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TRANSCRIPT
Surveillance: The Public Health Version of CSI
March 2006 Connie Austin and Judy Conway Illinois Department of Public Health
Outline of Surveillance Talk
♦Basics of Surveillance ♦Uses of Surveillance ♦Limitations of Surveillance ♦Future of Surveillance ♦Examples of Surveillance in Action in
Illinois ♦ Infectious Disease Quiz
Public Health Surveillance
Systematic, ongoing ♦ Collection
“get data” ♦ Analysis & Interpretation
turn data into information” ♦ Dissemination
“route to those who need it” ♦ Link to public health practice
“do something about it”
Building Block of Surveillance ♦All surveillance starts with the single
case who is brought to the attention of public health by a laboratory, HCP or other party and who’s risk factors are investigated by the LHD CD investigator
Three Main Features of Surveillance ♦Systematic Collection
♦Consolidation and Evaluation of Data
♦Prompt Dissemination of Results to
Those Who Can Take Action
Public Health Approach
Problem Response
Surveillance: What is the
problem?
Risk Factor Identification: What is the
cause?
Intervention Evaluation:
What works?
Implementation: How do you
do it?
Legal Authority For Conducting Surveillance ♦Diseases and conditions to be reported ♦Who is responsible for reporting ♦What information is required for each
case ♦How, to whom and how quickly must
cases be reported ♦Control measures to be taken for
specific diseases
Reportable Infectious Diseases, 2006 ♦67 reportable infectious diseases in
Illinois ♦56 diseases/conditions are nationally
notifiable to CDC ♦ 3 are reportable to WHO
Primary Data Sources for Surveillance ♦Lab reports ♦Health care providers ♦Death certificates ♦Animals/insects
Modes of Surveillance Passive Surveillance: Wait for reports Enhanced Passive surveillance: Health
alerts to encourage rapid reporting Communication and relationship building with hospitals and clinicians
Active surveillance: Actively querying or auditing clinical sites for cases; expensive and more often part of “ramping up”
The Public Health Team
♦ Health care providers ♦ Other Experts ♦ Epidemiologists ♦ Communicable Disease Investigators ♦ IT persons ♦ Support staff
Allied Surveillance Useful to Infectious Disease Surveillance ♦Biowatch-environmental monitoring for
BioT agents in big cities ♦Biosense
Uses of Surveillance ♦ Identify cases for investigation and
followup ♦Estimate magnitude of the problem ♦Determine trends in incidence and
distribution ♦Detect sudden increases in disease-
Outbreak detection
Uses of Surveillance (cont) ♦Generate hypotheses, stimulate
research ♦Evaluate prevention and control
measures ♦Monitor long-term changes/trends in
infectious agents ♦Detect changes in health practices ♦Facilitate planning
Uses of Surveillance ♦ Identify cases for investigation and
followup ♦Estimate magnitude of the problem ♦Determine geographic distribution of
disease ♦Detect sudden increases in disease-
Outbreak detection
Uses of Surveillance ♦ Identify cases for investigation and
followup ♦Estimate magnitude of the problem ♦Determine trends in incidence and
distribution ♦Detect sudden increases in disease-
Outbreak detection
Enterics in Illinois, 2001-2003
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
2001 2002 2003
E coli O157:H7CryptosporidiaGiardiaShigellaSalmonellaCampylobacter
Uses of Surveillance ♦ Identify cases for investigation and
followup ♦Estimate magnitude of the problem ♦Determine trends in incidence and
distribution ♦Detect sudden increases in disease-
Outbreak detection
Lyme Disease Cases Reported in Illinois, 1995-2005
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Num
ber
of r
epor
ted
case
s
Lyme Disease Exposures in 3 Counties in Illinois, 1995-2005
02468
1012141618
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Year
Num
ber
of c
ases
DuPage CountyJoDaviess CountyOgle County
Uses of Surveillance ♦ Identify cases for investigation and
followup ♦Estimate magnitude of the problem ♦Determine trends in incidence and
distribution ♦Detect sudden increases in disease-
Outbreak detection
Surveillance-Outbreak Identification ♦S. enteritidis, Kankakee, 2002 ♦Histoplasmosis, Iroquois County, 2003 ♦Rabies, 2004&2005
Uses of Surveillance ♦Generate hypotheses, stimulate
research ♦Evaluate control and prevention
measures ♦Monitor long-term changes/trends in
infectious agents ♦Detect changes in health practices ♦Facilitate planning
TOXIC SHOCK SYNDROME (TSS) United States, 1983-1998
*Includes cases meeting the CDC definition for confirmed and probable cases for staphylococcal TSS.
