formulating or implementing policies. These need to be addressed in ways that cannot fit within the Darwin Plus straitjacket. R28. The Committee might like to recommend changes in policy, practice and attitudes and a restructuring of resources and staffing, so that protecting the overseas 90% of the UK’s

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global biodiversity can addressed effectively by DEFRA, DFID, FCO and other government departments, as well as by support via NGOs. S. Problems in HMG governance in respect of UK Overseas Territories (continued from Section K) S1. In its session on 9th July 2013, Committee members noted that the Cayman Governor’s concerns over some aspects of the locally elected chief minister had been reported to FCO for some years before action was taken. UKOTCF is aware of a similar situation in the Turks & Caicos Islands, where the then Governor expressed similar concerns from shortly after his appointment in 2005 and for about two years, before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee itself came across the problems in 2007-8. In evidence before that Committee in 2008, FCO indicated that there was not enough evidence for an investigation. It is difficult to understand how such a fundamental breakdown in communications at a senior level in FCO could have happened, and UKOTCF hopes that no similar situation would occur under the present or any future Director. S2. The Committee may want to recommend that better monitoring be undertaken by HMG of the performance of UKOT Governments, so that gentle and light assistance can be arranged, rather than the late, crisis interventions of the past. However, it is difficult to see how this can be achieved within a system where many Governors are career members of the Diplomatic service and in carrying out their duties are often acting on instructions from departments in London; and have their own careers to protect by not causing waves. Perhaps the Committee will conclude from the fact that, in addition to their Inquiries important findings relating to environment, so many issues unearthed are not purely to do with environmental or sustainability issues that they need to recommend that the Foreign Affairs Committee conducts a wider-ranging Inquiry into the Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies, but one which also takes evidence from all government departments and agencies that have any significant engagement with the UKOTs and CDs. That should include several which have not been called on to give evidence to this inquiry, notably Treasury, Justice, MOD, Department of Transport, DCMS, the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS S3. UKOTCF notes that the written evidence to this Inquiry from the Governor of the Turks & Caicos Islands indicates that “the environment is not one of the reserved areas for the Governor; it is the responsibility of the Turks and Caicos Islands Government (TCIG). My role, therefore, is to work to ensure that the Constitution, law and proper process are followed. As Chair of the Cabinet I would also be part of any collective Cabinet discussions on issues of the environment and development. It is the Governor's responsibility to approve development agreements on the advice of the Cabinet.” Whilst this was correct (subject to the general point about HMG’s shared responsibility for environmental matters, as noted at paragraphs R1-R8 above) at the moment it was written in April 2013, it is somewhat misleading. In fact, it had been correct for only about 5 months. For the preceding year of his appointment (and all of his predecessor’s term), this was not the case, as under that period of direct HMG rule, the Governor was the Government of TCI. S4. The Governor’s own evidence quotes the joint response of the Ministry of the Environment and Home Affairs and the Department of the Environment and Maritime Affairs in citing the direct HMG rule administration as setting a bad example: “ ‘In the recent election, candidates did not set the environment as a priority. This may be as a result of the situation during the period of the Interim Administration [where the focus was on solving financial and political emergencies rather than the environment.] However, within the

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relevant departments in TCIG (DEMA, Department of Agriculture, Environmental Health) I believe there is high priority and even passionate consideration for the environment and sustainable development. However, the political will at the moment is focused on economic considerations. Unfortunately, this current attitude fails to recognize that the entire TCI economy is based on the maintaining a baseline of environmental integrity.’ ” S5. The TCI Governor goes on to report that: “There are no examples of where developments or projects proceeded which would have damaged the environment under the Interim Administration, and none so far under the elected Government. The Interim Administration worked to ensure that environmental issues were fully taken into account.” In view of the evidence already submitted by UKOTCF (paras B8; G6-G7; K12-K47; and below at S7-S12), we are surprised at this comment, not least because it was the Governor who unilaterally cancelled the Conservation Fund, raised from a tax on tourists. Unlike the establishment of the fund, this was done without consultation with the Governor’s environmental officials or the public and was not widely announced. Several of the commercial enterprises responsible for collecting the tax were unaware, even as recently as June 2013, of its cancellation (and of the funds being put directly into the general budget). This action by the Governor removed what HMG had previously insisted that TCI initiate (in return for grants on related matters) and had considered would be the major funding source for TCI environmental work. We note the parallels with the point made by Dr Offord in relation to Cayman’s environmental tax. In the case of TCI, actions by the Governor during the period of his direct rule have removed a long-term sustainable form of funding for environmental conservation. UKOTCF notes also that the Governor agrees that long-awaited environmental legislation has been delayed during this period. S6. On a point of detail, we should note that Mr Simmonds’ statement (in response to Dr Offord’s point noted above) about the French model needs amendment. He was actually referring to the model of the departments outré-mer, rather than the territoires outré-mer; the status of the latter is closer to (but not identical with) those of UKOTs. S7. Paras K18-K28 of UKOTCF’s earlier evidence related to the caves near Providenciales Airport which hold important wildlife, including an animal species which has been found nowhere else in the world. UKOTCF personnel visiting TCI in June 2013 obtained further information. At the end of March, a team of experienced volunteer cave divers further explored the caves near the airport, in close collaboration with well qualified personnel from the TCI Department of Environment and Maritime Affairs, DEMA (see para K20). The dive team reported a passage leading off the main chamber of the cave, and leading in a general southerly direction. The dive team followed the passage for a short distance, but were able to ascertain that it reached at least a depth of 45 feet below sea level and was located generally underneath the existing airport and runway. On the basis of this and in particular the depth below surface, DEMA noted that the proposed extension of the airport could take place without endangering the existing cave structure. DEMA recommended that, in order to prevent potential noise impacts to bat populations, the Airport Authority provide DEMA with a schedule of works, in order to facilitate DEMA’s monitoring of construction activities. If at any time indicators of stress to bat populations, such as observation of daytime exiting of the cave, works should be halted and alternative methods of construction implemented. They recommended further that funds be secured to have the wildlife populations quantitatively surveyed by expert consultants. If deemed significant, TCIG should attempt to secure the parcel of land, currently in private hands, by compulsory purchase, to preserve an ecological asset of incomparable value. Those conducting the survey thought it likely that the cavity into which earlier airport works had broken (para K21) was probably part of this system (contrary to the comments by the TCI Airport Authority's consultant, para K27). UKOTCF noted also that, contrary to the comments by the TCIAA consultant (para K27), the car-park cliff face would be staying as existing, part of this had been cut into to make a new road-ramp. However, it seems that fortuitously no break-through occurred here, even though a further visit by the expert divers in late May 2013 revealed much sediment in

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the water, possibly the result of vibration by the heavy equipment working overhead to create the new car-park; it is hoped that this will eventually settle without causing serious damage. Conservation (and the reputations of UK and TCI Government) have been lucky in this case. However, this underlines the importance of undertaking proper environmental impact assessments. The Committee might like to recommend that UKOT Governments (whether locally elected or run by HMG) should not exempt themselves from the need for environmental impact assessments and that these should be conducted to exemplary international best-practice standards, as commitments in the Environment Charters require. S8. UKOTCF paragraphs K29-K32 reported that, for reasons which are not readily understood, late during the period of direct rule, TCI fisheries law was amended to allow the keeping of marine mammals in captivity, thereby enabling the establishment of dolphinaria. We expressed our surprise at this change to the previously existing law which made the keeping of marine mammals illegal, rather than leaving this to an elected Government – and without consultation, in breach of the Environment Charter. UKOTCF has now learnt that, not only was this a personal initiative by the Governor but also he failed to consult DEMA, the only TCI Government Department with responsibility and competence for the fishery laws. The Committee may like to recommend that UKOT Governors (and Ministers) simply keep to the Environment Charters’ Guiding Principles and Commitments in terms of seeking expert advice and consulting openly beforehand on decisions affecting the environment. S9. As noted above, in his evidence to the Committee, The TCI Governor indicated that his role “is to work to ensure that the Constitution, law and proper process are followed.” S10. In paragraphs K33-K35, UKOTCF noted the earlier illegal deep dredging in a National Park and adjacent to a Nature Reserve, which caused severe damage to the coral reefs and a commercial conch farm, and severe erosion and destruction of a popular nature trail on a nearby island nature reserve, and that consideration was being given to further deep dredging, despite the partial recovery from the earlier devastation and the fact that dredging is prohibited in a National Park. Several legal and procedural flaws were noted. FCO had responded (para K34) that there had been no encouragement for the dredging application by the Interim Administration or the UK Government; indeed neither has been involved in it in any way. S11. In common with many responsible persons in TCI, UKOTCF has now learnt that Governor Todd personally asked how to get around the legislation to allow dredging at Leeward, this being within a protected area where such activity is not allowed by law. He also raised the possibility of removing some areas from the protected area or changing the protected area law. Given that these actions were by the Governor personally, there would seem to have been some breakdown in communications between the Governor and FCO. The Committee may wish to recommend that Governors be instructed neither to seek to subvert laws nor to pressure others to collude in doing so, or to reinforce any such instructions already in existence. S12. UKOTCF is concerned also that the unfortunate example set during the period of direct HMG rule has been followed by the relatively newly elected TCI Government, which in August 2013 announced that it is seeking to promote this and other built developments in statutorily protected areas, by changing the law to allow dredging through protected areas, and by excluding areas from the National Parks. (The announcement indicated also a review of protected areas, a rather surprising use of resources, as there have been several such reviews commissioned by TCI Government in recent years, which appear to have been overlooked.) The National Parks Ordinance has survived intact for 20 years and throughout the administration that preceded direct UK rule – and judged as “likely to be corrupt” by the judicial enquiry. The protected areas themselves have also been maintained throughout this period, except for some well publicised examples of illegal damage such as the initial dredging that it is now proposed to repeat and extend. It is shocking that the current threats to these well established laws and protected areas

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have their roots in decisions taken in disregard of competent technical advice during the period of direct rule by HMG. ST HELENA S13. With regard to St Helena, DFID’s evidence on 9th July seems remarkably untroubled that the essential environment mitigation plan had not even started to be put into operation 18 months after the construction of the airport was under way, including changes in design, some with obvious impacts on biodiversity. Best practice is to have such a process in place before construction work commences. (See also our previous evidence at paras K3-K11, and the written evidence of Buglife, which UKOTCF strongly endorses.) S14. A major problem running through the St Helena Airport exercise seems to have been a serious under-estimate of the novelty and complexity of the operation within a fragile desert, home to uniquely adapted and rare animals and plants. St Helena has never before seen a construction project of this scale or nature. We are not convinced that there are no notable environmental consequences, considering the fact that a major component of the Airport Environmental Management Plan (a legal requirement of the development permission) has not moved forward alongside the evolution of the detailed design and planning stage, as we would have expected. We expect that highest possible standards of environmental management would be required in such an ecologically sensitive and internationally important site. Some questions have been raised as to whether attempts to limit expenditure may have led to an approach giving undue priority to cost-savings, rather than to quality of the work and to avoiding environmental damage. In this context, it is notable that the declared cost of the construction contact, at about £200m, is significantly less than the £300m figure used by DFID in its consultation document of 2009. There is no independent inspection/audit outside of the project management or contractor’s teams, and there is the potential for conflict of interest in view of the contractual process put in place by SHG and DFID. Halcrow is appointed as the Engineers for the project which includes the Environmental Monitor. However, they are responsible to their employers whom they advise. They cannot be considered independent. In this situation, it was inevitable that St Helena would look to DFID for guidance, but DFID’s own experience in this type of project appears to be limited. In this context, it is worth noting that DFID’s performance in its previous major programme in a UK Overseas Territories (Montserrat) has recently been subject to serious criticism by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), the independent body established by the present Government to be responsible for scrutinising UK aid. Both DFID and the Committee may well feel that it would be appropriate for this body to study this project also. S15. It is important to bear in mind that the airport is being built on an area of such global biodiversity importance that the loss of any small area is a major impact. This was why DFID and other parties agreed that the airport’s physical footprint would be as small as possible when conservation bodies responsibly agreed not to oppose the project. Careful planning and timely initiation of construction works, alongside appropriate signage to avoid unnecessary damage to ecologically sensitive sites are all actions required to ensure that the minimum possible footprint is achieved. Unfortunately, corporate memories of governmental bodies seem to have forgotten this. It is not unsurprising that the project has necessitated the introduction of people, within SHG, Halcrow & contractors Basil Read who, at the start of the project, had limited experience of St Helena and the management of its environment. Despite this, there has been a reluctance to involve others who could have contributed more constructively, particularly in the light of the delay in the Landscape & Ecology Mitigation Plan (LEMP) and the fast pace in which the airport project took off from signing to physical works, with design and build working simultaneously. This has clearly had consequences on the quality of the environmental management. Alongside this, the overriding requirements to keep within budget and complete on time may have resulted in acceptance of lower standards of management, leading to the loss of more natural areas and their unique invertebrate species. For example, the initial airport approach road was designed in a

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way that breached international safety and security rules and had to be re-aligned. However, for no apparent reason, the contractor had already bull-dozed the original route, so that it seems that more important habitat was lost than necessary. Why was it necessary to strip the land area for the initial approach road when the existing road has continued to be used for 6 months and no further construction works on the road has taken place? Changes to the design to meet the new requirements have required a further re-design of the approach road necessitating more land-take. Has this resulted in more land-take then would have been necessitated with the second design? Were more sensitive alternatives considered and what additional efforts of mitigation were carried out? Despite the on island presence of specialists who could have given assistance, they were not invited to help. Top-soil has been collected and stored and is visually monitored as is the adjacent land, and there were plans to initiate studies on soil substrate for the mole spider, but there was possibly more that could have been achieved had advice been sought. Was it the speed of the works that prevented adequate environmental response, or was it that the resources were inadequate to respond/cope, or was it a lack of environmental priority? S16. The facts that the Landscape and Ecology Mitigation Plan was not started before the airport construction started, and it is still not in place about half-way through the planned construction process do indicate a lack of priority attached by DFID to this aspect. We are well aware that DFID blames EU tendering procedures for this, but the steps taken as each problem arose appear to have been delayed by lack of resources applied. Whatever the cause, this lack of environmental capacity has had several consequences:

• There is limited base-line information against which to measure impact; • There is limited base-line against which to assess the impact of mitigation measures; • The few pre-project trial mitigation exercises have not been followed up, so that these are

unassessed also (notably the Wirebird Mitigation Project has had no post-project long-term Wirebird monitoring programme put in place to support the maintenance of the long term benefits of the investment);

• There is no capacity for independent environmental assessment of the frequent changes of airport construction design;

• The attempts that the contractors are making to manage their environmental impact, although well-intentioned, would have benefited from the early engagement of local knowledge and experience. Approaching established environmental NGOs to identify where additional assistance could be found would seem a sensible start. In initiating a project in a new country in a novel environment, it seems extraordinary that local knowledgeable people have not been more openly engaged or sought for their experience, even in an informal manner. The approach taken seems to have assumed that all the necessary skills and experience to deliver this project are available in-house or within the Project Management Unit team. When so little is known of the ecology of Prosperous Bay Plain, this is an odd assumption.

It is too late to solve some of these failings but the consequences are that the costs of mitigation for those aspects that can still be mitigated are likely to be higher than would otherwise have been the case. The Committee may wish to recommend that the funding for ecological work and mitigation be ring-fenced despite the late start to this work. S17. UKOTCF worked with local Governmental and NGO partners in St Helena on the strategy to implement the Environment Charter in 2004-5. At that time, there was good collaborative working between St Helena Government and the St Helena National Trust, together with the latter’s constituent organisations. We are disturbed to discover that DFID, the St Helena Government and the contractors have not sought to involve the Trust and its skilled personnel in designing or implementing environmental work – except in a few cases at the Trust’s instigation when problems have arisen. (There have been occasional exceptions, but these have not been effective. For example, the Airport Project Director did share the Environmental Assessment for an open drain with the Director of the Trust and the RSPB but only within two days of it going before the Governor in Council, thereby necessitating a speedy and limited response without time

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for adequate research and consultation.) This seems perverse, especially when the project itself lacks the required level of environmental capacity. Such involvement would help address some of the bullet-pointed problems in paragraph S16 above. The Committee may wish to recommend that DFID, St Helena Government and the contractors openly engage St Helena National Trust and its partners at as early a stage as possible in consultations on construction and operational design and in all environmental aspects, and consider resourcing the Trust for the major impact this will have on their work. S18. The Air Access project, with all its associated impacts on the well-being of Saints in the island and overseas, is far more likely to be successful if the public are trusted with information by departments of both the St Helena and UK Governments. One encouraging move under Governor Andrew Gurr was that ExCo meetings were open to the public (with the right to go into closed session when appropriate); and reports of that day’s Executive Council (ExCo) meetings were read by the Governor on the radio that same evening and then published in the weekly local newspapers. It is a pity that this practice has been discontinued, on the grounds that the public showed little interest in attending. There is, however, encouraging evidence of renewed openness, with many of the newly-elected councillors having made clear in their messages to the electorate that they favoured effective and properly-resourced Freedom of Information legislation. This is shown in a report about a controversial decision (on re-siting the local jail): “As we had said before the election that we would strive for openness and transparency so this part of the ExCo meeting was held in public. About a dozen people attended. Once we had made the decision we then held a public meeting the next evening and around 20 people came.” (Source: http://sthelenademocracy.blogspot.co.uk/ ) S19. There is a wider point, relevant to all territories with a locally elected government. That is that decisions taken on public policy should be recorded in a form that makes clear, rather than obscures, the reasoning behind them. What are sometimes called “Minutes” in a number of territories seldom meet the criteria set out in the following guidelines: "It is essential to record the decision made and where applicable the person who has responsibility for carrying out that decision. The minutes ideally should record the discussion in such a way that a reader can understand the reasoning behind the decision made by that committee and, where alternatives were suggested, why these were regarded as unsuitable by the members. Your recorded notes should focus on points made for and against a proposal or idea and the reasons to support these points. Minutes should be written so that they are complete, and in sufficient detail to enable a person who was not present at the meeting to fully understand what business was transacted." (Source: Guidelines on Recording Minutes, South Eastern Education and Library Board; http://www.seelb.org.uk/data_protection/PDFs/Guidance_on_minute_taking.pdf). This is relevant also to paragraphs R10-R17. TRISTAN DA CUNHA S20. The 75,300-tonne bulk carrier MS Oliva ran aground and was wrecked on 16th March 2011 at Spinners Point, the far north-west promontory of the uninhabited Nightingale Island, Tristan da Cunha. This and neighbouring islands are amongst the globally most important areas in British territory. The spilling of its fuel and cargo of soya bean resulted in severe damage to wildlife and devastation of the fishery which is the main economic activity at Tristan. The ship was registered in Malta. This was only a few years after a drilling rig under tow had broken loose from its tug, and wrecked on the shore of Tristan da Cunha, with consequent impacts by invasive marine species which it carried. Questions have repeatedly been asked by many about:

1. Why did the Oliva incident occur? 2. What are the prospects for recovery of the fishery? 3. Why did so many birds die despite the valiant efforts of the Tristan Islanders? 4. Who was responsible?

