survive, reproduce, and be moral: foot and casebeer’s naturalized ethics show that evolutionary...

7/28/2019 Survive, Reproduce, and be Moral: Foot and Casebeers Naturalized Ethics Show that Evolutionary Ends are Compatible with Morality

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Survive, Reproduce, and be Moral:

Foot and Casebeers Naturalized Ethics Show that Evolutionary Ends are Compatible with

Morality

A thesis presented to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts

Alexa Kovachevich

Advised by

Erik Wielenberg

DePauw University

May 2012


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Philippa Foot and William Casebeer believe Hume and Moore were wrong: ethical facts

do not belong to a mysterious and unrelated category separate from other facts; instead, Foot and

Casebeer believe moral facts simply are natural facts. In Natural Goodness , Foot closes the

supposed gap between our individual moral judgments and the grounds we have for those

judgments, arguing against antirealist subjectivist positions that view moral facts as action -

guiding, and different from natural facts (Foot 9). She believes knowing we have a reason to do

something is reason enough for action, and that the things we have reason to do are objectively

grounded in how our life-form operates. In Natural Ethical Facts , Casebeer argues that all our

beliefs are revisable in light of experience; there are no analytic truths for values to be reducedto. Thus, he also closes the gap that makes facts about value different from other kinds of facts.

Casebeer imagines that uniting the natural with the normative will enrich both our understanding

of moral theory and biological science. While Foot and Casebeer have slightly different goals in

mind, they both believe that we enhance our understanding of morality when we view moral

facts as natural facts.

Uniting the moral and the natural is often thought to be problematic because our

commonplace ethical values seem to clash with a biological view of human nature. Evolution by

natural selection is considered an unforgiving process that pushes individuals into ruthless

competition with each other. Selfishness and acting only for ones own benefit are hallmark

attributes that natural selection is thought to ascribe to the human character. The worry is

something like How could a moral system be established with organisms whose only goal i s

getting as many copies of their genes into the next generation as possible? A system of morality

based on selfish egoists does not seem like a moral theory at all. Thus both Foot and Casebeer

struggle to create a system of value that is not based on only evolutionary ends such as gene


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propagation. Foots strategy is to deny an evolutionary story and instead establish morality as an

essential characteristic, or norm, of a good human life. Being moral is part of what it is to be

human and live well as a human being, she argues. While Foot avoids tying her norms to

evolutionary ends, she is not able to show that the norms she views as essential are connected to

anything but arbitrary statistical averages of how species actually exist. Casebeer is able to avoid

Foots pitfall and establish an account where many functions make up a properly functioning

human. His functions are neither subjective nor based on pure evolutionary ends. However, his

view prescribes that how we should be, that is, the functions that we should have, relate very

specifically to our recent evolutionary ancestors. Because our modern moral values do notalways coincide with our evolutionary ancestors, Casebeers view is flawed. I believe if

evolutionary ends are understood in the proper way, it is not necessary to avoid them. Uniting

ethics and evolution looks a lot less scary when we realize acts deemed as biologically self-

interested are not always psychologically self-interested. I argue that we can use evolutionary

ends such as survival and reproduction to form a moral system that looks much like the one we

have now.

Updating Aristotle

Aristotles virtue theory, which he outlines in the Nicomachean Ethics , provides the basis

for Foot and Casebeers views. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle sets out to determine what

the good consists of, what our actions should aim for. He calls this good eudaimonia and

conceives of it as human happiness, flourishing, or the state that characterizes the well-lived life

(Crisp xiii). Aristotle believes we may understand eudaimonia if we know the characteristic

function of human beings. Just as the goodness of a flute player can be assessed because he has


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conceive of what our human essence or function is: where Foot conceives of natural norms,

Casebeer discusses proper function as relating to our recent evolutionary history.

Foots Natural Norms

Foots view grounds morality in natural evaluations. She believes that moral judgments

are another category of evaluations just like aesthetic or practical assessments, except that moral

judgments happen to deal with human behavior (Foot 3). Rather than moral goodness being

some overarching universal ideal, Foot believes that we should assess human moral goodness

like we would the goodness of a birds beak or dogs bark. She sees symmetry in the basiclogical structure between the judgments we make of animals and their characteristics and

judgments of human action (27). This symmetry in evaluation stems from Foots idea that a

certain form of intrinsic value, which she calls natural goodness , exists in all living things.