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID) data*
National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) data
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Year (Quarter)
Rep
orte
d C
ases
Reported Toxic Shock Syndrome in Illinois, 1980-2004
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Year
Num
ber
of r
epor
ted
cas
es
Uses of Surveillance ♦Generate hypotheses, stimulate
research ♦Evaluate control and prevention
measures ♦Monitor long-term changes/trends in
infectious agents ♦Detect changes in health practices ♦Facilitate planning
Poliomyelitis (Paralytic)
NOTE: Inactivated vaccine was licensed in 1955. Oral vaccine was licensed in 1961. Year
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Rep
orte
d C
ases
Source: CDC. Summary of notifiable diseases. 1998.
Rat
e/10
0,00
0 P
opul
atio
n
Year
Inactivated Vaccine
Oral Vaccine
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1000
1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
United States, 1968-1998
Rabies, potential human exposure ♦15% of rabies PEP unnecessary ♦ Improper timing of rabies PEP in 1/3 of
cases ♦ Improper location for injections in 1/3 of
cases ♦Given properly in 43% of cases
Uses of Surveillance ♦Generate hypotheses, stimulate
research ♦Evaluate control and prevention
measures ♦Monitor long-term changes/trends in
infectious agents ♦Detect changes in health practices ♦Facilitate planning
Brucellosis in Humans and Cattle in Illinois, 1951-2004
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 2
Year
Hum
an C
ases
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Cattl
e Ca
ses
HumansCattle
Trends in Pertussis in Illinois by Age Group (1998 through December 2004)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
< 6 Mo 6-11 Mo 1-4 Yrs 5-9 Yrs10-19 Yrs >20 Yrs
Uses of Surveillance ♦Generate hypotheses, stimulate
research ♦Evaluate control and prevention
measures ♦Monitor long-term changes/trends in
infectious agents ♦Detect changes in health practices ♦Facilitate planning
Uses of Surveillance ♦Generate hypotheses, stimulate
research ♦Evaluate control and prevention
measures ♦Monitor long-term changes/trends in
infectious agents ♦Detect changes in health practices ♦Facilitate planning
What Diseases Should be Under Surveillance? ♦Cause serious morbidity and/or
mortality ♦Have the potential to affect additional
people beyond the initial case ♦Can be controlled or prevented with an
intervention ♦Any outbreak or unusual increase in a
disease ♦Any unusual case/cluster
Competing Interests ♦CDC ♦State Health Department ♦Local Health Departments ♦Citizens and action groups ♦Health Care providers ♦Politicians
Types of Infectious Diseases Under Surveillance ♦Diseases transmitted from food/drinking
water ♦Diseases requiring contact tracing for
prophylaxis ♦Vaccine preventables ♦Diseases requiring environmental
control measures ♦New/emerging/unusual infections
Diseases transmitted from food/drinking water ♦Enterics-Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7 ♦Other-botulism, Listeria etc ♦PH responses
– Restrict foodhandlers – Remove contaminated foods from
commerce – Find problem in manufacturing process
Vaccine Preventables ♦ Examples: H. influenzae, Hepatitis A and
B, pertussis, chickenpox, influenza ♦ PH Response
– Increasing vaccination rates in risk groups
Diseases Requiring Environmental Control Measures
♦Examples: outbreaks of legionellosis, leptospirosis, histoplasmosis, cryptosporidiosis, arboviruses
♦PH Response – Recommendations on how to decrease
exposure to organism and prevent further cases
Characteristics of Good Public Health Surveillance ♦Qualified and dedicated personnel ♦Teamwork approach to investigations ♦Strong relationships with reporters ♦Strong relationships with partners-other
LHDs, state and federal partners
Characteristics of Good Public Health Surveillance (cont) ♦Templates and database resources
available on hand ♦24/7/365 availability ♦Always stay alert/open minded
Ways to Improve Surveillance ♦ Improve awareness of reporters ♦Simplify reporting ♦Frequent feedback ♦Active surveillance
What’s Up in the Future for Infectious Disease Surveillance in Illinois???
♦ INEDSS – Faster reporting – LHDs have access to their own data
♦Electronic Reporting from labs ♦Electronic death certificate data? ♦ IDPH-Intranet resources for each
reportable disease, A-Z
Surveillance/Epi Response overview
♦ “Signal” – Call from clinician/hospital – Syndrome threshold/trigger – Environmental trigger
♦ Early Epi Investigation – Targeted questions for MD, Patient – Laboratory work up – Environmental investigation – Cross-Evaluation data from all systems – Enhance surveillance/ Actively look for more case
♦ Outbreak investigation
PIAPO-Assessing Surveillance Data ♦Problem? ♦ Investigation needed? ♦Assessment of the situation ♦Plan of Action ♦Over?