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5. What lessons have been learnt?

Why did the incident occur? S21. A Malta Marine Safety Investigation Report (https://mitc.gov.mt/mediacenter/PDFs/1_MV%20OLIVA_Final%20Safety%20Investigation%20Report_Publication%20Copy.pdf) makes clear that the shipwreck disaster was caused by poor procedures, inadequate planning and charting and ignoring of radar signals. The ship’s officers knew they would pass close to some islands on their voyage from South America to Singapore, but not when. They failed to follow their route properly on charts, relying mainly on a satellite navigation system. Just after four in the morning, the ship passed only 3.25 nautical miles from Inaccessible Island – a World Heritage Site that was later polluted by escaped oil. The second mate saw its radar echo but “assumed it was either rain clouds or an iceberg.” Soon after 0500, the chief mate “noticed a large echo on the radar screen, very close ahead. He assumed it was a heavy storm cloud and thereafter, he felt the vessel’s impact of running aground. “The vibration of the vessel running aground and the change in the main engine noise woke up most of the crew, including the master.” The investigation report says the chief mate had been unable to sleep until five hours before he was due on night watch, because of a cold, and had taken medicine. “He required two wake-up calls before he arrived on the bridge to take over his watch. The combination of the cold, medication, lack of sleep, the time of the day and reaction to the ship’s grounding suggested that the chief mate was probably not fit to stand a navigational watch.” The report also says that bridge management systems were not followed. Charts were not marked with a “no go” area around the islands, and a plotting error meant that the ship’s projected route took it straight over the mile-wide Nightingale Island. The ship slid on the sea bottom as conditions worsened and at about 0300 the next day, a rock pierced one of the holds. The engine room flooded and an oil slick appeared. The unnamed Greek captain and the Filippino crew were taken off by a fishing vessel and boats from a cruise ship - and the captains and crews of these have been rightly commended. Nearly 48 hours after the collision, Oliva broke in two in heavy swells, spilling 1,500 tonnes of oil into the sea, and most of its cargo of soya beans.

S22. People on Tristan spent weeks trying to save the lives of rockhopper penguins that were plucked from rocks after the cargo ship broke up in heavy swell. Months after the incident, scientists found rotting soya beans had killed sea creatures and caused severe damage to the lobster fishery that provides islanders with most of their income. Seventeen months after the incident, the Nightingale fishery remained closed and the quota at Inaccessible Island had been halved. In September 2012, the ship’s owners agreed to pay compensation to the islanders.

S23. The Malta Marine Safety Investigation Report’s conclusions and its report of safety actions now taken by the shipping company are:

3. Conclusions Findings and safety factors are not listed in any order of priority. 3.1 Immediate Safety Factors 3.1.1 Oliva ran aground because the planned course the vessel was following on the plotting sheet was found to have taken the vessel directly over Nightingale Island. 3.1.2 Although the bridge team was aware that the vessel would be passing close to some islands, it was not aware as to when that event would take place. 3.1.3 Although the vessel did not have BA (British Admiralty) Chart 1769, other appropriate available charts covering the area had not been used. 3.1.4 Both the second mate and chief mate were not aware that the vessel was heading towards Nightingale Island. This was because there was no indication on the plotting chart to alert them of the dangers ahead.

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3.1.5 Both the second mate and chief mate saw some echoes on the radar screen, but did not investigate them and dismissed them as rain clouds. 3.1.6 There was no suitable mark placed across the ship’s track to indicate the need to change to a hydrographic chart. 3.1.7 Neither officer had consulted BA Chart 4022. Although this chart was of an unsatisfactory scale, it could have prompted them to adopt a precautionary approach when radar echoes were sighted on the radar. 3.1.8 The combination of the cold, the medication, lack of sleep, the time of the day and reaction to the vessel’s grounding suggests that the chief mate was probably not fit to stand a navigational watch. 3.1.9 Although the company had provided comprehensive guidance and procedures in its SMS (Safety Management System) to prevent this accident, these were not followed on board. 3.2 Latent Conditions and other Safety Factors 3.2.1 The passage plan did not comply with the company’s instructions of clearing distances when a vessel was in open waters. 3.2.2 The master made no reference to the passing of Islands in his night orders. Reference to the Islands, could have alerted the second mate and chief mate to the significance of radar echoes. 3.2.3 The handing over checklist required the chief mate to establish the proximity of any hazards to the vessel. This appears not to have happened and he relied on the brief hand-over he received from the second mate. 3.2.4 The chief officer did not check the position which the AB (Able Bodied Seaman) plotted on the chart. 3.3 Other Findings 3.3.1 The company had adopted the concept of bridge team management to address performance variability. However, in this case it appears that the crew members’ interaction was not effective and they did not identify and eliminate the factors that resulted in the grounding. 3.3.2 The lifeboat was lowered soon after daylight as a precautionary measure, but was lost when the painters parted. Had the fishing vessel not been in the near vicinity, given the remoteness of the area, the crew of Oliva would have found themselves in a difficult position without a lifeboat. 3.3.3 Although the master had saved the VDR (Voyage Data Recorder) data, he was unable to retrieve it as he abandoned the vessel. 4. Safety Actions Taken 4.1 Safety actions taken during the course of the safety investigation TMS Bulkers Ltd has carried out its own internal investigation, which has resulted in a review of its procedures. These include: instructions on the use of plotting sheets during ocean navigation; requiring all officers on board to complete computer based training in voyage planning and bridge team management. TMS Bulkers Ltd. also intends to increase the frequency of internal navigational audits so as to identify any potential problems of a similar nature within its fleet.

What are the prospects for recovery of the fishery?

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S24. The Tristan Administrator reported that, by December 2012, there were signs that a limited fishery of lobsters around Nightingale and Inaccessible Islands could resume and that the fish catch was free from contamination and taint. However, it may be some years before the long-term effects on the juvenile lobsters could be assessed. It was concluded that there are still many uncertainties but things do look more positive than in 2011. Tristan will continue to adopt a precautionary approach to the management of the fishery.

Why did so many birds die despite the valiant efforts of the Tristan Islanders?

S25. It took a week for salvage crews to make the 1,700-mile voyage across the South Atlantic to the wreck, while the captain and crew were sheltered in homes. The fishing vessel Edinburgh transported 3,718 penguins to Tristan da Cunha, where 80 islanders worked for three months to clean and feed the birds. Conservation workers arrived from South Africa to help, bringing medicines. A works shed was transformed into a penguin hospital, and recovering birds took over the island’s swimming pool. However, only 12 per cent of those taken to the main island survived to be released into the sea, and the survival of those released is unknown. Dr Ross Wanless of Birdlife South Africa, who called the outcome “an unmitigated disaster”, criticised insurers for delay in sending bird experts to join the clean-up. Cape Town in South Africa, the nearest port to Tristan, is the world’s leading centre for cleaning oiled penguins and has achieved high rates of survival. However, timing is crucial. An expert has commented that the unnecessary deaths of thousands of penguins seems to have been caused by the inability of the SANCCOB (Southern African Foundation for the Conservation of Coastal Birds) team and their equipment to get to the islands, which seems in turn to have been caused by a lack of oil-spill planning by the FCO, a lack of cooperation by the insurer and a failure of leadership by FCO personnel. Another expert commented that FCO chose to shift the blame on the distance between Cape Town and Tristan. However, there has been little change in this distance in recent years, so that should not have affected planning.

Who was responsible? S26. Although there were many statements by FCO extolling the excellent and caring work of the islanders (with which UKOTCF and all we have heard from agree) and the wonderful cooperation provided by the insurer, remarkably little has been forthcoming about the ship’s officers and owners – and no indications of any legal action despite the incident occurring in UK territory. Enquiries were unanswered, apparently because such information would somehow endanger the delicate legal negotiations. In contrast, there have been extensive and highly detailed revelations about the oiling incident in the Gulf of Mexico and of the wreck of the Costa Concordia in Italy and the conduct of its captain. One correspondent commented that, as far as he could see, this had only helped the claimants in that matter. How is the Oliva incident different? It is difficult to believe that such secrecy could have happened if this wreck had been in Europe. It is difficult to understand the approach of the UK Government. Still, today, we do not know the terms and conditions of the settlement with the insurer. Would this endanger the settlement, which has already been signed and finalised? Do the islanders themselves know what has been negotiated on their behalf?

What lessons have been learnt? S27. Tristan da Cunha is one of the globally most important parts of UK territory in terms of world biodiversity. It has many endemic species, including 10 unique bird species. Two of its four islands (including one of those impacted by pollutants from the wreck) are World Heritage Sites and Wetlands of International Importance, while the other impacted is proposed for the latter status. In the past few years, Tristan has suffered two major wrecks, an oil-rig which had

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broken its tow having struck the main island a few years earlier. The risk of damage to this uniquely important area – and to the fragile economy of the territory – from pollution and the introduction of alien invasive species are immense. However, each incident seems to have to generate an improvised response. The responses of the Tristan Islanders and of the fishing and tourist vessels were superb, but where was the infrastructure? Had this been in place, the superb efforts of the Islanders in respect of the penguins might have been rewarded with more success – and other threats could have been addressed promptly.

S28. In the Foreword to the 2012 White Paper the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said: “ The Coalition Government has a vision for the Territories: of flourishing communities, ... of natural environments protected and managed to the highest international standards. ... the Territories are more vulnerable than the UK. We have a broad responsibility to support them and to ensure their security and good governance. ...We have not in the past devoted enough attention to the vast and pristine environments in the lands and seas of our Territories. We are stewards of these assets for future generations. ... And it doesn’t stop with Government. The strategy aims to support coalitions and partnerships across and between the private sector, professional bodies and civil society in the UK and in the Territories. I particularly welcome the growing partnerships between the Territories and local authorities and with the NGO community on environmental and other issues. ...The White Paper ... focuses on the security of the Territories, their economic development and their natural environment. It looks at how we can foster high standards of governance and build strong communities. It promotes the development of wider partnerships for the Territories. ... We will report regularly on progress and welcome scrutiny from the public and parliaments.” It is difficult to see these commitments in play in this case. Maybe there have been lessons learnt. If so, why has the Government declined to answer the enquiries about them? Is there now a contingency plan and, if so, what is it?

S29. The final subsection of Section S would logically relate to Gibraltar. However, for easier handling of this large text, we separate this as Section T.

T. Gibraltar fisheries and marine conservation (continued from Section L)

SUMMARY T1. It is all but impossible to consider the issue of illegal fishing without taking account of the political situation. A number of key issues are raised including enforcement of the Nature Protection Act 1991, including: the role of the Royal Gibraltar Police and the Royal Navy; perceptions of the UK Government failing to protect the interests of Gibraltar in order to mollify the Government of Spain; the roles of UK government departments and agencies and their activities both between Departments and within the FCO; considering whether the policies outlined in recent UK Government White Papers are being applied properly with respect to Gibraltar; the situation within the EU, especially with the European Commission, in respect of the Habitats Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive; reflections on Gibraltar’s politico-legal status within the Mediterranean and its absence from environmental mainstream processes; and, related to this, its relationship to UN environmental processes. Some recommendations are made regarding working practises within the UK Government and enhancing external relations within the Mediterranean. Issues of concern T2. A number of questions became evident and these are outlined below followed by a discussion around the issues.

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1. Enforcement of the Nature Protection Act 1991 insofar as fisheries are concerned.

a) Why is the Royal Gibraltar Police expected to enforce the legislation without sufficient backing from HMG and the necessary equipment?

b) Why is so much pressure placed on the Commissioner of RGP having sole responsibility for taking decisions that are clearly of international importance and not just domestic to Gibraltar in nature?

c) Why is the Royal Navy not clearly empowered to assist in fisheries protection as it is elsewhere in the world?

d) If the role of the Royal Navy is restricted to territorial infractions, why is it not dealing with boats from the Guardia Civil “guarding” illegally operating Spanish fishing boats when they are clearly not using BGTW for through navigation purposes and in breach of territorial integrity?

2. Matters relating to the policies of HMG. a) Why is the apparent overarching aim of the FCO appeasing/mollifying/not

upsetting the Government of Spain, rather than protecting the interests of British citizens in Gibraltar? The reasons given at the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in December 2012 (and in general) seem rather one-sided in favour of Spain.

b) How will any decision be taken and by whom that enough is enough with respect to Spanish actions, and that some equal and opposite action is required by HMG?

c) Will this involve the National Security Council? d) Why the need for representatives of HMG to give thinly veiled advice to the

consultants that it would in everyone’s interest to allow some fishing by Spanish boats?

e) Why, apparently, is the Royal Navy under instructions not to engage in the fishing dispute?

f) Given that the staff (including the then Director and his PA in 2012) in the Overseas Territories Directorate were unaware of the individuals dealing with Gibraltar in the Western Europe Directorate, or the location of their offices in the FCO, is there sufficient (any?) liaison between those different sections of the FCO? (NB recent discussions at the FCO suggest that this is subject to some potential change but only in respect of non-EU related matters).

g) Given the extraordinary mess over the designation of the Special Area of Conservation (SAC) in BGTW, is there adequate coverage of Gibraltar by DEFRA and its statutory advisors, JNCC, and adequate liaison between them?

h) Given the unique situation of Gibraltar as a UK Overseas Territory, and also being in the EU, is sufficient recognition given to managing the necessary relationships?

i) Are JNCC appraised of the processes required by the European Commission in respect of submissions to the Commission relating to UK waters?

j) Does JNCC/DEFRA deal with Gibraltar as if it was like any Overseas Territory or are special measures in place to deal with its EU obligations?

k) Noting that the Government of Spain has already produced a management plan incorporating BGTW, what measures have been put in place to deal with the obligations under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive to ensure that there is no repeat of the situation arising out of the SAC problems (in which Spain designated BGTW as part of their own SAC without HMG raising objections)?

l) What advice has been given by DEFRA/JNCC in respect of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive for Gibraltar?

m) Given the new emphasis on Blue Growth within the EU, what steps are being taken to ensure that the existing priorities of environmental protection and sustainable development continue to be met?

n) What liaison is there by FCO/DEFRA with MoD over environment management issues?

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o) Why were the representatives of Defence Forces in Gibraltar not aware of the guidance notes issued by MoD on management within designated sites such as SACs? (NB Gibraltar is specifically mentioned in the relevant guidance note.)

3. White Papers – there have been two White Papers issued by the current Coalition Government of consequence here. The first “The Natural Choice: securing the value of nature” which was issued by DEFRA in 2011, and the second is specific to the UKOTs “The Overseas Territories Security, Success and Sustainability”, issued in June 2012. The former did raise one interesting issue and that was the reference to the National Security Council leading on matter related to UK Overseas Territories.

a) What is this coordinated approach and how will it be achieved? b) What is its relevance to Gibraltar? The latter document sets out quite clearly the

UK’s responsibilities for the UKOTs: P 14: “Defence and Security: the UK is committed to defend the Territories.” “International Support: the UK is responsible for the external relations of the Territories

and uses its diplomatic resources and influence to promote their interests.” P 22: “We will continue to maintain an independent ability to defend the Territories –

including their territorial waters and airspace – from any external security threats they may face.”

“We will also ensure that the Territories are able to trade, to exploit their natural

resources… free from undue external interference.” “The Royal Navy is tasked with... upholding the sovereignty of British Gibraltar

Territorial Waters.” P 48: “economic activity, including tourism and fisheries is managed in a way that is

consistent with the long term sustainable use of the natural environment, including over-exploitation.”

P 88: “Conclusion … We are defending robustly Territories which face external threats.”

c) To what extent can the UK government claim that they are meeting all of these in

respect of Gibraltar? d) The White Paper seems largely to be one-size-fits-all – to what extent is

Gibraltar being a part of the EU taken properly into account? This is equally true of the HMG’s “UKOTs Biodiversity Strategy” where no regard is given to Gibraltar’s role in the EU.