Natural goodness exists outside of the value that humans ascribe to things (e.g. we value things

that are useful), as Foot explains: [F]eatures of plants and animals have what one might call an

autonomous, intrinsic, or as I shall say natural goodness (26). Natural goodness depends

not on any human perspective but on the relation of an individual organism to the species, or

life form to which they belong (27).

Foot believes the natural goodness of living things corresponds to certain set of natural

norms that an organism of that type should have. Her idea stems from the work of Michael

Thompson, who argues that describing something as a living thing, e.g. identifying an organism

by s aying that is a rabbit implicitly places the organism within its life form (28). By saying

that it is a rabbit, we are positing certain norms that an organism must meet if it is to be a

rabbit, e.g. that rabbit can hop, and we use these norms to judge if it is a good representation of a


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are related to essential features of the organism, such as its development, self-maintenance, and

reproduction. Foot explains using birds: a peacocks bright tail, due to its function in the self-

maintenance and reproduction of the peacock, creates a natural norm; peacocks ought to have

bright tails for survival and reproduction. However, a random blue spot on the head of a blue tit,

which does not affect its life, does not establish a norm (30). Since the peacocks characteristic

tail affects its survival and reproduction, we can say that a peacock with a dull tail is defective,

whereas a blue tit with a blue spot (although other blue tits do not have this spot) is not defective

as t he spot does not play a part in the life of the blue tit (30). It is not just the fact that most

peacocks have brightly colored tails that make the tail a natural norm for peacocks, but the factthat peacocks need bright tails for self-maintenance and reproduction (33).

Foot makes it clear that she does not believe her norms serve as end goals for the

organisms (31). Because a peacock should have a bright tail for survival and reproduction, that

does not mean its purpose is to have a bright tail for surv ival and reproduction. Organisms

norms are not their ends. With her natural norms Foot only aims to point out behaviors and

attributes that organisms, like peacocks, have that are essential to how they live. By attributing a

biological element to norms, she wants clarify that she is not saying that organisms should act in

a way that gives them the greatest opportunity to replicate their genes (32). The behaviors and

attributes that natural norms describe have to relate to what an organism does in its life cycle, but

it is not as if the organism should act only in a way that allows it to replicate its genes (32).

Foot maintains that the same patterns of natural normativity found in animals and other

living organisms are also found in humans (38). She believes that the same goodness attributed

to other living organisms can be attributed to humans: [T]here is no change in the meaning of

good between the word as it appears in good roots and as it appears in good dispositions of


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the human will (39). Whi le she admits that goodness will be more complicated for humans

because survival is something more complex for us, she believes that it is still possible to come

up with a general account of human natural norms (43). By starting with the concept of human

deprivation, Foot believes that we can come up with the necessities of human natural goodness,

such as needing the mental capacity for language, or needing the power of an imagination (43).

Without these things humans would survive, but would not have all the natural goods that

humans should have; in other words, without these capacities we would be deprived (43). Part of

human natural goodness is living cooperatively (44). Thus, Foot believes that in order to not be

defective, we must play our part in socie ty just like other animals do: As some species of animals need a lookout, or as herds of elephants need an old she-elephant to lead them to a

watering hole, so human societies need leaders, explorers, and artists. Failure to perform a

special role can her e be a defect in a man or woman (44). Along the same lines, Foot argues that

natural goodness for humans involves needing love and friendship, and also needing codes of

conduct (44). Foot, therefore, believes needing a system of morality for development , self-

maintenance, reproduction, etc. of human beings is a norm for humans. Part of the human life

form, and a part which affects our life cycle, is our ability to behave in a certain way, such as

refraining from murder (52). Thus, Foot views moral behavior as an essential part of what it is to

be a member of the human life form.

Furthermore, Foot believes we would care about being moral because we are rational

creatures (56). Like Aristotle, Foot believes what separates humans from other animals is our

ability to reason (52). As rational creatures we not only have the ability to know that we should

do something, but we are able to see why we should perform one action over another (56).

Unlike other animals, we can see the good and choose the good know ing that it is good (56).