Biosense Reports ♦On the following dates there were
reports of Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever cases from Illinois VA or DOD facilities: 10/5, 10/6, 10/28, 11/1, 11/1, 11/2,12/2,12/13
Wednesday, October 14
0
1
2
3
4
5
10/5/
2003
10/6/
2003
10/7/
2003
10/8/
2003
10/9/
2003
10/10
/2003
10/11
/2003
10/12
/2003
10/13
/2003
10/14
/2003
10/15
/2003
10/16
/2003
10/17
/2003
10/18
/2003
10/19
/2003
10/20
/2003
10/21
/2003
Friday, October 17
0
1
2
3
4
5
10/5/
2003
10/6/
2003
10/7/
2003
10/8/
2003
10/9/
2003
10/10
/2003
10/11
/2003
10/12
/2003
10/13
/2003
10/14
/2003
10/15
/2003
10/16
/2003
10/17
/2003
10/18
/2003
10/19
/2003
10/20
/2003
10/21
/2003
Meningococcal Disease Clusters
♦Vaccine available for serogroup A/C/Y/W-135. No vaccine for serogroup B.
♦Cluster requiring vaccination – 3 or more probable or confirmed cases of
serogroup C in < 3 months – Attack rate of >=10 per 100,000 population
Saturday, October 18
0
1
2
3
4
5
10/5/
2003
10/6/
2003
10/7/
2003
10/8/
2003
10/9/
2003
10/10
/2003
10/11
/2003
10/12
/2003
10/13
/2003
10/14
/2003
10/15
/2003
10/16
/2003
10/17
/2003
10/18
/2003
10/19
/2003
10/20
/2003
10/21
/2003
Information gathered ♦All six cases are male ♦Ages range from 27 to 42 years of age ♦Residents of the north side of City A ♦All 4 confirmed cases are SG C ♦3 of 6 cases were fatal
Vaccination Campaign ♦Began Oct 19 with 5 vaccination sites ♦Recommendations for vaccination ♦Flow of persons ♦Time frame
Positive Rabies Test ♦You receive a call from a physician who
reports a patient has tested positive for rabies
♦What do you do?
Additional Information Gathered
♦Test was an ELISA test for rabies, not approved for diagnosis of human rabies; test was equivocal
♦Person visited Mexico, returned and has been hospitalized for a month and is on a ventilator but can watch TV and is alert.
Further Information from Investigation ♦Bitten by a sheep 3 weeks prior while
preparing sheep for a county fair
Campylobacter cluster ♦3 cases of Campylobacter come thru
from a provider into your in-box in INEDSS on the same day
Information Obtained ♦2 persons were from same household ♦Family had purchased a hooded rat
from a chain pet store ♦Rat became ill
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
7/29
/04
7/31
/04
8/2/
04
8/4/
04
8/6/
04
8/8/
04
8/10
/04
8/12
/04
8/14
/04
8/16
/04
8/18
/04
Purchase rat Onset of rat illness
Onset of mother’s illness
Onset of daughter’s illness Death of rat
Traceback of rat ♦Rats purchased by pet store from
Distributor A in Arkansas ♦This distributor was also implicated in
other states
November 3, 2004 Report ♦Pet Store Chain in Illinois calls to report
they had a hamster that died suddenly and was culture positive for S. ser. Typhimurium
Investigation ♦Upon investigation, all confirmed cases
reported swimming in the municipal facility prior to illness
Laboratory Investigation
♦12 persons had laboratory-confirmed cryptosporidiosis
♦The pools had been hyper-chlorinated; no water samples were available for testing
Epidemiological curve of clinical cases and date of symptom onset, July/August 2004 (N=37)
Pool hyperchlorinated Aug. 23-24
0
1
23
4
5
6
7/25/20047/26/20047/27/20047/28/20047/29/20047/30/20047/31/20048/1/20048/2/20048/3/20048/4/20048/5/20048/6/20048/7/20048/8/20048/9/20048/10/20048/11/20048/12/20048/13/20048/14/20048/15/20048/16/20048/17/20048/18/20048/19/20048/20/20048/21/20048/22/20048/23/20048/24/20048/25/20048/26/20048/27/20048/28/20048/29/20048/30/2004
Date of Onset
Num
ber o
f cas
es
Probable Lab Confirmed
Pool hyperchlorinated
Aug. 23-24
Conclusions ♦ A visit to the pool facility was linked to becoming
ill with cryptosporidiosis ♦ The wading pool was a likely source of infection
though other explanations are possible ♦ Improved fecal accident response may reduce
risk of disease transmission ♦ Cryptosporidium remained in the pool water even
though chlorine levels were generally adequately maintained
Background ♦ IDPH notified by the LHD on March 25
about an outbreak of GI illness in two groups eating food from a single caterer on February 25
Epi Findings ♦Cases included 14, 17, 19 and 2 from
the four groups, respectively ♦Group 1-13 of 14 ills ate pasta salad
and/or tuna salad ♦Group 2-pasta salad ♦Group 3-multiple including tuna
sandwich and pasta salad ♦Group 4-tuna salad sandwiches and
mixed green salad
1970 Surgeon General Statement ♦ “it was time to close the book on
infectious diseases, declare the war against pestilence won, and shift national resources to such chronic problems as cancer and
heart disease”