4. The EU situation - which appears to be somewhat confused.

a) Is the European Union consistent in its approach to Gibraltar? b) Which Commissioner(s)2 are responsible for matters relating to the ongoing disputes

with Spain relevant to EU matters? c) Given the number and range of possibilities, what role does the Commission

President play if any? d) Does the UK Government make its position clear and sufficiently often to the

European Commission on matters pertaining to Gibraltar? 2 Options here include Commissioners for: Environment; Maritime Affairs and Fisheries; Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship; Inter-institutional Relations and Administration; Internal Market and Services; Taxation, Customs, Statistics, Audit and Anti-Fraud.

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e) Does the UK Government supply relevant information in a timely manner and in the correct form to the Commission?

f) Is there sufficient liaison/provision of advice between DEFRA and JNCC in particular with Gibraltar on environmental issues?

g) Is there sufficient understanding in the Commission of issues pertaining to Gibraltar especially in DG ENV and DG MARE. (NB Officials in DG ENV were unaware that Gibraltar was not part of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the member of staff dealing with marine SACs was unaware of the case before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). No meetings were possible with DG MARE, although representatives from Gibraltar have met with the Commissioner, but no feedback has been received to assist in drafting this note).

h) Why is Gibraltar effectively ignored and excluded from the EU Alboran Sea strategy?

i) Given the recent problems in North Africa, would it not be a good idea to promote involvement in such regional programmes with Algeria and Morocco?

j) On wider issues, what role will Gibraltar play in any re-negotiation of the EU Treaties?

5. Gibraltar’s status as a Mediterranean entity. It is clearly accepted as being part of the EU – it has received structural funds; has had proposals for SACs verified; and has an elected MEP. However, it is hardly, if ever, included as a Mediterranean entity alongside the seven existing member states. a) Why for example is Gibraltar excluded from the extremely relevant EU-funded

MEDPAN project? (An EU transnational cooperation programme of the EU Cohesion Policy, including “partners from 13 countries including the whole Northern Mediterranean seacoast” [except Gibraltar] to strengthen the competitiveness, employment and sustainable development of this area.) The EU makes considerable use of existing politico-legal processes in the Mediterranean, such as the Barcelona process and the Barcelona Convention to implement its own instruments, policies and processes. Specifically as regards fisheries, it uses the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM). (NB the GFCM deals not only with commercial fisheries, of which Gibraltar technically has none, but also with matters of direct concern to Gibraltar such as recreational fishing (which has a code of conduct), artificial reefs and non-fish species interactions). Gibraltar is currently outside all of these processes and at a major disadvantage, as it cannot work directly with them, as such matters are the responsibility of the UK Government. This is especially true for the more environmental processes such as the Barcelona Convention and its protocols and the GFCM, given the interactions with fisheries in the historical, current and ongoing dispute.

b) How does the UK Government see Gibraltar as a Mediterranean entity, especially within the EU?

c) What steps is HMG taking to see Gibraltar as part of these processes? d) Does the desire not to upset the Spanish Government restrict or prevent HMG from

entering into these politico-legal processes on behalf of Gibraltar? e) There have been indications that HMG may be considering becoming a party to the

Barcelona Convention – what progress on that front? f) And similarly for GFCM?

6. UN procedures

a) Why is Gibraltar regularly excluded from the list of Mediterranean entities? b) Why has HMG not dealt with this anomaly? c) What action has been taken by HMG with UNESCO following the exclusion of

Gibraltar from the Strait Biosphere Reserve? d) Why has no action been taken with respect to IUCN ignoring Gibraltar?

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7. Spain a) If the Government of Spain is so convinced about their case, why did they not make

a derogation as to their position on BGTW when they became parties to UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)?

b) Why have they never tested their case in the international courts? THE FISHING DISPUTE T3. It is apparent that the dispute with Spanish fishermen is at least as much about territorial waters and sovereignty, as it is about fishing. That is notwithstanding the genuine difficulties of local Spanish artisanal fishermen, but that is a socio-economic issue for the Spanish authorities, not those of Gibraltar. Predicated on the existence of BGTW under UNCLOS, and the recognition by the EU of Southern Waters SAC, it is quite clear that the Government of Gibraltar were, and are, entirely within their rights in enforcing the 1991 Nature Protection Act which the previous government had effectively by-passed with the so-called “Joint Understanding”. Indeed, had they not done so, it would have made the law effectively useless and undermined the rule of law and potentially created an ongoing issue with law enforcement in Gibraltar. Indeed citizens of Gibraltar fishing in Gibraltar waters have asked why they have been stopped and arrested under the same legislation when Spanish boats have not. Legislation brings with it consequences for both the legislators and those affected by the legislation; if those are ignored by either, this brings the law into disrepute. There is clearly backing for breaking the law from the Spanish capital as has become ever more apparent from recent statements by Spanish Ministers and actions in recent days concerning the new artificial reef. THE ROLE OF THE UK GOVERNMENT T4. During discussions with those representing the UK Government, it has been apparent that – even if not stated overtly – their first thought was not protecting the interests of the citizens of Gibraltar (at least as they saw the issue) but in not upsetting the Spanish Government. Until late in 2012, when statements were made by the UK Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in support of Gibraltar and the summoning of the Spanish Ambassador following an incursion by a Spanish navy craft, little had been placed in the public domain in defence of Gibraltar by HMG. More robust statements have been made subsequently, following the delays at the border but predicated on not disturbing the good diplomatic relationship with Spain. This does seem to be mostly a one-way relationship, with Spain seemingly having little regard for such a relationship. The UK idea of diplomacy appears to be to back off in any near-conflict situation despite immense provocation both at the border and through the actions of the Guardia Civil. T5. During the preparation for the marine resources management report, less than thinly veiled hints were received from several quarters that it really would be in the best interests of all concerned if the recommendations in the Report would allow for some sort of fishing by Spanish fishermen. This ranged from “surely a few boats won’t make much difference” to “what about the Spanish boats undertaking some of the monitoring”. The former would have been entirely presumptuous and would have required a prediction on the outcomes of the analysis that, aside from a very preliminary report already provided at very short notice, was far from complete. It would also have been political in nature and would have exceeded the remit. The second “preferred option” would require (a) a knowledge of the monitoring regime which we did not have; (b) a scientific licence to allow any boats to catch fish with nets (otherwise illegal in BGTW under the 1991 Nature Protection Act); and (c) a means of verifying the location and type of any catches which would require monitoring in Spanish ports (most unlikely to be effective) or almost certainly require landings being made and checked in Gibraltar, also more than somewhat problematic. Apparently the FCO, who have made no comment on the Report, either privately or

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publicly, find it acceptable as it leaves the door open (albeit very narrowly) for some Spanish fishing and (in HMG’s view) for the GoG to back down gracefully.

THE NATURE PROTECTION ACT AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES T6. Even if no change to the NPA 1991 was to be the outcome of the recommendations of the final Report following detailed analysis (i.e. the 1991 Act stays as is), then there would still be a major issue with enforcement. The 1999 so-called “Joint Understanding” was not, and never could be, a formal agreement as (a) it was actually allowing ongoing severe breaches of the legislation specifically put in place to deal with fisheries practices; and was a fudge provided by the then Government of Gibraltar to avoid dealing with a difficult political situation and basically giving into external threats; and (b) since the Spanish government does not recognise the GoG, it could not make any formal agreement with it. This postponement of, rather than tackling, the fisheries issue at the time has probably exacerbated the situation by allowing illegal activities to continue for so long and to be seen to be the norm. Any suggestion of returning to the so-called 1999 “Joint Understanding” would render parts of the 1991 Act (passed it should be noted nem con) null and void and would make the law look ridiculous both in Gibraltar and outside. It should also be noted that the present GoG was given a firm mandate to deal with this issue at the last election - it being a clear manifesto commitment. T7. Given that the 1991 Act (unless weakened by repeal - which is unlikely given the GoG manifesto commitment and current policy position) there remains a major issue over enforcement. Under the 1999 “Joint Understanding” a “blind eye’ was turned on Spanish fishing incursions, and the present situation was brought about by a change in this. Nonetheless, despite a still very gentle touch by the Gibraltar Marine Police, the problems escalated very quickly. This has included, in particular, the Spanish fishing boats undertaking the incursions being accompanied by armed Guardia Civil boats, with the encouragement and backing of both the regional and federal governments in Spain. Discussions with representatives of Her Majesty’s Forces in Gibraltar have indicated that the Royal Navy has, as its formal position, no remit for fisheries protection in BGTW, their only role being protection of territorial integrity. This also provides a fudge of sorts since it is quite clear that Spanish boats fishing and Guardia Civil boats in their company, clearly in a protection role, are not using the BGTW for navigation purposes. They are therefore breaching the territorial integrity of BGTW but, for both political and practical purposes, are regarded as fisheries and therefore not the remit of the Royal Navy. This line appears to have been reinforced somewhat by the written evidence provided by the Governor of Gibraltar to the EAC in this enquiry that, as fisheries come under environmental legislation, they are not within his purview in dealing with defence, security and foreign affairs (see para R1). There is also now an increased emphasis on problems relating to incursions by “state vessels”, again apparently trying to avoid dealing with fishing boats which HMG does not seem to regard as state vessels. As such, this would appear to be an attempt to further distance HMG from the need to defend the interests of Gibraltar and its citizens. Overall, there is apparently a reluctance to upset the Spanish for fear of escalation in the dispute – something that has happened anyway. T8. There is also reluctance on the part of the Gibraltar Marine Police to intercede, for two reasons it would appear. These are: first, as with the Royal Navy, the fears over causing an escalation in the dispute; and second, and more importantly, the very real and justifiable concern over sending unarmed and vulnerable officers in small craft against, not just fishing boats, but armed paramilitary Guardia Civil in larger boats. This makes for an unacceptable risk and puts an onus on the Gibraltar Police. It also puts a considerable and unacceptable burden on the Commissioner of Police, whose duty it is alone to take decisions on operational matters of which this is one. Under the Constitution, the Commissioner reports neither to the Governor (as used to be the case) nor the GoG. The Police Authority can provide guidance and advice and deal with non-operational matters, such as recruitment, but have no role in operational decisions. It is understood that there will be some operational changes in that a police post will be operated from

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the east side thus improving observation and cutting down response times and also the acquisition of a new dedicated fisheries protection vessel. T9. Discussions with the Captain of the Port provided information to the effect that he could reassign a boat from the Port to fisheries inspection duties once it had been reflagged as such but this too could be used only for monitoring and inspection purposes using trained inspectors, of which there are none currently. The boat would be unarmed and, if approached by armed Guardia Civil boats, would not engage and would break off any engagement with fishing boats. It is likely that the GoG will create a monitoring and inspection team; this would be welcome but will not enhance the enforcement capacity and capability – indeed it might make matters worse by increasing the number of defaulters identified. There are staffing implications here and the need for training programmes. The role of the newly created Coastguard and its powers are unclear, and will need to be investigated in this context. RELATIONS WITH SPAIN T10. The concerns of HMG, in particular the FCO, seem to revolve around two issues. First, an apparent desire to protect, in some way, the citizens of Gibraltar inter alia from the imposition of stronger border controls causing even more disruption to their lives with the possibility, as HMG sees it, of the border being closed completely once more. There is a perception that Gibraltar needs Spain more than vice versa. In terms of the local economy (indeed, given that the problems in both regional and national economies in Spain, this may go wider), this would appear to be a false premise, but there may be unknown wider political issues directly applicable to Gibraltar and Spain. At the local level, other threats that seem to be under consideration as potential retaliation are the Guardia Civil using bigger boats than the Gibraltar boats as they increase in size, but nonetheless a larger dedicated boat is due shortly. Spanish Navy boats are being posted to Algeciras to deal with any operations by the Royal Navy, i.e. tit for tat following escalation. It is noted that a Spanish navy boat did enter BGTW in November 2012 (and another more recently) and a formal protest was issued to the Spanish government via its Ambassador in London. A further potential threat was noted as anchoring a large (Spanish Navy) boat across the flight path to the airport, thus hindering landings of aircraft and more recently once again closing Spanish airspace to aircraft. In discussions with HMG officials, any suggestions that the Royal Navy be utilised in fisheries protection were greeted with complete horror and leading to the suggestion that this would lead to starting a war. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS – THE UK PARLIAMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE T11. In the course of preparing the main report, considerable efforts were made to investigate any relevant documentation or other sources of information or opinion relevant to the issue. One of these sources was a report of the UK Parliament Select Committee on Foreign Affairs dealing with “The British Government's response to the current problems facing Gibraltar.” This dealt specifically inter alia with the dispute over fisheries pertaining at the time. It is extraordinary to read in that report how many of the issues remain unchanged from 13 years ago – and that their recommendations are still pertinent. Lack of robustness by HMG T12. In light of the very real perceptions of Gibraltarians generally that not enough is being done by the British Government, perhaps the most pertinent recommendation arising from that report is “We conclude that there have been occasions in the past when the British defence of Gibraltarian interests has not been as robust as it should have been. Of all our overseas

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territories, Gibraltar is in the unique position of having to conform to almost all EU regulations and directives. This means that the British Government have a special duty of care towards Gibraltar in the European Union, and places extra responsibilities upon United Kingdom Ministers to uphold the interests of Gibraltar. We urge Her Majesty's Government both to recognise and to act in full accordance with these responsibilities.” T13. It is apparent that this lack of robustness from HMG is still a common perception and attitude among the populace in Gibraltar. The Committee noted in its report that they were left in no doubt “that the people of Gibraltar will not capitulate under pressure. All such pressure does is to harden attitudes against Spain.” The report further notes “Lowering the temperature of the debate is not synonymous with lack of firmness, though it can be mistaken as such in Gibraltar where there is a feeling that successive British Governments have not supported Gibraltar as actively as they might have done.” Some 13 years on from that drafting, the situation appears to be much the same, with the priority apparently being mollifying Spain ahead of defending the interests of the citizens of Gibraltar. Various reasons are put forward to explain this. HMG suggests that they are concerned about retaliatory action by Spain especially at the border or other transport arrangements to do with shipping or aircraft. Those less generous have suggested that it is more to do with arrangements in the EU, particularly voting in Council, or that there are a considerable number of UK citizens domiciled in Spain who might be disadvantaged by some sort of action against them. Further insight into this was provided by the Minister responsible for UKOTs at the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in December 2012 (see below). Having been engaged for technical expertise rather than in foreign affairs and diplomacy, it is difficult to comment further other than to see that there seems to be a lack of regular oversight coupled with something of an “ostrich-head-in-the-sand mentality” among UK officials. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee report also deals with this and notes, “We are also aware that Gibraltar figures much more highly on the Spanish foreign policy agenda than it does on the British. This is widely acknowledged in Gibraltar itself, and is perceived as causing difficulties. For example, Mr Christopher J Pitaluga told us that ‘the real difficulty posed by the Gibraltar problem is that it is of insufficient magnitude to warrant anything other than drift, muddle, fudge and obfuscation on the part of British civil servants whose concern lies with wider issues.’ Instead of this alleged appeasement, Gibraltarian witnesses called for tough action. “ T14. There seems to be a perception at present in HMG that Gibraltar needs Spain more than vice versa. However, given the number of Spanish citizens who work in Gibraltar, the importance of Gibraltar to the local economy in the region, and the general financial malaise in Spain, this would seem to be a misreading of the situation. Governance issues T15. The report further noted “We are equally sure that neither this nor any other British Government will allow the sovereignty of Gibraltar to pass to Spain unless the people of Gibraltar want that outcome.” During the previous UK administration, this was by no means certain, with Ministers looking for a dual governance solution quite clearly against the wishes of the people of Gibraltar. It is possible that there is an overhang of those times in the current relationship between HMG and the GoG, although the 2011 FCO White Paper makes it clear that this is not an option. It is also noteworthy, therefore, that in 2012 there have been several fairly (deliberately so?) low key statements from the UK Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister to that end, but these statements very carefully avoid mention or consideration of matters relating to territorial waters. The most recent incursion by a Spanish navy boat followed on from some forceful statements from HMG, which then proceeded to do nothing – at least overtly. There seems to be a little of “huff and puff” but little in the way of substance to follow this. There does come a time when actions have to follow words. The exact mechanism of deciding when that should be is somewhat obscure.