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Foot believes that human rationality is best understood as practical rationality, because it is

constrained by how our life form operates (62). What is rational for us to do aligns with human

natural goodness. Thus, being practically rational is both part of what it is to be human, and

everything that is naturally good for a human to do is also practically rational (63). Since being

virtuous is a natural human good, it is also part of our practical rationality to act virtuously (63).

Acting morally is both part of what it is to be human and, since we are rational, knowing that

acting morally is part of what it is to be a human, is what motivates us to act rationally (62). In

Foots view we should be motivated to act virtuously becau se we realize it will allow us to live

good human lives that are not deprived.

Casebeer and Proper Functioning

Casebeers view unites Aristotles virtue theory with modern biological science.

Casebeer interprets the human aim, or eudaimonia, to be proper functioning (Casebeer 43). He

imagines that we have many interworking parts that contribute to our overall state of proper

functioning. If all our parts are working, then we are functioning properly as an organism (50).

Our different parts, or separate functions, that make up our overall state of proper functioning

include our eyes seeing well, our heart pumping blood properly, and acting with the correct

moral virtues. Casebeer, therefore, establishes a purely naturalistic account of morality where the

correct moral virtues to possess and act in accordance with relate entirely to those that will allow

us to function properly (113). Cooperating well with others is just like our heart pumping blood

well; they both are part of proper functioning, which puts moral virtues on the same level as

working organs.


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the concept that our ultimate function is to reproduce, and in an immediate view of functions the

function of something can be whatever you want it to be (52). Casebeer uses human eyes as an

example: while eyes may contribute to reproduction, their etiological function is to see and act as

light receptors (52). Thus, Casebeer situates the functions of our individual parts (which make up

our holistic proper functioning) so that they relate to survival and reproduction, but are not

defined just by how they contribute to survival and reproduction they encompass more than

distal ends. In other words, the parts that comprise us function in a way that is not exclusively

related to our gene propagation.

In order to understand the etiological functions in relation to our holistic proper functioning, that is, in order to understand how our eyes should see, or how we should interact

with others, we must look to our recent evolutionary history. Since these parts make up proper

functioning as a whole, and since proper functioning relates to our recent evolutionary history,

we must look to the recent past to evaluate our individual functions. Our eyes function is to see,

and seeing well relates to how Homo sapiens saw when we evolved (141). Another example may

be that our function is live with others, and living well with others relates to how we lived in

small groups when we were evolving. Casebeer provides an example of a man named John to

illustrate his idea of proper functioning: because of his job, John moves every few years to a

different state; he must decide if he should spend his time making many shallow friends, or if he

should try to make a few close friends that will remain his friends despite relocation (141).

According to Casebeer, in order to solve this dilemma about what John should do, we must look

at what will allow John to function properly, as Casebe er describes, [W]e would establish the

modern- history function of some biological and mental capacities that mediate sociability (141).

One of our individual functions relates to friendships and being social, and how we acted in our


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recent past shows how John should answer his friendship dilemma. Casebeer notes evidence

from archaeology and evolutionary psychology that points to the fact that in our recent past, we

were in contact with a small group of close relatives and kin (141). Thus, we had a small social

world, which probably enabled us to develop deep friendships (141). Due to this fact, our

function will be best fulfilled by a few deep relationships, and John should focus on a smaller

number of deep relationships rather than many shallow ones (141).

Casebeers conception of how we should be, or what our proper function is, is structured

but not completely fixed. Thus he allows that John may be the type of person who does not need

extremely deep interactions. Casebeer works with what he calls a so ft-essentialist view of human nature (151). He does not believe there is only one way humans are meant to be, but does

believe that the functions we should have are constrained by how we evolved (140). Casebeer

explains that our essential nature will constrain the space of possible functions so that there is

only so much variation that can possibly occur (47). He imagines that the majority of humans

would have functions that were quite similar: [M]odern -history proper functions for human

beings as a gro up may overlap dramatically among conspecifics butnot be exactly the same

across all members of our species (151). Casebeer admits that his theory allows for some

variation in what it means to function properly among human beings, but argues that the

variability will not be radical or widespread (153). Our evolutionary history will confine the

variation of what it is to function as a human being. Thus, John most likely needs a significant

friend, if not several deep relationships.

Because his view of human nature is so closely linked with evolution, Casebeer provides

a way that his system of natural ethics is not entirely egoistic. Casebeer argues that most of our

functions are only fulfilled by working closely with others (60). Casebeer explains that because


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environments place different demands on organisms (Casebeer 40). Because he views morals as

functions that fulfill proper function, and proper function relates to how we evolved, it follows

that the subtly different environments we live in would have created slightly different notions of

proper function (Casebeer 153). Thus, depending on the particular environment, we will have to

use different functional virtues to best flourish in that specific environment (Casebeer 47). While

there will be room for variation, the functions will remain objective because they have to do with

the organisms relation to the environment rather than what the organism wants to do. The

variation stems from how the organism best interacts with its environment, which is not

subjective, but rather is defined by Casebeers ob jective etiological approach to function, or howour recent ancestors lived (40). Furthermore, Casebeer believes that the variation will not be so

radical as to destroy the possibility of a shared moral system. He believes that most of our

functions will overlap, at least within a species. Casebeer sees variation in proper functioning as

a better explanation for variation in morality because this is what we should expect given the

non- fixed nature of experience and the variability of life as lived (Caseb eer 40). Because our

moral functions will respond to environmental differences, our morals have the possibility to be

slightly different.

Foots natural norms share a similar relationship to the environment as Casebeers

functions, and while Foot does not challenge Mackie directly, her sketch of natural norms

provides a rebuttal to Mackies worry. When first describing the norms, Foot points out that they

have a relative stability, (Foot 29). She notes that the norms are completely time sensitive:

Theytell how a kind of plant or animal, considered at a particular time, and in its natural

habitat, develops, (Foot 29). Foot, therefore, believes that norms, including norms about

morality, are relative to a particular organism at a particular time and place. However, because


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these norms relate to the life form of the individual, they are not subjectively based. She goes

on to say that norms are relative to an organisms habitat: [T]he way a life form

functionscomes about in a species of a certain conform ation, belonging in a certain kind of

habitat (Foot 33). Foot sees norms as representative of a particular instance, or snapshot, of an

organism in relation to its place in time, evolutionary history, and habitat. While she never

explicitly says that different norms may exist at the same time for the same life form, her

commitment to the norms relativity in relation to time and habitat speaks to this idea.

Furthermore, like Casebeer, it is clear that Foot believes variation would not preclude a general

set of norms because, while there may be different ways to fulfill human natural goodness, Footmaintains that there are certain general things humans must have to live good human lives (40).

Foot and Casebeer are also able to handle the argument from queerness because they

ground ethics in natural facts. Casebeer views moral facts as functional facts about how we

should interact with our environment (48). There is no such thing as uniquely moral skills

because they are learned and modified in the same way as skills about health, and skills about

finding food (Casebeer 113). Moral facts are not epistemologically queer because Casebeer

believes moral knowledge may be gained in a similar way to scientific knowledge (48). Repeated

interactions with our environment will allow us to learn how to behave in accordance with virtue

so that we may function properly (84). Morals are also not metaphysically queer in that they do

not have a self-motivating property. As Casebeer explains, his functional Aristotelian approach

allows motivation to stem not from the function itself, but from the environment: Functions

obtain between organisms and the environment, and so the motivational aspect of a value is not

to be found in the environmentbut rather within the organism (48). In other words, moral

facts are not strange because they stem from the natural environment and our relation to it.


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explicit principles 2. Both views share something like the idea that we should be guided to act in

way that allows us to live successfully as humans, or as Casebeer puts it, to function properly.

How we are, or how our ancestors were, determines how we should be.

Foots view in particular is especially successful i n its ability to account for motivation to

act virtuously. While many ethical theories can establish a moral code humans may have, it is

another problem to describe why people would care about following such a code. With her

concept of practical rationality, Foot gives humans a reason to want to act virtuously because it

is rational. A particular benefit of Casebeers view would be its ability to unify areas of human

knowledge that are often thought to be incompatible. His view would allow us to understandethics from a scientific perspective, and even to study morality as a science. Rather than viewing

humans as immoral and selfish from a biological perspective, Casebeers view would allow us to

incorporate our ethical beliefs into a scientific picture of ourselves.