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T16. It is possible that representatives of HMG were awaiting the production of the report relating to sustainable use of marine living resources, sometimes shortened to the report on fishing, but the consultants have long ago advised them that it is going to be far from a magic bullet. It does, however, provide a much better (although still incomplete) scientific basis for management decisions from which an analysis of local political imperatives and legislative outcomes can be derived. The consultants can only provide recommendations – it is up to those in authority to decide to act on them, or not, and in what way. However it must also be stated that the research on fisheries is effectively an optional extra – the NPA 1991 was clearly put in place as an environmental protection measure, which proscribed various fishing practices. There should be no need to defend that with analysis of fisheries showing (as best as possible with existing incomplete data) illegal, unsustainable and damaging practices. T17. Among its conclusions the Foreign Affairs Select Committee said “We recommend that the new process [NB now defunct] of dialogue should put issues of sovereignty on hold, and concentrate on exploring areas of co-operation.” It is impossible to know the extent to which the UK Government has attempted to follow this suggestion, if at all. There is some evidence that those in authority in Gibraltar have done so but with very limited success. There have been attempts by inter alia the Maritime Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police and the Port Authority, and of course the Chief Minister with the fisheries MoU to engage with local interests, all of which have failed because of interference at regional or national level within Spain. There is clearly willingness on the part of Gibraltar to seek to cooperate locally and some evidence of reciprocity locally but all fail at a national level. Thus the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Report went on to say, “Negativity, whether in Gibraltar, Madrid or London, serves no-one. Constructive engagement, with give and take on both sides, and a practical approach to cross-border co-operation is a solution which the Committee believes can be embraced by people of goodwill in Spain, the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. Support for such a solution should be the British Government's principal response to the current problems facing Gibraltar,” While a positive response has been noted from Gibraltar the same cannot be said for either Spain or UK. Consideration of fisheries T18. In this context, the specific issue of fisheries was dealt with in the Report. It notes “Mr Caruana told us of the contacts he had developed with the local authorities at the level of town, provincial deputation and region. What he has done to secure an agreement with local Spanish fishing interests demonstrates how progress can be made. Gibraltarian witnesses argued that leaving Madrid out of the equation might help this process. For example, the Gibraltar Council of the European Movement wrote that the "present campaign of harassment" will "only achieve the souring of relationships between Gibraltar and the neighbouring towns." The Gibraltar Labour Party believed that "interregional co-operation without Madrid/London interference could be the way ahead." The devolved governmental structure in Spain makes possible a substantial level of development of policy on economic development and co-operation at regional level in Andalucia, but ultimately the foreign policy is determined in Madrid. The agreement referred to in this paragraph is the so-called “Joint Understanding” which was clearly derived under duress and promoted breaching the laws of Gibraltar. The progress referred to was made entirely in favour of Spanish fishermen while the only gain from Gibraltar’s point of view was a cessation in the level of harassment. Sadly, this was the cause of some congratulation from the then UK Foreign Minister, Joyce Quin. The FCO issued a press release to the effect that the agreement was "very welcome" and that it had the "strong support of the British Government and of the Governor." Note use of the word “agreement” rather than “understanding” even though there was dispute over the exact wording in English vs. Spanish versions. As well as the written “Joint Understanding” there was a prior verbal “agreement” between the then Foreign Secretary with the Spanish Foreign Minister without representation from Gibraltar.

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Enforcement issues T19. A very significant issue revolved around enforcement. The Committee stated, “There is one important constitutional point to be made in the context of the fishing dispute. The Commissioner of the RGP has operational responsibility for the RGP and ‘exercises normal policing discretion when taking decisions on operational matters, on the same lines as Chief Constables in the United Kingdom.’ Whatever agreement there may be between the British and Spanish Governments, or between Mr Caruana and the fishermen, it is for the Commissioner to decide how to enforce the law. It is wrong to place a Chief Officer in a position where he is asked to enforce the law in a way which is politically expedient. Ms Quin told the House that the Government hoped that the agreement would be ‘backed up by legislation in the Gibraltar Assembly.’ We agree. We understand Mr Caruana's concern that amending the law might appear to be capitulation to Spanish pressure, but we do not believe that this is the case.” Perhaps the most worrying observation (although not framed as a conclusion or recommendation was “We hope that the Government of Gibraltar will seek to amend the Nature Protection Ordinance so that the informal understanding about the extent to which it is not to be enforced is given proper legal effect.” Clearly (and fortunately) this did not happen and the mandate provided to the present Government of Gibraltar works in the opposite direction. T20. Very much related to the above, the FASC noted,“We were surprised to learn that the Royal Navy based in Gibraltar is not tasked to support the RGP on fisheries protection or drugs interdiction, though the Royal Navy had trained the RGP in methods of intercepting and boarding vessels. The Royal Navy did, however, have the job of maintaining the integrity of Gibraltarian territorial waters. Spanish official vessels (for example, of the Guardia Civil) could be intercepted and asked to leave, though they had the right of innocent passage under international law. When requested in the House to arrange for the dispatch of a fisheries protection vessel to Gibraltar at the height of the fishing dispute, Ms Quin did not give any specific response. We can understand that to have acceded to this request might have been deemed to have been inflammatory at the time. However, the FCO confirmed to us that HM Forces in Gibraltar are responsible for "providing aid as appropriate to the civil authorities", and earlier in the dispute the Government had said that the deployment of a fisheries protection vessel "to aid in calming the situation" was one of the options they were considering. Mr Caruana made it clear that he would expect the Royal Navy to be used if the situation required, and we understand that the Governor would not hesitate to ask the Government to deploy the Royal Navy in aid of the RGP if a strong case was made to him by the Commissioner. We recommend that the Royal Navy should be tasked to support the Royal Gibraltar Police in their duties of fisheries protection and the interdiction of smuggling. The unacceptable and unfair arrangements with respect to the Commissioner of the RGP pertain. There is a considerable burden on the Commissioner to implement what is effectively a political process and with insufficient resources. It is very rare for the Royal Navy to intercede in any fisheries (or indeed other) incursions, contrary to the recommendation of the Committee and in contrast to what appears to be a practical solution adopted elsewhere in UK waters, for that is what they are.

European Union matters T21. To return to the European Union “The Committee has made it plain that it believes that the British Government must robustly defend Gibraltar's rights in the European Union, both through action at the European Commission and through bilateral diplomacy with other EU Member States. This has not been done with sufficient vigour in the past. It must also continue to make clear and high-level representations to Spain, at ministerial and ambassadorial level, whenever improper pressure is put on Gibraltar, making it plain that the British Government is prepared to take reciprocal action against Spanish interests if Spain takes unreasonable action against Gibraltar.” It further noted, “Spanish membership of the EU has given Spain an important arena in which it is able both to make accusations against Gibraltar, and to manoeuvre against the

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interests of the territory”. Spain has not been slow to take advantage of this. And the “special duty of care” mentioned in the Committee report with respect to EU membership does not appear to have been followed. T22. Leaving aside the most glaring error by HMG of allowing the European Commission to agree to the Spanish government annexing BGTW as part of its SAC after it had been agreed to be a UK SAC, the same appears to be happening with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. The government of Spain has already produced a management plan incorporating BGTW. What steps is the UK taking to ensure that the EC does not repeat this error? UK GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPERS T22. “The Natural Choice: securing the value of nature” There are two White Papers that have been issued by the current coalition government of consequence here. The first “The Natural Choice: securing the value of nature” was issued by DEFRA in 2011. Initially, the consultation paper leading to this suggested that DEFRA’s responsibilities extended only to England following devolution but, following that consultation, inserted a section on DEFRA’s international responsibilities which had been missing previously. Included among these was their interest in UK Overseas Territories and this was dealt with in one single paragraph, 5.11: “We will also continue to give priority to the UK Overseas Territories (OTs) Biodiversity Strategy, through a co-ordinated approach across government that is led by the National Security Council. The Government will continue its engagement with the OTs in their efforts to conserve their biodiversity through programmes such as the Flagship Species Fund and one-off initiatives such as the £200,000 contribution towards a project to eradicate rodents on Henderson Island in the Pitcairn Group. Moreover, the Darwin Initiative is also making a significant difference to wildlife in our OTs. An additional £1.5 million has already been invested in Darwin projects in the three years from 2010, and this sum will increase further as a result of the new Darwin funding referred to above.” As far as Gibraltar was concerned the latter part of that paragraph is fairly immaterial as funding from the then Darwin Fund3 was extremely unlikely. Matters relating to the EU, also covered in the international section of the White Paper, did not also encompass Gibraltar. T23. However, the paragraph did raise one interesting issue and that was the reference to the National Security Council leading on matters related to Overseas Territories. What is this coordinated approach and how will it be achieved? Questions to the Minister to that effect produced obfuscatory answers. Reference to the National Security Strategy (A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty produced in 2010) provides little in the way of answers. Strangely, although much could be read into the text that implicitly may deal with the Overseas Territories, there is very little that explicitly deals with them. There are only two specific mentions and they are in the breakdown of priorities, the first is in Tier two: “An attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons”; and the second in Tier three: “An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider regional conflict.” Given some predictions of war by UK officials if the fishing dispute escalates, it is possible that the latter could relate to Gibraltar but, other than that, it is still very unclear what responsibilities the NSC has in respect of leading on UKOTs. So the question still requires clarification. There is, however, one useful sentence and one useful section in the National Security Strategy with respect to wider issues. In a section called “National Security and British values” it is noted that “The UK has a proud tradition of protecting its citizens, promoting civil liberties and upholding the rule of law.” This is clearly something with which the Government of Gibraltar would agree, certainly in respect of fishing infractions. The section relates to strategy production. The Strategy notes, “A national security 3 Changes to the Darwin Initiative were announced following the publication of the FCO White Paper on UK Overseas Territories but the consequences for Gibraltar are as yet unclear

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strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination of ends (what we are seeking to achieve), ways (the ways by which we seek to achieve those ends) and means (the resources we can devote to achieving the ends). A strategy must reflect the context in which it is developed, the particular strengths and skills that we can bring to bear (our areas of comparative advantage) be clear, but also flexible, to take account of uncertainty and change. It must also take account of the activities of others: the positive contributions of allies and partners and of the private sector; and the negative effect of adversaries seeking to thwart our objectives. Therefore a strategy must also be based on creative insight into how best to achieve our own objectives and prevent adversaries from achieving theirs. It must balance the ends, ways and means. The ways and means by which we seek to achieve our objectives must be appropriate and sufficient and the objectives must also be realistic in light of the means available”. It is interesting, particularly in the light of HMG’s “UK Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy” which is deficient in most respects with regard to these principles and upon which much apparently rests in terms of implementing government policy. T24. “The Overseas Territories Security, Success and Sustainability” The second and most recent output on generic policy with respect to the UK Overseas’ Territories as a whole is the White Paper “The Overseas Territories Security, Success and Sustainability” issued in June 2012. Unfortunately it fails to recognize properly the Gibraltar situation especially with regard to EU membership, unlike the situation with other UKOTs. The 2012 White Paper sets out quite clearly what Britain's responsibilities are in this situation:

P 14: “Defence and Security: the UK is committed to defend the Territories.” “International Support: the UK is responsible for the external relations of the

Territories and uses its diplomatic resources and influence to promote their interests.”

P 22: “We will continue to maintain an independent ability to defend the Territories –

including their territorial waters and airspace – from any external security threats they may face.”

“We will also ensure that the Territories are able to trade, to exploit their natural

resources… free from undue external interference.” “The Royal Navy is tasked with... upholding the sovereignty of British Gibraltar

Territorial Waters.” P 48: “economic activity, including tourism and fisheries is managed in a way that is

consistent with the long term sustainable use of the natural environment, including over-exploitation.”

P 88: “Conclusion … We are defending robustly Territories which face external

threats.”

It would be entirely possible to put “except Gibraltar” in brackets after each of these commitments given the situation in practice rather than in theory. RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN HMG Further information from the UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Select Committee in December 2012

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T25. Gibraltar is not the responsibility of the Overseas Territories Directorate in the FCO but, as part of a member state of the EU, falls under the Western Europe Directorate. There appears, until very recently, to have been little cooperation between the two sections. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee has decided thus far not to hold an enquiry on the UKOTs White Paper as the EAC is currently holding this one. However, on 11th December 2012, it held an evidence session on the White Paper with Mark Simmonds MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State; Peter Hayes, the newly appointed Director for Overseas Territories, and Tim Colley, Deputy Director for Overseas Territories, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Note that neither the Minister responsible for Europe nor the Western European section was represented. This was despite, it is believed, the Committee advising that significant questioning would relate to Gibraltar and the Falklands, neither of which are the attending Minister’s responsibility. T26. An examination of the record of that meeting shows that matters relating to this undertaking on Gibraltar were considered following a couple of questions by Committee members. The answers were given with the obvious caveat that the Minister answering was not the one responsible but would provide such information as he could. It is clear that those present representing the FCO had been given a briefing, but that is not quite the same as having those with direct responsibility present. Some interesting responses were elicited by the Committee. In response to a question about the dispute over territorial waters, the Minister made observations on the following points:

on the fisheries dispute, he wrongly referred to the 1999 document as being an agreement rather than an understanding;

the territorial limit was referred to wrongly as being 3km and it being an “exclusion zone”, but noted under UNCLOS it could go to 12km;

although the fisheries dispute was a serious issue, incursions by the Guardia Civil were more serious;

it was noted that “Gibraltar ‘forces’ meet them and encourage them to leave” [note interesting choice of the word ‘forces’] and that dealing with the GC was “challenging” as they have right of navigation provided it is by the shortest route possible and that is difficult to show, so have to monitor them [this seems utterly disingenuous when GC boats are clearly circling Spanish boats to protect them and not undertaking any sort of passage].

as to why the UK government does not do more to protect our waters, there was a fairly generic response to the effect that, in almost every other context of international relations, the UK and Spain have very positive relationships – e.g. EU, UN, parts of Africa on conflict resolution and counter-terrorism.

further, the UK Government wishes to be firm and determined but is not convinced that ratcheting up the rhetoric or moving to “a more aggressive gunboat diplomacy” would be a positive and responsible response.

it was accepted that some in the Gibraltar Government would like more action; however HMG monitors the situation constantly and keeps it under review but reiterated that at the moment does not feel it would be beneficial to ratchet up the rhetoric or the action.

T27. John Stanley MP asked about the Special Area of Conservation and the ECJ result, which had been the subject of a written answer by the Foreign Secretary the day before and was told that the case had been lost on “technical grounds”. The Minister would not go into those but offered to provide written feedback to the Committee. John Stanley MP further asked whether this loss was in any way due to incompetence by UK official(s) but was referred back to the written note to be provided. The Minister said that, despite the legal outcome, impact on the ground would be negligible – the British government does not recognise the Spanish position on the SAC. (What about the EU position?; how will this be dealt with by the Commission?) John Stanley MP then asked about Spanish restrictions on UK planes and Royal Navy boats despite both governments being NATO members. The Minister agreed that these were regrettable but this was blamed on the Spanish having withdrawn from the former tripartite discussions. The

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Minister was unable to say much about the detail but the UK was trying to get communications going again in structured way; again he could not go into details but there are continuing very high-level contacts with Spain to address both fisheries/territorial waters and NATO issues. T28. The Chairman said that the Committee wished to express continuing concerns but felt that the government were probably right in their current degree of (in)action but also there will come a time when we can no longer continue and see UK citizens harassed in this way. (This rather begs the questions – how will it be decided when enough is enough? Who will take that decision and on what basis? What process is in place and is the NSC involved?) Liaison within HMG T29. Given the above, it seems likely that it is Gibraltar’s misfortune to fall between the slats. It is a UKOT but not dealt with by the relevant FCO Directorate for UKOTs and, as it is part of the EU, coming under Western Europe within the FCO, which has a whole range of other priorities, especially related to the EU. The situation within the EU and the consequences for Gibraltar appear to be poorly understood by officials, not just within the FCO but within DEFRA and, most importantly, its statutory advisors JNCC, on which DEFRA appear unfortunately over-reliant. The latter, at a meeting in December 2011, appeared to be unaware that, as far as the European Commission is concerned, BGTW are UK waters as far as implementation of directives are concerned and require Gibraltar input alongside that from UK. It was also disturbing to learn – especially after persistent protestations from DEFRA, in the context of the UKOTs Biodiversity Strategy, that nothing can be imposed on UKOTs – that JNCC altered documentation to the European Commission on the Gibraltar SAC without reference to the Gibraltar Government. The Ministry of Defence T30. In the context of coordination, it is also worthwhile mentioning the Ministry of Defence. There seems to be a good relationship between Gibraltar and the MoD Advisor on environment, who is apparently a regular visitor to Gibraltar. Discussions were also held by the marine consultant with the then Head of the Armed Forces in Gibraltar, ostensibly about enforcement and sovereignty issues but strayed on to issues of biodiversity conservation. There was (then about to be revised) a guidance note for the armed forces on their use and management of protected areas under UK and EU legislation dealing with both habitats and species. The Head of the Armed Forces stated that he was unaware of any such guidance while the advisor stated that, if he was not aware, he should have been. One of the outcomes is that the habitat of two Habitats Directive Annex IV species suffered significant damage and a number of animals were lost as a result of MoD operations. Any such operations should have been cleared with the relevant authority – in this case the Gibraltar Department of the Environment – before proceeding but they MoD failed to do so. A formal letter was subsequently sent from the Minister to the MoD. Other examples were provided, in relation for example to erosion management, where cooperation and coordination have not been good. There is also the use by the Armed Forces of the Southern Waters SAC for training purposes and ensuring avoidance of sensitive areas, as well as the use for ordnance disposal, although the latter may have ceased. GIBRALTAR’S STATUS WITHIN THE MEDITERRANEAN UN System T31. It is apparent that the UK Government does not see itself as having a Mediterranean entity, even though it has responsibility for Gibraltar within the EU. There is also some confusion in the EU and in Mediterranean initiatives as to the status of Gibraltar – indeed, to some, it does not