Problems with the Views

There are many benefits to taking an Aristotelian approach to naturalized ethics, and

Casebeer s and Foots theories present particularly successful versions of such an approach.

However, both Foot and Casebeer run into trouble when they attempt to unite Aristotle with

modern biology. Both Foot and Casebeers views rely on the Aristotelian concept that organisms

have something essential or characteristic about them, which defines their function. Foot believes

that organisms have a set of norms that relate to their characteristic life form, and Casebeer

purports that organisms have functions that relate to how their recent ancestors lived. Each

2 Information about general worries for virtue theories from:Hursthouse, Rosalind. Virtue Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 8 March 2012.

Stanford University. Web. 1 April 2012.


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its survival or reproduction, her norms are consequently arbitrarily based on statistical averages.

The have no other foundation other than the way the organism currently exists. Casebeer, on the

other hand, includes evolutionary goals in his theory, and is able to pick up where Foot leaves

off. He believes functions will be determined by an organisms recent evolutionary history. Thus,

the functions are not based on the ultimate end goals of evolution but more immediate responses

to the environment. While his etiological approach to function saves him from claiming

evolutionary ends, his view falters because our moral system today does not match how our

recent ancestors lived, and thus our evolutionary past does not guarantee a mutualistic morality.

Foots omission of an evolutionary story for her norms makes them arbitrarily based onaverages, while Casebeers inclusion of an evolutionary story forces him into a system of

morality that is extremely different from the ones that we actually have.

Foots Averages

Foots task with her norms is to ground them objectively in the natural so that they

consist of more than desires, but she must also not allow them to be trapped by evolutionary

ends. Her norms must relate to something outside the individual organism, but they cannot be

said to relate entirely to supporting reproductive success. Trying to meet both these requirements

leaves Foots norms empty, and shows that she has no ground for them other than how

organisms typically are, which is ethicall y insignificant. Foots norms, therefore, are problematic

because they seem to be only related to averages (what organisms typically do) rather than what

they actually should do.

Foot is careful to relate her norms to evolution, but she makes it explicit that her norms

do not support evolution only, or reproductive success only. In fact, her norms are not required to


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support the success of the organism at all. When describing natural norms, Foot carefully

modifies Michael Thompsons norms to include a rela tion to the life cycle of the organism (Foot

30). Recall Foots blue tit example: a spot on a blue tits head does not create a natural norm

because it does not relate to the birds self -maintenance or reproduction (30). In a more direct

statement, Foot declares that norms are determined by their relation ends, which seem like

evolutionary ends: The way an individual should be is determined by what is needed for

development, self- maintenance, and reproduction (33). However, she makes it clear that pure

evolutionary ends are not what she has in mind. Foot explains that by saying a peacock should

use its bright tail to attract mates for reproduction, she is not subsequently saying that a peacocks purpose is to reproduce when he uses his bright tail to attr act mates (31). Similarly,

when a mother cares for her children, an action that directly benefits her reproductive success,

we cannot say that her purpose in caring is reproductive success.

Foot wants to separate the actions relation to survival and repr oduction from the

organisms goal in performing the action. While this is a noble goal, her norms imply that part of

what it is to be a certain organism is to attempt to fulfill the norms, and part of fulfilling the

norms relates to survival and reproduction. Thus, Foot ends up implying the very goal that she

wishes to avoid an organism must exercise its norms for survival and reproduction. Foot

creates a connection between the norm and the function the norm plays in the life of the

organism. Take the peacock example that Foot uses. An extension of her example might read:

Part of what it is to be a peacock is to use bright tails to attract mates. Because

bright tails contribute to the self-maintenance and reproduction of peacocks,

peacocks should have bright tails in order be successful peacocks. A peacock with

a dull tail is defective. A good peacock has a bright tail.


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Foot is not just making an observation that peacocks have this attribute of using their tails to

attract mates for reproduction. Instead, she says that peacocks need to have this property of using

their tails to attract mates for reproduction. When Foot declares that peacocks need to have their

tails to attract mates for reproduction, she implies support for not just the tail, but the act of using

the tail in a particular way. She implies that having the tail is not the only part of the norm, but

having the tail for reproduction is also part of the natural norm. If a peacock needs a tail for

reproduction, then, it seems part of what it is to be a peacock is to at least try to reproduce using

the tail. A similar example is that of a deer that runs fast. From Foots view, it is not true that

because deer tend to be able to run fast, that they should run fast. Foot believes that it is the factthat deer need to be fast for survival that means they should run fast. Thus, part of what it is to be

a deer is to run fast for survival, or at least to try. Foots norms are more than just descriptions of

behaviors and characteristics that relate to an organisms life form. Although she tries to stay

away from the connection, her norms create expectations about how an organism should behave

to support its survival and reproduction.

Without intending to, Foot attaches survival and reproduction to her norms. Because she

also declares that the success of an organism in survival and reproduction is unimportant, her

norms have no foundation. She explicitly denies the thing her norms are based on, and, therefore,

the only other explanation is that they are based arbitrarily on statistical averages of the

characteristics that the majority of organisms have. In chapter three Foot declares that the

success of the organism does not matter to the norms. She says that the deer does not have to

survive for it to count as good. For example, it could be shot by a hunter while running away. As

long as it is running quickly, it still counts as a good deer (42). In order to be a good deer, its

success does not matter; it only has to have been a fast deer in relation to the deer life form. She


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the norms are related to a larger matter. However, because she tries to argue that success does

not matter, she contradicts herself. If success does not matter, why does it matter that organisms

do certain things in certain ways? If surviving successfully does not matter, why must the deer be

a fast deer (if his quickness is a function of his survival)? The only answer Foot can give is that

most deer are fast; however, this fact is based on statistical average and is ethically irrelevant.

This same flaw is present in Foots treatment of human norms. For example, a human

norm may be that humans should be omnivores for survival. Eating both plants and other animals

is crucial to our survival as there are certain proteins we get from meat. Being an omnivore in

order to get the proper nutrients to survive is part of what a human is, one could say, just ashaving a bright tail for reproduction is part of what it is to be a peacock. Nevertheless, some

humans make the choice not to eat meat. Foot has to say that these humans are defective humans.

Even if vegetarians get the same nutrition from supplements as meat eaters do from meat,

vegetarians are defective humans, since being an omnivore is part of what a human is, what a

human ought to be. All this shows again is that Foots natural norms are based on what the

majority does, or what is average.

Practical rationality comes into play when dealing with humans in Foots view, and must

be taken into account in the vegetarian example, as it complicates the picture I just drew. Foot

might object that vegetarians act against practical rationality. Being rational is what separates

humans from other animals Foot explains, because we can see something is good and choose it

knowing it is good (55). We can do something and understand why we are doing it. Our

rationality is constrained by our natural norms, such as needing to eat meat. Since we know we

should eat meat, that knowledge should give us motivation to eat meat. However, it is difficult to

claim that in this case humans are acting against practical rationality even if there is a natural


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norm related to eating meat. Because we have practical rationality, we can create our own

evaluations, as Brook Sadler points out in her review of Foots Natural Goodness . Because

humans are practically rational, we are both the evaluators of our norms and the ones being

evaluated (Sadler 3). Sadler believes this allows us to choose what to value. Her example

addresses the deaf. That humans should hear to help them survive and reproduce may be a

natural norm for human, as humans need to hear in order to live lives that are not deprived.

Sadler resists this idea. For humans, she says, there is no general account of norms that can be

provided. There is no such thing as a set of species -given norms for humans (Sadler 7). Sadler

argues that we create the norms; we are not created or restricted by them. Thus, humans canvalue not-hearing, for example. Sadler notes the existence of a debate in the deaf community

about whether or not to use hearing aids to fix or correct hearing to support this view.

Additionally, Sadler argues that nothing will be a universal defect: Humans are so remarkably

resilient, capable of valuing so many different ways of living, that most alleged defects will be

found by some to be rich (Sadler 8). Sadler hits on an important point from the beginning of

Foots argument. Foot begins with Thompsons idea that when we say something is an organism,

we place it in a normative way within its species. Inherent in Thompsons remark is that humans

are the evaluators. As Sadler says, if we are the evaluators, an implication of practical rationality

is that, to a certain extent, we can value what we want to. Thus, in the end, Foot fails to provide

an explanation of where natural norms come from. We are left with only statistical averages or

individual choice, both of which are ethically irrelevant, and a substandard ground for objective

morality.