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seem to exist. In some documents it is regarded as a Mediterranean entity/country; in some it is noted but with a statement that it is subject of a dispute with Spain and then no longer considered in the context of the document; or it is ignored completely. These processes also link into UN procedures. There are, of course, issues relating to the status of Gibraltar with respect to self-determination. However, Gibraltar is clearly recognised as an entity within the UN system, and that issue is not dealt with here. On most occasions, the UN in its publications speaks of 21 riparian states within the Mediterranean; on very few occasions there is mention of 22 riparian countries and territories, which one assumes is referring to Gibraltar but is not explicit. The Strategic Action Programme for the Conservation of Biological Diversity (SAP BIO) in the Mediterranean Region drafted by the United Nations Environment Programme Regional Activity Centre For Specially Protected Areas does not acknowledge Gibraltar and, for example, fails to mention inter alia Gibraltar’s importance for Patella ferruginea in its annex dealing with areas important for certain species. Gibraltar is also missing from the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean LME (Large Marine Ecosystem) drafted by UNEP/MAP and one of the analytical tools used in its production the Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA) for the Mediterranean Sea. More relevant to the EU, but once again diagnostic is the Communication from the Commission of 5 September 2006 entitled: "Establishing an environment strategy for the Mediterranean" [COM(2006) 475 final. All of these publications rely on the country in question being a party to the Barcelona Convention – which UK/Gibraltar is not. Cooperation around the relatively new ICZM (Integrated Coastal Zone Management) Protocol falls into the same category. In the very latest UN publication concerning the Mediterranean UNEP/MAP: State of the Mediterranean Marine and Coastal Environment, UNEP/MAP – Barcelona Convention, Athens, 2012, there is again no mention of Gibraltar, as once again it relies entirely on the Barcelona Convention for its framework. T32. A good example of the first category where Gibraltar is disadvantaged is the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS, an agreement under a UN treaty, the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species - CMS). Here, UK/Gibraltar is listed as a Mediterranean country and has the status of a non-party, i.e. it could be a full party if it wished. By contrast, Gibraltar is covered by EUROBATS, an equivalent agreement under CMS, as an uncontroversial component part of the UK ratification, although the reports from Gibraltar are rather short and somewhat hidden away in the UK report. Arguably, ACCOBAMS is far more important in a biodiversity context to Gibraltar than EUROBATS. Apparently, the UK Government did consider joining ACCOBAMS in 2002 and 2004. It attended a couple of its meetings as observers and has provided funding to it on a voluntary basis but, as of 2010, it was still considering becoming a party to the Agreement. Is the fear of upsetting Spain behind the reason so far not to become a Party to this agreement? European Union T33. An example of a second category is the range of activities/initiatives on the Alboran Sea (these are part-EU, part-IUCN, part governments of Spain, Algeria and Morocco). The strategy for the Alboran Sea was initiated by IUCN in 2007. When dealing with “the Legal and International situation”, this fails even to mention Gibraltar. A document “The potential of Maritime Spatial Planning in the Mediterranean Sea Case study report: The Alboran Sea”, prepared for the European Commission, mentions Gibraltar almost as an aside at the outset, and then largely ignores it for operational purposes in the rest of the document. For a third category, there are numerous examples where Gibraltar is missed off the list of Mediterranean riparian states. These examples include the Barcelona Convention, UNEP Regional Seas and many EU documents, despite the UK/Gibraltar being part of the EU. It is telling that a search on Eurostat (where statistics for the EU are collated) for any documents with Gibraltar included provides a nil return. EU documents usually describe 7 member states of the EU in the Mediterranean - Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta. Gibraltar is not listed among the remaining 14 riparian states either. Gibraltar is missed off the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan that “has been

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extended to involve all 21 countries that border the Mediterranean Sea”. Other regional initiatives T34. There is a fourth category where Gibraltar has been deliberately excluded from involvement in some form of regional initiative. A good example of that is the Strait Biosphere Reserve, falling under UNESCO. T35. Thus different parts of the UN under their MEA arrangements deal with Gibraltar in completely different ways. The responsibility for managing arrangements with such treaties lays with the UK Government, not the Gibraltar Government. The example of ACCOBAMS is particularly puzzling, given the strategic importance of both Strait and Bay of Gibraltar to cetaceans and that in this case Gibraltar/UK is actually recognised as a potential partner in the Agreement. For some of these agreements, e.g. the Barcelona Convention, the EU is a contracting party but it is unclear what role – if any – the UK Government plays, or can play, in the arrangement. The role of IUCN T36. At a slightly lower level internationally is the organisation IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature). Although officially an observer at the UN, it is part-government and part-non-government. As such, it often tries to run with the hare but also hunt with the hounds. IUCN also tends to ignore Gibraltar’s existence. In its review of implementation of the Biodiversity Convention by UKOTs, in 2010 it stated that Gibraltar was not a party to the CBD, which is incorrect, and thus failed to consider it. IUCN is responsible for managing implementation of the Alboran Sea strategy, which also misses out Gibraltar. It should be noted that IUCN operates a Mediterranean office in Malaga with considerable financial support from within Spain. Confirmation has now been received from a former senior employee of IUCN in the Malaga office that any mention of Gibraltar in documents is vetoed, with the threat of withdrawal of funds. Several attempts were made to engage with the IUCN officer responsible for marine issues within that office but without success. The UK has been an active member of IUCN, both at government and non-government levels, but of late the UK Government has decided that IUCN is no longer a priority. However, it does need to address the relationship with IUCN with respect to Gibraltar as IUCN is tasked by the European Commission with much of the liaison and policy implementation within the Mediterranean. T37. It is apparent that Gibraltar is marginalised in a Mediterranean context by the absence of representation in the many relevant pan-Mediterranean processes, including for example the high level ones such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well as those specific to environmental matters. It is not clear whether this is deliberate on the part of HMG – as any involvement would have to be through the UK Government as responsible for foreign affairs for Gibraltar – or an oversight or through diplomatic difficulties caused by the ongoing dispute with Spain. The full extent of the problem can be seen in a Blue Plan Note (No 22 June 2012) “20 years of sustainable development in the Mediterranean: review and outlook” which outlines the founding acts of sustainable development co-operation in the Mediterranean region, the main processes over the past 20 years and the region’s major sustainable development trends. CONCLUSIONS T38. It seems apparent that there is still a perception within Gibraltar, both in government circles and among the general populace that the UK Government does insufficient to protect the interests of the citizens of Gibraltar in respect of the relationship with the government of Spain.

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Perceptions within the UK are much more difficult to gauge since little of this reaches the public domain inside the UK, by contrast to the situation in Spain. This apparent relationship is all the more difficult to comprehend given that there should be shared interests and many common legal instruments (especially related to border controls and customs matters but also environmental issues) within the EU; common membership of NATO; and, according to the Minister responsible for Overseas Territories (but not Gibraltar) when responding to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in the House of Commons in December 2012, close cooperation between UK and Spain in the UN and on conflict resolution and counter-terrorism. The perception is that this is very much biased in favour of Spain with everything being done not to upset the Spanish government at the expense of Gibraltar’s interests. T39. Within the EU (and also internationally in general), Gibraltar finds itself at a significant disadvantage, since any formal discussions or negotiations are undertaken by the UK Government, as foreign affairs and defence are reserved powers. This is further exacerbated by much of the EU policy related to environmental issues in the Mediterranean being implemented through the Barcelona Convention, to which Gibraltar is not a Party. It cannot be so without the UK Government ratifying on its behalf. To further complicate matters, some initiatives such as the Alboran Sea initiative encompass BGTW but fail to relate to Gibraltar at all. This is typical of the approach of IUCN, which unfortunately is often tasked with implementing initiatives in the Mediterranean, but does not seem to recognise the existence of Gibraltar. T40. The fishing dispute is also complicated by the fact that Gibraltar is not subject to the EU Common Fisheries Policy, as technically it has no commercial fishing interests. For fisheries in the Mediterranean, there is a separate regime under the CFP closely allied to the work of the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM). Again, Gibraltar is not a Party to this organisation and would require the UK Government to accede on its behalf. This is not to suggest that Gibraltar should either become part of the CFP or that it should manage a commercial fishing fleet in BGTW. There are other good reasons to be part of the GFCM, for example for recreational fishing. T41. A more fundamental reason, which applies even more so in the context of the Barcelona Convention, is that Gibraltar is almost completely marginalised on environmental issues within the Mediterranean because it is not associated with mainstream environmental processes, including those operated within the EU. It is difficult to gauge whether this is due to previous governments in Gibraltar wishing to remain outside these processes or possibly a deliberate decision on the part of HMG not to risk possibly further exacerbating the situation with the Government of Spain, or possibly an oversight on the part of a succession of those in the UK Government with responsibility for Gibraltar. The latter is quite possible, given that there appears to be no joined up strategy for dealing with Gibraltar as it cuts across two sections within the FCO (Overseas Territories Directorate and Western Europe Directorate); has strong MoD involvement (especially given its still strong strategic importance as a military resource and as a landholder); is considered as a UKOT by DEFRA but seemingly not really taking into account its links to the EU (unique among UKOTs); and JNCC, which treats it as part of its international programme and seemingly fails to deal with it as part of the EU, with BGTW being UK territorial waters in an EU context. Much is made in UK Government circles of the UK Government’s so-called “UKOTs Biodiversity Strategy” but this fails to address the situation of Gibraltar as part of the EU (as well as its many other failings noted previously). Furthermore, the European Union and the Commission have not helped, in particular failing to deal with the dispute over territorial waters openly and transparently. The test for them will surely be how the management plans for the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) are dealt with and to what extent the UK Government takes action to defend the interests of Gibraltar in this respect. One particular element raised in the operationalisation of the MSFD is a strong component of cooperation with neighbouring countries both within the EU and with non-EU countries. The relationship with Spain is sure to be tested in this respect. Given the need for strengthening links with North African countries after the Arab Spring and recent problems in the region, it is a great pity that

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Gibraltar has been excluded from both the Strait Biosphere Reserve and the Alboran Sea Initiative, although there are some good links between Gibraltar and Morocco especially after an INTERREG-funded project. (INTERREG is an initiative that aims to stimulate cooperation between regions in the European Union.) T42. On the basis of the above it is recommended that:

A. HMG reviews its internal processes with respect to Gibraltar and derives a specific strategy (assuming none exists already but, if it does, it needs revision) with, in the first instance, a cross-departmental task force, but including representatives of the Government of Gibraltar, to establish the framework and objectives. Initially, this need to deal with environmental issues particularly around territorial matters but could be expanded to other areas as needed. This should include some mechanism for deciding when action and what action needs to be taken by the UK Government in respect of Spanish maritime incursions and unreasonable (and probably unlawful) delays at the border.

B. If not already in place, to make strong representations within the EU regarding Spain’s annexing of BGTW within its management plan for the MSFD.

C. Even before any strategy is completed, gently to integrate Gibraltar into wider Mediterranean processes including particularly the Barcelona Convention to which the UK should become a Contracting Party at the earliest opportunity, also ACCOBAMS (an agreement to reduce threats to cetaceans in Mediterranean and Black Sea waters and improve our knowledge of these animals) with immediate effect and the GFCM.

D. HMG should take action with respect to IUCN at the highest level. MR LIDINGTON’S LETTER T43. UKOTCF is aware that David Lidington MP, the FCO Minister responsible for Gibraltar matters, was unhappy at some of the evidence provided by the Forum to the EAC as part of this enquiry and which led to a number of Parliamentary Questions. Mr Lidington has subsequently written to the Chair of the Committee. T44. Many of the issues about which there is some dispute are covered in the additional supplementary evidence above, and so UKOTCF does not wish to dwell too much on the content of the letter but there are a few matters with which we wish to deal directly. T45. It is well understood that the Government of Gibraltar is responsible for environmental matters under its Constitution and that HMG is responsible for foreign affairs, defence and security. However, we doubt that many will follow the line now being produced by HMG that, as fisheries come under the environmental legislation of Gibraltar, HMG has no role to play in enforcement when it is perfectly plain that:

(a) the fishing dispute is being used as a proxy for the sovereignty/territorial dispute with Spain; (b) the incursions by Spanish boats are in breach of BGTW; (c) the recent apparent emphasis on separating State vessels (with fishing boats not being treated in this category) in respect of infractions is something of a red herring as they are often accompanied by Guardia Civil boats very clearly not using BGTW for navigation purposes; (d) the Royal Gibraltar Police are ill equipped to deal with paramilitary police armed with automatic weapons in larger rigid boats; (e) the Government of Gibraltar has asked for assistance in dealing with these incursions from the Royal Navy who we are reliably informed are under instruction from the FCO not to get directly involved beyond the standard radio message asking Spanish vessels to leave BGTW;

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(f) the use of the Royal Navy in dealing with incursions by Spanish boats was a very clear recommendation of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee when it held an enquiry into Gibraltar in 1999.

T46. UKOTCF did not suggest – indeed it never has suggested – that the present Coalition Government should wish to abolish the Nature Protection Act 1991. Dr Tydeman, in his Report to the Government of Gibraltar, also has not suggested this. UKOTCF did point out that Mrs Joyce Quin, the then Minister responsible in the FCO, had suggested (apparently as the previous government’s policy) to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee during the aforementioned 1999 enquiry that the Nature Protection Act 1991 should be repealed so as to make the so-called “agreement/understanding” the legal position, i.e. that fishing with nets would no longer be illegal. UKOTCF expressed a view to the Committee that they hoped that this was not the position of the present government – which Mr Lidington has now done in a somewhat roundabout fashion in his letter. T47. UKOTCF cannot comment on the suggestion that HMG has supported HMGoG’s efforts to reach a solution to the dispute with Spanish fishermen since we have not been party to any such discussions. However, Dr Tydeman when compiling information on his Report, found little evidence of that and certainly perceptions in Gibraltar are that such encouragement was sorely lacking. Dr Tydeman did hold several meetings with local Spanish fishing interests on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) drawn up by the Chief Minister of Gibraltar and local fishermen but these proved fruitless as the fishermen reneged on the MoU. There is no doubt that local fishermen, especially from La Linea, are having difficulties – but that is not of Gibraltar’s making, nor should it be of their solution. It is clear from statements arising from within both Andalusia and the Government of Spain that, despite the problems for fishermen, the dispute is being used as a proxy for the wider issue. The Government of Gibraltar is not in a position to deal with that since, as the Minister himself pointed out, it is HMG that is responsible for foreign affairs. Local solutions are suggested for a number of issues and seem to find a practical outcome until such time as they have to be formalised and they are then blocked at a national level by Spain. Suggesting that a local solution is possible now would only seem to be practical if there is a reversion to the 1999 “understanding” or similar which allows for Spanish fishing in BGTW in breach of the laws of Gibraltar. No formal agreement is possible between Gibraltar and Spain, as Spain does not recognise the right of Gibraltar to make such. This leaves the matter firmly with HMG. T48. The Minister once again has confirmed that the Royal Navy is there to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity in BGTW and not for fisheries protection, and once again makes the distinction between fishing vessels as private vessels and other “state” vessels. This line of argument seems rather akin to the old question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Spanish boats are Spanish boats and the fishing boats are registered as Spanish, leaving aside the issue of the fishing boats being “accompanied” by boats from the Guardia Civil. Elsewhere in British waters the Royal Navy deals with both territorial integrity and illegal fishing. The Minister also continues with the line that all incursions are closely monitored and then issue appropriate (to whom?) warnings. Given the scale of the incursions, this seems rather a pitiful response – monitoring merely provides information on how many boats, where and when – and the warnings are almost completely ignored. T49. The reference by Mr Lidington to “suggestions” by UKOTCF was deliberately unspecific since it referred in fact to the words of his colleague, Mr Simmonds, when speaking to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in December 2012. T50. There is a clear perception, both within Gibraltar and amongst the general public in the UK, that Spain adopts bullying tactics against Gibraltar. As this relates to much wider matters than the fishing dispute (even if one accepts the rather frail argument that fisheries enforcement falls under environment legislation), it clearly falls within the remit of HMG and it is impossible for

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the HMGoG to deal with. The argument that action will lead to escalation has now become merely a theoretical argument, as there is already a state of escalation. The UK Government may be clear that “unlawful incursions by vessels of the Spanish State are an unacceptable violation of British sovereignty and contrary to international law, specifically the provisions of UNCLOS.” The maintenance of diplomatic pressure, as described by Mr Lidington, would appear to have no positive consequence at all – the Spanish government merely ignores it and carries on as before. The UK Government’s idea of diplomacy seems to be to back off from tackling the issues and taking any practical steps. While it is possible to accept the argument that the UK Government does not wish to put at risk good diplomatic relations with the Government of Spain, there seems to be a distinct lack of reciprocity. T51. If bullies are allowed to carry on without any practical attempt to tackle that behaviour, then bullies will continue to do so. Unfortunately, the consequences fall on Gibraltar while the solutions lie mostly within the UK Government. We are certain that the people of Gibraltar would be much happier to see the sort of robust response to the issues raised by UKOTCF focused on the Government of Spain, rather than try to finesse reasons for not taking action and raising unfounded criticisms against a small UK NGO fulfilling its remit. UKOTCF would, of course, be very happy to discuss the issues concerning fisheries and Gibraltar with Mr Lidington. U. Final remarks

U1. In evidence to the Committee, Ministers complained that the Committee was focussing on the negative and ignoring the achievements. The Committee Chair rightly pointed out that, to improve matters, one needs to look at what needs improving.