In trying to avoid attaching her norms to only evolutionary goals, while still grounding

them so they are not completely subjective, Foot creates a picture where natural norms contain


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function is to see; however, this function stems from survival and reproduction in the end.

Casebeer does not think it is useful to focus on the end function; I argue, though, that the end

function is the one actual function of eyes to see for survival and reproduction. To say the eyes

function is to see is to leave off the reason they see. While it is not irrational to speak like this,

this thinking just disregards part of the explanation. Casebeers argument for leaving off end

functions is that it is not very fruitful or useful, and would be a bad analysis of any particular

character -driven function (52). This reasoning does not constitute a good argument for why we

should ignore end functions other than that the etiological concept of function allows Casebeers

moral theory to work. The debate about function is complicated, and although I suspectetiological functions may collapse into functions about reproduction, I admit in some sense it

does seem that we really have these intermediate etiological functions. Although a full-fledged

discussion of proper function remains beyond the scope of this work, if our only true biological

function is gene propagation, it will be problematic for Casebeers view. Later I will argue that

survival and reproduction, if understood in the proper way, will get us close to a moral theory we

could accept.

Nevertheless, independent of the debate about proper function, other problems remain for

Casebeers view. The first major problem with Casebeers view is that he relates proper

functioning to our recent evolutionary ancestors but does not take into account that our modern

moral system requires different behavior than how proper function would have us behave. In

Casebeers view, how we should function properly as human beings is defined by how our recent

evolutionary ancestors lived, and what individual functions they had (Casebeer 52). Recall

Casebeers example of John, the man who moves around constantly for work and must decide

whether to cultivate a few long-term relationships or many shallow ones (141). To answer this


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example of the homeless man that you may or may not choose to help. Choosing to ignore the

man negatively affects your ability to function properly because it makes you less empathetic

and less likely to be able to enter into deep relationships in the future (63). On the other hand, it

is not part of your proper functioning that you should give the man everything you own (64). The

correct response is somewhere in between. In this example, your proper functioning does line up

with the proper functioning of the homeless man, but it is easy to come up with examples where

individual functions clash with the functions of those around you. Consider a modified John

example. Say John has the opportunity to take a new position that will allow him to stop moving

around so much for work. The position that will keep him stationary is not something that hewants to do. John is much better off and happier in the old position. John also has a family that

he continually has to uproot; his kids have to find new friends, etc. In this situation what would

satisfy Johns proper functioning is keeping his old job; however, what would satisfy his

familys proper functioning would be to take the new position. In this case what is best for John

is not best for others, as Casebeer describes. Other examples like this abound, which points to the

fact that individual proper function does not coincide with everyone elses proper function.

Casebeers theory cannot unite individual egoistic proper function with the type of mutualistic

moral system we want.

In Casebeers view our proper functioning relates directly to what our evolutionary

ancestors did; however, it is clear that the system of morality we could derive from this concept

is not similar to the one we want. Furthermore, as Joyce argues, proper functioning relates to a

failure to meet your needs, not necessarily to moral rights and wrongs. La stly, Casebeers

conception that what is good for our proper functioning is good for everyones is flawed. While


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his view may succeed in incorporating evolution, the picture of morality he creates is

unsatisfactory.

Evolutionary End Goals and the Prospect for Morality

In naturalizing ethics, Foot and Casebeer must decide how to incorporate evolution,

which is commonly thought of as immoral or amoral, into a system of objective morality. This

problem arises not only with Foot and Casebeers neo -Aristotelian theories, but exists generally

for any system of realist ethics that includes evolution. Survival of the fittest is the idea most

commonly associated with natural selection, and even those trained in evolutionary biologycommonly speak of natural selection as a process that produces selfish organisms. Thus in order

to naturalized ethics Foot and Casebeer attempt to deny that their theories relate directly to the

scary end goal of evolution: gene propagation. If their moral theories somehow rested on

organisms only goal being gene propagation it is difficult to see how such a system would be

moral at all.

However the end goal of evolution is only threatening to morality if it is misunderstood.

Saying organisms have an evolutionary end does not mean the same thing as saying gene

propagation is their only goal, and it also does not make gene propagation a conscious goal.