U2. There are some excellent examples of positive achievements of conservation in UKOTs and Crown Dependencies. Some outstanding examples are:

a) The recovery of the Bermuda petrel or cahow from near extinction (due to earlier human actions);

b) The now likely recovery of the Cayman blue iguana from a similar human-induced reduction to a few individuals;

c) The rescue of several threatened endemic plant species from near extinction on St Helena and the outstanding success of the Millennium Gumwood Forest;

d) The restoration of breeding seabirds to the main island of Ascension; e) The protection of certain key sites as World Heritage Sites and Wetlands of

International Importance; f) The development and introduction of environmental education materials based

on the unique ecology and environment of individual territories, rather than using standard material from Europe or North America or other islands within the region but of markedly different ecology.

g) Good interpretative printed and website material and signage in local nature reserves, supporting local incomes through sustainable tourism - as well as reinforcing (f) above

h) The exchange of expertise between territories, so that projects that would not be achievable without this became possible.

i) Introduction of sustainable fisheries at South Georgia. U3. However, set against this have to be, for example:

j) The fact that so many species have been lost by human actions in the past (even the recent past), including many endemic plant, invertebrate and bird species on St Helena, continuing even until the loss of the endemic genus of the St Helena olive in 2003, with other species on the edge;

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k) Continuing risk to others due, for example, to failure to meet commitments in planning terms, even by UK Government when in direct control of a territory (see paras K12-K47, S4-S12);

l) The lack of strategic planning and appropriate guidance from HMG even in territories with tiny physical areas;

m) The failure to provide adequate (or, in some cases, any) fishery protection vessels in several territories, so that much of UK territorial waters are unmanaged.

U4. Even if we restrict ourselves to the successful examples at paragraph U2, several points emerge:

1) The successful projects took many years to achieve, in some cases decades; HMG’s grants for conservation work have rarely covered more than three years, and now only two. Furthermore, the grant applications now require outputs within that period, and so cannot readily contribute to the longer timescale needed for achieving and measuring the success of many projects. 2) Overall, HMG contributed relatively little to the examples, contributions of various sizes having been made to (d) to (i). However, recent changes to HMG policy mean that contributions to projects exemplified in (e), (f), (g) and (h) would now be unlikely.

U5. Similarly striking lessons can be learnt from the partial successes. HMG, in consultation with the UKOTs and NGOs, initiated the Environment Charter process in 2001, as an output from the 1999 White Paper. The Charters were – and are – valued by governmental and NGO conservationists in the UKOTs. HMG supported UKOTCF and others to facilitate UKOT stake-holders to develop strategies for implementation (essentially a “mainstreaming” process) in several territories and, at HMG’s request, UKOTCF collated information on progress in implementation. However, a few years later, HMG lost interest in the exercise, leaving it to UKOTs and NGOs, without even its continued encouragement. Within the last couple of years, HMG has now felt the need to reinstate a similar process under a different name, ignoring the earlier material. This wastes public money, sets back conservation, and demoralises local officials as well as the civil society organizations and volunteers that HMG says it wishes to work with. U6. This lack of staying power and continuity by HMG is evident, as well, in ways which would have potentially saved the UK taxpayer some future expenditure. HMG, about a decade ago, insisted on the TCI Government introducing a Conservation Fund, by an increase in the tax on accommodation and meals, mainly of tourists. This was achieved, after wide consultation and public approval. In 2012, the direct UK Government of TCI cancelled this fund with no consultation (see paras K42-K44). A similar Environmental Fund in the Cayman Islands still exists, although it is not being used in the manner originally announced (see e.g. oral evidence Q124 on 9 July 2013). It is to be hoped that the faults in this are cured before HM Treasury finds a way to cancel this too.

U7. There are some excellent concepts in the 2012 White Paper, and we would love to believe the Prime Minister’s words when he says of the Overseas Territories: “We see an important opportunity to set world standards in our stewardship of the extraordinary natural environments we have inherited.” The opportunity is there, but it will be realised only with actions that match the words.

U8. There is not yet, however, convincing evidence of actions to match these words. Even after the publication of the White Paper, HMG (in direct control of TCI) has continued to act against the advice on sustainable development that it had encouraged UKOT Governments to follow for well over a decade. Examples are given above and in earlier evidence (paras K12-K47, S3-S12). HMG seems to have lived in a world of “do as I say, not as I do.” Not surprisingly, some UKOT governments seem to be copying HMG’s flawed approach.

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U9. We welcome the continued interest in the natural environment of the territories shown by the DEFRA Minister, Mr Benyon, but this has not yet been reflected in the depth of engagement with the territories by his officials. When the FCO reduced its staff resources dealing with environmental issues in the UKOTs in 2005, it indicated that DEFRA would take over that work. At one level this made good sense. The richness of the territories in endemic species and diverse ecosystems meant that the UK’s commitments under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) were particularly important in terms of its overseas territories; and DEFRA was the lead department on these MEAs. U10. However, this move to apparently more logical “joined-up government” had risks, which we foresaw at the time. The two most obvious risks were, first, that many of the problems in good environmental governance in the territories relate to planning processes, and easy and timely access to information about development projects and changes in the use of land and marine resources, over which DEFRA has little direct experience and no responsibility. The governance conundrums here are really for FCO and DFID with their far more detailed and nuanced engagement with the territories. U11. Second, without strengthening its policy capabilities and its knowledge on the ground of issues and personalities in the territories, there is no way for DEFRA to have the confidence to say to FCO, DFID, MOD (in respect of the Falklands, BIOT, Gibraltar, Ascension, the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus), DCMS and elected governments in the territories: “You need to be aware that what you / your “partners in prosperity” are doing will make a mockery of the UK’s commitment to slow the rate of loss of global biodiversity.” U12. A toothless DEFRA is a poor substitute for an FCO and a DFID which treat environmental sustainability as a serious criterion of good policy (rather than as a definition that automatically attaches to “whatever we do”). However, there has been no sign of strengthening of DEFRA’s capability to lead over environmental issues in the territories. Whitehall’s policy architecture is not helpful: “Follow the money” – does the Treasury accept that it matters a jot whether there is loss of biodiversity or environmental degradation in any of the overseas territories – despite the Prime Minister’s words? U13. There was some boost in DEFRA attention to the UKOTs after the Committee’s 2008 Inquiry, but this was only to a low level, and soon declined again (see paras E20-E29). However, we are pleased that the long vacancy has now been filled in the one DEFRA post for work on the overseas territories (together with demanding tasks on wider conservation matters). We await with interest to see what the new appointee to the long-vacant part-post looking after this area will achieve, but she will clearly be working in a difficult environment, given the approach of her senior colleagues. U14. DFID, despite its statutory duty that “The reasonable assistance needs of the Territories are a first call on the UK’s international development budget” (see 2012 White Paper, p 13), seems to be “downsizing” its engagement with the environment in the UKOTs. We hope that, as with DEFRA, the delayed filling of the vacant DFID post addressing environmental matters will improve the situation. However, that will require support from senior levels of management, which still seems to be lacking. It was discouraging that, despite the massive environmental impact of the St Helena Air Access project on St Helena, the Committee’s 9 July session did not hear evidence from any DFID minister; and the one official who gave evidence was shortly due to retire, thus having no continuing responsibilities for the subject covered by the Inquiry. We are, furthermore, concerned at DFID’s long-term decrease in support of biodiversity conservation, shifting funds towards direct poverty alleviation (apparently not seeing the linkages between the two), as reported by Dilys Roe in “Has biodiversity fallen off the development agenda? A case study of the UK Department for International Development” (2013, Oryx 47: 113–121).

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U15. Some of the problems across Whitehall seem to arise from the FCO (which leads overall on the overseas territories) reducing its direct engagement with environmental issues without having managed to persuade other departments to increase their own capabilities in this area. There is also a distinct loss if desk officers in FCO, who have far more opportunities than others in Whitehall to visit the territories, feel that environmental issues are for someone else. For many UK officials, whether Governors, their staff, or desk officers in London, supporting the social and natural heritage of the overseas territories is a major element in their job satisfaction. We need a conception of “joined-up government” which is not “That’s your job (and down to your budget and contingent liabilities)” – words with which officials terrorize their ministers, The FCO’s role will remain crucial. It is in daily contact with Governors; and its ministers and officials have the legal authority to use Orders in Council and other means to instruct Governors on what they are to do or not to do. There are encouraging signs from the FCO under Mr Simmonds and the new Director of Overseas Territories. However, there is a long way to go to overcome the effects of the latter’s two predecessors, even to re-establish the state of a decade ago, before making improvements beyond that. We wish them well. We also encourage them to put in the considerable effort needed to make the Whitehall policy and resource architecture work better in relation to the overseas territories. We hope that your committee’s report will result in more constructive responses from Government than was the case with your and the FAC’s earlier reports on the overseas territories. 19 August 2013

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Supplementary written evidence submitted by Mark Simmonds MP, FCO and Richard Benyon MP, Defra

Thank you for the opportunity on 9 July to contribute to the Environmental Audit Committee’s inquiry into Sustainability in the Overseas Territories. The OK’s Overseas Territories are among the world’s greatest environmental asset, so we welcome this opportunity to review the work undertaken to safeguard their future.

We undertook to come back to you in response to some specific points raised by members of the Committee. In doing so, we would also like to take the opportunity to provide further detail on the wide-ranging support which the UK Government is providing to the Overseas Territories on environmental issues.

During the evidence session on 9 July there was considerable discussion on the constitutional arrangements of the Territories. There are important and significant differences in the specific constitutional provisions in the individual Territories, which can have an impact on the relationship between the UK and the Territory Government. We would be pleased to provide further information to Committee members on this issue, including a meeting with officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

It remains important to note that Territory Governments are constitutionally responsible for the protection and conservation of their natural environments. The UK Government’s role is to work in partnership with Territory Governments to provide them with the technical advice and support they need to enable them to fulfil this responsibility successfully. This support is provided through mechanisms such as Darwin Plus and Environmental Mainstreaming and through direct provision of technical advice and expertise, including via the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC).

The aim of Darwin Plus, launched in 2012, is to support the long-term sustainable environmental management of the Territories. The fund dedicates around £2m per year to supporting environment and climate projects and has been widely welcomed, including by the Territories themselves and UK-based environmental organisations.

The 14 projects supported by the first round of funding cover a wide-range of activities, including: invasive lionfish control in the Caribbean; seabird monitoring in the southern ocean; and a census of rare plants in St Helena. These projects range in value from £8,000 to £285,000. We enclose a list of successful projects in the first round. The second round has recently been launched and is open until 23 September. Successful bids should be announced in December.

Our Environmental Mainstreaming inititative is helping the Territories put environmental consideration at the heart of policy decision making. Projects have been completed in the Falklands, British Virgin Islands and Anguilla with funding being made available from the FCO and Defra. The initiative focuses on the value of diverse ecosystems in supporting economies and the need to take account of these values in economic and physical planning,

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drawing together a range of stakeholders to identify priorities. Completed projects have generated complementary support programmes involving economic assessments, training programmes, capacity building and additional fund raising designed to allow the policy makers to draw on a substantial environmental evidence base. We are in the process of extending the initiative to Bermuda and the Cayman Islands and intend to roll it out to all willing Territories by 2015.

There was a brief discussion at the evidence session about the Joint Ministerial Council (JMC), an annual event which brings together Territory leaders and UK Government Ministers to discuss key issues and identify priority actions. The last JMC took place in December 2012 and enclosed is a copy of the Communiqué agreed between the UK Government and Territory leaders following a session on ‘Cherishing the Environment and Creating Green Growth’. The progress made by the UK Government in a number of key areas agreed in the communiqué is also summarised.

We undertook to provide the Committee with further information on the Aarhus Convention. The UK ratified the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters on 23 February 2005. The Aarhus Convention is a regional instrument open to States who are members of or who have consultative status with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). States from outside the UNECE region may also accede with the approval of the Meeting of the Parties.

UK practice is that Conventions are only extended to Overseas Territories at their request and if they can demonstrate that they can meet their obligations under the Convention. To date, no Territory has requested such an extension of this Convention.

[I] hope you will find this additional information valuable and we look forward to continuing to work with the Committee as the inquiry progresses.

26 July 2013

Annex A—Successful Darwin Plus Bids (First Round)

Bermuda invasive Lionfish control initiative, Bermuda Zoological Society, £169,898

An autonomous seabird monitoring network for the southern ocean, University of Oxford, £215,848

Biodiversity action planning in the Falkland Islands, Falkland

Conservation, £105,200

Upgrade and revision of reef survey resource, Charles Sheppard, £8,000 Sustainable management of the marine environment and resources of Tristan da Cunha, RSPB, £285,673

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Seed conservation in the Caribbean UKOTs, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, £95,755

Using seabirds to inform Caribbean marine planning, University of Liverpool, £226,367

Rare plant census of St Helena, St Helena Nature Conservation Group, £8,650

Antarctic and sub-Antarctic marine protected areas: using penguin tracking data to identify candidate areas, British Antarctic Survey, £142,176

Coral nursery project in Little Cayman: enhancing resilience and natural capacity of coral reefs in the UKOTs, Central Caribbean Marine Institute, £41,631

Ile Vache marine restoration project, Chagos Conservation Trust, £32,256

Conserving plant diversity and establishing ecosystem based approaches to the management of forest ecosystems in the E3V1s, National Parks Trust of the Virgin Islands, £83,915

Promoting the creation and appropriate management of protected areas in Anguilla and the Cayman Islands, Anguilla National Trust, £193,568

Building capacity to develop and provide long term sustainability for St Helena’s paper and card recycling unit, St Helena Active Participation in Enterprise (SHAPE), £99,200

Annex B—Joint Ministerial Council Communiqué (Environment section)

We recognise that the Territories are home to many species and environments found nowhere else in the world and that sustainable economic growth and livelihoods within the Territories depend on the responsible stewardship of these natural resources. Territory Governments recognise their responsibilities for the sustainable management of the natural environment and the need to put environmental considerations at the heart of policy and decision making. The UK recognises the supportive role that it can play with Territory Governments to help make this shared agenda a reality, in cooperation with NG0s, the private sector and other stakeholders.

We have agreed to work together on the following priority actions:

• to develop sustainable fisheries—including developing sustainable management plans and facilitating development of the sector (with the UK providing–as necessary–support for scoping studies on fish stocks, model legislation and fisheries monitoring and patrols);

• to create sustainable long-term incentives and encourage private sector investment in renewable energy;

• to take a more strategic approach to the management, protection and conservation of the natural environment, including embedding that understanding into Government policies and decision-making;

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• to ensure that where commercial use of natural resources takes place, it is carried out in the most sustainable and environmentally responsible way (including through the use of environmental impact assessments, evidence-based management plans, and protection of important areas);

• to share knowledge and best practice in the areas of food security and agricultural and aquaculture production;

• to continue to implement Environment Charters, and to work towards the full implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements where these have been extended to the Territories;

• for the UK to strengthen the way it represents Territory interests in relevant international fora;

• to identify and share best practice

Annex C—Progress made by the UK Government

1. Strategic Approach to the Environment

At the JMC both UK and Territory Governments agreed to adopt a more strategic approach to the management, protection and conservation of the natural environment. To facilitate this, the UK Government has been working with a number of Territories, including Anguilla, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, to support Territory Governments mainstream environmental policy into the decision-making processes. We are working to extend this initiative to other Territories and develop a shared agenda for sustainable environmental management.

2. Financial assistance

We announced in April 2013 the funding of 18 new projects in the Territories totalling £2.6 million. This included 14 projects under the new Overseas Territories Environment and Climate Fund (known as Darwin Plus) which is co-funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development (DfiD) and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). These projects and other Defra funding will support many of the actions identified in the JMC communiqué.

Darwin Plus is only one source of funding for activities in the Overseas Territories. Defra has, for example, also initiated a series of research projects to address threats to biodiversity in the South Atlantic and Caribbean Overseas Territories. These projects were designed to bring UK and Territory expertise together to address issues specifically identified by the Territory Governments.

3. Identifying and sharing best practice

Many of the activities funded by the UK Government seek to identify and share best practice amongst the Overseas Territories. We are conscious that to do this it is necessary to bring representatives of the Overseas Territories together. This is all the more important when

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addressing issues that impact on more than one Territory, such as the review of the UKOT Biodiversity Strategy held at Kew Gardens earlier this year, where participation of Territory representatives was facilitated by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), the public body that advises the UK Government on international nature conservation.

JNCC also undertakes activities in the Territories themselves, such as the organisation of workshops for the Caribbean Territories, to address the cross-territory threats to biodiversity from the invasive lionfish and to exchange expertise in this area. Work to address threats from lionfish has received funding from JNCC, FCO and through the Darwin Plus funding mechanism.

Exchange of best practice is also achieved through secondments and placements. At present, a JNCC staff member (a St Helena national) is on a two year secondment to St Helena as director of the new Environmental Management Department, with funding for the secondment provided by DFID. In her absence, a marine expert from Bermuda has been seconded to JNCC for 9 months. Defra also funds a JNCC officer in the Falkland Islands, who works with the Falkland Islands Government on issues related to the conservation of endangered albatrosses and petrels.

4. Access to Expertise

We are conscious that the Overseas Territories often need access to expertise within Defra and its executive agencies. Defra has established a joint mailbox (UKOTenquiriesadefra.qsi.qov.uk) as a first point of contact for all environment related enquires from the Overseas Territories. The mailbox is monitored on a daily basis, and queries are directed to the officials who are best placed to assist.

Defra also funds the Overseas Territories Pest identification service, operated by the Food and Environment Research Agency (Fera). This service was set up to identify invasive invertebrate plant pests in the Territories in order to improve bio-security. At least 77 of the invertebrate species examined to date have never before been reported from the Territories A total of sixteen species new to science have been observed and are being studied further.

There is a clear demand for an identification service for invasive invertebrate plant pests to improve bio-security in the Territories (132 samples were received during 2012/13) and the service has produced a wealth of new and useful data In 2012 alone, at least 15 economically important, invasive, plant pests, were recorded from three of the Territories.

The FC0’s Jubilee Programme supports public services in the Overseas Territories and includes the exchange of expertise between public servants in the Territories and the UK through a programme of secondments providing Territory officials with opportunities to train and work with colleagues in the UK, and UK experts to work in the Territories.

As well as providing support from the UK Government, we are also encouraging Territory Governments to share expertise amongst themselves. Recent examples include Gibraltar’s offer to host a meeting for the Territories Geographic Information Systems and a cross-Caribbean effort to coordinate a response to combat the invasive lionfish.

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5. Sustainable Fisheries

The UK Government is working with a number, of Territories including St Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Ascension, Pitcairn and the Turks and Caicos Islands to establish baseline information on fisheries resources and to scope opportunities for developing sustainable fishing industries. JNCC is currently developing a marine strategy for the Overseas Territories and is organising a series of technical workshops, bringing together marine experts from Defra and the Territories, to, address priorities in marine conservation and marine biodiversity. These workshops are anticipated to start later this year.

We have a good working relationship with UK-based NGOs such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), but we also want to engage with a number of Territory-based NGOs though the Environmental Mainstreaming initiative.

6. Renewable Energy

Many of the Overseas Territories have the potential to exploit renewable energy and reduce their dependency on fossil fuels. The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is ready to provide advice and technical expertise in matters relating to energy and climate change and has established a single point of contact for any enquiries. The Falkland Islands are already making significant progress on reducing their dependency on fossil fuels with the capital, Stanley, now deriving 40 per cent of its energy needs from a wind farm.

7. International Commitments

UK Officials continue to support the Territories in implementing a range of multilateral environmental agreements, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

Defra lawyers have drawn up guidance for Territories considering extension of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and several of the daughter agreements to the Convention on Migratory Species, such as the Memorandum of Understanding on Migratory Birds of Prey (Raptors MoU) and the African-Eurasian Waterbirds Agreement (AEWA). We are also working actively with Territories to which CITES has been extended to ensure that their legislation meets the four basic requirements of the Convention.

8. Representing Territory interests internationally

We work hard to ensure that Overseas Territories are involved in activities under Multilateral Environmental Agreements that are of interest to them and both Defra and DECC ensure that the Territories are consulted prior to and following major international meetings.

In addition to this consultation process, Defra included a marine expert from one of the Overseas Territories in the UK delegation to the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity held in Hyderabad, India, in October 2012. Territory interests were

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also represented at the 16th Conference of the Parties to the CITES, held in Bangkok, Thailand, in March 2013,for example in respect of work regarding the queen conch, which is of significant economic interest to some of the Territories.

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Written evidence submitted by BioDiplomacy

1 This submission argues that the evidence given to the Environmental Audit Committee on 9 July by FCO, DEFRA and DFID was inaccurate in respect of the differing and complementary responsibilities of HMG and the governments of overseas territories concerning environmental issues. The fundamental problem is that the 2012 White Paper’s vision of “natural environments managed to the highest international standards” is not matched by adequate attention to policy detail. This is shown in the patchy and unsatisfactory record over the extension of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to the overseas territories. The defects in delivering adequate results are shown in the case of the flagship environmental agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Excessive ministerial and official time has been wasted on misconceived and ill-founded arguments about where responsibilities lie, both between HMG and the territories and amongst Whitehall departments. It is a symptomatic result of these misdirected efforts that in the UK’s Fourth National Report to the CBD information was only provided on two of the UK’s 14 overseas territories. Introduction 2 This BioDiplomacy submission is written largely in my personal capacity as a former member of the UK Diplomatic Service (1968-2002). I had experience in several postings, in London and overseas, of treaty negotiations and of the UK’s instruments of ratification being extended (or not) to the overseas territories. That included being seconded to the Government of Hong Kong (when it was still a UK Dependent Territory), negotiating the agreement for Gibraltar to establish a Red Ensign Shipping Register, and, in my final post, negotiating the series of Environmental Charters between the UK and the overseas territories. However, the BioDiplomacy network which I set up on retirement includes a wide range of people with shared interests in environmental sciences and politics, conservation and human rights, with a strong interest in island communities, especially in the UKs Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. Without their support, I would not have been able to prepare this submission and earlier ones to this Committee and the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Ministerial Views 3 In the oral evidence session on 9 July 2013 the following points were made (bold text is my emphasis): Mark Simmonds[FCO Minister of State]: ….We have a significant commitment to the Overseas Territories to support them in their work as it relates to the environment. I just need to say upfront, if I may, Madam Chairman, that territory governments are constitutionally responsible for the environment, for environmental protection and for conservation of their natural environments. While each constitution is different, in all cases in all inhabited Overseas Territories they are responsible. As it relates to uninhabited Overseas Territories, then we are responsible, but we do work in partnership providing technical advice and

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support as they need to make the importance of the environment a priority. As I will argue, this defensive presentation ignores the fact that only one government is responsible for multilateral international environmental agreements applying to the UK’s overseas territories– HMG.. The Legal Position 4 The following more accurate summary of the law covering treaties being extended to the territories, is worth quoting fully (the bold text adds my emphasis): “As a matter of constitutional law, it is open to the United Kingdom to apply treaties to (or to withdraw their application from) the territories without any consultation with them because the application of treaties falls wholly within the responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom, not those of the territory Governments. This is the case whether or not the subject-matter of the treaty has been devolved to the territory Government. However, it has long been the practice of the United Kingdom Government to consult territory Governments before taking a decision on extending the application of a treaty to them and, certainly nowadays, it would only be in an exceptional case that the United Kingdom would act against the wishes of a territory government. This can be seen from the fact that there are many treaties which apply to some territories but not others, even if one looks at older treaties.47 The Cayman Islands Constitution is unique in addressing this issue by making it a constitutional requirement that the Governor, unless instructed otherwise by a Secretary of State, obtain the agreement of the Cabinet before he or she enters into, agrees or gives final approval to any international agreement, treaty or instrument that would affect internal policy or require implementation by legislation in the Cayman Islands.48 47 See eg the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, UKTS No 39 (1954); Cmd 9171, which was extended to certain overseas territories at different times but which at the time of writing had not been extended to all of them. 48 Cayman Islands Constitution s 55 (3) Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson, British Overseas Territories Law Hart Publishing, 2011 p 256. 5 However, the scope of the UK Government’s legislative authority in relation to the overseas territories goes far beyond the power to ratify and extend treaties: “There is no limit to the power of Parliament to enact legislation for any of the overseas territories” (op. cit p 61). The ways in which that power can be exercised is a matter of great legal complexity (op.cit. Chapter 4 passim Legislative Authority and Controls pp 55-78) which need not be examined here except to note that it has also been a matter of legal and political controversy, extensively debated in the courts over several decades in the case of the forcibly displaced Chagossians. 6 That the jurisprudential arguments are far from being resolved is in part due to the conceptual incompatibility of trying to treat the overseas territories as “partners” while relying on a legal framework with deep roots in colonial distinctions between settled

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ceded or conquered territories. As well as the power to legislate for specific purposes, “there is also a general power to legislate by Order in Council for all of the overseas territories except Bermuda. The legal basis for this general power is exclusively the Royal prerogative for Gibraltar and British Indian Ocean Territory, and for the other 11 territories it derives, at least in part, from an Act of Parliament. Furthermore, the Orders in Council making constitutions for all of the territories except Bermuda and the Sovereign Base Areas expressly reserve to Her Majesty power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the territory in question. There are historical reasons behind this practice.” (op. cit. p 57). We do not need to go into them, but we do need to go into the resultant politics, first in general and then in relation to treaties, especially, for the Committee’s purposes, environmental ones. The Politics of Treaty Extension 7 Considerable confusion arises from Ministers and officials using “devolved” in relation to the Overseas Territories. The analogy that this implies with the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (and, indeed, matters “devolved” to local authorities) is misleading because in these cases, as well as roles being devolved, so too are budgets and legislative powers that were formerly reserved for the Westminster Parliament. Note, too, that in the matter of international agreements, whether environmental or not, national powers to sign them and to determine their geographical scope are no more devolved than they are in the case of the overseas territories. The more important concept concerning the overseas territories is that of “reserved powers”. These essentially concern defence, foreign policy and internal security. These powers are generally exercised by the Governor on his own (i.e. not in Executive Council/Cabinet and following the advice of local ministers), though sometimes with an obligation to consult and to inform local institutions of his/her reasons for exercising the powers in this way. 8 When it comes to MEAs such as the CBD, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar), the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the UK Government’s general practice of consulting the governments of territories before extending the UK’s ratification of a treaty to them - see the passage quoted in paragraph 4 above - makes perfectly good sense, since complying with the objectives of these MEAs often requires local institutional changes, including legislation and administrative arrangements (eg to have scientific and administrative bodies able to authorise export licences under CITES). The UK territories often share the UK’s admirable practice of not undertaking new responsibilities until being in a position to meet them. What an effective sharing of responsibilities between HMG and overseas territories governments does require, however, is an active disposition on the part of HMG to explain why the UK regards these MEAs as important and what actions will be needed in order to implement them effectively. As a key UK commitment under the 2001 Environment Charters acknowledges, this includes helping each territory “ensure that it has the legislation, institutional capacity and mechanisms it needs to meet international obligations”. We now need to see how this currently plays out in a specific example – the

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CBD. Biodiversity in the UKOTs: CBD as an Example of Treaty Extension 9 A key document emerging from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit was the CBD. The UK was one of the prime contributors to the international negotiations leading to its coming into force in 1994. This is not surprising, since the UK takes pride in the contribution that amateur and professional natural scientists and conservationists have made, over the past millennium, to a greater knowledge of global biodiversity of species and ecosystems and of the importance of protecting them. HMG has also long been aware of the huge contribution of its overseas territories. Indeed, the works of scientists and conservationists, past - like Darwin, Wallace, Hooker and Banks- and present, like Sir David Attenborough and many other distinguished members of the Royal Society - are full of references to St Helena, the Falklands, the Caribbean territories, Bermuda, the Chagos Archipelago, and the Pitcairn Islands. But what is the record? 10 As far as I know, not one UK overseas territory has ever said that it does not share the objectives of the CBD. Several have said, with good reason, that they need time and help to put in place the right institutional arrangements to help it meet these objectives (for instance, having in place a system for designating areas needing protection). But in the almost twenty years since the CBD entered into force, to how many territories has the UK’s ratification been extended? Just four – Cayman, Gibraltar, St Helena and the Virgin Islands. Note that the CBD has not yet been extended to the two territories with currently no resident population – South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and British Indian Ocean Territory – despite HMG having acknowledged for many years that both ought to be treated as if they had the status of world heritage sites because of their biodiversity. 11 Even more telling is that in the UK’s Fourth National Report to the CBD of 20 May 2009, there was no mention of the biodiversity of the overseas territories in the main body of the text. Information was included in notes, following the main Annexes to the report, on just two territories, Bermuda and St Helena. Note also that the information concerning Bermuda was included even though the UK’s ratification of the CBD has not yet been extended to Bermuda; and that the information on St Helena does not include any mention of the hugely important biodiversity of Ascension and of Tristan da Cunha. The extension of the CBD applies equally to the three parts of the territory of “St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha” even though each part has its own constitution. 12 The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that, as of now, the UK Government lacks the institutional capacity and mechanisms properly to meet its international biodiversity obligations. Perhaps the Committee will wish to consider assisting HMG by recommending the following steps: a) That it improves its own policy capacity to engage actively with promoting the

objectives of the CBD in all the overseas territories; b) That in its Fifth National Report to the CBD, due to be submitted by 31 May 2014, a

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substantial part of the main body of the UK report is devoted to the Overseas Territories (and the Crown Dependencies); and

c) That an annex is included to the report to cover the current position regarding the objectives of the convention in respect of each territory and crown dependency, including the progress needed in order to extend the UK’s ratification to it – where that has not yet been possible.

13 If HMG lacks the capacity to undertake this work, BioDiplomacy is ready to offer its services to do so, as, I am sure would bodies with wide experience and skills in this area such as the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum network (in which I have to declare an interest as a Forum Council Member). If, however, what is lacking is the political will to value and protect the biodiversity of the UKOTs, can HMG please refrain from claiming that it seriously intends that the natural environment of all the overseas territories should be managed to the highest international standards? 21 August 2013

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Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)  

  

The RSPB is extremely grateful to the Environmental Audit Committee for bringing some much‐needed attention to this oft‐overlooked area of environmental policy. We are submitting this supplementary evidence in response to the oral evidence session conducted with the UK Government on 9 July 2013.  UK Responsibility for Compliance 1. We were pleased to learn that Defra has written to ‘those Territories to which CITES has been extended and that have legislation which is classified as not meeting the basic requirements of CITES’, ‘offering any assistance they might need in order to achieve [compliance] and giving them a longstop date... for when we want to see that in place’. The Minister should be congratulated on this proactive approach towards CITES compliance, which we consider to be exactly the form of action required for all the international environmental agreements to which the UK and the OTs are ascribed.   2. Despite this excellent precedent, unfortunately CITES appears to be the only international environmental agreement where HMG has both conducted a proper strategic assessment of OT compliance and worked to ensure any gaps are filled (most likely because CITES is the only agreement which also contains strong penalties for infractions for which the UK would be liable). Indeed, the RSPB was surprised to read HMG’s response to a series of parliamentary questions answered on 4th September 2013 that ‘It is the responsibility of the St Helena Government / Cayman Government / British Virgin Islands Government to ensure that [they] meet the requirements of the Convention on Biological Diversity’. This position would appear to directly contradict both HMG’s legal responsibility and the Government’s own 2012 White Paper, in which it said that it was an HMG priority for action to ‘ensure compliance with the requirements of relevant environmental agreements’ (p.46). It is to be hoped that the UK’s legal responsibility for compliance with all international environmental agreements, not just CITES, can therefore be adequately addressed by Defra.  3. Recommendation: Defra should conduct a strategic assessment of compliance with all relevant international environmental agreements, along the lines already implemented for CITES, and then provide proactive technical and policy assistance to OT Governments to remedy any issues identified.  UK Strategy 4. The RSPB was disappointed that Defra made no mention of the UK Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy, for which it has lead departmental responsibility, when asked where Defra’s objectives for the OTs could be found. This was particularly surprising given that the JNCC had co‐ordinated a review meeting of the Strategy just 6 months ago, but perhaps demonstrates the low political priority that this document is afforded within Defra, and the 

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need for it to be developed into a more concrete strategy with a workplan and objectives. In January 2012, Defra did set out in its departmental paper on the OTs that it would ‘oversee...where appropriate the strategy’s further elaboration into an implementation plan’. OT Government officials expressed strong support for the creation of an implementation plan at the 2013 review meeting, and it is hoped that this could provide the strategic HMG biodiversity workplan which the OTs so badly need. For instance, such a plan would have contributed to prevent the plant extinction crisis which has apparently just been reached on Pitcairn, where two unique plant species have declined to the very brink of extinction (<5 specimens each) with no off‐island populations secured. Indeed, one of the two species, the Pitcairn red berry tree, may now be functionally extinct as it occurs in male and female plants, and the remaining individuals may all be of the same sex.  5. Recommendation: Defra should establish an Implementation Plan with clear objectives for its UK Overseas Territories Biodiversity Strategy so as to ensure strategic on‐the‐ground action.  6. At present, Defra’s strategy seems to be almost entirely reactive, placing the onus on small OT Governments to make formal applications for assistance. Such a strategy is untenable for small Governments such as Tristan da Cunha or Pitcairn, where overstretched Environment Departments numbering just a few people spend their time fire‐fighting pressing issues, and have no opportunity to step back and undertake a strategic assessment of where they need assistance, especially as it is often over such a wide range of areas (from waste management to biosecurity, from biodiversity conservation to fisheries management). There is also anecdotal evidence that OT Governments have been placed under pressure by the FCO to not kick up a fuss or complain to other UK Government Departments that they need more help than they are receiving. Defra therefore must not abdicate responsibility by adopting a reactive strategy, but should instead follow its own excellent CITES example and adopt a proactive partnership approach to working with OT Governments.   UK Government Capacity  7. The HMG response to the EAC’s effective questioning about departmental capacity was very disappointing (Qs. 128‐135). The RSPB alone has the same number of full‐time dedicated OT environment staff (3) as the entire UK Government (1 in FCO and 2 in JNCC). Defra meanwhile still has no dedicated staff member, and no Defra ministers or civil servants have visited an OT in an official capacity since 2009. Indeed, the Defra official questioned appeared to display an unfortunate lack of understanding of the extent of environmental need in the OTs by intimating that any full‐time OT environment official in his Department would spend time ‘twiddling their thumbs’. The full‐time FCO environment lead is far from unoccupied, as the provision of pro‐active and effective long‐term, technical support to OT Governments is a major endeavour. Moreover within the remit of biodiversity conservation alone, the RSPB has had to make two separate emergency OT interventions to prevent imminent global extinctions since the EAC inquiry begun. It is uncertain whether Defra was aware of the need in either case, and biodiversity conservation is the highest profile environmental policy area for which Defra has 

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OT responsibility. Strategic Defra involvement in other policy areas such as OT water or waste management meanwhile sadly appears almost non‐existent.  8. Recommendation: Defra should follow the FCO’s welcome lead and establish full‐time dedicated OT environment staff capacity.  9. With regard to the discussion on Governors’ capacity and expertise on environmental issues, the RSPB notes that whilst some Governors have received briefings from expert environmental organisations prior to commencing their roles, this has to date been conducted in a highly ad hoc and inconsistent manner. A systematic approach to environmental training, involving NGOs as well as NDPBs such as RBG Kew, is required.  JNCC 10. The official role of the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) is to provide evidence, information and advice to the UK Government on nature conservation. The JNCC has had full‐time OTs capacity for 5 years, and the RSPB recognises that this team has facilitated valuable environmental mainstreaming processes and other conservation projects in several Territories, established excellent working relations with OT Governments, and provided them with useful support. We are therefore concerned to hear that core funding for this work have recently been substantially reduced, as this can only have a negative impact on the type and level of support that can be provided.  11. However, the RSPB believes that the JNCC has not, to date, effectively fulfilled its role as a technical adviser to the UK Government with regard to OT biodiversity conservation. The JNCC’s current working methodology in relation to OTs is to be responsive solely to the various and changing priorities of OT Governments. Effective partnership‐working with OT Governments is vital, but the JNCC seems to have overlooked its responsibility to provide the UK Government with sufficient evidence to enable it to discharge its international responsibilities. Indeed, after 5 years of biodiversity work, the JNCC still does not know the number of species unique to each of the Territories, nor the total which are at imminent risk of extinction.   12. Furthermore, a recent parliamentary question reveals that the JNCC does not even know the number of terrestrial or marine protected areas in the Territories, a seemingly fundamental piece of conservation knowledge. Without such basic information, JNCC is unable to provide the UK Government with the evidence and advice it requires to enable an overarching strategy. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a strategic work programme in place to address this evidence deficit, as Defra’s Evidence Plan for Biodiversity and Ecosystems Evidence provides only one sentence of detail on the OTs: ‘Improve the evidence base in UK Overseas Territories to assist in meeting international commitments, in particular the control and management of invasive species (ongoing – medium priority)’. Such vagaries urgently need to be translated into detailed scientific action in a much more concerted manner.  