Worries about the ability to incorporate evolution into ethical theories stem from a mistake of

assigning value to a process that is inherently devoid of value. Evolution is actually neutral in

value, and ethical worries that arise from evolution wrongly join the biological concept of self -

interest with a psychological motivation to be self -interested. If understood in the correct way, I

believe the end goal of evolution in not incompatible with morality at all. While Foot and

Casebeer have trouble because they try to avoid them, I believe evolutionary ends do not need to


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be avoided. A system or morality that takes into account our evolutionary ends is similar to the

moral system we have today.

There is no goal in evolution, but biologists tend to view organisms as gene -machines,

because the process of natural selection works on genetic material in such a way that the material

that is able to make the most copies of itself, is the material that is most likely to survive in the

next generation. While it is not completely inaccurate to see humans as working to propagate our

genes, the gene machine concept is often misunderstood and misused. Evolution by natural

selection does not actually assign any value, immoral or otherwise to us. While it is

commonplace to animate genes and speak of them as copying themselves or attribute propertiesto them like selfishness, these must only be s een as devices used to help us understand a

thoroughly neutral process. Natural selection is merely a process of replication and to see this

clearly I think it is most helpful to think of natural selection in its most basic form, that of the

original RNA r eplicators that scientists theorize were at the start of natural selection. In a

primordial soup of floating RNA proteins, some proteins linked together in chains. At some point

a chain formed that was able to replicate itself perhaps because its parts had affinities for parts of

the same type (Dawkins 15). As the soup filled with copies of the original replicator mistakes

must have been made so that different version of the replicator existed (14). Replicators that held

together in their chains for the longest amount of time would have grown in numbers in the soup

because they would have had more time to replicate (17). Additionally, other characteristics such

as frequency of replication would have allowed certain replicators to grow in numbers (17). This

sort of process, where factors such as longevity and fecundity allow some replicators to be

greater in number is natural selection. Stripped of context it is clear to see that it is a process of

pure replication, devoid of value. A neutral process of replication is the sort of process biologists


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evolutionarily advantageous to rape this does not mean much to us, because it is actually

disadvantageous for humans to be motivated by the idea that rape will allow us to get our genes

into the next generation. Thus our lack of psychological motivation to rape, or our moral belief

that it is wrong, exists because it actually is disadvantageous for us because of the sort of

organisms we are and the environment we live in. If our psychological motivation corresponded

directly to what was evolutionary advantageous it would land us in prison. Because no human is

isolated and there are repercussions for our actions, it is actually not advantageous to be

psychologically motivated by biological self-interest, and thus it is not actually advantageous for

us to rape in the social context in which we live. Rape is a dramatic example, but it illustratesthat a moral system based on evolutionary ends produces morals similar to those we think we

have today.

Some moral realists may object to the moral system I propose because in my system our

psychological motivations, what we think of as morals stem from evolution. However what my

view shows is that we can have a robust moral system stemming from evolution and facts about

the environment that is not selfish. While our psychological motivations will often help us

perpetuate our genes I do not believe it sullies our morals. In my view it actually is morally

wrong to rape because as humans living in the environment we live in it is disadvantageous to

rape. Our moral system exists outside of us even though it depends on evolutionary facts about

us.

Conclusion

Grounding moral facts in natural facts, Philippa Foot and William Casebeer update

Aristotelian virtue theory. Their views successfully deal with the common moral problems of


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queerness and relativity. Foot establishes a system of moral norms about how we should live that

correspond to the way our human life form is. In an effort not to tie her norms directly to

reproductive success, she ends up grounding her norms only in ethically irrelevant statistical

averages. Casebeers functional account of ethics that bases what we should do on our recent

evolutionary ancestors succeeds in avoiding both evolutionary ends and statistical averages.

However because he ties his view to our recent past, he is forced into a picture of morality that is

drastically different than the one we have today. I argue that evolution is commonly

misunderstood as immoral. When we view ends in their proper place, that is, not as conscious

ultimate goals, we can achieve a picture of morality that is similar to the one we have today. Themoral system I imagine is based on the fact that we are social creatures and that what is

biologically advantageous for us to do is usually not related to psychological self-interest. More

often, what is biologically advantageous is best achieved by non-self-interested psychological

motives.


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survive, reproduce, and be moral: foot and casebeer’s naturalized ethics show that evolutionary...

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