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13. Recommendation: Defra should establish an OTs‐specific evidence plan and explicitly direct the JNCC to implement a more strategic programme of OT biodiversity evidence‐gathering, to include the systematic identification of the most urgently threatened species and habitats in the Territories, and a joint‐assessment with OT Governments as to the adequacy of current terrestrial and marine protected area networks..  14. The Committee also discussed policy‐making by the JNCC during the evidence session. Due to a chronic lack of capacity within Defra, the JNCC has ended up in a de facto policy‐making and small grant‐disbursing role with regard to the OTs. For example, stakeholders at the March 2013 review of the OTs Biodiversity Strategy agreed that the JNCC had actually written this document. JNCC also  makes spending decisions through its own OT funding lines, and is the most active promoter of the incongruous position that the UK Government should not have any of its own environmental priorities with regard to the OTs (cf. JNCC presentation to CIEEM conference, January 2013). The JNCC’s exclusion of research institutions and civil society from its ‘OT Research & Training Steering Group’ also appears in direct contradiction to HMG’s White Paper commitment to ‘strengthen co‐operation with the non‐governmental and scientific communities’.   Transparency 15. The Committee’s focus on this fundamental issue was very welcome. It was therefore disappointing to learn that the FCO could give no examples of practical support it had offered to advance freedom of information. The RSPB would suggest a different approach for the various Territories. Firstly, transparency standards in the uninhabited Territories remain poor. This is an area where immediate UK Government action is both possible and strongly desirable, and freedom of information legislation should be passed in these Territories forthwith. The RSPB recognises that capacity constraints are an issue for the smaller OTs, but notes that the smallest inhabited OT, Pitcairn, has successfully introduced freedom of information legislation. This sets an important precedent for those Territories with less capacity to introduce a proportionate transparency framework, and this is something which the FCO should proactively facilitate. Finally, for those Territories where DfID funds major infrastructure projects, the DfID ‘Aid Transparency Guarantee’ should be extended so as to include coverage of the environmental impacts of aid spending.  16. Recommendation: Freedom of Information legislation should be passed for the uninhabited Territories as soon as practicable, whilst the DfID ‘Aid Transparency Guarantee’ should be extended to incorporate the environmental impacts of that department’s aid spending.  St Helena Airport 17. The St Helena airport is currently being built on a unique habitat: a mini‐Namib desert located in the middle of the South Atlantic. The biodiversity of this site remains very poorly known, even to the degree that we do not know exactly which species are there, and which may have recently gone extinct. The RSPB has supported improved access to St Helena, but is 

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gravely concerned that the environmental management of the airport project has, to date, been inadequate. Of particular concern has been the severe delay to the Landscape & Ecology Mitigation Plan (LEMP), which was supposed to begin a year before construction took place so as to allow adequate time to secure sensitive populations and enable adequate mitigation. The DfID official questioned characterised this plan as being ‘mainly about the visual impacts of the airport’, which belittles the enormous role that this aspect of the project has to play in restoring the biodiversity of this remarkable site. The official stressed that whilst it was ‘unfortunate that those delays took place, we do have the environmental impact assessment’. Without active mitigation work however to remedy any impacts which an assessment identified, the value of an environmental impact assessment alone is questionable. Finally, the DfID official expressed their full confidence in the opaque structures established to manage the Air Access project. The key concern that the St Helena Government finds itself in an impossible situation where it is both project manager and project regulator was sadly overlooked. In particular, it is interesting to note that it is widely alleged on island that it is the St Helena Government itself, not DfID, which will be financially liable for the cost of any delays or budget overruns. The prospect that environmental management will therefore genuinely be prioritised by SHG when it is under so much pressure from DfID to deliver the project to time and to budget is limited.  18. Recommendations:  DfID must establish clear and transparent mechanisms to enable independently verifiable oversight of LEMP implementation and the environmental management of the project, preferably through the establishment of a steering group with a clear Terms of Reference and made up of a majority of independent experts who are not employees of SHG or the companies involved in airport construction or environmental management.  9 September 2013 

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Written evidence submitted by Edison Baird

On the 25th March 2013, Ms. Joan Walley MP, Chair of the Environmental Audit Committee, wrote to the then Governor of Anguilla, Mr Alistair Harrison, in part:

Although the environment is a devolved matter, our Committee is keen to explore whether the UK Government is providing enough support to the Overseas Territories and fulfilling its international obligations concerning the environment and biodiversity.

A key part of our evidence gathering will be to seek the views of the territories themselves.

It is against this backdrop that I write to the Environmental Audit Committee to avert a potential environmental disaster in respect of the Road Salt Pond, an important bird area (IBA). The Government of Anguilla intends to approve a salt works project for this pond that would undoubtedly give rise to a host of environmental difficulties.

The proposed Road Bay salt works project will include extensive engineering works that will exclude the inflow of fresh water, the building of walls to subdivide the pond and facilitate the inflow of seawater. I believe that this proposal will cause irreparable damage to the pond, its bird interest and will cause extensive damage to the village of Sandy Ground which is located on a sand bar.

The Road Bay Salt Pond plays a critical role in the flight path of birds from the American east coast on their way to South America when winter sets in. This pond acts as a resting, breathing and feeding area for these migrant and other birds. The salt works project will disrupt and eventually destroy the pond as a way station.

The British Government is fully aware, too, of the weak legal instruments to protect the environment in Anguilla, in general, and the Road Bay Salt Pond, and the Village, in particular.

For example, the Biodiversity and Heritage Act was enacted in 2009. One of its main objectives was to protect wild, and endangered birds and their habitat. This Law, however, affords no legal protection to the Road Bay Salt Pond and its birds as no regulation exists. This Act, to put it bluntly, is toothless.

On the 20th September 2001, in order to provide environmental protection for Anguilla, the UK Government and the Anguilla Government signed the Environment Charter for the Overseas Territories. This is regularly ignored by the Hubert Hughes Government. Several Memorandum of Understandings have been signed in defiance of the Charter which clearly states that Anguilla must ensure that environmental impact assessments are undertaken before approving major projects and while developing our growth management strategies.

It is said that an Environment impact Assessment (EIA) has been done in respect of the Road Bay salt works project. If this is true, it is clear that it has not been discussed with the Anguillan people, especially those living in the village of Sandy Ground, a vulnerable area.

Sandy Ground village is a sand bar that lies between the Road Salt Pond to its east and the sea to its west. The pond is connected to the sea by a canal. In 1999, Hurricane Lenny struck Anguilla. The pond overflowed and caused extensive damage to the sand bar and village. The horror of this event was captured in a flood study done by Hallcrow Water, a British Company. The study was entitled

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Department for International Development Anguilla Drainage Study Final Report, August 2000. The study stated:

If the sand bar is overtopped then a breach will normally form and the rapid release of water from the pond can pose a significant risk to life for any inhabitants living at the position of the breach. The breach channel formed during Lenny (1999) occurred away from residential properties, but there is no guarantee that the inhabitants would be so lucky in the course of the next hurricane.

Despite this obvious threat to the environment and the village of Sandy Ground and its inhabitants, the Chief Minister, the other Ministers and the Parliamentary Secretary show little or no regard for following procedure and rules as they relate to the environment. On the 20th February 2013, the Land Development Control Committee met to discuss the proposed salt works project. Uninvited, the Chief Minister and the Parliamentary Secretary, Mr Hadyn Hughes, barged into the room, disrupted the meeting, making it clear that the salt works project was good for Anguilla and there was no need for an EIA study. They accused certain members of the committee of holding up progress. The meeting became chaotic.

As the Elected Representative of the Road North Constituency in which the Road Salt pond is located, I was shocked when, on the 20th December 2011, in the Anguilla House of Assembly, the said Parliamentary Secretary stated that there was no need for an EIA. He said the salt works project was good for Anguilla. He made use of the following words:

God made seawater, God caused the condensation, and God caused the salt to be formed and people went and take out the salt. So tell me, how is that detriment to the Sandy Ground Salt Pond or the surrounding area? You are not putting any chemicals in it, you are not digging any holes, you are not mining. So where is it, so why is it so important to do environmental impact assessment for the Sandy Ground Salt Pond?

In conclusion, I ask the following of the British Government:

1. Ensure that an authentic EIA study is done of the salt works project. 2. Ensure that it is widely disseminated and discussed with the Anguillan people, especially

those living in the village of Sandy Ground. 3. Ensure that the EIA is reviewed by an independent and reputable company. In this regard, I

hope that the British Government will finance this review.

I am hopeful too, that the British Government will take seriously its international responsibility to protect the environment in Anguilla – a British Overseas Territory.

10 September 2013`

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Further written evidence submitted by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Sustainability in the Overseas Territories Inquiry

1. I am writing to respond to the further written evidence submitted by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF) to the Environmental Audit Committee. This contains a number of factual errors and serious accusations against the former Governor to the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), Ric Todd. This letter addresses the most serious of our concerns and does not cover every issue that we would dispute in the UKOTCF’s supplementary evidence.

S3-4: Priority of the Environment

2. In S3, the UKOTCF states that former Governor, Ric Todd’s description of his role with regards to the environment in TCI is “somewhat misleading”. The description provided by Ric Todd on the Governor’s role in his letter of 17 April 2013 is correct. The TCI Government has constitutional responsibility for the environment in TCI. The UK’s objective during the period of Interim Administration, as set out in the Written Ministerial Statement of 9 December 2010, was to make sufficient changes and reforms to permit the restoration of self government. The Interim Administration faced a huge number of urgent, competing demands across the board when it inherited the chaotic situation left by the previous TCI Government. Its immediate priorities were to restore public finances and procedures; update laws and institutions; build the economy; run effective and transparent Government; and to ensure no future repeat of the mistakes of the past. The focus of the Interim Administration was rightly on preventing the TCI Government going bankrupt and getting TCI on the path for elections to take place. The Interim Administration took very seriously its environmental responsibilities and ensured that developments took full account of environmental concerns.

S5: Conservation Fund

3. In S5, the UKOTCF states that the then Governor “unilaterally cancelled the Conservation Fund.... without consultation with the Governor’s environmental officials or the public” and in an act which was “not widely announced”. The Conservation Fund was not a fund but a hypothecation of taxes. This hypothecation of taxes was removed as part of the rationalisation of public finances and incorporated into the Consolidated Fund to permit proper and transparent management of taxpayer’s money. The rationalisation of public finances was a major topic of debate and consultation over a long period of time on TCI. The rationalisation was an essential part of bringing public finances into order and starting to pay down the government’s unsustainable level of debt.

S8: Amendment to Regulations on Marine Mammals

4. The UKOTCF claims in S8 that the then Governor amended the previously existing fisheries law to allow the keeping of marine mammals in captivity (thereby enabling the

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establishment of dolphinaria) as: a “personal initiative”....“without consultation” (in particular of the TCI Department of Environment and Maritime Affairs, DEMA); and “in breach of the Environment Charter”.

5. The TCI Supreme Court dismissed on 17 September 2013 a claim brought by the Turks and Caicos Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (TSPCA), the Turks and Caicos Reef Fund, PRIDE Ltd and the Providenciales Chamber of Commerce, for judicial review of the decision to amend the regulations on marine mammals. Judge Ramsay Hale dismissed the allegation that this decision was taken without proper consultation, as well as the claim that the decision should have been left to an elected Government. She ruled that “the ordinance does not give special protection to any marine mammal species, nor was it made for any such purpose”.

6. I attach a copy of the court ruling and news release which provide further information on

this issue.

S10-12: Deep Dredging

7. UKOTCF makes the serious allegation at S11 that then Governor Todd “personally asked how to get around the legislation to allow dredging at Leeward” and “raised the possibility of removing some areas from the protected area or changing the protected area law”. UKOTCF had failed to provide any substantiation for this allegation. The application to carry out dredging in the Leeward Channel was considered and refused by the elected TCI Government under the normal planning process.

8. UKOTCF state in S12 that changes to the National Parks Ordinance and a review of

protected areas originate from “decisions taken in disregard of competent technical advice during the period of direct rule by HMG”. Both issues were considered by the TCI Government through the normal process. Links to the post Cabinet press releases, where these issues were discussed, can be found below.

https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/summary-of-cabinet-meeting-actions-on-21-august-2013

https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/turks-and-caicos-islands-cabinet-update-and-actions--3 

Peter Hayes Director, Overseas Territories

9 October 2013

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Further written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would like to take this opportunity to provide supplementary information to the Committee on UK treaty practice and the extension of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to the UK Overseas Territories (OTs). We recognise that this is a complex area which is open to differing views and interpretations. I hope this letter will provide you with a steer on the UK Governments position on this matter.

In relation to MEAs, the UK is ultimately responsible for its Overseas Territories where it comes to the performance of treaty obligations extended to them. This is exemplified by the care exercised to ensure that treaty rights and obligations can be fully implemented in the OTs both in terms of political commitment, and underpinned where necessary by adequate implementing legislation. The Ministry of Justice, the FCO’s Overseas Territories Department and other Government Departments (where appropriate) consult with the governments of the OTs before the UK consents to be bound by new treaties. If it is not appropriate or possible to include an OT within the territorial scope of the UK’s ratification at the time of ratification, the UK works with the OTs to ensure that they are fully compliant with the treaty’s obligations before subsequently extending the treaty to the OT.

It is important to distinguish between responsibility for the performance of treaty obligations and responsibility for determining how those obligations are met. It is for each OT to decide for itself, in accordance with its own legal and constitutional arrangements, the appropriate system or measures to put in place to meet the obligations under treaties that have been extended to it. The UK Government can and will assist OTs in determining whether the measures proposed are sufficient to meet the obligations but will not impose a particular system or measures on OTs.

It is the UK’s consistent practice (and has been for several decades) when consenting to be bound by treaties by ratification, accession or other means, to clearly indicate at that time, whether ratification of the treaty applies only to the metropolitan territory (the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”), or whether it further includes a specified Overseas Territory or Territories. Reference in a ratification instrument to “the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” in this context does not include the Crown Dependencies (Bailiwicks of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man) and/or the Overseas Territories.

Article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to which the UK is a Party, states as follows; “Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory”. The UK’s practice in this regard has established a “different intention” to the general provision set out in the VCLT. This is described in paragraph 7 of the “Memorandum on Application” which is available on the .gov website.

With specific reference to the current status of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted at Aarhus on 25 June 1998 (“Aarhus Convention”), the answer provided by Mr Simmonds to the PQ tabled by Dr Offord (2 July 2013: Column 591W), is entirely correct. The UK’s ratification of the Aarhus Convention did not make any reference to the Overseas Territories or the Crown Dependencies. Consistent with the UK’s treaty practice therefore,

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the Aarhus Convention currently applies to the metropolitan territory, i.e. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but not the OTs. The information supplied by the United Nations as depositary which is referenced in the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum’s (UKOTCF) further written evidence, is not inconsistent with this fact; had the UK included any OT in its ratification instrument, this would be reflected in the Notes appended to the UN’s own status list for the Convention.

It is our view that the electronic map referenced in the UKOTCF’s further written evidence does not clearly indicate that the UK’s OTs are excluded from the UK’s ratification of the Aarhus Convention. This is an issue that we will raise with the UN publisher responsible.

3 December 2013

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